Chapter 4

The Capture of Kurnah

‘The infantry must ever be valued as the very foundation and nerve of an army.’

(Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses, 1517)

Operations against Kurnah commenced on 3 December. A landing was made on the left bank (looking downstream) and on the British right (looking upstream). See the sketch map on page 26, which is worth several hundred words.

Having opted to land on the left bank it was the Tigris that presented the main obstacle to ‘a composite force of two Indian battalions [104th Wellesley’s Rifles and 110th Mahratta Light Infantry] and a double company of the Norfolks with some sappers and a couple of field guns’.³⁶

The soldiers were supported by a small flotilla of five vessels. These ships provided gunfire support once having landed their passengers.

The Tigris at Kurnah, which was ‘a stretch of yellow racing water as wide as the Thames at London Bridge’, was nevertheless crossed, about 1½ miles north of the town on 8 December. By this time the force had been reinforced and was now 2,300 strong. Thereafter the outcome was not in doubt and the combination of naval gunfire and soldierly aggression was sufficient to win the day.

By 19 December Kurnah was in British hands. The Turks had suffered heavy casualties on the contested left bank, especially around Muzereh. When the town eventually fell, forty-five officers and 989 men were captured. British losses were twenty-nine killed and 302 wounded.

It had been an exemplary operation and all concerned had cause to be satisfied. The scale of the victory, and the relatively small price paid, not only raised morale but must also have raised expectations, most certainly in Simla.

From this point, the aims of His Majesty’s Government and the Indian Government started to diverge. Hitherto, responsibility for the direction of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ had been merely imprecise. Now clear differences started to emerge and the overriding responsibility of HMG for the employment of IEF‘D’ was tacitly questioned. The Secretary of State for India said that whilst he had been content with an advance to Kurnah, he nevertheless ‘deprecated any further advance for the present.’³⁷ Crewe spoke for HMG in this matter but Hardinge and Duff had a different agenda that, at this stage, they had not shared.

9. Captain Nunn (right) and Army officers examine a Turkish gun. HMS Espiègle at anchor in the background. Turkish arms stacked after capture. (Nunn)

The unvarnished truth is that Hardinge had taken it upon himself to expand the Empire, add Mesopotamia to its assets and administer this addition from India. He had carried General Sir Beauchamp Duff along with his pipe dream. The ambition of both men was entirely beyond the remit of two senior officials whose non-negotiable function was to operate under the direction of HMG.

In mid-April 1915, Hardinge declared that Britain could turn lower Mesopotamia into a ‘second Egypt’. Annexation would mean safeguarding, once and for all, all of Britain’s traditional interests in the Gulf and would ensure control of the southernmost section of the Baghdad Railway – should it ever be completed. Britain’s allies, the sheikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah, could be protected through permanent occupation, and other Arab chiefs coaxed away from Turkey.³⁸

10. The strategically important confluence of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates at Kurnah. (World War I at Sea)

However, Hardinge did swither, for example on 9 June 1915, when he wrote to his friend Sir Valentine Chirol saying that with one town taken, ‘there is no reason why we should move a yard further upriver.’ This rethink did not last long, and on 17 June he restated his enthusiasm for expansion when he wrote to one of his old political colleagues, Lord Morley of Blackburn,³⁹ and closed by saying, ‘I know that you hate expansion, and so do I, but I see no way out of it.’⁴⁰ Those were insincere words intended to appease Morley.

Notwithstanding the expansionist ambitions of Hardinge and Duff that were far beyond their remit, they still only allocated the minimum of resources to achieve their aim. They set a task that was impossible for a single division with a fragile line of communication.

Busch observed dryly that, ‘Clearly, Hardinge was an early victim of success and Crewe had now to cool his ardour.’ Later, when giving evidence to the Mesopotamia Commission, Hardinge made clear that he entertained an aspiration to extend the Empire into Mesopotamia. These personal aspirations, unsupported by HMG, seem to be at the base of his eagerness for a ‘forward’ policy throughout the campaign.

This campaign gave rise to some unique incidents. One such occurred when, on 12 January, the gunboat HMS Gadfly was downstream of a boat bridge by which a column of transport camels was crossing the river. One beast slipped, fell into the river and the 4-knot current swept it downstream towards Gadfly. The unfortunate creature was washed under the ship and became wedged under the propeller. At this point a bluejacket made a report to the bridge, probably unique in the long history of the Royal Navy, that there was a ‘Camel foul of the screw, Sir’.

All hands of one of HM’s ships were called to the scene in order to save a ‘ship of the desert’ entangled in the screw. A bluejacket dived into the river, secured a line around the beast’s neck, but to no avail and it drowned.

Early in 1915, intelligence sources indicated that the Turks were planning to mount an attack on Basra and the pipeline. They would approach by way of the Karun River. This threat had to be confronted and further reinforcement was needed. The IG was asked to provide additional troops and Hardinge and Duff resisted. There was a flurry of terse telegrams and eventually, as the MC commented, ‘the Indian Government finally acquiesced.’⁴¹ Accordingly, on 7 February, a further brigade arrived from India, but this proved to be insufficient and the situation became ‘acute’.

The Viceroy had left India on 25 January to visit the theatre, while these terse negotiations were being conducted, and he arrived in great state on the 31st. ‘At Basra Hardinge was greeted with full military honours. He investigated the situation of the sick and wounded and found them cheery, and the hospitals well run, but the Mesopotamian force had not yet suffered the severe losses of later stages of the campaign.’⁴²

It was entirely proper for Hardinge to be greeted in a manner befitting his station, with ample ceremony at every turn. It would be an unusual man who was unaffected by the degree of extreme deference that the Viceroy received. Did it generate a feeling of omnipotence? Did that in turn affect his judgement? There is no doubt that Hardinge had a well-developed sense of self-worth. He was a sophisticated gentleman who conducted himself accordingly but he also exhibited a degree of arrogance, probably typical of those of his eminence. His biographer described him as ‘cold’.

He received loyal Arab sheikhs and presented them with ‘robes of honour’. Bartlett briefed Hardinge and so the Viceroy was fully aware of the current issues. Whatever passed between the two men, it did nothing to curb the Viceroy’s ambitions; more importantly, nor did it stir a glimmer of interest in matters logistic.

The future of Baghdad was in his thoughts. He put it to Curzon (at the time Lord Privy Seal), ‘I do not want to go to Baghdad unless forced to do so, but when the time comes to make peace with Turkey, Baghdad, Basra and perhaps even Mosel must be lopped off, and while we remain in Basra some kind of protectorate over the rest of Mesopotamia must be established.’⁴³ There is little doubt that the political vision of Hardinge was interesting, bold and visionary; the difficulty was that his vision owed nothing to the military reality of the day.

The MC Report, at page 103–104, said acidly that:

The control of the expedition … narrowed down to two high officials … both permanently stationed in localities which had little, if any, private or personal touch with forces campaigning in Mesopotamia. Although the Viceroy paid a short visit in 1915, yet in the main it is a fact that both he and the Commander-in-Chief, in their management of the expedition, entirely depended upon the official information from that country. The wellbeing and adequate maintenance of the expedition were therefore dependent upon the requisitions made on Simla by the General Officer Commanding and his subordinates in Mesopotamia.

This is an indictment initially of Barrett, but in far greater measure of the man who would replace him, and his regulation-bound staff. It is also a veiled rebuke to Duff for distancing himself from the activities of his soldiers.

It was still necessary, on 5 March, for HMG to order, peremptorily, the IG to send a further brigade. On what basis this order was given is unclear because the only formal source of intelligence for HMG from this theatre was through the IG. The probability is that Foreign Office assets elsewhere had sounded an alarm, although the possibility exists that HMG had an independent agent in place who, at this time, was able to judge when matters were ‘acute’.

As a sop to the wounded pride of the IG, HMG absolved it of responsibility for any mishaps that might occur in India as a result of the diminution of its domestic military assets.

Business between the two governments was conducted by telegram and there was now growing friction between all the principal players. Interestingly, the MC commented:

It should be noted that practically the whole of the important telegrams … relating to Imperial demands upon the Indian Government for military expeditions outside India and the replies of India to these demands are ‘private’ telegrams. A private telegram is the property of the person who sent it, and it is not the practice to record it on file in any public department, although this may be done at the option of the sender. Such telegrams are kept by private secretaries and are, as a rule, taken away at the termination of office by the person who sends or receives them.⁴⁴

On 1 April, the IG, without reference to London, decided to reorganise the force in Mesopotamia into an army corps. Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon was appointed to be the Corps Commander. Hardinge, who saw him as ‘a keen hard soldier’, admired Nixon.⁴⁵ Less so Barrett, who, he complained, ‘played too much for safety.’⁴⁶ A current description of Nixon was that ‘he revelled in responsibility’ whereas Barrett ‘would take responsibility.’⁴⁷

In the meantime, command still rested with General Barrett and he was conscious of the strategic importance of Shaiba, a modest area about 10 miles to the west of Basra. Shaiba was just above the all-encompassing floods, and relatively defensible. Barrett decided to occupy Shaiba. The decision required Indian and British soldiers to ‘march’ from Basra. In reality they waded, about 18 miles, through the muddy floodwaters on 5 April 1915. It was an exhausting journey conducted in ferocious heat, with no vestige of shade and with its own unique hazards. The advance was not contested, other than by untold millions of aggressive flies.

Shaiba was occupied and fortified. It was by no means an ideal location. Not the least of its deficiencies was the difficulty of resupply and reinforcement. Barrett’s concerns about an attack on Basra from the east were fully justified. The Turks were in considerable strength and concentrating at Nasariyeh, further west, and across the seasonal but very shallow Hammar Lake.

It was at this point that General Barrett left Mesopotamia, ostensibly because he was ill. However, the fact that he was, in effect, being demoted to serve under Nixon might have been a factor. Sir Percy Cox suggested that Barrett ‘was probably better fitted to solve the Mesopotamian military problem than his dashing successor.’ Whatever the reason, Barrett was evacuated to India. As it happens, he survived the malady that struck him down and he recovered. This saved him from the blight that affected many of the other generals who served in the theatre.⁴⁸

11. The Battle of Shaiba. (Map prepared by the historical section of the Committee for Imperial Defence. Ordnance Survey 1924)

12. Mountain guns at Shaiba, April 1915.

Later, Lord Crewe, in giving evidence to the MC, remarked that he ‘was sorry the change had been made.’ Nixon, clearly not everyone’s choice, duly arrived with his Staff in Basra on 9 April. He bore with him his orders from General Sir Beauchamp Duff. The orders were lengthy and specific but, in the interests of brevity, the key elements were that Nixon was ordered to take Sir Percy Cox,⁴⁹ the political officer, under his command. He was to ‘Report on the requirement for river transport’ and the desirability of building a railway with 137 miles of track. He was, in addition, to ‘plan an effective occupation of Basra Vilayet’⁵⁰ and ‘plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.’

Percy Cox was in a very influential position. He was, in effect, the Viceroy’s personal representative and had a background in colonial administration. His function was to advise Nixon on civilian issues and governance. He ranked alongside Major General Kemble, Nixon’s Chief of Staff.

Nixon had no time to play himself in as a reconnaissance in force was being made towards Nukhaila. An Arab force was encountered but the ensuing skirmish was indecisive and unsatisfactory. Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC, temporarily General Officer Commanding (GOC), 6th Division, was thrust into more serious action on 12 April when about 4,000 Turks attacked his forces, predictably from the west and by way of Barjisiya Wood. For the next three days there was intense and savage fighting, during which Major Wheeler won the first VC of the campaign.⁵¹

13. Major G.G. Wheeler VC.

The battles were both bloody affairs; British casualties were 1,000 killed and wounded, including eighteen officers killed and forty-two wounded. Usually the proportion of killed to wounded is from 1:3 to 1:4, so the probability was that there were 700–750 or more Indian soldiers needing medical treatment. ‘As in all battles, the dead and wounded came chiefly from the best and bravest.’⁵² It was ever thus.

The opposition lost about 3,000, and 800 prisoners (who had to be fed, watered, accommodated and guarded). The wounded of both sides were the first test of the Indian Medical Service. The MC Report commented on medical care with the following:

Another defect … was the failure to supply the expedition with suitable vehicles for carrying the wounded. The only land ambulance transport provided were stretchers and riding mules. Stretchers are not suitable for distances over 2½ miles. Whenever it became necessary to carry the wounded any distance, resorts had to be to the ordinary army transport cart [ATC], which is without springs, has no cover to give protection against rain or the direct rays of the sun; and the bottom of which consists of bars of iron, which, even when liberally covered with mattresses or other paddling, renders the placing of a wounded man, especially cases of fracture, in such a conveyance, a practice which can only be described as barbarous and cruel.⁵³

The treatment of the wounded is a topic that will be revisited at regular intervals. As the opposition gained in strength and effectiveness, so there was a commensurate rise in the number of casualties. In the case of the engagements around Shaiba, the distances were relatively short and water transport could be employed across the flooded plain.

Major General Mellis,⁵⁴ who had briefly commanded the Division, described Shaiba as ‘a real soldier’s battle’. He rather hoped that his command would become permanent but it was not to be and he reverted to the command of a brigade – not unusual for a major general at the time. Nevertheless, over the next year Mellis, a notable warrior, would demonstrate that he was not only a physically brave man but that he also had moral courage of a high order. He was one of very few general officers to emerge from the misery of Mesopotamia with his reputation enhanced. The brigade commanded by Mellis now became a component of the 12th Division commanded by Major General George Gorringe.

At the time Duff’s orders were given to General Nixon, the home authorities knew nothing about them. As far as ‘an advance to Baghdad’ was concerned, this was not even a consideration in London and quite what induced Duff to issue such instructions was never satisfactorily explained. He exceeded his remit by a margin – a very wide margin.

It was not until 2 May 1915 that a copy of these instructions reached London, by which time the Battles of Barjisiya and Shaiba had been fought and won against a mixed force of Arabs and Turks, over the period 12–14 April. Suleiman Askeri, who had clearly chosen sides, led the Arabs.

Duff’s orders were the first time that ‘Baghdad’ was mentioned in any official communication and a glance at the map reveals why. Advancing to Baghdad should have been, at best, an aspiration because it was 502 river miles from Basra and that river was the only effective line of communication on offer. It also presented all manner of navigational difficulties, even if appropriate, shallow draft shipping was available. Nixon’s orders were quite specific and planning the river transport was high on the list of priorities imposed upon him by General Duff.

At Simla Sir Beauchamp Duff, as Commander-in-Chief, was in absolute and untrammelled control of every branch of military administration. The General Staff was in no sense a separate or independent branch.⁵⁵

14. Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC KCB. He was one of the few generals to return from Mesopotamia with his reputation enhanced.

The IEF‘D’ was now composed of two divisions, 6th and 12th, the latter being very weak and without artillery. It has to be said that any division without integral artillery is ineffective. Artillery is the ‘Queen of the Battlefield’ (as any gunner will tell you, probably at great length) and on the Western Front about 58 per cent of casualties on both sides were inflicted by artillery in its various forms.⁵⁶ Thus the new Mesopotamian Corps was, in effect, one and a half divisions at best and deficient in the most effective of modern weaponry.

Major General C.V.F. Townshend CB DSO was appointed to command 6th Indian Division in Barrett’s place and arrived in Basra on 22 April 1915. He was to be a very important player in the campaign and it is appropriate to consider him in some detail. The author wrote his biography. They say ‘no man is a hero to his valet’; similarly, few men are heroes to their biographers – certainly not in this case.

Chapter notes

36 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.34.

37 MC Report, p.15.

38 Hardinge papers, 93/No. 9a, Gould, D., p.930.

39 Lord Morley of Blackburn OM PC (1838–1923). Liberal politician elected MP in 1883. Secretary of State, India Office, 1905–10. Lord President of the Council 1910–14. Resigned from the government in protest at the declaration of war in August 1914.

40 Hardinge papers, 94/No. 33.

41 MC Report, p.15.

42 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.232.

43 Ibid, p.232.

44 MC Report, p.11.

45 Hardinge to Nicholson, 4 February 1915, HP 93/No. 290.

46 Gould, D., ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Commission and Inquiry 1914–17’, The Historical Journal, December 1976.

47 Wilson, Sir A., Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917, p.33.

48 Barrett went on to greater things. He died in 1926, at the age of 69, as Field Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett GCB GCSI KCVO ADC.

49 (Honorary) Major General Sir Percy Zachariah Cox GCMG GCIE KCSI (1864–1937).

50 Vilayet is an administrative region and, in this case, it included an area that encompassed Amara and Nasariyeh.

51 Major G.G.M. Wheeler VC, 7th Hariana Lancers (1873–1915). He is buried in the Commonwealth War Cemetery in Basra.

52 Field Marshal Lord Carver, El Alamein, Batsford, London, 1962.

53 MC Report, p.70.

54 Later, Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC KCB KCMG (1862-1936).

55 MC Report, p.109.

56 Corrigan, G., Mud, Blood and Poppycock, p.116.