Chapter 5

Chitrál Charlie, his Regatta and the Capture of Amara

‘Leadership is that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion, which makes men do what you want them to do.’

(FM Viscount Slim, Courage and Other Broadcasts, 1957)

Townshend was an interesting character. He was known as ‘Chitrál Charlie’ as a result of his command of the besieged fort of Chitrál, on the North-West Frontier, in 1895. In that siege he was a captain and he did no more than his duty but, nevertheless, he was appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) after the siege was lifted. This was a decoration vastly out of proportion to his rank and, at that time, more normally awarded to general officers (colonel and above). The award had a strong political tinge but it made Townshend something of a celebrity, and for a man who was already an egotist it was very heady wine.

Townshend was a student of the business of arms and he studied his profession avidly. He was an admirer of Napoleon and believed that he shared some of the Emperor’s martial characteristics.

Townshend was a gregarious, positive personality. He sang and accompanied himself on the banjo and found most of his friends in the theatre. He was married to a wealthy French woman and spent as much time in Paris as he did in London. He was intelligent, well read, entertaining, quick witted, fluent, capable and inventive. He was also insensitive, utterly selfish, overwhelmingly ambitious and impossibly immodest. One of his other unattractive characteristics was his constant criticism of his superiors. However, his lack of moral courage usually prevented him from challenging them directly.

He was fully aware of his position in the ‘Army List’.⁵⁷ This is a document few officers will admit to perusing but, at some time, all do. C.V.F. Townshend was at the top end of the Army, which in 1914 was officered by:

11 field marshals (+ 3 Royal)

18 generals (+3 Royal)

28 lieutenant generals

114 major generals

15. Major General C.V.F. Townshend CB DSO (later Sir Charles KCB DSO).

Seniority is really only of academic interest as it was not one of the criteria for promotion. Nevertheless, if Townshend had counted (he probably did) he would have found that he was 66th on the major generals’ list. He realised that, with the normal casualties from ‘death, disablement or dishonour’ among those above him, in the now rapidly expanding army, elevation to lieutenant general and the knighthood that went with it were both firmly on the cards.

Townshend also entertained ambition to succeed to a peerage and become the 7th Lord Townshend. It was a reasonable ambition given that the 6th Marquess was older and unmarried. Charles Townshend was heir apparent. Active service in the bleak wastes of Mesopotamia in command of a division was just what the doctor ordered and Townshend was overjoyed.

His chain of command was through Nixon to Duff and ultimately to Hardinge. It was an unfortunate combination. Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon GCMG KCB, who had been selected to command Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’, was fifty-seven and had had an exemplary career to date. He had been part of the force that had relieved Chitrál in 1895 and so Townshend was well known to him. He had seen active service in India, Afghanistan and South Africa. He seemed to be just the man for the job. At least his superior, General Sir Beauchamp Duff GCB GCSI KCVO CIE, thought so.

16. Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon KCB.

Duff was in a vastly influential post as Chief of the Indian General Staff in Delhi, and he advised the Viceroy on matters military. He had command over and responsibility for hundreds of thousands of lives. Duff was a seasoned soldier and, like most Victorian soldiers, he had a wealth of active service behind him. All of his campaigning had been against irregular or tribal opposition. In 1914 he was exposed to a conflict for which he had direct command responsibility but for which he was ill-equipped. He chose to exercise that responsibility at long range, as noted by the Mesopotamia Commission. To be fair, he had appointed what he believed to be the best senior officers at his disposal and it would have been incorrect for him to breathe down their necks. He could not be too ‘hands on’ but, Napoleon remarked, ‘a general who sees with the eyes of others will never be able to command an army as it should be.’ These wise words, from 1817,⁵⁸ were extraordinarily prescient when applied to Duff.

The recent victories at Barjisiya and Shaiba had allowed the British to consolidate their position, but the thin cloak of success concealed a serious deficiency. The MC commented:

Although the force was doubled the medical equipment sent to the last two brigades was not up to the authorised scale of equipment, and practically two divisions had medical equipment for only one and that on the Indian and not the British scale.

Neither was there made such an addition to the river steamer transport as to bring its proportions up to the requirement of the increased forces. These deficiencies do not seem to have had sufficient recognition by the Government of India.⁵⁹

The oil supply was secure and the original aim of IEF‘D’, set by His Majesty’s Government, had been achieved. At this point the initiative for future operations slipped from the distant hands of Lord Crewe in London and was seized by General Nixon, with the tacit approval of the Indian Government in the persons of Hardinge and Duff.

On 19 April 1915, Nixon asked the IG to furnish him with a further cavalry brigade and a battalion of pioneers but the Viceroy, certainly advised by Duff, rejected the request outright.

It was in April 1915 that Surgeon General (Major General) H.G. Hathaway CB was appointed Principal Medical Officer in Mesopotamia. In this post he answered to Surgeon General Sir William Babtie VC KCMG CB MB KHS, the Director of Medical Services, India, on medical matters but was under the regimental command of Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon. Hathaway was to be a key player in the campaign, with awesome responsibility for the sick and wounded. He was a well-meaning man but, as events showed, he was over promoted and out of his depth. Babtie had wider responsibilities for both the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian theatres and he, too, was later found wanting.

17. Major General William Babtie VC (later Lieutenant General Sir William VC KCB KCMG). He had overall responsibility for medical matters in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles.

Meanwhile, at Townshend’s initial briefing at Corps headquarters in Basra on 23 April, he was told that his orders were not only to drive the enemy from his present position between Pear Drop Bend (see map on page 44) and Kurnah and capture his guns but also to push upriver to attack and occupy Amara (87–90 river miles further north) – the operation to be continuous.⁶⁰ The country was under floods and in those conditions movement in any direction was going to be challenging.

On the following day, 24 April, the Secretary of State concurred with the decision made by Hardinge on the matter of the cavalry brigade and added three critical paragraphs to his message, which read:

Any advance beyond the present theatre of operations will not be sanctioned by the Government at the moment and I presume Nixon clearly understands this. During the summer we must confine ourselves to the defence of oil interests in Arabistan and of the Basra Vilayet.

If an advance to Amara, with a view to establishing an outpost for the purpose of controlling tribesmen between there and Karun, thus adding to the security of the pipe-line, is possible after smashing the enemy in the direction of Karun I should, if such a proposal received your support, be prepared to sanction it. Any proposal involving possible demands for reinforcement or undue extension is to be deprecated, however.

Our present position is strategically a sound one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.⁶¹

On the face of it, that statement of HMG policy appears crystal clear, but it was promulgated in ignorance of the orders Nixon had already been given from India and perhaps in ignorance of the physical extent of the Basra Vilayet. Nixon had already been authorised, in principle, to advance to a position just short of Kut on the Tigris, and to that end, Townshend was actively planning his attack on Amara.

Hitherto, advances north up the Shatt al-Arab had been to consolidate the hold on Abadan but by April 1915 the seizure of Baghdad had become the stated aim of the IG and for that to be achieved the shape and size of the river transport fleet had to be determined and assembled.

By April 1915, the Royal Navy had assembled an extraordinary collection of shallow draft vessels, many of which were ‘taken from Trade’. The only feature that the ships had in common was their shallow draught. Civilian ships were adapted for Service use and in many cases they were still commanded by their civilian masters.

The role of this flotilla was ill-defined, initially, and its role developed until eventually it was required to provide gunfire, logistical support and casualty evacuation. The Royal Navy river craft were a combination of floating packhorses, artillery batteries and ambulances. The senior naval officer was Captain Wilfred Nunn.⁶² The need for shipping of specific proportions and the delays in their provision was a constant refrain in the later MC Report but, in the meantime, Nunn had to make do with what he had.

On 27 May 1915, Lord Crewe left the India Office. Prime Minister Asquith replaced him with Austen Chamberlain,⁶³ who at once endorsed his predecessor’s policy. Hardinge was relieved at the appointment; as confided to a correspondent, he feared, ‘some creature like Winston’⁶⁴ might become his new chief.

That same day, Nixon advised the IG that the paddle steamers and tugs sent to him had a draught that precluded them working the river above Kurnah. He said, specifically, that 3 feet 6 inches was the maximum practical draught. As it was, shipping that conformed to the shallow draught criteria had to be carefully tasked in order to use it to best advantage.

Both of the two great rivers had burst their banks, as they did routinely every year. The melt water flowed down from the mountains to the north and the flood covered an area of more than 10,000 square miles. Townshend was faced with the task of taking enemy positions at the far side of a vast lake of uncertain depth. It would involve a painfully slow advance with absolutely no cover from sight or from fire. It was an extraordinary situation that called for an extraordinary solution, and an extraordinary man to put that solution into effect.

Townshend was that man.

His first objectives were 2 miles away and the only way to close with the enemy would be by boat. These could only be the local, unpowered bellums, some of which were 30–40 feet long.

There followed one of the most extraordinary feats of arms in the annals of the British Army. Townshend was separated from enemy positions, which occupied ‘dry’ ground as opposed to the tactically more desirable ‘high’ ground by this vast flooded plain. The water could be 3 feet deep in some places but where there was a fold in the ground it might be 15 feet deep. In these conditions any soldier on foot or who was wounded would almost certainly drown.

It is alleged that soldiers said that Mesopotamia had too much water and the Navy said it had too little. Townshend and his troops would have endorsed that in late May 1915. Despite the extensive flooding, the ships were, of course, confined to the deeper water only to be found in the rivers. The difficulty for them was deciding the line of the navigable stream because the river, most inconveniently, did not have raised banks.

18. HMS Espiègle. An elegant vessel that played a major role in the river campaign. (Nunn)

Townshend asked that Captain Wilfred Nunn RN, the senior naval officer (SNO), and his ships be placed under command of 6th Division, and when Nixon concurred, Townshend moved to HMS Espiègle, which became his mobile advance headquarters.

Captain Nunn later commented that, on meeting Townshend for the first time, he ‘found the General, very talkative – indeed loquacious – and he constantly referred to Napoleon’s campaigns, maxims and doings … the one thing about Townshend that I did not care for was his rather pompous and boastful style of conversation.’⁶⁵ Chitrál Charlie was not everyone’s cup of tea for just those reasons.

Townshend trained his troops in the propulsion of the bellums and he assembled 328 of these craft. Townshend’s ‘fleet’ was sufficient to carry one full brigade of 2,560 men. Ninety-six of the bellums were fitted with rudimentary armour as protection from small-arms fire. Seventy-five bellums were allocated to carry the impedimenta of war for this extraordinary operation.

Townshend did not have anything like his entire division for the task as he swiftly discovered that General Nixon had ruthlessly hived off many of 6th Division’s soldiers to staff his headquarters and his messes. Valuable bayonets were being employed as batmen, waiters, clerks, signalmen and a host of other line of communication jobs. In addition, Nixon had withdrawn 18th Brigade and deployed it in defensive positions around Basra. Townshend asked for his soldiers back and got a very dusty answer from Nixon. In effect he had only the weakened 16th and 17th Brigades to carry out the operation. Neither of the brigade commanders relished the prospect of what lay ahead.⁶⁶

19. The flooded battlefield and the site of Townshend’s Regatta, 30–31 May 1915, showing the strategic importance of Kurnah. (World War I at Sea)

The bellums were to carry ten fully armed men, some with machine guns and others with the guns of a mountain battery. One man was to punt the craft and another was deputed as assistant punter, to be employed on the demise of the first. Each bellum carried picks, shovels, ammunition, paddles and caulking material to plug the anticipated bullet holes.

The soldiers had no illusions about the dangers of punting slowly, in reality very slowly, for 2 miles into entrenched enemy positions. This operation, which became known as ‘Townshend’s Regatta’, started on 30 May 1915. Heavy and expensive defeat was on the cards. Even Townshend, who had an overprovision of self-confidence, confided to his batman, Whitmore, that he ‘felt anxious’. As well he might, because the whole operation flew in the face of reason.

The bellums with their well-rehearsed crews poled through the reeds, and it was discovered that the armour hung over the side snagged on any vegetation waving in the muddy water. It was a brutally hot day, about 110°F, and clouds of flies tortured the men during their journey.

Townshend, now ensconced in his waterborne headquarters, climbed to the crow’s nest on the foremast of Espiègle and, from there, he was able to survey the whole battlefield. The Turkish positions showed up as low-lying islands but nevertheless readily discernible targets for the artillery. These targets were named as One Tree Hill, Shrapnel Hill, One Tower Hill, Gun Hill and Norfolk Hill.

Nunn directed matters naval from Espiègle and had under command the three sloops, HMS Clio, Odin and Lawrence. In addition were HMS Miner, Shaitan and Sumana, all three of which were ‘armed launches’. They all had a part to play and took their place to the rear of the convoy. Nunn also mentions the presence of HMS Comet, Shushan and Muzaffari.⁶⁷ It was at the rear of the convoy that the logistic support bellums took station. There was also a collection of barges upon which were installed the mountain guns, machine guns and field ambulances.

This motley force kept pace with the infantry-carrying bellums as the artillery engaged the islands. The point might be made at this stage that although various craft could and would be described as ‘His Majesty’s Ship’, all were small, unarmoured, of shallow draft and, in reality, ‘His Majesty’s Boat’ would be a more accurate nomenclature.

Enemy opposition was ineffective. 22nd Punjabis grounded their bellums on One Tree Island and took the position at the point of their bayonets. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (Ox and Bucks) stormed Norfolk Hill, and Captain Brooke, who led, was the first man to die on the position. It is trite to say that there were only ‘light casualties’. To the family of Captain Brooke, his was a very heavy loss.

20. The recently promoted Captain Wilfred Nunn DSO RN (later Vice Admiral CB CSI CMG DSO). He commanded a collection of vessels and is, perhaps, unique in fighting naval battles in the middle of a desert. (Nunn)

The ‘Regatta’, thus far, was a crashing success. All the first objectives were taken and Townshend ordered his brigade to bivouac on their captured objectives. The Brigade spent the night among the putrefying enemy corpses. The flies were attracted to the dead but took time out to torment the living.

The following day, 17th Brigade (now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S.H. Climo) ‘continued the movement’ and Gun Hill fell to 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry. An aeroplane, the first to be seen in the theatre, overflew Bahran (not on the map) and Maziblah and reported that the enemy had fled from both places. A bag of 300 prisoners had to be evacuated back to Kurnah and dry land.

Townshend’s stock was sky high. He had achieved his aim in the most exemplary manner. Nixon, who had played no part in the operation and whose headquarters functioned ‘as little more than a post office’,⁶⁸ embarked in a motorboat and came to share in the success of Townshend and Nunn, his naval subordinate.

Nunn’s book chronicling these events makes no criticism of anyone, but having been a participant in a conference with Nixon and Townshend, he wrote later:

I must confess that the arrangements of the Military High Command in this and other parts of the campaign were – and still are – a puzzle to me. I suppose that having confided this operation to Townshend’s division, it would be – or [he] thought that he would be – committing some military discourtesy if he (Nixon) took over and ran the show himself. The force engaged however was very much more than General Townshend’s division and further was engaged in an expedition which if successful – as was most likely – would develop into an advance of many miles and would result in the capture of important towns and the acquisition of a great area of Turkish territory. Surely, therefore, it would have been better if he had taken over the direct control of the whole affair.⁶⁹

Although Nixon had no intention of taking command, nevertheless he was bullish and insistent on the advisability of taking advantage of the success already gained. He was anxious that pursuit of the enemy should start immediately. Smoke from their retreating ships could be seen fading away to the north. Nunn recorded that, ‘It was General Nixon’s energy in urging this course, which decided Townshend after a little hesitation.’ Amara, the next significant town on the river, lay 90 miles ahead. The MC took evidence as to the state of the river and noted (at page 9) in its Report:

Beyond Kurnah the river Tigris narrows rapidly and between Ezra’s Tomb and Kelat Sala, a stretch of 28 miles, the navigation of the river is very difficult. It twists and turns with sharp bends and hairpin corners leaving at certain places little or no room for vessels towing a barge on either side to pass each other. The stream is strong, about 4 knots an hour, and it is difficult for steamers without independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when going round corners downstream. Vessels under such conditions occasionally turn completely round and it is a common experience to see lighters breaking adrift under the strain.

Nunn went on ahead to reconnoitre the blockage in the river at Ruta and found that a large iron lighter had been sunk across the river and mines had been laid to complete the barrier. Sumana cleared the mines and, having done so, found that there was room for a passage. Shaitan and Sumana led the pursuit; Espiègle with Clio and Odin followed in their wake. Espiègle was able to bring her bow guns to bear and engage the two Turkish ships Mosel and Marmarice, which were fleeing north to Amara, but several hits were not enough to stop either ship.

The river had narrowed from a width of 270 yards to about 70 and navigation, always difficult, was now very difficult. Espiègle could not go much further and already she was the largest ship to penetrate so far up the river. Darkness fell, with Townshend’s force about 20 miles north of their last action. By now it was close to Ezra’s Tomb, where three large lighters full of munitions were captured and 300 Turks surrendered without a fight.

21. Marmarice after the pursuit. Photographed on 2 June 1915. (Nunn)

Townshend left his General Staff Officer (Grade 1),⁷⁰ Colonel Gamble, in command here and, in moonlight, pressed on in Espiègle, which grounded several times and on the sharp bends ran into the riverbank. Despite the navigational difficulties, at 0420 hrs Espiègle’s gunfire hit Marmarice, some way further north, and set her on fire. She lost way, stopped and in due course the British force caught up with her.

River conditions were such that it was clear that HMS Espiègle could go no further and Townshend transferred to HMS Comet, a small paddle-wheel armed steamer. Leaving his force to deal with Marmarice and her survivors, he then continued his journey with Shaitan, Samana and Lewis Pelly in company with a handful of soldiers. The party was estimated as being forty-eight strong. That the official arithmetic differed is only of academic interest because the events that followed were either a demonstration of inspired generalship of the very highest order or grotesque and unnecessary folly.

The small flotilla sailed on, and along both banks Arab villages flew white flags and the occupants came out to line the river. It was midday when, at Qalat Salih, a nondescript settlement halfway to Amara, there was a brief flurry of activity. A small mixed force of Turkish cavalry and infantry came into sight. Several well-directed rounds from Comet’s 12-pounder discouraged any hostile action on the Turks’ part and the group headed for the distant shimmering horizon.

At this point a local sheikh came aboard Comet and submitted to Townshend. It was an unasked for gesture but indicative of the impact Townshend’s excursion was having, not only on the Turks but also on the indigenous population.

Townshend played his trump card when he blustered to the sheikh that he had ‘15,000 men coming up behind me’. He directed the sheikh to start assembling food for the mythical, oncoming host and generously offered to pay for whatever was provided. Townshend did not hold out much hope of getting the food but he calculated, correctly, that news of the 15,000 men would be widely broadcast.

In warfare, over the ages, deception, bluff and misinformation in their many guises have been used. There never was a better example than this masterly performance by Charles Townshend.

Military wisdom of the previous 2,000 years or so favoured Charlie’s unsupported foray to Amara. Sun Tzu,⁷¹ who wrote the Art of War II in about 500 BC, opined that, ‘if the enemy leaves a door open you must rush in.’ The Emperor Maurice, writing in AD 600, agreed, and said that, ‘In war, opportunity is fleeting and cannot be put off at all.’⁷²

The consensus is that Townshend was right to press on. He and his small, lightly armed party duly reached Amara without mishap. The MC certainly favoured ‘inspired generalship’ and commented briefly:

On 3 June Amara was reached and General Townshend with twenty-two sailors and soldiers achieved the surrender of a garrison of 700 Turks. As a military operation this action was audaciously planned and well timed, and it deserves high praise as it achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.⁷³

The phrase ‘audaciously planned’ is ill-chosen because the dash upriver was not planned at all. It was unsupported opportunism. The reality is that Townshend put himself and his party at great risk; nevertheless, his gamble came off in the most spectacular manner. The last word rests with Clausewitz, who wrote, ‘Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.’⁷⁴

For his part, Townshend was aggrieved at the degree of acclaim he received. He wrote, five years later, ‘It has always struck me that no one, except the officers and men of 17th Brigade and the naval officers, seems to have recognised the difficulty of the operation and the possibility of disaster.’⁷⁵ Clearly, Nixon was insufficiently laudatory, but then the Corps Commander was already looking ahead as he had different fish to fry. However – did he have the means?

Major General Gorringe, one of his senior subordinates, believed that the major factor that determined the outcome of the initial phase of the campaign from 1914 to mid-1916 was the stringent financial constraints imposed by the IG on the conduct of military operations in Mesopotamia.

He had no doubt that officials in Delhi, led by the powerful Finance Member, Sir William Meyer, consistently refused to sanction expenditure on the port facilities or other infrastructural works, such as a proposed railway from Basra to Nasariyeh to take the strain off the river, unless and until it was decided to make the occupation of Mesopotamia permanent. Later, Gorringe gave evidence to the MC and in the Report he is quoted as saying:

I have no doubt that great improvements could and should have been effected during the first twelve months and so on in proportion afterwards. There was reluctance to spend money on improvements, which would partake of a permanent character.⁷⁶

That view is interesting because, as far as Hardinge, Duff and Nixon were concerned, the permanent annexation of Mesopotamia was the aim. This suggests that, although Meyer was at the centre of the IG, he was unaware of the political ambition of Hardinge.

The campaign was being conducted as cheaply as possible and in line with the limited budget available. On that basis, funding the building of railways was unlikely to win financial support. Meyer has been cast as the dead hand of inertia on the tiller of military success, but he did not set the Government of India budget – he administered it. Gorringe was damning when he said, in evidence, that there was:

No improvement in the unloading wharves for ships was made until December 1915, when the reinforcements for two divisions were coming out.⁷⁷

Notwithstanding Nixon’s ambition and Townshend’s undoubted flair, IEF‘D’did not have, readily to hand, the means to fry those other ‘different fish’.

22. Major General G.F. Gorringe DSO, later, Lieutenant General Sir George KCB KCMG DSO.

Chapter notes

57 The Army List 1914, HM Stationery Office.

58 Napoleon, 9 December 1817, B.E. O’Meara, Napoleon in Exile, 1822.

59 MC Report, p.15.

60 Townshend, Sir C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.41.

61 MC Report, p.17.

62 Later, Vice Admiral Wilfred Nunn CB CSI CMG DSO, author of Tigris Gunboats.

63 Sir Joseph Austen Chamberlain KG (1863–1937). He was Secretary of State for India 1915–17 and, as such, a key player in the military debacle in Mesopotamia.

64 Hardinge papers, 26 May 1915, 93/No. 10.

65 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.98.

66 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.62.

67 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.105.

68 Ibid, p.174.

69 Ibid, pp.107–108.

70 General Staff Officer Grade 1. In this case, his senior staff officer.

71 Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) was a philosopher, soldier and military strategist. He is credited with the authorship of the influential book The Art of War.

72 Maurice (539–602) was a Byzantine emperor and prominent general of his time. George Dennis translated Maurice’s Strategikon in 1984.

73 MC Report, p.18.

74 Major General von Clausewitz, Principles of War, 1812.

75 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.72.

76 MC Report, p.55.

77 Ibid.