The special features of Confucian constitutionalism are the unique system of supervision, the parliament, and the type of state.1 The type of the state is a republic under a symbolic monarch. Having already discussed the first two features, this chapter looks at the third.
The first question to be addressed is what one means by types of state, which presupposes that we first understand what the state is itself. The Chinese term “body or essence of the state” refers to the basic character of the state that makes it different from all other forms of human organization.2 The basic nature of a state is described variously according to one’s theory of the state. For instance, Marxism takes class as the basic nature of the state and hence adopts class dictatorship as the essence of the state. Liberal democracy is based on contracts and so assumes that the essence of the state is to uphold rights. Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) makes political exceptionalism the nature of the state and so sees the state’s power to make exceptions to the rule of law as the essence of the state. Meiji Japan was a constitutionalism under the emperor and so saw imperial sovereignty as the essence of the state.
Confucianism locates the basic nature of the state in its historical identity. National history is sacred, mysterious, whole, awe-inspiring, and enduring because the state is not the artificial creation of one generation or one group of people.3 The state is formed naturally and reasonably over a long period of history owing to the cooperation of heaven, earth, and the human element.4 Therefore, Confucianism holds that the historical nature of the state is its essence.
From the point of view of political theory, the history of the state is its historical legitimacy. The essence of the state is then embodied in national historical legitimacy. The state derives its right and authority to rule from historical legitimacy, and from acceptance of this history the state obtains the voluntary acknowledgment and long-term obedience of the people.5
We now turn to explaining the types of state. The type is the way in which the essence of the state is expressed in political form. For instance, a state based on protection of rights may be a constitutional monarchy, a cabinet, or a presidential or committee system. In a class dictatorship, there could be two houses of parliament under the People’s Congress as in the former Soviet Union or one as in China. So in today’s world different types of state can exist alongside different state essences. In other words, the political form of the state must correspond to its essence. In that way the body politic is also the national or state body.
In Confucianism historical legitimacy must be part of Confucian constitutionalism. If national history cannot be embodied in politics, the state will lack historical legitimacy. Therefore, Confucian and Chinese constitutionalism demand that the body politic in China embody the national history and historical legitimacy. Republicanism under a symbolic monarch is the type of state that Confucian constitutionalism leads to.
In China today, republicanism under a symbolic monarch is the only way in which historical identity of the state and national historical legitimacy can be united. No other way is possible. Western political types such as republicanism under a president or a chairman are not faithful to China’s history and so cannot embody the nation in China. Below we will discuss the format of this type of government.
Here we need to clarify what the historical nature of the state is. Firstly, it is something that cannot be wholly analyzed or grasped by reason. It is sacred, mysterious, whole, and awe-inspiring. To try to rely only on reason to understand it would be to “exorcize” it, which would amount to destroying it and making it into the temporary creation of humanity of limited rational ability. Secondly, it cannot be completely grasped by the will either. Western political thought has been influenced by Roman civil law, which uses the will to understand the state on the basis of consent to a contract. The state is made into the product of the will. Human will and human reason are both limited and temporary in nature. Even if this limited and temporary will can provide the basis for contracts between people today, it cannot do so with people of the past or of the future. So even if there were a social contract, it would be binding only on the present generation. But the state is not only the state of the present generation. It belongs also to past and future generations. A contract decided today cannot change the historical nature of the state. Therefore, will is insufficient as a means of understanding the historical nature of the state.
Furthermore, interest and desire are even less apt for grasping the historical nature of the state. Ever since Machiavelli, modern theories of the state have relied on secular interests to understand the state. Hobbes went one step further in holding that the state should be understood as deriving from the desire to protect one’s own life. The result is the utilitarian view of the state as upholding interests and desires. But the state is not a deliberately constructed public service body dedicated to providing for human needs (a legal person). Still less is it an interest group (a company) formed to obtain secular interests. Rather, the state is lofty and spiritual, transcending the secular interests and selfish desires of a given time. It is a mysterious body from a distant past. Hence, the historical nature of the state cannot be understood on the basis of desires or interests.
Finally, the concept of rights cannot be used to understand the historical nature of the state. Western constitutionalism defines the purpose of the state as the protection of rights. Now, “rights” is a universal, abstract, metaphysical concept that does not belong to the category of history. Likewise it is subject to the limitations of reason and so cannot grasp the historical nature of the state. That nature may be intuited only in sincere tones of cultural warmth and in a spirit of respect for history. In other words, it must be wholly and loyally believed in, with a quasi-religious sincere faith and humble morality. Thus, reason, will, interest, desire, and rights have no place in understanding the basic nature of the state, its historical identity, though they should not be excluded from an understanding of some aspects of its functions.
Now the historical nature of the state is formed over a long period of time through many twists and turns of rational historical events or chance happenings. It is composed of both reasonable and fortuitous factors that have coalesced into a definite history. The long process of formation will finally settle down and once settled will not go in reverse.6 This irreversibility of history is determined by the strength exercised by the length of time and by historical rationality and by many chance factors. There is no one standard for all cases. The real reason for this is that the state is an organic living body. Once the body is born, it changes in history and becomes a historical reality.
In the course of formation of a state there are constantly people who come and go, but over a long period of intermingling a definite type of state will be shaped and, on the basis of this type, the historical identity of the state will be formed. This historical identity is not an absolute, static concept but one formed in relation to history. However, once formed it is stable and continuous over a long period of time, and so it creates a stable national character and an unchanging national essence; that is the basic characteristic of the state.7 The historical identity of the state is a complicated, dialectical concept of stability that has grown up and been formed. It cannot be thought of in terms of simple reason.
While the historical nature of the state may be expressed in the form of the state, its most basic and vital embodiment is in the highest ruler of the state, in the person of the ruler. In traditional monarchies the person of the monarch is the embodiment of the state’s historical identity as well as the embodiment of political ruling authority. The monarch represents the state and runs the government. In the person of the monarch, the state’s historical identity and political authority are united. In modern times the two have come apart. The nation is represented by the king, president, or chairman, while the government is in the hands of the parliament or government. In Confucian constitutionalism, the two are also distinct: the ruler of the state embodies the nation and the historical identity of the state, while the parliament and head of government hold the power to govern. The ruler in Confucian constitutionalism is the symbolic monarch. He is a head of state, who descends from a noble and ancient lineage.
Under the influence of Western constitutional theory, today state and government are frequently confused, to the point of seeing them as one and the same, with the result that the state is constitutionally and representatively disorganized and chaotic, to the point of abolishing its existence altogether. In Confucian constitutionalism, state and government are separate, and both have their own independent sphere. They run according to different norms and have both different systems of organization and of representation. In detail, the differences are as below.
According to the Confucian historical view, the state is the product of an autonomous long evolution of history and culture. It is a spiritual, organic, and living body that has a spiritual life that runs through past, present, and future and forever. The spiritual life of the state will not be cut short or destroyed by the rational choices or deliberate decisions of a group of people at any given time. This is what the Spring and Autumn Annals refers to as one body of the state that endures through the centuries.8 This means that the state is one body with the nation and not with the people.
The nation refers to a historically enduring idea that transcends the present period, whereas the people refers to a defined contemporary group and is a modern political idea. The living spirit of the state is inherited and passed on by each generation of the nation.9 The spiritual life of the state embodies the spiritual life of the nation. Through the spiritual life of the nation, the spiritual life of the state is received from the ancestors and handed down to their descendants forever and ever.
In Confucian language, it is the decree of heaven that gives rise to, and maintains, the state, and so the spiritual life of the state is also a result of that decree. Under the guidance of the decree of heaven, politics is led through history to form a state. Therefore, the state itself can be embodied and explained only by the decree of heaven working in history. In contrast, the Western contract theory cannot explain the rise or continuity of the state or its nature because contemporary interests cannot determine the nature of this spiritual body, nor can the reason of individuals comprehend its nature, nor can the will of the people determine its life or death.
We now turn to the government. The government is very different from the state. It is not the product of an autonomous long evolution of history and culture but the product of a particular generation or particular group of persons motivated by interests, desires, and rights and relying on reason or the will. For instance, the ancient monarchs themselves managed affairs outside the court or delegated them to a prime minister. Nowadays, one party may monopolize the government and propose a government for one term, or the people may choose a government by general elections at legally determined intervals, or a government may be formed by violence and revolution.
In this sense the state can be said to be a transcendent sacred existence, while the government is this-worldly secular existence. Moreover, the government is one with the people and not with the nation because it is chosen and supported explicitly or implicitly by the people of that generation without the need for the consent of the ancestors or of generations yet to come. The government is the presence of the people not of history. The state, by contrast, is produced by the will of heaven and is the presence of history.
Furthermore, what the government monopolizes is executive power, which is not the same as the power of the state. This executive power is entrusted by the people to the government, which governs in their name. It is a highly institutionalized, structured, hierarchical, universalized, monopolized, secularized, this-worldly, violent, and substantive form of power. If power has a purpose, then executive power is to prevent people’s various rights from being abused and to ensure they can be exercised. This is because it is a form of political power that derives its legitimacy from the people. In contrast, the power of the state is far more often symbolic and spiritual in nature. It is religious, historical, continuing, and national and expresses the values of the state’s historical legitimacy. The purpose of state power is to protect the state as an organic, living body, to ensure its continuity, and to guarantee that the nation’s historical identity is not destroyed. In practice, the daily running of political power is executive power, while state power is the power of the national leader. The government’s executive power is in the hands of the head of the government, while the state power is in the hands of the leader of the state. It is thus clear that both in their origins and in their nature state and government are very different. The two may not be confused.
Firstly, one may consider traditional governments, especially monarchy. In ancient times monarchies allowed the emperors and kings to represent the state and the prime ministers to represent the government, as in traditional China. Yet since in monarchies all legal power is in the hands of the monarch, there is frequently little real distinction between the emperors and the prime ministers. In practice the monarch can represent both state and government, which means that the structure of the state and that of the government are confused and not very clearly separated.
Yet precisely for this reason, monarchy is better able than other forms of rule to manifest the distinction between the state and the government. The historical identity of the state is better embodied in a unique political institution, monarchy itself.10 Given that monarchy is hereditary, there is a sense that the state lasts forever. Hence monarchy, rather than any other form of rule, is better able to bring it about that the national leader is made conscious of his sacred duty to uphold the decree of heaven in continuing the organic life of the state and its historical continuity.
We now turn to contemporary politics, which expresses political modernity. The main form is democracy, which in practice means constitutional monarchy, a republic headed by a president or a state under a chairman.11 Constitutional monarchy clearly distinguishes between the government and the state: the monarch represents the state and the cabinet represents the government. Although today most constitutional monarchies have a democratic parliament and cabinet, since this kind of monarch inherits the ancient monarchy, monarchy still represents the tradition of the nation. Hence, this form of polity can best express the foundation of the state on the sacred political tradition of history, and best show that the state as an organic, living body inherits and continues the undying spirit of the nation, and also best reveals that the distinction between state and government is that the former is the presence of historical continuity.
Although in republicanism the president is not a hereditary monarch, he or she does take on the monarch’s role as representative of the spirit of the nation. Normally the president represents the state and the premier the government, but there are republics in which the president represents both state and government, the classic example being that of the United States. The president’s role in the state is usually set out in the constitution. He can conclude treaties with other countries in the name of the state; he can proclaim the law. He can send and receive ambassadors; he can grant amnesties, name officials to civil and military posts, give out honors and awards, and preside at state ceremonies. All of these tasks were traditionally performed by monarchs.
Even in countries, such as France, where the president holds power over both state and government, the presidential office still represents the state. The constitution of the Fifth Republic accords the president many executive powers that properly belong to the government. It also grants the president quasi-monarchical powers traditionally reserved to one who represents the state, so the president represents both state and government. The most outstanding feature of this constitution is to be found in Article Five, which describes the president as guaranteeing the continuity of the state.12 Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) understood this clause as serving to ensure the unbroken continuity of the government. He thought that the president should be above party politics and should represent the state. Furthermore, de Gaulle believed that the premier stood for the temporary and changeable nature of the government, not the continuity of the state. The president alone, the head of the country, was qualified to embody the continuity of the state. Hence, even in a country like France, where there is no clear distinction between state and government, one cannot deny that the historical nature of the state must be embodied and represented by the head of state. The head of government cannot represent this historical nature because of the temporary and changeable nature of the government itself.13
However, it is highly problematic to have an elected president replace a hereditary monarch in guaranteeing the continuity of the state and upholding its historical nature. This is because the president is elected by a rational process dependent on the periodic expression of the will of the people and thus is temporary and subject to change. A president is thereby not up to representing the historical nature of the state and lacks sufficient legitimacy to ensure the continuity of the state. Representing continuity demands that legitimacy is accorded by the historical nature of the state. This is the legitimacy required if the people are to permanently and willingly recognize, and sincerely obey, state authority, according to their awareness of the state as an organic, living body with a continuing history and their sense of loyalty. Heads of state chosen by periodic elections do not have the sacred nature that transcends the present that the title of head of state demands, nor do they have the mysterious aura created by the state, nor the authority that has developed of itself by the state throughout a long history, nor the nobility of the blood of the founding father of the state, nor the loyalty of the citizens to their state and the state’s role in binding them together.
Moreover, to elect the head of state by the consent of the people’s will is to look at the state as the product of a contract. The election of a head of state is equivalent to a political contract drawn up between each citizen and the head of state, granting him or her rule for a limited period of time. A state like that is just like a company. It is a rationalized, contractualized secular organization. The head of state becomes the general manager of a secular company. The only difference from any other company is that the product produced is different. The company is formed by the individual wills of the people present, and the manager is the legal representative of the will of the shareholders. Once the state is turned into a company, the election of the head of state is rather as if by the consent of each individual, the head’s right to rule is entrusted to the head of state by means of a law, the constitution, and a contract for a number of years is signed entrusting the power of running the state to one person. The result is that the historical nature of the state no longer exists. This is a considerable devaluation of the state.
Truly performing these functions necessitates that the head of state not be chosen by universal suffrage. Inheritance alone is demanded. For only a hereditary head of state can represent this historicity for he alone has the requisite noble blood, sacred and august personage, and unique exalted status that can compare with the characteristic of the state and its essence and that can ensure the transcendent, mysterious, and historical nature of authority combined with noble lineage and exalted status as well as commanding the loyalty of citizens and the state’s role in binding them together. No other way thus ensures that the state is not reduced to being a temporary company.14
Above we set out how the heads of state and government have different representative roles. To make the point clearer we will continue to develop our argument. The state is an organic body founded on the sacred recognition and historical sense of loyalty among the people. These sentiments arise from the citizens’ intuitive awareness of the will of heaven acting in the state and their profound sense that history will continue. It is these two feelings that constitute the historical legitimacy of the state, by virtue of which the state earns a long-lasting and continuing stability and the authority of legitimate rule. No matter how much the government, or the imperial court in the past, changes, rises, or falls, this cannot influence the continuing existence in history of the organic and sacred nature of the state.
To achieve this, the essence of the state must correspond to the state’s own historical continuity, and hence can be nothing else but hereditary. Inheritance alone bears the hallmarks of status and tradition demanded by the continuity of the state. In all forms of government invented by humans up to now, a hereditary head of state is closest to the nature of the state itself and therefore can represent it in respect of historicity and continuity. Governments, on the other hand, may be of many types, such as prime ministerial, presidential, with a premier or a committee, oligarchy, or dictatorship. Thus, there cannot be only one best form of government, unlike in the case of the state. Many options are possible. In practice governments can be democracies or dictatorships, with separation or centralization of powers, based on elections or on nomination, civilian or military, but there can only be one best form of representation of the state: hereditary succession.
Now we must ask how a hereditary head of state can be introduced to represent the state in China today. I believe that a republic under a symbolic monarch is the answer to that question for it can ensure the historicity and historical legitimacy of the state within the constitution.
Today we propose republicanism under a symbolic monarch because of the challenges that China faces in establishing her own type of constitution in face of the political modernity spread by globalization.15 We want to look for a constitutional format that is true to the specifics of China’s history and culture. As I see it, republicanism under a symbolic monarch is the only way forward for history in the search for a polity within the context of republicanism, one that will embody the state in its historicity and continuity with a hereditary head of state—a symbolic monarch—who will represent the form of the state today.16
By a symbolic monarch, we mean that he does not hold actual political power either legislative like the parliament or executive as in the government. He exercises state power only by virtue of his ancient and noble lineage and serves as the head of state, whom the citizens look up to with respect. Hence “symbolic” refers to not holding the political power that belongs to the parliament or government. It is not really “nothing” though. State powers such as signing and concluding international treaties, proclaiming the law, naming civil and military officials, proclaiming amnesties and pardons, distributing honors, and the like, while their symbolic significance is greater than their real power, nonetheless really exist and are powers with a widespread influence.17 Hence, the significance of the symbolic monarch is to establish a clear distinction between the head of state and the head of the government. To say that the head of state exerts no political power but holds only state power is not quite like the really purely symbolic statue that Kang Youwei thought the symbolic monarch should be.
Moreover, when the symbolic monarch is a hereditary head of state, the symbolism has even greater meaning. It means that the head of state is not appointed following abdication or by election, nomination, canvassing, force, a change of politics, revolution, or assassination but according to inheritance, the tradition of a lineage. This form of creating a head of state is very simple and can also be called “symbolic.”
The symbolic monarch must have a long and noble blood lineage and also be a hereditary head of state. In today’s China the symbolic monarch will have to meet five conditions to be acceptable: (1) the monarch must have a noble and ancient blood lineage; (2) this lineage must be political in nature; (3) it must be clearly shown that the lineage is direct and unbroken; (4) the lineage must be so unique as to exclude competition from any other lineages; and (5) the citizens must universally respect and accept the person with this noble political lineage.
According to these five conditions, the symbolic monarch must be a descendant of one of the Chinese dynasties because only their lineages are political in nature. Such lineage is both noble and capable of winning universal respect from the citizens. However, it is not so easy to find a suitable candidate among the descendants of the dynasties. This is partly because the ancient kings ruled a long time ago and there are no clear genealogies preserved. People may claim to be descended from past dynasties, but this is merely on the basis of deduction. There is no trustworthy proof.
Moreover, even if it were provable, the descendants of the past dynasties have split into too many branches such that it would be impossible to prove direct descent. Without direct descent, the blood line would be neither pure nor close, in which case the candidature would be contested and it would be hard to make a choice. Since the question of the symbolic monarch involves power and honor, his election could provoke competition unless there were only one possible candidate. Otherwise, competition would be virtually unavoidable. Secondly, China has had too many dynasties. It is difficult to know which particular dynasty should give rise to the symbolic monarch. In Japan the imperial line has never been broken, so the emperor is of pure blood, from one family, and there can only be one possible candidate. China cannot present such a political trump card. It is also impossible to draw up a standard to adjudicate in the matter. Hence, the choice of the descendant of any of China’s dynasties would provoke only competition and render the choice of symbolic monarch impossible.18
Thus, it would seem that the five conditions can not be met. We need to ask, then, if there is not some other way of finding a candidate to be symbolic monarch and thereby realize the form of state present in symbolic monarch republicanism. The answer is yes, and that person is the direct heir of Confucius.
The heir of Confucius has three forms of identity: political, cultural, and personal. Although they are united in the one person, they remain quite distinct in nature and illustrate the various historical-cultural duties and political-social roles the heir enjoys.
The cultural identity of the heir is his identity as the descendant of the sage and hence as the symbolic representation of Confucian culture. This cultural identity is exercised in the heir’s presiding at rites to Confucius and the other Chinese sages at Confucius’s side. The heir holds this role by virtue of blood and not by virtue of learning itself. The tradition of learning is passed down by the great Confucians among the people and by the Chief Libationer of the Academy. However, that the heir holds this cultural identity is a fact that has never been contested. The personal identity of the heir is an internal matter for the family of Confucius since as the direct descendant of the sage, the heir is head of the family and performs rites to Confucius as a member of the family. Both the cultural and personal identities of the heir are clear and have always been so. There is no need to add anything more.
Yet in this chapter we have noted that the post of symbolic monarch is a political matter. The heir’s cultural and personal identities do not directly touch on politics and so are not discussed any further. However, their very prominence throughout history has led to concealing a very important political identity, namely that the heir of Confucius is also the descendant of the early kings. The heir inherits the lineage of the Shang kings from before Confucius.19 Since we are interested in the political status of the symbolic monarch, we do need to deal with this political status of the heir in more detail and examine its significance for republicanism under a symbolic monarch.
According to the Han History, in the reign of Emperor Yuan of the Han (49–33 BCE), the new emperor wanted to honor the kings of the Zhou and Yin dynasties. The Spring and Autumn Annals prescribed investing a surviving relative of the previous dynasty with the duty of continuing to offer rites to his ancestors as a way of indicating that the empire did not belong to one family and as a mark of respect for the previous kings. Since the founding of the Han came shortly after the collapse of the Zhou, it was not difficult to find a direct descendant of the Zhou kings. Very soon into the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han (141–87 BCE), a descendant of the Zhou, who had been honored as the Zhou South Prince, was honored with the rank as Zhou Successor Marquis-in-Waiting.20
But eight hundred years had elapsed since the fall of the Yin, and when the first Han Emperor sent officials and scholars to find a descendant, they reported that the descendants were scattered among over ten family names, all of whom were known to be descendants of the Yin kings, but it was impossible to identify the direct descendant of the kings. At the time the prime minister, Kuang Heng, suggested selecting one of the families as the descendants of the Yin and asking them to inherit the mantle of the first kings of the Yin and perform the rites to King Tang, founder of the Yin. He noted that in the Record of Rites, Confucius said he was a man of Yin and so his descendants should be chosen as “First Prince” in place of Qi, Viscount of Wei,21 who had first been appointed to this role, and since it could be shown that Confucius was a direct descendant of King Tang, his descendants would then be able to perform the rituals to King Tang from generation to generation. At the time the emperor judged Kuang Heng’s suggestion as failing to conform to the classics and so did not follow it. Later, under Emperor Cheng (33–7 BCE), the Spring and Autumn Annals specialist Mei Fu sent in a memorandum asking that Confucius’s descendants should be granted the honor of offering rites to Tang. The emperor accepted the suggestion and so the Han History notes, “In the first year of Sui-he, Kong Ji was honored as Meritorious Marquis: Successor to the Yin. In the third month he was ennobled as a duke.”22 When the search for a direct descendant by primogeniture had failed to yield any results, Kuang Heng and Mei Fu both suggested that the direct male lineage of Confucius was in the line of King Tang and so Confucius’s heir was honored as Meritorious Duke: Successor to the Yin.23
From the above history we can see that Confucius’s heir is not only the heir of the sage Confucius but also the heir of the sage king Tang of the Shang. His blood not only represents the “Uncrowned King” Confucius; it also, and even more importantly, represents the founding King Tang of the Shang. Tang of the Shang is one of the three royal dynasties of old and one of the lines of Chinese rulers. As heir of the kings, Confucius’s heir embodies a political identity that qualifies him to take part in the basic structure of the state because in the ancient rituals to the Zhou and Shang monarchs, what is touched on is the basic structure of the state.
Today we wish to establish a Chinese-style Confucian constitutionalism and want to make Confucius’s heir the symbolic monarch in the Republic. It is in his political capacity as successor of the Shang dynasty that the heir takes his place in China’s present state structure as a part of the Chinese constitutional setup. This political participation of the heir is not something thought up today but something that has been around from the past. It is just that it has been obscured in recent times owing to the emphasis on the heir’s personal and cultural identities. Since Confucius’s heir is of royal descent, he can represent the rule of the kings and emperors, and with this political qualification he can embody the unity of China’s history and take part in the public and political arena in China. He is the most authoritative representative of both the national spiritual and living body of China and the continuity of her history. In this way the constitutional order of China will be able to manifest the unity of the three dynasties and the fact that China does not belong to only one family while also honoring the early kings. It is the hereditary status of the heir that enables him to embody history and represent the state as such.
Confucius’s heirs were ennobled as dukes in both the Han and the Song, but the significance of these actions was not the same. The Han ennoblement as Meritorious Duke: Successor to the Yin brought out the political significance of the unity of the three dynasties. The Song ennoblement as Duke: Successor to the Sage was an acknowledgment of their personal role as head of the family clan. What is surprising is that everyone remembers the second title but forgets the first. Just as Emperor Yuan of the Han thought that the title was unclassical, so too many people today consider it unthinkable that Confucius’s heirs have a political identity. This is why I have gone back to the sources to prove that Confucius’s heir is the descendant of the Shang kings, that he has a political status and thus can embody the essence of the state, namely its historical nature, and so show that his appointment as symbolic monarch is based not only on scholarship but also on history.
Having discussed the history we now turn to explaining why Confucius’s heir is best qualified to be the symbolic monarch and why he is the best candidate for an hereditary head of state. We will use the above five conditions and show how Confucius’s heir fits them all.
Nobility and antiquity of lineage is not a problem for Confucius’s heir because he not only inherits Confucius’s blood but also inherits the blood of King Tang of the Shang. Confucius was a sage and King Tang was a sage king. The blood of a sage and that of a sage king are what merit the most respect from Chinese people throughout our long history. Compared with other historical, political, or cultural personalities, the lineage of Confucius’s heir is best suited to matching this condition to be the symbolic monarch. Confucius lived over 2,500 years ago and King Tang over 3,600 years ago, so Confucius’s heir has inherited blood lines of 2,500 and 3,600 years. This may be said to be the most ancient lineage in human history. There must be practically nobody who can claim a more ancient pedigree.
The second condition is that the lineage must be political in nature. As the descendant of the sage kings, Confucius’s heir embodies the unity of the three dynasties, which is the basic concept of Chinese political theory. By virtue of the political nature of his lineage, the heir represents the unbroken essence of the state and can guarantee the continuity of the state. This political identity held true in the past and continues to do so today.24
The third condition is that the lineage is direct and unbroken. Over the past two millennia Confucius’s family tree has constantly been revised and added to. It is the longest, most detailed, most complete, and most systematic family tree in human history. Hence, as a descendant of a sage, Confucius’s heir’s credentials are well established. As a descendant of the sage kings, the picture is more complicated. There are no unbroken records of direct descent from the other kings such as the Xia and Zhou kings.25 Given that by the time of the Han the direct lineage of King Tang of the Shang was no longer clear, at least we know Confucius was of that lineage and the direct descent from Confucius onward is clear because of the father-son succession. It is then no problem to present Confucius’s heir as representing the direct descendants of the sage kings. This has been resolved by the ennoblement of Kong Ji as Meritorious Duke by Emperor Cheng of the Han. Given the lack of any clear direct descendants of the sage kings, the claims of Confucius’s heir are unparalleled. That means that today Confucius’s heir is the only person whose lineage can clearly affirm that he is the heir of an unbroken lineage from the sage kings. Apart from Confucius’s heir, no other person in China can claim a direct, unbroken lineage from the sage kings. Hence, Confucius’s heir is best qualified to represent the rule of the ancient kings.
The fourth condition is that the lineage must be so unique as to exclude competition from any other lineages. Firstly, Confucius’s heir lineage is no problem in terms of antiquity, political significance, or direct descent. Furthermore, the lineage of other personages in Chinese history is either not as noble as his or, though ancient, is not political in nature, or is both ancient and political but we cannot determine direct descent. Hence, no one else in Chinese history can be superior to Confucius’s heir.
The fifth condition is that the citizens must universally respect and accept the person with this noble political lineage. Since his lineage goes back over several thousand years to people whom the Chinese universally honor and look up to, no Chinese person has a lineage more reputable than this. Furthermore, the political nature of this lineage has been recognized since ancient times. The Gongyang school of the Spring and Autumn Annals acknowledges Confucius as king. Sima Qian in his biography of Confucius’s family in the Historical Records also held Confucius to be king. That Confucius had a political status means that his descendants also do. That is self-evident. Hence, since ancient times Chinese people have maintained an attitude of approval for the political identity of Confucius’s heir.
From the above we can see not only that Confucius’s heir meets the five conditions. He meets them best of all, which shows that he is the most suitable person in China for the post of symbolic monarch.
Before discussing how Confucius’s heir can be the symbolic monarch, we must first clarify his title as Duke. In ancient China protocol required that those who followed the king were named dukes, and so Confucius’s heirs were ennobled as dukes. After the Republic of China was founded, the Nationalist Party government of Chiang Kai-shek believed that it was now a republic and so hereditary titles no longer existed. To continue to call Confucius’s heir Duke: Successor to the Sage was deemed to harm the republic, and so the heirs were forced to abandon a title they had held for over two thousand years and exchange it for the common office of Sacrificial Official of the Highly Accomplished, Most Sagely, First Teacher. I do not recognize this change of title because it fundamentally destroys China’s Confucian tradition and historical culture.26
However, the title of heir to Confucius is not an issue of ordinary state honors, nor is it a personal honor. Rather, it affects the whole basis of the state. And it will also change in accordance with the times. The symbolic monarch represents the state constitutionally, internationally, and by virtue of his title. It is somewhat unbecoming that Confucius’s heir, as head of state, is known only as a duke. The Record of Rites says that ceremonies can be modified as common sense demands.27 The constitution is the ceremony of the state, and so it too can be changed. To overcome the inadequate title of duke assigned to the head of state, he should be promoted in accordance with Confucian theory.28 I think promotion by one degree to the rank of king is sufficient, and he should be called King: Successor of the Sage. My reasons are given below.29
There are three meanings of the title “king,” which match the three identities of Confucius’s heir. Firstly, the title “king” implies reference to the first sage kings. These kings of the first three dynasties were the highest rulers of ancient China and of political significance. The royal title assigned to Confucius’s heir shows that he continues the rule of the sage kings and manifests his political significance. Secondly, the title “king” appears in the ascriptions “Uncrowned King” and “King of Perfected Culture” that were granted to Confucius, not for his actual political rule but for his maintaining the virtue of the sage kings and their culture. He was the highest ruler of China in a cultural sense and hence was called King Who Proclaims Culture. This testifies to the cultural identity of Confucius. His heir symbolically represents the cultural reign of Confucius. It should be noted that the actual representation of this rule of culture lies with the academies throughout the country and with the National Academy. At any rate, the heir’s qualification to be called a king in a cultural sense is in accord with his cultural identity. Thirdly, Confucius can be called a king in that he is the ancestor of all the Confucius’s family, and so he may be hailed as their king in a broad sense. The title thus fits the personal identity of Confucius’s heir.
The actual arrangement of republicanism under a symbolic monarch is not complicated. Constitutional monarchies such as those of Great Britain, Japan, and other countries in which the monarch is within a constitution are the basic models for the position and functions of the hereditary head of state in republicanism under a symbolic monarch. The King Successor of the Sage is the permanent representative of the Chinese state, and republicanism with him as its core is China’s national form. In practice this means that the King Successor of the Sage as hereditary head of state is not a post that is the object of political party competition. Hence, it can effectively uphold the stability, continuity, and eternal nature of the state. He is thus not influenced by any party political disputes.30
Those who discuss constitutionalism in China today are stuck in the narrow constitutional thought and models of the modern West. They merely see the constitution as a matter of the separation and balance of powers in the political arena and overlook the separation and balance of power between the body of the state and the body politic.
Locke thoroughly idealized the state making it the product of will and something created by people drawing up a contract. In so doing he demolished the state, removing it from the purview of the constitution. All that was left were the parliament, law courts, and government. This was because Locke was a rationalist; it is impossible to grasp the sacred, spiritual, historical, organic living nature of the state. Locke did not know that the sacred and historical nature of the state can be grasped only by a transcendent faith and intuitive life. It is no surprise, then, that the first part of Locke’s Treatise on Government begins with a criticism of the divine power of kings. Locke’s rationalist viewpoint blinded him to this reality of the state, and his grounding in the social contract led him even further to ignore the nature of the state. In Locke’s eyes, the state was lifeless, unhistorical, lacking in self-identity or special characteristics and, even more, in power. So Locke’s theory can be considered only as political theory and not as a theory of the state. What is surprising is that people later took it as a theory of the state, resulting in a lot of confusion over the matter of the state. This confusion persists in our own time.
We now turn to Montesquieu. Although Montesquieu held that the king could hold executive power, like Locke, he divided state power into three. The government represents the state with the result that the state has no character of its own and no power. In politics anyone can represent the state, even if they are not a hereditary monarch. In my view this kind of narrow Western constitutional thought and model is problematic.
Hence, when I talk about constitutionalism today, I want to go beyond the narrow Western thought and model of modern times, speaking of a separation and balance of powers not only at the political level but also at the state level, the separation and balance of the body of the state and the body politic. In practice this means talking about constitutionalism on the basis of the symbolic monarch as restrained by parliament and government. It is only by addressing the issue at both the level of the body politic and the body of the state that one can fully discuss constitutionalism in all its depth.
The symbolic monarch holds a state power that is purely symbolic. Although this power entails no substantive control at the political level or in practical life, this symbolic power is still substantive in nature in the life of the nation, influencing and determining actual life at the level of the state. Although the carrying out of his functions may depend on decisions or recommendations of the government, the people know in their hearts that the power belongs to the state. Unless the functions are carried out by the symbolic monarch, they lack the state’s historical legitimacy. The state power implies endorsement by the people, which is deeply rooted in the historical legitimacy of the state. Although endorsement by the people is the basic factor in Western constitutional legitimacy, grounded on limited reason and the temporary will, parliament and government cannot embody the endorsement of the people deeply rooted in the historical legitimacy of the state.
Hence, the symbolic monarch provides a form of check on the parliament and government, limiting them by the exercise of the authority of the state on the basis of its historical nature. By this check, the spirit of separation of powers and political justice is achieved. This acts as a check on parliament or government encroaching on state power in respect of legitimacy.
At this point we need to say more about the relationship and difference between state power and political power and how parliament and government decide the powers ascribed to the head of state. These powers include the practical details of alliances concluded with other countries, the details of the constitution or laws, and the persons who should be appointed to civilian or military posts and declare states of emergency or rallies for the whole people. Since the content of these powers touches on state affairs, they are not purely political matters like maintaining security, protecting human rights, developing the economy, increasing well-being, and collecting taxes. A body that specifically represents the state is the only one constitutionally qualified to carry out these functions—albeit after the requisite decisions made on the political level by parliament and government. Political powers that affect the state require a constitutionally appointed body at the state level to ensure that these functions themselves are elevated to state level. By this means they are endowed with the legitimacy of the body of the state, and their abstract nature as state functions is rendered visible by being carried out by a state-level body. That body is the symbolic monarch. Hence, we may say that state power is the political power that touches on state affairs. In addition, neither parliament nor government may decide the content of the state power that is religious and cultural in nature; even less may they ever exercise it.
Of course sacred state power may also not encroach on, or seize, secular political power and unite both in one monopoly of power. There has been a failure to distinguish the boundaries, leading to situations opposed to the constitution such as parliamentary dictatorship, executive dictatorship, or party dictatorship. The extremes of these abuses can be seen in the left- and right-wing governments of the last century in which secular political power encroached on, and replaced, sacred state power to swallow up all sacred space and the historical nature of the state in a totalitarian regime.31
The symbolic monarch has a further power: the nomination of the head and members of the House of the Nation. The symbolic monarch should appoint the leader and members of the House of the Nation because both, in constitutionally different ways, represent the historical nature of the state. At the same time, this is a challenge to the idea that sovereignty lies solely with the people. Part of the legitimacy must come from the historical nature of the state. This mechanism effectively prevents parliamentary dictatorship.
It is clear that republicanism under a symbolic monarch is a new form of constitutional arrangement, one that is rooted in history. It has been rooted since ancient times in the historical nature of the state, which has been represented by the monarch.32 To say that republicanism under a symbolic monarch is new refers to the fact that, under modern constitutions, the traditional monarchy no longer represents the historical nature of the state. This traditional role is reintroduced into a modern constitution.
Thus, symbolic monarch republicanism is not a matter of restoring the monarchy or reviving the past.33 Rather, it maintains the basic spirit of constitutional checks on power within new historical circumstances and establishes a more perfect and complex constitutional setup. The purpose is that, by using the state to restrict the parliament and government, all three will attain to a level of harmony and balance.
Over the past several hundred years, one wave after another of modernity has swept in, establishing an unprecedented political modernity. In my view, political modernity is precisely the chief cause of political problems. The most serious problems wrought by political modernity in the state are as set out below. I will also explain how republicanism under a symbolic monarch can be a remedy for the losses.
The state has a historical nature because it is an organic entity that continues to exist in unbroken succession. It differs from other forms of organizations by virtue of having a self with national spirit. Yet political modernity looks on the state as a secular product of contract, limited reason, and temporary will that are constantly subject to change by a given group of persons at some given time, rather than a spiritual self.
As political modernity reduces the state to a mere product of a secular contract, the state no longer has the sacred nature and prestige derived from the will of heaven. In the absence of a religious atmosphere of awe and devotion, people no longer obey the state out of sacred duty or reverence but simply out of their own temporary will and worldly interests.
Moreover, since the value of the state as the universal and moral good originates from its sacred nature, the loss of one would also entail the loss of the other.
By loyalty we mean the sacred, single-minded, profound, enduring fervent call arising from an irrepressible, heartfelt moral sense of belonging. This heartfelt sense of belonging is not a commonplace feeling. Rather, it is a religious and moral sense. It is the profound psychological element from which political duty and the right to rule are born. This religious and moral sense arises by bringing together the spirit, historical nature, continuity, sacredness, and value of the state. It is the psychological feeling that is at the basis of the unity and stability of the state.
Moreover, loyalty to the state cannot be treated as it is in Western theories of legitimacy, in which religious and moral feelings are excluded and may be embodied only under a rational framework of constitutional and legal arrangements established by the citizens. It is imperative that loyalty is embodied in living people and personalities. Perhaps for a very few philosophers, such as Socrates, loyalty can be a rational thing that adapts to a lifeless objective legal order, but that will not work for most citizens. For them, what really matters is that the sacred personality of the ruler should embody or call forth the binding loyalty of the citizens to their state, or what Weber called his “charisma,” which is the characteristic of the head of state, by which his person becomes the object of citizens’ loyalty. This loyalty can then be loyalty to the state and realize the kind of sentiment that the continuity and stability of the state requires.
In modern rationalized politics, however, the head of state is chosen by the citizens’ calculation of their own interests. The subjects will brazenly expect that the head of state should be no different from anyone else. All are simple citizens or commoners. The head of state lacks the sacred, historical, lofty, and eternal mysterious power of attraction and transcendent great magic in his person. The people will obey him for his acts for a time and give him a loyalty that does not last. He can never hope to gain the quasi-religious moral loyalty of a long-lasting and fervent heartfelt service rooted deep in the hearts of the citizens. Hence, in modern states, when the head of state is assassinated, dies in office, or dies in an accident, there can no longer be the ancient custom of loyal servants sacrificing their lives for the monarch. China’s “loyal ministers” will never be seen again.34 This is because a loyal minister expresses his loyalty to the state in his loyalty to the person of the monarch, but contemporary heads of state produced by rational elections are not worthy of the loyalty of the citizens for they are contracted, entrusted, exchanged, temporary, secular, and vulgar.
Nonetheless, republicanism under a symbolic monarch can be a remedy for the above losses. First of all, given his exalted identities and hereditary status, a symbolic monarch can restore the historical nature, continuity, sacredness, and spiritual self of the state. The people will hold the state in awe and relate to her with a profound sense of loyalty since the relationship of citizens and state will once again be founded on a religious and moral sentiment. This will ensure the cohesiveness and stability of the state and restore the state to its religious and moral foundations. Furthermore, as China’s unique unity of state and religion is made clear, the state can recover its value and prestige by restoring religious and moral aims, as opposed to mere satisfaction of the selfish desires, as its goal.
Symbolic monarch republicanism is the most political aspect of Confucian constitutionalism. The widespread influence of political modernity will lead many people to look askance at it, but there are also other complicated issues that it gives rise to, and so it is necessary to say something about these issues. This section raises a number of topics in a piecemeal fashion, but overall aims are to provide a better understanding of republicanism under a symbolic monarch.
Confucian constitutionalism is structured according to the three forms of legitimacy. Symbolic monarch republicanism represents historical-cultural legitimacy. Monarchy has formed a very important historical and cultural nature of China. One could say that without the monarchy there would be no Chinese national historicity. Hence, in constructing a constitutionalism with Chinese historical and cultural characteristics, it is important to acknowledge the monarchy as an important constitutive part in Confucian constitutionalism.35
Today China has already become a republic; it is no longer possible to completely restore the monarchy. Yet in China republicanism cannot represent historical legitimacy. The only way to resolve this problem, while recognizing the principle that the times decide, is to use a dual way: to keep the basic spirit of the traditional monarchy by having a symbolic monarch and to maintain the basic constitutional framework of a republic. Thus, symbolic monarch republicanism respects the political reality of China today, while also finding a new format to express the historical legitimacy. It produces a harmonious balance and so truly realizes the constitutional ideal of equilibrium through checks and balances. This is not like postrevolutionary France, the Soviet Union, or China where republicanism and monarchy were viewed like fire and water, unable to mix, and there was total opposition to the basic spirit of harmonious equilibrium that the constitution should bring about in the state.
Firstly, both symbolic monarch republicanism and the House of the Nation represent historical legitimacy. Yet symbolic monarch republicanism does this at the level of the state and has no substantive political power. In contrast, the House of the Nation is political in nature and holds real political power. Furthermore, symbolic monarch republicanism is a form of the state that combines tradition and modernity, while the House of the Nation is fundamentally part of a modern constitutional framework.
Symbolic monarch republicanism is also different from the Academy. While both are in the realm of the sacred and of values, the Academy is so in a substantive way and the symbolic monarch in a purely formal way. The Academy engages in practical supervision of all forms of state and political power and enjoys a higher status in the constitution than any other body.
There are many causes of the world’s present ecological crisis. In politics, democracy is certainly the root cause because its deepest foundations lie in the ever-increasing material demands of the present generation of people. This has a malevolent influence on the environment. The long-term interests of the environment can never be satisfied in democracy.
In contrast, the symbolic monarch is a hereditary head of state, and so he is answerable not only to the present generation but also ancestors and generations yet to come. He can provide a check on the political power that destroys the environment for the worldly interests of a given group of people. He can use state power to give advice, question, encourage, and warn people in the various important areas of national life and suggest to the political authorities that they cannot use ecological destruction to run counter to the continuing and enduring nature of the state. He can prevent political power from engaging in transitory behavior based on selfishness motivated by elections that would harm the interests of future generations and the long-term interests of the state and in this way succeed in protecting the environment.36
From the point of view of human psychology, we know that a human being is not only a being with interests, reason, and will. He is also a being of feeling, not only in daily life but also in the context of the state. There are three kinds of feeling that are relevant to the life of the state: moral feelings, religious feelings, and psychological feelings. By moral feelings we refer to the citizens’ feeling of loyalty to the state. By religious feelings we refer to the citizens’ feeling of dependence on the state. By psychological feelings we refer to the citizens’ feeling of loving admiration for the state. These three feelings all exist in human life, and if they can develop normally in the life of the state, they will enhance the cohesiveness of the state and further its stability. The reasons for this are given below.
When citizens have a feeling of loyalty to the state, both state and citizens will be of one mind and heart. Even when the state is beset by great internal difficulties or external oppression or even when it faces invasion from an enemy state, the citizens will not feel like deserting their state. The highest proof of this loyalty is to die for the state when it faces great danger. It is not necessary to describe this loyalty in detail. It is clear that it can increase the cohesiveness of the state and forward stability.
Secondly, the religious feeling of dependence can bring about a more intimate relationship between the citizens and the state and raise it to the level of a transcendent, sacred dependence. Human existence is limited and very fragile. Life is short and full of worries, and so people are often troubled at heart and need comfort and consolation from outside. In the life of the state, citizens place their worries and anxieties over their limited existence into the enduring life of the state, which is sacred and transcendent in form, and so there will be a belief in the state that is religious in nature. In this way the religious nature of the state can comfort the citizens in their worries and cares and console their feelings of hardship and trouble. State and citizens will thereby be bound in inseparable bonds of intimacy and the state will give rise to great forces of cohesiveness that result in ensuring the stability of the state.
The psychological feeling of loving admiration comes from one’s love for one’s parents. We know that from an early age there is a love for one’s parents and this love lasts into adulthood and accompanies one to the end. This love is born from the depths of an individual’s loneliness. This loneliness means that the heart is always in a state of emptiness and helpless suffering and by oneself alone one cannot overcome this deep sense of loneliness. So people can only long for a force from the outside that will relieve this loneliness, which force is parental love. The great feeling of love of the older generation enables a person to not feel alone. All people, then, long for the external force of the great and tender love of elders. The difference is that when young this feeling of admiring love is focused on the parents, and when one is older it is the state or religion. Therefore, people have a desire that the state will show a strong and tender feeling toward them in their loneliness, and they in turn will feel a deep love for their country rather like the love for one’s parents. Since the state embodies the transcendent sacred will of heaven, it is able to resolve the innate feeling of loneliness of the citizens and become the object of their loving admiration, thereby effectively forward the stability of the state.
Monarchy is the most natural and most ancient form of political governance in human history. It must then have a reasonable core, or else it would not have existed throughout history, nor would it have enjoyed the support of countless scholars and sages both in the past and in the present, in China and abroad, people such as Plato and Burke in the West and Confucius in China. In my opinion the reasonable core of monarchy is that a hereditary head of state has a noble and ancient lineage, an honorable and respected status, and the mystical charisma of his person is such that he can embody the historicity and continuity of the state and thereby increase its cohesiveness and stability. What this reasonable core embodies is the basic spirit of monarchy. In contrast, monarchical autocracy, when the monarch is exclusive and subject to no checks and alone holds and exercise political power, is not the basic spirit of monarchy. It is merely a special form of holding onto and using power in which the monarchy has expressed itself in particular historical conditions. Thus, it is not of universal significance or long-lasting value.
In fact, the autocracy of prime ministers, presidents, or party cabals in the modern democratic form of dictatorship of political parties is certainly just as bad as monarchical autocracy. To criticize monarchical autocracy in the name of democracy is but a form of democratic ideology, a demonizing of all forms of politics that are not democratic and a means of democracy blasting its own trumpet. Therefore, the basic spirit of monarchy may be continued without change, though the form in which it is expressed must be changed. However, in recent times, political modernity, that is, republicanism, has so thoroughly demonized and denigrated monarchy that people are no longer able to see its reasonable core. In establishing a state structure they reject this basic spirit and universal value of monarchy, resulting in the head of state in a republic not being able to represent the historicity and continuity of the state in a way that is long-lasting or effective.
Based on these observations, when today we seek to establish a Chinese-style constitutionalism with Chinese historical and cultural characteristics, we must sort the wheat from the tares and acknowledge the reasonable core of monarchy and return to its original face, inheriting its basic spirit and rejecting its external form—that is, rejecting its dictatorial hold of substantive political power. In this way, the ancient tradition of monarchy, in the context of today’s Chinese constitution, can attain a reasonable, proper, and positive constructive role. Symbolic monarch republicanism is a criticism of political modernity’s demonization of monarchy and a corrective to republicanism’s utter denial of monarchy. Symbolic monarch republicanism, then, inherits the virtues of monarchy, while avoiding its disadvantages of autocratic hold on political power.
Again, symbolic monarch republicanism also avoids the disadvantages of republicanism, that an elected head of state is incapable of representing the state, while inheriting its virtue, a constitution with separation and balance of powers. In this sense, we have every reason to say that for the establishment of a constitution for China today, symbolic monarch republicanism is truly an appropriate use of the past in the present, a use of what is Western in China, a rejection of what is out of date and creation of something new, a constitutional arrangement that is both critical and traditional. It is not an undigested restoration of the past, or wishful thinking, or a return to imperial rule or opposition to the Revolutions of 1911 and 1949.
In China today, political modernity has expanded to such an extent as to oppress and destroy political traditionalism. China is an even worse case than other countries. In the realm of the state, wave after wave of revolutions has utterly eradicated the traditional nature of the state. In this respect, China is the most modern state in the world. On the practical political front, China’s current political setup is the most marked by modernity in the whole world because the People’s Congress, which is based on the principle of sovereignty of the people, legally speaking, is more democratic and more republican than any other form of representative parliamentary system. While there is a gap between political realities and the constitutional norms of sovereignty of the people in China, this gap is one of failure to put into practice and not one of lack of legitimacy. In fact, in terms of legitimacy China’s constitution today is basically no different from that of Western countries. Indeed, it is perhaps even more democratic. There is, therefore, no denying that China’s current constitutional order very clearly embodies political modernity. It is just that this political modernity today has not yet acquired the protection of due process and rational law. China’s mainstream thinking is concerned to remedy this defect and to follow international guidelines, the supposedly political civilization of humanity.
To propose symbolic monarch republicanism is not nostalgia for the past, putting the clock back, or wanting to restore the emperor. Rather, it goes beyond the divide into left and right and postmodernity’s criticism of modernity and seeks to take a new road by using traditionalism to criticize modernity. The aim is to arrive at a constitutional model or constitutional road that is in accord both with China’s historical and cultural tradition and with the development of modern politics. The result should be to overcome the complete rejection of tradition in China’s recent past by which the state itself is left without any form of representation.
This duty is onerous and great and not something one person can solve alone or something that can be achieved in a short space of time, but I propose this framework of Confucian constitutionalism in the hope that the Chinese people do not allow the great economic success of China to lead them to neglect thinking about what kind of constitutional arrangement would be best for China and whether or not China should establish a constitution with Chinese historical and cultural characteristics. If the answer is in the affirmative and can be resolved within the theoretical path of Confucian constitutionalism, then there is hope yet for a revival of Chinese civilization. China will no longer be subject to the loss of her own cultural identity under the influence of thorough Westernization. The establishment of a Chinese constitution need no longer entail a rejection of her own self in order to follow the international line. The renewal of China’s political civilization will no longer have to be carried out under the banner of humanity’s political civilization. Instead, it will be done on the basis of China’s own civilization, having absorbed and digested the positive values in Western civilization, to create a new Chinese civilization that embodies features of Chinese civilization. No longer will the cry that democracy is a good thing be heard in China, that naïve cry that implies the loss of national identity and a lack of critical reflection on the deficiencies of Western political thought.37