1. Gan Chunsong, “Qingmo minchu kongjiao hui shijian yu Rujia xiandai zhuandai de kunjing [The Establishment of Confucian Religious Associations in the Late Qing and Early Republican Period and the Difficulty of Transforming Confucianism Today],” Qilu Xuekan 3.186 (2005): 24–25. Gan shows that the debates were both substantial and open, and one cannot fail to note the contrast with the veiled decision-making process regarding the Confucius statue that was put up in Tiananmen Square in January 2011 and removed three months later.
2. As things stand (May 2012), Jiang cannot officially publish his institutional proposals in mainland China, but they have circulated samizdat-style among friends and supporters, and parts have been published in Taiwan and circulated on the Internet.
3. See, e.g., Fan Ruiping, ed., Rujia shehui yu daotong fuxing [Confucian Society and the Revival of Dao] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2008), and Chen Lai and Gan Yang, eds., Kongzi yu dangdai Zhongguo [Confucius and Contemporary China] (Beijing: Xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2008).
4. Scholars and reformers have also debated experiments with subnational democratic deliberation and “democracy within the party,” but these tend to be viewed as eventually paving the way for “full” democracy in the form of competitive elections for top leaders.
5. This section draws on Wang Ruichang, “The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China,” in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, ed. Fan Ruiping (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 33–45; and Erika Yu and Meng Fan, “A Confucian Coming of Age,” in Fan, Renaissance of Confucianism, 241–57.
6. Several of Jiang’s cohorts went on to become prominent legal scholars, including Liang Zhiping (a distinguished legal historian of the Qing dynasty) and He Weifang (perhaps the most prominent liberal legal scholar in China).
7. This is not to deny that neo-Confucians also wrote on politics: Zhu Xi’s idea of the community compact is a famous example. But political constraints meant that they could not be too explicitly focused on state-level politics (in some ways, the constraints were greater than they are today: for example, neo-Confucians did not have the option of publishing their works overseas in a different language).
8. See, e.g., Stephen Angle, “Rethinking Confucian Authority and Rejecting Confucian Authoritarianism,” in Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua (di ba ji): Tang Junyi yu Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu [Chinese Philosophy and Culture (v.8): Tang Junyi and the Studies of Chinese philosophy], ed. Liu Xiaogan (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2010), 27–55.
9. See Guy S. Alitto’s excellent intellectual biography of Liang Shuming that was somewhat prematurely titled The Last Confucian, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
10. To be more precise, Jiang began to shift his focus from self-cultivation Confucianism to political Confucianism before the bloody repression of the student movement on June 4, 1989. In May 1989, Jiang participated in a conference held at Hong Kong Baptist University on the theme of ultimate concern for the postmodern world. Jiang presented a paper titled “The Meaning and Problem of Revitalizing Confucianism in Mainland China,” in which he argued that the priority for Chinese scholars should be exploring how Confucianism can tackle problems faced by contemporary China rather than responding to challenges posed by the postmodern West.
11. Jiang’s earlier works on political Confucianism include three books: Gongyangxue yinlun [Introduction to the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995); Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan [Political Confucianism: The Transformation, Special Characteristics, and Development of Contemporary Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2003); and Shengming xinyang yu wangdao zhengzhi: rujia wenhua de xiandai jiazhi [Faith in Spiritual Life and Politics of the Way of the Humane Authority: The Modern Value of Confucian Culture] (Taiwan: Yang Zheng Tang Chuban, 2004). These books have yet to be translated into English.
12. For an account of my visit to the Academy, see “A Visit to a Confucian Academy,” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=146, September 22, 2008 (accessed June 19, 2011).
13. Wangdao is more commonly translated as the “kingly” or “royal” way, but given that Jiang argues that the monarch should have a largely symbolic role, it may be misleading to use an English term that suggests the monarch exercises substantial political power. The first book of this translation series also translates “wang” as “humane authority” (Yan Xuetong [Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe, eds.; Edmund Ryden, trans.], Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011]).
14. In Chinese, the scholarly tradition of Confucianism is known as Ruxue. Ru is a tradition with Confucius as a central figure, but it predates Confucius (who viewed himself primarily as a transmitter of an earlier tradition) and was carried on as a tradition with different interpretations after Confucius. Since the “House of Confucians” connotes (to the Anglophone ear) the more narrow idea of a house composed of the followers of Confucius, we translate the Tongruyuan as the “House of Ru.”
15. Functional constituencies are highly controversial in the Hong Kong context, and there may be similar problems if they are used in China as a whole: see my book China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 182–83.
16. Chapter 1, note 25.
17. Hahm Chaihark puts forward a similar proposal. In Choson dynasty Korea, the king was obliged to listen to policy lectures by Confucian scholars and was not allowed to hold audience with ministers unless he was accompanied by two court historians, one of whom recorded all the verbal transactions while the other recorded all physical movements. Hahm argues that “we should retrieve the notion that a ruler can and should be disciplined by being lectured to all the time, and put under constant surveillance.” Hahm Chaihark, “Constitutionalism, Confucian Civic Virtue, and Ritual Propriety,” in Confucianism for the Modern World, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52.
18. Page 64 of this book and chapter 2, note 39.
19. Such claims make more sense of “civilizational” states like China, rather than recently created states like Singapore that are the self-conscious creation of identifiable “founding fathers.”
20. The Thai monarchy is perhaps the closest model of what Jiang Qing has in mind for China. Just as the Thai monarch must be a Buddhist from a distinct lineage who stands above the fray and mediates political conflicts between real power holders as well as supports all traditions and religions in Thailand, so the Chinese monarch should be a Confucian from a distinct lineage who stands above the fray and mediates political conflicts between real power holders as well as supports all traditions and religions in China.
21. What Chan terms “civility” is similar in substance to what American liberal theorists such as Amy Gutmann and Stephen Macedo term “public reason.”
22. John Rawls himself, however, would disagree with this implication. His last work—the Law of Peoples—is an argument that liberal societies should tolerate “decent” nondemocratic societies with an official state religion so long as they have consultative mechanisms and respect basic human rights. Jiang’s “Confucian constitutionalism” is an excellent example of a “decent” society, except that Jiang would add that it is superior to liberal democracy, not a subpar society that should be “tolerated” by liberal societies.
23. In discussion, however, Bai Tongdong suggested that Confucianism might be more flexible than Jiang suggests. For example, Confucians might favor a complementarity of roles in marriage arrangements that need not map directly onto sex differences; hence, gay marriages that instantiate a complementarity of roles might be (legally) acceptable to Confucians.
24. Bai and Chan both appeal to Rawls to argue that any defense of Confucianism needs to be stripped of a priori foundations to be acceptable in a modern-day pluralistic context, but Bai is more optimistic about the fate of Confucianism in China in the sense that he believes a modernized version of pre-Qin nontranscendent Confucianism that captures the true spirit of Confucianism could command widespread assent in China (as opposed to a “piecemeal” defense of values derived from the Confucian tradition that aims for political consensus without moral consensus). Li, as we will see, goes even further than Bai, in the sense that he explicitly thinks it is possible to build a society built on a consensus of Confucian values (even though the political form would be democratic).
25. As Jiang himself points outs, both Bai and Li accuse Jiang of defending a view of a transcendent heaven that does not represent the true spirit of Confucianism, but whereas Bai accuses Jiang of employing a later Han Confucian reading of heaven that represented a distortion of classical Confucianism, Li accuses Jiang of invoking a reading of heaven that was even earlier than the pre-Qin classical period. Bai does note, however, that the Han reading is an apparent (politically motivated) move back to a pre-pre-Qin reading.
26. One might add that there are different levels of crises of popular legitimacy. It may be true that there is more popular support for the Chinese government than for most Western governments, but it is doubtful that there is more support for China’s constitutional system as a long-term ideal compared to (for example) the support for the constitution in the United States. Put differently, Americans are likely to be satisfied with their form of government even if they are dissatisfied with their particular rulers, whereas the opposite may be true in China.
27. The same goes for his critics: their comments are excellent from an academic point of view, but they seem aimed at hacking away at the foundations of Jiang’s theory with the hope that the whole edifice would collapse rather than learning from his theory.
28. I use the word “impression” because Jiang Qing has been open to modifying his views if he has felt that his critics have advanced arguments that have allowed him to improve his theory (e.g., he modified his view that the three houses should have equal power in response to the criticism that it would lead to political gridlock). See Jiang Qing, “Rujiao xianzheng de yili wenti yu yihui xingshi: huiying Bei Danning jiaoshou dui ‘Yihui Sanyuanzhi’ de piping” [“Political Legitimacy and the Tricameral Parliament: Reply to the Criticism of Daniel A. Bell”] (unpublished manuscript). Plus, he openly says that the Way of the Humane Authority has incorporated some elements of modernity, such as democratic elections for the House of the People. Other aspects of his theory—like the fact that it is nonsexist in the sense he implicitly allows for the possibility that both women and men can be rulers—also seem to be informed by modern ideas of gender equality. So presumably Jiang should be open to further improvements to his theory in response to new developments and new arguments. One can infer that he did not modify his views in response to the four critics in this book because he thought they did not put forward any arguments that caused him to rethink and improve his theory. So that is why I ask if Jiang Qing could “compromise” without having to give up his normative commitments. From Jiang Qing’s perspective, the result may not be as desirable as the Way of the Humane Authority, but from his critics’ point of view, it would be an improvement.
29. Chapter 3, note 16.
30. Chapter 3, note 16.
31. Daniel Bardsley, “Plan for Church Higher Than Confucian Temple Causes Stir in China,” http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/asia-pacific/plan-for-church-higher-than-confucian-temple-causes-stir-in-china?pageCount=0, April 12, 2011 (accessed June 19, 2011).
32. In discussion, Jiang Qing said my own criticisms of Yu Dan were overly harsh, even though he largely agrees with the substance of the critique (see my book China’s New Confucianism, appendix 1).
33. This is not to deny that some people benefitted from the Cultural Revolution. One successful businessman told me that he would still be toiling in the fields had it not been for the Cultural Revolution: his father was admitted to the elite Beijing University largely because of his peasant background, thus paving the way for upward mobility for himself and his family members. For a scholarly defense of the view that the rural poor and urban working class often benefitted from Mao’s policies in the Cultural Revolution, see Mobo Gao, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2008).
34. Chapter 8, note 41.
35. Elsewhere, Jiang has written, “[A]fter conservatism, socialism comes closest to Chinese thought in all of western thought. In fact, Chinese history shows that Confucianism is a natural form of socialism.” He argues that such socialist values and concern for the poor and global justice are also traditional Confucian concerns. Moreover, Jiang argues that the “authentic critical spirit of original Marxism … is still required in China today” to address the huge gap between rich and poor in China. But Marxism cannot address the basic problem of legitimacy because it is foreign (and hence lacks historical legitimacy) and also because it is a form of secular atheism in which technology determines historical development (and hence lacks sacred legitimacy). See his article “Rujiao xianzheng de yili wenti yu yihui xingshi.”
36. In the Record of Rituals, the most famous account of a Confucian political ideal begins with “tianxia wei gong” (the world for all) and is followed by the line “xuan xian yu neng” (the virtuous and the talented will be chosen [to rule]), suggesting that even an ideal that has been compared to “higher communism” would need a state governed by those with above-average moral judgment and intellectual ability.
37. Bryan Caplan has argued that American voters hold irrational beliefs that pose the greatest obstacle to sound economic policy, and he suggests that requiring potential voters to pass tests of economic literacy would lead to more sensible policies. Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 197. Such proposals are nonstarters in the American context, but in China they may hold some promise.
38. See, e.g., Joseph Chan, “Democracy and Meritocracy: Toward a Confucian Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34, no. 2 (June 2007): 179–93; Bai Tongdong, “A Mencian Version of Limited Democracy,” Res Publica 14, no. 1 (2008)): 19–34; and Chenyang Li, “Where Does Confucian Virtuous Leadership Stand?” Philosophy East and West 59, no. 4 (October 2009): 531–36. It is worth asking why Jiang’s “liberal Confucian” critics reacted so strongly and negatively to Jiang’s proposals even though they share his basic political aim of reconciling democracy and meritocracy. One reason might be that Jiang labels them as “liberals” rather than as different interpreters of the same Confucian tradition (as compromise terminology, they are referred to as “liberal Confucians” in this introduction). I once saw a similar reaction to a well-known orthodox rabbi who addressed a crowd of largely secular Jews at the University of Tel Aviv and questioned their Jewishness because they did not practice religious rites. Speaking for myself, I was charmed by the intelligence and humor of the speaker and thought he was making some good points and was somewhat surprised at the vehemently negative reaction of the audience (perhaps because I am only “half Jewish”—my father is Jewish, and my mother is Catholic—and I already consider myself to be both inside and outside the Jewish tradition, which may be similar to my relationship with Confucianism, and do not agonize too much about whether I have a “pure” Jewish or Confucian identity).
39. To borrow Rawlsian language, both sides can strive for an overlapping consensus on politics based on different versions of a comprehensive system of (religious or secular) value. Jiang may object to the (re)introduction of Rawls, but such strategies for seeking consensus in politics are older; for example, they were invoked as means for seeking consensus on the basic rights in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (its drafters, including the Confucian philosopher P. C. Chang, allowed for disagreement about foundations). Besides, Jiang should not object to borrowing from aspects of Rawlsian liberalism if they help to promote his political aims just because it comes from Rawls (just as liberals should not endorse Rawlsian liberalism just because it comes from Rawls).
40. Given that the members of the House of Ru are supposed to focus on the needs of future generations and foreigners, it may also be desirable that the deputies be tested for basic knowledge of environmental science and international affairs.
41. Jiang argues that the American constitutional system prioritizes a Protestant value system, but it does not explicitly do so. In the same vein, the Chinese constitutional system could prioritize a Confucian value system without explicitly doing so.
42. But nineteenth-century “aristocratic” liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville explicitly allowed for elite rule in liberal societies (e.g., Mill suggested that educated people should have extra votes) and hence may have been more supportive of such proposals.
43. He does not, however, explicitly draw on contemporary legal (and social scientific) scholarship in support of his views on Confucian constitutionalism.
44. A more substantial modification would be to allow for the possibility that the Academy need not be composed exclusively of Confucian scholars, but Jiang is almost certain to reject such a modification (even if the Academy is still primarily composed of Confucians) because the members of the Academy are supposed to represent sacred Confucian values.
45. The U.S. presidential system may be defective in the sense that the U.S. president is both the head of state whom people project their emotions onto and the most politically powerful head of government. In practice, it may mean that Americans do not rationally scrutinize the president’s policies as much as they should, especially regarding foreign policy.
46. Consider the serious doubts about the “playboy son” and likely successor to the current king of Thailand.
47. Even as an ideal, however, parts need to be further fleshed out. For example, the composition of the executive branch of government other than the symbolic monarch remains unclear (perhaps it can be composed of three people chosen from each of the three houses, like a Confucian-style politburo?).
48. This is not to deny that there has been substantial political reform the past three decades. Most important, there are now term and age limits for the top posts of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. There is also a competitive voting process for leaders within the highest echelons of the party (e.g., Hu Jintao is said to have lost the vote that was meant for him to choose his own successor; Hu’s protégé Li Keqiang lost the vote to Xi Jinping). But such changes have not been openly debated, and they are not sufficiently substantial reforms from the point of view of most critics of the government (even from the point of view of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who has called for more political reforms).
49. For a recent essay that seeks inspiration from Kang Youwei’s political ideals, see Ban Wang, “The Vision of International Morality in Kang Youwei’s Book of the Great Community” (paper presented at the Tianxia Workshop, Stanford University, May 6–10, 2011).
1. I have thought about the three sources of legitimacy of the Way of the Humane Authority for over a decade and discussed the issue with colleagues and friends, but had not yet written my ideas down. With the publication of Political Confucianism, which discusses politics in a rather different way, more people at home and abroad were interested in the Way of the Humane Authority, so I wrote a paper for the “International Conference on Contemporary Confucianism” in Hangzhou and set out the basic features of the Way of the Humane Authority to reply to scholars both at home and abroad.
2. Sébastien Billioud notes that Confucianism distinguished between external and internal kingship. The contemporary neo-Confucians have discussed the wisdom of Confucianism, the internal kingship, but have joined this to democracy as the external kingship. See Jiang Qing (Sébastien Billioud, trans.), “Le confucianisme de la Voie royale, direction pour le politique en Chine contemporaine,” Perspectives on the Political in China Today (Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident), 31 (October 2009): 103–23, 103n3.
3. Sébastien Billioud notes that Jiang Qing follows Kang Youwei (1858–1927) in going back to the Gongyang Commentary, which treats the historical text of the Annals of the state of Lu as an esoteric teaching of Confucius, with moral lessons drawn applicable to present times. The Commentary was popular in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). See ibid., 103n2, 104n5.
4. The founders of the three dynasties: Yu is supposed to have founded the Xia, Tang founded the Shang, and Kings Wen and Wu founded the Zhou.
5. James Legge, trans., The Sacred Books of China, vol. 4, book 28: The State of Equilibrium and Harmony (New York: Gordon Press, 1976), 324–25.
6. The translator notes that Billioud translates these terms according to the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) as le politique (zheng Dao) and la politique (zhi Dao). See Sébastien Billioud, in Jiang Qing, “Le confucianisme de la Voie royale,” 108n8. See Carl Schmitt (George D. Schwab, trans.), The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
7. “King Wan’s Explanation of the Entire Hexagrams,” in The Book of Changes, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 2, 213.
8. Louis Rougier, La Mystique démocratique: ses origins, ses illusions (Paris: Flammarion, 1929).
9. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992).
10. The translator draws on Billioud’s note that Jiang’s language echoes that of Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who stressed the struggle between human desires and heavenly principles. See Sébastien Billioud, in Jiang Qing, “Le confucianisme de la Voie royale,” 109n19.
11. In fact, this pressure comes from the steel, chemical, and auto industries and from the fact that most Americans are reluctant to reduce their standard of living.
12. Carl J. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942).
13. For instance, in the Western Middle Ages, sacred legitimacy was exalted as the only kind, leading to politics dominated by religious authority and oppression of reasonable human desires. The contemporary Western democracy, as discussed, has gone to another extreme. Or, in some Islamic countries, cultural legitimacy is exalted, and so those countries reject any change or reform of the cultural legacy. Such regimes do not accord with the will of the people and are obstinately conservative.
14. Although India and Japan did so reluctantly at first and only later by choice or partly so.
15. The translator draws on Billioud’s note that the six offices represent heaven, earth, and the four seasons (The Rites of Zhou). See Sébastien Billioud, in Jiang Qing, “Le confucianisme de la Voie royale,” 115n23.
16. The translator draws on Billioud’s note about the daishi (Grand Teacher), daifu (Grand Counselor), and daibao (Grand Protector) of the Zhou kings. See ibid., 105n24.
17. The translator notes from Billioud’s note that the Bright Hall is where the Zhou king conducted administrative affairs. See ibid., 116n25.
18. The translator draws on Billioud’s note that this is a Song dynasty custom with origins in the Han. See ibid., 116n26.
19. The translator draws on Billioud’s note that dynastic annals were kept by many early dynasties. The system was formalized in the Tang and called True Records. See ibid., 116n27.
20. The translator notes from Billioud’s note that the four major sacrifices were at the altar of heaven to the south of the imperial city, the altar of earth in the north, the altar of the sun in the east, and the altar of the moon in the West. See ibid., 116n28.
21. The term guoti [national body] comes from the Spring and Autumn Annals and refers to the one body of the state that endures through the centuries. The state is the product of history and culture. It is an organic body. From the day the life of the state begins its organic life can never be cut off no matter what changes there are of dynasty, government, political authority, rulers, or the name of the state. The life of the state will always continue to exist forever. This is what the Spring and Autumn Annals means by saying, “[T]oday’s state is that of the ancestors and of our descendants.” China today continues the life of ancient China and hands this life on to China of the future. History and culture are the life of the state. China will always be China. Hence, the state is not only the product of history but also the body and inheritor of history and culture.
22. The eldest son of the descendants of Confucius has traditionally been honored with the title “Duke Successor to the Sage.”
23. According to the meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals, Confucius was a king and so Confucius’s descendants inherit his royal seat and should be kings. But the term “king” here is not to be understood in the common way. Rather, it stands for a historical and cultural kingship. Confucius inherited the cultural tradition of Fu Xi, Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Kings Wen and Wu, and the Duke of Zhou. These guarantee the legitimacy of the tradition. The descendants of Confucius chair the House of the Nation as a sign of the legitimacy of Chinese culture. Confucius was also descended from King Tang, founder of the Shang dynasty. Hence, he also inherited the rule of the ancient kings, which symbolizes the historical continuity of Chinese culture. His descendants as head of the House of the Nation, therefore, also represent the historical continuity of the nation. The continuity of this history is the cultural legitimacy of China.
24. The members of the House are chosen according to the following principles: “keeping alive the former kings” (Spring and Autumn Annals) for the descendants of rulers; “the three roots of the Rites” since the sages are the roots of culture and we should be grateful to them, for descendants of famous people and sages; the principle of compassion for those “whose renown has spread through generations” (Book of History) for descendants of patriots; the principle of “history as the mirror for running the state” for the history professors; the principle of “sustaining the old people of the state as advisors” for the retired officials; the principle of “choosing the worthy and elevating the capable” (Spring and Autumn Annals) for the worthy people in society; the traditional Chinese tolerance of religions for choosing religious leaders, with the Confucians representing the scholars of the palace and taking the lead and the other religions standing for the “hundred schools” under the direction of the former.
25. The tricameral system is different from Western democratic parliamentary systems. The U.S. Senate and House are chosen in different ways, but members all represent the popular will, which is the sole foundation of law. The restraint each chamber exercises on the other is simply a reflection of different opinions among the people and has no real significance. According to the Way of the Humane Authority, both are part of the House of the People.
In countries that still have a monarchy, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the real power of the monarch is not the source of political legitimacy. Hence, the monarch cannot represent cultural legitimacy, nor exert any influence in the legislative process. The monarch is simply a ceremonial symbol of tradition and so cannot be compared to the House of the Nation. The House of Commons in the United Kingdom is very much like the House of the People in the Way of the Humane Authority. The House of Lords includes archbishops, bishops, aristocrats of the royal house, law lords, and other lords. To some extent it combines the sacred and cultural legitimacies, but since its existence is not clearly defined in law—it is simply something left behind by history—added to which the power of the Commons is always growing while that of the Lords is decreasing, the House of Lords has no effective role.
The Iranian parliamentary system has something like two houses. The parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is rather like a lower house that decides on legislation, while the Council of Guardians is rather like an upper house that assesses laws. Members of the Assembly are chosen by direct elections by all the people and represent popular legitimacy. The Council of Guardians is made up of religious leaders and legal experts. It represents both sacred and cultural legitimacy. However, since Iran is a theocracy, the only form of legitimacy is that of the sacred, and so the Council of Guardians has power over the Assembly and is not subject to its restraint. The two do not work in tandem. One leads the other. This is very different from the three-dimensional relationship between the House of Ru and the House of the People in the tricameral system. While in terms of content the Iranian and Western systems are very different, in their basic format they are not. Both exalt one kind of legitimacy: popular in the West, sacred in Iran. They both go against the principle of harmony and exhibit a biased form of legitimacy.
1. This essay was written for a conference held at Qufu in Shandong, April 25–26, 2009, titled “Reform and Opening Up and China’s Future: Confucian Ideas, Values, Motivations and Explorations.” The conference was organized by Professor Fan Ruiping and Mr. Hong Xiuping and was sponsored by the Qufu Union of Confucian Culture.
2. Contemporary Chinese liberals, new Confucianists, and official circles in Hong Kong and Taiwan also share the same idea about issues of constitutional legitimacy.
3. We are very surprised that neither Kang Youwei nor Zhang Junmai added any Confucian element to the legitimization of their constitutions.
4. Ban Gu, Han shu [Book of the Han History] (Beijing: Shangwu Yìnshuguan, 1941), book 30.
5. In today’s world, among the types of constitution there are Christian constitutions and Islamic constitutions. Each type expresses the particular features of a given culture and civilization. Hence the term we must use is Confucian constitutionalism and not Confucianist constitutionalism or Confucian School constitutionalism because the latter two names refer only to the thoughts of a particular school of thought and do not represent Chinese culture and civilization in its entirety. Moreover, Confucian constitutionalism is the only thing that can respond to Christian or Islamic constitutionalism because in both these cases “Christian” and “Islamic” refer to civilizations formed in history and culture and not to mere schools of thought alone.
6. Ban Gu, Han shu, book 56.
7. Shu King in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 1, part V, book 1, The Great Declaration, 128.
8. Translator’s note: In this section, the author uses rujia and not rujiao. One wonders if that is an oversight.
9. Shu King, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 1, part II, book 2, The Counsels of the Great Yu, 47.
10. This is a comment on the Qian hexagram of the Book of Changes, which is the hexagram of heaven. Cheng Yi, Zhouyi Shangjing shang in Zhouyi Chengshichuan [Cheng’s Commentary on the Book of Changes] (Taipei: Cheng Wen Chubanshe, 1976).
11. Mao Heng, Maoshi zhushu [Mao’s Commentary on Odes], vol. 4 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 1964), 339.
12. For details on this point, see chapter 1.
13. The relationship of sovereignty to legitimacy is a complicated matter of political philosophy. It cannot be questioned that both exist in a tight relationship and in constitutional matters it is impossible to separate them. In general, “sovereignty” refers to the supreme real power of the ruler. To say that sovereignty comes from x is to refer to the origin of its legitimacy. If we say “from the people” then the people are the source of legitimacy, if “the ruler” then he is the source, and if “heaven” then heaven is the origin. Sovereignty is what carries the legitimacy. Without a sovereign the legitimacy does not exist. It would lack any power to rule and could not influence politics. It would be merely a transcendent value. Legitimacy is what founds the value of sovereignty. Without it sovereignty would be naked brute force and politics would lack any correct norm to speak of. The state would be one that, in Mencius’s words, had “lost the way” or that Augustine refers to as an “expanded band of robbers.” From the point of view of political philosophy, the problem of the relationship between sovereignty and legitimacy is a fundamental issue for Confucian constitutionalism and something that we will encounter when discussing other issues.
14. In fact in Western democracies there are also subdelegations as in the American system where the people elect an electoral college, which then elects the president.
15. Dong Zhongshu, Renyifa, in Chunqiu fanlu [Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals], book 8, sec. 9 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1989), 51.
16. See Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984).
17. Modern Western constitutions, on the contrary, uphold limitation of power as a means to ensure the constitution meets its basic goal of power protecting rights.
18. Confucius encapsulated the spirit of this rule by scholars by saying “those who study and do well can be officials.” The later imperial examination system provided a structure for this spirit. Rule by scholars is very different from the Western tradition of rule by wealth. From ancient Greece and Rome up until today in the West, the capitalist class has had a hold on politics and has obtained this by wealth. History shows us that the ways to obtain power are by violence, inheritance, usurpation, wealth, and the will of the people, whereas in Confucian rule by scholarship, power is obtained by learning. From the point of view of human history, that is pretty remarkable.
19. Huang Zongxi (Wm. Theodore de Bary, trans.), “Schools,” in Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 104.
20. Ibid., 104.
21. Ibid., 107.
22. For instance, in its present development in Taiwan, the Control Yuan cannot impeach the president and so remains unable to supervise the work of the government.
23. In practice this means that, for all important discussions or decisions in the country, the Academy is to send two academicians to take part and keep a record: one to record the events and the other to record what is said. Within a legally fixed period of time, the records are then to be consigned to the archives of the Academy and sealed. The recording academicians are to be sworn to silence in the name of the sage kings. Access to the records is then denied to all, until such point as they are made available to later historians.
24. Ban Gu, Yiwenzhi [Treatise on Literature], in Han shu, 3115.
25. The Collection of Treatises on the Rules of Propriety or Ceremonial Usages, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 4, book 17, The Record of Music, 106.
26. The palace examinations were to select scholars for the Hanlin Academy. The emperor, or his representative, selected the best graduates of the triennial examinations for this Academy.
27. It is clear that the Academy functions very differently from Sun Yat-sen’s Examination Yuan. Sun’s Examination Yuan was rather like the old imperial system or that of the modern civil service exams.
28. The Five Classics are the Book of Changes (Yijing), the Book of Odes (Shijing), the Classic of History (Shujing or Shangshu), the Book of Rites (Liji), and the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu).
29. Huang Zongxi, Waiting for the Dawn.
30. Historically the system worked best in the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties, when the lecturers and emperors were in a teacher-friend relationship. In the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911), the emperor assumed a position of too much power, such that, during the lectures, the lecturers kowtowed to the emperor. The reason for this is that the scholar who was lecturing was considered a minister of the emperor and came from among the scholars of the executive under the emperor as in a cabinet or in the Hanlin Academy. He did not come from an independent supervisory body above the executive. Once the emperor assumed political power, the lectureship on the classics could not realize its full constitutional potential. In Confucian constitutionalism, however, the Academy is situated above, and is independent of, all other state institutions, hence the Chair of Classics can adequately fulfill its role by ensuring that at the level of the state’s basic ritual order, it can independently, respectfully, and effectively regulate and educate the political leadership.
31. E.g., to Fu Xi, the Three Kings, Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu, Cheng Yi (1033–1107), Zhu Xi (1130–1200), Lu Xiangshan (1139–92), and Wang Yangming (1472–1528).
32. Translator’s note: The Five Mountains are the Eastern Mountain (Taishan), the Western Mountain (Huashan), the Southern Mountain (Hengshan), the Northern Mountain (Hengshan), and the Central Mountain (Songshan). The Six Honored Ones (Liu Zong) are listed in various ways; a note on the Classic of History gives them as (1) the Four Seasons, (2) Cold and Hot, (3) the Sun, (4) the Moon, (5) the Planets, and (6) Water and Dryness.
33. For more on this, see chapter 3 of this book.
34. On this traditional ceremony, see my article “A Plan to Restablish China’s Confucian Religion.” Jiang Qing, “Chongjian rujiao jihua” [“A Plan to Reestablish China’s Confucian Religion”], Zhongguo rujiao yanjiu tongxun [News on Chinese Confucian Studies] 1 (December 2005): 1–5.
35. It may be objected that, in the past, the emperor or government officials frequently presided at state ceremonies of a religious nature, so what is to prevent government institutions or officials doing the same today. A response to this objection has been suggested above. Here we draw it out in more detail. The reason why contemporary, as opposed to former, government institutions and their officials are unsuitable for presiding at such ceremonies is that politics have changed. In the past state and religion were united and the government aimed to implement the sacred values of the Confucian way, that is the principles of Yao, Shun, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius. Moreover, the emperor saw himself as governing on behalf of heaven and deriving his sacred legitimacy from heaven. China of the past was not the secularized, rationalized state of today. It enjoyed a certain religious and sacred status. In carrying out sacrifices, emperors and government officials had a religious and sacred identity, and hence it was appropriate for them to carry out the ceremonies.
China today has already succumbed to the influence of Western political modernity with its increasing secularization, rationalization, impartiality, and accompanying exclusion of religion, the sacred, and values. State institutions no longer carry the religious values of Confucianism, and state officials bear only a rationalized political significance. It is, clearly, inappropriate that state leaders or government officials preside at state ceremonies in a nonreligious capacity. But this is not to exclude the possibility that one day Confucianism will revive throughout China and the way of Yao, Shun, Confucius, and Mencius will become the official learning of the state.
When Confucian constitutionalism is enshrined, then political and moral authority will be reunited and state institutions will once again be bearers of sacred, Confucian values and China will have returned to her own cultural specificity. China will once again be Confucian China. Furthermore, state leaders and government officials will nearly all have passed the Academy examinations and be scholars who believe in the transcendental values of Confucian religion. Then they will be qualified to preside at state ceremonies because they will enjoy a certain religious status. This union of political and moral authority is indeed what Confucianism seeks. Unfortunately, it has not materialized at present.
36. In democratic constitutions the people are above the parliament, whereas in Confucian constitutionalism scholarship is above the parliament. A parliament is not the ultimate source of authority; it is only the body that carries out sovereignty in practice.
37. The Chinese text gives the titles to the first and eleventh poems in the Book of Odes. The first is said to present ideal relations between husband and wife; the eleventh is its sequel, describing how the world was so perfect there were no faults to be observed.
38. Such as the legalization of homosexual marriage, the founding of one-parent families, the encouragement of sexual liberation or sexual freedom, the promotion of an open and legal sex industry, the cloning of human beings, research into genetic weapons, and blasphemy of the sages and worthy people.
39. It may be objected that this is a Taliban-style theocracy. Yet, unlike the Taliban, though the Academy upholds religion, it does so without exercising any power in carrying out daily affairs, or in performing legislative, executive, or judicial acts. The Taliban, by contrast, does hold such power, though it lacks the structural role of holding other powers in balance and hence does not act purely at the constitutional level. A Taliban-style regime may be described as a theocracy, but not one in which the Academy upholds religion.
If we take a step back and admit that, in fact, upholding religion does have a certain degree of judicial power, we must note that this judicial power is exercised according to the sacred way and principle of heaven. This kind of judicial power is not something that modern secular judiciaries enjoy, want, or have the capacity or qualifications to possess. Modern judiciaries have already become detached from religion and morality and are wholly secularized, rationalized, and neutral. Yet society cannot exist without a power that upholds religious and moral values, for without it society becomes oversecularized and rationalized and people fall into a moral abyss and the whole society collapses. For this reason, the Academy is the only body fit to uphold religious and moral values and ensure the state maintains its basic morality.
40. Below we make a few remarks about the formation of the Academy. The highest spiritual leader of the Academy, the Chief Libationer, could be publically proposed by the Confucians (Rulin). He would manage the affairs of the Academy and would serve for life. In the capital city, the Bright Hall would be erected as the seat of the Academy. Academicians would be chosen by the Chief Libationer from among the Confucians (Rulin) on account of their outstanding merit in both learning and practice and would run the daily business and teaching of the Academy. The state would finance the Academy, though the Chief Libationer would not receive a state salary as an indication of his transcendent and superior status.
Entering into more detail, we suggest that the Chief Libationer and academicians could be selected by a Confucian Scholars Committee (Ruxuejia weiyuanhui) formed of thirty persons selected jointly by the House of Ru and Confucians (Rulin) from the whole country, on the grounds of their outstanding merits in scholarship, practice, virtue, and competence. The Confucian Committee would then proceed to elect the Chief Libationer by secret ballot. He would serve for life unless he wished to resign on health or other grounds. The Confucian Committee would hold power of recall over the Chief Libationer. The academicians would have to be outstanding in both scholarship and practice. Persons could be recommended to this office by being nominated by the state, selected by the people, recommended by the Confucian Scholars (ruxuejia), by modern examinations, or by selection by the Chief Libationer. The election of the Chief Libationer would be like that of the Pope by the College of Cardinals in the Catholic Church, or like that of the Supreme Leader of Iran by the Assembly of Experts. At some later stage we could enter into more detail on the composition of the Academy and the creation of academicians. Here we present a simple sketch only.
41. For more information on the tricameral system, see chapter 1 of this book and my work Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan [Political Confucianism: The Transformation, Special Characteristics, and Development of Contemporary Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2003).
1. From May 3 to May 5, 2010, at the invitation of Professor Fan Ruiping, I took part in a Conference organized by the City University of Hong Kong under the title “Confucian Constitutionalism and China’s Future.” This chapter is my submission to the conference. Although I have taken part in many academic conferences, this one was different in that, despite the difficulty of the topic, my pen flowed freely, and I found that I wrote over sixty thousand characters. Were it not for Professor Fan’s invitation, I might never have gotten around to putting down on paper my thoughts about such an important topic as republicanism under a symbolic monarch.
2. Other organizations may be formed or produced out of interests, reason, will, or belief, but not the state.
3. This is unlike the modern states produced by constitutions that are contractual in nature.
4. Heaven partakes in the formation and continuation of state history through the sage kings and sages who represent it, and so national history shares in the characteristics of heaven and is itself sacred, mysterious, whole, awe-inspiring, and enduring. State rituals also show these qualities since from ancient times rituals at the altars of state and at the altar of the national spirits are the best exemplars of the sacred, mysterious, whole, awe-inspiring, and enduring nature of state history. This phenomenon may be observed in many Confucian classics such as the Book of Odes and the Book of History, which record how the sacred decree of heaven was behind the formation and maintenance of many states.
5. The historical nature of the state and its continuance and eternal existence are connected. These features of the state affect the essence of the state, but the key term is that of historical identity, hence this chapter concentrates on historical identity as the essence of the state, though at times some of the other features will also be referred to.
6. For instance, ancient Greece has now become an Orthodox Christian state. Ancient Persia (Iran) has now become a Muslim state, and the ancient Buddhist states of the Silk Route have also become Islamic states.
7. For instance, it is impossible for today’s Orthodox Greece to revert to the many gods of ancient Greece or for Islamic Iran to revert to polytheist ancient Persia. This is because the historical nature of the state has already formed a firmly fixed nature, out of the mixture of historical rationality.
8. Gongyang Gao, Gongyang chuan in Chunqiu [Gongyang Commentary in the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1931).
9. The term “nation” is also distinct from that of “nationality” since its scope is much broader. In most countries the nation is composed of many nationalities. There are few countries, like Japan, composed of only one nationality. Nation is a historical concept and is formed by many nationalities coming together over the years; hence, it is the nation and not the nationalities who embody the historical nature of the state and hence the existence of the state. It may be that, among the many nationalities that compose the nation, a general awareness has built up over history, or an increase of population has led to oppression of minorities, or because of the great influence of a widespread and ancient culture, there is a dominant nationality, which forms the backbone of the nation and can naturally be taken as representative of the nation. For this reason the religion of the dominant nationality will naturally assume the characteristics of a national religion while the religions of the other nationalities are seen as the free beliefs of a given nationality and lacking in national status. The Chinese people of today is composed of fifty-six nationalities who together form the nation, but the Han people are the dominant nationality and hence represent the nation of China. The Confucian religion of the Han thus naturally becomes the state religion of China. This is not simply the result of abstract deduction; it is a fact of Chinese history.
10. For instance, under the Ming and Qing dynasties in China, the state erected in Beijing a temple for emperors and kings. Sacrifices offered to past emperors and kings by the emperor were an indication of the five thousand years of China’s historical continuity. By honoring the rule of emperors throughout history, the sacrifice manifests the unbroken historical identity of the state, the reason being that the monarchical system is basically founded on the idea of national history as “one line through ten thousand generations.”
11. There are different forms of democracy: procedural democracy, substantive democracy, explicit democracy, implicit democracy, effective democracy, sovereign democracy, democracy at the level of implementation or at the level of legitimization, democracy based on universal suffrage, democracy in which one party monopolizes the government, liberal democracy, and dictatorial democracy. Hence, in the matters of sovereignty, implementation, and legitimacy, a state under a chairman is also a form of democracy.
12. “Article 5: The President of the Republic shall ensure due respect for the Constitution. He shall ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the State. He shall be the guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity and due respect for Treaties.” Assemblée Nationale, “Constitution of October 4, 1958,” http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp, n.d. (accessed April 14, 2011).
13. That the constitution of the Fifth Republic accords the president the role of representing the continuity of the state is due to French constitutional history: an elected president has replaced the traditional hereditary monarchy. It is not purely a creation of de Gaulle himself.
14. While constitutional monarchies may not have written the continuity of the state into their constitutions, their hereditary monarchs are at least in a better position to represent historical continuity than an elected president ever could be.
In states run by a chairman, barring their ideology, there is no great difference from republican presidential systems. Both come from political modernity. The only difference lies in the method of election. In states run by a chairman, the chair is chosen by the People’s Congress, whereas in republics the president is directly or indirectly chosen by all the people. However, in states run by a chairman, the difference between state and government is more marked because the role of the chairman as representative of the state would appear to be spelled out more clearly than the role of a president.
15. The first person to propose a republic under a symbolic monarch was Kang Youwei, at the height of the 1911 Revolution. At the time China’s several-thousand-year-old monarchy had just fallen, and Kang was concerned how the spiritual and living body of the state and its historical continuity could be maintained in a constitution or in the way the state was set up. With profound historical wisdom, bold creativity, and a deep desire to save the nation, Kang proposed the very-Chinese idea of a republic under a symbolic monarch in the face of rush of pro-Western fever to imitate Western constitutions. His wisdom and courage still move those of us today who are seeking a Chinese-style constitution. Unfortunately, given the immense pressure at the time to save the nation, Kang had neither the time nor the right conditions to think about his plan in detail. He was able to draw up only a few simple structural principles. But those very principles are what can help us think today. They provide the wisdom needed for drawing up a constitution based on the specifics of Chinese history and culture. They serve as the point of departure for our efforts today to create a Chinese-style Confucian constitutionalism. As Kang gradually became accustomed to the Republic, he surprisingly did not mention the symbolic monarch but accepted the Western presidential model. This is evident from his draft constitution of 1903. But this fact does not diminish, in the slightest, the creativity and vitality of his original theory. We know that Kang Youwei was a thinker and political theorist imbued with passion and faith, rather than a bookish scholar or systematic academic. So Kang’s intellectual contribution lies in his originality and depth and not in logical rigor or systematic thought. It is precisely those qualities that motivate our principles and thoughts today. Hence, in discussing the form of the state in Confucian constitutionalism, we are inheriting, deepening, developing, and completing Kang’s reflections on the constitution.
16. The highest political hope of Confucianism is for the return of a sage king who will restore the direct rule of the sage kings. Confucian constitutionalism is the interim Way of the Humane Authority that prepares for this direct rule by the sage kings. The former entails personal rule by the sage kings, while the latter relies on the structural input of Confucian religion. Thus, republicanism under a symbolic monarch as presented by Confucian constitutionalism is not designed to last forever. It exists only in this interim period of republicanism.
17. In the United Kingdom and Japan and other countries that enjoy a constitutional monarchy, the monarch either constitutionally or by custom has only state power, which even if it is rarely used or used only on the advice or request of the government is said to be “symbolic.” This does not mean that the head of state as “monarch” is completely powerless or unable to execute state power, and still less does it mean that the symbolic monarch has no influence on the life of the nation. It is a sort of unspoken tradition.
18. When he proposed the post of symbolic monarch, Kang Youwei envisaged giving it to the deposed emperor. In terms of recognizing the direct heir, there was no problem there, but it earned Kang the reputation of wishing to restore the monarchy even after the Republic was founded. Now, a hundred years later, the deposed emperor is already dead, and it would be impossible to find a symbolic monarch in the descendants of the Qing emperors. Not that it would be difficult to find a direct descendant given that we are dealing with a period of only a hundred years, but throughout that time there has been anti-Manchu propaganda and the Qing dynasty has already been utterly demonized. Even today anti-Qing feeling runs high. The Qing rulers were Manchu and, though Kang Youwei proved that the Manchu, like the Han, were descendants of the Yellow Emperor, the narrow racist propaganda of the past century has become part of general belief, such that even today many people in China look on the Manchu Qing dynasty from a narrow racist perspective. Given this background, it is clearly unrealistic, and impossible, to find a suitable candidate for the symbolic monarch among the descendants of the Qing emperors.
19. The kings called themselves “Yin,” but their dynasty was also known as “Shang,” and it is commonly referred to in English by the latter name. However, for all practical purposes Yin and Shang are equivalent terms.
20. Under the feudal system, the rank Marquis is the second among the five. The first, third, fourth, and fifth ranks are Duke, Earl, Viscount, and Baron, respectively.
21. Qi was the elder brother, by a concubine, of the last king of the Shang/Yin dynasty. He was named Viscount of Wei. His name is recorded in the Analects 18.1.
22. Ban Gu, Yang Hu Zhu Mei Yun chuan, in Han shu, book 67.
23. According to the Spring and Autumn Annals, a duke is second in rank to a king. Confucius’s heirs were dukes from this time in the Han and not as is said today ennobled only in the Song. Emperor Ren Zong of the Song ennobled the heir as the Duke: Heir of the Sage.
24. The descendants of all other historical figures, even if they claim to be of noble lineage, cannot claim descent from the ancient kings, and so their lineage has no political significance, nor can it permit them to take part in the public political arena or in the establishment of the basic structure of the state in the way that the heir can lay claim to. Hence, it is he who is qualified to meet the political test of the symbolic monarch.
25. In a broad sense, all Chinese people are descended from the Yellow Emperor, and so all Chinese people can trace their blood back to the Yellow Emperor, but since this blood has already flowed out to all Chinese people, it is significant only when talking about the origin of the nation as such. It is not relevant to the political culture or order of the state that has been formed over a long period of time in China. At least, it is not of determinate significance.
26. In fact, republicanism is not at variance with a peerage. The United Kingdom and other constitutional monarchies are proof of that. I will discuss this further in another paper.
27. See The Collection of Treatises on the Rules of Propriety or Ceremonial Usages, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 3, book 7, Ceremonial Usages, Their Origin, Development, and Intention.
28. Kang Youwei considered promoting him two degrees to the rank of emperor (di) and calling him the Emperor: Successor of the Sage.
29. Confucian texts speak of Confucius as a king, the King of Culture, the Uncrowned King, and the King of the Latter Days. Later the state elevated him to the status of King of Perfected Culture (Wenxuanwang). The title “emperor” (di) is reserved in ceremonial books to Yao and Shun. Confucius is a descendant of King Tang of the Shang and hence should be called “king” and not “emperor.” Confucius’s heir thus inherits his royal title both from Confucius and from King Tang.
30. This would be impossible for secular presidential systems or states with a chairman because for party political reasons neither president nor chairman can be superior to party politics. Both president and chairman also hold many powers that belong to parliment or the government. Furthermore, a president is elected by competition among all the people, while a chairman is proposed by the party. In both cases there is fierce competition. Moreover, once elected, president and chairman hold office for only a limited number of years. Being a country with a long history of centralized power, China is particularly susceptible to unrest and separation as a result of many political forces trying to seek the post of head of state and the supreme state power this brings. Therefore, only a system by which the King Successor of the Sage is the symbolic monarch is adapted to China’s long, historical, and cultural tradition of centralized power.
31. Under Confucian constitutionalism parliamentary power and executive power are not purely secular powers. In the secular political power referred to here, what is meant are the modern Western or non-Western political powers guided or influenced by political modernity. In Confucian constitutionalism, the House of Ru and House of the Nation are not purely secular political institutions. Furthermore, in Confucian constitutionalism, government by scholar-officials is not purely secular power. Nonetheless, even in this Confucian constitutionalism there is a separation between state power and political power. State power has rather more of the sacred about it and political power comparatively less, though political power is not utterly void of the sacred. This is very different from totalitarianism, in which secular political power stifles all sacred space. This is a complex matter, and I have not said all that could be said on the matter. It will be left for a later discussion.
32. It is strange that when Sun Yat-sen, who overthrew the monarchy and founded a Republic, died in Beijing, members of the Republican Party set up a shrine in the temple of the past kings and emperors and held a funeral rite there. This shows that even the Republicans could not deny the historical nature of the Chinese state and, in their confusion, hoped that the Republic could continue the rule of the kings and emperors of the past. Of course this hope did not overcome the fact that the revolutionary consciousness that had thoroughly destroyed the monarchy had also destroyed its most important role, namely that of representing the historical nature of the state. Hence, the Republicans’ hope of inheriting the five-thousand-year rule could not be realized and had to remain as only a hope.
33. In the constitutions of the United Kingdom and Japan today, the monarch can rely on custom or law to call the parliament, dismiss it, proclaim laws, nominate officials, approve foreign affairs documents, and carry out the role that the symbolic monarch has over parliament and government.
34. Let us speak no more of dying for the monarch, nor mention again the loyalty of Guan Yunchang and Zhuge Liang for Liu Bei and A-dou. Even what happened in the early years of the Republic when Liang Dingfen wept night and day alone at the emperor’s tomb will never come to pass in our day. In that year the Qing troops entered Zhejiang, and Liu Jishan and his comrades died for their monarch as a sign of the death of the state. Another example is that when the Meiji Emperor died in Japan, there were Japanese generals who chose to die for the emperor. I wonder what the current “citizens” who are the “masters of the country” today would think of such loyalty!
35. Because the historical and cultural traditions of each country are different, the national ethos is also different. The United States is a rare example of a country with a short history and no tradition of monarchy. Its national ethos is such that its historical legitimacy may perhaps be based on representative republicanism on the basis of universal suffrage. But even if that is the case, one must still separate the state and the government and ensure a division in the constitution between representatives of each. The two should not be confused and focused only on the person of the president alone.
36. At present this kind of power is used by constitutional monarchs in the United Kingdom and in Thailand. In Confucian constitutionalism, both the symbolic monarch and the Academy can resolve ecological crises, but they do so in different ways and to different effect. The Academy has more effective teeth as it can effectively prevent parliament, government, and even the state from running counter to the way and principle of heaven and in effect the ecological values. Of course, the House of Ru also represents the legitimacy of the way of heaven and so can also solve ecological crises in a constitutional way. This problem is very complex and has many fine points to it. Since it is not the subject of this chapter, we will leave it at that.
37. After completing this essay, I noticed that there is a problem that affects the whole system of Confucian constitutionalism, which, although not the topic of this chapter, is nonetheless related to it and so should be briefly explained in order to get a better grasp of Confucian constitutionalism and republicanism under a symbolic monarch.
This problem is that of the five spheres of rule in Confucianism. In the system of Confucian thought there are five spheres of rule: the rule of the Way, of the state, of law, of politics, and of the government. In matters of legitimacy the superior legitimacy is enjoyed by the Way, then the state, down to the government.
These five spheres of rule are found in Confucian constitutionalism where different bodies represent different spheres of rule. The Academy represents the sphere of the Way, the symbolic monarch represents that of the state, a Confucian legal system represents that of the law, the parliament represents politics, and the scholar-officials represent the government. The hierarchy of legitimacy is reflected in the hierarchy of these bodies. In practice the Academy holds supervisory power, the symbolic monarch holds that of the state, the law courts hold judicial power, the parliament has political power, and the government has executive power. In terms of legitimacy, these powers are in descending order. But in the actual running of affairs, except for the supervisory power of the Academy, which always transcends the other bodies and is subject only to the way of heaven, the other powers are mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, of the five powers, four are active and one, that of the law, is passive, in that it is exercised only when a case is brought in court. Speaking of the law, there should be a constitution and a supreme law court that are grounded on Confucian principles. The first task of this is to define a Confucian constitution on the basis of which the supreme law court can exercise independent judicial judgment and investigate breaches of the constitution, and only in this way can it qualify as a Confucian judicial system with the characteristics of Chinese history and culture, and only then can the supreme court represent China’s very own, independent rule of law. (It is not surprising that China must write her own Confucian constitution. In fact, the constitution of the United States is a Christian constitution. The difference is that a Confucian constitution should include some elements of modernity or of the West that do not clash with Confucian ideas.)
In this system the symbolic monarch is the only person who can represent the state. Unlike the British system in which the monarch rules “in parliament,” in the Confucian system the king is above the parliament because the rule of the state is superior to the rule of politics, that is, historical legitimacy is higher than popular legitimacy. This is the special constitutional status of the symbolic monarch. Here I do not discuss the Confucian judicial system or the government by scholar-officials since these matters are also not the topic of this chapter.
1. I am grateful to Elton Chan for translating parts of the original Chinese essay into English. I also thank Franz Mang and Elton Chan for assisting the research and writing of the Chinese article. The work is my responsibility alone. My work on this essay was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (HKU 741508H).
2. A recent articulation of this view is in the work of Yu Yingshi. See his Xiandai ruxue lun [On Modern Confucianism] (Hackensack, N.J.: Global Publishing, 1996), chap. 4.
3. See Li Minghui, Dangdai ruxue de ziwo zhuanhua [Self-Transformation of Contemporary Confucianism] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 1–19.
4. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 59.
5. For a detailed discussion of these two kinds of perfectionism, see my “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, no. 1 (2000): 5–42.
6. Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), 26–28.
7. I have discussed the importance of civility in greater detail in my unpublished paper “In Defense of Moderate Perfectionism” (2009).
8. Chapter 2, note 5.
9. Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan [Political Confucianism: The Transformation, Special Characteristics, and Development of Contemporary Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2003), 37.
10. For details on the Academy, see chapter 2 of this book. For details on the tricameral parliament, see chapter 1 of this book.
11. For details, see chapter 3 of this book.
12. See my “Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism,” Philosophy East and West 52, no. 3 (July 2002): 302–4.
13. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue—xubian” [“Political Confucianism—A Sequel”] (unpublished manuscript), 47–48.
14. I am indebted to Elton Chan for providing the ideas in this section.
15. Wang Fuzhi, Du Tongjian lun: Sung Wendi 13 [On reading the Zizhi Tongjian: Emperor Wen of Liu Song] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002).
16. Anonymous (Fu Huisheng, trans.), The Zhou Book of Change: The Survey I, vol. 1 (Changsha: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2008).
17. Zheng Xuecheng, Wenshi tongyi: yuandao [General Principle of Literature and History] (Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Publishing, 1998), 33.
18. Ibid., 33.
19. Anonymous, Zhou Book of Change, vol. 1.
20. Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 4, book 28: The State of Equilibrium and Harmony, 305.
21. Shu King, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 1, part V, book 1, The Great Declaration, 128.
22. “For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven” (Mencius 7A:1).
23. Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 4, book 28, The State of Equilibrium and Harmony, 302.
24. Dong Zhongshu, Tiendaosi, in Chunqiu fanlu.
25. Wang Fuzhi, Si Jie (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1956).
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism,38.
27. This paragraph is drawn from my unpublished paper “In Defense of Moderate Perfectionism,” which gives a detailed defense of moderate perfectionism against liberal neutrality and comprehensive perfectionism.
28. Shils, Virtue of Civility, 49.
29. I have tried to do this in my earlier attempts. See “Is There a Confucian Perspective on Social Justice?” in Western Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, ed. Takashi Shogimen and Cary J. Nederman (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 261–77; “Democracy and Meritocracy”; “Giving Priority to the Worst Off: A Confucian Perspective on Social Welfare,” in Bell and Hahm, Confucianism for the Modern World, 236–53; “Confucian Attitudes toward Ethical Pluralism,” in The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, ed. Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 129–53; “Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism”; “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212–37.
1. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue—xubian” [“Political Confucianism—A Sequel”] (unpublished manuscript), 15; see also 328.
2. Ibid., 320.
3. Fukuyama, End of History.
4. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 35–38. See also chapter 1 of this book. In my own book A New Mission of an Old State, I also list a few more problems caused by a too strong emphasis on popular will in politics, such as problems related to budget deficits, foreign aid, and foreign policies (that need to be farsighted and stable). Bai Tongdong, Jiubang xinming: gujin zhongxi canzhaoxia de gudian rujia zhengzhi zhexue [A New Mission of an Old State: The Contemporary and Comparative Relevance of Classical Confucian Political Philosophy] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2009), 65–68.
5. Thus in the following, when we use the word “Confucian” in Jiang’s theory, it means ru jiao, and not ru jia.
6. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 57. See also chapter 1 of this book.
7. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 144. See also chapter 2 of this book.
8. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 50–52. See also chapter 1 of this book.
9. See chapter 1 of this book.
10. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 9 and 46.
11. For details, see ibid., 29 and chapter 1 of this book.
12. For details, see Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 97 and 169–75 and chapter 3 of this book.
13. For details, see Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 133 and 143 and chapter 2 of this book.
14. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 84, 134–38, 212–13, and 223.
15. Ibid., 228.
16. Ibid., 11.
17. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
18. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 254.
19. In the Book of Odes, there is a famous line, describing the state of Zhou, that reads, “Zhou is an old state, but its mandate/mission is ever renewing.” James Legge (trans.), The Book of Poetry, in The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, ode 235 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 427. This has become a motto for, among others, the contemporary Confucian philosophy of Feng Youlan that describes what he wishes to achieve. That is, he hopes to show the contemporary relevance of an old tradition, which is Confucianism. So, for him and for the author of this chapter, “old state” means the essence or spirit of Confucianism, and the new mission or new mandate means Confucianism contextualized in today’s world and thus made relevant to it (which explains the title of my own book [Bai, Jiubang xinming] and what I intend to achieve in this chapter). But I think that Jiang is actually imposing an interpretation of Confucianism in an “old” context on today’s world, which is why I call his project “an old mandate for a new state.” There are puns based upon this famous line from the Odes throughout this chapter.
20. In the first part of one of my recent books in Chinese, A New Mission of an Old State: The Contemporary and Comparative Relevance of Classical Confucian Political Philosophy, I offer and defend a Confucian ideal state that is different from Western liberal democracies and human rights regimes.
21. Jiang Qing, “ ‘Rujiao xianzheng’ zhuti cankao wengao—yuanqi” [“The Reason of Writing on the Topic ‘Political Confucianism’ ”] (unpublished manuscript), 103.
22. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 101; see also 232–33.
23. Ibid., 18 and 224.
24. Ibid., 330–31.
25. John Knoblock (trans.), Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, book 17, Discourse on Nature (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 19–20.
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism.
27. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 262.
28. Mencius being one of the most important Confucians in the history of Confucianism.
29. Qian Mu, Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi [Merits and Problems of Chinese Dynasties] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2005).
30. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 289.
31. Ibid., 27.
32. Ibid., 22–23, 27–28, 31, 67, 73, 91, and so on. See also chapter 3 of this book.
33. For the readers unfamiliar with Chinese philosophy, there is a notorious saying by some neo-Confucians that claims “to starve to death is a small matter, compared to saving one’s chastity.”
34. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 104.
35. In chapters 2 and 3 of my book, I offer reasons, both practical and from Confucian texts, why, in spite of the Confucian belief in the equality of human potential to become a sage, in spite of the Confucian emphasis on the government’s obligation to educate everyone, and in spite of Western political theorists’ attempt to reform democracy from within, the poor quality of average voters can never be improved to a level that meets the minimal requirements of a participatory democracy, and thus a hybrid regime is the only solution to the problem with popular democracy (Bai, Jiubang xinming, 21–77).
36. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 134–35.
37. Sheng Hong, “Jishan zhi jia, biyou yuqing—lun rujia xianzheng yuanze de lishi weidu” [“Families That Have Been Doing Charitable Things Will Be Particularly Blessed—On the Historical Dimension of Confucian Constitutionalism”] (unpublished manuscript).
38. For a detailed discussion, see Bai Tongdong, “Philosophical Reflections on National Identity,” in Teaching the Silk Road: Reflections and Pedagogical Essays for College Teachers, ed. Jacqueline M. Moore and Rebecca Woodward Wendelken (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), 139–55.
39. Jiang Qing, “Zhengzhi ruxue,” 74–78.
40. Ibid., 91–92.
41. Ibid., 78.
42. Ibid., 18 and 38.
1. This essay evolved from a paper presented at the International Conference on Confucian Constitutional System and China’s Future at the City University of Hong Kong, May 3–5, 2010. I would like to thank participants at the conference, especially Ruiping Fan, for their comments and critiques.
2. Here I use “conservative” as a value-neutral term.
3. I use “transcendent heaven” as a shorthand translation of Jiang’s notion of transcendent, metaphysical, sacred, and personal heaven. In Jiang’s system, the transcendent heaven in this sense is beyond the “heaven-earth-humanity” triad and hence not interrelated with earth or humanity.
4. Feng Youlan (Derk Bodde, trans.), A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), 31 (Chinese transliteration has been modified to conform to modern usage).
5. Ibid., 57.
6. Meng Mo (ed.), Mengwen Tongxiaoji [Scholarly Records of Meng Wentong] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1993), 23–34.
7. Chen Lai, Gudai zongjiao yu lunli—rujia sixiang de genyuan [Ancient Religions and Ethics—Roots of Confucian Thought] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1996), 183, emphasis added.
8. Ouyang Zhenren, “Xianqin rujia wenxian zhong de ‘tian’—jianlun Meng Wentong xiansheng dui xheyi wenti de sikao” [“The Concept of Tian in Pre-Qin Confucian Texts—Also on Meng Wentong’s Opinions of the Matter”], http://www.mianfeilunwen.com/Zhexue/Zhongguo/30630.html, n.d. (accessed January 18, 2011) (my translation).
9. Cf. Zhang Dainian (Edmund Ryden, trans.), Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 4.
10. Book of Changes: The Great Appendix II.10, my translation. Cf. Z. D. Sung, The Text of Yi King (Taipei: Wenhua, 1988), 333.
11. Knoblock, Xunzi, 15.
12. Ibid., 14.
13. Dong Zhongshu, Tiandi yinyang, in Chunqiu fanlu, book 17, sec. 81, 99.
14. See the last section of this chapter.
15. Chenyang Li, The Tao Encounters the West (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
16. Joseph Chan, “Democracy and Meritocracy.”
17. For a more detailed account of this proposal, see Chenyang Li, “Minzhu de xingshi he rujia de neirong: zailun rujia yu minzhu de guanxi” [“Confucian Content and Democratic Form: Revisiting the Relationship of Confucianism and Democracy”], Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua [Chinese Philosophy and Culture], 10 (2012).
1. Yu Keping, Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008).
2. Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue: dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan [Political Confucianism: The Transformation, Special Characteristics, and Development of Contemporary Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2003).
3. Jiang Qing, Gongyangxue yinlun [Introduction to the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1995).
4. Jiang Qing, “Wangdao zhengzhi shi dangjin zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhan fangxiang: ‘rujiao xianzheng’ de yili jichu yu ‘yihui sanyuanzhi’ ” [“The Way of the Humane Authority Is the Way Ahead for China’s Political Future: Political Legitimacy and the Tricameral Parliament”], Yuan Dao 10, no. 1 (2005): 79–94.
5. Jiang Qing, “‘Rujiao xianzheng’ zhuti cankao wengao—yuanqi” [“The Reason of Writing on the Topic ‘Political Confucianism’ ”] (unpublished manuscript).
6. Jiang Qing, “Rujiao xianzheng de yili wenti yu yihui xingshi,” 3.
7. Jiang Qing, Zailun Zhengzhi Ruxue [Further discussion on Political Confucianism] (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), 5–6, 29.
8. It is a state where “a public and common spirit rule all under the sky; everyone is sincere and friendly; everyone has sense of shame and no one would violate laws so that no litigation and punishment are necessary; everyone acts as a gentleman treating all others equally.”
9. Jiang Qing, “Wangdao tushui: ‘rujiao xianzheng’ de yili jichu yu ‘yihui sanyuanzhi’ ” [“Explanation of the Way of the Humane Authority: Political Legitimacy and the Tricameral Parliament”] (unpublished manuscript), 12–13.
10. Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue, 202–5.
11. Feng Youlan (Derk Bodde, trans.), A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), 31. The translation of these five expressions is that of Derk Bodde.
12. Jiang Qing, Zailun Zhengzhi Ruxue [Further discussion on Political Confucianism] (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), 20.
13. Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue, 206–7.
14. Jiang Qing, Zailun Zhengzhi Ruxue [Further discussion on Political Confucianism] (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), 11.
15. For details, see chapter 1 of this book.
16. Jiang Qing, “ ‘Rujiao xianzheng’ zhuti cankao wengao—yuanqi” [“The Reason of Writing on the Topic ‘Political Confucianism’ ”] (unpublished manuscript), 1.
17. Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 11.
18. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Heinemann, 1983), 64.
19. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942). From Aristotle’s time all the way up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, most political thinkers, whether they were supporters or opponents of democracy, always associated democracy with sortition rather than election. In this book, Schumpeter challenged what he called the “classical doctrine” of democracy and asserted that the idea of “rule by the people” was neither possible nor desirable. Instead, he advocated a minimalist model of democracy whereby the participatory role of the people was reduced to taking part in periodic elections, which was a mechanism for competition between elite.
20. Chen Jie, Yang Zhong, and Jan Hillard, “Assessing Political Support in China: Citizens’ Evaluations of Governmental Effectiveness and Legitimacy,” Journal of Contemporary China 6, no. 16 (November 1997): 551–66; Shi Tianjian, “Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan,” Comparative Politics 33, no. 4 (July 2001): 401–19; Tang Wenfang, “Political and Social Trends in the Post-Deng Urban China: Crisis or Stability?” China Quarterly 168 (2001): 890– 909; Chen Jie, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004); Li Lianjiang, “Political Trust in Rural China,” Modern China 30, no. 2 (April 2004): 228–58; Wang Zhengxu, “Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes,” in Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Lynn White (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005); Tang Wenfang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Joseph Fewsmith, “Assessing Social Stability on the Eve of the 17th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor 20 (2007): 1–24; Shi Tianjian, “China: Democratic Values Supporting an Authoritarian System,” in How East Asians View Democracy, ed. Chu Yun-han, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 209–37; Bruce Gilley, “Legitimacy and Institutional Change: The Case of China,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 3 (2008): 259–84; Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
21. For instance, Shi Tianjian’s “Establishing Evaluative Criteria: Measuring Political Stability and Political Support in the PRC” has not been published.
22. Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China: Bringing Ideology and Governance Back In,” GIGA Working Papers 127 (March 2010): 6.
23. Bruce Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 499–525.
24. Chu Yun-han et al., How East Asians View Democracy.
25. See Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, “Satisfaction with Democracy,” http://www.umich.edu/~cses/resources/results/CSESresults_SatisfactionWithDemocracy.htm, October 24, 2005 (accessed May 7, 2011).
26. Damarys Canache, Jeffery J. Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Meaning and Measurement in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 65, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 506–28.
27. For the original data, see ASEP/JDS Data Bank, “Confidence in the Government,” http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyActualidad.jsp?Idioma=I&SeccionTexto=0404, 2010 (accessed May 7, 2011).
28. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2003), 241.
29. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “The People and Their Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor,” http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf, April 18, 2010 (accessed May 7, 2011).
30. To have access to the data, please visit Norwegian Social Science Data Services, “European Social Survey Education Net,” http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/, 2011 (accessed May 7, 2011).
31. Aristotle argues, “The appointment of magistrates by lot is thought to be democratic, and the election of them oligarchic.” See his The Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), VI, 9, 1294b.
32. John P. McCormick, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 149–50.
33. Wang Shaoguang, “Jingti dui minzhu de xiushi” [“Guarded Against modifications to Democracy”], Dushu [Reading], no. 4 (2003).
34. Hsu Cho-yun, Wangu jianghe: Zhongguo lishi wenhua de zhuanzhe yu kaizhan [The Eternal Rivers: The Turning Point and Evolution of Chinese Historical Culture] (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 2006), 49.
35. See Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 152–79, etc.
36. Hu Qiaomu, “Mao zhuxi zai zhuiqiu yizhong shehuizhuyi” [“Chairman Mao in the Search of an Ideal Socialism”], in Hu Qiaomu tan zhonggong dangshi [Hu Qiaomu Talks about the History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), 70–72.
37. Mao Zedong, “Dui ‘heshi zhengzhi zhansian shang he sixiang zhanxian shang de shehuizhuyi geming’ yiwen de piyu he xiugai” [“Comments and Revisions on the Draft ‘This Is a Socialist Revolution on the Front of Political and Ideological Battlefields’ ”], http://www.hprc.org.cn/hybldrzz/dhgj/mzdzz/wg6/200908/t20090810_24920.html, September 15, 1957 (accessed May 7, 2011).
38. Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shixuehui (ed.), Mao Zedong dou shehuizhuyi zhengzhixue pizhu he tanhua [Mao Zedong’s Remarks on and Discussions about Socialist Political Economy] (Beijing: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shixuehui, 1998), 40–41.
39. Mao Zedong, “Dui zonghouqinbu guanyu jinyibu gaohao budui nongfuye shengchan baogao de piyu” [“Comments on the Report of the General Logistics Department on Further Improvement of PLA’s Agricultural and Sideline Production”], in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Foundation of the PRC], vol. 12 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 54.
40. Mao Zedong, “Guanyu lilun wenti de tanhua yaodian” [“Main Points of a Discussion on Theoretic Issues”], in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Foundation of the PRC], vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 413.
41. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, “Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhi: Maozhuxi zhongyao zhishi” [“The Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Chairman Mao’s Important Instructions”], Zhonggong zhongyang 1976 nian sihao wenjian [Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, no. 4, 1976] (March 3, 1976). Based on Mao Zedong’s several talks during the months from October 1975 through January 1976, this document was personally endorsed by Mao himself.
42. Kang Xiaoguang, “Weilai 3–5 nian zhongguo dalu zhengzhi wendingxin fenxi” [“An Analysis on China’s Political Stability in the Coming 3–5 Years”], Zhanglue yu guanli [Strategy and Management], no. 3 (2002): 1–15.
43. Sun Chengbin, Tian Yu, and Zou Shengwen, “Gengduo xinmiankong ‘liangxiang’ Zhongguo zhengzhi wutai: shiyijie quanguo rendadaibiao gouchen teshe fenxi” [“More New Faces Showing Up on China’s Political Stage: An Analysis of the Composition of the National People’s Congress Deputies”], http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-02/28/content_7687622.htm, February 28, 2008 (accessed May 7, 2011).
44. National Political Consultative Conference, “Zhongguo zhengxie de goucheng” [“The Composition of the National Political Consultative Conference”] http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/page.do?pa=402880631d247e3e011d24ad4ee60072&guid=4625e9e517e64bddac0d3ea06e09fb8f&og=402880631d2d90fd011d2de66e59027e, December 19, 2008 (accessed May 17, 2011).
45. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
46. Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1991).
47. Wang Shaoguang, Qumei yu chaoyue: fansi minzhu, ziyou, pingdeng, gongminshehui [Disenchantment and Transcendence: Reflections on Democracy, Freedom, Equality, Civil Society] (Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe, 2009), 227–33.
48. Sean Loughlin and Robert Yoon, “Millionaires Populate U.S. Senate: Kerry, Rockefeller, Kohl among the Wealthiest,” http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/06/13/senators.finances/, June 13, 2003 (accessed May 17, 2011); Paul Singer, Jennifer Yachnin, and Casey Hynes, “The 50 Richest Members of Congress,” http://www.rollcall.com/features/Guide-to-Congress_2008/guide/28506-1.html?type=printer_friendly, September 22, 2008 (accessed May 17, 2011).
49. Agence France Presse, “Millionaires Fill US Congress Halls,” http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0630-05.htm, June 30, 2004 (accessed May 17, 2011).
50. Wang Shaoguang, Qumei yu chaoyue, 241–42.
51. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).
52. Mark Murray, “Obama Blasts GOP for Ignoring Economy,” http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/09/03/1334964.aspx, September 3, 2008 (accessed May 17, 2011).
53. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 260–70.
54. Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue, 341–58.
55. Ibid., 18–23.
56. Ibid., 109.
57. The Anecdotal History of the Scholars (Rulin Waishi) is a novel by Wu Jingzi (1701–54).
58. The Ye Shaoweng of the Song dynasty accused Zhu Xi in his Sichao jianwenlu as follows: He maltreated his elderly mother and was lacking in piety toward his parents. He played with a Buddhist nun and seduced her into becoming his concubine. He opened his door to students, whose families offered him gifts worth tens of thousands of taels of silver. The reference to his maltreatment of his mother refers to his not giving good rice to her to eat. See Ye Shaoweng, Sichao jianwenlu [Records of Observation in Four Dynasties] (Taipei: Guang Wen Shu Ju, 1986). Zhu Xi himself did not deny some of those allegations. He said that he had reflected on his conduct and expressed his willingness to repent. Hong Mai in his Yijianzhi also records Zhu Xi’s hypocrisy and small-mindedness. See Hong Mai, Yijianzhi (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937).
59. Longchan, “ ‘Xuezhe shetou’ Zheng Jiadong” [“Scholar Smuggler Zheng Jiadong”], Sanlian shenghuo zhoukan [SDX Life Weekly], no. 25 (2005).
60. Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, 1952).
61. The distinction between great and little traditions is one made by Robert Redfield. See his Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
62. Bell, China’s New Confucianism, 22.
63. Baidu has an English introduction about its products at “The Baidu Story,” http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=irol-homeprofile, 2011 (accessed May 17, 2011).
64. Jiang Qing, “Wangguanxue, Zhengzhi baoshou yu hefaxing chongjian: Nandou zhoukan Jiang Qing zhuanfang” [“Reconstructing the Palace School, Political Conservatism and Legitimacy: Southern Weekly’s Interview with Jiang Qing”], http://www.rjfx.net/dispbbs.asp?boardID=25&ID=7051&page=1, August 30, 2007 (accessed May 17, 2011).
65. Bai Tongdong, “Yige rujiao banben de youxian minzhu: Yige gengxianshi de wutoubang” [“A Confucian Version of the Limited Democracy: A More Realistic Utopia”] in his Jiubang xinming, chap. 3.
66. Two legendary sage kings in ancient China.
67. Wang Shaoguang, “Jianshou fangxiang, tansuo daolu: Zhongguo shehuizhuyi liushinian” [“Adhere to the Direction, Exploring New Road: The Practice of Socialism in China in the Last 60 Years”], Zhongguo shehui kexue [China Social Sciences], no. 5 (2009).
68. Erik Olin Wright, “The Real Utopias Project,” http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm, n.d. (accessed May 17, 2011).
69. See Wang Shaoguang, Qumei yu chaoyue; and Minzhu sijiang [Four Lectures on Democracy] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2008).
1. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 96, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1–21.
2. See Neuhaus, Naked Public Square.
3. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Leo Strauss, On Tyranny (New York: Free Press, 1991) and What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
4. James Legge (trans.), The Book of Historical Documents, in The Chinese Classics, vol. 3, The Announcement of T’ang (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 186.
5. James Legge (trans.), The Book of Poetry, in The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, ode 191 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 312.
6. Ibid., ode 255, 505.
7. Direct rule by sage kings is the highest historical ideal, but rule by sages or scholar-officials is a practical goal that can be realized in history.
8. For instance, besides the basic demand of respect for parents, the Classic of Filial Piety explains carrying out filial piety as exerting social responsibility, accepting the political duty of running the state, and fulfilling the transcendent, sacred meaning of life by realizing religious and moral values. This is what is meant by the Classic of Filial Piety when it says filial piety “commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; it is completed by establishment of the character.” In Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 1, 466–67. These are the familial, sociopolitical, and religious dimensions of piety.
Again the Classic of Filial Piety goes on to say, “When we have established our character by the practice of the (filial) course, so as to make our name famous in future ages, and thereby glorify our parents.” Ibid., 466. This means that the way to carry out piety is by realizing religious and moral values and thus accomplishing one’s transcendent sacred life and thereby ensuring that the life of one’s parents endures forever. The Classic of Filial Piety goes on to speak of the Duke of Zhou who “at the border altar sacrificed to Hau-ki as the correlate of Heaven, and in the Brilliant Hall he honoured king Wan, and sacrificed to him as the correlate of God.” Ibid., 477. The Analects speaks of Yu as “showing great piety to ghosts and spirits” (Analects 8.21). These passages refer to the religious dimension of piety.
In four chapters, “Xiaozhi” (Filial Piety in Government), “Shengzhi” (The Government of the Sages), “Ganying” (The Influence of Filial Piety and the Response to It), and “Sangqin” (Filial Piety in Mourning for Parents), the Classic of Filial Piety variously discusses the piety of social public responsibility and political duty and the piety of the realization of transcendent sacred values and eternal life.
Again, the Record of Rites of the Elder Dai has a theory of the three roots of rites, one of which is stated as “the prince as teacher is the root of ruling.” Dai De, Da Dai Liji [Record of Rites of the Elder Dai] (Taipei: Shangwu Yìnshuguan, 1984), 41. By the prince as teacher is meant the union of virtue and status as with the sage kings. “Ruling” here refers to the educational and moral transformation of society and politics, which is the same as the culture of the sages mentioned above. On the basis of these three roots of rites, Confucianism has formed the idea of the three returns for rites. This means that by sacrificial rites to the three roots, to heaven-earth, ancestors, and the prince as teacher, one can show piety in response to the grace by which heaven and earth have formed humanity and all that is, piety in response to the grace of life given to us by our ancestors, and piety in response to the grace by which the prince as teacher undertakes the educational and moral transformation of society by means of the culture of the sages and thus ensures the stability and harmony of society. Here, the response to the sages embodies the cultural aspect of piety, which is involved in offering sacrifices to the sages, and the responses to heaven and earth and to ancestors express the religious aspect of piety. Hence, we can say that response is piety and that the three forms of response are piety toward heaven and earth, toward ancestors, and toward the sages. These three forms of piety were later inscribed on a tablet as Heaven Earth Parents Prince Teacher and form part of the common faith of Chinese people.
Furthermore, the Record of Rites of the Elder Dai says, “Grass and trees are felled in season; birds and beasts are killed in season. The master said; ‘to fell one tree or kill one beast not in season is to fail in piety.’ ” Ibid.,186. What is spoken of here is the way of treating things with filial piety, a piety directed toward nature. Moreover, in the faith of piety that involves responding to heaven and earth, heaven and earth are both the transcendent sacred religious origin and the natural world of sun, moon, stars, mountains, and rivers. So the piety of responding to heaven includes the ecological sense of treating things with piety.
9. The Classic of Filial Piety tells the story of a conversation between Zengzi and Confucius. Zengzi asked “[i]f (simple) obedience to the orders of one’s father can be pronounced filial piety.” Confucius replied, “[T]he father who had a son that would remonstrate with him would not sink into the gulf of unrighteous deeds. Therefore when a case of unrighteous conduct is concerned, a son must by no means keep from remonstrating with his father. . . . Hence, since remonstrance is required in the case of unrighteous conduct, how can (simple) obedience to the orders of a father be termed filial piety?” Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 1, 484. From this we can see that even in the family circle obedience to parents is not unconditional. The conduct of the parents must be in accord with right living if the children are to obey. It is not a case of simple obedience alone.
10. Bai Tongdong and Li Chenyang share a sympathetic understanding of Confucianism and appreciate many Confucian values. However, the framework and direction of their basic political thinking is still that of liberalism. Among academics in China today there is a Chinese liberalism and a Confucian liberalism. Bai and Li can perhaps be accommodated under both of these labels. In my reply to Joseph Chan, I have already discussed some of the basic principles of liberalism, and so here I do not repeat what was said there insofar as it also applies to Bai and Li. Instead, I concentrate on the important points raised by the two, which have not yet been discussed.
11. Ban Gu, Dong Zhongshu chuan, in Han shu, book 56.
12. A peaceful transition of political power, by abdication and succession or by hereditary succession, is one way in which heaven exercises its sovereignty. There are many other ways too, such as in giving life to all that is, in revealing auspicious omens, and in sending down disasters.
13. The Great Declaration in The Book of History.
14. See my discussion in chapter 2.
15. “Explain” here has two meanings: it means to interpret and to deconstruct, or to deconstruct while interpreting. For more details see my paper “Yi Zhongguo jieshi Zhongguo: huigui Zhongguo ruxue xijuan de jieshi xiyong” [“Explaining China from a Chinese Perspective: Returning to the Internal Logic of Chinese Confucianism”], http://www.chinamengzi.net/Library/ddmjsj/jqwj/200707/1797.html, July 23, 2007 (accessed April 15, 2011).
16. Mencius is talking about the undoing of political power by heaven and not by men. The human undoing of power, evidenced in the historical examples of the revolutions led by Tang and Wu, was but a form of implementation of the will of heaven.
17. Mencius says that heaven is what acts without action.
18. “King Wan’s Explanation of the Entire Hexagrams,” in The Book of Changes, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 2, 213.
19. Because today’s academic world has rejected metaphysics, it has deconstructed the united purpose of the universe and the universal significance of the world, with the result that the world and human history have fallen into a chaos and absurdity without purpose, meaning, or value. This type of thought is very prolific and should be discussed elsewhere.
20. Li Chenyang, “Tian-di-ren zhi tian, haishi chaoyue tian-di-ren zhi tian?—jianlun ‘minzhu de xingshi he rujia de neirong’ ” [“Heaven of the ‘Heaven-Earth-Humanity’ Triad or Transcendent Heaven? Also on the Discussion of ‘Confucian Content with Democratic Form’ ”] (unpublished manuscript), 4.
21. Chapter 6.
22. Li Chenyang, “Tian-di-ren zhi tian,” 13.
23. Friedrich, New Belief.
24. Chen Shui-bian was president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 2000 to 2008.
25. Li Chenyang, “Tian-di-ren zhi tian.”
26. The House of Representatives, “Honoring the 2,560th Anniversary of the Birth of Confucius and Recognizing His Invaluable Contributions to Philosophy and Social and Political Thought,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/bills-111hres784ih/pdf/bills111hres784ih.pdf, n.d. (accessed June 14, 2011).
27. “Supplementary to the Thwan and Yao on the First and Second Hexagrams, and Showing How They May Be Interpreted of Man’s Nature and Doings,” in The Book of Changes, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 2, 409.
28. See Mou Zongsan, Zhengdao yu zhidao [The Way of Politics and the Way of Governance] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1996).
29. See Fok Tou-hui, “Keyi you youzhi minzhu ma?” [“Can There Be Elite Democracy?”], Fadeng 338 (August 1, 2010). Translator’s note: Fok Tou-hui is the head of the Dharmasthiti College of Cultural Studies.
30. Translator’s note: Fan Yafeng is the head of Christian Human Rights Lawyers of China, the Shengshan (Holy Mountain) Culture Research Institute, and the Shengshan (Holy Mountain) Church.
31. Translator’s note: Tu Weiming is a lifetime professor of philosophy and dean of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University and research professor and senior fellow of Asia Center at Harvard University. He thinks that there can be Confucian democracy, Confucian liberalism, even a Confucian Christian, in which “Confucian” is an adjective and the Western terms “democracy” and “liberalism” are the nouns.
32. See Gan Yang, Women zai chuangzao chuantong [We Are Creating Tradition] (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 1989). Translator’s note: Gan Yang is at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou.
33. Translator’s note: This is a remaking of the famous phrase of Zhang Zhidong (1835–1909) in his book Exhortation to Study of 1898: “Chinese learning as substance; Western learning as means.” See Zhang Zhidong, Quanxiaopian [Exhortation to Study] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 2002).
34. Translator’s note: Chen Yinke (1890–1969), educated in Western learning, retained a preference for traditional cultural norms.
35. Li Chenyang, “Tian-di-ren zhi tian,” 12.
36. The view that Confucianism has already lost all creativity in political matters is not only the view of Professor Li and the other scholars mentioned above. Two classic examples of this attitude can be seen in Yu Ying-shih’s theory of the social role of Confucianism and Lee Ming-huei’s theory of Confucianism as a form of pure criticism alone. Yu Ying-shih thinks that under suppression from authoritarian monarchs, Confucianism was forced out of the political sphere into that of society and that only in society can it still exercise a function. Lee Ming-huei thinks that the basic political framework today is already that of democracy, so Confucianism can only resign itself to fully accepting this situation and not pretend to exert any creativity. This does not mean that Confucianism is totally useless since it can still act as a critic of democracy. From these views, we can see that Confucian-inclined Chinese intellectuals today have accepted a mitigated version of Fukuyama’s thesis in the realm of politics and lost any creative awareness or creativity based on the political ideas of Confucianism itself. Translator’s note: Yu Ying-shih (1930–) taught at several universities, retiring from Princeton in 2001 Lee Ming-huei (1953–) is in Taiwan and is an expert on Confucianism and Kant.
37. Over the past sixty years, China’s national ideological attitude has been one of atheism and materialism. It is this attitude that determines that China cannot resolve the problem of the lack of sacred legitimacy.
38. Chapter 7.
39. Mao’s May 7th Directive refers to Mao’s letter to Lin Biao, then the vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Committee, regarding educational policy, dated May 7, 1966, during the Cultural Revolution. For a Chinese version of the letter, see Anonymous, “Wuqi zhishi” [“May 7th Directive”], http://baike.baidu.com/view/423078.htm, n.d. (accessed June 21, 2011).
40. This point is evident from the Analects, Mencius, the chapter on the Confucians in the Record of Rites, the Four Sentence Doctrine of Zhang Zai (also known as Heng Qu), the Memorials of Wang Yangming, and the history books throughout the ages.
41. Let us imagine that we ask Professor Wang to work on the assembly line in a factory in Dongguan and let an assembly worker from a factory in Dongguan go to lecture in the Chinese University of Hong Kong. This was the ideal of great equality of the Cultural Revolution in which intellectuals and manual laborers exchanged positions. This is impossible.
42. Professor Wang is correct in noting that “Chinese” refers to the way of earth and historical and cultural legitimacy. There is no need to say any more about this here.
43. A political ideology founded on money and wealth is not only that of the West today. It has also been the ideology of the West in the past. Ancient Greece and Rome had this wealth-based attitude to politics. Likewise, the political attitude that relies on rule by the worthy and capable is not only part of my Confucian constitutionalism. It is the tradition of rule by learning that has been a constant thread throughout the five thousand years of Chinese history. For details on this matter, one may refer to my discussion in chapter 2.
44. The Collection of Treatises on the Rules of Propriety or Ceremonial Usages, in Legge, Sacred Books of China, vol. 4, book 17, The Record of Music, 112.