Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, Second Edition

The era following the death of Mao and the demise of the so-called Gang of Four is identified with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his policies proclaimed under the banner of “modernization.” To the latter concept, problematical and contestable in almost any case, a special irony attaches here, after three decades of Maoist “liberation” and revolutionary struggle had failed to fulfill their modernizing goals. What remained to be done, and how, is the subject of the claims, proposals, and counterproposals put forward in the following by some of the leading actors and activists of this period.

In December 1978, veteran leader Deng Xiaoping and his allies gained control of the Party and government and began repudiating the policies of the Cultural Revolution while rehabilitating many of those purged during the last several decades. The new regime claimed it was returning, after Maoist deviations and distortions of Marxism, to orthodox or scientific socialism. It rejected class conflict and emphasized instead the building of the forces of production through the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. The modernization of these four sectors would then create the preconditions for bringing about true socialism, albeit at some vague point in the future. The regime, concurrently, began to emphasize its nationalist as well as socialist credentials, and later to portray itself as the protector of the Chinese cultural heritage.

In the early 1980s the agricultural communes were dismantled and land was leased to individual farm families; agricultural production, helped by a spate of good weather, sharply increased. The government at the same time retooled factories to meet pent-up consumer demand. The country was opened to the outside world, and foreigners were encouraged to bring capital, technical information, and managerial knowledge to China. The new government established four Special Economic Zones to absorb and experiment with foreign knowledge and technology. At the same time, it lessened its reliance on political campaigns and reduced the political pressure on the people. As long as they did not oppose the “socialist” system and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese could think what they wished. In a society where almost every aspect of people’s lives had been controlled, this represented real change. Popular religion revived in the countryside, while cultural and intellectual life in the cities cautiously reappeared. Publishers poured out translations of foreign works, as well as new and old books by Chinese authors. The new regime seems to have been genuinely popular in its early years; people affectionately referred to Deng Xiaoping as “Old Deng,” a term they rarely used for the venerated yet remote Mao Zedong.

The opening of the country and the relaxing of political control, however, created problems for Deng’s regime. Many Chinese came to believe that life in the Western liberal democracies and Japan was much better than life in “socialist” China. Moreover, neighboring countries and territories such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which had decisively rejected socialism, flourished over the course of the 1980s while the Soviet Union and “socialist” bloc countries languished. Belief in the superiority of socialism was shaken. If countries with much the same cultural heritage and racial background as China had advanced so rapidly, they reasoned, why shouldn’t China? Students and intellectuals, already disillusioned by the violence and contradictions of the Cultural Revolution, now had the chance to learn about foreign countries and different political and economic systems. Many came to wonder about the efficacy of the existing Chinese political and economic system. Some, moreover, came to see the regime’s claims to preserve Chinese culture as really intended to block out cultural and intellectual influences from the outside world.

Increased contact with the outside world also now gave members of the Party and government increased opportunities for graft and corruption. The People’s Republic of China had not yet succeeded in establishing institutions to handle this problem, and many of the Party’s political campaigns going back to the early 1940s can be explained in part as attempts to wipe out corruption and curtail special privilege. The prestige of the Party and government, already badly shaken by the violent and seemingly arbitrary political campaigns of the past decades, plummeted. Moreover, since the new regime stressed the modernization of the country rather than revolutionary leadership and the building of socialism, the dominant role of the Party was now called into question. Despite efforts to bring younger and better-educated people into the Party and government, many Chinese saw members of the Party and government as elderly veterans of the Long March or uneducated people who got their positions through seniority rather than through merit. They did not seem equipped to lead China into the twenty-first century.

These developments led to a series of student movements, or “tides,” over the course of the 1980s, which garnered increasing support from the urban population. Intellectuals moved from thinking about reforming socialism to considering how to establish liberal democracy and called for the release of activists imprisoned in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the summer of 1988, government price reforms brought about high rates of inflation in China’s cities, and this in turn created a wave of panic buying. Despite their new admiration for consumer goods and capitalism, urban Chinese were not willing to give up the safety net established for them by the party. In the fall the government slammed on the economic brakes, cutting back on reform. This move, while not entirely reassuring the populace, led to fears among students and intellectuals that reforms begun by Deng Xiaoping a decade before were now being retracted. All these developments culminated in the 1989 student movement and the Tiananmen Massacre of early June.

Through repression, the government managed to stifle dissent and curtail the student movement. At the same time, increased foreign investment led to an economic boom in certain parts of the country; attention was drawn, even by Deng, from making revolution to making money. While certain areas along the coast, such as the southern province of Guangdong, boomed, areas in the hinterland languished. With China rapidly becoming a nation of two unequal halves, migrants from depressed interior provinces crowded increasingly into the more dynamic coastal areas, seeking employment. Meanwhile the population, despite government efforts to curb it, continued to grow, while efforts to increase production and make money at all costs led to increased exploitation and degradation of the environment and to charges that the affluence of some was gained by collusion and corruption among entrepreneurs and bureaucrats.

In 1975 Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was already stricken with cancer and would die early the following year. This speech, given to the rubber-stamp legislature, is considered the clarion call to emphasize modernization rather than class struggle. The Four Modernizations referred to as the second stage became slogans of a national campaign.

Socialist revolution is the powerful engine for developing social productive forces. We must adhere to the principle of grasping revolution, promoting production and other work, and preparedness against war, and with revolution in command, work hard to increase production and speed up socialist construction so that our socialist system will have a more solid material foundation.

On Chairman Mao’s instructions, it was suggested in the report on the work of the government to the Third National People’s Congress that we might envisage the development of our national economy in two stages beginning from the Third Five-Year Plan: The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system in fifteen years, that is, before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing to the front ranks of the world.

We should fulfill or overfulfill the Fourth Five-Year Plan in 1975 in order to reinforce the foundations for completing the first stage before 1980 as envisaged above. In light of the situation at home and abroad, the next ten years are crucial for accomplishing what has been envisaged for the two stages. In this period we shall not only build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system but march toward the splendid goal set for the second stage. With this objective in mind, the State Council will draw up a long-range ten-year plan, five-year plans, and annual plans. The ministries and commissions under the State Council and the local revolutionary committees at all levels down to the industrial and mining enterprises and production teams and other grass-roots units should all rouse the masses to work out their plans through full discussion and strive to attain our splendid goal ahead of time.

Deng Xiaoping and his allies gained control of the party at the third plenary session of the Eleventh Party Congress. This document indicates that they intended to steer the country in a new direction, away from the class struggle and mass movements of the Cultural Revolution and toward the modernization of the economy. Though the rhetoric of revolutionary struggle is still used, the main thrust is to achieve stability.

The Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its third plenary session in Beijing between December 18 and 22, 1978. . . .

The plenary session unanimously endorsed the policy decision put forward by Comrade Hua Guofeng on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee that, to meet the developments at home and abroad, now is an appropriate time to take the decision to close the large-scale nationwide mass movement to expose and criticize Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and to shift the emphasis of our Party’s work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist modernization. This is of major significance for fulfillment of the three-year and eight-year programs for the development of the national economy and the outline for twenty-three years, for the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology and for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country. The general task put forward by our Party for the new period reflects the demands of history and the people’s aspirations and represents their fundamental interests. Whether or not we can carry this general task to completion, speed socialist modernization, and on the basis of a rapid growth in production improve the people’s living standards significantly and strengthen national defense—this is a major issue that is of paramount concern to all our people and of great significance to the cause of world peace and progress. Carrying out the Four Modernizations requires great growth in the productive forces, which in turn requires diverse changes in those aspects of the relations of production and the superstructure [that are] not in harmony with the growth of the productive forces and requires changes in all methods of management, actions, and thinking that stand in the way of such growth. Socialist modernization is therefore a profound and extensive revolution. There is still in our country today a small handful of counterrevolutionary elements and criminals who hate our socialist modernization and try to undermine it. We must not relax our class struggle against them, nor can we weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, the large-scale turbulent class struggles of mass character have in the main come to an end. Class struggle in socialist society should be carried out on the principle of strictly differentiating the two different types of contradictions and correctly handling them in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Constitution and the law. It is impermissible to confuse the two different types of contradictions and damage the political stability and unity required for socialist modernization. The plenary session calls on the whole Party, the whole army, and the people of all our nationalities to work with one heart and one mind, enhance political stability and unity, mobilize themselves immediately to go all out, pool their wisdom and efforts, and carry out the new Long March to make China a modern, powerful socialist country before the end of this century. . . .

While we have achieved political stability and unity and are restoring and adhering to the economic policies that proved effective over a long time, we are now, in the light of the new historical conditions and practical experience, adopting a number of major new economic measures, conscientiously transforming the system and methods of economic management, actively expanding economic cooperation on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other countries on the basis of self-reliance, striving to adopt the world’s advanced technologies and equipment, and greatly strengthening scientific and educational work to meet the needs of modernization. Therefore, there can be no doubt that our country’s economic construction is bound to advance rapidly and steadily once again. . . .

The session points out that one of the serious shortcomings in the structure of economic management in our country is the overconcentration of authority, and it is necessary boldly to shift it under guidance from the leadership to lower levels so that the local authorities and industrial and agricultural enterprises will have greater power of decision in management under the guidance of unified state planning; big efforts should be made to simplify bodies at various levels charged with economic administration and transfer most of their functions to such enterprises as specialized companies or complexes; it is necessary to act firmly in line with economic law, attach importance to the role of the law of value, consciously combine ideological and political work with economic methods, and give full play to the enthusiasm of cadres and workers for production; it is necessary, under the centralized leadership of the Party, to tackle conscientiously the failure to make a distinction between the Party, the government, and the enterprise and to put a stop to the substitution of Party for government and the substitution of government for enterprise administration, to institute a division of responsibilities among different levels, types of work and individuals, increase the authority and responsibility of administrative bodies and managerial personnel, reduce the number of meetings and amount of paperwork to raise work efficiency, and conscientiously adopt the practices of examination, reward and punishment, promotion and demotion. . . .

The session held a serious discussion on the question of democracy and the legal system. It holds that socialist modernization requires centralized leadership and strict implementation of various rules and regulations and observance of labor discipline. Bourgeois factionalism and anarchism must be firmly opposed. But the correct concentration of ideas is possible only when there is full democracy. Since for a period in the past, democratic centralism was not carried out in the true sense, centralism being divorced from democracy and there being too little democracy, it is necessary to lay particular emphasis on democracy at present, and on the dialectical relationship between democracy and centralism, so as to make the mass line the foundation of the Party’s centralized leadership and the effective direction of the organizations of production. In ideological and political life among the ranks of the people, only democracy is permissible and not suppression or persecution. . . . The constitutional rights of citizens must be resolutely protected, and no one has the right to infringe upon them.

In order to safeguard people’s democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is systematized and written into law in such a way as to ensure the stability, continuity, and full authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict and lawbreakers must be dealt with. From now on, legislative work should have an important place on the agenda of the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and judicial organizations must maintain their independence as is appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws, rules, and regulations, serve the people’s interests, keep to the facts, guarantee the equality of all people before the people’s laws, and deny anyone the privilege of being above the law.

In September 1979, after Deng Xiaoping’s assumption of party leadership, the chairman of the State Planning Commission, Yu Qiuli, a vice premier of the State Council and a Politburo member, addressed the State Council on a basic redirection of economic policy. While reaffirming the inseparability of politics and economics, he reversed Mao’s priority of “politics in command” and declared that economics should guide state policy and technical expertise [an “economic cabinet"] provide political leadership. Putting ideology aside in favor of pragmatism, he argued that Mao’s China, following the Soviet model, had fallen far behind after 1949 in the economic competition with Taiwan and Japan, which followed the Western model.

1. The relationship between politics and economics cannot be severed because to do well in economics is to serve the purposes of politics. . . . From now on, we should break away from the bad habit of beginning every briefing with a political report before taking up the subject concerning business operations. People used a lot of political terms even at meetings called by departments in charge of business operations. . . .

2. There is nothing wrong with the “State Council’s being not a political cabinet but an economic one.” Let others say what they want, I see no harm in Jiang Jingguo’s bringing in a large number of economic experts to form a Taiwan economic cabinet. Taiwan’s economy is making rapid progress; the people there are living many times better than the people in any of our provinces, and Taiwan’s per capita income is reported to be the forty-fourth in the world, putting Taiwan among the rich areas. It would not be a bad idea to learn from this economic cabinet. . . .

3. Why do we compare ourselves with Taiwan rather than with any other country? The economic situation in Taiwan during the 1950s differed little from that in any of our provinces, the only difference being that the area on their side continued to be ruled by the Nationalists while on our side we had a change of government. At first, they lived on American aid, later taking the Japanese route of economic development, while we, on the other hand, “leaned completely to one side” and followed the Soviet pattern of economic development. In the first decade, we did have some achievements. In the second decade, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated; the Soviet Union tore up treaties, withdrew its experts, and suspended all kinds of assistance and cooperation projects. It was a time when we could have turned a misfortune into a blessing. For if we had turned back as soon as possible and opened wide our door to take in scientific and technical achievements and equipment from the advanced Western countries, instead of continuing to follow the Soviet pattern, the situation today would not be like this. . . . It is always more difficult to rebuild after destruction than to build up from nothing. The situation in Taiwan is just the opposite. While we were rapidly regressing, they suddenly forged ahead like a miracle. With one working in high gear and the other moving backward, the gap between us has become wider and wider. When our ostrich policy no longer worked, we had to admit that we have lost in this peaceful economic competition in which there was not even a whiff of gunpowder. One does not lose “face” in conceding defeat. Failure is the mother of success. There is no reason why we cannot win back the lost time if we would learn from past experiences.

[From Xuexi zhiliao, September 4, 1979; trans. adapted from Issues and Studies 16, no. 5 (January 1980): 88–90]

Although the Deng regime put an end to the Maoist emphasis on political campaigns and class conflict, from early on it tried to set parameters on speech and actions. Despite these strictures, the eighties, as we shall see below, saw greater freedom for intellectuals than any period since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.

The [Party] Center believes that in realizing the four modernizations in China we must uphold the four basic principles in thought and politics. They are the fundamental premise for realizing the four modernizations. They are [as follows]:

The Center believes that we must reemphasize upholding the four basic principles today because some people (albeit an extreme minority) have attempted to shake those basic principles. . . . Recently, a tendency has developed for some people to create trouble in some parts of the country. . .. Some others also deliberately exaggerate and create a sensation by raising such slogans as “Oppose starvation” and “Demand human rights.” Under these slogans, they incite some people to demonstrate and scheme to get foreigners to propagandize their words and actions to the outside world. The so-called China Human Rights Organization has even tacked up big character posters requesting the American president “to show solicitude” toward human rights in China. Can we permit these kinds of public demands for foreigners to interfere in China’s domestic affairs? A so-called Thaw Society issued a proclamation openly opposing the dictatorship of the proletariat, saying that it divided people. Can we permit this kind of “freedom of speech,” which openly opposes constitutional principles?

Like the Qing dynasty in the nineteenth century, the new regime hoped to open the country to the outside world without modifying its legitimating ideology. New technology or scientific advances were welcomed while Western cultural or political notions were considered threatening and undesirable. The regime therefore developed this concept of a socialist spiritual civilization in the hope of combating the inroads of what it called Western bourgeois material civilization.

Since the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, inspired by the idea of “improving and strengthening the Party leadership,” I have felt all along that, after the ten disastrous years of the “cultural revolution,” there still exists within the Party the pernicious influence of the ultra-left line of the Gang of Four, remnants of the factional ideology of feudalism, selfish individualism of the bourgeoisie, anarchism of the petty bourgeoisie, and colonial ideas that worship things foreign. Under these influences, ideological demands inside and outside the Party have grown somewhat slack. . . . I feel that, along with the general goal of realizing the Four Modernizations, we should also consider putting forward a goal of “building socialist spiritual civilization.” The phrase itself first appeared in Vice Chairman Ye’s 1979 speech at the meeting in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

I consider that the socialist spiritual civilization includes a concrete aspect (such as well-developed education and thriving science, literature, and art) as well as an ideological aspect (such as social ethics, traditions, and customs). For example, by ideals we mean dedication to the people’s cause and building the socialist motherland, whereas moral concepts imply identification of individual interests with the interest of the people and, when the two fall into contradiction, subordination of personal interests to the overall interests of the people. Moral concepts also refer to democracy and unity, hard work and plain living, eagerness to acquire an education, attaching importance to the development of science, paying attention to personal and public hygiene, and being polite and courteous. . . .

It was wrong for Lin Biao and the Gang of Four to emphasize the primacy of the spiritual role. However, we should not overlook the fact that spirit can play a definite role.

The people’s communes had been established during the heyday of the Great Leap Forward, and although they were modified in the early sixties, they remained the primary form of rural organization until the early eighties. At that time the new regime dismantled the communes and leased the land to the people of the communes, hoping that this would increase agricultural production. The farmers still had to sell a certain amount of grain to the state at fixed (albeit higher) prices but could now sell the surplus on the market for whatever price they could get. The new contracting arrangement came to be known as the responsibility system, and at least in the first few years, helped by a period of good weather, production rose. Note, however, that these moves toward free enterprise and a market economy are all clothed in the language of socialism and collectivization and concede nothing in respect to overall state control.

Owing to the shortcomings in the movement of collectivization, the ultra-left interruptions, and the fact that for a long period of time the Party had not shifted the emphasis of work to economic construction, the current material and technical bases for the collective economy are still comparatively weak. Meanwhile, there also are matters in need of improvement and perfection concerning systems and structure of the people’s communes, the weakest link being the management and administrative work. For a long time there have been no significant improvements and breakthroughs in implementing the principle of distribution according to work and in perfecting the system of job responsibility for production. This has caused suppression of the peasants’ socialist initiative as well as insufficient exertion of the superiority of collectivization. Because the collective economy has not been doing satisfactorily, people in a few backward and poverty-stricken localities have even less faith in agricultural collectivization. We must face these problems squarely and solve them aggressively and step by step. At present, it is necessary to regard improvement of management and administration, implementation of distribution according to work, and improvement and perfection of the system of job responsibility for production as the central link for further consolidation of the collective economy and for development of agricultural production. It is necessary to put in a lot of strenuous effort to grasp it tight and grasp it well. . . .

3. Under the moral encouragement of the Third Plenary Session, Party cadres and the masses of commune members have in the recent two years proceeded from actual conditions, liberated their thought and boldly explored, and established many forms of job responsibility systems for production, which can be generally divided into two categories: one is contracted work of small segments with payments according to fixed quotas, and the other is contracted work and production quotas with payments in accordance with actual production. Results of implementation indicate that most areas have increased production by acquiring some new experience. Especially noteworthy is the emergence of the system of job responsibility that gives contracts to specialized persons and gives payment in accordance with actual production, which is widely welcomed by commune members. This is a very good start. Leadership at various levels should sum up the positive and negative experiences, together with the broad masses, and help the communes and brigades perfect and improve the system of job responsibility to energetically push further the management work of the collective economy. . . .

5. The system of job responsibility, of giving contracts to specific persons and giving payments in accordance with actual production, is a system based on division of labor and cooperative work. Under the system, the labor forces [peasants] who are good in agriculture receive contracts for arable lands according to their ability, while those who are good in forestry, stock raising, sideline production, fishery, industry, commerce, and so on receive contracts of various trades concerned according to their ability. Contracts for production of fixed quotas in various trades are assigned to teams, to labor forces, or to households, according to the principle of facilitating production and benefiting management. All operations in the process of production are to be centralized whenever centralization is suitable, and decentralized whenever decentralization is good, by the production team. Centralized distribution [of payment] is made for the portions under fixed quotas, while rewards or penalties are given for production in excess of quotas or unfulfilled production. These are stipulated in the form of contracts for the current year or for the next several years.

This kind of system of production responsibility has many more merits than other forms of contracted production: it can satisfy the commune members’ demand for calculating payments in accordance with production, stabilize the production team’s position as the main economic entity, concretely consolidate both the mobilization of production initiative of individual commune members and the exertion of the superiority of centralized management as well as division of labor and cooperative work; it is favorable to the development of diversified business, popularization of scientific farming, and the promotion of production of commercial items; it is good for people to exert their talents, things to exert their usefulness, and land to exert its potential; it is favorable for the commune members to take care of their sideline business; and it is convenient for making arrangements for production to ensure a livelihood for the four categories of bereaved households . . . and the weak-labor households. This form is, on the one hand, applicable to areas currently undergoing difficulties while, on the other, it can be developed into a system of job responsibility that further divides specialties by an even higher degree and with more socialist characteristics.

During the Beijing Spring period, roughly 1978 to 1981, unofficial journals and big character posters expressing all sorts of ideas flourished, free of government censorship. Most of them, subscribing to Marx-Leninism and the Communist Party, supported the new regime under Deng Xiaoping, which tolerated their existence because they were useful in its battle with political enemies opposed to Deng’s emphasis on modernization of the economy and minimizing of class conflict. Once those enemies were vanquished, however, these publications were closed down and many of their editors and writers were punished by long jail sentences.

It was once predicted that the China giant would shake the world the moment it rose. In 1949 it rose, but over a long period of thirty years it has not yielded proper influence. It not only has failed to surpass the imperialist powers but has staggered along behind, hesitating and wavering. Finally, we realize that this great nation wears two tight shoes—ignorance and tyranny. This is why China fails to keep pace with the times and lacks the ability to stand in the front ranks of the nations in the world. Can it be that the Chinese people truly lack such ability?

To be rich and powerful, China must be built into a modern socialist power. This has long been the dream of the Chinese people. However, to stride toward this great ideal we must break down modern feudalism and modern superstition and gradually acquire socialist democracy and modern science.

On the basis of Marxism-Leninism, this publication supports the Chinese Communist Party, adheres to the socialist path, and follows Comrade Mao Zedong’s policy of “a hundred flowers blossoming and a hundred schools of thought contending.” As a comprehensive mass periodical, it fully exercises the democratic rights of speech and publication as provided by the Constitution. It will publish the appeals of the people and all kinds of articles of an exploratory nature.

The road of progress is arduous and tortuous, but the historical current of the people’s desire for democracy and the nation’s desire for wealth and power is irresistible. The fresh flowers of socialist democracy and science will brave blizzards and spring’s chills and will bloom proudly. Baptized by the great and powerful April Fifth Movement, the Chinese people will, with an indomitable fighting spirit, welcome Beijing spring’s hundred flowers.¹

Wei Jingsheng edited the journal Exploration during the Beijing Spring period and differed from most of his fellow editors and writers in warning that Deng Xiaoping and other members of the new reform faction could become dictators themselves without the implementation of democracy in China—what Wei dubbed the “fifth modernization.” More than any writings of this period, his heralded the student and democracy movements of the mid- and late 1980s. After the following poster appeared on Beijing’s Democracy Wall on December 5, 1978, he was arrested on trumped-up charges and served nearly fifteen years in prison. Upon his release in late 1993, Wei resumed his political activities and was re-arrested in April 1994 and sentenced to fourteen more years in prison. He was exiled to the United States in 1998.

Newspapers and television no longer assail us with deafening praise for the dictatorship of the proletariat and class struggle. This is in part because these were once the magical incantations of the now-overthrown Gang of Four. But more importantly, it’s because the masses have grown absolutely sick of hearing these worn-out phrases and will never be duped by them again. . . .

After the arrest of the Gang of Four, the people eagerly hoped that Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, the possible “restorer of capitalism,” would rise up again like a magnificent banner. Finally he did regain his position in the central leadership. How excited the people felt! How inspired they were! But alas, the old political system so despised by the people remains unchanged, and the democracy and freedom they longed for has not even been mentioned. . . .

But now there are people warning us that Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought is the foundation of all things, even speech, that Chairman Mao was the “great savior” of the people, and that the phrase “without the Communist Party, there would be no new China” actually means “without Chairman Mao, there would be no new China.” If anyone denies this point, the official notices make it clear that they’ll come to no good end. There are even “certain people” who try to tell us that the Chinese people need a dictator and if he is more dictatorial than the emperors of old, it only proves his greatness. The Chinese people don’t need democracy, they say, for unless it is a “democracy under centralized leadership,” it isn’t worth a cent. Whether you believe this or not is up to you, but there are plenty of recently vacated prison cells waiting for you if you don’t.

But now there are those who’ve offered us a way out: if you take the Four Modernizations as your guiding principle, forge ahead with stability and unity, and bravely serve the revolution like a faithful old ox, you will reach paradise—the glory of communism and the Four Modernizations. Those kindhearted “certain people” have also told us that if we find this confusing, we should undertake a serious and thorough study of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought! If you’re confused, it’s because you don’t understand it, and the fact that you don’t understand only goes to show just how profound a theory it is! Don’t be disobedient or the leadership of your work unit will be uncompromising! And so on and so on.

I urge everyone to stop believing such political swindlers. When we all know that we are being tricked, why don’t we trust ourselves instead? The Cultural Revolution has tempered us and we are no longer so ignorant. Let us investigate for ourselves what should be done! . . .

What is true democracy? Only when the people themselves choose representatives to manage affairs in accordance with their will and interests can we speak of democracy. Furthermore, the people must have the power to replace these representatives at any time in order to prevent them from abusing their powers to oppress the people. Is this possible? The citizens of Europe and the United States enjoy just this kind of democracy and could run people like Nixon, de Gaulle, and Tanaka out of office when they wished and can even reinstate them if they want to, for no one can interfere with their democratic rights. In China, however, if a person so much as comments on the now-deceased “Great Helmsman” or “Great Man peerless in history” Mao Zedong, the mighty prison gates and all kinds of unimaginable misfortunes await him. If we compare the socialist system of “democratic centralism” with the “exploiting class democracy” of capitalism, the difference is as clear as night and day.

Will the country sink into chaos and anarchy if the people attain democracy? On the contrary, have not the scandals exposed in the newspapers recently shown that it is precisely due to an absence of democracy that dictators, large and small, have caused chaos and anarchy? The maintenance of democratic order is an internal problem that the people themselves must solve. It is not something that the privileged overlords need concern themselves with. Besides, they are not really concerned with democracy for the people but use it as a pretext to deny the people their democratic rights. Of course, internal problems cannot be solved overnight but must be constantly addressed during the development process. Mistakes and shortcomings are inevitable, but these are for us to worry about and are infinitely preferable to facing abusive overlords against whom we have no means of redress. Those who worry that democracy will lead to anarchy and chaos are just like those who worried that without an emperor China would fall into chaos following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Their recommendation was, Patiently suffer oppression! Without the weight of oppression, the roofs of your homes might fly off!

With all due respect, let me say to such people: We want to be the masters of our own destiny. We need no gods or emperors and we don’t believe in saviors of any kind. We want to be masters of our universe, not the modernizing tools of dictators with personal ambitions. We want the modernization of people’s lives. Democracy, freedom, and happiness for all are our sole objectives in carrying out modernization. Without this fifth modernization, all others are nothing more than a new promise.

Comrades, I appeal to you: Let us rally under the banner of democracy. Do not be fooled again by dictators who talk of “stability and unity.” Fascist totalitarianism can bring us nothing but disaster. Harbor no more illusions; democracy is our only hope. Abandon our democratic rights and we shackle ourselves again. Let us have confidence in our own strength! We are the creators of human history. Banish all self-proclaimed leaders and teachers, for they have already cheated the people of their most valuable rights for decades.

I firmly believe that production will flourish even more when controlled by the people themselves because the workers will be producing for their own benefit. Life will improve because the workers’ interests will be the primary goal. Society will be more rational because all power will be exercised by the people as a whole through democratic means.

I don’t believe that all of this will be handed to the people effortlessly by some great savior. I also refuse to believe that China will abandon this goal because of the many difficulties it will surely encounter along the way. As long as people clearly identify their goal and realistically assess the obstacles before them, then surely they will trample any praying mantis that might try to bar their way. . . .

If the Chinese people want modernization, they must first put democracy into practice and modernize China’s social system. Democracy is not merely an inevitable stage of social development, as Lenin claimed. In addition to being the result of productive forces and productive relations that have developed to a certain stage, democracy is also the very condition that allows for such development to reach beyond this stage. Without this condition, society will become stagnant and economic growth will face insurmountable obstacles. Therefore, as history tells us, a democratic social system is the premise and precondition for all development, or what we can also call modernization. Without this premise and precondition, not only will further progress be impossible but it will be very difficult to maintain the development we have already achieved. . . .

Does democracy come about naturally when society reaches a certain stage? Absolutely not. An enormous price is paid for every tiny victory, so much so that even coming to a recognition of this fact requires sacrifices. The enemies of democracy have always deceived their people by saying that just as democracy is inevitable, so it is also doomed, and therefore it is not worth wasting energy fighting for.

But let us look at the real history, not that fabricated by the hired hacks of the “socialist government"! Every small twig of true and worthy democracy is stained with the blood of martyrs and tyrants, and every step taken toward democracy has been fiercely attacked by the reactionary forces. The fact that democracy has been able to surmount such obstacles proves that it is precious to the people and that it embodies all their aspirations. Thus the democratic trend cannot be stopped. The Chinese people have never feared anything; they need only recognize the direction to be taken and the forces of tyranny will no longer be invincible.

[From “Diwuge xiandaihua—minzhu ji qita,” in Wei Jingsheng qishilu, pp. 37–39, 44–46, 47–48; trans. adapted from Wei, The Courage to Stand Alone, pp. 199–212—KMT]

Everyone in China knows that the Chinese social system is not democratic and that this lack of democracy has severely stunted every aspect of the country’s social development over the past thirty years. In the face of this hard fact there are two choices before the Chinese people—either to reform the social system if they want to develop their society and seek a swift increase in prosperity and economic resources or, if they are content with a continuation of the Mao Zedong brand of proletarian dictatorship, then they cannot even talk of democracy, nor will they be able to realize the modernization of their lives and resources. . . .

Does Deng Xiaoping want democracy? No, he does not. He is unwilling to comprehend the misery of the common people. He is unwilling to allow the people to regain those powers usurped by ambitious careerists. He describes the struggle for democratic rights—a movement launched spontaneously by the people—as the actions of troublemakers who must be repressed. To resort to such measures to deal with people who criticize mistaken policies and demand social development shows that the government is very afraid of this popular movement.

We cannot help asking Mr. Deng what his idea of democracy is. If the people have no right to express their opinions and criticisms, then how can one talk of democracy? If his idea of democracy is one that does not allow others to criticize those in power, then how is such a democracy different from Mao Zedong’s tyranny concealed behind the slogan “Democracy of the dictatorship of the proletariat"? . . .

The people should ensure that Deng Xiaoping does not degenerate into a dictator. After he was reinstated in 1975, it seemed he was unwilling to follow Mao Zedong’s dictatorial system and would instead care for the interests of the people. So the people eagerly looked up to him in the hope that he would realize their aspirations. They were even ready to shed their blood for him—as the Tiananmen Square [April Fifth] incident showed. But was such support vested in his person alone? Certainly not. If he now wants to discard his mask and take steps to suppress the democratic movement, then he certainly does not merit the people’s trust and support. . . . People entrusted with government positions must be controlled by and responsible to the people. According to the constitution, organizations and individuals in the administration must be elected by the people, empowered and controlled by an elected government under the supervision of the people and responsible to the people. Only then is there a legality for executive powers. . . .

Only a genuine general election can create a government and leaders ready to serve the interests of the electorate. If the government and its leaders are truly subject to the people’s mandate and supervision, those two afflictions that leadership is prone to—personal ambition and megalomania—can be avoided.

This essay (March 1979) reflects the sentiment of Beijing Spring activists who found Wei Jingsheng’s attitude toward the new regime too extreme but who tried nevertheless to establish a rational basis for public discourse.

An article titled “Democracy or New Dictatorship” in the March 25 Exploration has aroused argument and general concern. We differ with some of the main points made in the article. We present our view here to engender further discussion with that author. We also invite criticism and suggestions from the people. . . .

The Exploration article criticized “would-be autocrats” who “take advantage of people’s gullibility” for their own petty ends. For example, in his March 16 talk to leading cadres of various central ministries and commissions, Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping attempted to use the people’s previous confidence in him to oppose the democratic movement. He made various charges against the democratic movement, attempted to blame it for the failure of the Hua-Deng regime to save China’s economy and production, and tried once again “to make the people scapegoats for the failure of their policies.” We doubt that this is correct. . . .

We wonder whether Exploration has evidence to sustain the view that Comrade Deng is “petty” and “a would-be autocrat.” . . .

Lin Biao and the Gang of Four used to take a sentence or two [out of context] and use them to label people and oppress them. We must do everything we can to rid ourselves of this bad practice. Placing labels on people on the basis of a few sentences spoken is the wrong way to treat either a leader like Deng Xiaoping or a common person. . . .

Deng Xiaoping remains China’s most powerful personage. If he really wants to suppress the democratic movement, he will have the support of many officials and could easily do so. But he has not done so, and the people are able to write what they wish and the publications are available at Democracy Wall. . . .

But no good end awaits anyone seeking to suppress the democratic movement. History will attest to that.

In the early 1980s the new regime began experimenting with free elections from the local level. Hu Ping, a Beijing University graduate student in European philosophy, ran for delegate to the county-level legislature and won. The government, however, did not allow him to assume his post.

The purpose of this article is to assert freedom of speech. At a time when there is absolutely no freedom of speech, it is certainly not possible to engage in such a novel endeavor. However, at a time of complete freedom of speech, it would not seem necessary to expound on it. This peculiarity often leads to a misunderstanding—that is, to the assumption that the question of freedom of speech is dependent on the will of those in power. This misunderstanding again leads to a neglect of any work or discussion of the theoretical side of this question and thus results in smothering completely any value and vitality in the principle of freedom of speech. This unfortunate misunderstanding is so deep-rooted that when this highly important and sensitive topic is brought up, many people take it to be a tiresome commonplace, the empty talk of scholarly nitwits. But when a country is without freedom of speech, the real reason is that its people lack a consciousness of freedom of speech. It is for this reason that it becomes a matter of the highest importance to clarify the inherent meaning of freedom of speech, its value and power, in the course of our work of perfecting and developing our country’s socialist democracy and legal system.

Freedom of speech for our citizens is the first article in the list of the various political rights in our constitution. If a man loses the right to make known his own aspirations and ideas, he will of necessity sink to the status of slave or a mere tool. Of course, to have the right of free speech does not mean to have everything, but losing the right of free speech will definitely lead to losing everything. In the science of mechanics, everybody knows the highly important function of the fulcrum. Even though the fulcrum itself cannot perform any work, it is indispensable to make the lever work effectively. It is said that Archimedes, the discoverer of the principle of leverage, made the statement “Give me a fulcrum and I will move the world.” In political life, isn’t freedom of speech just like this fulcrum?

What is freedom of speech? It is freedom to make known various opinions, and this includes everything: good speech, bad speech, correct speech, and incorrect speech. If freedom of speech were to be limited to only the sphere outlined by those in power, then one might ask: Is there any country in the world, past and present, that did not have “freedom” of speech? In this sense, wouldn’t the article of our sacred constitution on freedom of speech become a most useless piece of rubbish? . . .

We must point out in passing that some people consider it anarchism if “everyone is free to speak and act as he pleases.” This amounts to equating freedom of speech with freedom of action. It is true that if everybody is free to do as he pleases, it may lead to a state of anarchy. However, if we extend our prohibition to preclude everybody from speaking as he pleases, that will lead to despotism. In our future opposition to any particular “ism,” we must have a fairly distinct definition of it and not commit the same error as in the past when we opposed revisionism.

There is an ancient Chinese saying: “Do not condemn the speaker.” What does it mean? Since it is only those in power who can condemn anybody else, and since those in power will of course not send their cohorts to prosecute someone who speaks the way they, the rulers, approve, it is clear that the saying “Do not condemn the speaker” especially affirms that no guilt should be attached to those who “sing a different tune.” This again proves that our definition of freedom of speech above is absolutely correct.

The suppression of the Democracy Wall of the Beijing Spring movement did not silence debate on China’s future. People both inside and outside of the party and the government continued discussion as the state periodically tightened and loosened its control over free expression.

Wang Ruoshui, an established intellectual older than the Democracy Wall activists, rejected both the Maoist interpretation and the new regime’s Leninist interpretation of Marx, and instead sought to imbue Chinese socialism with a humanism seen as the heart of Marx’s vision.

The question is quite complex. We cannot simply say that once a system of public ownership is established, all problems will be solved. It seems that originally Marx and Engels assumed that the root of all alienation was the system of private property and once society mastered the means of production, alienation would disappear. . . . From today’s perspective, getting rid of private ownership and wiping out exploitation have indeed been an important issue, but this is not to say that, having done this, society is completely free of all problems and the people can enter an unfettered realm. No! There is still alienation because people can still fail to fully understand the laws of social development; there is still obscurantism, giving rise to problems and thereby leading to a certain loss of freedom. In my view, Chairman Mao had something to contribute here. He said, “Human history develops continuously from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. It will never end.” This formulation is quite scientific and accords with dialectical materialism.

Therefore, in a socialist society, in addition to the possibility of alienation in thought and politics, alienation can also appear in the economy. Of course, this alienation is different from capitalist alienation, in that mainly it is created not by exploitation but by not understanding objective economic laws. In addition, problems with bureaucratism and the system itself still exist. . . . In some matters we frequently concern ourselves with the immediate or obvious result. It is good that we can foresee short-term results, but we frequently cannot predict the long-term effects. Yet the long-term consequences can slip out of our control and on the contrary harm people. . . . This is also alienation. The goal of socialist production is to satisfy the needs of the people; this should be very clear! Yet socialist society can also give rise to this kind of phenomenon, one-sidedly pursuing speed and one-sidedly developing heavy industry. The advantage of speed is that it quickly raises the people’s standard of living. Only in this sense is it an advantage! Sacrificing the people’s living standard for the sake of speed or heavy industry—speed for speed’s sake or heavy industry for heavy industry’s sake—results in great suffering, and the greater the enthusiasm, the greater the suffering. The fruits of labor do not benefit the people, but on the contrary cause them loss; this is also alienation. Due to this . . . , not understanding objective economic laws along with great blindness results in economic alienation. Exploitation is one type of alienation—admittedly a very important type—but it is not the only type. Therefore we can look at this question from a broader perspective and see that many social problems are actually problems of alienation. We must now overcome alienation by recognizing objective laws and mastering our own fate.

Raising this question of alienation now touches upon many new problems in our midst, and we must all reapply ourselves. In the past we did not pay enough attention to the early works of Marx. I think there were two reasons. We felt they were unimportant and also too difficult to understand. It is true that they are difficult to understand, but they are not unimportant. We can now see the profundity of his thought on alienation. Actually, Marx in his later years also discussed alienation, and although he discussed it a little less, he nevertheless never abandoned this concept.

In the last three years more than four hundred articles on the question of “humanity” have appeared, and among them quite a few explore the Marxist concept of humanism. . . . That the question of humanity inspired such strong interest, in my view, is not merely a reaction to the decade of domestic turmoil but also reflects the necessity of creating a highly civilized and highly democratic socialist society for a new era. In the process, when deviations arise, these must of course be corrected through discussion and criticism. However, some well-intentioned comrades fundamentally reject any call for humanism, considering it to be heretical. . . .

Consequently, I would like to argue in defense of humanism, especially Marxist humanism.

“Humanism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie”—If this statement means humanism was the ideology of the bourgeoisie, this is an objective, historical fact and there is nothing to dispute. If, however, this statement means that humanism can only be the ideology of the bourgeoisie, then it must be questioned. The meanings of these two statements cannot be confused; the second meaning cannot be inferred from the first.

Materialism was also the ideology of the bourgeoisie (and even of the slave-owner and feudal classes), and yet this has not prevented materialism from becoming the worldview of the proletariat. Indeed, there is a huge difference between Marxist materialism and old-style materialism, and yet this is the difference between one type of materialism and another, not materialism and idealism.

It depends on the content of this concept of humanism. If the concept of humanism is substantially and necessarily linked to the special class characteristics of the bourgeoisie (for example, “individualism” is this kind of concept), then humanism can only be the ideology of the bourgeoisie. Otherwise, such is not the case.

What is humanism? Humanism is a term borrowed from abroad, and many people in our country are not sure what it means precisely. Yet they judge it on the basis of this hazy understanding. Of course, the schools of humanism are numerous, and the various theories differ. However, there is still a generally accepted explanation. . . .

In essence, the term humanism at the earliest indicated the central intellectual theme of the Renaissance (this is humanism in the narrow sense, in general it is also translated as renwen zhuyi—the doctrine of humane learning); later it came to refer to all concepts or philosophical thought that placed primary importance on humanity, the value of humanity, the dignity of humanity, the interests or well-being of humanity, the development or freedom of humanity (this is humanism in the broader sense, which is discussed in this essay).

In my view, some of the comrades who evaluate humanism negatively may be starting with a mistaken conception of humanism. Humanism is a longstanding and well-established intellectual trend, going back at least six hundred years in the West. After the Renaissance, there was the humanism of the Enlightenment, the humanism of utopian socialism, the humanism of Feuerbach (renbenxue) and also the multifarious modern humanisms. . . . So many intellectual schools are all called “humanism” because they have a common principle. This common principle, simply put, is the value of humanity. This is the same as the many philosophical systems called “materialism” because they all recognize the “primacy of material substance.” The understanding of the value of humanity by the different humanisms may differ greatly, but as long as they emphasize the value of humanity, then these differences are distinctions between different types of humanisms, and not differences between humanism and non-humanism or anti-humanism.

In carrying out socialist modernization reconstruction today we need socialist humanism. What does this humanism mean to us?

Isn’t this socialist humanism already existing in our practice, and isn’t it increasingly developing? Why treat it as something strange and alien?

This excerpt is from a talk with the Japanese delegation to the second session of the council of Sino-Japanese nongovernmental figures, June 30, 1984. Although he did not always hold top positions in the party or government, Deng Xiaoping clearly led the nation from the late seventies to the late eighties. As the regime adopted more and more capitalist-style practices over that period, however, it was forced into an ideological corner. How could the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) introduce capitalist practices? It looked back to a more orthodox theory of development from capitalism to socialism to provide it with an ideological fig leaf. Since socialist revolution, according to this theory, could take place only in an advanced capitalist country, it was the task of the ccp to build up the forces of production that would eventually serve as the premise and basis for socialism.

People may ask, If China had taken the capitalist instead of the socialist road, could the Chinese people have liberated themselves and could China have finally stood up? The Nationalists took that road for more than twenty years and proved that it does not work. By contrast, the Chinese Communists, by adhering to Marxism and integrating Marxism with actual conditions in China in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought, took their own road and succeeded in the revolution by encircling the cities from the countryside. Conversely, if we had not been Marxists, or if we had not integrated Marxism with Chinese conditions and followed our own road, China would have remained fragmented, with neither independence nor unity. China simply had to adhere to Marxism. If we had not fully believed in Marxism, the Chinese revolution would never have succeeded. That belief was the motive force. After the founding of the People’s Republic, if we had taken the capitalist rather than the socialist road, we would not have ended the chaos in the country or changed its conditions—inflation, unstable prices, poverty, and backwardness. We started from a backward past. There was virtually no industry for us to inherit from old China, and we did not have enough grain for food. Some people ask why we chose socialism. We answer that we had to, because capitalism would get China nowhere. We must solve the problems of feeding and employing the population and of reunifying China. That is why we have repeatedly declared that we shall adhere to Marxism and keep to the socialist road. But by Marxism we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions, and by socialism we mean socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has Chinese characteristics.

What is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear about this before. Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces. We advocate communism. But what does that mean? It means the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs, which calls for highly developed productive forces and overwhelming material wealth. Therefore, the fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated by faster and greater development of the productive forces than under the capitalist system. One of our shortcomings since the founding of the People’s Republic was that we neglected the development of the productive forces. Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism. The superiority of the socialist system lies above all in its ability to increasingly develop the productive forces and to improve the people’s material and cultural life. The problem facing us now is how China, which is still backward, is to develop the productive forces and improve the people’s living standard. This brings us back to the point of whether to continue on the socialist road or to stop and turn onto the capitalist road. The capitalist road can only enrich less than 10 percent of the Chinese population; it can never enrich the 90 percent. That is why we must adhere to socialism. The socialist principle of distribution to each according to his work will not create an excessive gap in wealth. Consequently, no polarization will occur as our productive forces become developed over the next twenty to thirty years.

The minimum target of our Four Modernizations is to achieve a comparatively comfortable standard of living by the end of the century. . . . By a “comfortable standard” we mean that per capita GNP will reach U.S. $800. That is a low level for you, but it is really ambitious for us. China has a population of 1 billion now and it will reach 1.2 billion by then. If, when the GNP reached $1,000 billion, we applied the capitalist principle of distribution, it would not amount to much and could not help to eliminate poverty and backwardness. Less than 10 percent of the population would enjoy a better life, while more than 90 percent remained in poverty. But the socialist principle of distribution can enable all the people to become relatively comfortable. This is why we want to uphold socialism. Without socialism, China can never achieve that goal.

However, only talking about this is not enough. The present world is an open one. China’s past backwardness was due to its closed-door policy. After the founding of the People’s Republic, we were blockaded by others, and so the country remained closed to some extent, which created difficulties for us. Some “left” policies and the Cultural Revolution in particular were disastrous for us. In short, the experience of the past thirty years or more proves that a closed-door policy would hinder construction and inhibit development. Therefore, the ideological line formulated at the Third Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee is to adhere to the principles of integrating Marxism with Chinese conditions, seeking truth from facts, linking theory with practice, and proceeding from reality. In other words, the line is to adhere to the essence of Comrade Mao Zedong’s thought. Our political line focuses on the four modernizations, on continuing to develop the productive forces. Nothing short of world war would make us release our grip on this essential point. Even should world war break out, we would engage in reconstruction after the war. A closed-door policy would not help construction. There are two kinds of exclusion: one is directed against other countries; the other is directed against China itself, with one region or department closing its doors to the others. We are suggesting that we should develop a little faster—just a little, because it would be unrealistic to go too fast. To do this, we have to invigorate the domestic economy and open up to the outside. We must first of all solve the problem of the countryside, which contains 80 percent of the population. China’s stability depends on the stability of the countryside with this 80 percent—this is the reality of China from which we should proceed. No matter how successful our work in the cities is, it will not mean much without the stable base of the countryside. Therefore, we must first of all solve the problem of the countryside by invigorating the economy and adopting an open policy so as to bring the initiative of 80 percent of the population into full play. We adopted this policy at the end of 1978, and after several years in operation it has produced the desired results. . . .

As for our relations with foreign countries, we shall pursue the policy of opening up still wider to the outside world. We have opened fourteen medium and large coastal cities. We welcome foreign investment and advanced techniques. Management is also a kind of technique. Will they undermine our socialism? Not likely, because the socialist economy is our mainstay. Our socialist economic base is so huge that it can absorb tens and hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of foreign funds without shaking the socialist foundation. Besides, we adhere to the socialist principle of distribution and do not tolerate economic polarization. Thus, foreign investment will doubtless serve as a major supplement to the building of socialism in our country. And as things stand now, this supplement is indispensable. Naturally, some problems will arise in the wake of foreign investment. But the negative aspects are far less significant than the positive use we can make of it to accelerate our development. It may entail a slight risk, but not much.

Well, those are our plans. We shall accumulate experience and try new solutions as new problems arise. In general, we believe the road we have chosen—building socialism with Chinese characteristics—is the right one and will work. We have followed this road for five and a half years and have achieved satisfactory results. We want to quadruple China’s GNP by the end of the century. The pace of development so far exceeded our projections. And so I can tell our friends that we are even more confident now.

Chen Yun, a veteran party leader and specialist in economic affairs, had opposed Mao’s Great Leap Forward during the late 1950s but by the mid-1980s found that the policies of the post-Cultural Revolution regime had moved too far in adopting capitalist practices. Chen’s advocacy of a stable economy based upon agriculture and his rejection of commerce echo the views of conservatives throughout the imperial era (221 B.C.E.–1912 C.E.).

There are now some peasants who have no interest in growing grain, and we must pay attention to this problem. . . . Raising pigs and growing vegetables are looked upon with contempt since “industry is wealth.” . . . The problem is that the voices yelling “industry is wealth” drown out those yelling “agriculture is stability.”

Clothing and food for one billion people is a great economic problem for our country, and also a great political problem. The matter of “no grain means chaos” cannot be ignored.

The current reform of the socialist economic system is the self-perfecting and development of the socialist system.

The reform of the economic system is meant to develop the productive forces and gradually improve the lives of the people. The rural reforms have already achieved noticeable results. As for the reforms of the urban economic system, the general direction is correct, while the concrete steps and measures are now being explored. We’ll proceed step by step, summing up our experience as we go, and persevere in carrying out reform.

From the perspective of national work, the planned economy is the mainstay, while regulated markets remain supplementary. This notion is not obsolete.

Of course, planning includes command planning and guided planning. The two methods of planning are different, but both make planned use of various methods of economic regulation. The guided plan really is not the equivalent of market regulation. Market regulation—that is, no planning—carries out production only according to changes in market supply and demand—that is blind regulation.

The plan is the foundation of macroscopic control. Only having achieved macroscopic control can we profitably achieve microscopic [control] to prosper without chaos.

The resolution concerning the seventh five-year plan, which was passed at this meeting, proposed that the speed of industrial and agricultural development over the course of the five-year plan be divided into 7 percent and 6 percent [annual growth, respectively]. This speed is quite moderate and can be exceeded as we proceed, but there is no need to subjectively set even higher targets.

On August 2 when receiving foreign guests, Comrade Xiaoping, in discussing the excessive speed of industrial development in our country, said, “It sounds wonderful, but there are unhealthy aspects.” I agree with him.

In 1984 total industrial output value increased 14 percent over the previous year; in the first half of this year it increased 22.8 percent over the same period last year. We cannot sustain this high rate of growth because our present energy sources, transportation and natural resources and the like are inadequate.

In the end, we must still steadily advance in accordance with proportionate planning; only then can we achieve the highest rate of speed. Otherwise, we will create all kinds of strains and loss of control and be unable to avoid redundancies, and the results will instead be slow. Haste makes waste.

In recent years [Party] Central has taken on the problem of the Party’s work style. However, the mission of improving the Party’s work style is still extremely important.

At present there definitely is a minority of Party members and party cadres, especially individual old Party members and old cadres, who are unable to uphold the principles of Party loyalty and have indulged in every harmful trend.

Serious violations of Party discipline and national laws such as counterfeiting medicines and alcohol have occurred throughout the Party.

That vast numbers of cadres, both inside and outside of the Party, and the masses are extremely dissatisfied about these matters should draw the serious attention of the whole Party. . . .

I hope that all high-level leading personnel, in disciplining their sons and daughters, should set an example for the whole Party. They should never allow them to use their family connections to gain power and profit and become privileged characters.

Strengthen thought and political work, and uphold the authority of the thought and political work department.

Recently, the secretariat has discussed the problem of strengthening thought and political work; in my view this is absolutely necessary. We are the ruling party and are currently in a new stage of development; how we effectively carry out intellectual construction and organization work is of great consequence.

At present, some people, including some members of the Communist Party, have forgotten the ideals of socialism and communism and have forsaken the goal of serving the people. Pursuing private advantage, they have become “money-mad,” disregarding the interests of the nation and the masses, even violating the law and discipline. It’s just like all those phenomena so frequently reported by the press—speculation and fraud, corruption and bribery, illicitly gained wealth and consorting with foreigners with no regard for national or individual dignity.

These problems are related to our letting up on thought and political work and weakening the function and authority of the thought and political work department; we should thereby draw a lesson.

All levels of party organization should conscientiously take on propaganda and political work.

Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist at Science and Technology University, Hefei, Anhui, became famous for his frank and trenchant criticism of the post-Cultural Revolution regime. Arguing from scientific method, he sought to analyze China’s problems and debunk the ideological dogma of the regime. His ideas express the thinking of Chinese students and intellectuals during the 1980s and make a clear argument for more power and responsibility to be placed in the hands of intellectuals. Fang seeks an end to state control of intellectuals and the return of the freedom that intellectuals enjoyed during the May 4 period.

The following are excerpts from Fang’s best-known speech, delivered to an audience of about three thousand students and faculty members at Shanghai’s Tongji University on November 18, 1986. Many of the remarks in this speech were later singled out for criticism by the Communist Party as examples of bourgeois liberal thought.

Our goal at present is the thorough modernization of China. We all have a compelling sense of the need for modernization. There is a widespread demand for change among people in all walks of life, and very few find any reason for complacency. None feel this more strongly than those of us in science and academia. Modernization has been our national theme since the Gang of Four was overthrown ten years ago, but we are just beginning to understand what it really means. In the beginning we were mainly aware of the grave shortcomings in our production of goods, our economy, our science and technology, and that modernization was required in these areas. But now we understand our situation much better. We realize that grave shortcomings exist not only in our “material civilization” but also in our “spiritual civilization”—our culture, our ethical standards, our political institutions—and that these also require modernization.

The question we must now ask is, What kind of modernization is required? I think it’s obvious to all of us that we need complete modernization, not just modernization in a few chosen aspects. People are now busy comparing Chinese and Western culture—including politics, economics, science, technology, education, the whole gamut—and there is much debate over the subject. The question is, do we want “complete Westernization” or “partial Westernization"? Should we continue to uphold the century-old banner of “using Western methods but maintaining the Chinese essence” or any other “cardinal principle"? Of course, this is not a new discussion. A century ago, insightful people realized that China had no choice but to modernize. Some wanted partial modernization, others wanted complete modernization, and thus they initiated a debate that continues down to the present day.

I personally agree with the “complete Westernizers.” What their so-called complete Westernization means to me is complete openness, the removal of restrictions in every sphere. We need to acknowledge that when looked at in its entirety, our culture lags far behind that of the world’s most advanced societies, not in any one specific aspect but across the board. Responding to this situation calls not for the establishment of a priori barriers but for complete openness to the outside world. Attempting to set our inviolable “essence” off-limits before it is even challenged makes no sense to me. Again, I am scarcely inventing these ideas. A century ago people said essentially the same thing: Open China up and face the challenge of more advanced societies head-on, in every aspect from technology to politics. What is good will stand up, and what is not good will be swept away. This prognosis remains unchanged.

Why is China so backward? To answer this question, we need to take a clear look at history. China has been undergoing revolutions for a century, but we are still very backward. This is all the more true since Liberation, these decades of the socialist revolution that we all know firsthand as students and workers. Speaking quite dispassionately, I have to judge this era a failure. This is not my opinion only, by any means; many of our leaders are also admitting as much, saying that socialism is in trouble everywhere. Since the end of World War II, socialist countries have by and large not been successful. There is no getting around this. As far as I’m concerned, the last thirty-odd years in China have been a failure in virtually every aspect of economic and political life.

Of course, some will say that China is a big, poor country, and therefore that progress has been hard to come by. Indeed, our overpopulation, our huge geographical area, and our preexisting poverty do contribute to our problems. This being the case, some say, we haven’t done badly to get where we are today.

But these factors by themselves don’t completely account for the situation. For every one of them you can find a counterexample. Take population, for example. While our population is the world’s largest in terms of absolute numbers, our population density is not. China has about 750 persons depending on each square kilometer of arable land, while Japan has about twice that, some 1,500 persons per square kilometer. Why has Japan succeeded while China has not? Our initial conditions were not that different; after the war, their economy was nearly as devastated as ours. Why have we not prospered like Japan? Overpopulation alone does not explain this. . . .

We need to take a careful look at why socialism has failed. Socialist ideals are admirable. But we have to ask two questions about the way they have been put into practice: Are the things done in the name of socialism actually socialist? And, do they make any sense? We have to take a fresh look at these questions, and the first step in that process is to free our minds from the narrow confines of orthodox Marxism. . . .

I’ve always had the feeling, even though we claim that Marxism embraces all contributions to civilization down through the ages, that when you really get down to it, we’re saying that only since Marx has anyone known the real truth. Sometimes even Marx himself is tossed aside, and all that counts is what’s happened since Liberation. Everything else is treated very negatively. Anything from the past, or from other cultures, is denigrated. We are very familiar with this attitude. When a historical figure is discussed, there is always a disclaimer at the end: “Despite this person’s contributions, he suffered from historical limitations.” In other words, he wasn’t quite of the stature of us Marxists.

This is typical. When scholars of other races or nationalities make great discoveries, we’ll say that they’ve done some good things, but due to the limitations of their class background, thus-and-so. In one area after another, it is made to appear that only since Liberation have truly great things been accomplished. This is parochial and narrow-minded in the extreme. What became of embracing the contributions of other cultures? We see ourselves towering over the historical landscape, but the fact is, nothing can justify such a claim. Only religions view their place in history in this fashion. . . .

Democracy is based on recognizing the rights of every single individual. Naturally, not everyone wants the same thing, and therefore the desires of different individuals have to be mediated through a democratic process, to form a society, a nation, a collectivity. But it is only on the foundation of recognizing the humanity and the rights of each person that we can build democracy. However, when we talk about “extending democracy” here, it refers to your superiors “extending democracy” for you. This is a mistaken concept. This is not democracy.

“Loosening up” is even worse. If you think about it, what it implies is that everyone is tied up very tightly right now, but if you stay put, we’ll loosen the rope a little bit and let you run around. . . . In democratic societies, democracy and science—and most of us here are scientists—run parallel. Democracy is concerned with ideas about humanity, and science is concerned with nature. One of the distinguishing features of universities is the role of knowledge; we do research, we create new knowledge to develop new products, and so forth. In this domain, within the sphere of science and the intellect, we make our own judgments based on our own independent criteria.

This is the distinguishing characteristic of a university. In Western society, universities are independent from the government, in the sense that even if the money to run the school is provided by the government, the basic decisions—regarding the content of courses, the standards for academic performance, the selection of research topics, the evaluation of results, and so on—are made by the schools themselves on the basis of values endemic to the academic community, and not by the government. At the same time, good universities in the West are also independent of big business. This is how universities must be. The intellectual realm must be independent and have its own values.

This is an essential guarantee of democracy. It is only when you know something independently that you are free from relying on authorities outside the intellectual domain, such as the government. Unfortunately, things are not this way in China. I have discussed this problem with educators. In the past, even during “the seventeen years” [1949 to 1966, the era before the Cultural Revolution], our universities were mainly engaged in producing tools, not in educating human beings. Education was not concerned with helping students to become critical thinkers, but with producing docile instruments to be used by others. Chinese intellectuals need to insist on thinking for themselves and using their own judgment, but I’m afraid that even now we have not grasped this lesson. . . .

Knowledge must be independent from power, the power of the state included. If knowledge is subservient to power, it is worthless. . . . When it comes to our fields of knowledge, we must think for ourselves and exercise our own judgment about what’s right and wrong, and about truth, goodness, and beauty as well. We must refuse to cater to power. Only when we do this will Chinese intellectuals be transformed into genuine intellectuals and our country have a chance to modernize and attain real democracy. This is my message to you today.

At present, the biggest problem of the reforms is the lack of theoretical studies. We are still in a country where ideology decides everything. If the theoretical problem[s] are left unsolved, the reforms have no hope of success. Also, no one has studied our economic problems from the viewpoint of modern economics. The level of discussion at our highest-level economic conferences is no more profound than everyday conversation, and it amounts to no more than the presentation of general problems. Among the older generation of revolutionaries, there is not one who understands economics.

I believe we intellectuals must have a strong sense of social responsibility. In this regard, European intellectuals are far more committed than those of America. They are conscious of a historical duty to pay attention to and discuss world affairs. They believe that anyone who merely understands his own occupation can be called a technician or specialist, but never an intellectual. Intellectuals must assume certain responsibilities and duties. We too must have this consciousness as intellectuals, since we hope at least that the Chinese nation will not be cast aside by history. . . .

Freedom, democracy, and human rights are [the] common heritage of humanity, and they do not belong only to the bourgeoisie. What I want to emphasize is this: freedom, democracy, and human rights have to be fought for; if we don’t fight, they will never arrive on their own.

As intellectuals, we are obligated to work for the improvement of society. Our primary task in this regard is to strive for excellence and creativity in our chosen professions. This requires that we break the bonds of social restraint when necessary. In keeping with Chinese tradition, creativity has not been encouraged over the past three decades. It is a shame that, as a result, China has yet to produce work worthy of consideration for the Nobel Prize. Why is this? We should reflect upon this question and take a good look at ourselves.

One reason for this situation is our social environment. Many of us who have been to foreign countries to study or work agree that we can perform much more efficiently and productively abroad than in China. . . . Foreigners are no more intelligent than we Chinese are. Why, then, can’t we produce first-rate work? The reasons for our inability to develop to our [full] potential lie within our social system. Therefore all of us, when considering our social responsibility, should dedicate ourselves to the creation of a social environment that allows intellectuals to fully utilize their abilities and encourages productivity in their work. . . .

Lately the state has been promoting idealism and discipline. [Its] idea of idealism is simply that we should have a feeling of responsibility toward our society. Of course, our goal should be the improvement of society, but it shouldn’t be some utopian dream a million years down the road. (Applause.) Scientists like myself, who study the universe, cannot see that far into the future. What is much more important is to identify problems that exist now and try to solve them and to identify problems that will beset us in the near future that we might be able to minimize or avoid. . . .

What is the real reason we have lost our ideals and discipline? The real reason is that many of our important party leaders have failed to discipline themselves. I will give you an example: There was recently an international symposium on particle accelerators. Both Taiwan and mainland China were represented. In my mind, of course, the participants should be scholars and experts who are directly involved in this kind of work. But in the Chinese delegation of over ten people there was only one from our university. Many of those sent had no qualifications in physics and no familiarity with accelerators. Is this considered “observing discipline"? Among those attending was Beijing vice-mayor Zhang Baifa. I have no idea what he was doing there. (Loud laughter.) If you are talking about discipline, this is an excellent example of what it is not. (Applause.) And this kind of breakdown of discipline is the same thing as corruption. (Loud applause.) In the future, as you learn more about our society, you will find that this sort of corruption is very commonplace. If we are really serious about strengthening discipline, we should start at the top. (Applause.) . . .

We Communist Party members should be open to different ways of thinking. We should be open to different cultures and willing to adopt the elements of those cultures that are clearly superior. A great diversity of thought should be allowed in colleges and universities. If all thought is simplistic and narrow-minded, creativity will die. At present, there are certainly some people in power who still insist on dictating to others according to their own narrow principles. They always wave the flag of Marxism when they speak. But what they are spouting is not Marxism. . . .

We must not be afraid to speak openly about these things. It is our duty. If we remain silent, we have failed to live up to our responsibility.

Although the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to improving the lot of Chinese women was never complete and less than claimed, it could point to a certain record of accomplishment. With the new emphasis on practicality in the eighties, however, the party and government lessened efforts to advance women. Some reforms inadvertently reduced women’s access to education and participation in the workforce. As a result, some earlier gains were lost and new problems appeared. Li Xiaojiang, a professor of Chinese at Zhengzhou University and chair of the Women’s Studies Research Center, analyzes the situation in 1988.

The “Report on Work” of the Thirteenth Party Congress clearly lays out the theory of the first stages of socialism: so-called reform, including reform of political structures, is intended first and foremost to advance the development of society’s productive forces. The congress initiated improvements in economic efficiency in order to realize more quickly the transformation of our country from impoverishment, to relative comfort, to prosperity. It also attacked the bureaucracy of the political world, the dogmatism of the theoretical world, the egalitarianism of the economy, and the apathy of the individual. It proposed a realistic approach to reform and true economic competition. These goals, sought after but unrealized for many years, are well and good—but they threaten women. In the spirit of realism, we are impelled to face squarely the issue of biology and childbirth for women in social production. In actual economic competition, the facts that the quality of women as workers is inclined to be low and that they have a dual role evidently make women and the enterprises that employ them less competitive.

Reform has also eliminated life tenure for cadres and the “iron rice bowl” of industry. At precisely the same time that the limited tenure policy and the contract system were being implemented, much of the protection and many of the benefits for women in industry began to disappear one by one. As a result, the problems of “same work—different pay” and unequal promotions for men and women have arisen.

In 1988 a series of women’s issues became even more pronounced. Not only women, but the many men whose interests are intertwined with women’s and who are with women from morning to night, were affected, as well as all the families concerned about a daughter or a wife. Let us take a glimpse at the issues in the natural course of that one year.

First quarter. In the process of democratic elections for people’s congresses at every level and for the Seventh National People’s Congress, few female cadres were elected, highlighting the problem of women’s participation in government.

Second quarter. With the simultaneous implementation of enterprise self-management and discretionary hiring and contract systems, women’s social benefits, salary, employment, and promotions were all threatened, rendering women workers’ problems more acute.

Third quarter. In job assignments for college graduates and those who failed to pass the college entrance examinations, employment problems for women surfaced anew. This directly endangered young women intellectuals’ future prospects and development.

Fourth quarter. With the deepening of economic reform and the widespread pursuit in industry of peak work capacity, the increased vigor of enterprises and the increasingly tense double burden for women came into direct conflict. The call for “equal work—equal pay” causes women to face even more severe challenges in light of the actual work assignments and the disadvantaged position women encounter returning to work after childbirth. Under the circumstances, some women will inevitably decide to return to the home. But people will interpret this not as the will of society but as the conscious choice of women.

The travesty is that these pressures women endured then and continue to endure are never seen as social problems; they are construed as merely individual problems. Criticizing society as unfair is to no avail. The balance of justice has never been the moving force in the progress of history. If one is only willing to face reality, then one must see that the emergence of women’s problems is actually a means for society to resolve many other social problems that emerged with reform (such as excess labor, labor productivity, and so on). Women have thus been the cornerstone in the development of society’s productive capacity. Historically it has been so; in reality it is so. No wonder authoritative sociological publications are unwilling to print much on women’s issues, for to speak excessively of women’s liberation at this point would be to say that women’s problems are obstructing society’s reform and economic development. This means that Chinese women, who have worked hard all along to recognize their unity with society, cannot but acknowledge that women’s issues in the midst of economic reform have been abandoned by society. There are truly women’s problems, in that they have become sociologically insignificant.

Discussions of women’s issues in the past were always about women enduring oppression, discrimination, and enslavement; these were the pernicious vestiges of feudalism and the product of capitalist exploitation. To put it bluntly, these were mostly the problems of working women and could be categorized as problems of class.

Today, however, just as issues of class in China and the world have receded, women’s issues have gradually become more pronounced. They are reflected not only in the problems of women workers and of all women at work but also in the lives of women of every class and in every facet of women’s lives. Especially in contemporary China, women’s problems come from every direction, creating among those who concern themselves with women’s issues a sense of crisis.

It is hard to deny, even for Chinese women accustomed to the catch phrase “Socialism liberates women,” that the crisis objectively exists. If we use the obvious “equality of men and women” standard to measure women’s actual plight, then Chinese women’s liberation seems to be taking the road of regression. In the face of this “reverse tide,” the long-parroted, never tested, never deeply researched theory of women’s liberation appears exhausted. It is this weakness of conventional theory that compels us to face the reality of Chinese society and the reality of Chinese women, to investigate conscientiously all these earth-shattering women’s issues.

[Shehui kexue zhanxian 4 (1988): 300–310; trans. adapted from Gilmartin et al., Engendering China, pp. 361–364]

Many intellectuals debated the merits of the “new authoritarianism” during the latter half of the 1980s. To its proponents it had some resemblances to what earlier was called “political tutelage” or “guided democracy,” but its main emphasis was on the need for stability as a precondition for economic growth. We see in the excerpts below, a decade after Deng’s opening to the outside world, the influence of Western political experience and philosophy and references to the Four Dragons—Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Wu Jiaxiang, a noted advocate of the new authoritarianism, was a researcher at the Investigation and Research Division of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Office at the time of the debate. Rong Jian, an important opponent of the new authoritarianism, was a doctoral student in the philosophy department of People’s University in Beijing.

3. The development of human society cannot be without authority; authority provides stability. Similarly, it cannot be without liberty; liberty provides vitality. A stable and yet continuously changing society is a modern society in which authority and freedom are integrated. . . .

4. The fundamental program of the new authoritarianism is the market economy. Without a new authority, marketization cannot be accomplished, and without that, there can never be true democratic politics. . . .

5. The new authoritarianism is dedicated to forming the political power necessary to resolve major social problems and liberate society from crises during the stage of society’s transformation. It has been said that China’s most critical problem today is that the country is not clear on what its critical problems are. This is a clever saying but expresses poor judgment. In fact, China is already clear on its problems; the reason there has not been an effective resolution is that a sufficiently large and strong political power has not yet been amassed. There are two aspects to this political power that are necessary to solve society’s problems: the government’s power and the power of the masses. . . .

6. The new authoritarianism is most concerned about the form of the redistribution of social power resources in a traditional society when the old authority has declined or even collapsed. . . .

7. The new authoritarianism’s “bible” is human equality. The realization of this equality, however, is certainly not as relaxed, romantic, and poetic as is perhaps envisioned by some radical democrats. . . . The hierarchy that authority (the old one) created must be abolished by authority (the new one). There is no other way.

8. The new authoritarianism holds a critical attitude toward Rousseau’s theory of the general will and the theory of sovereignty. Rousseau’s theory is a politically malformed baby of French literary romanticism. If we were to follow this theory, the result could only be a return to the traditional monarchical autocracy or to a traditional government by gangs. An indivisible general will and popular sovereignty is merely a fantasy in Rousseau’s mind. In practical politics, one either has an indivisible dictatorial power, a divisible checked-and-balanced party politics, or warlord or gang politics in which each piece of authority occupies a “mountaintop.” . . .

9. China’s new authoritarians are particularly concerned about how democratic politics can fit the conditions of a large country. As we all know, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were all admirers of small countries. In their view, democracy befits a smaller country, whereas autocracy is more suited to a large country. . . . [The new authoritarianism] seeks to combine a powerful central government with regional self-rule, and it is precisely in this sense that I call the Federalists of the United States the American examples of new authoritarianism.

10. The new authoritarianism is not particularly picky about the form in which society produces its new authority. It is almost impossible to have a design or a set of rules for how the new authority of a society is to be produced. . . .

11. The new authoritarianism is, first and foremost, a political philosophy. Its scope of study is restricted to the question of what kind of government strategy and plan should the rulers have. It does not extend to how a good ruler may be produced or how the ruler could maintain the position. In other words, it explains what the new authority is and what it does but not how the new authority is obtained. Second, I believe the new authoritarianism is a philosophy of history. From the perspective of the new authoritarianism, a typical history of politics must go through the evolutionary stages—namely, the old authoritarian stage, the new authoritarian stage, and the liberal democratic stage. . . .

The fortunate societies are the ones that can successfully go through all three stages; the unfortunate often interrupt the process of evolution. . . . China had some problems: the muddleheadedness of the Qing monarchy plunged China in modern times into a protracted stage of chaos in which there was no clear idea of authority. It is more difficult to go from a stage of chaos to the new authoritarian stage than to go directly from the stage of the old authoritarianism to the new authoritarian stage. As soon as a normal process is interrupted, it is extremely easy to plunge history into a pitiable cycle of old authority and chaos with no authority, replacing each other repeatedly. Therefore, we can see that the new authoritarian stage is a stage that cannot be leapfrogged by any nation that seeks to realize modernization. Any attempt to do so would only bring about disaster. . . . History has demonstrated that the monarchical form was the ideal instrument. . . for going through the new authoritarian stage. It was able to minimize the crisis of the legitimacy and unity of the authority during the period of social transformation and was able to reduce the use of violence while enhancing the use of the government’s prestige. Therefore, according to my theory, I do not consider the new authoritarianism to be merely a summation of the post-World War II political system in Latin America and the East Asian region; rather, I see it as a philosophical summation of a certain stage of development in the history of humanity as a whole.

[From Liu and Li, Xin quanwei zhuyi, pp. 47–53; trans. adapted from Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 23, no. 3 (Spring 1991): 16–23]

China’s reliance on political authoritarianism during the period of developing a liberated economy may appear, phenomenologically, to reflect that China, too, cannot bypass what seems to be a necessary and unavoidable stage in the progress toward modernization. This may well further confirm the resolve on the part of the highest level decision [makers] and policy makers in the reforms to carry out an intense concentration of power. In reality, the reforms have already shown signs of developing in this direction. Nevertheless, I believe that to carry out, under China’s present conditions, a coexistence between political authoritarianism and a liberated economy would invite a confrontation with an ever-sharper contradiction than that which existed in those countries where modernization has already been completed or is being completed. The reasons are the following:

First, from the perspective of the progress of modernization in what were the nondeveloped countries, especially from the perspective of the Four Little Dragons in Asia, the premise of political authoritarianism is the thorough dualism between politics and economics. By “thorough,” we mean the privatization of the ownership system (or socialization), the “marketization” of the economy, and the independence of the enterprises. On the other hand, it remains dubious as to whether this same dualism can become a reality in China . . . still saddled with a basic problem, namely, that the question of the system of ownership has not yet been resolved. . . .

Second, China’s traditional system was based politically on an intense concentration of power. Even though this basis has suffered tremendous impact since the reforms began, it has become ossified but has not died and is still the greatest current roadblock to the liberalization of the economy. Clearly, we cannot use this kind of “political authoritarianism” to facilitate the development of the commodity economy. . . .

Third, in China’s traditional system, the contradictions between “vertical strips and horizontal blocks” have existed for a long time; these are the contradictions between the center and localities. The reason for the long-term existence of such a contradiction is that the traditional system simply had not resolved the problem of the dualism between politics and economics. . . . Fourth, . . . when the Four Little Dragons in Asia, as well as other developing countries, carried out their political authoritarianism, there was a close connection between that and the prevailing international conditions at the time. The state of the cold war created an excuse for every dictator to carry out autocratic government. But now the world has already moved into an age of moderation, and it is precisely in this general trend of moderation that a worldwide tide of democracy, especially that in the developing countries, has become the mainstream of the world. . . . Faced with such a worldwide democratic tide, China cannot be negligent and certainly cannot be immune from its influence. . . .

The fifth and most important issue is that the broad masses of the people, who have already spent forty years under the traditional system of management with its high degree of concentration of power and have also experienced the tempering of the economic reform and the last few years of democratic enlightenment, today have a greatly enhanced democratic consciousness. The clamor for political reform is rising by the day. . . . According to the historical experience of the democratization of the world, unless the people’s democratic demands can be met and realized through normal means, they are bound to be vented through abnormal means, such as demonstrations, protests, strikes, and even violent behavior. . . .

From this argument, we may see that at the same time that China takes steps toward the unity of liberalizing the economy and democratizing politics, it must also carry out a thorough reform and transformation of the traditional, highly centralized political system and economic system. The essence of the reform should be the following: on the one hand, creating the social conditions for the liberal development of the economy and, on the other hand, creating the social conditions for the transition from political authoritarianism toward democratic politics.

[From Liu and Li, Xin quanwei zhuyi, pp. 113–131; trans. adapted from Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 23, no. 2 (Winter 1990/1991): 57–61]

Yan Jiaqi, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, led the discussion on political reform during the eighties and clearly admired the political structure of the Western liberal democracies. Note that the question of how China is to achieve wealth and power goes back to the self-strengthening movement of the 1860s, when it was also linked to domestic political reform. Like the self-strengthener Feng Guifen, Yan seeks to release the energies and enthusiasm of the Chinese people through political reform and to bring about wealth and power.

China is at present engaged in a reform of its political and economic structures. However, if this reform cannot bring into full play the enthusiasm and initiative of individuals, then it is of little use. Each person comes to know politics through his personal experiences. A successful reform must be conducive to bringing into play the initiative of the individual. . . .

China has a very long history. However, despite the differences among the political systems of the various dynasties, they were all built on the foundation of the “perfect man.” Whenever Chinese society is faced with all sorts of serious problems, the only remedy that comes to the mind of the Chinese is to hope for the appearance of a morally upright and perfect leader, whose efforts will then change the status quo. For all the complexities of the “Cultural Revolution,” its guiding idea is exceedingly simple—that is, China must search for a perfect leader in order to transfer the highest state power. The tremendous calamities caused by the “Cultural Revolution” shook this idea to its very foundations. As I see it, the starting point for China’s political structural reform is to admit that no one is perfect. Since human beings have all kinds of defects and weaknesses, a system is needed to restrain them. . . .

Though it promoted “big democracy,” the Cultural Revolution actually was a period of the total destruction of democracy. To call the destruction of democracy “big democracy” was a great invention in human history. Therefore, I think there is a need today for clarifying the meaning of democracy, to prevent certain people from using the banner of “democracy” to trample on democracy. I believe the most important foundation for democratic politics is to recognize the imperfectibility of human nature—to err is human. In an organization or group that cannot fully agree on goals, opinions, or values, the adoption of democracy means the making of group decisions according to agreed-on procedures and the will of the majority. The practice of democracy often requires people to bow to mistakes. When a majority of the people realize that the original decisions were wrong, then they can be corrected according to procedures that are agreed on by most people and predetermined. . . . When a country or an area has such an error-correcting mechanism, it has democracy; when a political party or a social organization has this kind of error-correcting mechanism, it has democracy. There are various forms of decision making in human society; on questions where there are clear goals and no disagreements over values, decision making should be left to science, advisory groups, and think tanks. Consequently, on scientific questions, we will not resort to majority rule but will have to follow the dictates of truth constantly; on questions of democracy, however, we must be constantly ready to follow mistakes [made by the majority]. The premise of democracy, like those procedures of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as I just related, is to recognize the imperfectibility of human nature, recognize that the decision makers possess different cultural levels and capabilities, recognize that people may freely express their opinions, desires, and emotions, and make or revise decisions through procedures.

Whether to recognize “human imperfectibility” or not is also the foundation determining whether a country or area can establish “legal rule.” The idea of legal rule is to establish the idea that laws are supreme; political parties, the government, enterprises, organizations, and individuals all have to obey the law without exception. . . . Not only the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong but that of the whole of China will depend on the constitution and laws guaranteeing the independent decision-making powers of each level of government, each enterprise, each organization, and each individual. Only in so doing can our society be full of vitality and efficiency and the initiative of each of us given full play.

China’s prosperity has to rely not only on political and legal reforms but also on economic reforms. . . . The problem facing China’s economic reform is how, in an economy dominated by public ownership, to establish an economy where the market determines resource flow, enterprises have self-development abilities, and the industrial structure is continuously renewed. Today, in some areas on the Chinese mainland, some industrial departments will develop the private economy on a larger scale while using the stock and responsibility systems to reform the traditional public ownership system. I think all these measures are extremely useful explorations.

A major task facing China’s political and economic structural reforms is to improve the legal system and imbue reform with the spirit of the rule of law. Use the law to promote reform; use the law to guarantee reform. I believe, if we do so, then China’s prosperity will not be a very distant thing from us.

[From Bachman and Yang, Yan Jiaqi and China’s Struggle for Democracy, pp. 84–90]

1. “April Fifth Movement” refers to a gathering of townspeople in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to commemorate the recently deceased Zhou Enlai and support his protege Deng Xiaoping.