Genesis.
In the beginning there were pilots – only pilots. In the beginning, that is, of the British Army’s involvement with powered flight. In point of fact, officially sponsored experiments with balloons having begun as early as 1878, there had been aviators of a sort in the British Army long before the advent of the aeroplane. Military balloonists of the Royal Engineers had seen active service during the Boer War and in the Sudan, while others had been deployed as far afield as India and China. The use of aerostats had provided commanders with their first opportunities to see what was happening ‘on the other side of the hill’ but the arrival of the aeroplane was to revolutionise every aspect of the conduct of war. While it was axiomatic that the first soldiers to fly in powered aircraft would be pilots, they did not bring about the eventual revolution unaided and once the fighting started, indeed even before that, they would be assisted at practically every turn by others, the observers and gunners, whose part in the development of early military aviation has for too long been overlooked.
Doubtless there are several candidates for the title of being the ‘first British air observer’ but a reasonable claimant must be a far-sighted junior staff officer serving in India, Capt W S Brancker. He managed to engineer events so that on 15 January 1911 he was able to fly in a privately-owned Bristol Boxkite during manoeuvres held in the Deccan. Piloted by H M Jullerot1 and operating under the direct orders of Sir Douglas Haig, Brancker took off to search for an ‘enemy’ column. He found it in the vicinity of Jalna, some thirty miles away. Less than 1½ hours after briefing, the General was handed a report identifying all of the units involved. An attempt to repeat this exercise the following day ended in a crash shortly after take off.
While this obscure exploit in far-off India had been instigated largely by the personal enthusiasm of one man, despite what has often been written in the past, it is clear that the potential of military aviation in general, and air reconnaissance in particular, had not been lost on (at least some departments of) the War Office.2 Here the question of reconnaissance was being actively discussed as early as March 1911 when, until a cadre of experienced military pilots had been built up, it had been proposed to make a start on ‘training personnel in observing, and conveying information of (sic) their observations’ by arranging for civilian aviators to fly staff officers as passengers.3
Sefton Brancker (on the left) may well have been the ‘first British air observer’. He is seen here, as a major, talking to Lt-Col Frederick Sykes at the RFC ‘Concentration Camp’ in June 1914. These two officers were to be very influential in the development of British military aviation; within four years both would be major-generals (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
This idea was soon discarded, as it was thought that ‘the preliminary training should be from a dirigible balloon, rather than from an aeroplane.’ This was merely a change of tack, however; the concept was still being embraced with such zeal that a letter urging the Air Battalion to begin such a programme using the airship Beta, went so far as to state that ‘it is considered that it should take precedence over anything but the most pressing of experimental work.’4 Unfortunately, flying hours were a precious commodity at that stage, and those that were available had to be husbanded for pilot training, so nothing came of this initial burst of enthusiasm.5
Nevertheless, if little effort could be devoted to live practice, the theoretical possibilities continued to be examined. Thus the first Military Aviation Course,6 which ran at Farnborough between April and August 1912 (ie, as the Royal Flying Corps was actually being formed), included reconnaissance and aerial photography among the topics being studied, albeit still primarily in the context of lighter-than-air craft.
The increased autonomy conferred by the creation of the RFC stimulated its members to find ways of persuading a still sometimes sceptical General Staff to accept the military worth of aeroplanes. The first significant opportunity to do this was provided by the annual Army Manoeuvres held in the summer of 1912 when, among others, Majs Trenchard, Brooke-Popham and Sykes, Capt Webb-Bowen and Lt C J L’Estrange-Malone RN could all be found occupying the second seats of aeroplanes from time to time, all of these men later becoming influential figures in British military aviation. Once play had begun, Lt-Gen Sir James Grierson, commanding the ‘Blue’ defenders, was more successful than his opponent in exploiting his air assets, leading directly to the early defeat of Lt-Gen Haig’s ‘Red’ offensive.
The manoeuvres had clearly demonstrated that, weather and daylight permitting, reconnaissance could be successfully conducted from the air. It had been convincingly shown that it was possible not only to detect troop movements but to establish much additional associated intelligence, such as the numbers involved and the rate and direction of advance. This information was of little value, however, if it could not be placed in the hands of the field commander while it was still current. Thus, the need for reliable and much faster communications links was demonstrated with equal clarity, the successful exploitation of the wireless equipment carried by the ‘Blue’ airship Gamma having contributed significantly to Grierson’s ‘victory’. Many other lessons were learned, notably about the logistic problems involved in operating aeroplanes on a relatively large scale in what was still very much a horse-drawn era – it was probably still easier to find fodder than petrol in the rural England of 1912.7
1913. Early indications of a possible need for professional Observers.
As its first birthday approached, and with the previous year’s manoeuvres having provided a sound basis of practical field experience, Lt-Col F H Sykes, the commander of the RFC’s Military Wing, decided that it was time to arrange its affairs on a more formal basis. On 5 February 1913 he proposed the publication of four key documents: Standing Orders for the Military Wing and for the Central Flying School, a Training Manual and a War Manual. By April the first draft of the latter had been circulated, the following (slightly edited) extract being of particular significance:
‘In order that good results may be obtained from aerial reconnaissance, it is essential that the same pilot and observer should always work together as far as possible, at all events in the case of aeroplanes (ie, as distinct from airships – CGJ). Mutual confidence is of the utmost importance.
It is inadvisable to lay down hard and fast rules as to the respective duties of pilots and observers, as it must depend largely upon the personality of the individuals. As soon as the orders have been received, the pilot and observer should consult together with the aid of a map, as to the best manner of carrying out their task, and the route to be followed.
Compass bearings, distances and times must be worked out, and, if necessary, tabulated and fixed to the machine, so as to be clearly visible during flight. As regards the former, allowance must be made for the probable drift due to the wind at the height the aeroplane will fly.
(The pilot) will mark the route on his map and place it in readiness. The observer will also mark his map, and in certain cases, such as where a detailed reconnaissance is required, will make an enlargement of it and duplicate it with the aid of carbon paper. He will collect and get ready all his apparatus, notebook or writing block, pencils, sharpened at both ends, weighted message bags, watch, field glasses and in some cases a camera.
Finally both pilot and observer will commit their orders to memory and then burn them. On return from the reconnaissance, the observer is responsible for seeing that the information gained is transmitted to its destination by the most expeditious means.’
Most early aeroplanes were flown from the back seat, as was the case with this BE3, seen here taking off from Hendon. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
All of this represented sound practical guidance for observers (and pilots) and it is interesting to see that the crucial importance of flight planning had already been clearly identified. What the draft signally failed to provide, however, was any indication of who ‘the observer’ was to be. Would he continue to be a second pilot, as in the 1912 manoeuvres, or was it the intention to employ specialists in the future? The first paragraph rather suggests the latter but, as yet, no arrangements had been made to recruit such men.
This Breguet G3, 211, of No 4 Sqn participated in the 1913 Army Manoeuvres during which it crashed on 25 September. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
By June the ‘War Manual’ had been extensively revised and renamed the RFC Training Manual, Pt II (Military Wing). On 3 September proof copies of this document were issued to at least forty-eight of the officers participating in the 1913 manoeuvres. The guidance on techniques was practically unchanged from the original draft but the following additional paragraph had been added:8
‘Pilots will always be provided from the personnel of the Royal Flying Corps; officers for duty as observers will be provided by the Royal Flying Corps or, temporarily, from the General Staff and other units, as occasion demands.’
It would seem from this proposal (the document had not yet been formally approved for publication) that the RFC acknowledged that it might need to ‘borrow’ outsiders from time to time but that it intended to provide its own observers whenever possible. Since the RFC had no professional observers, however, this implied that it was content to misemploy its pilots. 9
This concept was put to the test during the 1913 war games, this time between ‘White’ and ‘Brown’ forces. Most of the officers who flew as observers were relatively inexperienced pilots drawn from recent intakes; they included Capts B R W Beor and W Picton-Warlow, and Lts R O Abercromby, J E G Burroughs, R G D Small, F G Small, R P Mills, P H L Playfair, M W Noel and E R L Corballis, and 2/Lts G F Pretyman, C W Wilson and W C K Birch. Significantly, however, three students from the current Staff College course also participated. They were Capts E W Furse, L P Evans and H C Jackson, who thus became the first non-pilots to fly quasi-operationally with the RFC. This was only a temporary arrangement, however, and once the manoeuvres had ended these three men resumed their studies.
Following the manoeuvres, HQ Military Wing received a number of constructive criticisms and comments on the Flying Training Manual, Pt II. Despite their ‘amateur’ status, incidentally, the three part-time aviators from Camberley had been among those issued with a proof copy. In the main the observations offered were confined to minor amplifications and changes in emphasis. Since there was little disagreement with the bulk of its content, on 19 May 1914 the document was published, without amendment, as the ‘provisional’ manual.
Before moving on there is a specific innovation which is said first to have been employed during the 1913 exercises and which is worthy of a mention. Among the more experienced pilots who were, on occasion, content to take a proverbial (and in this instance literal) back seat was Maj J F A Higgins who:10
‘… caused quite a sensation in the RFC by introducing a revolutionary system of intercommunication between pilot and observer. He flew as observer, being an experienced soldier who could read troop movements, in a Blériot monoplane piloted by Lt Featherstone Briggs, a distinguished pilot of the Naval Wing, who had already broken the British Height Record. Maj Higgins, sitting aft, tied stout string to the pilot’s arms and used it as reins, and steered him whither he listed. A series of jerk signals indicated whether he wanted to go up or down. The results were wholly satisfactory.’
Although ‘Josh’ Higgins’ solution to the problem was evidently not considered to be worth incorporating into the Manual as a standard operating procedure, it is clear that the early RFC was already well aware of the practical problems involved in enabling pilots and observers to communicate while in flight.
1913-14. The need for professional Observers is recognised.
Capt G S Shephard, another future general, had flown both as pilot and as observer during the 1913 manoeuvres and he subsequently committed his thoughts to paper. In his view, which was probably shared by many of his colleagues, pilots, particularly experienced ones, made poor observers as they disliked flying as passengers and tended to become preoccupied with monitoring the efforts of the man driving the aeroplane. Shephard suggested that the ideal observer would be an experienced ground-based officer, preferably one possessing some technical skill which might be of value in the event of mechanical failure, who had previously flown several times with the same pilot or group of pilots. He also urged that the observer’s station should be provided with a compass ‘as the observer is ultimately held responsible for finding the way.’11
Shephard had, in effect, set out the case for the creation of a cadre of professional observers who would be at home in the air and who knew what they were about. It is not known how much direct influence his paper had, but shortly afterwards an infantry officer was attached to the RFC to be trained as just such an observer. He was Capt H H Shott DSO of the Royal Berkshire Regiment, who appears to have been the first non-pilot officer to be specifically trained for observation duties from aeroplanes. He reported to HQ Military Wing on 6 November 1913 but, because of a shortage of machines at South Farnborough, Lt-Col Sykes, redirected him to Montrose to be looked after by No 2 Sqn; Shott rejoined his battalion on 17 December.12
So far as this writer has been able to ascertain Shott’s was an isolated case and the RFC does not appear to have run another lengthy one-man course. On the other hand, provision was made for individuals to be taken up for a flight as part of the RFC’s continuing effort to ‘sell’ the advantages of aerial observation. Officers who showed an interest, typically engineers, artillerymen and those concerned with intelligence, could apply for a flight ‘through channels’ and several are known to have been taken up from Farnborough over the next few months.13
Fig 2. The six officers nominated to attend the second formal observers course to be run by the RFC.
With tensions rising in Europe the War Office finally decided to take positive steps to ensure that a group of trained observers would be available in the event of war. On 13 July 1914 the ten officers listed at Figure 1 reported to Netheravon for a month’s course of instruction.14 They were to draw an additional three shillings per day while under training and, assuming that they passed the course, they would subsequently be entitled to draw flying pay at a rate of five shillings per diem throughout any period during which they were seconded to the RFC for observation duties.15
A second course (see Figure 2) was scheduled to commence on 12 August but this one was to be overtaken by events.16 Meanwhile, on 27 July the first course had moved to South Farnborough where it was attached to No 6 Sqn. Four days later the War Office suspended observer training and directed that all ten of the officers concerned were to return to their units. On 4 August Great Britain declared war on Germany and the following day the second observers course was cancelled before it had even begun.
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1 A Frenchman, Henri Marie Jullerot was employed by the Bristol and Colonial Aeroplane Company as a test and demonstration pilot and flying instructor. As supervisor of the Bristol flying schools at Larkhill and Brooklands for four years, Jullerot was probably responsible for the training of more pre-war RFC pilots than any other individual. Returning to France to enlist on the outbreak of war, he was back in England by May 1915 when he was commissioned into the RNVR. Rather surprisingly, in view of his considerable flying experience, he was initially employed as an observer, first appearing as such in the RNAS Disposition List for October 1915. On 4 August 1916 he was graded as a pilot and transferred to the RNAS, spending most of the remainder of the war at Dover and Greenwich on (mostly ground) instructional duties.
2 For a concise and informative appreciation of the pre-war Army’s actual level of concern over, and interest in, the emerging implications of military aviation see ‘Far from “A Useless and Expensive Fad” – Aircraft at British Army Manoeuvres 1910-1913’ by Andrew Whitmarsh in Cross & Cockade International Journal, Vol 39, No 2 (2008).
3 AIR1/1607/204/85/14. War Office letter 87/311(MT2) dated 23 March 1911 signed by the Director of Military Training, Maj-Gen A J Murray.
4 Ibid. War Office letter 87/275(FW4) dated 28 April 1911 from The Director of Fortifications and Works, Brig-Gen F Rainsford-Hannay, to Commandant Air Battalion, Maj Sir Alexander Bannerman.
5 Ibid. A somewhat prickly series of exchanges between various interested parties, was eventually ended by a letter from the Aldershot Command (AC 18485(CE) dated 31 May 1911) which explained the situation and stated categorically that ‘passengers can not be carried until pilots and machanists (sic) are first trained.’
6 Not to be confused with No 1 CFS Course which did not begin, at Upavon, until 17 August 1912.
7 While its participation in the 1912 Manoeuvres represented the RFC’s first substantial involvement in a formal exercise, it had not been the Army’s first experience of working with aeroplanes in the field. Apart from the exploits of Jullerot and Brancker in 1911, a privately owned Farman and a pair of Bristol Boxkites loaned by the manufacturer had taken part in Army Manoeuvres held as early as September 1910. A particularly significant event on that occasion was Mr Robert Loraine’s demonstration of air-to-ground communication by W/T, using a transmitter devised by Mr T Thorne-Baker. The range achieved at the time was a mere quarter of a mile, although that would be quadrupled in early post-exercise experiments. The potential demonstrated by aeroplanes in 1910, amplified by the possibilities represented by the use of radio, were probably instrumental in hastening the early elevation of British military aviation first to battalion and, shortly afterwards, to corps status.
Building on the experience gained in 1910, it was intended to use army-owned aeroplanes during the annual manoeuvres planned for the following year. In the event, in view of the international tensions which had been aroused by the Agadir Crisis, it was considered inadvisable to mount any significant display of military force and the 1911 Manoeuvres were cancelled.
8 AIR1/785/204/558 contains draft copies of the War Manual and of the original version of the Training Manual, Pt II.
9 AIR1/119/15/40/62. This accorded fully with the original constitution of the RFC which had made no provision for the employment of dedicated observers. Indeed, Appendix I to the Royal Warrant which had established the Corps (published as a Special Army Order on 12 April 1912) had made specific provision for observation duties to be carried out by pilots, since the staff of each squadron HQ was to be furnished with six surplus pilots ‘to act as reliefs to the officer flyers of the flights or to be employed as observers.’
10 Condensed from Air Mshl Sir John Higgins’ obituary published in The Aeroplane for 11 June 1948.
11 Memoirs of Gordon Shephard, edited by Shane Leslie and published privately in 1924. Key extracts, including Shephard’s thoughts on the provision of air observers, were reproduced in an article by Marvin L Skelton in Cross & Cockade (Great Britain) Journal, Vol 8, No 1 (1977).
12 AIR1/771/204/4/280. War Office letter 43/Flying School/92(MA1), dated 4 November, directed that Capt Shott should report to Farnborough two days later. In an undated HQ Military Wing memo, RFC HR 4859, Lt-Col Sykes notified the War Office that Shott had returned to his unit on 17 December.
13 Ibid. Officers who are known to have been flown from Farnborough under these terms included:
Name |
Corps/Regt |
Date |
Lt W G Welch |
RFA |
28/11/13 |
Capt E Hope Carson |
(Rhodesian) |
5/12/13 |
Lt J A C Pennycuick |
RE |
?/2/14 |
Lt C W M Firth |
1st Sigs Coy RE |
9/3/14 |
Capt H G Gandy |
RE |
?/4/14 |
Lt S StQ Fullbrook-Leggatt |
1st Royal Berks |
?/5/14 |
Lt G Cheetham |
11th Fd Coy RE |
?/5/14 |
14 AIR1/683/21/13/2234. The ten officers listed at Figure 1 were nominated for the course by War Office letter 43/Flying School/119(MA1) dated 6 July 1914.
15 Effective from 1 July 1914, rates of pay for non-RFC officers acting as observers were promulgated by Army Order 244 of 1 August, although it does not necessarily follow that arrangements were in place for such payments actually to be made – see Chapter 2, Note 18.
16 AIR1/365/15/231/5. The officers nominated for the second observers course, which was to take place at South Farnborough, were identified in War Office letter 43/Flying School/123(MA1) dated 24 July 1914. They were to draw the same rates of pay as the students on the first course, apart from Pitcher who, being a qualified pilot, was already permanently in receipt of full flying pay.