1914. The RFC goes to War
Although the RFC had clearly accepted that it was going to need dedicated airborne observers, by the time that it began to cross the Channel in the second week of August 1914 it still had no designated aircrew other than its pilots. Concerned to fill this gap, the War Office exercised its option on the three Staff College students who had flown as observers during the 1913 manoeuvres. Because they were still at Camberley, these officers were not carried on the immediate fighting strengths of their own regiments, making them readily available for employment elsewhere. Capitalising on its investment, the RFC had already earmarked these men for flying duties in the event of general mobilisation.
As early as 5 August Capts Evans and Furse had been directed to report to Nos 3 and 5 Sqns respectively but this order was rescinded on the 7th. Three days later they were summoned to Farnborough again, this time accompanied by Capt Jackson. Henry Jackson was sent to France on 19 August, thus gaining the distinction of becoming the first designated observer to be attached to the RFC on active service overseas. He was assigned to No 3 Sqn on the 21st, on which date Edmund Furse sailed to be allocated to No 5 Sqn on the 22nd. For a month, Lewis Evans was obliged to exercise his newly acquired skills as a staff officer at the Department of Military Aeronautics (DMA) in London before following his colleagues across the Channel on 20 September. He was to spend three month with No 3 Sqn before rejoining his regiment, the Black Watch.
With the obvious exception of the RFC’s pilots, the only other officers with any experience of aerial reconnaissance work were the members of the observers course which had been interrupted by the declaration of war. An effort was made to recall these officers but this met with only limited success, as most of them were serving with their own units. The first to be released was Capt Hughes-Hallett, who was despatched to join the BEF on 1 September, being assigned to work with No 4 Sqn from the 8th. Capts Walker and Powell left England two days after Hughes-Hallett, both of them being allocated to No 3 Sqn on the 9th. The fourth and last member of the one and only pre-war observers course to return to the fold was Capt Hewlett. He had the distinction of being the first observer to go to France as part of a constituted unit, No 6 Sqn, which left South Farnborough in three daily waves beginning on 6 October. Hewlett was part of the first element and he was formally taken on strength by the RFC in the Field ten days later.
As yet there were no laid-down rules as to what constituted a ‘qualified’ observer. It was simply left to the common sense and subjective judgement of those supervising operations in France to decide when a man was competent. Since all of the officers named above had had a modicum of previous experience, all seven were considered to be fully qualified more or less as soon as they arrived. In this respect they were to be (almost) unique. It would be the late summer of 1918 before the RFC/RAF was prepared to accept that an observer could be fully qualified as soon as he arrived in France.1
The first ‘unqualified’ observer to be attached to the RFC was Capt Theodore Crean (Northamptonshire Regt) who sailed for France on 4 September. Having been seconded to the Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force since February 1913, he had arrived back in England within days of the outbreak of war. There had clearly been no opportunity for him to have received any training and, like many of those who were to follow him, he was effectively thrown in at the deep end after joining No 4 Sqn on 9 September. He had still to be certified as fully qualified when he became the first observer to be killed in action with the RFC. He was shot down in a BE2 on 26 October.2
Late 1914. The characteristics of aerial warfare begin to crystallise.
The first two months of the war were characterised by hectic movement and intense activity. Despite the exploratory work which had been done before the war, it was inevitable that, with no previous operational experience upon which to build, there was little method to the earliest sorties flown by the RFC in France. This is not to say that these missions were ineffective. Indeed, timely response to aerial reconnaissance reports led to the British Army’s being ordered to withdraw from its line on the Condé-Mons Canal, preventing its being outflanked by a German advance. British aerial reconnaissance was equally important in the context of the Battle of the Marne when the RFC’s contribution was publicly acknowledged by the French. Furthermore, several important operational ‘firsts’ were achieved during the Battle of the Aisne in September – the first use of aerial photography; the first attempt to direct gunfire, by using pyrotechnics; the first use of wireless telegraphy (W/T) to report enemy troop movements; and the first use of W/T to direct artillery fire – all of which were to figure large among the activities which would routinely fall to observers in the future.
The experience acquired during the ‘Retreat from Mons’ and the subsequent ‘Race to the Sea’ had clearly demonstrated the potential of the aeroplane. It had also revealed the inadequacy of the available role equipment, such as it was, and the need for operating procedures (particularly those involving co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery) to be more clearly defined and mutually agreed. Many other lessons had been learned, the most important being that there could no longer be any doubt about the value of aeroplanes for reconnaissance. It was equally plain, however, that identifying a target by using terms such as ‘one hundred yards south of the second ‘e’ in Zillebeke’ was hardly a satisfactory means of relaying vital intelligence. What was required was a simple, uniform and unambiguous means of defining a geographical location which could be used by both aviators and ground troops. This need was satisfied by a grid system, devised by the Wireless Telegraphy Unit and introduced in September 1914.3
Typical of the relatively primitive aeroplanes available for operations in the spring of 1915 was this BE2a, 206, which was allotted to No 6 Sqn at Bailleul in December 1914. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
Thereafter, with the Front stabilised and the opposing armies becoming increasingly entrenched, the previously mobile campaign rapidly stagnated into a form of mutual siege warfare in which the RFC/RAF was to play a key role for the next four years, finding targets for the British guns and reporting the fall of shot. The latter required something more precise than the grid system and in January 1915 an adaptation of the existing artillery ‘Clock Code’ was introduced. In brief, range was indicated by reference to a series of imaginary concentric circles centred on the target, while bearings were reported relative to a clock face with its 12 o’clock aligned with True North (whereas the original ‘gunners’ 12 o’clock had been based on a line drawn from the battery through the target).4
Since air-to-ground communications facilities were very limited, eg message bags, Aldis lamps and coloured flares or smoke, it was possible to send only relatively crude messages in the early days, although even these had the potential to enhance the effectiveness of artillery fire to a significant degree. With the increasing availability of wireless during 1915, however, it became poss-ible both to extend the selection of pre-(Morse)-coded signals and to refine their content, permitting aircrews to provide increasingly precise information to assist the gunners in their endeavours. The standardised grid and the Artillery Code were to become the basic stock in trade of the many aviators who flew in direct support of the Army for the remainder of the war.
While these and other procedural refinements were being hammered out, other work was in hand with a view to redressing the RFC’s initial shortcomings. During the winter of 1914-15 its responsiveness and flexibility were improved, by decentralising its organisation, while significant technical advances were being made in the fields of aerial photography and wireless telegraphy, and in the design of bomb sights and gun mountings. There were practical limits to what could be achieved, given the limited capabilities of the available aeroplanes, but substantial progress had been made by the time that the 1915 campaigning season opened in March with the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Shortly afterwards another task was allocated to the RFC, that of ‘contact patrols’ – keeping track of the precise location of the leading troops during an offensive. This was first tried, with mixed results, at Aubers Ridge in May 1915. From the lessons learned, the techniques were refined and contact patrol work was conducted much more successfully the following year during the Battle of the Somme and after.
Late 1914. The shortage of professional Observers obliges the RFC to use pilots to fill the gap.
As previously noted, the RFC had been only partially successful in obtaining the services of those officers who had been given an insight into the techniques of aerial reconnaissance before the war and the seven men who did eventually return to the fold were not nearly enough. For several months, therefore, when it was necessary to carry a ‘passenger’ in an aeroplane he often had to be another pilot. As a result, the first ‘observer’ to be killed in action, Lt C G G Bayly, was actually a pilot who was flying a reconnaissance sortie in the second seat of one of No 5 Sqn’s Avros when it was shot down on 22 August.
Robert Loraine was an early anomaly. A notable pre-war civilian pilot, he enlisted in the RFC Special Reserve in 1914 but on being called up he damaged two aeroplanes. As a result, he was sent to France specifically annotated as an observer and he flew as such with No 3 Sqn. By late 1915, however, his pilot category had been reinstated and he was flying, as seen here, with No 2 Sqn. (Maj F W Smith)
Other pre-war pilots who flew as observers on occasion included Maj L B Moss, Capts G I Carmichael and L E O Charlton, Lts R O Abercromby, K P Atkinson, I M Bonham-Carter, D S K Crosbie, W R Freeman, H D Harvey-Kelly, T L S Holbrow, L da C Penn-Gaskell, F G Small, R G D Small and R M Vaughan and 2/Lts C E C Rabagliati, L A Strange, A A B Thompson and C W Wilson (this list being far from comprehensive). Some pilots were specifically identified as being intended to serve as observers, a document dated 28 September, for instance, noting Capts R A Boger and H L Reilly as being in this category. Boger was another pilot who was to become an early casualty while flying as an observer, being taken prisoner on 5 October.
When additional pilots began to be sent out to France, some of these were also earmarked as observers. The first such pilot to arrive was 2/Lt R Loraine who, as a member of the RFC Special Reserve, was called to the colours and commissioned as a probationary 2nd lieutenant with effect from 15 August 1914. Despite his being a qualified pilot, when Robert Loraine was initially sent overseas on 1 September it was as an observer.5
Over the next few months the strength of the four squadrons which were on active service was maintained, even increased, by a steady flow of reinforcements, some of the pilots involved evidently being either of indifferent quality or only part-trained. In late September, for instance, a batch of five new pilots was despatched from Southampton of whom two, Capts H T Lumsden and J R C Heathcote, were annotated as being ‘fair pilots who will probably be useful as observers.’ Similarly, the despatch note accompanying Capt H Wyllie, who left for France a month later, noted that he had flown the Longhorn but clearly stated that he was being sent to France ‘as an observer.’6
Another slightly unusual case was represented by a small group of colonial officers who had been seconded to the RFC before the war to learn to fly. Four of them, two from the Indian Army (Capt D le G Pitcher and Lt H L Reilly) and two from the South African Defence Force (Lt K R Van der Spuy and 2/Lt C F Creed), were attached to Nos 2, 4 and 5 Sqns in August 1914 and accompanied them when they first crossed the Channel. In October the War Office required that one of these men, Capt Pitcher, be sent back to England. Although Pitcher was a qualified pilot, in his response Brig-Gen Henderson (Commanding the RFC in the Field) stated that he had actually been ‘employed exclusively on observation duties.’ The General went on to agree to release him, but only after a replacement observer had been received. London repeated its request, stating that Capt Wyllie, who had just arrived in France, was to be regarded as the necessary replacement.7
Late 1914. Early efforts to provide additional Observers from home.
Although the RFC had been prepared to use pilots as observers when it had to, this had always been a matter of necessity rather than choice. In December 1914 Lt-Col H M Trenchard commented adversely on this unsatisfactory practice when he wrote ‘in my opinion it is absolutely unnecessary for the squadrons out here to have more pilots. 15 pilots per squadron is ample and we should get 9 observers who are not pilots to go with them, as it is manifestly a waste of time to train a man as a pilot and then when he comes out here not to allow him to fly a machine, and only use him as an observer …’8
Apart from anything else, it was clearly uneconomic to risk losing two pilots when only one was necessary to fly the aeroplane. Already well aware of this, the War Office had been doing its best to find additional officers to fly with the RFC. This early recruiting campaign included the experiment of selecting a batch of Gentleman Cadets at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and sending them straight to France as observers. The first six (I T Lloyd, A Lees, J C W A Pinney, A J Capel, A C Wilson and R Pierson) arrived at GHQ on 14 November. They were all gazetted as 2nd lieutenants a few days later, their back-dated seniority anticipating their attachment to the RFC by three days.
Including all of those named above (but excluding the misemployed pilots), by 11 December a total of twenty-three officers had been sent to France as observers and a few more would arrive before the end of the year. To these should be added 2/Lts E W Powell and C A Gladstone who had originally been sent abroad to serve the RFC in their professional capacity as Intelligence Officers. Sailing for France as early as 17 August, they had been attached to the staff of HQ RFC but on 15 and 21 November, respectively, they had been reassigned to fly as observers with Nos 3 and 5 Sqns.
It should be appreciated that the men being sent to France to serve as observers would have had very little, if any, previous experience of aviation. Some of them may have been given a few days of indoctrination training at South Farnborough (although this has not been confirmed) but, in essence, they were expected to learn the tricks of the trade as best they could in the course of flying operational sorties. Once they were considered to have made the grade, this process taking anything from a week to a month, this was certified by an announcement in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders.9 Those officers who flew as fully qualified observers during 1914 are listed at Figure 3. It should be stressed that Figure 3 does not reflect the whole picture, as it was quite normal for observers to fly on operations before they had completed their certification; there were, for instance, a further eighteen officers in this category entitled to draw flying pay during December.10
Fig 3. Officers known to have flown as qualified observers with the RFC in the field during 1914.
In the meantime a training scheme, of sorts, had been introduced at home. Before the end of 1914 a number of junior officers had been attached to the rump of the RFC, which had been left behind in England, with a view to their becoming observers. The first to arrive at Netheravon was 2/Lt J Robertson (RFA) who reported to No 1 Sqn on 28 November; he was followed the next day by 2/Lts F H Jenkins (RFC Special Reserve) and W E B Wright (KOYLI) and they were joined on 1 December by Lt E M I Buxton (Royal Fusiliers) and 2/Lt H F T Blowey (RFA). There is some evidence to suggest that others went to No 7 Sqn, although, if they did, this writer has failed to establish their identities. Early in December another four were sent to Chelmsford to join an RFC flight which had recently been established there. They were Lt W Milne (Loyal North Lancs), 2/Lt H W Medlicott (Rifle Bde), 2/Lt W P Knowles (Manchester Regt) and 2/Lt W E Gardner (DLI).11 Of these nine men only Blowey, Medlicott and Milne appear to have seen active service as observers in France, all three crossing the Channel during January 1915.
There were no courses as such at Netheravon (or at Chelmsford), not even a formal syllabus. These protoobservers were simply expected to develop their map-reading skills and to become familiar with the practice of troop reconnaissance conducted from the air by exercising with soldiers training on Salisbury Plain or elsewhere. Fortnightly reports as to each student’s progress and efficiency were called for, which suggests that their stay was expected to be of several weeks’ duration. Few other specific references to this early phase of observer training appear to have survived but it is evident that one lesson was learned very quickly. The following instruction appears among No 1 Sqn’s Routine Orders for 8 December 1914 – ‘Officers and NCOs acting as observers will invariably have their maps tied to them if they are not attached to the aeroplane.’ Thereby, no doubt, hung a tale, but while one of these early trainees may well have been the first observer to lose his maps in the slipstream he was certainly not the last.
It is interesting to note that this anecdote clearly indicates that some NCOs were already being trained for observation duties. It was generally assumed, however, that the levels of intelligence and education required to perform satisfactorily in the air were more likely to be exhibited by officers. While there was never any prohibition on non-commissioned personnel flying as observers (or as pilots), the RFC/RAF always preferred its aircrew to be officers, NCOs tending to be used only when this was necessary to balance the supply and demand equation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that two of the first three wartime casualties to be sustained by the RFC were non-commissioned personnel. 2/AM H E Parfitt was killed, along with his pilot, when their BE8 crashed on a non-operational sortie on 16 August 1914 and Sgt-Maj D S Jillings was wounded by rifle fire six days later.
1914-15. Intimations of the need to grant Observers a degree of formal recognition.
As soon as it began to become apparent that the war was unlikely to be ‘over by Christmas’ after all, some consideration began to be given to the long-term implications of attaching officers to the RFC as observers. As early as 17 November it was pointed out that six of the observers currently flying with the RFC were Staff College graduates but that, apart from their rank, their standing was no greater than that of the half-dozen Gentleman Cadets who had reported to GHQ three days earlier. Soldiers are very fond of hierarchies and the RFC had signally failed to create one for its handful of observers. To redress this situation to some degree, it was suggested that provision should be made for the more senior officers to be employed on specialist liaison duties at corps or division level and that this service should be regarded as being at a Staff Officer grade.
This proposal appears to have been acted upon as soon as it was received, as Maj Furse and Capts Hughes-Hallett and Hewlett were all graded as staff officers (GSO3) with effect from 18 November. They were assigned, respectively, to HQ RFC, and to Headquarters 1st and 2nd Wgs with effect from 16 December.12 The real significance of this event was not appreciated at the time but, in effect, it had served notice that something would eventually have to be done about recognising the status of observers – all of them.
Although the assignment of observers to staff appointments never became a common practice, this is not to say that the first few made no worthwhile contribution. The topic on which they concentrated at first was the ability of aviators to direct artillery fire effectively, a fact which was far from being universally recognised at the turn of 1914-15. Writing to Lt-Col Ashmore in December 1914, Trenchard described the situation as follows (the passage is quoted verbatim) .13
‘The co-operation with artillery is fairly good and will undoubtedly get rapidly better as soon as the gunners realise that our observers in the air are to be trusted in marking shots, but at present there is a certain amount of distrust placed in the observer who signals short, and the battery only creeps up to the target instead of making a bold increase in range. Also it very often happens that a battery is ordered to fire at a certain target and when the observer is in the air finds that the target does not exist or has been moved, and he finds the enemies battery five or six hundred yards away. The battery really comes under the control of the observer and can be put on to the new target with the greatest of ease, if batteries will tumble to it. Some of the Division Generals and Battery Commanders are good in letting the observer do this; others say, “Oh the observer does not know what he is doing,” and refuses to alter range or line, and it is a waste of valuable time and machines if batteries do not trust the observer.
Whenever I send up a senior gunner as observer batteries trust him more, but the gunner observer will tell you that it is just as easy for the infantry Officer to observe for artillery fire as it is for him, and in this I agree.’
It is evident from the gist of this piece of tortured (pre-Maurice Baring) Trenchardian prose that the first three observers-cum-staff officers would have plenty to do over the next few months, selling the concept of air observation to often very sceptical field gunners. Furse, whose credibility would have been considerably enhanced by the fact that he was a professional gunner himself, is reported to have been particularly effective in preaching the RFC’s gospel.14
In the event, the need to provide suitable ground appointments for senior observers turned out to be a transient requirement because the supply of such officers soon began to dry up. In mid-December 1914 50% of all observers attached to the RFC had been majors or captains. By the following August there were no majors and the proportion of captains had declined to a mere 10% of the total. Why? Because by that time any officer wise enough to consider the practical implications of RFC policy had concluded that volunteering to fly as an observer was not a sound career move. (The basis of this conclusion is examined in more detail below). It was fortunate for the RFC that such longterm considerations failed to deter ample numbers of energetic, but trench-bound, youngsters from seeking a more satisfying and dynamic (and comfortable?) occupation. For the time-being, therefore, an adequate supply of volunteers continued to come forward, but by 1915 being an observer was already perceived to be a job for subalterns.15
Early 1915. The RFC begins to recruit and train Observers in the field.
By the end of 1914 it was clear that the trickle of observers being sent out from England would be insufficient to meet the requirements of the operational squadrons. Furthermore, the demand for additional pilots, both to permit the formation of new squadrons and to replace casualties, had begun to exceed the capacity of the training system. In January 1915 the War Office acknowledged that the Central Flying School (CFS) could no longer cope with the task alone and it was decided that home-based Service Squadrons working up to operational status would also have to function as advanced flying training schools. To satisfy the urgent need for additional pilots it was also directed that ‘training with artillery, and other similar duties, and the training of observers will be cut down to the lowest minimum possible’ (author’s italics).16
This major change in training policy will not have been introduced on a whim and it is almost certain that HQ RFC would have been at least aware of, if not actively consulted during, the War Office’s deliberations. Anticipating that the flow of additional observers was likely to dwindle, HQ RFC was obliged to take matters into its own hands by launching what amounted to a local recruiting campaign. Late in December authority was granted for Wing Commanders to arrange for two artillery officers to be attached to each of their squadrons for periods of up to twenty-one days.17 The aims of this initiative were ostensibly to promote an appreciation of the advantages of aerial observation and to foster a mutual understanding of the operational limitations imposed by the contemporary state of the arts of aviation and field gunnery, but it was clearly hoped that some of the participants might also be enticed into volunteering to fly on a permanent basis. Attached officers were entitled to an additional three shillings per day (the instructional rate of flying pay) while they were with the RFC and any who showed an interest in becoming full time observers were invited to apply through their COs once they had returned to their units.18
While the opportunity to spend three weeks among aviators served to attract a number of gunner officers, the upper echelons of the artillery community regarded the RFC’s scheme with some misgiving. Suspecting that the RFC was plotting to ‘poach’ some of its men, HQ Second Army wrote to GHQ seeking clarification as to the long term implications of such attachments. The letter was passed to Col Sykes (by now Chief of Staff and deputy to Maj-Gen Sir David Henderson) who explained that the RFC considered that there were two classes of observer; those who were fully trained and who were ‘attached permanently’ to the RFC, and those who, trained or otherwise, were only temporarily attached.19 The officers currently being ‘borrowed’ from the artillery were regarded as being in the second category but Sykes admitted that, once trained, he would be glad to offer them employment within the first group. If this offer were to be accepted, however, it would have to be on a permanent basis; the RFC could not afford to commit itself to observers who might subsequently be withdrawn.
With hindsight it can be seen that Sykes’ real problem was that (barring one or two who were Special Reservists) the RFC was actually in the rather vulnerable position of not having any observers that it could really call its own and it was therefore having to beg, borrow or steal them from other arms of the Service. From HQ RFC’s immediate perspective, however, the only problems were quantity and quality and, so long as volunteers were forthcoming, it was content. No one could see that it was of any consequence which cap badge an observer wore, but time would eventually show that it really did matter.
So far as quantity was concerned it was necessary to state what numbers were actually required and in January 1915 HQ RFC decreed that the provisional ‘establishment’ (ie the officially approved manpower allocation) of a squadron was to include six qualified observers, two more on probation and four temporarily attached from Artillery Divisions (see Note 17).20 There appears to have been little difficulty in obtaining sufficient volunteers and, taking advantage of the subdued level of operational activity imposed by the winter of 1914-15, HQ RFC decided to replace its relatively low-key individual attachments with a concentrated formal training programme. To meet this requirement, three-week courses were organised by 1st and 2nd Wgs during February, all of the students being drawn from the Royal Artillery.
Quality, however, turned out to be a rather different matter. In March the wings reported that, of the two dozen or so men they had recently trained, only ten were considered to be suitable candidates for permanent employment as observers. In the event only four of these officers, 2/Lts W S Douglas, G S M Ashby, R Balcombe-Brown and C H Awcock, actually exercised this option and two of them (Douglas and Ashby) had already committed themselves well in advance of their courses, having been attached to the RFC at their own request from 26 December and 7 January, respectively. It was a disappointingly small return for what had turned out to be a major diversion of effort and no further large-scale courses were laid on.
In the light of this experience, Col Sykes reflected further and in April he recommended to GHQ that there should be three recognised categories of observer.21
a. A highly trained group of eight men per squadron attached permanently to the RFC.
b. Two further men per squadron, undergoing training and forming a first reserve.
c. A group who, although fully trained, would return to their parent units whence they could be attached to the RFC for specific tasks as required by their own commanders while also representing a second tier of reserves.
Fig 4. The sixteen officers who attended the course run by HQ RFC in April 1915.
In effect, this amounted to little more than a refinement of the provisional arrangements that had been authorised by HQ RFC in January, raising (temporary attachments aside) the total of observers per squadron from six plus two to eight plus two. It is interesting to note, however, that neither of these allocations conformed to the provisions that had been sanctioned by the War Office. The first official statement to make reference to a specific establishment for observers had appeared in December 1914; it had allowed for only seven per squadron.22 Since that document was addressed solely to HQ Administrative Wing (at Farnborough), however, its content does not appear to have filtered through to HQ RFC in France. In the absence of any other directive, therefore, Sykes had evidently taken it upon himself to make up his own rules. Just two days after he proposed his increase to eight plus two, however, a revised official establishment was published, and this time as a formal printed document which would have been widely circulated.23 This still made provision for only seven observers per unit.
Notwithstanding the numerical mis-matches, Sykes’ three-tier proposal was effectively implemented. The existing arrangements already included the first and second groups (although there would now be only seven, rather than eight, men in the first) and authority was granted to create the third. This was done by HQ RFC’s running a course for sixteen officers, again all artillerymen, between 16 and 25 April (see Figure 4). Once this course had graduated the immediate needs of the RFC in France had been virtually satisfied, although, in the event, only three of the officers who had attended HQ RFC’s course were subsequently to fly as observers.24
Sykes had one more card up his sleeve, however – the cadets who had been sent out from Sandhurst in November (see page 8). Stating that ‘the experiment has so far proved distinctly successful’, he wrote to the War Office requesting that another six be sent out in May, noting that they ‘should not be heavier than ten stone, seven pounds.’25 These men were equally successful and the RFC would soon begin trawling for much larger numbers of graduating cadets, although most of these would be required as pilots rather than as observers.
Since there were deemed to be adequate numbers of trained observers available by the spring of 1915 and a system was in place to provide replacements, there could no longer be any justification for misemploying pilots. Instructions were therefore issued to the effect that ‘two qualified pilots are not to ascend in the same aeroplane, except by special permission of a Wing Commander.’26
The manning situation was further improved by the availability of limited numbers of non-commissioned personnel. Although the RFC instinctively preferred to use officers for flying duties, it had not ruled out the use of soldiers. Some of these men were volunteers from the trenches but most tended to be the more capable of the RFC’s own NCOs and air mechanics. While it may have been tentative at first, in view of the aptitude and enthusiasm shown by these men, this practice became quite widespread. Many of these men would eventually be formally recognised as qualified observers and, following a successful period of active service, it was not uncommon for them to be sent home to be commissioned and trained as pilots.
1915. The nature of Observer training in the field.
While Sykes’ endeavours had ensured that each squadron would continue to be furnished with an adequate supply of officer observers, his reference to some of them being ‘highly trained’ smacked of wishful thinking. In fact, with no further courses being organised, there was no formal training system whatsoever to prepare later arrivals for their duties and new observers were more or less obliged to fend for themselves. An impression of what this meant in practice can be gained from the experience of 2/Lt C F A Portal who had been in France since the beginning of the war as a Motor Cyclist Officer attached to the Signals Company serving HQ I Corps.27
When he reported to No 3 Sqn on 5 July 1915 Portal already knew the Morse code and considered that he could read a map – on the ground. He had never seen a Lewis gun, however, nor had he ever been up in an aeroplane, and he had ‘only the vaguest idea’ of what his new employers might require him to do. He joined A Flight, which was commanded by another relative newcomer, Capt T O’B Hubbard,28 who instructed him to familiarise himself with the Lewis gun, as they would be flying together in two days’ time. Doing as he was bid, Portal devoted the next several hours to studying the machine gun. Wiser counsels soon prevailed, one of the older hands pointing out ‘that the Morane could not carry it and me’ and recommending the more practical alternative of a stripped ·303 rifle.29
The next day Portal was briefed on the Artillery Code by another observer and on the third morning the crew flew their first mission, a reconnaissance which took them as far east as Lille. Portal found his first exposure to anti-aircraft fire somewhat disturbing and the engine’s tendency to cutout intermittently was sufficiently alarming to frustrate some of his attempts to count rolling stock. Despite getting lost twice, they eventually returned safely to Lozinghem. As Portal later recalled:
‘At the time, it did not appear strange that a reconnaissance should be performed by a pilot who had only once before flown the type of aeroplane used (and wrecked it) and had never been over the objective or any other part of the enemy’s lines, accompanied by an observer who had never been in the air at all.’
After a few more reconnaissance sorties, Hubbard and Portal progressed to the direction of gunfire. The squadron’s reigning artillery co-operation expert gave them a thirty-minute briefing on what was involved, the theory subsequently being backed up by two demonstration shoots. That was it. The crew was now considered to be fully trained. Charles Portal was officially accredited as a qualified observer with effect from 4 August. His experience had been typical. A new observer was simply thrown in at the deep end. Whether he succeeded in learning to swim in his strange new environment, and how strongly, depended almost entirely upon his enthusiasm, aptitude and resourcefulness, reinforced by any advice that might be offered by sympathetic colleagues. By mid-1915 there were certainly some relatively experienced observers in France but Sykes’ ‘highly trained’ was a misnomer.
Another first-hand account of squadron-based training in 1915, albeit rather later in the year, has been left us by E M Roberts.30 An American, and a volunteer from the trenches, Cpl Roberts, like Portal, also learned his trade with No 3 Sqn. He found that he had to work ‘fourteen hours each day’ in order to absorb all that he was required to learn about gunnery direction, aerial gunnery and W/T work. He was also obliged to spend several days with an artillery battery, although he records that ‘nobody had explained to me so far why I had been attached to the battery and nobody ever did, but I surmised that they wanted me to get up some acquaintance with artillery practice.’
Attaching observers to artillery batteries was to become quite a common procedure, both for trainees learning the ropes and, later on, in the interests of maintaining a close working relationship between each squadron and the batteries which it served. It was typical of the RFC’s makeshift approach to training in 1915, however, that no one seemed to have bothered to provide Cpl Roberts with any specific guidance.
Before leaving the RFC’s early in-house training system, one more anecdote is offered to show just how inept it could sometimes be. On 3 January 1916, Lt E F P Lubbock, then an observer with No 5 Sqn, noted in his diary that:31
‘We had a lecture today on ‘Co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery’. The man got up and opened his lecture by saying ‘I don’t know much about artillery and I have never been in an aeroplane, nor have I ever seen an aeroplane working with the artillery, but I have been ordered to lecture to you.’ After that we had to listen for half an hour to his lecture on work which we had all been doing for months!’
While it is clear that the instruction on offer to an observer recruited in the field in 1915 could hardly be described as formal training, there was a ‘bible’ available. Published in June 1915, RFC Notes for Observers was a handy, 63-page, pocket-sized (although it was not supposed to be taken into the air) booklet that: described the basic routines to be followed when conducting reconnaissance; explained the ‘clock code’ and listed the associated W/T calls; laid down the procedures for cleaning and maintaining the Lewis gun, and so on.32 Since this little publication seems to have spelled out in some detail most of what an observer needed to know, it is a little surprising that this author has come across no references to it in the writings of contemporary observers. That could simply be because so few of them recorded their experiences or it might suggest that the booklet was not widely available, perhaps only being issued to men being trained in the UK.
1915. The beginnings of an Observer training system at home.
Despite its obvious limitations, in the absence of any better solution, an essentially pragmatic approach to the provision of air observers for the squadrons already in France was sustained, substantially unchanged, until early 1917. New squadrons arriving from home brought their own observers with them but in 1915 there were, as yet, still no dedicated training facilities in the UK. The most common practice was for prospective home-grown observers to be initially attached either to a Reserve Aeroplane Squadron or to a Service Squadron acting as a training unit prior to its mobilisation. On completion of their ‘courses’ they were posted to a unit which was preparing to deploy.
Some idea of the scope of the basic training being provided at home in the summer of 1915 is conveyed by the recollections of (then 2/Lt) R R Money. An impatient infantry subaltern, Money had applied to serve in the RFC as a means of getting into action. He was accepted as an observer, a significant factor being his light weight.
The limited power of the aeroengines of the day placed very real constraints on the weight-lifting capabilities of early aeroplanes and contemporary observers were expected to weigh no more than eleven stone. This point was laboured by an amply upholstered Lt-Col J F A Higgins (then commanding 3rd Wg) at an HQ RFC conference held in August.33 Maj-Gen Henderson acknowledged that the weight of an observer was important but considered that ‘we ought not to reject first class officers merely because they happen to weigh over 11 stone,’ pointing out, a trifle tartly, that he needed ‘to keep the supply of future Wing Commanders in view.’
Money was posted to Fort Grange (Gosport) in June 1915 where his instruction was supervised by Capt H Wyllie of No 17 Sqn. There were.34
‘… about eight of us on the course, and for the next fortnight we practised signalling, attended lectures and went up on practice reconnaissances on which we had to write reports. We also practised artillery observation, both from the air and in a hangar where a model village and trench system had been built, enabling the would-be observer, mounted in the roof, to spot and locate the flashes of tiny bulbs concealed variously over the ground. Locations and corrections were signalled down by buzzer.’
The first training aid of the type described by Money, a representation of the battlefield of Neuve Chappelle as seen from 5,000 feet, had been built by Cpl Frank Pratt at Brooklands in May 1915. It had been inspected by Generals Henderson and Brancker and, having evidently, received their endorsement, he built a second at Gosport and a third at Farnborough before being sent to France in 1916 where he made another twenty or so for the squadrons in action at that time, tailored in each case to match the specific sector of the front over which they were operating. On returning to the UK, Pratt built models of the Ypres and Armentières Salients for the Schools of Instruction at Oxford (where he personally instructed trainee observers) and Reading, respectively (see Chapter 5, Note 11).35
The nacelle of a wrecked Vickers FB5 used by No 5 Sqn at Abeele in 1915 to familiarise new observers with the rudimentary appointments of their battle station. (L Lubbock)
Known as Artillery Targets, their design varied in detail, but a typical example was described as being made ‘of wood, about 10 feet square,36 with scenery painted on it. […] This target should be raised a few feet off the ground to allow for repairs, etc.’37 The terrain model had electric light bulbs embedded in the scenery and a means of producing puffs of smoke to simulate the flashes from both British and enemy guns and the burst of British shells; in some cases it was even possible to represent a gas attack. Supplementing the hardware, there was a gridded map, representing the area of simulated terrain. Trainees were required to report the location of targets using the grid system and to estimate the miss distance of a salvo, converting this into Clock Code. Appropriate messages were then transmitted to the ‘battery’ using a silent Morse key – silent to simulate the conditions in a noisy, open cockpit where the operator would be unable to hear the ‘dits’ and ‘dahs’ that he was sending.
While artillery targets would have become commonplace by the end of 1916, the facilities available in 1915 were not always as sophisticated as those at Brooklands and Gosport but, wherever a prospective observer was sent, he was supposed to be taught something of the arts of aerial reconnaissance, photography and artillery direction, to practise Morse, to be introduced to the Lewis gun and to acquire some familiarity with the airborne environment. Unfortunately, because of the priority that had to be afforded to their equally green pilot colleagues, under the edict that had been issued in January 1915 (see Note 16), very few flying hours could be dedicated to the training of observers. While some will have managed to squeeze in a few trips, many observers found out much of what they knew about the business of flying through a process of osmosis rather than through actually getting airborne.
Fig 5. Distribution of commissioned observers serving with RFC Service Squadrons on 15 October 1915. Nos 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 30 and 31 Sqns also existed, their status varying from embryo to fully operational, but none of these had any observers on strength on this specific date.
A – Fully qualified and on active service.
B – On active service but still on probation.
C – Training complete, awaiting mobilisation.
D – Under training.
While the unstructured, makeshift training methods being applied, both at home and in the field, inevitably produced varied results, they sufficed to build up numbers. By 31 August 1915 there were 113 officers serving as observers in France. Of these, forty-six were recognised as being fully qualified.38 It is interesting to note that by this time the previously overwhelming predominance of artillerymen had largely disappeared and only 20% of the observers flying on operations were ‘Gunners’. While it is highly unlikely that any fault will have been found with their knowledge of gunnery, the group of men trained locally (and hastily) early in 1915 may have turned out to have been rather too specialised, and thus less flexible, compared to those drawn from the infantry and elsewhere – or perhaps it was simply that the RA preferred to keep its officers on the ground.
Apart from those who were being killed or wounded in combat and/or injured in flying accidents, there was further considerable wastage among observers due to many of the more experienced men returning home to become pilots. Nevertheless, the numbers of commissioned observers available continued to increase slowly as the RFC expanded and by the middle of October there were 129 on active service in France with another fifty under training at home; the distribution of these officers is shown at Figure 5.39 Note that by this time the average strength of the operational squadrons was approaching eleven observers per unit, somewhat higher than the authorised nine (seven qualified plus two under training). The effective figure was actually closer to sixteen as there were now substantial numbers of non-commissioned personnel serving as gunners or as de facto observers, a survey establishing that there were forty-nine flying operationally during October.40
1915. Men Only
While nothing ever came of it, it should be recorded that at least one woman volunteered to fly as an observer, a Miss E M Pearson (of Old House, Southam) offering her services to the War Office in August 1915. It is possible that she had been inspired by the Marchioness of Londonderry who had recently suggested that a Women’s Legion should be formed to relieve soldiers of some of their more mundane domestic chores – cooking and cleaning, for instance. Shortly afterwards women did begin to work for the military, and in increasingly technical trades, but they were not formally enlisted until 1917 when they began to be employed, initially as drivers, by the RFC and the Army Service Corps (ASC).41
Needless to say, the War Office declined Miss Pearson’s offer, Lt-Col E Turner’s polite but firm letter of rejection stating that it was ‘quite impossible to consider (her) application as an observer in the Royal Flying Corps, as only officers are employed in that capacity.’42 While this rationale may not have been scrupulously accurate, after all there were non-commissioned personnel flying as observers, it neatly avoided having to invoke the sensitive issue of gender. It should be remembered that in 1915 women had yet to be enfranchised. While the suffragettes were being relatively docile during the war years in the national interest, this represented only a truce, not a capitulation.
________________________
1 There were a few, a very few, exceptions to this rule. The earliest example appears to have been 2/Lt J O Andrews who spent some time at Netheravon with No 1 Sqn before being despatched to France to join No 5 Sqn on 15 January 1915, his ‘Qualified in England’ annotation being immediately endorsed by HQ RFC. It happened again when No 7 Sqn moved to France, its five observers (Capt W O’Gowan, Lts W E G Murray and G D Hill, and 2/Lts F H Hyland and R H Peck) all being recognised as being fully qualified with effect from 8 April 1915, the day before they joined the BEF. There were other anomalies too, such as Lt J A Johnstone, who was killed in action on 20 March 1915, still notionally uncertified. The following day his qualification was announced, backdated to 17 December 1914 which must have reflected experience gained at home as Johnstone was not attached to the BEF until 13 March.
2 This BE2 (612) was not the first aeroplane to be lost by the RFC in France, nor was Crean the first ‘observer’ to fail to return from an operational sortie. Crean’s unique distinction was that he was the first British non-pilot aviator to be lost in action, his predecessors having been qualified pilots flying in the second seat. Sadly, Crean and his pilot, Lt C G Hosking, had also had the singular misfortune to have been the first victims of a ‘friendly fire’ incident, their aeroplane having been brought down by Allied rifle fire.
3 The RFC’s limited pre-war expertise in the use of airborne wireless equipment had been concentrated within its Headquarters Unit. On mobilisation the most experienced W/T personnel were formed into a flight which was attached to No 4 Sqn and flew to France with its new parent on 13 August. The autonomy of this flight was restored in September when it was redesignated as the Wireless Telegraphy Unit (WTU) and made directly subordinate to HQ RFC. Having grown substantially in the meantime, on 8 December 1914 the unit became No 9 Sqn which was commanded by Maj H Musgrave. The officers who constituted the original staff of the WTU were Capt D S Lewis, Lt B T James and 2/Lts S C W Smith and O G Lywood.
4 Capt Lewis and Lt James are generally recognised as having been jointly responsible for adapting the Clock Code for use in an airborne context, Lewis also being credited with having introduced the idea of gridded maps.
5 AIR1/823/204/5/48. War Office letter 79/4878(MA1), dated 17 September, identified all officers who had been ordered to join the Military Wing (in any capacity) since the beginning of the war. Annex C listed the eight men who had been sent to the Expeditionary Force as observers, including 2/Lt Robert Loraine, which was a little surprising as he had qualified for (French) Aviator’s Certificate No 126 as early as 21 July 1910. Loraine had been a particularly prominent pre-war aviator, making the first crossing of the Irish Sea (although he had had to swim the last twenty yards or so) and handling the first significant W/T transmissions made from an aeroplane in the UK – see Chapter 1, Note 7.
This anomaly is explained in Norman Macmillan’s Sefton Brancker (1935), p71. It appears that, following his summons to Farnborough as a reservist shortly after the outbreak of war, despite his substantial experience, Loraine managed to damage two aeroplanes. As a result Lt-Col Trenchard refused to endorse him as a pilot, hence his being despatched to France as an observer, where he was assigned to No 3 Sqn. Reportedly, however, Loraine was short-sighted which provoked complaints to the effect that the BEF was being supplied with observers who couldn’t see! After recovering from a serious wound sustained in November 1914, Loraine was (short-sighted or not) given appropriate training and he returned to France in September 1915 to join No 2 Sqn as a pilot.
6 AIR1/814/204/4/1257. Officers proceeding to France at this time carried a note from Military Wing Headquarters at South Farnborough. It was to be handed to Brig-Gen Henderson (or his representative) when the bearer arrived at HQ RFC. Most of these missives simply stated that the bearer was at the General’s disposal but some contained a brief amplifying observation, occasionally accompanied by a copy of a CFS Report. The two notes specifically referred to in the narrative were unreferenced memoranda of this nature dated 29 September and 26 October 1914.
7 AIR1/864/204/5/506. This correspondence was terminated by War Office letter 100/Flying Corps/28(MA1) dated 29 October 1914, repeating London’s request that Pitcher be sent back to England. Capt Pitcher returned to the UK shortly afterwards. By the following March he was a lieutenant-colonel and Deputy Commandant of the Central Flying School.
8 AIR1/1283/204/11/13. The quotation is taken from an apparently private, and therefore unreferenced, letter dated 4 December 1914 from Lt-Col Trenchard to his successor at South Farnborough, Lt-Col E B Ashmore, who now commanded the recently established Administrative Wing.
9 AIR1/827/204/5/188. Although the information had been available previously elsewhere, eg in a memorandum despatched to the War Office by Maj-Gen Henderson on 8 January 1915, a consolidated list of the twenty-one observers who had qualified to date was published, along with their effective dates of qualification, in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 12 January 1915 (AIR1/829/204/5/219). Thereafter, until mid-1916, the certification of each individual observer was usually announced in Routine Orders more or less as it occurred.
10 AIR1/1057/204/5/1555. These figures, and the data at Figure 3, have been extracted from monthly nominal rolls identifying all commissioned observers available for operations in France, including those who were not yet fully qualified. These lists were maintained by HQ RFC from December 1914 until at least the following August.
11 AIR1/823/204/5/48. These four officers were directed to report to Chelmsford by War Office letter 121/1181(MA1) dated 3 December 1914.
12 AIR1/829/204/5/219. The RFC’s squadrons had been grouped into wings with effect from 29 November 1914, these arrangements being publicised in arrears by Army Order 62 of 16 January 1915.
13 AIR1/1283/204/11/13. The passage quoted is taken from a letter dated 4 December 1914, written just four hours after that at Note 8.
14 For reference to Maj Furse’s efforts, see, for instance, Maurice Baring’s Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918, (1920), p116. While at the Front co-ordinating ground signals for contact patrols being flown by No 3 Sqn during the Battle of Loos, Furse sustained very serious head injuries on 30 September 1915.
15 Subaltern is a generic term embracing commissioned ranks of lieutenant and below. By WW I this extended only to 2nd lieutenants but until, they were abolished in 1871, it had also included cornets and ensigns.
16 AIR1/1288/204/11/53. The revised arrangements for flying training, including the reduction of effort to be devoted to role training and the instruction of observers, were announced by War Office letter 87/4469(MA1) dated 9 January 1915.
17 AIR1/829/204/5/219. The opportunity for artillery officers to be attached to fly with the RFC was announced in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 27 December 1914, further amplification being provided on 5 and 6 January 1915.
18 Ibid. It is interesting to observe that, in the interests of its recruiting drive, the RFC had gained permission to offer a financial inducement before it had even been granted authority to pay the men it was already employing. Although rates of flying pay for observers had been established before the war (see Chapter 1, Note 15) it took several months for the War Office to authorise issues to be made. The procedure to be followed was eventually promulgated in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 5 January 1915.
19 AIR1/2148/209/3/199. HQ RFC letter G/155/1 dated 4 January 1915. Col Frederick Sykes had originally gone to France as deputy to Brig-Gen Henderson. In November 1914 Henderson was promoted to major-general and posted to command 1st Division, leaving Sykes in charge of the RFC. This situation was to be short-lived, as Henderson resumed his original post on 20 December. He fell ill shortly afterwards, however, and, although he did not actually relinquish his appointment, Sykes continued to function as the de facto GOC until May 1915, signing much of his correspondence (including this particular letter) as ‘Colonel, Commanding the RFC in the Field.’
20 AIR1/829/204/5/219. HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 19 January 1915.
21 AIR1/2148/209/3/199. HQ RFC letter CRFC 1578(A) dated 15 April 1915.
22 AIR1/366/15/231/6. A revised establishment for a standard RFC Service Squadron was covered by the War Office letter 87/4040(MA1), dated 8 December 1914.
23 AIR1/1291/204/11/83. A formal statement of the War Establishment of a twelve-aeroplane squadron was published on 17 April 1915.
24 AIR1/831/204/5/225. The sixteen officers who attended the course run by HQ RFC are listed on this file. The three who subsequently served as observers were Kennedy, Ryan and Prickett who flew with Nos 4, 6 and 1 Sqns respectively.
25 AIR1/122/15/40/116. CRFC 934/3(A) dated 23 April 1915. The six men sent in response to this request left for France on 18 May. They were 2/Lts J Parker, M W Greenhow, G C Levick, E W Leggatt, J E Evans and C S Whitworth.
26 AIR1/831/204/5/225. HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 10 May 1915. This order was actually couched as a reminder, indicating that there may have been some reluctance to comply with an earlier edict.
27 AIR1/2386/228/11/1. Taken from an account of his previous Service experience, written by Sqn Ldr C F A Portal when a student on No 1 Course at the RAF Staff College in 1922. He retired on 31 Dec 1945, by then MRAF Viscount Portal of Hungerford KG GCB OM DSO* MC.
28 Hubbard was no novice, as he had qualified for Royal Aero Club Certificate No 222 as early as 4 June 1912. He had spent much of the next three years instructing at the Central Flying School but, having only recently taken up his appointment as a Flight Commander with No 3 Sqn, he had little experience of flying in France.
29 AIR1/829/204/5/219. HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 6 January 1915 had specified the officially approved armament for aeroplanes at this stage of the war. Pilots were supposed to carry a standard Service revolver or a Webley Scott automatic pistol, as and when the latter became available. When a machine gun was fitted, observers were supposed to carry the same sidearm as pilots but, if a Lewis gun were unavailable or impractical, the recommended weapon was a French carbine.
30 E M Roberts, A Flying Fighter (1918), pp 109-111.
31 In the course of preparing a brief biography of Eric Lubbock, his family kindly granted this writer access to his papers, including the journal from which the quotation is taken.
32 AIR1/1164/204/5/2546. A copy of this seemingly very useful little publication is preserved on this file.
33 AIR1/920/204/5/884. Minutes of a Wing Commanders Conference chaired by Sir David Henderson. The document is undated but, since the recent approval of a badge for observers was noted, and Henderson was back at his desk in London as DGMA by the 19th, the meeting will probably have been held during early August 1915.
34 The extract is taken from the first of a series of articles entitled With the Royal Flying Corps which appeared in five successive editions of The Royal Air Force Quarterly from October 1930 onwards. The by-line is a cryptic ‘GOM’ but the text is strewn with clues as to who the author really was. He states, for instance, that he was one of the original seven observers who crossed over to France with No 12 Sqn in September 1915 and, since he names the other six, it is quite clear who the writer must have been. Money subsequently revealed his identity himself when these articles became the basis of the first half of his book, Flying and Soldiering (1936). ‘GOM’, incidentally, was a reference to his post-war service at Leuchars where he was known as the Grand Old Man of C (Reconnaissance) Training Flight, a unit with which he flew, and which he intermittently commanded, in the mid-1920s.
35 TS28/4. In 1921, by then Capt, Frank Pratt was awarded £1,250 by the Royal Committee on Awards to Inventors for his ‘System of Training Aerial Observers’.
36 AIR1/997/204/5/1241. Since some will have been constructed locally, artillery targets were made to measure and could thus be much larger than the ‘standard’. A report on a visit to the Schools of Instruction at Reading and Oxford, covered by HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 8 February 1917, states that theirs were ‘some 30-40 feet square’. RFC (Canada)’s School of Artillery Co-operation at Leaside was reported to have had two 40 ft × 20 ft ‘sand tables’ incorporating 13,000 feet of electric wire and 1,360 light bulbs (see Dancing in the Sky by C W Hunt (Toronto, 2009), p224).
37 AIR1/1266/204/9/61. This description was circulated to all units controlled by Headquarters Northern Group by the officer responsible for W/T training in his NG/100 dated 7 December 1916.
38 These figures have been drawn from a late edition of the nominal rolls referred to at Note 10.
39 AIR1/377/15/231/18. The data presented at Figure 5 is taken from a nominal roll of all officers serving with the RFC as at 15 October 1915, covered by War Office letter 114/Returns/1869(MA1) dated six days later.
40 AIR1/1169/204/5/2591. The number of NCOs has been extracted from returns submitted by 1st, 2nd and 3rd Wgs in response to HQ RFC letter CRFC 934/19(A) dated 30 October 1915.
41 AIR1/2433/305/33/1. Air Organisation (AO) Memorandum 338 dated 15 February 1917 granted immediate authority for the RFC to begin enlisting women for employment as cooks, waitresses, clerks and drivers.
42 AIR1/373/15/231/14. War Office letter 87/670(MA1) dated 9 August 1915.