Late 1915. The Observer is granted a degree of formal status within the RFC.
In the meantime, while the Navy was still dragging its feet, the level of formal recognition granted to observers flying with the Army had been significantly increased. This change had been introduced in an effort to redress an unfortunate consequence of the way in which military personnel were managed. In short, internally-recruited observers were ‘attached’ to the RFC, unlike the majority of pilots who were ‘transferred’ to it. This rather esoteric distinction had significant implications in terms of career management because most of the officers who were attached to the RFC were actually serving on the General List.1 Since these officers had effectively severed their connections with the regiment or corps with which they had originally been serving, they no longer figured in the promotion lists which were periodically raised by their previous sponsors. Unfortunately, their attached status meant that they did not figure in the RFC’s calculations either so that, in practical terms, no one had any direct responsibility for fostering their further advancement.
This problem was actually even more complicated. The majority of wartime officers held temporary commissions on the General List of the ‘New Armies’. Since they were serving only ‘for the duration’, relatively few of these men would have expected to gain significant advancement in any case but, even as ‘amateurs’, they could reasonably have expected to attain the rank of lieutenant. Even this modest ambition would be unrealised, however, unless someone was told to look after their interests. Suitable arrangements had been made for the RFC’s ‘own’ junior officers, those serving on the Special Reserve, in August 1915 but it was not until December that commanders were formally required to consider recommending 2nd lieutenants of the General List for promotion to lieutenant.2
In real terms the problem of promotion, or the lack of it, was far more acute for professional officers of the Regular Army who were serving as observers, all of whom would have had reasonable expectations of fairly rapid advancement in time of war. To avoid being overtaken in the promotion stakes by their less enterprising colleagues, an increasing number of older, more senior, observers had begun to request that they be permitted to return to their original units. The loss of these capable, ambitious and experienced men caused some concern but nothing could be done to alleviate the situation within the existing regulations, as RFC policy dictated that promotion leading to executive appointments was restricted to Flying Officers, that is to say, to pilots.
The obvious solution was to arrange for observers to be transferred to the RFC so that they too could be graded. From November 1915, therefore, it was ruled that all seven fully accredited observers held against the establishment of each squadron could be formally gazetted to the RFC.3 Two conditions applied. First, all observers graded as Flying Officers were to undertake to be retrained as pilots at ‘the earliest opportunity.’ Secondly, any observer selected for Flight Commander grade (which implied an automatic captaincy) would be obliged to retrain as a pilot before he could fill such an appointment (and be promoted).
The imposition of these constraints is very revealing of the RFC’s ambivalent attitude towards its observers. While it had quite clearly accepted that it needed them for the efficient and economic operation of its two-seaters, it is equally plain that the concessions it had granted were calculated to be the bare minimum necessary to ensure that an adequate flow of volunteers was maintained. It can also be seen that the RFC still did not regard its observers as professional aviators in their own right; much of their value was seen to be in their potential as additional pilots. That the RFC had little real regard for its observers is heavily underscored by the second condition it had imposed which ensured that for all practical purposes the rank ceiling for an observer was fixed at lieutenant.4
Since they plainly had very little respect for back-seaters, it is perhaps unsurprising that the War Office’s mandarins appear to have been quite unconcerned at the likely effect that all of this negativity might be having on their morale. Perhaps they thought that no one would notice that observers were being short-changed. If so, they were mistaken, as Sqn Ldr J O Andrews recalled some ten years later:5
‘… the observer began to find that the interest of his work and the pleasant relations in a squadron did not counterbalance the unhappy feeling that, in the eyes of the superior RFC Authority, he was a very inferior person. His prospects of promotion were negligible, his pay less than that of the most recently joined pilot, very rarely was he awarded any mention or decoration. The consequence was that an observer, as soon as he became valuable, either learned to fly or returned to his regiment.’
A significant number of early, unbadged observers are likely to have flown in this pre-war BE2c, 336, as it went to France with No 4 Sqn in August 1914 and subsequently saw service with Nos 9, 2, 4 (again) and 8 Sqns before being repatriated to England in October 1915. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
A closer examination of the new rules makes it plain that Andrews’ complaints about inferior status and rates of pay were fully justified. For instance, while it had been conceded that some observers would be gazetted the conditions were not to be the same as those which applied to pilots, all of whom automatically became Flying Officers as soon as they qualified for their ‘wings’. Until his training was complete, whether it had begun at home or on active service in the field, an observer was merely ‘on probation’ and receiving flying pay at the reduced (instructional) rate of three shillings per day. He had still to win his spurs in action before, on his CO’s recommendation, he could finally be awarded his flying ‘O’ and be accredited as a ‘qualified observer’,6 at which point his flying pay was increased to the full daily rate of five shillings. ‘Full’ for observers that is; pilots were paid eight shillings.
Even this did not automatically make an observer an acknowledged member of the RFC. Gazetting as a Flying Officer required his CO’s further recommendation, following the appearance of a vacancy in the seven-man establishment of his unit – and until he was gazetted an observer was still serving on attachment and thus still forfeiting (in that he was not accumulating) seniority.
Furthermore, it seems that the full implications of the increased degree of recognition which had been accorded to observers may not have been appreciated in some circles. Observers were no longer ephemeral beings who existed only while they were serving on the strength of a squadron in France. Like a pilot, an accredited observer was now a permanent RFC fixture and he had to be recognised as such, wherever he happened to be serving. To clarify the situation, OC Administrative Wing was obliged to point out to Accounting Officers at all home-based units that ‘observers who have qualified as such overseas, and who are employed on observation duties in England are entitled to receive Flying Pay at five shillings per diem for each day of ascent.’7
Accounting Officers were not the only people who were having trouble adjusting to the new policy and it was to be January 1916 before the War Office’s bureaucrats began to include observers in the RFC section of the Army List. That month’s edition featured fifty-one Flying Officers annotated with an ‘(O)’ in front of their names; three of them had their seniority dated with effect from 11 November 1915, the remainder from the 22nd. A month later the total had risen to eighty-nine but thereafter the system of recording was changed. It had evidently been decided that a degree of segregation was called for and observers began to be listed separately under the heading of Flying Officer (Observer).8
The March 1916 List notes only nine names in the new category, the remainder, still with their (O) prefixes, still being embedded among the pilots. The extraction process took some three months but by June all graded observers had been weeded out and listed separately. In the meantime some detailed amendments had been incorporated and twenty-three flying officer (observers), the total having risen to 220 by then, had had their seniority backdated to the earliest possible date of 21 October 1915 (see Note 3).
Thereafter the number of observers required grew at an accelerating rate to keep pace with the formation of new squadrons and to meet an increased unit establishment which was raised from seven to twelve per squadron in mid-1916.9 This development was particularly significant as it meant that, apart from the demands of new squadrons working up in the UK, all of those already in France would each immediately be entitled to five additional men.
Increasing an establishment could be achieved at the stroke of a pen, of course, but the manpower resources needed to match the revised scale were not immediately available. It would take several months to find and train all of the additional men who were now required and before this exercise had been completed the goalposts would have been moved again. Until mid-1916 the majority of aircrew being accepted directly into the RFC had been regarded as prospective pilots, relatively few being taken on as observers. The suddenly increased demand for them (the additional requirement was initially estimated to be for one hundred10) now justified a significant proportion of the intake being earmarked for observer duties on entry. Another innovation was that some of these directly recruited observers were expected to undergo an initial ground-based aviation course at Reading or Oxford alongside officers destined for pilot training.11
While the RFCs administrators were gradually coming to terms with the need to provide adequate numbers of observers, and to provide them with some form of instruction and, grudgingly, to begin to afford them an increased degree of recognition, there is some evidence to suggest that more positive progress was being made at the coal face. How widespread this was is uncertain but when 2/Lt (later Air Cdre) Patrick Huskinson joined No 2 Sqn in April 1916, he found that:12
‘… for awhile (sic) I was not to be allowed to go up with an observer. Observers, it appeared, were scarce and hard to train. They were, therefore, valuable. I had to prove my skill as a pilot before one would be entrusted to me. Later, when I was thought worthy of the care of one of these precious articles […] I well remember how bitterly I resented the nervousness which my colleague on this occasion made no effort to conceal when we took off; but since the wretched fellow had, of course, no means of knowing how far official confidence in me was justified, I suppose his feelings were natural enough.’
1916. The Bailhache Report.
In mid-1916 the RFC was placed under close scrutiny in response to a degree of public disquiet. This had been stirred up by a group of activists with Mr Noel Pemberton-Billing MP acting as their chief spokesman. As a result, a Committee on the Administration and Command of the RFC was appointed, under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Bailhache, to investigate a variety of specific allegations. Taking evidence from May 1916, the Committee’s final report was dated 17 November; it was published a month later.13 In essence, while noting that some honest mistakes had been made, particularly in the early days, the Committee dismissed the charges and upheld the reputations of both the Corps and its commanders. This is not to say that the RFC had no shortcomings, however, and among its many observations the Committee had a number of interesting things to say about observers.
a. Having first pointed out that the observers employed by the RFC in the early days had been almost totally lacking in training and experience, the Committee’s report went on to accept that, under the circumstances, this had been almost inevitable. It was noted that steps had been taken to remedy this situation and the Committee considered the current training system to be ‘fairly satisfactory, except in regard to the use of the machine gun and fighting in the air.’
b. The report stated, quite unequivocally, that ‘the importance of the observer cannot be overestimated’ and that the Committee had been given to understand ‘on unimpeachable authority’ that, because he needed to be skilled in interpreting the military significance of what he saw on the ground, as well as being an expert in the direction of artillery fire, his work was actually ‘more difficult […] than that of the pilot.’
c. The Committee had also concluded that, since he was not in control of his own destiny, it was far more ‘trying to the nerves’ to fly as an observer than as a pilot.
d. The Committee considered that, in view of his importance, it was ‘strange that no encouragement by way of promotion’ was offered to an observer, unless he became a qualified pilot. As a result, it was noted that many of them gave up their duties to enter flying training, thus depriving the RFC in the Field of their invaluable experience.
e. Following on from the previous comment, the Committee suggested that ‘after the war, the ideal to be aimed at is that pilots and observers should be interchangeable. Meanwhile we think more encouragement should be given to observers to remain observers.’
From these very penetrating observations it is evident that, lacking any preconceived ideas about airmen and their activities, Bailhache’s unbiased investigators had been able to see them in perspective. His Committee had concluded that, while pilots and observers had very different responsibilities, they were essentially two of a kind. Since the activities of pilots and observers were mutually complementary, and each was dependent upon the other, it followed that they were of equal importance. The Committee considered, therefore, that the RFC had been somewhat short-sighted in allowing itself to evolve into an exclusively pilot-dominated organisation. While this had probably limited the RFC’s vision and distorted its perception, the Committee was in no doubt that undervaluing its observers had resulted in their being both underprivileged and inadequately represented.
To put all of these matters right it would be necessary only to acknowledge the considerable contribution that observers were capable of, indeed were, making. If this were done the Service would benefit from having a more balanced personnel structure while simultaneously permitting individual observers to realise their full potential. It was this finding that inspired the Committee’s only specific recommendation regarding observers, ‘… that observers should receive promotion without having to become pilots and that a corps of observers be formed with a regular establishment graded for promotion among themselves.’
Had this far-sighted recommendation been implemented promptly it would have neutralised the impact of the prejudice inherent in the existing system. It would also have provided the incentive that was essential to foster the creation of a professional class of permanent specialist back-seaters. Although Bailhache did not actually say so, it followed that his recommendation would, by permitting observers to attain ranks at which their voices could be heard, have ensured that some of them would surely have risen to become members of the ‘air establishment’. Had this happened, the long-term implications for the RAF in the inter-war period could have been both positive and far-reaching. Sadly, it was not to be.
When Sgt James McCudden was flying with No 3 Sqn as an observer in early 1916 the bulk of its aeroplanes were Moranes, Type LA parasols and Type BB biplanes. These are the Morane Type P parasols that began to replace both during the summer. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
In the meantime, since the RFC’s senior management had been deeply involved in the Bailhache Committee’s investigations from the outset, it was well aware of the weaknesses that were being revealed in 1916. As a result, a number of remedial measures had already been implemented by the time that the final report appeared. So far as observers were concerned, for instance, steps had been taken to improve machine gun training. Unfortunately, it would take another eighteen months for the idea of recognising the vital role of observers, and of raising their status to acknowledge this, to gain official endorsement. By then it was already too late; attitudes had become far too deeply entrenched and some very senior officers were quite unable to accept that an observer could ever really be anything other than an assistant to his pilot. The post-war mould had already been made; it would take another war to break it.
1916. The RFC introduces formal training courses for its Observers at Reading, Oxford, Brooklands and Hythe.
It will be recalled that in January 1915 it had been deemed necessary to reduce the amount of time and effort devoted to the training of observers to the ‘lowest minimum possible’ (see page 10). A year later, although military aviation had become a much more complicated business, this edict was still in force. Although there is evidence to indicate that, at least, some observers were now being given a modicum of flying experience,14 it was clear that the January 1915 policy, never really a practical proposition, could no longer be sustained.
By the spring of 1916 there was a growing realisation that something would have to be done about the content of observer training, and soon, but an even more urgent requirement was an increase in output. This was the case in the air arms of both Services but the need for additional numbers was particularly acute in the RFC where, apart from meeting the demands of expansion, it was also necessary to replace substantial losses, many of the latter being caused by inadequately trained pilots.15 At one point Sir David Henderson neatly summed up the paradox inherent in this situation when he is reported to have said, ‘The loss rate is high because training is short, but training is short because the loss rate is high.’ Although he had actually been talking about pilots, much the same was true of observers. But, even the most capable of observers obliged to fly with an incompetent pilot was bound to share the latter’s almost inevitable fate – hence Bailhache’s comment on the stress of flying as an observer.
First-hand testimony as to the plight of the observer can be found in the autobiography of one who flew with No 3 Sqn as an NCO. Recalling a flight made in January 1916, he wrote:
‘… one morning I went up with a certain pilot in a forty mile an hour wind, and as soon as we were off the ground he turned and flew down wind about ten feet high, past trees, ditches and houses, made one circuit and landed again. I don’t know what he did it for, but I do know that I was absolutely terrified, for by now I had done a lot of passenger flying, and I knew whether a machine was being properly flown or not, and this was certainly not.’
This pilot, whom the author forbore to identify, was plainly dangerous but the observer’s existence could be made almost as uncomfortable by those who were simply thoughtless. As an example, the same writer has this to say about a flight he had made with Lt C A Ridley in September 1915, ‘… to tell the truth, I did not enjoy it much, for the pilot was one of the most dashing and enterprising kind. Such flying is all very fine for the pilot, but not always for the passenger.’ The observer who was having his nerves tested so thoroughly was James McCudden.16 If a man of his calibre could be frightened flying as an observer, what of lesser mortals?
Leaving aside the question of the competence of pilots, some attempt began to be made to improve the training being offered to observers by exploiting the facilities of two RFC training units which had been set up towards the end of 1915, the Machine Gun School at Dover (later Hythe)17 and the Wireless School at Brooklands.18 The primary tasks of these schools were to produce, respectively, armourers, and wireless operators and technicians (of all ranks), plus specialist technical instructors. Virtually from the outset, however, Hythe had also provided some academic and practical instruction in aerial gunnery, but only for pilots and for only very small numbers of those.
With a view to improving the training of observers, it was decided to send a small batch to Brooklands on a trial basis in March 1916. They were 2/Lts H W Girdlestone, C E Barrington, T S Pearson, C B Pratt and E J H Douch.19 The results of this experiment were so promising that the War Office immediately extended an invitation for prospective observers volunteering in France to attend the Brooklands course. HQ RFC declined this offer on a number of grounds. For instance, Trenchard (it was said) suspected that officers sent home for two or three weeks would treat the interlude as quasi-leave and not ‘do any work at all’.20
This somewhat uncharitable opinion reflected a certain lack of confidence in the volunteers themselves and a lingering suspicion among those in France that people ‘back home’ could not always be trusted to do the right thing. It is difficult to substantiate these misgivings but there can be no doubt that they existed. In July 1915, for example, Lt-Col Higgins had complained that the best observers being trained at home were often retained there, rather than being sent out to France. He further alleged that many of them subsequently became pilots without ever having seen active service, thus depriving the squadrons in the field of their expertise.21
A more soundly based objection was that HQ RFC did not wish to be excluded from the quality control process. Lt-Col J M Salmond had been recalled from France in February to take charge of home-based training, assuming command (as a brigadier) of VI Bde on 9 March. With the very capable Jack Salmond in charge, early improvements were anticipated but VI Bde had yet to establish its credibility and it remained something of an unknown quantity. For the time being, therefore, HQ RFC preferred to make its own assessment as to whether a trainee observer had, or had not, made the grade. There were certainly grounds for doubting the effectiveness of the training being provided at home. In May, for instance, Trenchard wrote to the War Office to complain about the inadequacy of all aspects of W/T training, noting in particular that large numbers of aerials were being lost through newly arrived aviators forgetting to wind them in before landing.22
This widespread malpractice was another consequence of the War Office’s policy decision of January 1915 which, apart from minimising the effort devoted to observers, had also directed that the instruction of pilots should concentrate on pure flying at the expense of all aspects of tactical training. Since then, gunnery, bombing, photography and the use of W/T had all become routine operational activities, but they were still receiving scant attention at home. Salmond would address these shortcomings in due course (as described in Chapter 7) but it could not be done instantly and it would be mid-1917 before the squadrons in France would be able to detect much improvement in the abilities of replacement pilots.
In the meantime, since HQ RFC had little regard for the capabilities of the home-based training machine, it was hardly surprising that it saw little point in sending probationary observers back to England. Furthermore, a recent exchange with the War Office had made it clear that it was also content that it would be able to sustain the strength of its deployed units. In March 1916, in an attempt to refine the size of the intake into training, HQ RFC had been asked how many observers it would need in addition to those already being sent out with each new squadron as it crossed the Channel. The reply was ‘None’, although it was requested that in future ten observers should accompany each unit, undoubtedly one of the factors that would shortly lead to the establishment being raised to twelve (see Note 9).23
In reality, the position was not really as satisfactory as HQ RFC perceived it to be, although one can see why they believed it be so. At the time, as a result of a directive issued by General Haig shortly after he had assumed command of the BEF at the end of 1915, there was a backlog of high quality volunteers queuing up to be selected as replacement observers.24
Fig 7. The syllabus of the four-week course designed for observers attending one of the two RFC Schools of Instruction in 1916.
The War Office had a very different perception of the current and future manning situation, however, and it would soon become clear that HQ RFC had been overoptimistic. This was probably a result of differing perspectives. HQ RFC was concerned only with its short-term need to find the relatively small numbers of observers needed to replace losses on the twenty-three squadrons which constituted its Order of Battle at that time. London saw the problem rather differently, as its task was to provide the considerable numbers of people needed to build completely new units. Despite the bland assurances coming from St André-aux-Bois, the War Office knew that the long-term outlook was far from satisfactory. In fact, the manning situation was so bleak that it was about to resort to using non-commissioned personnel as back-seaters in order to make up the numbers required (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, since HQ RFC was content to solve its own problems, and was confident that it could do so, London chose not to make an issue of its decision.
Even though HQ RFC had elected not to participate in the new scheme, from the spring of 1916, observers being trained at home began to attend the Brooklands course in substantial numbers and Hythe was soon co-opted into the programme as well. Considerable thought was now being devoted to devising the best means of training observers, and not only in the corridors of power. In April, for instance, 2/Lt Court Treatt (then Assistant Adjutant with No 1 Reserve Squadron at Farnborough) submitted a comprehensive proposal for a dedicated scheme.25 An accredited observer himself, and well aware of the inadequacies of the existing instructional facilities, both at home and in the field, Treatt had strong views. Arguing from the premise that a poorly trained observer was virtually useless, his proposals emphasised the following key points.
a. It was impractical to train pilots and observers within the same unit.
b. In order to facilitate the co-ordination of realistic cooperation exercises, an observer training school needed to be adjacent to a large training centre for troops of all arms,
c. It was essential that observers be provided with a substantial amount of practical flying experience.
d. There was a need for a special school, similar to those at Reading and Oxford, to provide an introductory aviation course designed to meet the specific requirements of observers.
Treatt’s paper was returned to him with due acknowledgement but it was deemed ‘not practicable to put it into force at present.’26 Nevertheless, a four-week School of Instruction syllabus, specifically tailored to the requirements of observers, was published in June (see Figure 7)27 and in August it was decided that all prospective observers being recruited at home should be sent to either Reading or Oxford, which was at least a step in the right direction.28 The ideal answer, of course, as 2/Lt Treatt had proposed, would have been to set up a preparatory school dedicated to back-seaters. This approach would eventually be adopted, but not until January 1918.
By July 1916 a discernible pattern had emerged for many of the observers being trained at home. After passing through Reading or Oxford, they were posted to a quasi-operational squadron which was approaching the end of its period of service as an advanced flying training school. From there they would be detached to Brooklands and/or Hythe to attend courses, each of about three weeks’ duration. Once this sequence had been completed a few were posted to France to take the place of the fallen but the majority returned to their parent squadrons, remaining with them while they mobilised and accompanying them across the Channel as part of their initial operational establishment.
Late 1916. HQ RFC begins to accept the limitations of its field training system.
While the training sequence which was now operating at home represented a considerable improvement over that which had been available previously, the various specialist courses were still not considered to be capable of teaching an observer all that he needed to know, leaving much still to be learned when he reached France. Nevertheless, the observers being trained in England in the latter half of 1916 were now far better prepared than their contemporaries in France who were still being trained in-house under relatively ad hoc arrangements which had changed little since 1914.
Although HQ RFC was reluctant to accept the assistance of VI Bde29 to help with its instructional commitment, at unit level the field training system had long been seen as an increasingly irksome imposition. Indeed, the additional burden which it placed on the squadrons sometimes inhibited their ability to carry out their operational tasks. As early as August 1915 Lt-Col Higgins had written to HQ RFC, requesting that locally recruited prospective observers be given two or three days of preparatory instruction on the Lewis gun before they were posted to a squadron. He had received a rather curt reply to the effect that there were no facilities to run such a course at St Omer and that the GOC was of the opinion that the squadrons had ‘ample time’ to cope with this task.30
Despite this dismissive response, by the following summer the staffs were beginning to accept that something did need to be done to alleviate the situation. So, when the War Office extended an invitation for observers being trained in France to attend the Hythe course, HQ RFC accepted on a trial basis. The first batch of ten (see Figure 8) reported to the Machine Gun School on 20 June 1916 to join the other thirty-nine members of No 20 Course. Eight more observers from France attended No 21 Course the following month.
Partly to improve the training of those observers who were obliged to remain in France and to enhance the skills of newly qualified pilots, and partly to gain some feedback on current combat tactics from the operational squadrons, it was also decided to set up an Aerial Musketry (later Gunnery) Range at Camiers, near Etaples. For air-to-air work there were to be towed banners and fixed targets suspended from kites and/or a balloon, these facilities being complemented by air-to-ground ranges and fixed targets to be fired at from a mock-up cockpit mounted on a rail car travelling on a closed circuit track. The scheme included a small aerodrome at Cormont to support the operation of banner-towing RE7s and to provide a base for visiting units, it being anticipated that operational squadrons would use the ranges by detaching a flight at a time. Cormont also had butts for testing and harmonising guns and a miniature firing range on which aircrew could indulge in target practice and clay pigeon shooting.
This project, which had been conceived as early as August 1916, took some time to bring to fruition. Nevertheless, with Capt A Higson-Smith in command, suported by an Assistant Equipment Officer,31 Lt H J C Smith, and a detachment of twenty air mechanics to serve as a labour party, the range finally opened in November.32 The first live firing trials were conducted on 13th and 14th. Thereafter, weather permitting, the ranges were in regular use until the following March when they were closed down, most of the manpower being withdrawn during April, although the facilities were retained on a care and maintenance basis. In the meantime they had permitted some of the observers being recruited from the trenches to be provided with a week’s gunnery course locally before they were faced with the prospect of having to fly on operations.
Fig 8. The first batch of observers to be sent back from France to attend a course at the Machine Gun School, 12-29 June 1916.
Above: A group of pilots reloading Vickers gun ammunition belts at Rang-du-Fliers before going for a spin in the rail-mounted pilots cockpit’ in the background to fire at targets placed alongside the track. Below: Similar facilities were provided for observers using a car simulating a ‘gunners cockpit’ armed with a Lewis gun on a Scarff ring. (Both Chaz Bowyer)
In addition to its use of the Aerial Gunnery Range, the RFC took advantage of the relatively quiet season to establish a mutually beneficial interchange with the Royal Artillery. Within V Bde, for instance, it became policy for each squadron, during its ‘rest period’, to attach six of its aircrew to an artillery battery for a fortnight while hosting six artillery officers. Furthermore, it was intended that pairs of artillery officers should be attached to corps squadrons for a week at a time throughout the winter months and arrangements were made for any newly arrived observer to spend a week with a battery during his first month with a squadron; if they could be spared, new pilots were given the same opportunity.33
It had always been envisaged that the range at Camiers would be a temporary arrangement which was expected to operate only over the winter of 1916-17. Its availability had evidently been appreciated, however, as Trenchard announced that he wished to reactivate the Cormont/Camiers facility during the winter of 1917-18.34 This time the enterprise was to be rather larger, with a range to the south of Etaples at Berck-sur-Mer, and, instead of being manned on a somewhat ad hoc basis, it was decided to raise a formal establishment. This was eventually published in January 1918 and reflected a considerable expansion compared to the previous year. The total manpower required to run the range now totalled 149, ten of them officers, with a major in overall command.35
To complete the picture, mention should also be made of two other gunnery training facilities that were set up in France in the summer of 1918. Associated with each Aeroplane Supply Depot (No 1 at Marquise and No 2 at Berck-sur-Mer) was a Pilots Pool where replacement pilots (and observers) were held. In order to keep these people occupied, HQ RFC (later RAF) wanted each of these holding units to be provided with a Pilots Pool Range, one at Setques, the other at Rang-du-Fliers, near Berck.
When it was first proposed, this scheme had envisaged that the two Pilots Pool Ranges, which were to provide opportunities only for ground-based firing, would be manned by the staff of the Aerial Gunnery Range at Berck, whose personnel would therefore need to be retained during the summer months while the range was dormant, rather than being disestablished at the end of April 1918 as had originally been intended.36 The War Office sanctioned this plan but, in the event, the two pools already had, between them, 110 pilots and observers on their books by July and the makeshift staffing arrangements were proving to be inadequate. This lead to a bid for the two Pilots Pool Ranges to be established in their own right. The eventual outcome was that a bulk allocation of manpower (and transport – a total of twenty-eight vehicles of various kinds being authorised) was approved in September 1918 from which HQ RAF was to find the resources to run its desired seasonal combinations of Pilots Pool Ranges and the Aerial Gunnery Range at Berck.37
The final chapter in this tale concerns the Independent Force (IF) which, being independent, demanded its own Pilots Pool Range, which was presumably to be administered by No 3 Aeroplane Supply Depot at Courban. Negotiations were carried out during the summer in parallel with those being conducted between HQ RAF and the Air Ministry and these eventually resulted in another establishment, tailored to HQ IF’s specific requirements, being issued in September.38
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1 While it was possible to play a number of variations on the theme of becoming a commissioned army aviator, in the context being considered here, there were only two basic wartime options – the General List or the RFC (Special Reserve). The fundamental difference was that an appointment to the General List involved a temporary, but open-ended, ‘for the duration’ undertaking whereas the Special Reserve was a permanently constituted body into which a candidate was commissioned for a fixed period, initially of four years.
2 AIR1/404/15/231/45. The earliest (pre-war) reservists, having been called up and commissioned as 2nd lieutenants in August 1914, were becoming eligible for consideration for promotion a year later. War Office letter 100/RFC/46(MA1) dated 9 August 1915 therefore requested that recommendations be made regarding the promotion to lieutenant of 2nd lieutenants of the RFC (Special Reserve). Letter 100/RFC/103(MA1) of 1 December extended this provision to cover officers of the New Armies holding temporary commissions on the General List who happened to be serving with the RFC.
3 Ibid. Authority for observers to be graded was contained within War Office letter 100/FC/95(MA1) dated 13 November 1915, although the regulation was made effective retrospectively from 21 October.
It should be appreciated that, despite their having been gazetted as Flying Officers, observers (and pilots) who were transferred to the RFC, ie those who had not been directly recruited as aviators, retained some tribal loyalty to their parent regiment or corps. This was reciprocated and, despite their names being included in the RFC section of the Army List, they continued to appear under their original units as well. It was well into 1917 before ‘straight through’ RFC flyers began to outnumber the transferees.
4 Some of the observers (and pilots) who transferred to the RFC from other organisations were already captains, or even majors, as a result of their previous service. This did not ‘count’ in aviation circles, however, since a captaincy in the RFC was specifically associated with the employment grade of Flight Commander. Thus, although a few observers (and some relatively inexperienced pilots) certainly wore the rank insignia of captains or majors, this was an anomaly, carrying with it no privileges beyond those conferred by normal military protocol. Similar provisions (or constraints) applied within the RNAS.
5 AIR1/2388/228/11/91. Taken from an account of his previous Service experience, written by Sqn Ldr J O Andrews at the RAF Staff College in 1926. Andrews had spent nine months flying as an observer with No 5 Sqn before training as a pilot at the end of 1915.
6 The term ‘Qualified Observer’ had been in widespread use as a convenient, self-explanatory and universally understood label since the autumn of 1914, but it had never acquired the same official standing as the equivalent ‘Flying Officer’. From November 1915, however, it had a precisely defined meaning and became an officially endorsed interim employment grade – a half-way house between being a probationary (albeit operational) trainee and a fully accredited, ie gazetted, member of the RFC.
7 AIR1/1305/204/11/184. Headquarters Administrative Wing Routine Orders for 18 March 1916.
8 When it had first been announced that a proportion of RFC observers were to be graded (see Note 3) the letter of authority had stated that they were simply to become Flying Officers. It would appear, however, that the term ‘Flying Officer (Observer)’ must have been formally sanctioned at some time in early 1916. Although this writer has failed to discover a specific reference to fix the date of its introduction, its appearance in the Army List and in official correspondence from March onwards suggests that the new title was probably coined in February.
9 AIR1/1291/204/11/83. A draft establishment for an enlarged, eighteen-aircraft squadron was forwarded to Maj-Gen Trenchard by the DMA on 31 March 1916. The final version was published under cover of War Office letter 87/6023(AO1) dated 1 June 1916. Among other changes, this raised the number of fully qualified observers from seven to twelve per unit and introduced the post of a Recording Officer (originally to have been called the Intelligence Officer) to assist with routine administration at squadron level.
10 AIR1/404/15/231/45. The requirement for one hundred observers, some of whom were to go to Reading, was notified to OC Administrative Wing at Farnborough by War Office letter 87/7632(MA1) dated 1 April 1915. In acknowledging this directive, Lt-Col H C T Dowding indicated that he considered that it would be more appropriate for observers to attend the new school at Oxford, rather than that at Reading (see Note 11), but in the event both were used (see Note 28).
11 Commanded by Capt A E G MacCallum, the RFC Officers Training School, the first unit to provide an introductory aviation course (for pilots) had opened at Reading on 20 December 1915. It was restyled the RFC School of Instruction (Sof!) in February 1916 and a second was opened in Oxford (Christchurch College) under Maj C Saunders on 3 April. Shortly afterwards they were given individual designations as Nos 1 and 2 SofIs, respectively.
12 P Huskinson, Vision Ahead (1949), pp 17-18.
13 AIR1/2405/303/4/5 contains a copy of the Committee’s Final Report, one of at least three preserved at The National Archives; AIR2/9/87/7661 contains a copy of the final draft, which included several less widely published Annexes. The report’s recommendations and final remarks were reproduced in Flight for 21 December 1916. The section of the body of the report dealing specifically with observers was reproduced in the issue of 4 January 1917.
14 The log book of Lt Cyril Williams records that between February and May 1916 he accumulated one minute short of twelve hours of airborne time in the course of twenty-six flights made in a Henri Farman F.20, a DH 1, a Vickers FB5 and sundry FE2bs and BE2cs of No 12 Reserve Squadron at Thetford. He subsequently joined No 60 Sqn, then mobilising at Gosport, and flew three more trips in Moranes before the unit deployed to France. Williams was killed in action on 16 July.
15 If Trenchard’s dictum of ‘a full breakfast table, with no empty chairs’ was to be complied with to the letter – see p190 of Andrew Boyle’s Trenchard, Man of Vision (1962) – all casualties had to be replaced as soon as they occurred. The GOC believed that the arrival of new faces served to divert the attention of the survivors and thus prevented excessive brooding over fallen comrades. He was probably right but, while his policy may have had a positive effect on morale, it also increased the pressure on the training machine and was one of the reasons why it often became necessary to send pilots to France before they had been adequately trained.
16 James McCudden, Flying Fury (1933), p67 (originally published in 1918 as Five Years in the RFC). McCudden had been with No 3 Sqn as a mechanic since before the war. As a corporal he began flying as a gunner on an occasional basis from early 1915. While still primarily a fitter, he flew with increasing frequency and, by then a sergeant, his formal qualification as an observer was eventually promulgated in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders, the effective date being 1 January 1916. Before the end of the month he had been posted home to retrain as a pilot. Commissioned at the beginning of 1917 he was eventually killed in a flying accident in July of the following year. By that time he was a major with fifty-seven victories to his credit and had been awarded the VC, DSO and Bar, MC and Bar, MM and Croix de Guerre.
17 The RFC Machine Gun School was set up at Broadlees, Dover under 2/Lt H E Chaney on 27 September 1915, starting its first course on 3 October. Its initially limited flying requirements were met by units of VI Bde but shortly after the school had moved to Hythe on 27 November it was established to operate its own aeroplanes, the initial entitlement comprising three BE2cs and a trio of Vickers fighters.
18 The nucleus of the Wireless School, which was formally established under Maj R Orme on 20 November 1915, had been provided by a group of specialist W/T technicians left behind at Brooklands when No 9 Sqn had moved to Dover in the previous July.
19 AIR1/1288/204/11/48. These names appear in a nominal roll of officers on the strength of the Wireless School as at 22 March 1916. All were annotated as ‘observers under instruction’.
20 AIR1/502/16/3/4. Unreferenced letter, dated 6 April 1916, from Lt-Col F Festing (AA&QMG at HQ RFC) to Capt B C Fellows at the War Office.
21 AIR1/1320/204/16/6. HQ 3rd Wg letter of 18 July 1915 which provided the basis for the discussion reflected in the minutes of the Wing Commanders Conference referred to at Chapter 2, Note 33.
22 AIR1/1266/204/9/61. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 15 May 1916. The GOC actually identified newly trained pilots as the culprits but the blame was obviously shared in equal measure by observers.
23 AIR1/1169/204/5/2591. War Office letter 121/Drafts etc/738 (MA1) dated 11 March 1916 and HQ RFC’s CRFC 934/19(A) dated 13 March.
24 AIR1/522/16/12/8. Shortly after taking up his appointment as CinC, Gen Haig directed that the COs of all BEF units were, ‘without fail’, to forward the application of any volunteer who wished to fly as an observer, GHQ reserving to itself the sole right to decide whether or not he could be released. If he could, his name would be passed to HQ RFC who would interview likely candidates and place the names of those selected on a waiting list.
25 AIR1/404/15/231/45. Farnborough letter 7329 dated 3 April 1916.
26 Ibid. War Office letter 87/7632(MA1) dated 24 April 1916.
27 AIR1/664/17/122/696. The first (it will have evolved subsequently) observer-dedicated syllabus was laid down in AO 141 dated 1 June 1916.
28 AIR1/405/15/231/46. The decision to send all direct entrant observers to Reading or Oxford, rather than just some (see page 32), was notified by AO 138 dated 25 July 1916.
29 It may be helpful to summarise the evolution of the RFC’s home-based training system. Salmond’s original command, HQ VI Bde, was redesignnated HQ Training Brigade on 20 July 1916. To cope with its subsequent expansion, a degree of devolution became necessary and on 1 January 1917 the Brigade was subdivided into Northern, Southern and Eastern Training Groups. Having continued to grow, on 5 August 1917 the three regional Groups were redesignated as Brigades, their controlling formation becoming HQ Training Division. Salmond remained in overall command until October 1917 when he succeeded Sir David Henderson as Director General of Military Aeronautics (DGMA) at the War Office, his place at HQ Training Division being taken by Maj-Gen C A H Longcroft. With the creation of the RAF the training structure was reorganised again. The newly created post of Director of Training, the first incumbent being Brig-Gen J G Hearson, assumed overall responsibility for training policy, implementation being devolved to numbered Training Groups via the various Headquarters of the five geographical Areas into which the metropolitan RAF had been divided. Now redundant, HQ Training Division was disbanded on 20 May 1918.
30 AIR1/1169/204/5/2591 contains copies of Lt-Col Higgins’ letter of 18 August and of HQ RFC’s blunt response of the following day.
31 Within weeks of the RFC’s having been committed to operations in France it had become apparent that a Squadron Commander could not reasonably be expected to run his unit single-handed. As a result, specifically to assist with administration on the ground, a fourth Flight Commander was established on the authority of War Office letter 20/Royal Flying Corps/56 (MA1) dated 6 November 1914 (AIR1/366/15/231/6). At much the same time a similar degree of support was provided for each of the recently formed wings by the creation of posts to be filled by an Adjutant and an Equipment Officer (EO), both of which were reflected in a revised establishment, 87/4040 (MA1) published on 8 December 1914 (Ibid). Pressure immediately began to be exerted to have the expensively-trained, but clearly misemployed, fourth Flight Commander at squadron level replaced by one of the newly conceived EOs, but of a lesser grade (see page 359). This was effectively approved by Treasury letter 4714/15 of 5 March 1915 (AIR1/502/16/3/11) which announced rates of pay for both EOs and Assistant Equipment Officers (AEOs) who were to serve at wing and squadron level respectively. The existence of the new category was formally recognised by a Royal Warrant of 26 March and the provision of an AEO for each squadron was reflected in a revised establishment published on 27 April 1915 (AIR1/1291/204/11/83). War Office letter 11/FC/208 (AO2) of 13 September 1916 eventually introduced a third grade and revised the nomenclature to EO1s, EO2s and EO3s, the latter serving at squadron level (AIR1/405/15/231/46).
All of that having been said, the term ‘Equipment’ Officer is sometimes misunderstood; it was an employment grade, not a job description. This misapprehension has come about because the RAF restyled its Stores Branch as the Equipment Branch in 1936 and it functioned as such for the next thirty years or so, thus creating a kind of ‘false memory syndrome’ that assumes that if you scratch an Equipment Officer you will find a storeman trying to get out. While that may have been true in WW II, it was not the case in WW I. The responsibilities of the RFC’s EOs embraced all aspects of engineering, maintenance, transport and logistics, including demanding and issuing replacement aircraft, engines and spare parts which were provided via the RFC’s own supply chain, and the petrol, oil and ‘barrack‘stores that were furnished by the ASC. As the system evolved, courses were introduced which permitted EOs (some of whom were grounded aircrew) to gain specialist annotations enabling them to fill appointments as Wireless, Armament, Photographic, Experimental and, later on, Compass and Air Navigation Officers. When the RAF came into being in 1918 it promptly redesignated its inherited EOs as Technical Officers, which was a far more appropriate label.
32 AIR1/867/204/5/522. Range Orders for Camiers were published under cover of HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047/2G dated 8 November 1916.
33 AIR1/997/204/5/1241. HQ V Bde letter 5B/98 dated 13 December 1916.
34 AIR1/32/15/1/185. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047/2g dated 25 August 1917.
35 AIR1/398/15/231/39. Establishment 87/Schools/33 dated 15 January 1918.
36 AIR1/532/16/12/106. The manning of the two projected Pilots Pool Ranges by retaining and redeploying the redundant staff from Berck during the summer off-season was proposed by Brig-Gen P W Game in CRFC 2047/4G dated 8 February 1918 and sanctioned by War Office letter 87/1315 (SD2) dated 24 February .
37 AIR1/32/15/1/185. Establishment AF/F/57 dated 10 September 1918.
38 AIR1/1988/204/273/135. Establishment AF/IF/11 dated 21 September 1918.