1914-17. Pilot Training in the RFC.
It will have become clear from much of the foregoing that, from being virtually non-existent in 1914, over the next two years the training of observers had progressed to being something less than adequate, substantial improvements not being introduced until the middle of 1916. Understandably, far more effort had been expended on the instruction of pilots, but even so their training had been of indifferent quality, and there had never been enough of it. As a result, while a new pilot arriving in France had always been more competent than a new observer, his capabilities were still very limited. So far as the practicalities of acquiring vital operational expertise were concerned, therefore, a pilot joined the very steep operational learning curve only slightly above his companion. The training of pilots is arguably beyond the scope of this book but the fact that no observer ever went flying without one is considered to justify a digression to examine how the ‘other’ member of a two-seater crew learned his trade.
While some pre-war military (and naval) pilots had learned to fly with the CFS at Upavon, most had gained their initial experience at a civil school at their own expense. Having obtained their Royal Aero Club (RAeC) Certificates, they were then able to recover their investment, up to a maximum of £751 (in 1911 – equivalent to a little short of £6,500 in 20112) from public funds.3 These ‘private’ pilots subsequently went to the CFS, to undergo a more advanced formal flying course, before joining one of the handful of pre-war squadrons to consolidate their skills.
General mobilisation created an immediate, and urgent, demand for additional pilots and it was quite clear that the existing system would be unable to cope. To provide extra training capacity, the RFC promptly opened a flying school at Farnborough followed, in September, by another at Netheravon, several pilots being recalled from France to serve as instructors. In November the War Office took over the civil aerodrome and facilities at Brooklands for ab initio instruction. These units would all be given military design-nations as Reserve Aeroplane Squadrons (RAS).4 The RNAS did much the same, creating the foundations of its wartime pilot training system by co-opting the civil schools at Eastbourne and Hendon to support the relatively long-established naval presence at Eastchurch.
Despite the subsequent growth of the military flying training organisation, the RFC (and the RNAS, and later the RAF) continued to make use of civil schools to provide elementary instruction until 1918. Examples of such enterprises included the Hall, the Ruffy-Baumann, the Grahame-White and the Beatty schools at Hendon, the London and Provincial School at Stag Lane and the Northern Aircraft Company at Lake Windermere. The precise arrangements varied. Some of these concerns worked under direct contract to the War Office or Admiralty, while in other cases pupils continued to pay their own tuition fees.5 Another early adjunct to the scheme was HQ RFC’s Flying School le Crotoy which operated throughout much of 1915. This unit provided remedial training for pilots who were considered to need it and permitted about fifty observers (and a handful of air mechanics) to gain their RAeC Certificates before being sent home to complete their training as military pilots.6
Although Brooklands’ remit was soon extended to permit it to train to ‘wings’ standard the training machine was still incapable of satisfying the RFC’s demands. In early 1915, therefore, the system was reorganised and expanded with a view to increasing its output.7 No 3 RAS moved from Netheravon to Shoreham, another pre-war aerodrome (operated by the Pashley Flying School) which had been among the civil facilities taken over in the previous August, and land was acquired elsewhere for further new units. The RASs were all intended to function as elementary flying schools. In addition to practical flying training to (at least) RAeC Certificate standard, they were also to provide all of the associated theoretical and technical ground instruction. The significance of the certificate, incidentally, reflected the fact that the Royal Aero Club was the only British body empowered to license a pilot, military as well as civilian.8
Having completed his elementary course at an RAS a trainee pilot proceeded either to the CFS or, and this was a major innovation, to one of the Service Squadrons working up to operational readiness (in January 1915 these were Nos 1, 7 and 8 Sqns). There they were expected to spend up to two months flying, ideally, one type of aircraft, rather than gaining experience on a variety of different aeroplanes which had been the favoured practice in the past (an ambition that was not substantially satisfied until 1918). By this means the number of pilots on the strength of a Service Squadron acting as an advanced flying school increased progressively until it was perhaps 50% above establishment. At this point the surplus was detached to form the nucleus of a completely new unit, leaving its parent squadron free to proceed overseas. The cycle then repeated itself.9
The major weakness in this system was its use, really its misuse, of Service Squadrons. The DMA was aware of the limitations which this might impose but considered that these would have to be accepted. The main drawback, and one which had certainly been foreseen, was that imposing a major flying training commitment on units which were supposed to be preparing for active service might well overload them. Nevertheless, while these squadrons were still supposed to practise operational techniques, it was ruled that, where conflict arose, priority was to be given to pilot training. As a result of this policy, and as we have already seen, tactical role training, and the instruction of observers, were to become increasingly secondary considerations.
In essence, the training philosophy adopted by the RFC in January 1915 (see page 10) represented an attempt to get a quart out of a proverbial pint pot and it inevitably resulted in a short measure. While this approach did serve to sustain the flow of new pilots, it became increasingly difficult to maintain a satisfactory balance between quantity and quality. The problem grew worse as the war progressed because the introduction of increasingly sophisticated aeroplanes, equipment and techniques meant that the amount that a new pilot needed to assimilate grew inexorably.
Furthermore, while some of those who had to teach this steadily expanding syllabus were relatively experienced pilots, few of them could be regarded as skilled instructors. As Maj Robert Smith-Barry put it, the flying instructors of 1916 were those pilots who ‘were resting, those who were preparing to go overseas and those who had shown themselves to be useless for anything else. The first two classes had other interests paramount; the third had no interests at all.’10 In fact, the sole qualification required of an instructor was that he had to be a licensed pilot and, on an advanced training squadron, it was not at all unusual for a pilot to be teaching his juniors to fly the day after he had himself qualified for his ‘wings’.11 The inevitable result was that the competence of most newly graduated pilots failed to meet the standards which were (should have been) required. This is not to say that the RFC had no capable pilots. It had, but they were either naturally gifted or lucky enough to have survived unscathed for long enough to have accumulated a worthwhile amount of experience.
By early 1916 the War Office was receiving ‘serious complaints’ from Maj-Gen Trenchard ‘concerning the insufficient training of some of the replacement pilots sent out as reinforcements.’12 By this time two major initiatives (references to both of which have already been made) had already been taken with the aim of raising training standards. First, RFC Schools of Instruction had been established at Reading and Oxford and from early 1916 these began to make a significant contribution by providing a comprehensive ground-based foundation course in aviation theory and technology. Secondly, Brig-Gen Salmond had been given overall responsibility for the conduct of training and his influence soon began to make itself felt. One of the earliest indications of more positive control being exercised was a clear restatement of what was required to qualify as a pilot. From March a pilot had to have:
a. flown solo for a minimum of fifteen hours;
b. flown a service (as distinct from a training) aeroplane ‘satisfactorily’;
c. made a cross-country flight of at least sixty miles, making two landings (at RFC supervised aerodromes) en route;
d. climbed to 6,000 feet and remained there for at least fifteen minutes before descending to land, with his engine switched off, touching down within a circle of 50 yards diameter; and
e. landed twice in the dark with the assistance of flares, although this requirement could be waived if delays would have been incurred by waiting for suitable conditions.
The airframe shop at No 2 School of Instruction at Oxford with examples of the Martinsyde S. 1, BE2c, RE7, Morane H and Vickers FB5 partially stripped to show their internal structure. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
With hindsight it is plain that this remarkably short list defined no more than a minimum standard. It should be appreciated, however, that at the time it was considered to represent a ‘raising of the standard of the graduation test’ (author’s italics).13
In order to keep the units conducting, what was known as, training in Higher Aviation fully manned, pilots were, if necessary, to be withdrawn from the elementary flying schools before they had even qualified for their RAeC Certificates, although these were still supposed to be obtained before final graduation. Clearly, quantity was still taking priority over quality, this being heavily underlined by the fact that the graduation standard still omitted any reference to tactical or operational skills. No mention was made, of combat manoeuvring, indeed of manoeuvring of any kind. Similarly, formation flying, cloud flying and practical experience of bombing, gunnery, photography and W/T work were all considered to be non-essential. Pilots were, of course, encouraged to indulge in such activities if time permitted but, unfortunately, it seldom did. In short, if the trainee pilot of early 1916 could get an aeroplane off the ground, keep it in the air and then land again, with or without power, he was considered to be ready for active service.
At much the same time as the graduation standard was being ‘raised’, three qualification certificates were introduced, these being additional to the RAeC Certificate. These were:
Certificate A. A written examination on the theory of flight, RFC organisation, artillery co-operation procedures, etc. The papers were set by Commandant CFS, the exams being held under local arrangements at the Headquarters of each Training Wing every Tuesday.
Certificate B. Tests of practical skills, involving aeroengines, rigging, Morse, machine guns and the like, held at the CFS on Tuesdays and at Reading and Oxford on Saturdays.
Certificate C. Flying tests, conducted in accordance with instructions issued locally by Wing Commanders. In effect Certificate C simply involved progressive completion of the exercises which had been laid down in March (see above).
Certificates A and B had to be gained in that order but the flying test could be completed at any time. Once he had collected ticks in all three boxes, the new pilot was awarded his RFC Flying (later Graduation) Certificate by the CFS. The War Office was notified that he had qualified and shortly afterwards he would be gazetted as a Flying Officer. Once he had been gazetted (and not before) he was entitled to wear a flying badge.14
By the summer of 1916 the majority of trainee pilots were passing through Reading or Oxford and the certification system was changed to reflect this. In June Certificates A and B were combined into a single Certificate A which had to be obtained before commencing flying training.15 The original procedure had to be sustained for several months, running in parallel with the new scheme, for the benefit of men who had begun their training under the old arrangements, ie those who had not had the opportunity to spend a period at one of the Schools of Instruction.
While the RAeC ‘ticket’ had been worthwhile when it had first been introduced in 1910, subsequent advances in flying techniques had made it increasingly irrelevant and it now represented only the first hurdle in the training sequence, and a very low one at that. In fact it was actually becoming counterproductive, because it required about three-quarters of an hour to complete the test and all other flying was usually suspended while one was being flown. To cut down on what HQ II Bde described as a ‘lamentable waste of time’, in October 1915 OC 5th Wg, Lt-Col W G H Salmond, had suggested that, while retaining the requirement to fly the course twice, the five figures-of-eight might be reduced to just two.16 The RAeC promptly acceded to this request.17
This had been the thin end of a wedge, of course, and, since the RFC had long been adjudicating the tests on its behalf, the RAeC (still the sole official licensing authority) was on the point of relinquishing its jurisdiction over military pilots in any case. Recognising that the RFC’s Flying Certificate reflected a far higher standard of competence than its own, the RAeC agreed to issue its ‘ticket’ to any pilot who could produce evidence to show that he had been certified by the military.
By the summer of 1916 more than 3,000 RAeC Certificates had been issued but it was becoming increasingly common for pilots to neglect to inform the Club authorities that they had graduated, often because they were packed off to France as replacements before they had had time to attend to this chore. Since they lacked their RAeC ‘ticket’, these pilots were technically unlicensed. It was recognised, however, that by this time the RAeC was merely ‘rubber-stamping’ the RFC’s Graduation Certificates and that its involvement had become redundant. All pilots who had qualified up to and including August were, therefore, automatically and retrospectively granted their RAeC Certificates (although not all of them were claimed). For pilots who qualified thereafter, the CFS documentation alone was deemed to be sufficient proof of their competence to fly military aeroplanes.18
The measures which had been introduced thus far were all worthwhile, since they had served to put pilot training on a more formal basis and to streamline the associated administrative procedures. But this had not addressed the fundamental problem. The training system was still failing to keep pace with the demands of front-line service, indeed the gap was becoming progressively wider. Much more needed to be done and these requirements can be summarised as follows.
a. Training needed to be extended to embrace operational activities in addition to pure flying.
b. Training needed to be adapted to reflect the increasingly specialised nature of aerial warfare.
c. Pilots had to be given much more time in the air.
d. Pilots needed to taught how to be the complete master of their machines, rather than merely having some measure of influence over them. This demanded a more structured and professional approach to training, including the provision of qualified flying instructors.
e. An all-through system of dedicated flying training schools was required, permitting Service Squadrons to be divorced from the system.
The first steps towards realising these aims were taken with the introduction of a substantially expanded syllabus in December 1916.19 Prior to this, as described below, more attention had already, if belatedly, begun to be paid to operational techniques and procedures. The new syllabus, as well as revising the content of the practical flying tests, now laid down the level of expertise that pupils had to be able to demonstrate in the fields of bombing, photography, signals and so on. It also raised the minimum number of solo hours needed to qualify for a flying badge to twenty, with the addition of further solo time ‘on type’ for pilots destined to fly certain nominated aeroplanes.20
For the first few months following the introduction of the new syllabus the necessary facilities were not universally available and this and other circumstances dictated that many short cuts had to be taken. The most serious deficiency was in flying hours and as late as June 1917, in order to make good the heavy losses sustained by the RFC during the previous April, replacement pilots were still being sent to France with less than thirty hours’ flying time; that is total flying time, let alone solo hours.
1918. Pilot training in the RAF.
Despite the early setback caused by the aftermath of ‘Bloody April’, the quality of flying training continued to improve thereafter. Suffice to say that, largely due to the positive influence of Maj Smith-Barry (see Chapter 12), all of the outstanding points listed above had been addressed by mid-1918 and, as a result, the capabilities of newly-qualified pilots had been completely transformed. Before leaving this topic, however, it might be as well to provide a brief summary of the three-phase training sequence that was adopted by the RAF and which remained in force for the rest of the war. The details and timing varied slightly according to role but the procedure was broadly as follows.
a. Basic training, which was undertaken as a flight cadet21 at a Training Depot Station (see page 88), involved at least 25 hours of airborne time on Avro 504s accumulated over a period of about three months. On successful completion of this phase, during which a trainee drew the four shillings per day instructional rate of pay, he was graduated ‘A’.
b. The second phase, which occupied up to two months, was conducted at the same unit with the student retaining his original status. On completion of the course he would have accumulated at least 10 more hours, five of which had to have been flown on a ‘service’ type. Apart from pure flying instruction, he would have passed practical tests in cross-country, formation and cloud flying, the conduct of reconnaissance and air-to-ground firing. On successful completion a trainee was graduated ‘B’ and gazetted as a 2nd lieutenant in the Flying Branch, although he still drew the instructional rate of flying pay.
c. The third phase was conducted at a ‘finishing’ school specialising in providing instruction appropriate to a particular operational role, ie single-seat fighter and fighter-reconnaissance, day and night bomber, army cooperation or maritime. Content and duration differed but on completion a pilot graduated ‘C’ whereupon he was entitled to put up his ‘wings’ and draw flying pay at the full rate of eight shillings per day.
The airframe shop at Oxford in 1918 at what had become No 2 School of Aeronautics. In the centre is a Camel, with an engineless DH 4(?) beyond it. In the right foreground is the tail of an Avro 504 and at the far end of the room, a Dolphin, a fully rigged BE2c and, against the wall, the stripped fuselage of another. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
In all, when the preliminary ground-based courses are added, by the late summer of 1918, and not allowing for leave, it was taking about eleven months for a pilot to progress from enlistment to gaining his ‘wings’.22 Before being sent to France, he would have flown about 60 hours, and many would have logged substantially more than that.
While it was obviously of considerable concern to any observer that his colleague should be able to fly their aeroplane well, it is considered that the foregoing provides sufficient background on the way in which pilots gained their basic flying skills during WW I. On the other hand, because it had a direct impact on the division of responsibility within a crew, it is worth examining the way in which pilots acquired increasing expertise in the handling of radio and in the conduct of aerial gunnery, both of which had originally been regarded as being the province of the observer.
1916-18. Wireless training for pilots.
While most of the observers being trained at home were being provided with a reasonable grounding in operational skills by the summer of 1916, pilots did not begin to attend dedicated courses, such as those being run at Brooklands and Hythe, until the following year. Nevertheless, they too were expected to be able to cope with wireless and to handle a machine gun.
For pilots trained prior to mid-1916 their instruction in W/T procedures had been a pretty haphazard affair. The syllabus (such as it was) was poorly defined and the amount of time devoted to the subject was largely dependent upon the enthusiasm of the individual instructors, Squadron and Wing Commanders involved. Many of these men will have won their spurs with the first wave of RFC units sent to France in 1914 and will have returned to Home Establishment before W/T had become firmly established as a basic tool of the aviator’s trade. Having had little personal experience of using wireless, some would not yet have recognised its importance. As a result, the instruction being provided could be variable in both quality and quantity.
The lack of familiarity with wireless displayed by new pilots had been causing concern at HQ RFC and the reform of the W/T content of the syllabus was high on Salmond’s list of priorities. In May 1916 a formal system was introduced.23 Units tasked with training in Higher Aviation (by now selected Reserve Squadrons as well as Service Squadrons awaiting mobilisation) were to be provided with sufficient resources to permit each of them to have two aircraft fitted with transmitters. Each squadron was also to have a ground receiver station which was to be manned by three wireless operators. In addition, each Training Wing was established to have a dedicated AEO to co-ordinate wireless activities at squadron level. To supervise them, there was to be an EO at a scale of one per three wings and, in overall charge, there was to be an Inspecting Officer at HQ Training Brigade.
The specific skills which a pilot needed to acquire were much the same as those being taught to observers. He had to learn Morse and the Artillery Code and demonstrate his ability to transmit using a silenced key. In the air he had to become accustomed to letting out and reeling in an aerial and practise making live transmissions simulating artillery cooperation messages. This basic syllabus was progressively expanded and within a few months it included the ability to read ground signals and practical work with ‘Artillery Targets’, similar to those being used to instruct observers in the techniques of ranging and spotting. As previously noted, from the autumn of 1916 onwards it was becoming increasingly common for pilots to assume responsibility for operational W/T work. While it was not the only reason (see, for instance, pages 63-64), there can be little doubt that the much improved wireless training that pilots were now receiving served to encourage this trend.
Until mid-1916 the key functions of military aviation had been reconnaissance and artillery co-operation and all pilots had undergone the same sequence of training. By that time, however, the influence of role specialisation was becoming increasingly apparent, bringing with it an appreciation that what was an essential skill for one pilot was largely superfluous to another. Early in 1917, therefore, the wireless training sequence was revised and a phased system was introduced.24
Since all pilots needed to have some facility with W/T, Morse training (at six words per minute) was introduced at the elementary stage and each of the Reserve Squadrons concerned was required to have ten aircraft equipped with winches and aerials so that all pilots would become familiar with the chore of having to wind out an aerial on every sortie. More importantly, they would also have drilled into them the importance of having to reel it in again! This approach, supplemented by appropriate lectures and building on the foundations laid at Oxford/Reading, served to provide all pilots with a reasonable grasp of wireless techniques. The amount of W/T training provided at the advanced stage was now variable and depended upon the nature of the unit to which an individual was next posted.
The main users of wireless continued to be the corps reconnaissance squadrons and several advanced training units were now required to concentrate on producing pilots for this particular role. They flew Avros and a selection of ‘service’ types, typically BE2s and Nieuport two-seaters until these could be replaced by RE8s and FK8s as they became available. Half of the Avros and all of the quasi-operational machines were scaled to be fitted with transmitters for practical airborne exercises. At these units Morse (at eight words per minute), panneau signalling, Artillery Target work and the like continued to be a central feature of the curriculum.
As the system evolved, other squadrons began to specialise in producing pilots for single- and two-seat fighters, and for day and night bombers. At these units the amount of practical W/T training was adjusted to reflect the extent to which students might actually use radio once they had joined an operational squadron, although consolidation training in reading Morse continued to be a universal requirement.
Above, Armstrong Whitworth FK3s of the School of Aerial Gunnery at Hythe and, below, a Bristol Fighter, C4692, that came to grief while flying with No 4 (Auxiliary) School of Aerial Gunnery at Marske; note the Thornton-Pickard Mk III Hythe gun camera mounted on the upper wing centre section. (Both J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
1916-18. Gunnery training for pilots.
Until the spring of 1916 gunnery training for pilots had been at much the same low level of intensity as wireless work. The provision of ground-based instruction on the Lewis gun as part of the Reading/Oxford syllabus was considered to represent sufficient improvement, as, in practice, it was usually the observer who actually handled these weapons in action. The introduction of synchronising gear during the summer meant that this approach was no longer adequate. As well as needing some familiarity with the Lewis gun, a pilot now had to be able to deal with the Vickers. Furthermore, he also had to be introduced to the concept of aiming his whole aeroplane at the target.
While a few more pilots began to pass through Hythe during the early summer, these courses continued to be largely the preserve of observers and (until January 1917) specialist ground tradesmen. In August it was decided that Hythe should also assume formal responsibility for the gunnery training of pilots, although the actual instruction was to be conducted remotely.25 Each advanced training squadron was to be provided with an NCO instructor and each wing was to have a similarly qualified, Hythe-trained, pilot to act as the Wing Gunnery Officer. These officers were responsible to the Wing Commander for the effectiveness of the gunnery training being carried out at all squadrons within his organisation. They were, however, only assigned to wings on attachment; technically they remained on the strength of the School of Aerial Gunnery, which meant that they also reported to the Commandant at Hythe. In addition there was to be an Inspecting Officer at HQ Training Brigade to oversee all gunnery training activities.
These arrangements were not entirely satisfactory, as the (often very junior) Wing Gunnery Officers were in the uncomfortable position of having to serve two masters. Furthermore, because the School of Aerial Gunnery reported directly to the DMA, rather than to the Training Brigade, the Inspecting Officer lacked the authority to direct Hythe’s activities.
So far as facilities were concerned, increased attention began to be paid to improving marksmanship. Each advanced training squadron was now required to maintain a ·22 firing range and small numbers of Hythe gun-cameras began to be issued as they became available. Lectures were introduced to cover sighting theory, deflection shooting and the like and there was practical instruction on the mechanics of both Lewis and Vickers guns and on the gearing which permitted the latter to fire through the disc swept by the propeller. The new system began to establish itself during the autumn of 1916 but it still did not fully satisfy the requirement.
The chain of command problem was eventually solved when Hythe was subordinated to the Training Brigade with effect from 18 December 1916, the latter thereafter assuming responsibility for all aspects of training in aerial gunnery.26 This enabled Salmond to implement a progressive system similar to that already being applied to W/T training. A phased syllabus was devised which introduced gunnery theory and practical work on machine guns as early as the Cadet Wing stage (see Chapter 8, Note 31). This foundation was subsequently reinforced at the Schools of Instruction and built on during elementary flying training. Clay pigeon shooting and machine gun practice on ground ranges were added at the advanced stage, further tuition being provided by employing pilots with recent combat experience as visiting lecturers.
Facilities for live air-to-air gunnery had been introduced at Cormont in late 1917 and by the end of the war, they were becoming widely available at home. This RE7, rigged for banner towing, was on the strength of No 3 (Auxiliary) School of Aerial Gunnery at New Romney in 1918 for the benefit of observers and gunners, but similar arrangements were made for pilots. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
All of this represented a considerable improvement but the system still failed to provide trainee pilots with first-hand experience of live air-to-air gunnery or of simulated air combat. It was envisaged that this sort of practical training would eventually take place at Loch Doon where a new School of Aerial Gunnery was being built with extensive and sophisticated training facilities, both live and synthetic, for both ground and air firing. Unfortunately, this project had been ill-conceived and it did not run smoothly. 27
Since Loch Doon failed to open for business in January 1917, as planned, No 2 (Auxiliary) School of Aerial Gunnery [(Aux)SAG] was set up at Turnberry to provide pilots with some practical experience.28 It took some time to decide on the format of the exercises to be flown at Turnberry but a formal syllabus had been agreed by the late spring of 1917. While this had solved the gunnery problem, there was still a requirement for tactical flying practice. This need was not really satisfied until the autumn when Nos 1 and 2 Schools of Aerial Fighting were opened at Ayr and Driffield, respectively.
Meanwhile, to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for dedicated gunnery training, two more interim units had been set up, No 3 (Aux)SAG at New Romney to deal with back-seaters and No 4 (Aux)SAG at Marske for pilots. When the Loch Doon project was abandoned these ‘auxiliary’ schools became permanent fixtures and their designations were changed to reflect their independent status. Nos 1 and 3 (Aux)SAGs merged to become No 1 (Observers) School of Aerial Gunnery in March 1918 and in May the resources of Nos 2 and 4 (Aux)SAGs were pooled with those of Nos 1 and 2 Schools of Aerial Fighting to form Nos 1, 2 and 3 Schools of Aerial Fighting and Gunnery.29 Thankfully, these rather cumbersome titles were short-lived and before the end of the month they had been redesignated as Nos 1, 2 and 3 Fighting Schools.
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1 AIR2/3. In its letter 10793/11, the Treasury had sanctioned the payment of £50 as early as 8 July 1911, a further £25 being added by its 14687/11 of 5 August. The intention to introduce the £75 refund was announced in the House on 30 October 1911 (ZHC2/539 – Hansard). The arrangements were eventually promulgated by a Special Army Order of 24 November and published as Army Order 342 on 1 December.
2 This comparison in prices, and others which appear elsewhere in this book, have been derived from the Office of National Statistics’ Long Term Retail Price Index (RPI). The edition used by this writer, which covers the period 1850-2012, assumed the RPI to have been 100 in January 1974. The base date is of little significance, however; another tabulation based on January 1956 gives very similar results.
3 AIR1/806/204/4/1189. It is interesting to note that in the early days of the war the Treasury was predictably tight-fisted about using public money to underwrite a private (and possibly even frivolous) activity. Although pilots enlisted in the RFC for a nominal four years, it was far from certain in 1914 that the war was going to last that long. War Office letter 100/FC/30(MA1) of 10 September 1914 announced, therefore, that any wartime pilot who failed to complete his four-year engagement would be liable for the refund of the full £75 cost of his licence and that he would also have to pay back his uniform allowance at the rate of £10 for each year of the four which was not served. This information was promulgated in HQ Administrative Wing’s Routine Orders on 12 October 1914. It is assumed that, once the war had become a permanent fixture, these regulations will have been relaxed.
4 The unit set up at Farnborough in August 1914 operated as the Reserve Aeroplane Squadron until November when was redesignated as No 1 RAS when Brooklands was acquired to become No 2. In January 1915, the Netheravon Flying School moved to Shoreham where it became No 3 and so it went on. On 13 January 1916, by which time there were eighteen of them, the RASs were redesignated as Reserve Squadrons. Neither title described the function of these units very precisely, however, and on 31 May 1917 they were all given the more appropriate designation of Training Squadrons. There were more than sixty of them in the UK by then, with others in Canada and Egypt.
5 For the first two years of the war there appears to have been an anomaly in the regulations under which serving personnel were able to reclaim their tuition fees in that they applied only to those seeking a transfer to the RFC (Military Wing). While similar arrangements had certainly existed for those wishing to fly with the pre-war RFC (Naval Wing) and the early RNAS, these would appear subsequently to have lapsed. Parity was restored on 7 November 1916 when the London Gazette published an Order in Council authorising the refund of fees up to £75 to any officers and warrant officers possessing RAeC Certificates who wished to transfer to the RNAS. See also page 976 of Flight for 9 November and Admiralty Weekly Order 3136 of the 24th.
6 AIR1/2149/209/3/200. This file lists the individuals who were sent to le Crotoy where they flew Shorthorns and/or Caudrons. They were not all successful but among those who were was Sholto Douglas (op cit), pp84-85.
7 AIR1/1288/204/11/53. The new scheme was described in some detail in War Office letter 87/4469 (MA1) dated 9 January 1915.
8 The Aero Club of the United Kingdom had become the Royal Aero Club on 15 February 1910 and, since it was the only responsible aeronautical organisation in the country at the time, the RAeC assumed (with the approval of the Government) responsibility for licensing all pilots in the UK, the first being issued on 8 March. To obtain his ‘ticket’ a pilot had to complete, to the satisfaction of an official observer appointed by the Club, three separate flights around a five-kilometre closed circuit course. Each flight had to terminate with the engine being switched off at or before touch-down which was to be within 150 metres of a point previously nominated by the candidate.
These requirements were later amended to reflect the increasing capabilities of aeroplanes. From February 1911, a pilot had to make only two five-kilometre flights but they were now to be flown around two posts located not more than 500 metres apart, with the direction of flight being reversed at each turn so that the course became a series of five ‘figures of eight’. A third sortie was still required, the object of this one being to attain an altitude of at least fifty metres. All three landings were to be made engine-off within fifty metres of the position nominated by the candidate. The rules were amended again in January 1914, the altitude test being raised to 100 metres and on this sortie the engine was to be switched off at height, the entire descent, approach and spot landing being carried out dead-stick.
At both military and civil schools, given favourable weather and an appropriate degree of urgency, it was quite feasible for an ab initio student to obtain his ticket within a week.
9 This practice was to be sustained for the next two years, some quite complex genealogies being established. No 8 Sqn, for instance, begat No 13 Sqn, which spawned No 22 Sqn, which provided the nucleus for No 45 Sqn, which passed on its genes to No 64 Sqn – by which time it was August 1916. A similar system was used in 1917 except that the parent unit was more likely to be a Training than a Service Squadron.
10 Smith-Barry, who was at the time, OC 60 Sqn in France, wrote two papers, both dated 10 November 1916, in which he advocated a new approach to flying training, specifically including the use of aeroplanes fitted with dual controls. These were sent to the Acting OC III Bde, Lt-Col G S Shephard, who forwarded them to Advanced HQ RFC on the 20th. Smith-Barry followed up with a further short paper, dated 10 December, in which he proposed the establishment of a ‘school of training for instructors’. The originals of his two papers of 10 November are on file at Kew (AIR1/997/204/5/1241). The text of the second of these and of the 10 December paper (from which the quotation was taken) were later printed and published in November 1917 (RAF Museum R018934). In his, Pioneer Pilot, The Great Smith-Barry (1976), p55, F D Tredrey records that Smith-Barry’s papers, found their way to Trenchard who, having made appropriate arrangements in advance with Salmond, had Smith-Barry posted home to take command of No 1 Reserve Squadron at Gosport where he was to put his theory into practice on a trial basis.
11 In his autobiography, Recollections of an Airman (1933), p132, Louis Strange notes that, while commanding No 23 Sqn in late 1915, ‘I put four of my best pupils on to instructing as soon as they were competent.’ This practice appears to have been quite widespread, another example being provided by No 45 Sqn in the summer of 1916 where Lt L W McArthur, Lt E F P Lubbock and 2/Lt B P G Beanlands were all retained to fly as instructors after having gained their ‘wings’ with the unit.
12 AIR1/387/15/231/28. Trenchard’s complaints were referred to in Major D Powell’s War Office letter 87/7094 (MA1) of 23 March 1916.
13 AIR1/387/15/231/28. The list of requirements (and the associated quotations) are taken from War Office letter 87/7094(MA1) dated 23 March 1916.
14 Although it was frequently stressed in the orders routinely published by training units that the wearing of ‘wings’ was conditional upon being gazetted, eg 5th Wg’s Orders No 245 of 18 October 1915 (AIR1/1273/204/9/148), it appears to have been a common practice for pilots to sew on their badges as soon as they knew that they had qualified, hence the need for repetition. This illicit practice will no doubt have been encouraged by the fact that, in order to give them some credibility, newly qualified pilots who were selected to act as instructors were granted local dispensations to wear their ‘wings’ immediately. Lt E F P Lubbock, for instance was authorised to wear his badge on 6 June 1916, although his formal appointment as a Flying Officer did not appear in the London Gazette until 12 July (albeit with an effective date of 22 May).
15 AIR1/405/15/231/46. War Office letter 43/FS/417(AO1a) of 22 June 1916 announced the introduction of the new Certificate A which covered all basic theoretical and practical work.
16 AIR1/138/15/40/283. In an unreferenced letter dated 30 October 1915, HQ II Bde requested that the War Office seek a reduction in the content of the RAeC test.
17 Ibid. In a letter of 1 December 1915, the RAeC Committee agreed that the distance to be flown on each test, previously 5 kms, could be reduced to 2 kms.
18 In his Fellowship of the Air (1951), p138, B J Hurren records that the War Office raised the issue of RAeC certificates with the club’s authorities on 3 August 1916. They promptly agreed that ‘the Graduation Certificate of the RFC should be regarded for all purposes as covering the club certificate, and that this arrangement was to operate retrospectively.’ While the War Office and Admiralty were recognised as being competent to license their own pilots from August 1916 onwards, however, this did not preclude a military flyer’s obtaining an RAeC Certificate on his own initiative. For the payment of a nominal sum, a military certificate was still negotiable and Hurren tells us that by 11 November 1918 the Royal Aero Club had approved a total of 6,308 aviator’s ‘tickets’ in addition to having issued certificates to 206 aeronauts (balloonists) and thirty-nine airship pilots. Some of the recipients will have been civilians but the majority were (or became) military personnel. That said, something like 20,000 pilots served with the RFC/RNAS/RAF, so it is clear that the majority of them had not needed and/or bothered to seek the blessing of the RAeC.
19 AIR1/676/21/13/1773. War Office letter 87/7094(AO1a) of 15 December 1916 redefined the practical flying tests to be passed by student pilots while Training Brigade letter TB/861 of 30 November had laid down the tests to be passed in a variety of operational techniques.
20 Ibid. Before being sent overseas, pilots flying BE12s, DH 2s and FE8s were required to have logged at least twenty-five hours solo of which not less than five were to have been on type. For Sopwith, SE5 and Morane pilots the corresponding figures were twenty-eight and eight.
21 AIR1/398/15/231/39. Until the end of 1917 the Army commissioned its directly recruited officers on graduation from a Cadet Wing, so that they underwent their flying training as 2nd lieutenants. This was at variance with later naval practice, since RNAS trainees were not formally commissioned until they were professionally qualified (see Chapter 11, Note 5). The RFC eventually adopted a similar approach, War Office letter 87/RFC/1049(F6) of 2 January 1918 announcing that the Air Council had decided that all prospective RFC officers would, in future, undergo all of their basic training as flight cadets, although, through some bureaucratic oversight, prospective ab initio kite balloon officers continued to be trained as 2nd lieutenants until late May when they too were subjected to the flight cadet regime.
The RFC cadet system was subsequently carried over into the RAF, at some notional disadvantage to ex-naval probationary observer/flight officers, since they lost their previous ability to acquire antedates of seniority in recognition of high standards being achieved during training, the RFC/RAF scheme having no provision for this refinement; see Air Ministry Weekly Order (AMWO) 251 of 15 May 1918.
22 AIR10/64. This information has been condensed from Field Service Publication (FS) 39, Training Courses in the RAF for Commissioned and Non-commissioned Personnel, showing Status and Pay, which was published in October 1918. See also Chapter 14, Note 22.
23 AIR1/1266/204/9/61. HQ VI Bde letter 6BP/356 dated 26 May detailed the measures to be implemented to improve wireless training facilities.
24 Ibid. Training Brigade letter TB/837, dated 29 January 1917, provided details of the extended W/T training system for pilots which was to be implemented with effect from 1 February.
25 Ibid. War Office letter 87/Schools/28(AO1a) dated 26 August 1916 provided details of the system being introduced to improve the gunnery training of pilots.
26 AIR1/129/15/40/200. AO 259 dated 8 December 1916.
27 The Loch Doon scheme had been approved in August 1916, civil engineering work commencing in the following month. It had originally been anticipated that the new School of Aerial Gunnery would open for business early in 1917 and Hythe’s Lt-Col L A Strange was appointed to command on 12 January. Since it was a peat bog, the chosen site was fundamentally unsuitable. Despite the efforts of Messrs McAlpine, who employed a labour force of 3,000 men and laid 56 miles of field drains, the airfield was never a practical proposition. Strange had little option but to start training at a temporary alternative location at Turnberry. With little of substance having been achieved at Loch Doon, Strange moved on to the CFS in April, leaving his successor, Lt-Col E B Gordon, to supervise building work and capital expenditure, both of which continued remorselessly. By late 1917 No 6 School of Military Aeronautics was slated to move to Loch Doon but whether this was as a part of the original grandiose scheme, or merely a late attempt to find some practical use for the barracks which had been built, is uncertain. In any event the move was cancelled on 11 January 1918 and all further civil engineering work on the site had ceased before the end of that month.
AIR6/16 contains a lengthy report (from which much of the above has been condensed) by Lt-Col Gordon detailing the inadequacies of the Loch Doon site which, apart from anything else, suffered from a particularly poor weather factor. The budget originally authorised for the project in August 1916 had been £150,000. The actual cost was a contentious issue with various MPs pressing for details from 1917 onwards, figures of up to £3M being alleged. The Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, appears to have had the last word in a Written Answer delivered on 21 March 1923 (ZHC2/670 – Hansard), when he stated that ‘As far as I can ascertain, the expenditure on the construction and site of the aerodrome at Loch Doon was, approximately, £435,000 (about £20M in 2011 money) and (the context implies that this probably meant ‘of which’) the amount paid to Messrs McAlpine was £320,600.’
28 ‘Auxiliary’, that is, to the non-effective establishment at Loch Doon. At the same time, January 1917, and for the same reason, the original school at Hythe became No 1 (Aux)SAG, now exclusively dedicated to the training of back-seaters.
29 No 1 SofAF&G operated from both Ayr and Turnberry; No 2 was at Marske and No 3 at Driffield.