1916. The RFC’s Observer training system begins to mature.
Reverting to the theme of observer training, activities at the Wireless School were being increasingly influenced by Brig-Gen Salmond and his staff and direct command of the unit was eventually transferred to Headquarters Training Brigade with effect from 1 September 1916. By this time the throughput at Brooklands was running at about twenty observers per month and to reflect the increasing importance of the aviation syllabus the unit was renamed the Wireless and Observers School on 24 October.1
The observers course had been extensively revised during August and it is informative to examine its content. Trainees were divided into two groups: Group A – those with less than six hours of flying time, and Group B – those with more. The course broke down broadly as follows:
First Week. Examination in basic signalling; the principles of electricity as related to W/T; theoretical and practical map-reading; the theory and practice of aerial reconnaissance and reporting, including some flying exercises; artillery co-operation, including use of the Artillery Code, ie ranging and spotting, using an Artillery Target and/or ‘puff targets’;2 Morse practice; and an introduction to the general routine of the duties of an RFC squadron. Any Group B pupils with more than fifteen hours of flying experience (eg relatively experienced men sent home from France to attend the course) were tested on the content of the first week of the syllabus on arrival and if they passed they were up-coursed and proceeded directly to Week Two.
Second Week. General principles of W/T, including the tuning of transmitters and receivers (although the standard in-service airborne installations were still transmit-only devices, it was necessary for an observer to be able to handle a ground receiver); lectures on photography; an introduction to the Lewis gun and progress tests on all work completed thus far.
Third Week. W/T practice; revision; practical artillery work – flash spotting, pre-arranged and opportunity targets (including some flying exercises) and final examinations.
This comprehensive syllabus, preceded by a sound theoretical indoctrination at one of the Schools of Instruction and reinforced by a practical gunnery course at Hythe, meant that all observers trained from the summer of 1916 onwards should have been far better prepared than any of their predecessors had ever been. This would only be true, of course, if all observers were permitted to attend the full sequence of courses and if the various schools were all capable of handling the whole curriculum competently.
Unfortunately, these conditions could not always be met. For instance, it was part of the stated aim of the course that all observers passing through Brooklands were to spend fifteen hours in the air. A routine weekly return for 17 January 1917 reported that there were 104 officers under instruction there on that date. Although there was no indication of how many of them were observers (rather than W/T Officers), the names of at least seventy-seven appear on a nominal roll dated 29 January3 so by this stage they clearly represented the bulk of the student body. Since the unit could field only five aeroplanes, however (one BE2d, one AW FK3 and three BE2cs), it is extremely doubtful whether any observers had been acquiring anything like the intended fifteen hours of airborne time during 1916.
Above. The Hythe camera gun represented a significant advance in training facilities. Devised by Maj D Geddes, it took a photograph instead of firing a bullet. This is an early version; in its fully developed form, the Mk III of 1917, the camera was built into the ‘gun barrel’. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection) Below. Developed by Marconi in 1915, and manufactured by several additional sub-contractors, by 1916 the Short Wave Tuner Mk III had become the standard ground equipment used for receiving signals transmitted from aeroplanes working with the artillery.
The overall situation did improve slowly over the next two years but, in order to maintain the strength of the front line, substantial numbers of observers continued to be sent to France, part-trained and very short of airborne time for much of 1917. Indeed, some observers were still reaching their first squadrons with less than fifteen hours in their log books as late as the spring of 1918.4
Nevertheless, despite the training machine’s persistent inadequacies, its limitations were gradually being overcome and there was a perceptible and continuing improvement in the competence of observers from mid-1916 onwards. To reflect this, the qualification standard was redefined in November. In their essentials the new requirements did not differ greatly from those which had been laid down in the summer of 1915 (see page 15) but they were now expressed with greater precision.5 Furthermore, an increased degree of formality was introduced. Rather than simply being certified on, what amounted to, the subjective assessment of his CO, an observer now had to be examined in the field by specialist officers at brigade or wing level. The subjects in which he was to be tested were: co-operation with artillery; the use and care of wireless equipment; photography and the care of the RFC camera; and the use and care of machine guns. A clear indication of what would be required to satisfy the examiners was laid down in each case. An example of the new certificate is reproduced on page 54.
Late 1916. The status of the RFC’s Observers is further enhanced.
With hindsight it is hardly surprising that the ‘improvements’ to their conditions of service which had been announced in November 1915 had failed to dispel, indeed they may well have added to, the widespread perception that observers were held in little esteem and that they had very limited career prospects (see pages 30-31). Whether the first of these impressions was justified may be a moot point, but there can be no doubt that the second reflected a fair appreciation of the situation. As a result, while HQ RFC had been able to reassure the War Office that it had ample numbers of prospective observers on its waiting list in March 1916 (see pages 34-35), by the autumn this was no longer the case.
Between June and September the number of squadrons authorised for the RFC in France had been more than doubled and the establishment of qualified observers/gunners on each of the two-seater units had been raised from seven to eighteen. This meant that, in round figures, the projected requirement for operational back-seaters had grown from about 200 to something like 1,000 in just four months. In the meantime General Haig’s edict, that all applications from officers volunteering to fly were to be forwarded to GHQ, had been repeated at least twice.6
As an aside, it is worth pointing out that the wording of the CinC’s most recent directives had been somewhat misleading, as they had clearly stated that observers graded as Flying Officers would be eligible to become Flight Commanders and thus, by implication, for promotion to captain. This was true, of course, but it presupposed qualification as a pilot and the text failed to make this crucial point. This was probably symptomatic of the fact that, while RFC personnel may have had a firm grasp on the rules of the game, they were not universally understood elsewhere within the Army. That this was the case is demonstrated by the following exchange from the record of evidence being taken by the Bailhache Committee at about this time; the speakers were the DGMA, Sir David Henderson, and one of his interrogators, Gen H L Smith-Dorrien:7
Gen S-D: ‘But are they (observers) in as good a position as the pilots as far as promotion goes now?’
DGMA: ‘Do you mean the observer who is not willing to be a pilot?’
Gen S-D: ‘Yes.’
DGMA: ‘He cannot be promoted.’
Gen S-D: ‘He cannot be promoted?’
DGMA: ‘He cannot be promoted as an executive officer. He can become an adjutant or become an Equipment Officer, or he can become a Staff Officer of the Royal Flying Corps, but I cannot make him a Flight Commander.’
Gen S-D: ‘I thought you said he could be made a Flight Commander.’
DGMA: ‘He can be recommended for a Flight Commander.’
Gen S-D: ‘It is no use recommending him if he never gets it.’
DGMA: ‘He will get it, if he becomes a pilot.’
While this exchange in London had distinct overtones of Catch 22, on the other side of the Channel there could be no doubt about the CinC’s wishes, which were quite unambiguous and had been widely publicised, so it is highly unlikely that COs would have been blocking applications. It had to be concluded, therefore, that there was some other reason for what was now an inadequate response to the internal recruiting campaign.
The RFC was finally beginning to discover that there was a price to pay for its discriminatory attitude towards observers. Officers were simply not prepared to volunteer to be treated as second-class citizens, not, at least, in the numbers that were now required, hence the introduction of non-commissioned gunners. There is no doubt that the War Office understood the nature of the problem. As Lt-Col W W Warner8 put it, ‘In view of the difficulty in obtaining observers for the Royal Flying Corps, the question of their prospects and status in the Corps has again been under consideration.’ Nevertheless, despite its having correctly diagnosed the cause of the problem, the RFC’s reluctance to accept the unavoidable implications of the fact that it required two men to operate a two-seat aeroplane successfully, prevented it from applying the obvious cure.
From late November 1916 onwards an observer had to be formally certified as competent before he could be graded and thus gazetted and permitted to wear a flying badge. This example certified 2/Lt J W Ferguson of No 48 Sqn. Since it was an Army, rather than a Corps, unit No 48 Sqn did not operate in the artillery cooperation role or use wireless, hence the deletions at paras 1 and 2. The signature at para 5 is that of OC 48 Sqn, Maj A V Bettington, and the final scribbled initials are those of Lt-Col R P Mills, OC 14th (Army) Wg. Ferguson was eventually gazetted as a flying officer (observer) with effect from 30 August 1917 with seniority backdated to 27 June, the date on which he hadjoined the squadron. (TNA AIR1/1026/204/5/1415)
The prominence afforded to Trenchard as the ‘father of the RAF’ tends to obscure the contribution made earlier by Maj-Gen Sir David Henderson, the de facto ‘father of the RFC’. In his capacity as DGMA from September 1913 to October 1917 Henderson had oversight of the entire Corps and thus considerable influence on the evolution of aircrew trades, not least that of the observer.
Since the members of a two-seater crew were mutually interdependent, it followed that they deserved to be treated with equal consideration and respect. This was still too much for the RFC’s generals to swallow, however, and the only concession that they were prepared to grant was the abolition of the intermediate grade of ‘qualified observer’ from November 1916.9 Thereafter any observer serving in the field, up to a maximum of twelve per squadron, and holding the necessary certificates would be immediately and automatically gazetted to the RFC as a flying officer (observer).
While this was obviously intended to improve the observer’s lot, it turned out to have little immediate impact at the coal face. In fact the new regulation served only to entrench even more deeply the unfair principle that had first been laid down in July 1915. All newly trained observers (all of whom lacked their certificates, since these could be obtained only ‘in the field’) still reached their squadrons on probation and, unlike pilots, they still had to undergo a baptism of fire before they were permitted to put up their badges. Note that the ‘in the field’ provision also meant that, again unlike pilots, it was impossible for a newly trained observer posted directly to a Home Defence Squadron (or any other UK-based flying unit) to qualify for his flying ‘O’.
If further evidence of the lack of appreciation of the position of the observer were needed, it was not long in coming. In mid-February 1917, in response to a request from HQ RFC, the War Office informed the Training Brigade that all two-seater squadrons being sent to France were, in future, to be accompanied by twenty officer and six NCO ‘Gunner Observers’.10 An amendment issued only a fortnight later restricted this increase to the next two units that were scheduled to cross the Channel, Nos 48 and 55 Sqns, all subsequent squadrons reverting to the normal twelve officers and six NCOs. This edict was allowed to prevail for less than a week, however, as the twenty-plus-six all round was reinstated at the beginning of March. This latest instruction went on to acknowledge that, although the increase did not conform to the currently authorised twelve-observers-plus-six-gunners, it was not intended to amend the formal establishment, because it was thought unlikely that the system would actually be able to satisfy the increased requirement for some time.
It was this proviso that betrayed the lack of consideration for back-seaters. GOC Training Brigade, Jack Salmond, took issue with it on the grounds that, should he be able to provide any officer observers in excess of the nominal dozen, the surplus would be denied the right to be gazetted as flying officer (observers), because a squadron was limited to having only twelve of those. At HQ RFC there was little sympathy for increasing the establishment of a squadron on those grounds, Lt-Col Festing evidently considering that it was a fuss over nothing. While observing that, in practice, it was rare for a squadron to be up to strength in flying officer (observers) in any case, Festing argued that their situation was similar to that on ‘an infantry battalion which has 4 company commanders and a large number of subalterns, yet I never heard subalterns complain that they were suffering an injustice because there were not captains’ vacancies for them all.’
This was a false analogy, of course, because all observers had the same duties and responsibilities, whereas those of a Company Commander were very different from those of his subordinates; besides which, because no observer could be promoted to captain, the whole question of rank was totally irrelevant. Since Festing plainly did not even understand the problem, he could hardly be expected to grasp the logic behind Salmond’s argument.
Eventually the GOC was brought into the discussion but he too thought it unnecessary to enlarge the establishment, although there was a very robust rationale underpinning his conclusion. Trenchard pointed out that, even if twenty officer observers could be sent out with each new squadron, all of them would be on probation. By the time that the first twelve had completed their qualification, what he euphemistically referred to as, ‘wastage’ would probably have taken care of the other eight.11 In the event the establishment would not be amended until as late as September (see page 71), although there were further informal (and probably temporary) modifications to it, such as a reduction in the number of aerial gunners from six to three.12
In view of all this, it is quite clear that the changes to the observer’s terms of service of November 1916 had been no more than cosmetic; there was still no career structure for them. The attitude of the RFC’s ‘establishment’ had not really changed and the PBOs – the ‘Poor Bloody Observers’ – knew it. Writing only a few months after leaving No 70 Sqn, with whom he had flown as an observer during the latter half of 1916, 2/Lt A J Bott summed up the situation as follows:13
‘The only two of our then flight-commanders still on the active list are now commanding squadrons, while all the subaltern pilots have become flight-commanders. The observers, members of a tribe akin to Kipling’s Sergeant Whatisname, are as they were in the matter of rank, needless to say.’
1917. Complications arising from the ‘improved’ terms of service for Observers.
While they had represented only a small concession, the revised terms of service of November 1916 did produce one tangible benefit. Observers had not previously been formally acknowledged by the RFC until they were graded, putting them at a significant (typically four to six months) disadvantage in terms of seniority compared to pilots of similar experience. Under the new rules, once an observer was certified as being fully qualified (and until he was he still did not receive full flying pay), his seniority was backdated to his embarkation for France (or elsewhere), in the case of those trained in England, or from the effective date of his initial attachment to the RFC for those who were still being recruited and trained in the field. Furthermore, if an observer subsequently retrained as a pilot, as many of them did, he retained all of the seniority he had built up during his service as a back-seater, which put him well ahead of a newly-trained ‘straight through’ pilot.
Presumably in association with this change in policy, the practice of recording back-seaters separately in the Army List under the heading of Flying Officer (Observer) ceased. From the November 1916 edition onwards a combined Flying Officer list was reinstated, observers once again being distinguished by an ‘(O)’, but this time after, rather than before, their names. Prior to this, in accordance with the previous regulations, the earliest seniority held by any graded observer had been 21 October 1915 (see Chapter 5, Note 3) but subsequent Army Lists incorporated extensive amendments to reflect the revised conditions and some observers eventually had their seniority considerably backdated.14
It will be appreciated that within less than two years of the observers badge having been introduced, the rules associated with its award and with the status of the wearer and those governing his seniority within the RFC and with the way in which this was reflected in the Army List had changed three times – and there were further amendments to come. As was only to be expected, this extremely fluid situation had caused some confusion, prompting a number of requests for retrospective recognition, antedates of seniority and so on. Some of the decisions handed down in these cases were almost certainly incorrect.
The case of Lt R C Morgan provides a good example of the arbitrary way in which the regulations were sometimes interpreted. A Canadian, who had been attached to the RFC on 4 August 1915, Morgan had been rated as a qualified observer and authorised to wear a flying ‘O’ with effect from 21 September. Having completed a stint of active service with No 6 Sqn, Morgan was eventually posted to Home Establishment to train as a pilot. For some reason he was unsuccessful in this endeavour but he remained with his unit, by now No 45 Sqn, in an administrative capacity. This arrangement was formally recognised when, on 15 November 1916 (by which time he was back in France), Morgan was gazetted to the RFC as a Recording Officer.
Wishing to have his earlier service properly acknowledged, Morgan subsequently applied to be retrospectively gazetted as a flying officer (observer) with his seniority antedated to that of his original attachment to the RFC. Under the recently revised regulations, this was a perfectly valid request but it was ruled, quite incorrectly, that, an observer’s seniority within the RFC could not be back-dated prior to 15 October 1915. Although he was still entitled to wear his observers badge, it was finally decided that Morgan’s formal transfer to the RFC as a Recording Officer in November 1916 would have to stand.
The pattern became even more confused when Morgan ceased to be employed as a Recording Officer a few months later. It was eventually agreed that he could now be belatedly recognised as a flying officer (observer) after all, although the effective date would have to be that of his return to Home Establishment for the second time, ie 28 May 1917. Thus, although it could have been done within the rules, Morgan’s first fifteen months of service with the RFC never were formally acknowledged.15
Probably because the junior officers who were submitting their cases for review were quite lost in the confusing jumble of regulations, they were unable to detect when the authorities were having similar trouble in finding their way through the maze. Like Morgan, most people were simply obliged to accept whatever decision was handed down. It is not suggested that any of those who were doing their best to interpret the rules were in any way malicious, merely that they were sometimes mistaken. Indeed there is ample evidence to show that most of their decisions were perfectly fair and sometimes even generous.
A typical early case is provided by that of 1/AM H Woodcock (4258) who, having had no formal training whatsoever, had accumulated over 50 hours of operational flying time in the course of thirty-one sorties flown with No 4 Sqn between December 1915 and July 1916. On the strength of this record, he subsequently sought permission to wear an observers badge. His CO supported his case and forwarded the submission to the War Office, accompanied by a certified copy of Woodcock’s flying log book. On 14 November the application was approved by the DMA.16
An example of a particularly generous ruling is provided by the case of Lt D R Smith who, although he had spent some time flying with No 43 Sqn, had never completed his qualification as an observer. By 1917 Smith was serving as a machine gun instructor with No 61 (Home Defence) Sqn. Since it would enhance his credibility if he could show some evidence of having seen active service, he sought permission to wear a flying ‘O’. His CO backed his submission and appropriate authority was granted in September, although, since he was technically unqualified, Smith was never actually gazetted as a flying officer (observer).17
Although the RFC was at pains to ensure that there were adequate regulations to govern the conditions of service of observers, they only worked if they were efficiently implemented. Unfortunately, this was not always the case and some of the problems experienced by individuals were caused by maladministration. For example, a routine recommendation for Lt J W Barnes to be gazetted was raised by No 42 Sqn in January 1918 and sent to 51st Wg who forwarded it to HQ VII Bde. In the meantime Barnes had been shot down and taken prisoner. Several months later his status was queried.18 By this time all three units concerned were in France, whereas they had been in Italy when Barnes had been lost, which had muddied the waters considerably. In the meantime VII Bde had disbanded but 51st Wg was considered to be at fault, as they should have taken some sort of follow-up action after a suitable interval. That they had failed to do so was probably because they had been packing up and moving back to France at the appropriate time. Nevertheless, 51st Wg did have some record of the correspondence and on 9 June 1918 Barnes was belatedly confirmed as having been a flying officer (observer) with effect from 17 January.19
While there may have been some justification for papers being lost in Barnes’ case, some errors were simply due to inefficiency. On more than one occasion Lt-Col H P Van Ryneveld’s 11th Wg was found to have been at fault for not following the correct procedures. For instance, 2/Lts A Leach, H S Gros and A S White of No 57 Sqn were all authorised to wear a flying ‘O’ in II Bde’s Routine Orders for 31 January 1918. HQ 11th Wg should then have initiated formal gazetting action, but it never did. A couple of months later Leach wrote to the War Office to enquire why his name had not yet appeared in the London Gazette. Needless to say, No 57 Sqn had since moved and its new sponsors, 13th Wg, were unable to offer any explanation. Despite II Bde’s Orders eventually being produced to support Leach’s claim, the War Office was not prepared to backdate his case and he was made a flying officer (observer) with effect from 31 March, effectively robbing him of two months’ seniority. On 18 June Gros joined in to complain that he still had not been gazetted – and so it went on.20
While these cases, and others like them, may well have been of little significance in the context of a World War, from the point of view of the individual, they could loom large. The reason for citing such examples here, however, is to provide further evidence of the way in which observers could be ill-served by the RFC’s complex rules and regulations. Although, there may have been one or two cases of pilots having to argue the toss to gain the right to wear their ‘wings’ (although this writer has not actually come across any), they generally put them up on completion of their training and that was that, even if they never flew again, let alone in combat.
Early 1917. A formal case for Observers to be granted virtual equality with pilots is fought and lost.
When the RFC’s observers had first been granted a degree of formal recognition in November 1915, the regulations had clearly been framed on the basis that observers were primarily regarded as a source of additional pilots. In short, they were seen as a means to an end, not an end in themselves. The prevailing argument was that, since the majority of observers were expected to become pilots, it could be safely assumed that those who showed the necessary promise would then be promoted. Since observers were, in effect, therefore, serving on relatively short-term engagements, it followed that there was no need to provide a career structure for them as such. When the implications of the amended regulations of November 1916 had been digested at unit level it became quite clear that there had been no change in the RFC’s basic philosophy. The only substantial innovation had been to make service as an observer accountable when it became necessary to calculate his seniority within the corps after, in the natural course of events, he had become a pilot.
By this time, however, there was at least one senior officer who, like (or perhaps because of) the Bailhache Committee, had begun to appreciate the advantages to be gained from having permanent professional observers, rather than a transient group waiting for places at flying schools. He was Brig-Gen W G H Salmond, then commanding the RFC’s Middle East Brigade. Noting that the failure rate at his flying schools in Egypt was running at 15-20%, Salmond was concerned that current RFC practice failed to take account of the fact that some people simply lacked the degree of hand and eye co-ordination that was necessary to fly an aeroplane satisfactorily. Furthermore, he believed that there were others who did not even want to be pilots. Experience had clearly shown, however, that an individual’s inability, or disinclination, to be a pilot did not necessarily degrade his performance as an observer. In fact, since they were committed to being long-term back-seaters, such men were likely to be better motivated than the majority of their colleagues and, since their longevity involved their accumulating a substantial amount of experience, they also tended to be more accomplished.
Salmond thought it manifestly unfair to deny such valuable officers any prospect of advancement and he knew that this same lack of prospects made it difficult to persuade some unsuccessful pilots to remain in the RFC as observers, their services thus being lost to the corps altogether. In January 1917 he wrote to the Director of Air Organisation (DAO)21 at the War Office to point out that ‘an officer whose aim and object is to become an efficient permanent observer is as valuable to the Royal Flying Corps as a pilot.’ He recommended that the bar to the promotion of observers should, therefore, be lifted. This would permit them to advance to Flight Commander grade and thus to become captains.22
The DAO’s staff did not like this idea at all. Lt-Col Warner’s reply pointed out that it was RFC policy to encourage all observers to become pilots and expressed the fear that if they were allowed to become captains many of them might never make the effort to learn to fly.23 Undeterred, Salmond tried again, explaining his proposal in greater detail.24 Without changing his basic argument, this time, like Bailhache, he stressed the value to the RFC of having a ‘cadre of highly trained observers’. Salmond proposed that an observer ranked as a captain should be established at flight level, not to command but to supervise the activities of its back-seaters, and that each squadron should also have a major to co-ordinate the efforts of the captains.25 He further suggested that it would be appropriate for an observer major to command an observers training school, that a captain would make an ideal Wing Adjutant and that observers of either rank would be suitable to fill a variety of graded staff appointments.
The revised proposal still amounted to heresy, however, as it continued to challenge the RFC’s doctrinaire belief in the absolute supremacy of the pilot. The War Office was quite unmoved by the justice and logic of Salmond’s argument. Indeed it is probable that it was only his unique status as the commander of an independent overseas brigade that had enabled Salmond to submit his case to the War Office at all. Had he been stationed in France, there can be little doubt that the other Brigade Commanders, and certainly Trenchard, would have seen to it that his proposals never reached London.
Warner’s second response was another flat dismissal.26 While this was certainly authoritative, it was sorely lacking in substance. In the absence of any coherent counterargument London simply resorted to a tired re-statement of dogma to justify its rejection. Most significantly, the War Office failed to offer any alternative solution to the very real plight of the ‘permanent’ observer which Salmond had highlighted. Instead, Warner merely admonished that ‘it must be realised that an observer cannot be promoted to command a flight.’ Sadly, he failed to explain why an observer could not command a flight, but, since Salmond had specifically not suggested that he should, perhaps ‘Willie’ Warner had simply felt it advisable to remind the General of one of the pillars of RFC wisdom. Presumably as a concession, his letter went on to state that the War Office had no objection to observers serving as Wing Adjutants or as Staff Officers. It failed to explain, however, how, under the existing regulations, they were supposed to attain the ranks associated with such appointments without forfeiting their aircrew status – which had been Salmond’s point all along.
With the benefit of hindsight we can see that the War Office’s flat refusal to grant observers any form of executive authority was extremely short-sighted. It was also illogical, embracing, as it did, a fundamental contradiction. After all, what was the point of having commissioned observers at all if they were not to be allowed to command? Underpinning the RFC’s rigid policy was a belief that, for some indefinable reason, only pilots were capable of exercising authority. This assumption was plainly confounded by the fact that none of the RFC’s senior generals had any substantial experience as aviators. This was hardly their fault, of course, but that is not the point. The point is that, despite their lack of flying hours and, in some cases, their marginal abilities as pilots, they were able to function as leaders. Why? Because the ability to lead and to command has very little to do with being a skilled pilot.
At the highest levels an air commander needed (and still needs) to be a planner and organiser, and a competent tactician who could manage his resources and inspire his men. His degree of flying skill was quite immaterial. In this context, it is interesting to note that while the RFC’s senior generals were (at least notionally) pilots, their German counterparts were not. Unlike Trenchard and Brancker, neither von Hoeppner nor Lieth-Thomsen, his very able Chief of Staff, wore a flying badge.
One of No 4 Sqn’s Flight Commanders, Capt D F Stevenson DSO MC, with his arm around his observer, Lt J W Baker MC, at St-Omer in May 1918. At the time, the latter had already reached his rank ceiling, whereas, as a pilot, Stevenson had virtually unlimited prospects, which he duly exploited to retire as an air vice-marshal. John Baker subsequently became a pilot, permitting him to rise through the ranks too, eventually to become Air Chf Mshl Sir John. Clearly, his being entitled to wear a flying badge had gained him access to ‘the club’, but had the acquisition of this fashion accessory really transformed his potential? Had he remained as an observer, in what way would Baker, the officer, have been any less capable as a policy-maker, as an administrator or as a senior field commander? Incidentally, the Lewis gun on a Foster mounting on the upper wing of this RE8 (E20) was a most unusual, possibly unique, installation (AVM H G White via Chaz Bowyer)
On a much smaller scale, the tasks of a Squadron Commander were much the same as those of a general. His main preoccupations, in addition to supervising (not necessarily participating in) flying activities, were to do with serviceability, supply, accommodation, welfare, messing and the like. In fact a CO’s primary responsibility was to see that his unit ran efficiently, not to take it into combat. Tactical leadership in the air was the responsibility of his Flight Commanders. Indeed, for much of 1917 Squadron Commanders were specifically forbidden to cross the lines, making their ability as pilots of somewhat marginal interest.
Under these circumstances, any competent officer with some practical experience of aviation should have been capable of commanding a squadron, or even a wing, irrespective of what kind of flying badge he wore. In fact many such units were commanded by officers who had begun their careers as observers.27 Had they remained in the back-seat they would have been the same men but they would never have progressed beyond lieutenant rank. Yet, simply by becoming pilots, they were considered to have undergone some mysterious transformation which enabled them to function as majors and lieutenant-colonels. It was nonsense, of course, but the longer this myth was sustained, the more it came to be believed.
Of its generals, only Geoffrey Salmond seems to have appreciated that the RFC’s policy was misguided but, having been turned down twice, he was obliged to abandon his one-man campaign on behalf of back-seaters. Nevertheless, while his ideas had failed to generate enough lift to permit his kite to fly, they did at least represent a straw in the wind.
Early 1917. The beginning of the end of the RFC’s squadron-based observer training system.
Despite its reluctance to grant observers their due, the War Office had clearly been devoting considerable thought to the RFC’s back-seaters during 1916. If nothing else, this showed that they were aware of observers and had some idea of what they expected of them. But restating what observers needed to know and tinkering with the regulations governing their seniority and the wearing of badges were all relatively superficial measures. Much more attention needed to be paid to the underlying problem – the inadequacy of the training being provided, especially for the observers who were still being recruited in France.
By this time the staffs at St André-aux-Bois were changing their tune. In April 1916 HQ RFC had politely declined to have anything to do with Brooklands, maintaining that it was perfectly capable of training its own observers (see page 34). Two months later their attitude had softened to the extent that they were prepared to make some tentative use of Hythe (see page 36). By the autumn, however, the magnitude of the field training task had forced them to acknowledge that they needed help. It was easy for them to accept this, since they were now able to recognise the increasing effectiveness of the training machine which Brig-Gen J M Salmond had been building since March. In December, Maj-Gen Trenchard finally requested assistance, writing to the DAO as follows:28
‘At present the elementary instructional work of observers in a squadron is very considerable, and time is taken up in teaching such work which should be used in raising the standard of qualified observers.
Further, new observers often arrive in a squadron after a long spell in the trenches, without any leave, in an unfit condition to take up work demanding absolute freshness mentally and physically.
I therefore propose, if you can make the necessary arrangements, to send home officers on their joining the RFC on probation for a course of training as observers. I would suggest that the course should last at least a month.’
The GOC’s letter went on to forecast that ‘about one hundred officers a month would be sent home once the scheme was in full working order’ and to include a detailed list of the topics that he thought ought to be covered. This produced a very rapid response, Brig-Gen Brancker promptly setting in hand appropriate arrangements which were to become effective on 1 January 1917 ;29 70% of those sent home were expected to go to the Schools of Military Aeronautics (SoMA)30 while the remainder were to go to the School of Aerial Gunnery at Hythe.
The main function of the SoMAs was to provide aircrew recruits who had completed their basic military training with a broad-based academic introduction to the business of being an aviator.31 The content of the syllabus at Reading/Oxford has already been discussed (see Figure 7 on page 35) but it is significant, especially for the men being sent home from France, that it included no practical flying experience. The course at Hythe was very different, being concerned solely with the technicalities of the Lewis gun and providing an introduction to its use. By this time the full Hythe syllabus involved two weeks in the classroom and on the range and a fortnight’s flying but most of the men sent back from France in the early days of the scheme attended abbreviated courses, very few of them gaining much airborne time.
Sending men back to England to attend these, often truncated, courses did serve to lighten the load on the hard-pressed squadrons a little, but it was hardly a complete answer to the training problem. A survey conducted in France during March 1917 revealed this all too clearly. Squadrons were asked to report how long their detached observers had spent at the School of Aerial Gunnery, how long they had spent at other schools and how much flying time they had accumulated. Within II Bde, for instance, Nos 20 and 45 Sqns had released a total of seven officers; on average each of them had spent fourteen days at Hythe, one day somewhere else and had logged just twelve minutes in the air.32 The reports from the other four brigades were similarly disappointing, adverse comments including: ‘require more practice in shooting from the air’ (I Bde); ‘one month at Hythe considered essential’ (III Bde); ‘general knowledge poor’ (IV Bde) and ‘insufficient practice in cooperation with the pilot’ (V Bde). Despite these generally negative reactions, something had been gained and Trenchard wrote to the DAO to acknowledge that the UK courses had provided some ‘relief from elementary instructional work in squadrons’, although his letter went on to include an extensive list of suggestions as to where improvements needed to be made.33
Mid-1917. Trenchard insists that all Observers complete their qualification.
In the early summer of 1917 the quality of observers, and of their training, remained a topic of particular interest to Trenchard. The GOC was in the habit of making frequent visits to front-line units in order to keep his finger on the RFC’s pulse. On one such occasion he ascertained that a particular probationary observer had been with his squadron for ten weeks. The General asked him why he was not a flying officer (observer) to be told that he had not yet accumulated sufficient flying hours to make him eligible. In point of fact this could only have been his CO’s personal opinion, since qualification had never actually been defined in terms of airborne time. Having made further enquiries, however, the GOC was disturbed to discover that this was no isolated case. It transpired that there were significant numbers of observers who had been in France for periods in excess of two months without having qualified. Furthermore, many of them had done a substantial amount of war flying, in addition to any airborne time which they might have logged in the UK. As a result, although most squadrons had ample numbers of observers on strength, very few were manned to establishment, ie they did not have twelve qualified flying officer (observers).
Trenchard decided that responsibility for this unsatisfactory situation had to lie with Squadron Commanders, rather than with individual junior officers. On 30 June Lt-Col Festing wrote to all five Brigade Commanders and Lt-Col Newall, CO of the autonomous 11th Wg, to inform them of the General’s concern. There was still no attempt to define what was required in terms of flying hours but the letter made it quite clear that it was the GOC’s view that ‘if an observer is not recommended for grading as Flying Officer at the end of, say, two months in addition to his course in England, he is not worth keeping unless there are special reasons to the contrary.’34
This very pointed piece of advice produced a flood of recommendations for probationers to be gazetted and action on such applications was soon having to be postponed because some squadron establishments were becoming oversubscribed. Thus, for example, when 2/Lt R F W Sheraton’s name was put forward for gazetting on 7 August, HQ RFC rejected the recommendation on the grounds that No 59 Sqn’s quota had already been filled, so Sheraton had to bide his time.35 No 59 Sqn lost a crew on 19 August and another on the 21st, which created the necessary vacancies. Sheraton’s, second recommendation was approved on the 24th – literally a case of ‘dead men’s shoes’.
The delay in such cases rarely amounted to more than a few weeks but, apart from generating unnecessary correspondence and denying the individual concerned an increase in pay, it achieved nothing of any substance. It simply represented yet another unfortunate consequence of the RFC’s apparent inability (or its stubborn refusal) to treat observers fairly. It hardly seems reasonable for the staffs to have withheld formal acknowledgement of an observer’s having successfully cleared all of the hurdles associated with qualification, while flying in combat, simply to satisfy an arbitrary numerical target set by some official in London. There can be little doubt that the RFC would have considered this practice to be quite intolerable had anyone tried to impose such a policy on its pilots.
A unit’s official establishment represents no more than an ideal manning level but, especially in wartime, it is a target which tends to be missed far more often than it is hit. Since a squadron was expected to continue to operate while it was in deficit, it would surely have done no more than help to balance the books to allow it to have the odd surplus observer from time to time. It was certainly a common occurrence for units to have one or two ‘spare’ pilots on strength. Until they could be slotted into an established post they were simply attached to the HQ Flight and carried on the books as supernumeraries. Why could this paper exercise not have been extended to embrace observers? The evidence suggests that it was because they were still held in such low esteem that, in the eyes of the staffs, the interests of a flesh-and-blood back-seater counted for less than a neat balance sheet.
1917. A bid for Observers to be granted a greater degree of equality with respect to pilots leads to a dispute over the award of ‘wings’.
Despite the inadequacies of the top-up training being provided for observers temporarily sent back from France, that being provided for recruits trained entirely in the UK was considered to be of quite a high standard by the summer of 1917. In view of this, on 10 July the DAO, Brig-Gen Charlton, proposed that all observers should be awarded their ‘wings’ on graduation, dispensing with the four-to-eight weeks of probationary service in France and permitting those observers assigned to home defence squadrons and other UK-based units to qualify for their badges. This provoked a rapid response from Maj-Gen Trenchard who, claiming the support of his Brigade Commanders, contended that while ‘90% of a pilot’s work can be learnt in England’, an essential element of an observer’s education still had to be acquired over the lines. Brig-Gen J M Salmond joined the fray on 30 July, writing to the DGMA to support the DAO’s view by confirming that, in his opinion, the sequence of courses now being offered by his Training Brigade was sufficiently comprehensive to warrant the immediate award of an observers badge on their completion, ie at much the same stage as pilots were entitled to put up their ‘wings’.36
The award of badges was proving to be a sensitive issue. In view of the GOC’s adverse reaction, the staffs in the Hotel Cecil were having second thoughts and on 9 August they proposed a compromise – only the best two students from each of the courses graduating from Hythe and Brooklands would be given their badges immediately, the remainder having to complete their probationary period in France as before.37 Trenchard did not like this one either and on 18 August he wrote to London, objecting strongly to this approach on the grounds that an observers wing was awarded for ‘war service’ and expressing (with a deft touch of tautology) the view that it should not therefore be given away as a ‘prize won at a competitive competition.’38
This raised an interesting question – was a flying ‘O’ a ‘war service badge’ or was it a ‘qualification badge’? Precedent, and the GOC’s contention that an observer could only really learn his trade in action, certainly suggested that the flying ‘O’ was, in effect, awarded for war service. On the other hand, there was a growing body of opinion that favoured the latter interpretation, to bring the award in line with that of a pilots ‘wings’ which were indisputably awarded on qualification. The argument begged a very obvious question. Why not standardise in the reverse sense? That is, why not make pilots serve a probationary period on active service? The question was never asked. Could this have been because it might have invalidated the ‘wings’ worn by many of the RFC’s most senior officers? After all, few of them had actually logged many operational flying hours.
Still doggedly fighting his corner, Charlton minuted the Director General to remind him that in 1915 virtually untrained observers were being awarded their badges on the recommendation of their CO after about six weeks of active service. He went on to point out that dogmatic adherence to this procedure two years later amounted to a condemnation both of the efforts of those who had striven in the meantime to create a formal training system and of the system itself. He suggested that the GOC be asked how many new observers he was being obliged to send home on the grounds of incompetence. If the figure compared favourably with that for pilots, significant numbers of whom were being rejected by squadrons at the time, it was argued that the General should be obliged to accept the inevitable conclusion. Although the argument rumbled on into the autumn, this very sensible proposal was not acted upon and Lt-Gen Henderson eventually put an end to further discussion by acceding to the wishes of his field commander. On 10 November 1917 the ‘prize’ option was finally rejected and it was ruled that all observers would still have to complete their qualification in the field.
While the RFC’s ‘establishment’ spent a great deal of time arguing about the timing of the award of the observers badge, it did relatively little to police its style. Lt Eric Lubbock, left, qualified for his flying ‘O’ with No 5 Sqn on 20 October 1915. Since the badge had been introduced only eight weeks earlier, it is quite possible that Lubbock’s was one of the initial batch of 100 that had been ordered in July; it certainly bore an acceptably close resemblance to the design that had been approved by Col Brancker (see page 18). Thereafter, however, artistic licence was allowed to go unchecked, resulting in distinctly distorted interpretations, such as that apparently being worn (centre) by Lt Archibald Streeter of No 82 Sqn in 1918. ‘Apparently’ because a studio would sometimes paint a badge onto an existing image and it is suspected that this is what has actually happened in this case. It certainly had in the picture on the right, which is one of a series of portraits of Lubbock taken to mark the award of his MC, as an observer, doctored to show him as the pilot that he later became. (Lubbock pictures courtesy of the family archives and that of Streeter via M O’Connor.)
Thus, despite the notional abolition of the interim period of service as a ‘qualified observer’ in November 1916 and further lengthy consideration of the situation over the next twelve months, very little actually changed at squadron level. Throughout 1917 observers continued to embark on their operational flying careers underpaid and without their badges until they had collected all the necessary signatures on their certificates and had been assessed as being fully competent. This interval was variable in length and largely at the discretion of Squadron Commanders. Typically, it involved four to eight weeks during which the probationer accumulated a substantial amount of operational experience – provided, of course, that he survived. Even if he did, he still had very limited career prospects. Despite the recommendations of the Bailhache Report, an observer still could not be given an executive appointment or even be promoted to captain.
Nevertheless, by this time, despite the disadvantages which the system persisted in imposing upon them, observers no longer saw themselves as the objects of derision of 1915, as described by 2/Lt Money (see page 17). By 1917 the flying ‘O’ was worn with considerable pride and regarded with great respect in informed circles, for, unlike a pilot’s ‘wings’, it had been won the hard way – under fire. In fact some observers became so attached to their badges that they were reluctant to give them up when they subsequently qualified as pilots. This led to a very naughty practice which was firmly suppressed in March 1917 when the DAO’s staff circulated a memorandum which read as follows:39
‘Instances having occurred of pilots wearing wings with an O underneath, it is notified that no badge of this pattern has been sanctioned. Disciplinary action will be taken in the event of any pilot or observer wearing an unauthorised badge.’40
Denied the right to advertise the fact that they had once been observers, which implied that they had seen a substantial amount of active service, some pilots took to sewing their old badge under the lapel of their tunic as a memento of what they had been through.41
Despite the evident pride felt by some back-seaters, there were others who still felt undervalued. For example, writing home to his family in Canada in the summer of 1917, Lt G W Blaiklock complained that he was ‘not appreciated; none of us observers are’ – and this was from a man who took part in seven successful combats while flying in 1½ Strutters with No 45 Sqn, at least four of the victims being driven down by his Lewis gun.
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1 The first Commandant of the joint school at Brooklands (it continued to train large numbers of wireless officers and operators) was Maj H A Oxenham.
2 The use of ‘puff targets’ involved a full-scale simulation whereby puffs of smoke were released on the ground to represent shell bursts in the vicinity of a ‘target’, the observer flying in an aeroplane being required to estimate the range and bearing of the error and pass an appropriate encrypted correction to the ‘battery’.
3 AIR1/1009/204/5/1290.
4 2/Lt John Blanford provides a case in point. Having begun his training in March 1918, he joined No 206 Sqn on probation on 9 May. At that time he had just six hours of airborne time recorded in his log book. His observers badge was formally bestowed on 5 July by which time he had accumulated some fifty additional hours, representing about twenty operational sorties. A first-hand account of Blanford’s wartime experiences was published in Cross & Cockade (Great Britain) Journal, Vol 7, No 4 and Vol 8, No 1 (1976-77).
5 AIR1/997/204/5/1241. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 29 November 1916.
6 AIR1/522/16/12/8. General Haig’s directive, to the effect that all applications were to be forwarded to GHQ ‘without fail’, was republished, as AG/D1936, on 12 June and 4 September 1916; these may not have been the only occasions.
7 AIR1/518/16/7/20. Minutes of the proceeding of 6 July 1916, the fifteenth day of hearings.
8 Lt-Col Warner was AAG at the DMA.
9 AIR1/406/15/231/47. The details of this decision were announced in War Office letter 100/FC/95(AO2) dated 15 November 1916. The message was disseminated to units in France by HQ RFC letter CRFC 1701(A) dated 26 November and more generally by Army Order 403 of December 1916.
10 AIR1/513/16/3/74. DAO letter 87/6023 (AO1a) dated 13 February 1917. It should be appreciated that, while the term used in all related correspondence was ‘two-seater squadron’, this is understood to have meant only corps reconnaissance units and it was certainly these alone that were specified when an increase in strength to twenty-four aeroplanes was eventually authorised in May 1917 (see Chapter 9, Note 41). An amendment to the establishment to formalise the requirement for twenty officer and six NCO back-seaters did not appear until as late as September, but when it did, it applied (oddly enough, since they had not been enlarged to twenty-four aircraft) to two-seater army and night flying (ie FE2b) squadrons as well (see Chapter 9, Note 45).
11 AIR1/17/15/1/87. The correspondence relating to this exchange, which took place between 13 February and 23 March 1917, is on this file.
12 AIR1/390/15/231/31. DAO letter 121/8903 (A)1a) dated 20 March 1917.
13 ‘Contact’, An Airman’s Outings With the RFC, June-December 1916 (1917), pp217-218. ‘Contact’ was 2/Lt Alan John Bott, who was credited with three victories while serving his RFC ‘apprenticeship’ as an observer. Thereafter, he followed a well-beaten path by training as a pilot. Only by taking this step was he able to realise his full potential and before being taken prisoner in April 1918 he had shot down two further aeroplanes while gaining his captaincy as a Flight Commander with No 111 Sqn.
14 To take a random example, 2/Lt H A T Trier had his seniority backdated from 21 October to 23 August 1915, the date on which he had first been attached to the RFC. It is interesting to note, however, that very few of the RFC’s earliest observers still appeared as such in the Army Lists of 1916. Some of them had been killed; some had returned to the trenches but many more had become pilots and were therefore listed without the (O) annotation. 2/Lt A J Capel, for instance, had been accredited as an observer as early as 30 November 1914 but he subsequently retrained, his seniority as a pilot dating from 3 November 1915. As a result, despite his having been one for a year, Capel never appeared as an observer in any Army List.
15 AIR1/1026/204/5/1415 contains the correspondence related to Lt Morgan’s case.
16 AIR1/406/15/231/47 contains the correspondence relating to 1/AM Woodcock’s case.
17 AIR1/1026/204/5/1415 contains the correspondence related to Lt Smith’s case.
18 It is quite possible that the investigation into Barnes’ status was prompted by his bank, as some banks adopted a very positive attitude towards protecting their clients’ interests under such circumstances.
19 AIR1/1028/204/5/1416 contains the correspondence relating to Lt Barnes’ case.
20 Ibid. Correspondence on 2/Lts Leach, Gros and White.
21 At the time, the DAO’s responsibilities included specifying the tasks of RFC units, laying down their establishments (which made him very influential in the context of determining terms and conditions of service) and authorising their formation and disbandment. The first incumbent of the post was Brig-Gen W S Brancker who took up his appointment on 27 March 1916. His successors were Brig-Gen L E O Charlton from 28 February 1917, Brig-Gen G Livingstone from 18 October 1917 and Brig-Gen B C H Drew from 18 February 1918. Drew remained in post until relieved by Brig-Gen P W Game on 8 March 1919 at which point the responsibilities of the appointment were merged with those of the Director of Training.
22 AIR1/2362/226/7/28. HQ ME Bde letter AG172 dated 1 January 1917.
23 Ibid. War Office letter 100/FC/95(AO2) dated 22 January 1917.
24 Ibid. HQ ME Bde letter AG172 dated 12 February 1917.
25 It would take many years for Salmond’s ideas to catch on but, in effect, he had predicted the creation of the Squadron Navigation Officer, an appointment introduced in the mid-1930s. The original Squadron Navigation Officers were pilots but in 1942 the task was taken over by observers (later navigators) and the post of ‘Navigation Leader’ survived into, at least, the 1980s.
26 AIR1/2362/226/7/28. War Office letter 100/FC/95(AO2) dated 23 March 1917.
27 Among the ex-observers who commanded wartime operational units after becoming pilots were Lt-Cols E W Powell, A W H James, A G R Garrod, T A E Cairnes, A V Holt and C T Maclean and Majs J O Andrews, A M Vaucour, C G Burge, G W Murlis Green, A J Capel, R W Gow, W S Douglas, E L Foot, L T N Gould, C E M Pickthorn, R StC McClintock, J A McKelvie, C F A Portal and J H S Tyssen.
Wartime units commanded at one time or another by erstwhile back-seaters included: Nos 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 43, 44, 45, 52, 56, 58, 63, 66, 70, 82, 84, 92, 94, 100, 112, 148, 202, 207, 209 and 220 Sqns and 9th, 10th, 22nd, 69th and 81st Wgs. Both of these lists are far from being exhaustive, but both are quite long enough to show that ex-observers were perfectly capable of exercising command. It is hardly reasonable to suppose that all of these men, some of whom would eventually attain very senior ranks in the RAF, would have been incompetent had they not changed their flying badges.
28 AIR 1/997/204/5/1241. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 8 December 1916.
29 Ibid. These arrangements were announced by AO 266 dated 14 December 1916.
30 At this time there were two SoMAs in the UK, these having been created on 27 October 1916 by redesignating Nos 1 and 2 RFC Schools of Instruction, at Reading and Oxford respectively, on the authority of AO 234. The ‘Military’ was dropped from the title following the establishment of the RAF in 1918 and by the Armistice seven such units were functioning in the UK and two more abroad. Two of the former (Nos 7 and 9) dealt exclusively with observers.
31 The basic military training of direct entrant potential officers, and the commissioning of RFC NCOs and other ranks, was originally undertaken by the RFC Cadet Battalion which had been established at Denham during 1915. Redesignated for a few days as the RFC Cadet School, it became the RFC Cadet Wing on 31 October 1916. In anticipation of a second wing being set up at Blenheim, the original unit became No 1 Cadet Wing on 14 April 1917. The second wing actually came into being at Winchester (Hursley Park), others being formed later to keep up with the RFC expansion programme. By the autumn of 1917 all initial training had been concentrated at Hastings under the auspices of the Cadet Brigade which had been formed on 3 September. Shortly afterwards the 27 year-old Brig-Gen A C Critchley was appointed to command, his HQ being established at 13 Eversfield Place.
Thereafter Hastings/St Leonards functioned as the main induction centre for RFC/RAF officers until the entire brigade (by then comprising Nos 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 Cadet Wings) moved to Shorncliffe (Folkestone) shortly before the end of the war. Overseas, No 3 Cadet Wing was at Aboukir and No 4 was at Long Branch, Toronto. The latter was closed down early in 1918 to be replaced by locally administered Nos 1 and 2 Cadet Wings at Camp Borden and Deseronto respectively. The ‘missing’ unit, No 7 Cadet Wing, had been set up in July 1918 to deal solely with observers but, since it closed in September, it is doubtful whether it ever completed the training of any cadets.
32 AIR1/1135/204/5/2224. This information was reported in HQ II Bde’s A26/1206 of 19 March 1917.
33 Ibid. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 29 March 1917.
34 AIR1/1025/204/5/1415. HQ RFC letter CRFC 1701/1.A dated 30 June 1917.
35 AIR1/1026/204/5/1415. HQ RFC letter CRFC 1701/1(A) dated 10 August 1917 rejected HQ III Bde’s initial request for 2/Lt Sheraton to be recognised as flying officer (observer).
36 Ibid. Training Brigade letter TB/1135/16 dated 30 July 1917.
37 Ibid. DAO letter 87/685(O.2) dated 9 August 1917.
38 Ibid. HQ RFC letter CRFC 1701 (A) dated 18 August 1917.
39 AIR1/2433/305/33/1. AO 387 of 22 March 1917.
40 Despite this edict, a photograph exists (in Leeds University’s Liddle Collection and reproduced on page 48 of J M Bruce’s Airco DH 4, 2000) showing that at least one officer was still blatantly advertising his dual qualification more than a year later. Russell Gow, one of the original batch of RNVR observers (see page 27), subsequently became a pilot; a picture of him, ranked as a major, taken fairly late in 1918 when he was commanding No 202 Sqn, shows him sporting a full flying ‘O’ above the RAF wings on his tunic.
41 This practice was attested to by Col T G Greenwell (MP for the Hartlepools) during a Parliamentary debate on the wearing of observers badges by army personnel; see ZHC2/915, Hansard for 18 January 1945.