1917. The RFC refines its Brooklands/Hythe training sequence.
Although substantial progress had been made, the RFC was still not entirely satisfied with the training of its observers and further refinements were constantly being introduced. The syllabus taught by the Wireless and Observers School was, therefore, reviewed and revised in the spring of 1917 and, under the guidance of a new CO, Maj J A Chamier,1 its duration was extended from three weeks to four. The last fortnight was to concentrate on practical work which was supposed to include ten hours in the air. Some of these changes were inspired by the fact that, in addition to observers, (as explained later) pilots were about to start attending the Brooklands course as well.
To support the flying phase, the Netheravon-based Artillery Co-operation Flight of the Central Flying School had already absorbed the Artillery Co-operation Flight at Lydd on 13 January to form the Artillery Co-operation Squadron (although the element in Kent remained in situ).2 In effect this squadron served as a remote extension of the Wireless and Observers School, providing trainees from Brooklands with practical experience of simulated and/or live artillery shoots in co-operation with the guns on Salisbury Plain. It was also intended to provide opportunities for live machine gun firing, the aim being for each man to fire 1,000 rounds. Partly to be closer to the action and partly to provide space for expanded aircraft production at Brooklands, the school moved to Winchester in October 1917.
In the meantime experience had shown that, while the facilities on Salisbury Plain were satisfactory for artillery work, live machine gun firing could be carried out from Netheravon only with some difficulty. Since there were dedicated air firing ranges available at Hythe, all responsibility for this aspect of training was transferred to No 1 (Auxiliary) School of Aerial Gunnery in the autumn of 1917. The standard training sequence for observers destined to work with the guns thus became four weeks at Winchester followed by a fortnight at Hythe.
1917. Role specialisation is formally acknowledged within the RFC.
By early 1917 the days of underpowered, inadequately armed, general purpose aeroplanes, flown by crews prepared to have a go at anything, were virtually over. By the end of June the BE2’s day was almost done and twenty-three squadrons were now flying RE8s, FK8s, DH 4s or Bristol Fighters. Each of these much more capable two-seaters had been designed in the light of combat experience. Furthermore, each had been introduced to carry out a specific function and it was inevitable that this would lead to a demand for increasingly specialised role-related training. An early indication that the RFC’s bureaucracy had recognised this trend came in February 1917 when, in response to a specific suggestion from Trenchard, and at the same time as the trade of aerial gunner was formally identified, observers were categorised as corps or army observers, depending upon the nature of their employment.3
Like the demand for increased output, the advent of ‘second-generation’ aeroplanes was to have a significant impact on the training system. For instance, despite its disappointing initial showing in combat, much was expected of the Bristol Fighter and it soon became apparent that traditional two-seater fighter tactics (based on flying in formation) would have to be discarded if the new aeroplane was going to realise its full potential. Furthermore, as early as March 1917 III Bde’s Brig-Gen J F A Higgins was writing to HQ RFC to point out that much of the content of the Brooklands course was superfluous for observers destined to fly Bristols.4 In fact this was equally true of all army observers, since those flying 1½ Strutters, DH 4s and FE2bs were not expected to work with the guns either, nor did their aeroplanes often carry wireless equipment.5
As it happened, as a consequence of the decision to recognise two distinct categories of observer, Higgins’ observation was already being addressed by the steadily expanding training system. Since there were now two types, it was necessary to quantify the numbers of each that would be required. In early 1917 the planned output of the Schools of Military Aeronautics at Oxford and Reading included thirty-seven-strong batches of observers at approximately weekly intervals. After some deliberation it was decided that ten from each batch should be sent to Hythe to become army observers, the remaining twenty-seven going to Brooklands to emerge as corps observers.6 Both courses were of four weeks’ duration although, as noted above, it later became necessary to provide the Brooklands men with an additional fortnight of practical gunnery at Hythe.
Things were also changing within the confines of the corps reconnaissance world. The previously noted tendency for pilots to assume responsibility for conducting artillery shoots had been gaining in popularity ever since the summer of 1916 (see page 23) and was now a fairly widespread practice. While there was some tactical logic behind this development, it is likely that a considerable degree of pragmatism may also have been involved. By this time many of the earliest observers were back in France flying as pilots. They were, therefore, already at home in the air and very familiar with artillery co-operation procedures. It seems likely that, having the capacity to do so, some of these pilots may well have preferred to deal with the guns themselves rather than tolerate the initially poor judgement and bad Morse of their inexperienced companions, especially those who had come straight from the trenches.
Whether this had been a significant factor or not, it was being argued, notably by OC 3rd Wg, Lt-Col E R Ludlow-Hewitt, that the best way to exploit the new RE8s and FK8s was for the pilot to manoeuvre his aeroplane on his own initiative, keeping the target or the friendly battery in sight as required, and handle W/T transmissions himself. This approach, it was argued, had the advantage of leaving the observer free to concentrate on general intelligence gathering and, more importantly, on look-out and rear defence.
It should be understood that the pilot-based approach to artillery work being advocated by Ludlow-Hewitt was not actually all that new. For example, J T B McCudden recorded an example of a pilot successfully directing the fire of an artillery battery by using a lamp to transmit Morse signals as early as December 1914. He was No 3 Sqn’s Capt A S Barratt who spent some forty hours on this task, all of them flown solo in a Blériot. Perhaps even more to the point, McCudden later describes a flight he made with Ludlow-Hewitt himself on 27 November 1915. During this sortie ‘the pilot ranged on his target while I kept a look out for enemy gun flashes and noted their time and place, above all I kept myself awake for two damnable Fokkers who were always present in this vicinity.’7
Eighteen months later, Ludlow-Hewitt was convinced that this was what all observers should do all of the time. His opinion was underpinned by the knowledge, gained both by observation and from personal experience, that it was perfectly feasible for a competent pilot to conduct a shoot while simultaneously flying his aeroplane. This is certainly borne out by Sir John Slessor who, recalling his time flying RE8s as a Flight Commander with No 5 Sqn in the summer of 1918, wrote:8
‘… after I’d been doing it for a few months I prided myself on being able to range two and sometimes even three batteries on different targets at the same time – it was only a question of being reasonably quick at Morse, timing one’s calls for fire right, and being in the right position to see the right target at the right moment. But it did call for some concentration and, largely for that reason, the job of the observer […] became almost exclusively that of what would now be called a tail gunner. […] So the pilot flew the aeroplane (which, of course, became almost instinctive and called for hardly a thought) and did the job, tapping the little Morse key under his right hand, and was able to give his whole attention to the ground, confident that his observer was watching the sky above and behind him ready to warn him if enemy fighters came unpleasantly close.’
By this time, of course, Slessor had been flying for two years, and Ludlow-Hewitt even longer. As a result, controlling an aeroplane may well have become ‘almost instinctive’ to them, but this was far from being the case for the average newly-trained, pre-Smith-Barry pilot of 1917.
The weakness in Ludlow-Hewitt’s argument, therefore, was that it assumed that all pilots were as capable as he was himself. Sadly, this was not the case, but, as we shall see, some twenty years later Ludlow-Hewitt was still disposed to overrate the competence of the average pilot (see page 174), which was to have some repercussions in the context of the second generation of air observers. In the meantime, however, if the prospective corps reconnaissance pilots of 1917 were going to assume many of the functions previously discharged by the RFC’s back-seaters, it would be necessary to ensure that they were all provided with a thorough grounding in artillery co-operation techniques.
Eventually, on 23 May, Ludlow-Hewitt committed his views to paper in a letter to HQ IV Bde. In this he outlined his concept of operations and formally requested that his pilots be more appropriately trained in the future. A week later Maj-Gen Trenchard wrote to the War Office, seeking its assistance in improving the training of corps pilots.9 In fact, the need for pilots to attend the Wireless and Observers School had been anticipated at home as early as March. The combined throughput of pilots and observers was expected to be at a rate of 300 per month, however, and before this proposal could be implemented it would be necessary both to expand the available accommodation and to find additional instructional staff. Appropriate measures had already been put in hand so that by early June, in response to the GOC’s request, the DAO was able to inform him that some fifty pilots were already in residence at Brooklands.10
The initial results of this development appear to have been somewhat disappointing. It is clear, for instance, that there was no apparent improvement in the competence of the replacement pilots reaching V Bde. In September its GOC, Brig-Gen C A H Longcroft, wrote to HQ RFC to suggest that there would be considerable advantage in sending corps pilots to Brooklands for a similar course to that given to observers.11 It is not clear whether Longcroft was subtly ‘making a point’ or whether he had simply not been paying attention, but HQ RFC’s reply assured him that 85% of corps pilots were already passing through Brooklands and that it was hoped that 100% soon would be.12
Since Longcroft had complained in his letter that a number of his new pilots displayed little awareness of what they were supposed to do, this would appear to indicate either that V Bde was getting the ‘other’ 15% or that the training being provided was less than adequate. It was almost certainly the latter, the reason being an intolerable additional burden which circumstances had temporarily imposed on the training machine. Already finding it extremely difficult to produce sufficient aircrew to man the ever-expanding front line, its problems had been considerably exacerbated by an urgent need to replace the heavy losses which had been experienced in the spring.13 This circle could only be squared by cutting corners and many pilots had to be sent to France in the spring and summer of 1917 without having been fully or properly trained. The same was true of observers, Longcroft having reported that some of his replacement back-seaters were arriving with less than four hours’ total flying experience.
The original bid for gunners to wear a flying badge was accompanied by some suggested designs sketched by the following: A by 1/AM F W Turner (20346); B, D, I, J & K by 2/AM E D Collinson (64091); C by 2/AM C A Jones (63571); E by 2/AM A H Brown (52708); F, G & H by 2/AM E Harper (30822) and L by 2/AM A G Matthews (17081). (TNA AIR1/818/204/4/1306)
Because of the time it takes to train aircrew there is always a significant lag in the system. The people who were causing V Bde concern in September would have begun their training several months earlier, when the crisis had been at its height. By the late summer, however, several remedial measures had been implemented and the system was already recovering. Recruiting had been stepped up yet again and the introduction of professional flying instructors, employing the techniques advocated by Maj Smith-Barry (see page 88), was just beginning to have some impact on the effectiveness of pilot training. Thereafter the competence of new arrivals gradually began to improve, a trend that was to continue for the remainder of the war.
It had also been possible to relieve a bottleneck at the Wireless and Observers School created by the decision to send corps reconnaissance pilots there. This was partially achieved by further expansion to permit the school to handle up to 500 pupils per month and partly through the April 1917 decision which should have ensured that observers earmarked for bomber and fighter squadrons no longer attended the Brooklands course. While it is possible that some may have continued to do so for a while, by the late summer of 1917 the role training of all army observers was being carried out entirely at Nos 1 and/or 3 (Auxiliary) Schools of Aerial Gunnery at Hythe/New Romney.
1917. Aerial Gunners are granted their ‘wings’.
In addition to its observers, the RFC had been employing non-commissioned aerial gunners since February 1917. By the summer, so far as RFC personnel were concerned, Hythe-trained gunners probably outnumbered squadron-trained volunteer air mechanics but the overall balance between RFC personnel and soldiers drawn from other organisations had changed little. In March 1917 60% of the available gunners had been RFC men and, although the numbers involved had virtually doubled by late August, the proportions remained the same.14 Of the 202 gunners on the strength of the thirty-four two-seater squadrons serving with the BEF by then, 121 were enlisted members of the RFC, the remainder having come from elsewhere.15
In June it had been proposed that a distinguishing badge should be introduced for these men, several designs being submitted for consideration.16 As previously noted, HQ RFC had sanctioned the wearing of a standard observers badge by its squadron-trained gunners as early as March (see page 39) and the War Office declined to complicate the issue by introducing a different emblem for those who had undergone a more formal course of instruction. It chose instead to endorse HQ RFC’s initiative and in July authority was granted for any gunner who had passed the Hythe course and who had ‘performed eight trips overseas’ to wear an observers wing.17 Unfortunately, this automatically excluded gunners who were flying with Home Defence Squadrons, Aircraft Acceptance Parks and other UK-based formations and steps had to be taken to have these men posted abroad, their places being taken by combat veterans who already had their badges. Interestingly, the use of the flying ‘O’ meant that an RFC gunner was superficially indistinguishable from an NCO or air mechanic who was actually an accredited observer.
As with all military regulations, if there is a way around them, someone will find it. In this case the rules had been expressed with insufficient precision and by October the ‘eight trips overseas’ condition was being interpreted as eight cross-Channel ferry flights. By November gunners who had yet to leave the country at all were to be found wearing the flying ‘O’. This caused the DAO’s staff to amplify the rules, the revised regulations making it quite clear that only those aerial gunners who had ‘qualified for them by service overseas’ were entitled to wear an observers wing.18
While on the subject of regulations, it will already have become apparent that the RFC tended not to think too deeply when it was devising regulations relating to observers. As a result, they were all too often disadvantaged by whatever new rules were being introduced. It is worth noting that this syndrome was not confined to officers; the system could be equally inconsiderate towards non-commissioned back-seaters. For example, in July 1917, while acknowledging that the establishment of aerial gunners provided for six per squadron, HQ IV Bde noted that its units would continue to operate on a basis of ‘five per corps squadron and nine per two-seater army squadron’.19 One assumes that there will have been a logical justification for this deviation from the norm but it failed to take note of an earlier local edict which had laid down that flying pay could be drawn by no more than six gunners per unit, ie those held against the official establishment, which presumably meant that three of the nine would be out of pocket.20 And so it went on.
As always, observers and gunners of all ranks, aspired to become pilots and many of those who were lucky enough to have survived a period of operations eventually returned to England for cross-training. Not surprisingly, their familiarity with the airborne environment (the common rule of thumb being that a back-seater should have flown at least 100 hours in France before being recommended for retraining21) made them excellent prospects and most of them passed through the instructional sequence with relative ease.
1917. Night bombing focuses attention on the practical problems of weapons delivery and air navigation.
During 1916 the RFC had begun to make increasing use of its FE2bs in the bomber role and by November some of them had begun to fly offensive missions by night. The ‘Fee’ had adapted easily to this nocturnal activity and, since it could deliver a respectable bomb load (about 350 lb) and was about to be superseded by later types for daylight operations, it was decided to employ them as dedicated night bombers.
The night-flying expertise of No 51 (Home Defence) Sqn was exploited by using it to foster the first dedicated unit of the new Light Night Bomber Force, No 100 Sqn, which was raised in February 1917. The training provided was initially aimed solely at pilots and dealt purely with the art of flying in the dark. Once No 100 Sqn went into action, however, its crews rapidly discovered that there was much more to it than that. Within weeks Maj-Gen Trenchard was requesting that future night bomber crews be provided with a substantial amount of tactical training, including night reconnaissance techniques, night bombing and flying in the face of searchlight beams.22 This was beyond No 51 Sqn’s limited resources and the demand for additional night bomber crews led to the creation of several dedicated FE-equipped Depot Squadrons (later restyled Night Training Squadrons).
In August Trenchard submitted to the Director General a secret memorandum on No 100 Sqn, which had by then been in France for five months.23 Among other topics, this report included an assessment of the capabilities of the unit’s aircrews. The numbers involved were too small to constitute a statistically valid sample but, since they were all he had to go on, the GOC had little option but to use them as the basis for his appraisal. Of the forty-three pilots who had flown with the unit thus far Trenchard considered that ‘roughly one third proved excellent night pilots, capable of finding their way remarkably well, even on moonless nights if clear. Another third, though less reliable, have done consistently useful work, whilst the remainder have been more or less of a failure.’ He went on to say that, ‘of the officer observers who have been on strength, only about 50 per cent have proved themselves really suitable, while of the aerial gunners less than 20 per cent have proved efficient.’
Trenchard went on to recommend (again) that his night bomber crews should be given more night flying training before being posted to France. He also noted that experience had ‘proved beyond doubt that in night-bombing the aiming, if not the actual releasing, of the bombs should be carried out by the observer.’ This, he explained, was because a pilot had quite enough to do avoiding searchlights and gunfire and judging when to make the attack run. Once committed, the most useful contribution that the pilot could make was in keeping his aeroplane ‘on a level keel and at a previously agreed height.’ Since the observer had much the better view from an FE2, he was best placed both to assess what corrections needed to be made to minimise line error and when to release the bombs.
For this reason Trenchard expressed a marked preference for commissioned observers for night work, noting that, while gunners were not lacking in courage, it had been found that they could ‘seldom follow a pilot’s course or assist him to get his correct line over the target.’ It was hardly surprising that gunners tended to display relatively limited abilities in this respect, as they had received little (if any) formal training in either navigation or bomb-aiming. It is also possible that, depending upon the individuals concerned, this problem may have been compounded in cases where pilots found it difficult to accept what amounted to orders from non-commissioned personnel, although there is no specific evidence to support this conjecture.
In August 1917 Trenchard specifically expressed a preference for commissioned observers for night work which, at the time, would have meant FE2bs. This black-painted example, A6562, was with No 102 Sqn. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
It is quite clear from Trenchard’s report that, because it was the best way to do the job, the observers of the night bombing force had actually begun to assume direct responsibility for bomb-aiming as early as the summer of 1917. Although the same rationale could have been applied to the day bomber force, however, its pilots seem to have been less enthusiastic about adopting the procedure. Predictably, while the RFC’s policymakers were content to condone the practice, their aversion to allowing non-pilots to wield any measure of executive authority prevented them from formally endorsing it. Nevertheless, the GOC’s observations had opened up the possibility and before the end of the war responsibility for bomb aiming would have been formally assigned to observers (see pages 117-119). Furthermore, the observer’s potential for improving the overall efficiency of a crew in other respects, notably in the field of navigation, would also have been acknowledged.
As Trenchard’s report had also pointed out, navigation had become a rather more demanding business at night and additional training was considered to be necessary, specifically including cross-country exercises covering distances in excess of 100 miles. Although the GOC had actually recommended ‘more’ training, it was decided that the training provided should also be better and from October 1917 units directly involved in night flying training were each established to have an EO3 to act as a specialist instructor. Most of these men had been electrical engineers in civil life and they all attended a course at the Admiralty Compass Observatory at Slough before taking up their appointments as Compass Officers.24
The academic syllabus they taught included: compass theory; the triangle of velocities; basic astronomy, eg the identification of Polaris and its use as a northerly datum; and maps and map-reading, stressing those features of particular significance at night and the exploitation of moonlight as an aid to nocturnal map-reading. Practical exercises for prospective night bomber crews included: being tested in day and night air-to-ground gunnery and bomb dropping; flying in searchlight beams; the use of W/T; day and night crosscountry flying and simulated exercises flown in daylight while wearing dark goggles, making allowance for the forecast wind in all cases. In all a pilot had to log ten hours of night flying prior to graduation, an observer requiring only five hours. Although the navigational content of the syllabus was being aimed primarily at pilots, observers received the same instruction, were tested in navigation and, where practical, all flying exercises were conducted as crews.
The initial establishment provided for one Compass Officer to be shared between two Night Training Squadrons. In view of the increasing emphasis being placed on navigation, however, this was raised to one per squadron in January 1918, their designation being changed to that of Air Navigation Officer. At the same time the War Office suggested that each operational Night Flying Squadron (ie those flying FE2s in the bomber role) should also have its own Air Navigation Officer to co-ordinate raid planning and to calibrate the unit’s compasses. Evidently regarding this as excessive, the GOC declined the offer but he did agree to one being added to the staff of Bombing Wings, of which the RFC had only one at that time, the 41st.25
1917-18. The state of the art of air navigation.
It may have been noted that, although the timeframe of this narrative has reached 1917, there has been little previous mention of navigational techniques. This has been not so much an oversight as a reflection of the fact that, having been almost entirely a question of fair-weather map-reading, in daylight, over relatively short distances, navigation in the RFC was a very straightforward, and thus unremarkable, business.
That said, one significant innovation had been introduced as early as the spring of 1915 to assist pilots ferrying aeroplanes across the Channel to France. Because compasses tended to be unreliable, some pilots had so little faith in them that they ignored them completely and, it is said, there had been instances of pilots taking off from Folkestone and flying north across the Thames estuary to land in Essex where they used their schoolboy French to seek further directions from the natives.
True or not, Frank Courtney recalls that, in order to, prevent this happening:26
‘… the authorities devised what was probably history’s first example of ground aids to air navigation. They cut two large white crosses, a couple of miles or so apart, into the chalky coastal fields near Folkestone, these crosses being lined up with Cape Gris-Nez in France. A new pilot, heading for war, was instructed to follow the railroad until he found one of the crosses. If he then couldn’t see the other one, visibility was too bad for a crossing. If he could see both crosses, he was to fly a straight line between them, correcting for drift. At the same time, he was to note his compass indication; and then, no matter what that indication was, he was to stick to it until he reached the other side.’
While the RFC was resorting to such practical, if crude, techniques, a number of enterprising RNAS officers had adopted a more scientific approach to solving the problems associated with air navigation. By adapting well-understood maritime procedures and applying them to the air environment, they had developed a variety of useful calculators and instruments.
Since few army aviators had much use for navigational tools, even one as basic as a compass, they will have shown little interest in the more arcane devices being promoted by the Navy. Headquarters RFC was well aware that there was a widespread lack of confidence in compasses, noting in August 1916 that ‘there are probably many pilots who never use them at all.’ Interestingly, however, this problem was not confined to the RFC, since it was also noted that naval pilots ‘who have been to sea make great use of their compasses; whilst others who have received direct commissions in the RNAS, and have not been to sea, make little or no use of them.’27 While early aircraft compasses had suffered from serious limitations, notably ‘northerly turning error’, this problem had been explained during 1915 (see Annex D) and it was clear that the continuing lack of faith in compasses a year later was largely to do with unfamiliarity with their use and a lack of understanding of how they worked.
In order to address this problem an AEO, 2/Lt A D Spiers, who had spent six weeks with the Admiralty Compass Branch to familiarise himself with the subject, was sent to France in September 1916. There he was intended to supervise the adjusting of compasses, advise on the most appropriate models to be fitted to various types of aircraft, and the best places to locate them on the airframe, and generally to spread the word by offering advice and training as required.28
While Spiers’ presence must have had some positive impact, since the activities of most RFC aviators continued, even at night, to consist almost entirely of short-range, tactical operations over familiar terrain, simple map-reading still sufficed, so it would seem unlikely that there will have been much demand for his services. Nevertheless, the increasing intensity of nocturnal operations during 1917 (defence against German intruders at home, as well as bombing in France) did begin to make the RFC increasingly aware of the problems inherent in air navigation. Prompted by the onset of long winter nights and the creation of the nucleus of a long-range strategic bombing force, the RFC finally began to acknowledge the need for a more sophisticated approach in the autumn of 1917.29 As a result, it was obliged to begin to adopt the tools and techniques which had been devised by the RNAS.
The recollections of Lt R Shillinglaw, who flew on night operations with No 100 Sqn from June 1918 until the end of the war, provide a succinct first-hand impression of the evolution of contemporary RAF practice:30
‘On the FE2b, we flew to targets by map-reading, using a flashlight consisting of a battery strapped to a belt and a loose flex to the light itself. We knew the ground so well that maps were hardly necessary except in finding a new target. Later, in Handley Pages, it was a different matter. I only did about a dozen raids on these. Again, open cockpits and we used to fly on a course by dead reckoning of a landmark every half hour or so (ie 20-50 miles apart, depending on the wind – CGJ). I used to draw out the course beforehand in our mapping room using triangles and parallelograms for track, course, forecast wind and speeds, etc. En route sometimes we could have an angle of drift of 45°, so on the side of the fuselage we had a drift indicator and, with two points on a track, obtained a drift angle (and, presumably, groundspeed by using a stopwatch to measure the time taken to fly between them – CGJ) and so calculated the change of direction and speed of the wind.’
Although the RNAS had certainly made considerable progress in developing navigational techniques, it should not be assumed that all naval aviators were prepared to put their entire faith in them. In an account of his wartime experiences, Obs Lt P Bewsher recalled a special mission flown on 29 September 1917, the target being the Luxembourg Bridge at Namur. The sortie involved a round trip, at night, of some 250 miles, requiring about four hours in the air. He was briefed by the very experienced OC 7(N) Sqn, Sqn Cdr J T Babington, who advised him to ‘fly by compass and only use landmarks as a check.’ Bewsher goes on to provide a detailed description of the subsequent planning and successful execution of the mission. After debriefing, while congratulating him on his navigational skill, Babington remarked, ‘I suppose you did it by compass!’ To which Bewsher responded, ‘No, sir! By landmarks!’31
Reading between the lines of these anecdotes provides us with some insight into the theory and practice of air navigation during the last year of the war. Paul Bewsher’s tale, for instance, clearly shows that by the summer of 1917 primary responsibility, for both flight planning and the conduct of navigation, was considered to lie with the observer, at least for long-range operations (then still the exclusive preserve of naval aviation).
Unfortunately (as will become clear later), the RNAS never managed to train sufficient professional observers to satisfy its needs. Since all naval pilots continued to receive comprehensive instruction in navigational techniques, however, the shortfall could be made up by misemploying some of them. It became quite common, therefore, for RNAS Handley Pages to carry two pilots, one of them acting as observer, with responsibility for both navigation and bomb-aiming. When the RFC finally began to establish a strategic bombing force of its own, the division of responsibility between the members of its crews broadly reflected naval practice. In contrast to the RNAS, however, the Army had sufficient trained observers both to avoid having to misemploy pilots and to redress the unbalanced manning situation in naval bomber squadrons when these were absorbed into the RAF.32
From late 1917 onwards the content of navigational training, both theoretical and practical, was progressively expanded. As a result, as Roy Shillinglaw’s account tells us, the aircrews of 1918 were familiar with the devices which had been developed by the RNAS and knew how to employ them to complement simple dead reckoning. To what extent they actually did so, however, is questionable, even for flight planning, as suggested by Lt A H Taylor, who flew with No 102 Sqn for the last two months of the war.33
‘To the best of my recollection, I was the only observer in the squadron who worked out his course, ETA, etc from the met wind and was prepared to fly through 10/10ths cloud for the major part of the journey to the target. On at least two occasions my aircraft was the only one to reach the target.’
The fact is that the complexity involved in actually using the available tools and methods made them unattractive propositions and, once airborne, the unreliability of contemporary instrumentation meant that, in reality, the results which could be achieved were of doubtful accuracy. Furthermore, since the only means of fixing position was by reference to a map, it is hardly surprising that, once they were airborne, like Bewsher, many observers relied entirely on traditional map-reading.
Map-reading was only practical with good visibility, of course, and it had long been appreciated that in the future aeroplanes would be required to operate routinely by night, as well as by day, and in all weathers. Work had been going on globally to develop practical solutions to the more intractable problems associated with air navigation since before the war. An interesting paper on this subject, translated from the original German, was circulating at the Admiralty as early as February 1914.34
This document made reference to such remarkably advanced concepts as celestial navigation, gyro-compasses and the use of airborne W/T, including the measurement of radio bearings in the air and the possibility of assessing position relative to two radio transmitters by measuring the difference between the strengths of their received signals.35 None of these was a practical proposition at the time but their potential had clearly been recognised. Of more immediate practical use was a network of light beacons which had been established in pre-war Germany to identify aerodromes and to act as navigational aids; twenty such facilities were already operating at the time the paper was written. By the end of the war substantial progress had been made in all of the fields discussed in the paper but the only one to have had any direct impact on operations was the deployment of lighthouses as an aid to nocturnal navigation. Development of the other applications continued but it would take another twenty-five years or so for most of them to become familiar practices at squadron level. (A summary of the development of navigational tools and techniques during WW I is at Annex D.)
1917. The RFC quantifies the scale of its Observer training task and introduces, but fails to realise, the concept of the twenty-four-aircraft corps reconnaissance squadron.
It is informative to consider what the numerical requirement for observers was expected to be in mid-1917. The major influence here was a series of policy decisions taken during the latter part of the previous year. In the light of the experience of aerial fighting gained during the long drawn-out Battle of the Somme, approval had been given for a succession of increases in the front-line strength of the RFC. This culminated in an Air Board decision of 16 December which endorsed a plan for a total of 106 Service Squadrons, two more FE2 night bomber squadrons being added shortly afterwards. This would give the RFC more than four times as many operational units as it had had at the beginning of the summer. Since an air force’s operational squadrons are comparable to the tip of a metaphorical iceberg, this implied an even greater expansion of the RFC as a whole. The requirement for additional manpower was enormous and in the early part of 1917 the training system was hard pressed to meet the seemingly insatiable demand, especially where aircrew were concerned.
An Armstrong Whitworth FK8, C8636, of No 82 Sqn. In March 1917 it was decided to increase the strength of all Corps Squadrons to twenty-four aircraft and crews. Although this was occasionally achieved by temporarily expanding individual units to meet specific tactical requirements, a lack of resources prevented permanent expansion until the spring of 1918 and the programme was still far from complete when the fighting stopped. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
Another factor which served to increase the pressure in the spring of 1917 was yet another increase in the size of corps reconnaissance squadrons. This derived from a technical innovation, the ‘clapper break’, which, by altering the pitch of the tone produced by each transmitter, permitted a ground station to distinguish between the Morse signals received from different aeroplanes working on the same frequency. It now became possible to allocate a crew responsibility for each 2,000 yards (sometimes even less) of trench line without mutual interference.
To maintain permanent coverage while operating at this density would clearly require more resources and it was considered that the most efficient way to provide them would be to expand existing squadrons, rather than by creating additional ones. In March 1917, therefore, GHQ BEF recommended that the establishment of squadrons co-operating with the artillery should be raised to three flights of eight aircraft each.36 While the War Office was content to approve this suggestion it was soon obliged to point out that ‘it will not be possible to provide sufficient aeroplanes to carry out this increase during the present year.’37 Nevertheless, as an interim measure in preparation for the Battle of Arras, which had begun on 9 April, the effective strength of some of the corps reconnaissance units within I, III and IV Bdes had been increased from the usual eighteen aircraft to twenty-one, and in some cases twenty-four.38
This pragmatic arrangement had been made on a strictly temporary basis, however, and all squadrons had reverted to their authorised eighteen-aircraft-per-unit establishment by mid-June.39 By this time, however, Field Marshal Haig had written to London again, recommending a universal, and permanent, increase in strength to twenty-four aircraft.40 The War Office had concurred and the establishment of all corps reconnaissance squadrons had promptly been amended to reflect the increased entitlement.41 The necessary six additional pilots were authorised at the same time but, oddly enough, there was no corresponding increase in the numbers of back-seaters to be provided, the establishment remaining at twelve officers plus six NCO gunners, although the Training Brigade was still under remit to try to provide twenty officers per squadron as it had been since February (see page 55).
In reality, the system still lacked most of the resources that were required to implement the twenty-four aircraft scheme. In July it was announced that, until further notice, new squadrons would continue to deploy with only eighteen aeroplanes and without the extra six pilots, although it was still the stated intention to bring them up to their authorised strength in due course.42 The War Office also decided that, before enlarging any squadrons, priority was to be given to replacing the remaining obsolete BEs.43 By mid-August the re-equipment programme was virtually complete and it was agreed to try to start the build-up to twenty-four aircraft at a rate of three squadrons per month commencing in September.44 This time the change was formalised by a further amendment to the official establishment of a corps squadron which now reflected, in addition to the six extra pilots, a total of twenty officer observers plus the six NCO gunners.45
Despite the postponed start to the expansion programme, the War Office’s earlier prediction, that it would not be possible to provide the additional aeroplanes required during 1917, proved to have been correct and little progress was made owing to delays in the delivery of RE8s and FK8s. On the other hand, the reduction in the intensity of operations due to the onset of autumn meant that less urgency was attached to the scheme and Trenchard suggested that he be allowed to continue to operate to the eighteen-aircraft establishment until the spring.46 This was immediately sanctioned and the expansion scheme reverted to its previously dormant state.
Having pursued this digression to a convenient interval, it is necessary to go back to the summer of 1917 to pick up the threads of the mainstream numbers game. On 21 June the War Office recommended that the size of the RFC, which had still to reach its presently authorised total of 108 squadrons, should be virtually doubled yet again. On 2 July the Cabinet sanctioned this increase, the aim now being to field a force of no fewer than 200 squadrons, forty of them to be equipped with long-range bombers. Following this decision, a study was carried out to assess its implications in terms of manpower. It concluded that to sustain the expansion of the RFC, while simultaneously replacing wastage, it would be necessary to provide 782 new observers during the remaining six months of the year. The monthly requirement for 1918 was expected to increase progressively to reach an annual total of 4,691 (these figures were exclusive of those needed to man kite balloons – see Chapter 10). The corresponding demands for pilots were expected to be 3,252 in 1917 and 13,387 in 1918.47
These estimates had been based on the loss rates being experienced (from all causes) in mid-1917, which gave an observer (and a pilot) an expected availability of four months on artillery co-operation and night bomber units and two weeks less on fighter reconnaissance and day bombing squadrons.48 Apart from being very depressing, these predictions were statistically significant in two ways. First, they were considerably shorter than the duration of a typical tour of duty, indicating that the front line might need to be replaced at something like double the rate suggested by the size of its numerical establishment. Secondly, this problem was much more acute in the case of pilots since they took some eight months to train, two or three times as long as they were likely to be available for operations.
Having introduced the notion of a ‘tour of duty’, it should be made clear that, while this concept became well-established during WW II, this was not the case in WW I. The period of time that an aviator could expect to remain on front-line flying duties does not appear ever to have been laid down by statute and its duration could be extended or shortened as required. Personal factors, such as battle fatigue, were taken into consideration when circumstances permitted but the ‘exigencies of the Service’ always had an overriding priority. Despite these variables, it is generally true to say that a notional tour lasted about six months, including one or two leave breaks, although ten months, or even longer, was not unheard of.49
What this meant in airborne time was dependent upon a number of variables, eg the stage of the war, the role of a particular squadron, the intensity of the ground operations that it was supporting and the seasonal weather conditions, but a typical corps observer might expect to accumulate 150-200 flying hours, possibly more, if he stayed the course. His chances of surviving that long were not good, but for the first three years of the war his prospects were improved by the likelihood of his being short-toured after three or four months so that he could be retrained as a pilot. The RAF sustained the traditional RFC practice of recycling its observers as pilots right up to the Armistice but by mid-1918 there was a growing tendency for this to follow completion of a relatively lengthy period as a back-seater.
Tour lengths aside, it was clear that a lot more aircrew were going to be needed and that, to address this situation, direct recruiting would obviously have to be considerably stepped up. Even so, it would take many months for the enlarged input to pass through the system to provide a corresponding increase in output. So far as observers were concerned, this meant that the RFC was obliged to continue drawing a substantial number of prospective observers from the trenches. By early 1917, however, air warfare had become far more complex and intense than it had been only a year before. It was quite clear that the 1915-style, informal, squadron-based approach to the training of locally recruited observers was no longer viable. Furthermore, as noted previously, the attempt to prolong the system by introducing top-up courses in the UK had yielded disappointing results (see page 60). From the spring of 1917 onwards therefore, all serving personnel transferring to the RFC in the Field were posted to Home Establishment where, prior to formal specialist training as observers or aerial gunners, they were to attend ground-based aviation indoctrination courses alongside new recruits.
It is interesting to note that by May 1918 the output of observers from Winchester, ie those earmarked for corps duties alone, had risen to some 220 per month.50 Bearing in mind that training had stopped before the end of 1918, the numbers of qualified aircrew actually available to the RAF in the following January (see page 129) would suggest that the targets set in mid-1917 had been substantially achieved.
1917. Changes in the regulations governing the employment of Observers.
Once it had become standard practice for all observers to attend a sequence of formal training courses it became apparent that there was a flaw in the revised conditions under which observers were now serving. It will be recalled that since November 1916 (see page 55) they had begun to accrue seniority once they became notionally available for operations, ie either from the date of their posting to France or from that on which they were initially attached to the RFC in France. Since the latter group were now promptly being shipped home (see page 60), they were accumulating several months’ seniority without actually seeing any action.
This anomaly was removed at the end of August 1917, the amended rules now stating that the date from which all observers would accumulate seniority was to be that on which they ‘report overseas for duty’, having completed all requisite training courses at home.51 This change was to be implemented immediately, but it was not to be applied retrospectively. In general, the key date was considered to be that on which a trained observer was taken on strength by HQ RFC, but there were certainly some instances where it was the date on which an individual was allocated to a squadron. The difference was usually only a matter of a few days but in some cases, when an individual had spent some time languishing as a potential replacement at one of the Pilots Pools administered by Nos 1 and 2 Aeroplane Supply Depots, for instance, it could be several weeks.
While the DMA was content that its latest ruling had solved a parochial RFC problem, it had reckoned without the assistance of the rest of the War Office’s bureaucrats. The revised terms of service introduced in late 1916 had been reflected in Army Order 403 of that year. Unfortunately, an amendment (Army Order 367) was published in December 1916 which served only to confuse the issue as it reverted to the original date, ie that of leaving the UK, and reinstated authority for an immediate nominal transfer to the RFC for observers who were recruited in the field.52
It would be charitable to credit the War Office with having made these changes to cater for the more remote theatres. In these cases there could well be a gap of several weeks between a formally trained observer’s departure from the UK and his reporting for duty and it was still the normal practice in the Middle East and elsewhere for observers to be recruited and trained in the field. On the other hand, on-the-job training had ceased in France, where the overwhelming majority of observers were employed, and one suspects that the drafter of the amended Army Order 367 was simply unaware of this. In theory, since it had been published by a higher authority and carried a later date, the Army Order should have overridden the instructions issued by the DAO in August 1917 and thus confounded his intentions.
It is difficult to be certain whether this confusion actually had any direct impact on RFC procedures and it seems likely that the latest change in regulations may well have been tacitly ignored, at least in France. Nevertheless, this incident provides yet another example of the seemingly careless way in which the kaleidoscope of regulations governing the lives of observers would be periodically picked up and given an unnecessary shake. Why unnecessary? Because, by mid- 1917 observers really ought to have been serving under the same stable and comparatively generous terms as pilots.
1917. Flying pay and its significance in the case of Observers who had become Prisoners of War.
Several references have already been made to the fact that observers were entitled to draw flying pay but the implications of this have not been examined in any detail. It will come as no surprise to learn that, as with practically all of its regulations, the RFC had managed to ensure that those governing the issue of flying pay meant that observers were badly treated when compared to pilots. The most obvious difference was that qualified pilots received flying pay at eight shillings per day while observers were paid only five (these sums being additional to regimental pay in both cases). There may have been some justification for this in the early days, on the grounds that observers were neither formally trained nor members of the RFC, but for those who were subsequently both certified as competent and gazetted as flying officer (observers) it is arguable that the differential should no longer have applied.
This differential was not simply confined to rates of pay, however. While pilots drew their daily eight shillings continuously, so long as they were filling an established post, observers were entitled to their five shillings only on those days on which they flew. As noted earlier, authorisation for non-commissioned back-seaters to draw flying pay continuously had been published in December 1916 (see page 19), but this provision was not officially extended to include officers until 2 April 1917, although this was not actually announced until as late as September.53
While it was a trifle late, this concession was certainly worthwhile, but it failed to resolve another major anomaly. The regulations governing the payment of allowances to prisoners of war and internees, had been promulgated in June 1915.54 These permitted the continuous issue of flying pay but only to officers entitled to the eight-shilling rate. This meant, of course, that the pilot of a downed crew would have his accumulated allowances to look forward to once he was released. His observer, always the poor relation, would not.
In view of the relentless consistency with which War Office regulations managed to operate to the disadvantage of observers, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this was just one more manifestation of a sustained policy of deliberate discrimination. On the other hand, one should not perhaps ascribe to malice decisions which may have been taken on the basis of incompetence. The unfortunate circumstances of captured back-seaters are far more likely to have been created through an uninformed and unintentional oversight.
It is possible that, to ensure that allowances would continue to be paid only to those who were fully qualified, the drafter of the regulations had chosen to define entitled pilots by reference to the eight-shilling rate. If this was the case, apart from being rather cumbersome, such a definition was actually quite superfluous. After all, it was highly unlikely that an unqualified pilot, drawing the instructional rate of flying pay, would be taken prisoner. Furthermore, this definition had had the unfortunate effect of excluding all observers, because none of them attracted the eight-shilling rate. This was of little consequence, however, as, not being entitled to continuous flying pay until April 1917, any observer shot down on an earlier date had forfeited his allowance in any case.
Then again, it is possible that, since it was to do with the outlay of public funds, the man who drafted this particular regulation was a paymaster, rather than an aviator. When he was writing his rules in mid-1915, observers had not even been authorised to wear a distinguishing badge, let alone been formally admitted into the exclusive ranks of the RFC. It is quite possible, therefore, that the rule writer was quite unaware that there were such creatures. Under the circumstances, while still unforgivable, his exclusion of them would at least be understandable.
Once published, however, the June 1915 rules remained in force. Perhaps because they rarely received bank statements, there are unlikely to have been many complaints from observers who had been incarcerated in Germany and it was more than two years before this particular injustice was legislated away. In September 1917 the regulations were revised, Army Order 277 permitting Flying Officer (Observers) to draw flying pay under the same conditions as those applying to pilots.55 The daily rate for back-seaters was still only five shillings, however, and entitlements could be antedated to no earlier than the introduction of continuous flying pay, ie 2 April 1917.56
While this measure was obviously well-intentioned, the complex web of regulations which had accompanied the evolution of observers still left many outside the system. The residual problem was that, in order to retain their entitlement to flying pay as prisoners, back-seaters had to be both ‘on the authorised establishment of observers and graded as flying officer (observers).’57 Technically, this automatically excluded two groups of prisoners: those who had fallen into enemy hands prior to the introduction of formal grading, ie before November 1915, even though they may have been recognised as ‘qualified observers’; and those who had been shot down while still on probation, ie before they had been formally graded.
By the late summer of 1917, however, there was sufficient awareness of observers for someone to feel concerned about those who were languishing at Holzminden, Karlsruhe, Ingolstadt and elsewhere but whose flying pay was still being withheld. An uncharacteristically magnanimous War Office appears to have decided that, despite the clear intent of Army Order 277, it might be possible to bend the rules. This would involve exploiting a subsidiary clause to the effect that flying pay could not be drawn by officers ‘who were not within the authorised establishment of observers on the date of their capture’. By stretching a point, it could be argued that the converse must also be true, ie that anyone who was filling an established post could continue to be paid. This interpretation would serve to cover most of the more than one hundred early back-seaters who had been taken prisoner prior to the introduction of continuous flying pay and who had not been gazetted as flying officer (observers) but who had been held against their unit’s official quota of observers, the first such establishment having been published in December 1914 (see Chapter 2, Note 22).
A list of the observers who had been taken prisoner prior to the spring of 1917 was compiled by the War Office and forwarded to HQ RFC who were asked to indicate which of these men, regardless of their status and degree of qualification, were being carried against the official establishment of their units at the time they were shot down.58 Confirmation is lacking, but it is suspected that those who were identified as having fallen into this category may subsequently have been paid five shillings per day.
These changes in the rules were certainly positive, especially as the War Office seemed to be applying them generously. Nevertheless, compared to captured pilots, whose flying pay had never been withheld, the regulations still managed to short-change a lot of captured observers because no provision was ever made for any of them to receive an antedate of pay to any date earlier then 2 April 1917.
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1 Maj Chamier, previously OC No 34 Sqn, arrived at Brooklands on 31 March 1917, taking up his appointment as Commandant of the school a month later. The unit was subsequently expanded and redesignated (see Chapter 12, Note 3), Chamier being promoted to lieutenant-colonel to reflect its increase in size. He was succeeded on 26 May 1918 by the unit’s last wartime CO, Lt-Col C H B Blount, who remained in command until 22 November.
2 The first CO of the Artillery Co-operation Squadron was Maj K T Dowding.
3 AIR1/997/204/5/1241. AO 336 of 13 February 1917, which had introduced the term aerial gunner (see Chapter 6, Note 8), had also formally categorised corps observers as being those employed on corps reconnaissance squadrons, while those on fighter, fighter reconnaissance and bomber squadrons were to be identified as army observers. This logical refinement in terminology had been proposed by Trenchard in HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 8 February 1917.
4 AIR1/1135/204/5/2224. HQ III Bde letter 3B/55A dated 19 March 1917.
5 AIR1/1001/204/5/1260. A week after a meeting of the RFC Wireless Telegraph Committee held at Woolwich on 2 November 1916, all fighter and bomber squadrons had been established to hold airborne receivers on the authority of AO 241. While expressed in very positive terms, this was actually little more than a declaration of intent as the necessary equipment was not actually available, and, even if it had been, army squadrons would have found little use for it as they tended to operate beyond its practical range..
6 AIR1/390/15/231/31. Scheduled output dates between March and August 1917 were notified in HQ Training Bde Letter TB/1146 dated 16 February and the intended numerical split was notified by DAO letter 87/RFC/349(AO2) of 13 April.
7 James McCudden, op cit, p75.
8 Sir John Slessor, op cit, p 63-64.
9 AIR1/1135/204/5/2224. HQ RFC letter 2047G dated 30 May 1917.
10 Ibid. War Office letter 87/Instruction/235(O.2) dated 7 June 1917.
11 Ibid. HQ V Bde letter 5B/3/3 dated 4 September 1917.
12 Ibid. HQ RFC letter 2047G dated 15 September 1917.
13 Trevor Henshaw, The Sky Their Battlefield (1995). Henshaw’s work indicates that something in excess of 160 observers were killed, wounded, injured or taken prisoner during ‘Bloody April’. The distribution of these losses varied widely but the brunt was born by Nos 11, 16, 20, 48, 57 and 59 Sqns, each of which lost ten or more (a total of seventy-nine between them), which meant that all of these units had to be virtually rebuilt from scratch.
14 AIR1/1297/204/11/139. Nominal rolls of officers and non-commissioned aircrew serving with the RFC overseas in January-April 1917.
15 AIR1/1301/204/11/158. Nominal roll of officers and non-commissioned aircrew serving with the RFC overseas in August 1917.
16 AIR1/818/204/4/1306. This proposal was originated by 2/Lt W T Douglas of the Aerial Gunners Office in Lympne in letter 3/AG/4 dated 10 June 1917.
17 Ibid. Immediate authority for qualified gunners to wear the observers badge was granted by War Office letter 87/RFC/600(OG) dated 12 July 1917.
18 Ibid. The revised regulations were promulgated by AO 663 dated 19 November 1917.
19 AIR1/1585/204/82/43. HQ IV Bde letter HS31 dated 13 July 1917.
20 AIR1/1585/204/82/36. HQ IV Bde RO 118 of 25 December 1916.
21 AIR1/1169/204/5/2591. It is unlikely that this rule was ever dignified by formal legislation but it had long been the standard yardstick. A relatively early written reference to it crops up in a letter of 12 December 1915 in which OC 3rd Wg, Lt-Col W S Brancker, advised the COs of Nos 4, 8 and 11 Sqns that ‘100 hours in the air after qualification should be the minimum amount for which an observer can be considered for training in flying’.
22 AIR1/1135/204/5/2224. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 19 April 1917.
23 AIR1/393/15/231/34. HQ RFC letter CRFC 1957/1G dated 14 August 1917.
24 Slough had begun training selected RFC and RNAS aircrew as Compass Officers several months earlier.
25 AIR1/398/15/231/39. War Office letter 87/RFC/1115 (O1a) dated 4 January 1918 contained the offer of an Air Navigation Officer for each Night Flying Squadron. A second letter of 14 January agreed to the GOC’s request for one per wing which had been counter proposed by HQ RFC’s CRFC 1957/1G of the 11th.
26 Frank T Courtney, op cit, p44.
27 AIR1/997/204/5/1241. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2047G dated 28 August 1916.
28 Ibid. War Office letter 87/Aeroplanes/757 (AO2) dated 20 September 1916 informed HQ RFC that Spiers would be leaving for France on the 27th and outlined his duties.
29 Commanded by Lt-Col C L N Newall, HQ 41st Wg was set up on 11 October 1917 to control three bomber squadrons, two RFC and one RNAS. Against a background of prolonged politico-military debate over the desirability of establishing an Anglo-Franco-Italo-US strategic bombing force, the British expanded their own organisation. In anticipation of the formation of a second wing, Newall’s command became HQ VIII Bde on 1 February 1918 and with effect from 6 June this was subordinated to Maj-Gen Trenchard’s HQ Independent Force, RAF. By the end of the war, the IF was controlling one fighter and nine bomber squadrons in France with others on the point of becoming operational at home. Trenchard was eventually appointed to be CinC of an Inter-Allied Independent Air Force, but not until October 1918 – too late for it to have had any impact on the outcome of the war.
30 Taken from an account of the wartime experiences of Lt Roy Shillinglaw, as told to Marvin L Skelton and published in 1979 in Cross & Cockade (Great Britain) Journal, Vol 10, No 3.
31 Paul Bewsher, Green Balls (1919), p258.
32 This process had actually begun before the formation of the RAF. There were, for instance, three RFC observers flying in the Handley Pages of A Sqn RNAS as early as November 1917 (Lts H A Samson, A H Thompson and L Harper), although the Army’s primary objective at this stage was probably to gain first-hand experience of heavy bomber operations, rather than to relieve the shortage of qualified naval observers.
33 This extract is drawn from the reminiscences of Arthur Henry Taylor, published in the spring 2010 edition of Intercom.
34 Foreign journals were (and are) routinely studied by Intelligence staffs to keep abreast of technological developments. The article in question is believed first to have appeared in Marine Rundschau in November 1913.
35 This approach was not really practical as it stood, since it envisaged the measurement of too imprecise a parameter; nevertheless it contained the germ of the differential principles which underlay later hyperbolic navigation aids, such as GEE, LORAN, DECCA and OMEGA.
36 AIR1/520/16/12/1. GHQ letter OB/1826 dated 5 March 1917.
37 AIR1/390/15/231/31. DAO Letter 87/9521 (AO1) dated 26 April 1917.
38 Nos 2, 7, 9 and 59 Sqns were to have twenty-one aircraft while Nos 8, 12, 13 and 16 Sqns were to have twenty-four. Apart from No 59 Sqn, which had RE8s, all of these units were still operating, mostly late model, BE2s.
39 AIR1/1002/204/5/1261. This file contains numerous letters providing local authorisation for the strengths of individual units to deviate from the official establishment. Such adjustments were not confined to the period of the Battle of Arras incidentally; for instance, No 7 Sqn was directed to transfer three pilots and aircraft to No 34 Sqn on 3 August 1917, increasing the strength of the latter to twenty-one machines and twenty-three pilots.
40 AIR1/520/16/12/1. GHQ letter OB/1826 dated 18 May 1917.
41 AIR1/17/15/1/87. Establishment 87/9406 dated 19 May 1917.
42 AIR1/2434/305/33/1. AO 477 dated 2 July 1917.
43 AIR1/520/16/12/1. War Office letter 87/98 (O.1a) dated 12 July 1917.
44 Ibid. War Office letter 87/98 (O.1a) dated 16 August 1917. See also AO 527 (AIR1/2434/305/33/1) of the same date which publicised the decision to commence the phased expansion programme.
45 AIR1/17/15/1/87. Establishment No 727 was reissued on 8 September 1917. Curiously, the revised edition also allowed for twenty officer observers plus six NCOs on both army two-seater and night flying (ie FE2b) squadrons. This was clearly a bureaucratic error, because the increase in strength to twenty-four aeroplanes was confined to corps squadrons, which is why they were the only units to be provided with the necessary six additional pilots. See also Note 12 to Chapter 12.
46 AIR1/520/16/12/1. HQ RFC letter CRFC 2022G dated 13 November 1917.
47 AIR1/676/21/13/1773. All of these figures had been calculated on the basis of the ‘estimated life’ of an individual. This term was a little misleading, however, as it suggests that all aircrew eventually perished. This was not the case; they were far more likely to become non-effective through wounds, injuries, sickness or posting.
48 Ibid. The outlook was even bleaker for single-seat fighter pilots who had a statistical life expectancy of a mere ten weeks.
49 AIR1/818/204/4/1301. A report dated 1 November 1918 analysed the fates of 1,436 (mostly) first tourist pilots sent to France between July and December 1917. Summarising the figures, it showed that 38% had been killed or posted missing, 27% had been hospitalised and 25% had returned to the UK. That left 10% of the sample still in action at least ten months after they had first crossed the Channel but the average time spent in France by those who had been transferred to Home Establishment worked out at six months plus or minus a few weeks depending upon the type of aircraft flown. Thus, although it may never have been specified, by 1918 a de facto tour was demonstrably of about six months’ duration. While the survey had been confined to pilots, it is likely that the experience of observers would have reflected much the same pattern, except that some of them will have returned early in order to become pilots.
50 AIR1/161/15/123/15. This figure has been extracted from a brief, undated (but certainly post-war), account of his involvement in observer training rendered by Wg Cdr Chamier.
51 AIR1/2434/305/33/1. AO 548 of 31 August 1917. Notwithstanding the publication of this memorandum, it should be understood that seniority was not publicly acknowledged until an observer had been formally gazetted to the RFC which still did not occur until he had completed his probationary service; this interval could be as long as three months, although six weeks was more typical by the autumn of 1917. Only then was an observer’s name added to the RFC section of the Army List, the entry being appropriately backdated, and only then did he receive full flying pay.
52 AIR1/835/204/5/255. The amendment to Army Order 403 was reproduced in HQ RFC’s Routine Orders for 23 December 1917.
53 The introduction of continuous flying pay for established Flying Officer (Observers), back-dated to 2 April 1917, was announced by Army Order 277 of September 1917.
54 Army Order 198 of June 1915.
55 Army Order 277 of September 1917.
56 With effect from 8 August 1918 (AMWO 795) observers were entitled to draw the same eight-shilling rate as pilots, although there was no provision for this to be back-dated (see page 106).
57 Army Order 277 of September 1917.
58 AIR1/1026/204/5/1415. War Office letter 48/Misc/1479(O3a) dated 20 September 1917.