Chapter 13

1918. The creation of the RAF – complications arising from differences between RNAS and RFC grading policies and ranks.

A major administrative task stemming from the formation of the RAF was the need to identify all of its personnel and transfer them to the books of the new Service. So far as officers were concerned, this resulted in the publication of an Air Force List, broadly similar in style and content to the long-established Army and Navy Lists. This led to yet another change in the way in which observers were recorded. The new Service adopted the RNAS term observer officer to identify its back-seaters and reinstated segregated lists. This was not simply a reflection of an apartheid philosophy, however, and pilots would shortly also be subjected to division, being listed separately as aeroplane officers, seaplane officers and airship (originally dirigible) officers. balloon officers (restyled as kite balloon officers by the RAF) represented yet another discrete category of aviators – as they always had done in the RFC, but not in the RNAS.

On 1 April 1918 the RAF’s strength in gazetted observers stood at 1,764,1 the RNAS having contributed 181 towards this total.² There were also 670 kite balloon officers. In addition there were large numbers of ex-RFC flight cadets and ex-RNAS probationary observer officers undergoing training, the result of the much enlarged intakes which had begun the previous year. These trainees began to graduate over the next few months and the Air Force List for August indicates that by then the totals had grown to 2,783 commissioned observers and 828 kite balloon officers, both of these figures being supplemented by substantial, but undetermined, numbers of qualified NCOs.

Transferring these personnel to the RAF’s books highlighted an example of misaligned military and naval practices – ranks, always a potential source of confusion. For instance, while an RNAS flight (or observer) lieutenant had ostensibly been equivalent to an RFC captain (see Chapter 11, Note 2), he was actually of much lower status, since the granting of a captaincy in the RFC had implied recognition of an officer’s suitability to command a flight, ie like an RNAS flight commander (or flight observer).

To avoid the inevitable discontent that would have accompanied the RAF’s effectively ‘demoting’ substantial numbers of its ex-naval brethren, it was eventually decided to accept all RNAS observer lieutenants into the new Service as nominal captains and to permit them to wear the appropriate rank insignia. Pending their selection for Flight Commander duties (a most unlikely event, of course), they were actually graded as Observer Officers and generally regarded (and paid) as if they held RAF lieutenant rank. This distinction was indicated by an asterisk alongside their names in the Air Force List.³ The August List contained three observers ranked as majors and fifty-four as captains, forty-seven of the latter being ‘starred’. The ten observers whose executive status had been formally acknowledged by the RAF were all ex-naval officers who had held a variety of junior command appointments in the RNAS. RFC policy had, of course, ensured that the Army had been unable to field a single observer with comparable experience.

1918. The various categories of RFC and RNAS Observer inherited by the RAF are rationalised.

In May 1918 regulations were published laying down that an RFC-style badge was to be worn by all qualified observers and balloonists.⁴ This seemed to be straightforward enough but it would appear that an appeal may have been lodged on behalf of ex-naval balloonists, who had been regarded as pilots by the RNAS. If there was such a protest, however, it fell on deaf ears. In June the Air Ministry reaffirmed that the RAF would follow the precedent established by the RFC. This meant that all qualified balloonists, regardless of their background and degree of expertise, were now graded as RAF Kite Balloon Officers and that the appropriate badge for them was, therefore, the flying ‘O’.⁵

This ‘balloon debate’ was not the only legislative hangover for which a cure needed to be found, however. In their customarily cavalier fashion the drafters of regulations had confined their efforts to officers. No one had given any thought to the hundreds of NCO observers whose circumstances had also to be catered for, resulting in yet another Weekly Order.6

But the problems did not end there. The language used in all Orders published thus far had specifically endorsed the wearing of the flying ‘O’ by ‘observers’, thus technically excluding the remaining ex-RFC aerial gunners. There were similar difficulties with ex-RNAS aerial gunlayers. Furthermore, the system had been complicated by the fact that some elements of the ex-RNAS faction had been very quick to take advantage of the creation of the RAF by formally remustering a number of technical ratings who would not have been recognised as aircrew by the RFC. This led the Air Ministry to issue an edict, specifically in the context of flying boat crews, imposing a moratorium on the promotion of any more W/T and/or engineering personnel as sergeant observers.⁷ This prohibition remained in force until October (see below).

This is probably as good a place as any to record that, although neither the RNAS, nor the RAF, ever saw fit to commission the Navy’s maritime ‘flight engineers’, their pilots had the highest regard for them. As Lt E A G Robinson would write many years later:⁸

‘The unspeakable petrol system (of the Felixstowe F.2A) very often meant that the later parts of the flight depended on hand pumping; if (as happened not infrequently) a petrol pipe broke, the engineer was more or less expected to climb out in the air and do his best to repair the pump with insulating tape while clutching as best he could on to the flying wires or the engine struts. All the boat pilots of that generation remember their flight engineers, as well as their wireless ratings, with admiration and gratitude.’

Because the RFC had ceased to train, or never had trained, aircrew in some of the categories that were still being employed by ex-naval units, the RAF’s personnel organisation was evidently experiencing some difficulty in framing regulations to acknowledge their continued presence. Nevertheless, despite the absence of any specific provision for these inherited odds and ends, it is highly unlikely that the Air Ministry meant to deprive them of their badges.

In fact the new Service eventually came to accept that, particularly for maritime operations, there was a continuing need to employ aircrew in the specialisations previously sponsored by the RNAS. In due course the RAF would make arrangements for the training of NCO W/T and engineer observers and would also reinstate a requirement for NCO gunners.

In the meantime, there remained the problem of the rump of ‘left over’ non-commissioned, ex-RFC and ex-RNAS, aerial gunners and aerial gunlayers who would still have been wearing the flying ‘O’. The interim policy was that, wherever possible, these men were to be remustered as sergeant observers.⁹ Unfortunately, without a degree of top-up training, this was not feasible in every case and demobilisation may have intervened before the circumstances of some of these men had been finally resolved.

The ex-RNAS lighter-than-air fraternity, some of whom considered that they had been particularly badly treated, represented yet another outstanding problem. Apart from their pilots, who were fully qualified, and a few appropriately trained fitters and wireless operators who might have been regarded as being professional aircrew, naval airships had tended to be manned on a relatively casual basis. Many of their crewmen were ratings drawn from the establishment of their operating bases with a nominal amount of gunnery training being organised from local resources. Another oddity (in army eyes) was that the RNAS had treated its airships rather like seagoing vessels with a crew being assigned to a particular craft. While this approach had served the Navy well enough in the past, it did not sit very comfortably with the RAF’s manning policy which, since the Army had been far and away the majority shareholder, usually tended to reflect RFC practices.

This is not to say that those ex-RNAS ratings who flew were not competent, but neither were many of them ‘aircrew’ per se; that is to say that they had not attended an aviation indoctrination course at a SoMA or at the Crystal Palace. The RAF was not prepared to grant these men full blown observer status, which would have involved making them all sergeants, particularly as the trend was towards bigger and better craft. A typical rigid airship had a crew of four officers and up to twenty-six men; if the RN had had its way all of the latter would have had to become NCOs.

Nevertheless, in September 1918 Lt-Col R Wilson, the officer responsible for airships at the Air Ministry, suggested that there was a case for awarding an observers badge to ‘W/T ratings, Engineers and Coxwains’.¹⁰ His submission received a fair wind, indeed the field was subsequently widened to include wireless operators and mechanics who flew in flying boats and large Handley Pages. The first step in this direction was taken early in October when it was announced that suitably qualified wireless operators who were ‘employed on continuous flying duties’ could be remustered as wireless operator observers (sergeant mechanics).¹¹ This was a universal ruling, applicable to exsoldiers just as much as to ex-sailors, but, since the RFC had made relatively little use of airborne wireless operators, the regulation had clearly been designed primarily to cater for the maritime case.

The new ruling would certainly have permitted many ex-RNAS flying boat crewmen to be upgraded and to wear a flying ‘O’, thus bringing them in line with current RAF policy which, by this time (see below), required that anyone wearing an observers badge should hold the minimum rank of sergeant.

Personnel associated with the airship NS-12, probably at Longside. The date is not known, but it must have been between October 1918, when NS-12 was delivered, and February 1919 when she was deleted. Since she was quite capable of carrying out 24-hour patrols (NS-11 held the record at a little over 100 hours) she normally flew with a complement of ten, two five-man watches. The captain, Capt P E Maitland (seated front and centre) and the two officers to his left are wearing the interim khaki RAF uniform; to his right, Capt W P C Chambers sports the short-lived pale blue; five of the ostensibly RAF airmen are still wearing RNAS cap badges. This photograph appears to indicate that, although never endorsed by the publication of a AMWO, it was by this time a common practice to permit anyone who flew regularly as a member of an airship crew, in any capacity, to wear a flying ‘O’, although only those who had been formally recognised as W/T or engineer observers were ranked as sergeants. Of the men in this picture, only two (Wagstaff, on the left and Bettaday, on the right) are sergeants and at least four of them do not appear to be even corporals. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)

While this had taken care of the remaining legacy de facto wireless observers, arrangements had also been made to provide a flow of formally trained personnel. By the late summer of 1918, the ground trade of the wireless operator had been sub-divided into three specialisations, one of which was trained to handle the direction finding equipment which was about to be fitted to Handley Pages. (For a summary of the progress that had been made in wireless direction finding techniques during WW I, see Annex F.) All W/T personnel underwent a total of twenty-four weeks of technical training at Flowerdown after which they became available for posting to units as air mechanics 3rd class. A proportion of these men were then earmarked for flying duties as W/T observers. This involved a further month of gunnery training (one week of theory at Eastchurch and three of live-firing at Leysdown) on completion of which they became fully-fledged, flying ‘O’-wearing sergeants for service in flying boats and Handley Pages.

Similarly, to cater for large flying boats selected qualified engine mechanics did the same month of gunnery as prospective W/T observers after which they were made up to sergeant, badged and classified as engineer observers.

In contrast to this, while it was recognised that some ground wireless operators would also be required fly in airships, and the training system made provision for them to spend twelve days on airships at Cranwell in addition to a month’s gunnery and bombing at Eastchurch, the regulations did not state that they were to become fully fledged W/T observers.¹² That left these men, and substantial numbers of other non-commissioned personnel who flew in airships without having any specific ‘aircrew’ function without a badge. In October 1918 Lt-Col Wilson drafted an AMWO which would have addressed his earlier proposal and in the process regularise what, photographic evidence suggests, had already become a common practice. The Armistice precluded this order’s being published but it would have provided for personnel who had ‘completed a course of probation of not more than one month attached to an airship’ and had their CO’s recommendation to ‘wear an observer’s badge, the grant of which will carry no increase of rank or pay.’¹³

1918. The disputes over the significance of the observers badge are finally resolved.

The creation of the RAF had meant, almost inevitably, that the oft-reviewed question of the significance of the observers badge had had to be aired yet again. The first change was relatively straightforward. With effect from 1 May the RNAS winged ‘O’ was withdrawn in favour of an RFC-pattern flying ‘O’ to be worn on the left breast of the interim army-style uniform adopted by the RAF.14 As discussed above, however, because the implications of this decision do not appear to have been considered very deeply, it had subsequently been necessary to publish a series of amplifying regulations to establish precisely who could (and should) wear the badge. It remained to determine exactly when they would become entitled to wear it. The new rules were published in August.¹⁵ An observer could now be awarded his badge:

a. on completion of all courses;

b. on passing all HQ VI Bde¹⁶ tests (for night flyers);

c. on posting to a mobilising unit;

d. on posting to a mobilised unit; or

e. on posting to serve with any Expeditionary Force.

In this respect, at least, parity with pilots had finally been achieved and a long-running argument had been settled. An observer was not awarded his badge for ‘war service’. From now on a flying ‘O’ was, like a pilots ‘wings’, quite definitely intended to be a ‘qualification’ badge. Furthermore, the Order specifically stated that on gaining his badge, under any of the above circumstances, an observer was deemed to be qualified and was to be gazetted as such with effect from that date.

Most observers, proceeding through the formal training system as flight cadets, will have fallen into one of the first two categories. On passing the final milestone they were immediately required to obtain and wear officers uniform, complete with badge, and assume the rank of second lieutenant, although they were not paid as such until they had been formally gazetted.¹⁷ Reference to the drawing of pay serves to highlight another significant clause which had been included in the August regulations. Any qualified observer was now entitled, not only to wear a badge; he could also draw full flying pay, now at the same eight-shilling rate as pilots, although there was, specifically, no provision for this to be back-dated.

It was inevitable that some aspects of these developments would prove to be somewhat contentious because they could give rise to anomalous situations. The most obvious was that of the newly trained and inexperienced, but badged, observer arriving on a squadron to serve alongside men who had been flying operationally for weeks without a badge. One such was 2/Lt A H Taylor who recalled that, on joining No 102 Sqn:¹⁸

‘I was viewed somewhat unfavourably by several observers because they had not yet qualified for their ‘wing’. […] The feeling was such that I went to ask the CO if I should take my wing down but, rather grudgingly I thought, he said that under the new regulations I could keep it up.’

‘Say George Old Bean, what d’ye think of this month’s RAF?’ The RAF’s inevitably mongrel appearance in the early days was not helped by changes to dress regulations which tended to make the whole business of ‘uniformity’ something of a joke, as suggested by this carton, drawn by Cadet Alan Murray and reproduced in Air Pie of 1919

Nevertheless, while the refinements introduced in mid- 1918 had finally afforded observers the degree of recognition that had long been their due, some still harboured reservations over the one-winged badge. One of them was Cecil Latimer-Needham, who, with 35½ hours of training flying in his log book, was authorised to put up his flying ‘O’ on 7 September 1918 prior to leaving for France to join No 205 Sqn. Many years later, he wrote:19

‘The brevet was a single-wing sprouting from the letter ‘O’ and this was regarded by some as rather unfortunate – a single wing, whether of bird, insect or aeroplane, is unbalanced and incapable of flight. Observers were not pilots, but this would have been apparent by an ‘O’ in a pair of wings, which in fact was the observer’s brevet as worn by the Royal Australian Air Force (sic).’²⁰

1918. Confusion over the effective date of an Observer’s seniority.

The confusing succession of regulations under which RAF observers could be gazetted are summarised at Figure 16 which, for convenience, also includes the rules which had previously applied within the RFC and RNAS. Before considering some of the specific problems which were caused by this endless chopping and changing, however, it would be as well to note some of the ground rules underpinning the creation of the RAF.

a. The constitution of the RAF was necessarily complicated but, in essence, on 1 April 1918 all officers of the RN, RNVR, RNR, RM, British Army and Indian Army previously serving as members of, or on attachment to, the RFC and RNAS were automatically and immediately transferred to the RAF. Their terms of engagement were to be similar to those under which they had previously been serving, with the proviso that anyone who applied within three months would, without prejudice, be permitted to return to his original Service. Officers who had been directly recruited into the RFC or RNAS as flying personnel and who declined to be transferred to the RAF had no original Branch of Service or unit to which they could revert. It would seem unlikely, therefore, that the War Office or Admiralty would have been under any legal obligation to take them back as officers.²¹

b. Although allowance was made for previous service, in the context of time promotion, seniority within the RAF could not be counted from any date earlier than 1 April 1918.²² In general, qualified observers already on active service as RFC lieutenants or 2nd lieutenants, or as RNAS observer lieutenants or observer sub-lieutenants, were all given the RAF rank of lieutenant (this procedure applied equally to pilots and to officers of ground branches). It was recognised, however, that some errors might have been made and officers who considered that they had been ill-served were invited to bring their cases to the attention of the authorities.²³

When the RAF had first come into being it had continued to apply the old RFC rules with regard to an observer’s seniority in that it was antedated on qualification to, more or less, the date on which he had joined his squadron in the field. This policy was changed at the end of May, seniority thenceforth being counted from the date on which an observer’s recommendation for confirmation was accepted, ie the end, rather than the beginning, of his period of probationary service!²⁴ In view of its significance to the individuals concerned, it is surprising that no public announcement of the new policy seems to have been made, the first indications of its having been implemented being the appearance of apparently incorrect dates of seniority in the London Gazette.

This caused some consternation, the situation soon being aggravated by the spirit of the regulations published in August and September (cf AMWOs 795 and 1091). These made it quite clear that it was the Air Ministry’s intention that any observer actually serving in the field should be entitled to wear a badge and to draw full flying pay. This implied that any observer ought to be fully qualified before he was sent into action. It followed, therefore, that there would be no probationary period in the future, as had been implied as early as 22 May by the publication of AMWO 330 (see Note 4) which had stated that the flying ‘O’ could now be worn ‘on graduation’. So, following the publication of AMWO 795 in August, seniority was made effective from the date of gazetting, which was expected to be more or less that of qualification on completion of the sequence of formal training courses. This could not apply in every case, however, as there were still substantial numbers of old-style probationers on active service and, until the system could actually provide 100% qualified men, more of them might well be needed.

Fig 16. Summary of conditions of service for commissioned observers, 1914-18. Note that examination of the service records of individuals reveals that there was some inconsistency in the application of these’rules’, particularly in France during the legislatively confused months of May-October 1918. It seems likely that anomalies would have been even more prevalent in the more remote theatres.

The new rules caused considerable confusion within the bureaucracy, not to say some discontent among disadvantaged probationers. Did not the regulations proclaimed by AMWO 795 mean that seniority should now accrue from at least the beginning of a probationary period, and possibly even earlier? If so, what of the observers who had been short-changed for the previous three months? These and other questions led to a prolonged exchange of correspondence between St André-aux-Bois and London.25

In point of fact, AMWO 795 had clearly stated that an observer could be regarded as qualified, and was to be gazetted as such, from as early as the date on which he joined a ‘mobilising’ squadron, ie even before his unit had left England. It would seem that, on reflection, the Air Ministry had had second thoughts over this and had decided that this was too much of a concession. On 9 August, therefore, (only one day after publication of the AMWO!) it was agreed that the old RFC procedure should be reinstated, that is to say that seniority was to be backdated, on qualification, to the date of joining an operational squadron. Because there were a number of other grey areas which HQ RAF wished to have clarified first, however, this ruling was not announced in France until 3 October.²⁶ When it was finally published, the same order effectively terminated the probationary procedure by stating that any remaining observers who had still not been recommended for gazetting were to be returned to Home Establishment for further training or disposal.

While their circumstances were slightly different, there had been similar uncertainty over the recognition of kite balloon officers. There was no problem with most of these, those who were arriving from home fully-qualified, and it was intended that this would eventually become the norm. In the meantime, however, some balloonists were still being recruited and trained in the field and it was anticipated that this practice might have to continue for a while. By the spring of 1918, the standard procedure was for such regimental officers to be temporarily attached to the RFC/RAF for a trial period. If they were assessed as being suitable candidates they were then taken on strength as probationers and authorised to draw three shillings per day instructional flying pay. On completion of the necessary certification they were eventually gazetted as kite balloon officers, authorised to wear an observers badge and paid five shillings per day.

It was decided that a slightly amended version of the same procedure would have to remain in force. As with observer officers, it was early October before the fine detail had been sorted out but thereafter a probationary regimental balloonist, attached to the RAF to be trained in the field, was immediately permitted to draw flying pay at the (by now universal) instructional rate of four shillings per day. He was authorised to draw the full eight-shilling rate, and to put up his badge, on formal gazetting as a qualified kite balloon officer. The effective date of his transfer to the RAF would, assuming that it was ratified by the GOC, be regarded as that on which the original recommendation had been forwarded by the officer commanding his Balloon Wing.²⁷

It is worth noting, incidentally, that by this time, although, as non-pilots, they were still classed as observers in the broadest sense, in practice the Air Ministry had come to regard kite balloon officers as a quite distinct category. While it does not seem to have been pressed to the point of formal legislation, as a matter of policy London now avoided using the term ‘observer’ when referring to balloonists in official correspondence.²⁸

1918. The inappropriate use of the term ‘probationer’.

Following the establishment of the RAF, although it was applied only selectively, it became fairly common for the term ‘probationer’ to be used as a rank for unqualified observers. There were other examples, but this malpractice was particularly prevalent within II Bde, where Nos 4, 7, 10, 20 and 53 Sqns all did it for several months in 1918.

It is not known for certain why this occurred or why it was so common in units under the command of Brig-Gen T I Webb-Bowen, but it is suspected that the explanation had its roots in Army General Order 1520.²⁹ Originally issued in April 1916, and republished from time to time, this had ruled that ‘all appointments to temporary commissions in the field will, in the first instance, be made on probation,’ eventual confirmation being dependent upon the subsequent recommendation of the subject’s CO. General Order 1520 had been framed primarily to cater for soldiers being commissioned from the ranks but it seems possible that in some quarters its provisions may have been extrapolated to cover the case of unqualified observers.

The London Gazette provides numerous examples of the sense in which the term ‘probationer’ was supposed to have been employed, a typical entry within the RAF Section reading as follows: ‘The undermentioned temp 2nd Lieutenants (late General List, RFC, on probation) to be confirmed in their rank as 2nd Lieutenants, Observer Officers.’ Note, incidentally, and crucially, that these provisions did not apply solely to observers, the Gazette containing many similar entries confirming the RAF commissions of pilots ‘late General List, RFC, on probation’.

The ‘on probation’ tag was plainly intended to refer to the status of an officer’s commission, not to his professional standing. It was an unfortunate coincidence that, although the context was different, the same term also happened to be applied to observers who had yet to complete their formal professional qualification. Even so, it was quite inappropriate, under any circumstances, to apply the ‘probationer’ label as if it were a rank but, if it were going to be done at all, then it should have been done to pilots as much as to observers. Needless to say, it was not.30 It is possible that this selective misapplication of ‘probationer’ was simply a misunderstanding but, in view of the RFC’s track record in such matters, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that it was yet another exhibit from the range of subtle humiliations that were reserved for back-seaters. Whatever the explanation, HQ RAF finally outlawed the misuse of the term ‘probationer’ in September 1918.³¹

1918. Real and perceived problems over seniority.

The misuse of nomenclature was not the only way in which observers appeared to have been disadvantaged by RAF regulations in the summer of 1918. For instance, because the RAF had been created on 1 April this date had been given a legislative significance which seemed to have unfortunate consequences for some observers, although this did not become apparent until June when unexpected dates began to appear in the Gazette. Once the problem had been identified, however, it provoked a protest from Maj A G R Garrod. By then Garrod was commanding No 13 Sqn as a pilot, but he had originally been an observer, which may have made him unusually sensitive to the RFC’s customary disregard for the interests of back-seaters. Perhaps hoping that the RAF would prove to be more enlightened, he was moved to put pen to paper in June.³²

Writing to OC 1st Wg, Lt-Col E L Gossage, Garrod’s letter cited (in essence) the hypothetical case of two ex-regimental, 2nd lieutenant probationary observers who might have joined his squadron on the same day in, let us say, January 1918, but who qualified a few days apart on (say) 28 March and 2 April. On the evidence of recent Gazettes, it appeared that anyone who qualified before 1 April 1918 would have his seniority antedated, RFC-style, to the date that he joined his squadron. By contrast, anyone qualifying after 1 April would accrue seniority only from the date on which they qualified. In Garrod’s example, therefore, it seemed that his two men could have three months’ difference in seniority which would influence the date of their subsequent promotion to lieutenant and thus have some adverse financial implications for one of them. He furnished the names of five officers who were directly affected by this problem and requested that the seniority of all of them be back-dated to their initial assignment to his squadron.

HQ 1st Wg was not prepared to make an issue of Garrod’s complaint, its reply simply acknowledging that, while they might seem a little unfair, rules were rules. In effect, and somewhat predictably, Gossage and his staff appear to have taken the fairly robust view that one could not make an air force omelette without breaking some eggs – and, so long as they were observer eggs, this was of no real consequence. It might have been a different matter if they had been pilot eggs, of course, but there was no question of there being a ‘seniority gap’ for them. Pilots continued, as they always had done, to accrue seniority from the date on which they gained their ‘wings’, irrespective of their level of competence, or even whether they were on active service.

With hindsight we now know that this exchange of correspondence had been prompted by a misconception, the confusion having arisen because the associated regulations were still ill-defined and, as a result, poorly understood. Fortunately, while Lt-Col Gossage appears to have been insufficiently moved by the plight of observers to raise the matter with his brigadier, similar complaints must have been raised by units within V Bde and these had been forwarded up the chain. In responding to V Bde’s letter, HQ RAF was able to put everyone’s mind at rest. While seniority within the RAF could not, under any circumstances, date from earlier than 1 April 1918, officers could be ‘recommended for promotion to Lieutenant after 12 month’s commissioned service whether in the Army, Navy or Air Force.’ Clearly, therefore, Garrod’s misgivings had been groundless. The first of his men to qualify would have had his seniority in the Air Force List noted as 1 April while his colleague’s would have dated from the 2nd. This difference was of little practical significance, however, as both would still have been eligible for promotion to full lieutenant one year from the dates on which they had first been commissioned.³³

1918. The resolution of unusual cases.

While it was relatively unusual for commanders to take up the cases of observers with any enthusiasm, as Maj Garrod had done, he was not alone. For instance, when HQ RAF eventually publicised the final version of the regulations governing the qualification of observers in October 1918, Maj J F Jones submitted an appeal on behalf of the ten original observers of No 215 Sqn, all of whom had been gazetted with effect from 16 August. Since they had all joined the squadron before it left the UK, he invoked AMWO 795 to request that their seniority be amended to reflect either the dates on which each individual had joined the squadron (the earliest of which was 27 May) or that on which they had all flown to France, which was 2 July. HQ Independent Force backed the case, requesting that the Air Ministry action the earlier date.³⁴ Probably because the war was effectively over by the time the appeal reached London, from an examination of the personal records of these officers, no remedial action ever appears to have been taken.

While there were a few other instances of such formal complaints being given official backing, most were submitted by individual officers. As previously noted (see pages 56-57), since early 1917 the constantly changing pattern of regulations had prompted a steady stream of appeals from observers who suspected that their cases might have been mishandled or who considered that their peculiar circumstances warranted special consideration. The confusion of contradictory arrangements which had been implemented during 1918 had served only to increase the incidence of such submissions. Most of these sought either antedates of seniority or permission to wear an observers badge where this had previously been withheld. In many cases the applicants were not even asking to be formally gazetted as observer officers; they simply felt that, having done a modicum of operational flying, and often having been wounded or injured for their pains, they ought to have more to show for it than a limp.

The ultimate decision in such cases was (usually) taken by the Director of Air Personal Services (DAPS) at the Air Ministry, acting on advice received. In practice this meant that the matter was referred to HQ RAF who handed it down, via Brigade and Wing Headquarters, to the squadron on which the applicant had served. After examining the unit’s records, amplified by his personal impressions (if he could recall the subject of the enquiry), the CO would express his opinion and his response would wend its way back up the chain to London. Since they rarely knew anything about a particular case, it was unusual for any of the intermediate formations to add more than a token comment, so the final judgement eventually handed down by the Air Ministry frequently reflected the recommendation made at squadron level.

In most cases DAPS’ pronouncement was accepted as being final but, very occasionally, an applicant would appeal. For instance, in the spring of 1918 a Stores Officer, Lt Hugh Jones, requested permission to wear a flying ‘O’ on the grounds that he had done a substantial amount of flying with No 2 Sqn.³⁵ His claim was rejected because OC 2 Sqn could find no record of Jones ever having served with the unit. This provoked a second, more detailed submission and on further investigation it transpired that Jones had indeed served with No 2 Sqn (July 1912 to November 1914) and with No 7 Sqn (April 1915-January 1916) and that he had flown with both units. At the time, however, he had been Air Mechanic Jones, H (229); it had simply never occurred to anyone that the applicant might not have been an officer.

Most cases were much easier to settle. For example, although Capt R G Lucena had flown with No 1 Sqn in 1915, he had never been authorised to wear an observers badge and he eventually sought permission to do so.³⁶ On investigation, this turned out to have been a simple bureaucratic oversight, as Lucena had been formally categorised as a qualified observer as early as 16 July 1915; authority for him to wear his flying ‘O’ was granted on 11 July 1918.

On the other hand, 2/Lt F C Wallis was less successful when he tried his luck.³⁷ His submission was based on his claim that, having joined No 20 Sqn in late October 1917, he had made three non-operational and eight operational flights, one of which had involved an aerial combat, before being wounded in action on 17 November. Although he never flew again, and had not completed his certification, Wallis considered that this record ought to be sufficient to earn him at least the right to wear an observers badge. OC 20 Sqn disagreed, however, and Wallis’ request was denied.

The Wallis case did not reflect a definitive policy, however, and in very similar circumstances the authorities sometimes took a more generous view. For instance, by September 1917 2/Lt A L Sutcliffe of No 21 Sqn had flown about forty hours and passed the tests in artillery observation and signalling. When he was shot down on the wrong side of the lines on the 26th he was still unqualified, as he had yet to be certified in gunnery and photography. His right leg having been amputated six inches from the top, he was eventually repatriated in February 1918. His subsequent request that he be permitted to wear an observers badge was granted, although he was never formally gazetted.³⁸

A similar case was submitted by Lt J E Cross on 25 July 1918.³⁹ Slightly edited, his letter read as follows:

‘I joined No 11 Sqn on 24 October 1917. I passed all the specified tests and did several hours over the lines and 4½ hours on an Aerial Gunnery Course at Berck Plage, but crashed badly on 26 November during the Cambrai offensive – my pilot going temporarily insane in the air. I was in hospital for 7 weeks after that, but returned subsequently to the same squadron. My Squadron Commander recommended me for my ‘wing’ after the crash but I understand it was refused as I had not done sufficient flying.

After returning to the squadron I did several hours more, but was brought down, I understand by enemy antiaircraft guns on 13 January.⁴⁰ I sustained a compound and depressed fracture of the skull and was taken unconscious to hospital. I understand that I was again recommended for my ‘wing’ after that – and while I was in hospital the Wing Adjutant came to see me, and when I questioned him about it he said that it would go through all right. Whether he meant it or whether he said it to prevent me from worrying I do not know.

I have now been 6 months in hospital and my name has not yet appeared in the London Gazette as a Flying Officer. I understand also that I am unfit for further flying.’

If nothing else, this tale of woe provides a classic illustration of Sir Clement Bailhache’s point about the observer’s lack of autonomy. After all, while the presence of a mentally deranged observer might have been something of an inconvenience to a pilot, it was unlikely to cost him seven weeks in hospital. Sadly, however, it was decided that, despite his misfortunes, Cross had not suffered enough. Permission for him to wear an observers badge was denied.

When No 35 Sqn’s Intelligence Officer, 2/Lt G A Morris, was granted permission to wear an observer’s badge in May 1918 the squadron was flying FK 8s, but not this particular one; A2709 had been shot down back in April 1917. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)

Although the authorities tended to take a fairly hard line in such matters, they did make exceptions where appropriate. For instance, No 35 Sqn’s Intelligence Officer, 2/Lt G A Morris, frequently flew over the lines to verify reconaissance reports and to develop his ability to interpret photographs. In recognition of his having spent more than fifty hazardous hours in the air on such activities HQ V Bde sought permission for him to wear an observers badge.41 This request was granted by the GOC on 16 May 1918. Thus, although he never actually qualified as an observer and he does not appear as such in the Air Force List, 2/Lt Morris was officially authorised to wear a flying ‘O’.

This was not a unique case, another example being provided by Lt T L M Meares, an Armament Officer, who had flown several night raids in No 83 Sqn’s FE2bs.⁴² The GOC gave permission for him to wear a flying ‘O’ on 29 June. HQ V Bde’s submission concerning Meares had, incidentally, included the rather interesting statement that he ‘desires to remain an Armament Officer, as the chances of his becoming a pilot are very small, as he was severely wounded and lost an eye when serving with his Regiment.’ This would seem to indicate that, even as late as the summer of 1918, service as an observer was still regarded by some as being no more than a half-way stage to becoming a pilot. If, like Meares, there was little likelihood of realising such an ambition, it followed that there was little point in bothering to become an observer – even if it was nice to be able to wear one of their badges.

Since the resolution of each case generally reflected the opinion of just one man, usually the erstwhile Squadron Commander, as the foregoing examples suggest, there was almost bound to be some inconsistency in the decisions that were handed down. All of this could have been avoided, of course, if the RFC could only have overcome its reluctance to acknowledge the fact that, qualified or not, any observer flying in France, or anywhere else for that matter, was risking life and limb and that this really did deserve some small token of recognition. As noted above, in August 1918 the RAF did finally rule that all observers on active service would be entitled to wear a flying ‘O’. It had taken four years to prize this concession out of the authorities, however, and in the meantime many observers had died, denied even the right to wear a simple cloth badge.

Until the summer of 1917 there had rarely been any question that any observer who fell by the wayside while still on probation, including those who had been careless enough to be wounded or killed in action, had forfeited his right to wear a badge. By June of that year, however, some cursory consideration was being given to such cases via a routine monthly return of all observers struck off charge by each brigade. Instigated by HQ RFC, this requirement was later sustained by HQ RAF.

The return covered all deletions, including, apart from operational losses, those arising from accidents, sickness, postings and detachments. In each case a recommendation was made as to whether the individual concerned should be considered for any form of advancement. This provided, for instance, an opportunity to gazette a missing probationer as a flying officer (observer) so that, in the event that he had been taken prisoner, he would be entitled to the (then full) five shilling rate of flying pay, or to promote to lieutenant someone who had been killed flying as a 2nd lieutenant, or to suggest that a particularly capable observer should be made up to Flight Commander (which would still involve his having to retrain as a pilot). The returns were submitted via the Headquarters of each Brigade to St André-aux-Bois where they were consolidated and forwarded to the War Office/Air Ministry for any appropriate action with regard to the Gazette.

Since the August 1918 regulations had been drafted on the assumption that virtually all observers would be fully qualified on arrival, the requirement for this return had lapsed by October. There were, however, a number of unresolved instances of observers who had been killed or taken prisoner while still on probation during the transitional period immediately following the formation of the Service. HQ RAF subsequently sought the Air Ministry’s advice as to the disposal of these cases. As the status of these men had financial implications for their estates, the Ministry decided that, in view of the fact that they had become casualties, and to reflect the more generous spirit of the August regulations, they all deserved to be gazetted.

This involved HQ RAF’s having to conduct a lengthy trawl through its personnel records to identify all of the individuals involved. This exercise took six weeks and it was a fortnight after the Armistice before a list of 152 names could be despatched to London. The Air Ministry was able to take appropriate gazetting action for most of these men but, somewhat surprisingly (or perhaps not?), it was unable to trace any record of no fewer than thirty-four of them. In January 1919 HQ RAF was asked to provide any additional information which might help to identify these individuals.43 By this time the personnel staffs at all of the agencies concerned would have had little spare capacity to undertake such a task, as they would have been heavily involved in preparing for and then overseeing a massive programme of repatriation and demobilisation. By the end of that month entire units were disbanding or being reduced to cadre status at a rate of one per day, many of their records being destroyed in the process. Nevertheless, all of the lost sheep were eventually tracked down, permitting the loose ends to be neatly tied off.

Before moving on, there is one last aspect of the wearing of flying badges (of either variety) which is worth mentioning. Although anyone actually serving with the RFC or RNAS on 1 April 1918 had been automatically transferred to the RAF, anyone who elected not to remain in the new Service was able to return to his parent organisation during the next three (later extended to six) months. Furthermore, some erstwhile aviators had already returned to their original folds before the RAF had been established. This raised the question of whether these people should still be permitted to wear their ‘wings’. The Air Ministry initially indicated that it would consider applications from ex-RFC pilots on their individual merit. It was subsequently decided that this would be inappropriate, however, and in May 1918 it was ruled that in future flying badges were to be worn exclusively by RAF personnel.⁴⁴ The War Office and the Admiralty raised no objections and in October the former published its own regulation to the effect that ‘Pilot’s and Observer’s Wings are now badges peculiar to the Royal Air Force and are worn by Army officers only when serving with the Royal Air Force. They are not worn by officers after return to the Army.’⁴⁵ As will become clear later, this ruling was to have unfortunate consequences during WW II (see pages 272-274).

1918. The RAF grants its Observers status (apparently) equal to that of its pilots.

While most of the complications associated with their ranks and with the wearing of the flying ‘O’ had been overcome without too much animosity, the merging of the two air services had thrown up another problem to do with observers, and this one was rather more contentious. It will be recalled that the Admiralty, once it had taken the plunge and accepted that observers were people too, had decided that they would be eligible to hold executive appointments and had set their notional rank ceiling as high as Captain RN (see page 81). The RFC had never taken either of these steps, however, and it was now necessary to bring these mismatched policies into line. The Air Council deliberated and elected to round up, rather than down. At a meeting held on 1 May 1918 it was decided that, possibly subject to their having to complete a brief flying training course, all RAF observers should be eligible to hold appointments as Flight, Squadron or Wing Commanders, thus raising their potential rank ceiling to lieutenant-colonel.

The senior air commanders in France appear to have been appalled at this prospect, Trenchard and Salmond both protesting to the Air Ministry on the grounds that any such appointments would seriously damage the efficiency and morale of the RAF in the Field. The Air Council dismissed these objections, evidently taking the view that, as a matter of principle, ex-RNAS observers ought not to have their prospects blighted as a result of their having been press-ganged into the RAF. Conversely, it followed that ex-RFC observers could not be seen to be disadvantaged by comparison with their ex-naval colleagues. At a meeting held on 5 June the original decision was confirmed; the minutes recording:⁴⁶

‘In connection with the eligibility of observers for appointment as flight, squadron, or wing commander, it was agreed that each case should be considered on its merits.’

That was clear enough; any observer could hold a command appointment if he was good enough, and there had been no further mention of the tentative requirement for a nominal amount of pilot training. This outcome was duly publicised via a formal order.⁴⁷

Had they reflected a little more deeply, the two outraged generals would probably have realised that they need not have been quite so concerned. It would soon become apparent that the system had a built-in bias so strong that (apart from the handful of ex-RNAS men who had slipped through the net on the strength of their previous record) it proved to be virtually impossible for any observer to gain even a footing on the RAF’s promotion ladder.

This was an inevitable consequence of the RFC’s longstanding aircrew employment policy which had ensured that all senior RAF appointments (and in this instance ‘seniority’ began at captain) were held by pilots. Pilots, therefore, both made and approved all recommendations for promotions and appointments. The record plainly shows that, regardless of the Air Council’s enlightened ruling that the RAF was to be an ‘equal opportunities employer’, those in positions of influence and authority were quite capable of keeping the back-seater very firmly in his place. It was to be another half-century before navigators (or officers of any other trade for that matter) began to break through the ‘glass ceiling’ in any significant numbers.

The advent of increasingly capable aeroplanes, notably the Handley Page V/1500, began to raise the profile of the observer to the extent that there was some possibility of some of them actually being ranked as captains – and even of their flying as captain of a crew. Needless to say, neither prospect was realised. (Chaz Bowyer)

Despite the ingrained reluctance of the upper echelons of the hierarchy to give observers their due, there had been a distinct change in attitude at the working level and many junior pilots had come to appreciate their comrades-in-arms. This was to little avail, however, as the prominence that officialdom had accorded solely to pilots meant that their companions often failed to gain the credit which they sometimes felt they deserved. To judge from (ex-2/Lt) George Fuller’s recollection of his time with No 9 Sqn in 1918, this still rankled sixty years later.48

‘On every flight the reports of duties carried out […] were written by the pilot and handed in to the Squadron Office […] some of them certainly needed no press agents […] If the observers had been given the same opportunity they might have picked up a few more mentions [in despatches] or perhaps the odd decoration for their part in a joint effort.’

Fuller was not alone in observing on an imbalance in the award of decorations; another was James Stedman who noted, in recalling his time with No 100 Sqn in 1918⁴⁹ (see also a post-war reflection by John Andrews on pages 30-31):

‘[…] my pilot was awarded an MC for his work and the CO told me that he was recommending me for one, but I was not to be too hopeful because the theory was that observers did not need to be brave: they just went where their pilots took them. So I did not get it.’

Nevertheless, despite the deep-rooted opposition to the idea of an observer’s being allowed to attain any sort of standing and an, at least perceived, reluctance to grant him any recognition, there were signs that, had the war continued, this situation just might have been about to change. If such a breakthrough was ever going to happen anywhere, it would probably have occurred in the very long-range squadrons of the Independent Force.

On 29 August 1918 Lt-Col R H Mulock, commander of the prospective, élite V/1500-equipped No 27 Group, wrote that ‘… the Observer will in all probability be the Captain of the machine.’ In view of his earlier opposition to observers being given any executive responsibility, it seems improbable that Trenchard would have endorsed Mulock’s proposals. On the other hand, the GOC was well aware of the vital role that the observer was expected to play in long-range navigation in the future and he did agree to the appointment of one observer per V/1500 squadron in the rank of captain, which suggests that he may have begun to moderate his view.⁵⁰

This concession was eventually reflected in an amendment to the official establishment of a V/1500 squadron.⁵¹ It is interesting to note that, uniquely, each V/1500 was established to have its own crew, there being four crews/aircraft per squadron. A crew consisted of nineteen men in all, eight of them for flying duties. There were to be four pilots, one of them a captain, two engine fitters and two W/T operators, all four of the mechanics being dual qualified as aerial gunners. Oddly enough, however, an observer was not provided, although there were to be six of them on the strength of the HQ Flight, these presumably being assigned as required on a mission-by-mission basis.

A precedent for observers ranked as captains had actually been created a month before Trenchard agreed to their provision on V/1500 squadrons. As early as 27 August the following footnote had been added to the official establishment of O/400 squadrons of the Independent Force:52 ‘Of the total 10 Observers, 1 may be a Captain Observer for duty as Navigation Officer.’ Note that the man filling the post did not have to be a captain; it was merely permissible for him to be one. In practice, of course, captain observers were such rare animals that few (if any) bomber squadrons were able to take immediate advantage of this amendment.⁵³ So far as V/1500s were concerned, the Armistice precluded their being committed to operations, so Mulock’s remarkably advanced ideas on captaincy were never put to the test.⁵⁴

The status of the Observer in the German Air Service.

It is actually somewhat misleading to describe ‘Red’ Mulock’s ideas as ‘remarkably advanced’, as this was true only within the blinkered society of the RFC/RAF. After all, the RNAS had accepted, at least the possibility of, observer captains in 1917. Because the Navy had so few qualified observers, however, it is doubtful whether many (any?) of them were ever formally nominated as aircraft captains or commanded operational units before April 1918. Once the RNAS had been absorbed into the ultra-conservative RAF, of course, its back-seaters were consigned to the anonymous obscurity that was so familiar to their RFC colleagues.

While the RF C/RAF was not alone in confining executive authority exclusively to pilots, there were air forces which took a more liberal view. This was particularly true within Germany’s Luftstreitkräfte, where:⁵⁵

‘The observer, invariably an officer, was as a rule the person actually responsible in an aeroplane. This was not only the case in giant aeroplanes, of which the Commander was generally an observer, but also in smaller types where the pilots were frequently of noncommissioned rank.’

Why did the Germans take such a different view? Perhaps, their Junker tradition permitted them to associate leadership with the officer class, without being distracted by the largely irrelevant issue of which seat a man occupied in an aeroplane. But there is a far more rational explanation. Until 1916 the activities of aeroplanes were largely confined to reconnaissance, the direction of artillery fire and photography. Logic suggested that these functions would be best discharged by someone with sufficient knowledge and experience to be able to interpret the implications of what he saw on the ground and in whom it would be possible to invest the authority needed in order to take tactical decisions. Clearly, that would require an officer, but it did not follow that both members of a crew needed to be commissioned. The upshot was that, it soon became standard practice within the German air services for an observer (Beobachter) to be an officer, whereas his pilot, whose function was perceived to be little more than that of a chauffeur, was not.

The Beobachterzeichen, the German observers badge, was worn, low down on the left side of the tunic, below the breast pocket.

The fact that a German back-seater was an officer and in command of the machine, did not, of course, insulate him from the dangers inherent in flying, as observed by Arthur Pfleger:⁵⁶

‘‘Franz’ was the nickname for the observer, a much-harassed creature who had to hand over – at the risk of a disastrous death – his life to ‘Emil’, his pilot, and who was responsible for ensuring that the tasks were carried out.’

Time did not stand still, of course, and the gradual broadening of the operational spectrum meant that the Luftstreitkräfte was subject to much the same evolutionary pressures as those which affected the RFC. For instance, after spending some time driving two-seaters, it was common practice for German pilots to be transferred to single-seat fighters, many of them eventually being commissioned. Similarly, from 1916 onwards an increasing scarcity of suitable material led to the introduction of enlisted men and NCOs as back-seaters, especially, as in the RFC, in aeroplanes in which their functions were largely confined to aerial gunnery.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, despite the introduction of aerial gunners, most German observers continued to be commissioned and, as officers, there was no bar to their being appointed to command operational units. One prominent example is provided by Oberleutnant Paul Freiherr von Pechmann who, having previously led Flieger-Abteilung (Artillerie) 215 (FAA 215) during 1917, was CO of FAA 217 when it played a leading role in the German offensive of March 1918. Another was Hauptmann Hermann Köhl, Gruppen-kommandeur of the AEG G.IV-equipped Bogohl 7 in 1918.

Furthermore, because the Germans were able to recognise that command of a unit involved its management and the direction of operations, which did not necessarily involve flying, they could even accept the appointment of observers as executives within their fighter force. This was never a common practice but a notable example was Hauptmann Erhard Milch, who, despite his ‘objections that he could not fly himself’, was given command of Jagdgruppe Nr 6, a formation which controlled four squadrons of single-seat fighters.58

The award of decorations was another field in which German practice contrasted sharply with that of the British. There were, of course, differences in the national criteria used to decide whose gallantry or service should be recognised but the fact remains that all nineteen airmen decorated with the Victoria Cross during WW I were pilots. Why were there no observers among them? It cannot have been because they never did anything very brave, because there were, for example, several instances of back-seaters saving the lives of wounded and incapacitated pilots, sometimes by climbing out of their cockpits to stand on the wing so that they could reach the controls. Such actions might win an observer an MC, but never a VC.

Unlike the RAF, the German air services were quite content to recognise the efforts of their observers. For instance, of the eleven aviators awarded Bavaria’s highest military honour, the Militar-Max-Joseph Orden, four were observers. Allowing for the numerical preponderance of pilots (every aeroplane has, at least, one, whereas only some need an observer) this would appear to have been a reasonable statistical outcome. Within the German armed forces, a special cachet attached to the Prussian Orden Pour le Mérite, the ‘Blue Max’, of which eighty-one were awarded to aviators. Predictably, the lion’s share of these, sixty-two, went to the glamorous coterie of single-seat fighter pilots, leaving nineteen for the rest. Of these, six were awarded to observers (Brandenburg, Horn, von Grone, Müller-Kahle, Nielebock and Schreiber), two went to officers who, although technically qualified as pilots, wore the badge of, flew as and were specifically decorated for their services as, observers (Griebsch and von Pechmann) and one went to a balloon observer (Rieper).⁵⁹

In the context of this book, one of these Pour le Mérite holders is of particular significance. He was Hauptmann Ernst Brandenburg, Gruppenkommandeur of Kagohl 3 in 1917. He led, and flew in, his unit’s Gotha G.IVs during the opening phase of the German air assault on the UK which began in May. The shock caused by the 162 fatalities inflicted by a daylight raid on London on 13 June was the greatest single factor leading, via the Smuts Report, to the establishment of an Air Ministry and the amalgamation of the RFC and RNAS. Since the RAF, which was so consistently dismissive of back-seaters, could be said to owe its very existence to the men who bombed London in 1917, there is an exquisite irony in the fact that they had been led by an observer.

Hauptmann Ernst Brandenburg, Gruppenkommandeur of Kagohl 3, wearing his observers badge (below the Iron Cross 1st Class) and the emblem of the Blue Max. No British observer was ever decorated with his country’s highest award and it was inconceivable that any would have been permitted to command a squadron, yet, in a sense, it was this German observer who had been responsible for the creation of the Royal Air Force.

________________________

¹      Since it is potentially very misleading, the figure of 1,764 gazetted observers deserves some amplification. Although it will have been a reasonably accurate reflection of the number of qualified observers carried on the RAF’s books, in practice nothing like this total would have been available for operations. For instance, substantial numbers were being employed on administrative or experimental duties. Others, still technically graded as observers, were undergoing training as pilots. Yet another sizeable group was ineffective, having sustained wounds or injuries, while others had been imprisoned in Germany and Turkey or interned in Holland. Finally, it should be appreciated that a substantial proportion of the observers who had been shot down had been posted ‘Missing in Action’ and these men remained on the active list until their deaths had been confirmed or were presumed.

Based on the notional establishments of the squadrons constituting the RAF’s Order of Battle on 1 April 1918, it is possible to make a reasonable guess at the broad distribution of the observers available at the time. If some allowance is made for significant variations in the manning of squadrons in the ‘side-show’ theatres and among those originating within the RNAS, and if the demands of units working up to operational status are included, this calculation suggests an overall requirement for something like 1,000 qualified ‘front-line’ observers, leaving about 750 in the non-operational margins.

²      The Navy List for 18 March 1918 (the last to be published prior to the formation of the RAF) indicates that the RNAS actually had 306 observers on its books at that time. The RAF listed only those who were fully qualified, however, and 125 of the naval contingent were probationary observer officers, the new Service affording them the same interim status as RFC flight cadets. Interestingly, even allowing for a handful who may have fallen by the wayside (eg those who had been regraded as pilots, had switched to some other trade or had become casualties) it would seem unlikely that many more than 350 sets of RNAS observers badges were ever issued.

³      Details of these arrangements were first announced in AMWO 432 of 12 June 1918. Almost inevitably, because the new Service’s RFC-dominated administration was conditioned to paying little heed to back-seaters, the language used had made AMWO 432 applicable exclusively to ex-RNAS pilots. The situation had to be redressed by publication of a separate Order (AMWO 579 of 3 July), extending the provisions of AMWO 432 to cover erstwhile naval observers.

⁴      AMWO 330 of 22 May 1918 authorised all RAF officers qualified as aeroplane, seaplane or kite balloon observers, or as free balloon pilots, to wear a single-winged flying ‘O’, the retention of the RFC-style badge having been announced on 1 May (see Note 14).

⁵      AMWO 524 of 26 June 1918 amplified the position regarding ex-naval balloonists. It confirmed that, notwithstanding the fact that they may have been ‘graded as Flying Officers’, ie pilots, in the RNAS, they were now to wear the RFC-style observers badge.

⁶      AMWO 525 of 26 June 1918 extended the provisions of Order 330 (see Note 4) to embrace similarly qualified non-commissioned personnel.

⁷      AIR/1/401/15/231/42. Amendment, dated 30 April 1918, to establishment AF/H/77.

⁸      From a letter published in Flight for 20 January 1956 in which, by then Professor (of Economics at Cambridge), Austin Robinson recalled various aspects of the Curtiss and Felixstowe boats of WW I.

⁹      AMWO 916 of 29 August 1918 required that, wherever possible, any remaining aerial gunlayers and/or aerial gunners should be remustered as observers.

¹⁰    AIR2/91. Minute dated 19 September 1918 on file C.49935 from Lt-Col R Wilson to the Director of Training, Brig-Gen J G Hearson.

¹¹    AMWO 1199 of 10 October 1918. In this connection it may be worth pointing out that the ‘hand and thunderbolt’ arm badge, which had been introduced with the formation of the RAF and had originally been worn only by wireless mechanics, had been reassigned exclusively to wireless operators by AMWO 1066 of 19 September 1918. This did not make it an ‘aircrew’ badge, however (as has sometimes been suggested); it was a ‘trade’ badge worn by ground personnel.

¹²    AIR10/64. Pages 30-31 of FS 39, Training Courses in the RAF for Commissioned and Non-commissioned Personnel, showing Status and Pay, published in October 1918.

¹³    AIR2/91. A copy of the draft AMWO of 24 October 1918 is on this file. It is annotated in manuscript ‘Reconsider whole question’. The likely outcome is that these men would eventually have been authorised to wear a simple ‘O’ badge, without a wing (see page 127).

¹⁴    AM Monthly Order 162 of 1 May 1918 advised that the form of dress for RAF officers for the rest of the war was to be an army-style khaki uniform, essentially a military Service Dress tunic, less the epaulettes, with RNAS pattern buttons and with a fabric belt in place of the Sam Browne. Rank was to be denoted by RN-style rings in khaki braid on the sleeves, surmounted by an RNAS-pattern eagle and a crown. Aircrew were to wear on the left breast an appropriate badge, RAF-monogrammed ‘wings’, otherwise reflecting exactly the RFC pattern, for pilots and an unmodified RFC-style flying ‘O’ for all other recognised aviators.

A light blue uniform embellished with gold braid had already been approved but this was optional and only to be worn as Mess Dress. On 10 July AMWO 617 introduced changes to some details of the blue uniform, including the deletion of the eagle and crown at the cuffs, and authorised its routine use for daily wear as a replacement for the interim khaki pattern.

No timeframe was laid down for the adoption of either the interim khaki or the permanent blue uniforms beyond the fact that they were to be used to replace existing outfits when these wore out In the meantime AMWO 99 of 17 April had sustained the use of RFC and RNAS badges, pending the introduction of RAF equivalents, and authorised all personnel to continue to wear their current uniforms. These included the distinctive RFC ‘maternity jacket’, a variety of naval rigs and virtually the entire range of regimental outfits with their differently cut tunics and their associated bonnets, trews, riding breeches and so on. The possession of any of these automatically marked the wearer as being an ‘old hand’ and (perhaps for that very reason) some officers continued to wear their original kit for many months. As a result, the RAF presented a distinctly mongrel appearance at first, although a modicum of drab khaki uniformity, relieved by the occasional splash of slightly Ruritanian blue and gold, was apparent by the summer of 1918.

On 3 October 1918 AMWO 1140 laid down that the only uniforms permitted to be worn in public were the adapted army-style khaki and the RAF blue. Other patterns could still be worn, but only as working dress, ie within the confines of a camp, barracks or aerodrome. On 1 January 1919 the Air Council ruled that no further army-style uniforms were to be purchased, although this never appears to have been promulgated as a regulation. The implementation of demobilisation on a massive scale soon after this meant that the pale blue uniform was to gain little currency before being superseded by the familiar RAF blue-grey with effect from 1 October 1919, on the authority of AMWO 1049 of 15 September.

¹⁵    AMWO 795 of 8 August 1918.

¹⁶    Note that earlier references to HQ VI Bde have related to the organisation which had become HQ Training Brigade in July 1916. The dormant VI Bde number plate was reactivated on 12 October 1917 when it was applied to HQ Home Defence Brigade. Although it had no direct association with its predecessor, the new VI Bde did have a permanent training commitment as it was responsible for instruction in night flying, both for its own crews and for those earmarked for night bombers.

¹⁷    AMWO 1091 of 26 September 1918.

¹⁸    This extract is drawn from the reminiscences of Arthur Henry Taylor, published in the spring 2010 edition of Intercom. Taylor had joined the RFC in November 1917 and, following ‘boot camp’ at Aldershot, he became an observer. Commissioned in August 1918, having followed the Bath, Eastchurch, Hythe/New Romney sequence, he became one of the first observers to be awarded his badge automatically on completion of training.

¹⁹    This extract is drawn from C H Latimer-Needham’s personal account of his wartime experiences published in 1974 in Cross & Cockade (Great Britain) Journal, Vol 5, Nos 2 and 3.

²⁰    He meant the Australian Flying Corps. For details of the badge, see Chapter 12, Note 9. To be pedantic, while the term ‘brevet’ was, and still is, commonplace, it is a misnomer. A brevet (French for certificate) is the document that signifies that an individual is qualified and therefore entitled to wear an appropriate flying badge. Regardless of its almost universal misuse in crew room patois, officialdom never used the term in formal correspondence – until standards finally began to slip in the 21st Century (see also Annex L).

²¹    AIR1/1995/204/273/222. The original three-month grace period was subsequently extended to six months by AMWO 426 of 12 June 1918, HQ RAF RO 815 of 3 October 1918 declaring 6 October to be the final cut-off date.

²²    Within a rigidly hierarchical organisation, such a casual approach to a matter as fundamental as seniority simply could not suffice. AMWO 370 of 1 June 1918 provided further advice to the effect that relative seniority among officers of the same permanent rank would be decided by their date of appointment to that rank. All officers holding temporary rank, ie the vast majority, would be junior to those holding corresponding permanent rank and were to take precedence among themselves according to their date of appointment to their temporary rank.

²³    AMWO 195 of 2 May 1918 noted that the Air Ministry had received a number of enquiries from officers regarding their seniority in the initial RAF Gradation List, ie as at 1 April. It is evident that the List had contained some errors and, until these could be corrected, it was ruled that it should be regarded as being merely a nominal roll of officers serving with the RAF who were, for the time being, to take seniority in accordance with their previous seniority within the RN or Army. When the next List appeared in August it contained numerous detailed changes, eg among the observers, the relative positions of Lts V D Fernald, P E H Van Baerle and V O Lonsdale, who had been listed in that order in April, had been reversed.

²⁴    AIR1/1078/204/5/1677. HQ RAF appears to have been notified of this change in policy by Air Ministry letter 47921 (P4b) dated 25 May 1918. This writer has failed to find a copy of this letter but specific references to it in related correspondence, eg HQ RAF’s AL/R/8 of 16 July, leave no doubt as to its content.

²⁵    Ibid. Most of the questions were raised Lt-Col Adrian Clark in France, seeking the resolution of apparent inconsistencies between certain recent AMWOs. Most of the answers were contained in Air Ministry letters 47921/1918(P4b) of 9 August and C.23632(P4b) of 7 September 1918, written by Maj S C Raffles and Capt C F Apthorp on behalf of Col R H More, the Deputy Director of Personal Air Services in London.

²⁶    AIR1/1995/204/273/222. HQ RAF RO 815 of 3 October 1918.

²⁷    Ibid. The definitive regulations governing the appointment of kite balloon officers were published in HQ RAF RO 819 of 10 October.

²⁸    AIR1/1078/204/5/1677. In commenting on the forms of expression used in a draft HQ RAF Order concerning kite balloon officers, which Lt-Col Clark had submitted to London for vetting, Maj Raffles noted that the term ‘observer’ was considered to be inappropriate in connection with balloonists and that it was no longer used by the Air Ministry in this context. This advice was offered in Air Ministry letter C.23632 (P4b) dated 3 October 1918.

²⁹    AIR1/872/204/5/552. HQ RFC reproduced the relevant paragraph from Army Order 1520 in its Routine Orders for 21 April 1916; it was subsequently repeated on, for instance, 20 October 1916.

³⁰    Consider, for example, the case of 2/Lt V F S Dunton who had joined No 1 Sqn as a pilot in November 1917. The specific reason is not known but he had presumably proved to be unsatisfactory in that capacity and on 1 February 1918 he was regraded as an ‘observer (on probation)’ and attached to No 57 Sqn, the point being that the ‘probationary’ tag applied to his trade, not his rank. To complete the tale, having qualified as an observer, Dunton spent three months flying with No 27 Sqn before returning to the UK to retrain yet again, this time as an airship pilot.

³¹    AIR1/983/204/5/1169. HQ RAF drew attention to the inappropriate use of the term ‘probationer’ in its Routine Orders for 10 September 1918.

³²    AIR1/1028/204/5/1416 contains the related correspondence.

³³    AIR1/1078/204/5/1677. This advice was provided by HQ RAF in its letter AL/R/8 of 27 June 1918. In fact, however, it would seem that the Air Ministry had probably acted unilaterally in introducing a twelve-month interval before promotion to lieutenant, this having been announced by AMWO 304 of 22 May 1918, as eighteen months was usual in the Army, certainly since the publication of Army Council Instruction 1253 of 12 August 1917. Since there were clearly financial implications here, the Treasury stepped in to object to the RAF’s procedure. An appeal, on the rather dubious grounds that it was more dangerous to be a flyer than an infantryman, was rejected on the basis that aviators were already amply compensated for the risks they ran by the issue of flying pay. The RAF was eventually obliged to come to heel and it adopted an eighteen-month rule in October 1918.

³⁴    AIR1/1989/204/273/147. No 215 Sqn letter 215/1805 of 5 October 1918 and HQ Independent Force letter IFA 1/6 dated 12 November.

³⁵    AIR1/1028/204/5/1416 contains the correspondence relating to this case.

³⁶    Ibid.

³⁷    Ibid.

³⁸    AIR1/1027/204/5/1415 contains the correspondence relating to this case.

³⁹    AIR1/1028/204/5/1416 contains the correspondence relating to this case.

⁴⁰    AIR1/2011/204/305/11. No 11 Sqn’s Casualty Returns do not indicate whom Cross’s mad companion might have been on 26 November but his pilot on 13 January was probably 2/Lt J H Hartley. Interestingly, despite the verbal reassurances which Cross claimed to have been given, the entries against his name on both Casualty Returns submitted by his squadron specifically did not recommend that he should be confirmed as an observer.

⁴¹    AIR1/1028/204/5/1416 contains the correspondence relating to this case.

⁴²    Ibid.

⁴³    AIR1/1078/204/5/1677. The list of 152 ungazetted probationary observers, most of whom had become casualties of one kind or another, was covered by HQ RAF letter AL/R/8 dated 26 November 1918. Air Ministry letter C.56065(P4b) contained London’s request for additional information on thirty-four of these men.

⁴⁴    AMWO 168 of 2 May 1918.

⁴⁵    ACI 1110 of 7 October 1918.

⁴⁶    AIR8/5. Minutes of the 59th Meeting of Air Members of the Air Council, ie not the full Air Council, held on 5 June 1918.

⁴⁷    AMWO 577 of 26 June 1918 proclaimed the policy that RAF Observer Officers, specifically including those not qualified as pilots, would be eligible for consideration for appointments as Flight, Squadron and Wing Commanders. Apart from the one recorded at Note 46 above, original documents relating to the discussions leading to this decision have proved elusive but a copy of the relevant extract from the minutes of the 1 May meeting is contained in AIR2/91/C.49935. A summary of the discussions of 5 June is also on file as Air Historical Branch précis AM/C1025 which may be found in AIR1/683/21/13/2234.

⁴⁸    This extract is drawn from G S B Fuller’s personal account of his wartime experiences published in 1978 in Cross & Cockade (Great Britain) Journal, Vol 9, No 3.

⁴⁹    From J Stedman’s memoirs published in 2009 in Cross & Cockade International Journal, Vol 40, No 2.

⁵⁰    AIR1/462/15/312/121. Trenchard’s agreement to the establishment of one captain observer per squadron was recorded in the Minutes of a conference held, under his personal chairmanship, on 30 September 1918 to discuss a variety of topics relating to the Independent Force.

⁵¹    AIR1/1988/204/273/138. This file contains copies of the original establishment for a V/1500 squadron (AF/F/39 dated 6 June 1918), of the final version (AF/IF/6 dated 28 August) and of the amendment of 10 October reflecting the post of a captain observer.

⁵²    Note that, by this time, there were two establishments extant for O/400s, AF/F/38 (in succession to the original universal – for Handley Page units – AF/F/16 – see Figure 14 on page 96) for units operating under HQ RAF, and AF/F/46 (soon to be superseded by AF/IF/5) for squadrons of the Independent Force.

⁵³    Possibly prompted by the anticipated early introduction of directional wireless equipment, on 29 October 1918 HQ Independent Force nominated three experienced observers for acting captaincies. They were Lt E D Harding, 2/Lt R P Keely and 2/Lt (Hon Lt) J F D Tanqueray.

⁵⁴    Remarkably, considering that he was a pilot, ‘Red’ Mulock’s willingness to recognise the capabilities of observers indicates that he did not feel at all threatened by them. This may well have been accounted for by the fact that he was an ex-RNAS man and thus reflected the positive attitude towards back-seaters which characterised that Service by 1918 but which was still sorely lacking within the RFC.

⁵⁵    Georg Paul Neumann, op cit, p89.

⁵⁶    Franz in Feur, a first-hand account of the experiences of a German air observer, Hauptmann Arthur Pfleger, a translation of which was published in Cross & Cockade International Journal, Vol 32, No 4 (2001).

⁵⁷    For a concise but comprehensive account of training in the German Air Force of 1914-18, readers are referred to a two-part article by Dr Hannes Täger, which was published in Cross & Cockade International Journal, Vol 34, Nos 2 and 3 (2003). In the specific context of recruiting, Täger notes that in 1917, in order to prevent applications being blocked by field commanders, the German High Command (the Oberste Heeresleitung) issued an edict making it compulsory for all requests for aircrew service to be forwarded to higher authority, mirroring the steps that Haig had been obliged to take on the British side of the lines in the previous year (see Chapter 5, Note 24 and Chapter 8, Note 6).

⁵⁸    David Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe (1973), p10. Milch, who had qualified as an observer in 1915, did become a licensed pilot after the war and was Managing Director of Deutsche Lufthansa before becoming a founder-member of the Luftwaffe and, in 1940, a Generalfeldmarschall.

⁵⁹    See, for instance, Peter Kilduff, Germany’s First Air Force (1991) and Terry Treadwell and Alan Wood, German Knights of the Air (1997).