Planning for the last lap – and after.
The revision of air crew categories in 1942 had been tailored to suit the operational practices of the time, the changes that were made having been driven mainly by the need to rationalise the functions of the seven-man crew of a four-engined heavy bomber (see page 221). While this had more or less established the pattern for the remainder of the war, the size and shape of the air force did not remain the same, nor did the classic seven-man crew suit all aeroplanes. For instance, the late-mark Liberators of 1944-45 were significantly more expensive in terms of manpower than their British equivalents.
Furthermore, the crew complement varied depending upon the role in which they were employed. For example a Liberator Mk VI, operating over the Atlantic on very long-range maritime duties, required a crew of eight (two pilots, two Nav(B)s, a flight engineer, two WOps(air) and a WOM(air), the last three all being additionally qualified as both gunners and ASV operators). By contrast the normal crew complement of a similar airframe being flown as a heavy bomber in India was eleven (two pilots, a navigator, an air bomber, a WOp(air), a WOp/AG, a flight engineer and four air gunners).
American aeroplanes tended to make much heavier demands on manpower resources than their British counterparts. A Liberator bomber, like this Mk VI, EW157 of No 356 Sqn, needed a crew of as many as eleven. (G J Thomas) By comparison, a Lancaster, like this one (below) NG347 QB·P of No 424 Sqn, normally flew with a crew of only seven. (Chaz Bowyer)
To investigate the possibility of resolving some of these inconsistencies, while making a start on considering the RAF’s post-war requirements, in September 1944 Air Chf Mshl Sir Sholto Douglas was appointed to chair a Committee on the Composition of Air Crew. It was initially charged with answering two basic questions:1
a. What changes needed to be made to the current composition of air crews, and to their relative grading and rates of pay?
b. Which air crew categories would be required after the war and what should be their relative gradings?
Having consulted widely across the Service, the Douglas Committee’s report produced a number of recommendations in response to the first of these questions. The more important of these may be summarised as follows:
a. The categories of navigator (B) and air bomber were now so similar that they could safely be amalgamated. Current air bombers would continue to serve but no more should be trained and the category should be allowed to waste away.
b. Since they were really a legacy of the pre-flight engineer era, Coastal Command’s dual-qualified air gunners (flight mechanic) had become something of an anachronism. They too should be allowed to fade away, those who were suitably qualified being remustered as flight engineers.
c. Experience had shown that requiring the WOM(air) to have the high-grade skills of a Group I tradesmen had been unnecessary. In practical terms, he could do little more in the air than replace suspect electronic boxes, a task that was well within the capabilities of (and was often carried out by) the WOp(air). The separate category of the WOM(air) should, therefore, also be permitted to wither away.
d. The grading of WOps(air) should be abandoned because it was a very cumbersome and unsatisfactory procedure which had given rise to a number of unfortunate anomalies.
Apart from the committee’s own ideas, its trawl of the various commands had stimulated a number of additional proposals. For instance, Transport Command had recommended that the RAF should introduce an air crew category of ‘despatcher’ to supervise the RASC personnel, ie soldiers, who actually did much of the work involved in the airdropping of supplies. It was further requested that a category of ‘air quartermaster’ be introduced to oversee passengers and the loading and unloading of freight on long-haul routes. While the committee recognised the need for RAF personnel to act as air quartermasters and/or despatchers, it was not persuaded that they needed to have air crew status. After all, Douglas was trying to reduce the number of air crew categories, not create new ones. It was considered that the demand could be adequately satisfied by continuing to rely on army air despatchers and by using airmen from an existing trade for the other tasks.2 This fell a long way short of what Transport Command had had in mind, but it had to suffice until the 1960s.
On the other hand, the Douglas Committee accepted that the status of meteorological air observers was long overdue for formal recognition and recommended the authorisation of their air crew badge (see page 258). While it may be no more than a coincidence, of course, it may not be without significance that, whereas he had dismissed Transport Command’s suggestion, Sir Sholto Douglas had approved a not dissimilar bid from Coastal Command – of which he just happened to be the AOCinC at the time.
The committee ruled favourably on another of Coastal Command’s submissions, recommending the introduction of the entirely new air crew category of the radar operator (air). He was to be of PNB quality and take over the responsibility for ASV currently discharged by the WOp(air), and the WOM(air), many of whom were expected to be remustered to the new specialisation. If a specialist category were to be introduced to handle ASV, however, it was considered that it would no longer be appropriate to pay the shilling-a-day allowance that had previously been paid to suitably qualified WOps(air) (see page 197). This rationale was based on a precedent established by Bomber Command which had initially assigned responsibility for the operation of GEE to the WOp/AG who, like his ASV-qualified counterpart in Coastal Command, had been paid an extra shilling-a-day for his pains. This arrangement had not lasted for very long, however, as responsibility for this equipment was soon transferred to the navigator. Apart from being more practical, this was also a much cheaper option because, it was argued, GEE was a basic tool of the navigator’s trade so it was neither necessary nor appropriate to pay him anything extra for looking after it.
Bomber Command had submitted two proposals for consideration. The committee agreed to recommend the introduction of a new sub-category of air gunner (radar), to handle the anticipated early introduction of Automatic Gun Laying Turrets, but rejected a similar request for formal recognition of the special duty operator, ie German linguists and others who handled certain airborne jamming and deception devices.
The only other significant suggestion was sponsored jointly by Transport and Coastal Commands, both of whom wanted flight engineers to be selected from PNB quality candidates. While the abilities of current flight engineers were adequate for Bomber Command’s purposes, it was contended that many had experienced difficulty handling the additional maintenance requirements demanded by aircraft which routinely operated away from base. The committee acknowledged that a problem existed but considered that it could be solved by better management of the existing resources, ie by ensuring that flight engineers posted to Transport and Coastal Commands already had a substantial amount of experience and/or were basically qualified as fitter Is or IIs, rather than being first tourist direct entrants. The proposal was rejected.
Finally, the committee noted that air crew pay scales had become so complicated that by 1944 there were nine different rates applicable to sergeants alone. It recommended that all NCO air crew should be classified as belonging to one of only three grades, each of which would have an appropriate pay scale. No proposals were made with respect to the pay of officers.
Moving on to the second question – the long-term future requirement – the committee concluded that the (currently) thirteen categories and sub-categories3 of wartime air crew would be overspecialised for peacetime purposes. It therefore recommended that these should be reduced to just five, tentatively identified as pilot, navigator/bomb aimer, flight engineer, radio operator (air) and air gunner/armourer. It was recognised, however, that it would be unwise to attempt to implement such a sweeping change until the fighting was actually over.
As to relative grading, the committee recommended that all five categories ‘should be of equal status as regards conditions of service and rates of pay.’ This degree of equality was justified on the grounds of the significantly increased level of technical skill that it was proposed to demand of the lineal descendants of the ‘non-PNB’ trades.
While acknowledging that it was exceeding its brief, having spent some time reflecting on the provision of postwar air crew, the Douglas Committee considered it appropriate to offer some further thoughts on their status. It recommended that the granting of commissions should be restricted to the numbers required to do specific jobs, ie to fill executive and leader posts on squadrons and associated appointments at station level, and on the specialist staffs at headquarters. That would mean that the vast majority of air crew would be airmen and the committee considered that they should revert to ‘the normal Service custom of working up through the ranks.’4 This was not enlarged upon, but it plainly implied doing away with the wartime policy of ‘instant NCOs and 50% officers’ and reinstating something like the aircraftmen gunners of the 1920s, except that this time, even pilots were to be consigned to oblivion.
After it had begun work the Douglas Committee had been asked to consider two further topics, captaincy and air crew badges. The question of badges is dealt with separately below but, so far as captaincy was concerned, somewhat predictably, the committee recommended that ‘normally the captain of (an) aircraft should be the first pilot.’ It did go on to concede that, ‘exceptionally, other members of air crew of proven merit and experience should be eligible for selection’, the unavoidable implication clearly being that pilots did not need to display any particular degree of merit or to have accumulated any worthwhile degree of experience. This did little more than endorse the status quo but the committee did stress two points which had originally been raised in the Inspector General’s Report of 1943 (see page 267). First, that, in heavy aircraft, the captain should always be an officer and, secondly, that this should also be the case where crews of mixed status were concerned, although it was not considered practical to insist that he must also be the senior man on board.
Rather like Sefton Brancker’s proposals of late 1918, all of this turned out to be too late. Within days of the Douglas Committee’s recommendations being published, the war in Europe ended. The formal recognition of the flying ‘Met men’ had already been authorised but most of the other changes which had been recommended were overtaken by events. Had the war continued into 1946, as had seemed likely when the committee had been set up, several of its other proposals would probably have been implemented but the sudden ending of hostilities in August 1945 rendered any interim changes redundant. Attention now needed to be focused on the post-war situation.
The desirability of twin-winged air crew badges is reconsidered.
Having last been subjected to serious scrutiny in 1942 (see pages 224-225), the contentious issue of air crew badges had lain dormant for a year. There had been a brief flurry of interest in March 1943 when a proposal, which would have reorganised the various air crew trades into thirteen categories and redesignated some of their badges, was under consideration. In commenting on this idea, Air Cdre H Gordon-Dean suggested that the whole business of badges was out of control. Pointing out that no attempt was made to distinguish between different types of pilot, he failed to see why it was necessary to do so for non-pilots. He considered, therefore, that ‘all air crew other than pilots should be satisfied with one common brevet’ which, he suggested, might be an ‘AC’.5
Nothing came of this and the subject of air crew badges was sidelined again. That is not to say, however, that it was no longer a sensitive issue. Although most senior officers (all of whom were pilots) preferred to brush the question aside, there can be no doubt that some of the ‘half-a-badge’ fraternity harboured some feelings of resentment. Apart from the perceived indignity of having to wear a badge with only one wing, there was dissatisfaction with the fact that the badge worn by pilots featured an ‘RAF’ monogram. Some questioned the logic of this. Were not all British flyers members of the RAF? However many wings pilots decided to award themselves, would it not be more appropriate for them to be identified by a ‘P’?
Then again, some people were irked by the fact that a pilot’s badge featured a crown while no else’s did. Why, asked the malcontents, were non-pilots denied this token of royal approval? This particular complaint may have been stimulated by the fact that a new range of single-winged badges introduced by the RCAF in the spring of 1943 did feature a crown.6 From this evidence, it could be argued that, apart from being afforded a lower status than all pilots, the RAF’s non-pilots were even outclassed by ‘colonials’. The presence in the UK of rapidly increasing numbers of USAAF personnel from the summer of 1942 onwards had inevitably added fuel to the fire, because all of the badges worn by American air crew had two wings. To cap it all, and as previously noted, the RN had recently introduced twinwinged badges for its non-pilots (see page 257).
This problem should not be overstated; there was no incipient mutiny, or anything like it. But, on the other hand, neither should it be dismissed. While discontent was far from being felt universally, it should be acknowledged that there was a low key sense of injustice over the design of air crew badges.7 Nevertheless, the Air Force was largely successful in ignoring the problem until May 1944 when AMT, Air Mshl Sir Peter Drummond, revived the question of twin-wings. Wearily pointing out that this matter had been settled only two years previously, Air Mshl Sir Bertine Sutton nevertheless undertook to test the water again.8
Seeking the opinions of crusty old air marshals could be expected to elicit much the same sort of impatient response as the previous review, so Sutton decided to try a different approach. This time, the aim was to establish the relatively unbiased view of inexperienced personnel who had yet to have their opinions distorted by loyalty, bigotry and partisanship. Only Flying Training Command was therefore consulted. Having overseen the 1942 exercise as Sutton’s predecessor, the AOCinC, Sir Philip Babington, was an old hand at the air crew badge game and he quickly arranged for a poll to be taken among cadets who had yet to embark on formal flying training.
Thirty each of prospective pilots, navigators, air bombers, flight engineers, air gunners and WOps(air) were asked six questions. The responses are summarised at Figure 50.9 The results of this survey appear to be quite conclusive with a three-to-one majority in favour of twin-winged badges for non-pilots. When they were presented to the Air Council, however, considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that, in responding to Q.6, the thirty prospective pilots had been split 50:50. By giving such undue weight to the relatively uninformed opinions of this small sub-group of cadets, simply because they were pilots – or might be one day – the overall picture was grossly distorted. As a result, surprising as it may seem (or perhaps not), it was concluded that the poll had failed to establish a clear cut case one way or the other and AMP recommended that the question should be referred to the Douglas Committee.
Fig 50. Results of a poll conducted among 180 untrained prospective air crew in May 1944.
Initially, Douglas’ team thought that it might well be a good idea to dispense with the single-winged pattern and to replace it with pilot-style ‘wings’ carrying appropriate monograms to distinguish each category. It was felt that this might be good for morale in general and, more specifically, that it might make it easier for trainees who, for whatever reason, failed to make the grade as pilots to come to terms with their reassignment to a less glamorous occupation. In the end, however, the double-wing once again failed to find favour. As the committee explained:10
‘For traditional and sentimental reasons, and in view of the fact that a cross section of opinion recently taken in Flying Training Command revealed no strong desire for abandonment of single-wing badges, a result which we consider would certainly be confirmed if a free vote in the operational commands were taken, we do not recommend that there should be any change in the design of air crew badges.’
As has already been pointed out, this was a most curious interpretation (indeed some might say an egregious misrepresentation) of the results of the recent poll which had actually shown that 62% of non-pilots were dissatisfied with the single wing, that 84% of them would have preferred a double wing and that, even allowing for the views of prospective pilots, 72% of those polled thought that twin-wings ought to be introduced. On the other hand, it might have been unwise to place too much reliance on the opinions of such an inexperienced group and it was almost certainly true that by 1945 some single-winged veterans would have been most reluctant to part with their old badges. In any event, on 8 June 1945, when AMP held a meeting to consider the Douglas Committee’s recommendations, the retention of single-wings was endorsed. But this was far from being the end of the matter.
The wearing of RAF badges by personnel of other Services.
Meanwhile, while the question of twin-wings had been raised and dismissed twice, another problem to do with air crew badges had been simmering ever since the beginning of the war. By 1945 it had become such a contentious issue that it eventually provoked a Parliamentary Question.
It will be recalled that in 1918, following the establishment of the RAF, the Army had decided that it wanted little more to do with air matters and that it would be inappropriate for ex-RFC officers, electing to return to the fold, to continue to wear their flying badges (see page 113). This policy proved to be short-lived, however, because a steady trickle of army officers was seconded to the RAF for flying duties during the inter-war years. Since the Army no longer had a pilots badge of its own, it was agreed that these soldiers should wear RAF ‘wings’ while actually serving with the RAF and for the next four years, during which they were liable to recall for resecondment. In 1938 the position was reviewed and it was agreed that these officers could wear their pilots badges permanently, even after the RAF had ceased to have any claim on them.11
Some of the soldiers who re-enlisted in the Army, following the outbreak of war in 1939 were veterans who had flown as pilots during WW I. After some deliberation the Air Council conceded that these volunteers were covered by the 1938 decision. From December 1939, therefore, any army personnel whose documents showed that they had qualified for RFC, RNAS or RAF pilots badges were granted the privilege of wearing current pattern RAF ‘wings’ on their army tunics.12
No one ever seems to have raised the issue at the time but, in view of the way in which old rules were subsequently invoked to justify the wearing (or not) of old badges, it is worth pointing out that, in theory at least, a WW I pilot’s grasp on his RFC ‘wings’ had not been totally secure. The Army Order which had introduced the RFC pilots badge in February 1913 had specifically required that the wearer remain ‘efficient’ as a pilot. This rule was relaxed in 1916 to the extent that a badge could continue to be worn permanently, even if the wearer ceased to be employed on flying duties, so long as he continued to serve with the RFC.
For a pilot who had ceased to be employed by the RFC to retain his badge, however, required the permission of the Army Council. This permission was to be granted only if the individual had left the RFC as a result of wounds or some other disability directly attributable to flying (the same conditions applied to retention of the flying ‘O’).13 Hence the previously noted War Office ruling that had required any ex-RFC men exercising their right to return to the Army, following their automatic transfer to the RAF in April 1918, to forfeit their flying badges.
Almost certainly unaware that he was breaking the rules, throughout WW II, Capt Alfred de M Severne wore on his RAMC tunic the observers badge that he had earned flying with No 53 Sqn in WW I. But one would like to think that he would still have done so even if he had known. (AVM Sir John Severne)
Leaving aside such arcane considerations, it was inevitable that, if all ex-pilots enlisting in the Army in WW II were to be given the right to wear their ‘wings’, it was only natural that ex-observers would expect to be granted a similar dispensation. One would have thought this a reasonable enough proposition but, although the Air Council had decided, within days of war having been declared, that an ex-WW I observer could wear his ‘O’ badge on an RAF uniform,14 it took the view that it would be inappropriate for it to be worn on khaki. The rationale for this decision was that, unlike army pilots of the inter-war years, ex-observers had never had any obligation to fly with the RAF.15 While this was a defensible argument, its logic was stretched beyond its breaking point by the concession which had permitted soldiers upon whom the RAF no longer had any claim, or, even worse, upon whom it had never had a claim, to continue to wear their pilots badges. Nevertheless, in June 1940, an ACI that amplified the conditions governing the wearing of the RAF flying badge went on to state that ‘the observers badge will NOT be worn by officers or other ranks on army uniform.’16 The strength of the Air Ministry’s feelings on the issue being made crystal clear by that shouted ‘NOT’.
The Air Council’s policy was seriously compromised by this inconsistency and the repeated rejection of soldiers’ requests to wear observers badges rankled.17 By 1942, in an effort to shore up its case, the Air Ministry had resorted to exploiting some of the more esoteric aspects of military dress regulations. It was contended that the RAF’s pilots badge was not ‘a decoration’, but an integral element of the unique RAF uniform and that inter-Service cross-dressing was quite inappropriate.18 To support this argument, it was pointed out that the RN did not permit the wearing of any RAF-sponsored badges on its uniforms and, likewise, that the Army did not permit air force or naval badges to disfigure its immaculate khaki.
Since the RAF flying badge represented a glaring exception to the latter rule, this argument was so transparent as to be totally unconvincing, especially to ex-observers. Furthermore, while the Admiralty may not have permitted RAF badges to be worn on RN uniform, it did recognise their status and an officer who had qualified as a pilot or observer in the RAF, but who subsequently served in the RN, was permitted to wear the equivalent FAA badge.19 This option was not available to the Army, of course, since it no longer sponsored any appropriate forms of air crew badge.20 On the other hand, the War Office had endorsed the wearing of the ‘AG’ badge by properly qualified army officers while flying with the RAF (see below). Furthermore, the Admiralty had permitted its naval gunlayers badge to be worn by appropriately qualified soldiers serving with the Maritime Royal Artillery as Acting Gunlayers (Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships).21 Going back to WW I, of course, one could also cite the fact that the RN had been content that army officers seconded to fly with the Navy as observers should wear the RNAS eagle (see Chapter 4, Note 8).
So much for the Air Ministry’s contention that there was no precedent for cross-dressing within the military, but its willingness to misrepresent the facts did not end there. Determined to deny the back-seaters of WW I the right to wear their badges, the Air Ministry had claimed that the flying ‘O’ was an exclusively RAF emblem. This was patently not the case, of course, as it had initially been sponsored by the Army and as such had narrowly missed being manufactured in khaki (see Chapter 3, Note 10). Indeed many of the men who were asking to be allowed to wear their old badges on their army uniforms had actually earned the right to do so as soldiers.
Applications to wear flying ‘O’s were not confined to soldiers serving with the British Army, incidentally. The Air Ministry was obliged to fight a running battle with Pretoria in 1940-43, which succeeded in denying South African veterans the right to wear their badges. Concern over the prohibition on the wearing of badges first became a matter of public interest as early as 1941,22 and it was brought up again two years later by Maj Oliver Stewart,23 but the Air Ministry was unmoved.
In January 1945 official intransigence over this matter was eventually raised in the House of Commons by Mr Edgar Granville (Eye) who stressed that, in contrast to a pilots ‘wings’, the RFC’s observers badge was not awarded ‘because one had done so many hours in the air (but because one had flown) so many operations against the enemy.’ Col T G Greenwell (The Hartlepools) and Maj F W Cundiff (Rusholme)24 expounded along much the same lines.25
The MPs’ case hinged on the fact that, since most observers badges had been won in battle, they amounted to de facto decorations and were almost regarded as such by some who had worn them. For the Air Ministry to insist that they had been no more than a piece of uniform, it was argued, showed a lack of appreciation of the reality of the situation. It was, said Granville, ‘a very niggardly thing to take away a treasured distinction from men who had worthily earned it’. Furthermore, even if the badge was no more than a piece of uniform, until 1918 it had been a piece of army uniform, so, it was argued, there were no grounds to prevent its being worn on khaki.
It fell to the recently appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, Cdr R A Brabner, to present the case for the defence. Although he rehearsed the old arguments, he had nothing new to say and it was clear that over the previous five years the Air Ministry had ‘painted itself into a corner’ over this issue. Its only options were to concede or to continue to hide behind its rather moth-eaten veil of inconsistent dogma and illogical regulations. Brabner did his best with the material available to him but it was plain that he failed to persuade the House of the justice of his Ministry’s position.
This was of little consequence, however, as it was not a matter of debate. No vote was to be taken. Brabner’s task had simply been to respond to a question that had been asked. It did not matter that he had been obliged to present an unconvincing answer. He had been required only to make it plain that the answer was final.
Most of the senior members of the wartime RAF Regiment were seconded army officers. While they wore RAF Regiment shoulder flashes, however, they retained their army ranks and when this unidentified colonel was photographed in Belgium in October 1944 he should certainly not have been wearing the flying ‘O’ that he had presumably acquired during WW I. On the other hand, it would probably have taken a general to tell a colonel that he was improperly dressed – and that presupposes that the general knew the rules (and cared). (via B L Davies)
Following post-war demobilisation, the incidence of requests declined rapidly, the last one of which this writer is aware being submitted in 1950. The Air Ministry stuck resolutely to its guns, however, and none of the dwindling band of old soldiers ever regained the right to wear his hard won observers badge.
Further problems with the wearing of badges.
In the context of badges, the Air Ministry’s preferential treatment of erstwhile pilots proved to have opened a Pandora’s box. If soldiers, including the Home Guard, could wear RAF ‘wings’ what of such paramilitary forces as the Royal Observer Corps? Then again, could a policeman wear a flying badge? Along with other similar organisations, both of these were ruled out of court. But in 1944 this policy was inadvertently subverted by HM King George VI who personally authorised the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Philip Game, a retired air vice-marshal, to wear his flying badge on his police uniform. Sir Philip promptly passed on the good news to some other members of the constabulary who had similarly been pilots at one time. This called for a degree of delicate diplomacy which eventually succeeded in righting the regally upset applecart. Sir Philip and his men dutifully toed the party line and took their badges off again.26
Meanwhile, the Air Ministry’s restrictive attitude towards the wearing of badges by erstwhile non-pilot air crew had disadvantaged certain ex-gunners, as well as ex-observers. Some of these men were soldiers. In February 1941 an officer of Anti-Aircraft Command had accompanied an RAF crew on a bombing mission in order to observe German Flak. His report had been so useful (to Fighter and Bomber Commands, as well as to the Army) that further similar flights were arranged. In October a batch of twenty army officers was formally trained by the RAF as air gunners and in January 1942 they became the staff of the newly established AA Observation Section. Proudly wearing RAF ‘AG’ badges, they were authorised to fly operationally with Bomber Command. The section was disbanded in May 1942, by which time it had lost seven of its members in action in the course of flying a total of 168 sorties. Although the section no longer existed, a few army officers continued to fly with the RAF until the end of the war (see, for instance, Chapter 23, Note 3).
In June 1943 the GOCinC Anti-Aircraft Command, Gen Sir Frederick Pile, pointed out that RAF air gunners were allowed to continue to wear their ‘AG’ badges after they had ceased flying and he asked the War Office to permit his officers to do the same.27 His request was strongly supported by HQ Fighter Command, whose AOCinC urged the Air Ministry to press the War Office to allow its soldiers to wear their RAF badges.28 Unbeknown to Air Mshl Leigh-Mallory, however, it was not the War Office that was dragging its feet; the problem lay much closer to home. But it was all to no avail in any case.
With hindsight, one might consider that, rather than simply pleading for equality with RAF gunners, the general would have done better to base his argument on the clear precedent set by the fact that any soldier, recognised by the RAF as having once been accredited as a pilot, was permitted to wear his ‘wings’. As previously discussed, however, by 1943 the position of the Air Ministry’s mandarins had become so deeply entrenched that they had denied themselves any room to manoeuvre. As a result, they were quite incapable of acknowledging the justice of the Army’s submission and the Air Council declined to extend its flying badge concession to embrace ex-air gunners.29
The same dismissive attitude was displayed in the cases of a handful of pre-war RAF ex-gunners who were still serving. This was because any airman wearing a winged bullet and mustered as air crew on or after 3 September 1939 had been required to exchange it for the new ‘AG’ badge when this had been introduced in the following December. Anyone, airman or officer, who had completed an appropriate flying training course since then would automatically have qualified for an ‘AG’ badge (see page 184). These regulations took care of all wartime gunners, of course, but they did not cater for people who had once been air gunners but who had ceased to be employed as such before the war. Those who had remained as airmen were still permitted to wear their obsolete winged bullets but these had never been worn by officers, so any pre-war airmen gunners who had since been commissioned had been obliged to forfeit the distinguishing emblem that showed that they had once been recognised as aviators.
Most were content to do without but the publicity surrounding the introduction of the range of new air crew badges in September 1942 (see Figure 32 on page 221) prompted a few pre-war ex-gunners to request permission to wear one of these. Perhaps the most deserving case was that submitted by Sqn Ldr R Wright.30 As an aircraftman, he had qualified for a winged bullet at Eastchurch in 1926 (No 22 Course). He subsequently served with No 39 Sqn in the UK and India until 1933, initially as a wireless operator mechanic (air gunner) but from 1931 as a full-time air gunner (wireless operator mechanic) (see page 139). During this period he won the squadron’s annual bombing trophy once and its gunnery trophy twice, earned an AOC’s Commendation and was decorated with a Distinguished Flying Medal for his service during the Chitral Relief of 1932.
In view of his experience, and the fact that he had been a full-time air gunner, Wright would have been eligible for automatic remustering as an observer in 1938 (see page 168). In fact, however, he had ceased flying by then and on being commissioned he had lost the right to wear his old arm badge. Wright considered that he was amply qualified to wear all or any of the ‘O’, ‘AG’, ‘N’ and/or ‘B’ badges. His question, therefore, was not actually whether he could wear one of these badges, but which one he ought to ask for.
His case was supported by Air Cdre J R Cassidy at HQ 27 Gp who forwarded it to the Air Ministry. It was promptly ruled that Wright was not entitled to wear an air crew badge of any kind. Thus, while a part-time Home Guard private soldier who had logged perhaps fifty hours, permitting him to qualify as a nominal pilot just before the war ended in 1918, could wear a flying badge, a regular RAF officer with over 1,000 hours of airborne time under his belt (more than 300 of these having been flown on operations) and the ribbon of the DFM on his chest could not. If ever there had been a case for the Ministry to exercise some discretion, this had surely been it. The mandarins were adamant, however; there were to be no concessions where non-pilots were concerned. Sqn Ldr Wright’s case was firmly rejected and HQ 27 Gp was advised not to bother lodging an appeal.
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1 AIR2/8638. The establishment of the Douglas Committee and the nature of its enquiries was publicised by Air Ministry letter S.103928/S.10(d) dated 27 October 1944.
2 AIR2/8636. In November 1945 letter PWM/TSC/S. 10(m) noted the subsequent recommendations of the Trades Sub-Committee of the Post-War Manning Committee, which had been set up on 13 October 1944 to review all RAF and WAAF trades. They were: that air quartermasters should be drawn from equipment assistants of Trade Group IV; that they should be of at least corporal rank, and preferably sergeants; and that they should be entitled to draw crew pay. But they were not to be categorised as air crew.
3 The thirteen were: pilot; navigator; Nav(B); Nav(R); Nav(W); air bomber; flight engineer; WOM(air); WOp(air) Grade I; WOp(air) Grade II; air gunner; air gunner/FM(A) and air gunner/FM(E); a fourteenth, the meteorological air observer, was about to be introduced.
4 AIR2/2662. From the Report of the Committee on the Composition of Air Crew, published as S.103609 dated May 1945. This document is also the source of most of the observations summarised in this section.
5 AIR2/8482. Memo BJ186/DTT dated 6 March 1943 from Gordon-Dean (DTT) to Air Cdre D V Carnegie (DTF).
6 For a brief summary of flying badges sponsored by the RCAF and other Commonwealth air forces, see Annex K.
7 For example, on page 50 of his One Wing High (1995), Harry Lomas describes the disappointed reaction of some of his colleagues on being awarded their ‘N’ badges at the end of 1943.
8 Yet another of the very senior RAF officers of WW II who had begun his flying career as an observer in WW I, Air Mshl Sutton had qualified for his flying ‘O’ with No 5 Sqn as early as 14 December 1915.
9 AIR2/8369. Air Mshl Babington informed AMT of the results of the poll in his letter FTC/AOCC/42 dated 27 May 1944.
10 AIR2/2662. From the Report of the Committee on the Composition of Air Crew, published as S. 103609 dated May 1945.
11 AIR2/6336. Memo 488232/36/S7a dated 24 September 1938 from L F Schooling, Assistant Secretary at the Air Ministry, to the War Office.
12 ACI 839 of 13 December 1939. These regulations were subsequently refined and restated in, for instance, ACI 660 of 29 June 1940; the final iteration was in ACI 1263 of 20 September 1944.
13 AIR1/818/204/4/1308. This file contains correspondence relating to the refinement of the regulations governing the wearing of ‘wings’. In late 1917/early 1918 the concerned staffs drafted Army Orders clarifying the rules for retention of flying badges on leaving the RFC but these were never published, presumably because the authorities considered that adequate legislation already existed.
14 AMO A.402/1939 of 28 September.
15 AIR2/6336. Memo 488232/36/S7a dated 2 May 1940 from R Monk Jones, Assistant Secretary at the Air Ministry, to the War Office.
16 ACI 660 of 29 June 1940. The prohibition on the wearing of the observers badge was repeated, again with a capitalised ‘NOT’, in ACI 1268 of 19 July 1941 and with the ‘not’ in italics in ACI 1263 of 20 September 1944.
17 Although the prohibition on the wearing of the flying ‘O’ by soldiers was publicised from time to time throughout the war, this did not prevent the more determined ex-observers from sporting their badges.
18 In October 1944, the Air Ministry buttressed its arguments by enshrining them within KR 198 (Amendment List 135 to the 2nd Edition), thus providing them with the legal basis which they had previously lacked.
19 AFO 3663 of 12 August 1943.
20 To be strictly accurate, ACI 768 of 11th April 1942 had introduced an Army Flying Badge, but this was to be worn only by AOP and glider pilots. Army pilots were entitled to wear this badge on completion of elementary flying training, ie an EFTS course, followed by conversion onto Austers at No 43 OTU or onto gliders via a course at the Glider Training School. While this level of instruction was clearly sufficient for the purpose, the overall demands of these courses were far less stringent than those which had to be satisfied prior to the award of an RAF (or FAA) flying badge. Since the two badges did not reflect the same level of skill or breadth of achievement it was presumably considered inappropriate to substitute the Army-sponsored emblem for RAF ‘wings’.
For the record, it should be noted that ACI 1128 of 19 August 1944 introduced a Second Glider Pilots Badge which was to be worn by the copilots of dual-controlled heavy assault gliders. These men were trained at the same units as ‘proper’ glider pilots but they attended less comprehensive courses.
21 ACI 1380 of 18 September 1943.
22 Sunday Dispatch, 14 August 1941
23 Evening Standard, 25 November 1943.
24 Cundiff had flown as an observer with No 2 Sqn in 1917.
25 ZHC2/915, Hansard for 18 January 1945.
26 AIR2/4062. The correspondence relating to this affair, in which the key players were AMP (Sir Bertine Sutton), the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair) and the King’s Private Secretary (Sir Alan Lascelles) is on this file.
27 AIR2/6336. Letter AAC/30147/A, of 4 June 1943, from Gen Pile, GOCinC Anti-Aircraft Command, to the War Office.
28 Ibid. HQ Fighter Command letter FC/S.27927/Ops3(b) dated 22 June 1943 from Air Mshl T Leigh-Mallory to the Under-Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, Sir Hugh Seely.
29 Ibid. Air Ministry letter A.15766/39/S.7.(a). 1 of August 1943.
30 AIR2/8369. The correspondence relating to Wright’s submission is on this file.