Chapter 15

1919-21. Early indications that the post-war RAF would continue to employ Observers prove to be illusory.

In August 1919 the RAF introduced its own distinctive rank titles.1 The familiar term Flying Officer, long used to describe the employment grade of a qualified pilot, now became a rank, as did the equivalent Observer Officer. This innovation appeared to acknowledge that observers had finally achieved the public recognition which they had surely earned. Furthermore, it suggested that they were to become a permanent feature of the post bellum air force.

This proved to be but a short-lived illusion. In fact little serious consideration had ever been given to retaining observers. Sir Frederick Sykes had been the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) when the war ended, so it had fallen to him to formulate a plan for the future and he produced a quite detailed memorandum less than four weeks after the Armistice had been signed.² He had envisaged a rather grandiose scheme which assumed the maintenance of a substantial permanent air force with responsibilities embracing the whole of the Empire. Presumably accustomed to wartime rates of expenditure, Sykes appears to have anticipated that he would be equally free to spend in peacetime. As a result, his proposals were so ambitious as to be quite unrealistic. In the specific context of this book, however, it is interesting to note that, while Sykes devotes a little space to the training of ‘aviation personnel’, and considers the provision of technical, administrative and staff officers (most of whom were to be aviators who, for whatever reason, were no longer suited for flying duties) he makes no reference to observers.

Sykes was succeeded as CAS by Sir Hugh Trenchard in March 1919 and he, in turn, began to consider the way ahead. The ‘Trenchard Memorandum’ of 25 November 1919 would turn out to be a far more practical proposition than Sykes’ effort. Following its approval in principle by the Cabinet, it was presented to Parliament as a White Paper on 13 December to become the blueprint for the RAF of the 1920s.³ Like Sykes, Trenchard made no mention of observers, but his paper was far more specific than that of his predecessor. It was quite clear that the only officers in Trenchard’s air force, or to be pedantic, the only officers of any consequence, were going to be pilots.

In fact, it would appear that the RAF had probably decided to do away with observers before Trenchard had even taken up his appointment.⁴ By that time it was already busily restructuring itself to exclude them. To illustrate this point, consider the case of the heavy bombers of the Independent Force. The constitution of the crews flying its O/400s when the war ended, a pilot and two observers, had not been arrived at by chance. This arrangement represented the distilled experience of four years of aerial warfare; it was the most economical and efficient way to man and operate the aircraft.⁵

By the autumn of 1918 the RAF knew that the best way to operate an 0/400 was with a pilot and two observers, all of them officers. Within a matter of weeks this hard-learned lesson had been forgotten. (Chaz Bowyer)

Thus it was that when an attack on Berlin from an advanced base near Prague was being planned in November 1918, No 216 Sqn’s air echelon was to have consisted of eight pilots and sixteen observers.⁶ This operation was preempted by the Armistice. Only six months later the squadron was redeployed from France to Egypt, taking with it twenty-three pilots, so one could reasonably have expected them to be accompanied by approximately forty-six observers. It actually took – two.⁷ The wartime lesson had been forgotten already.

This is Sgt R L G White who flew in the Bristol Fighters of No 48 Sqn from August 1918. There were relatively few NCO observers in 1918 and, had the war continued, their numbers would have declined even further. The peacetime air force had no place for observers, of any rank, so the remaining NCOs were discharged or remustered in 1919. (Matthew King)

While the future of the commissioned observer may have been, at best, precarious, there was no uncertainty whatsoever about NCO aircrew. They were quite definitely not wanted. While most wartime airmen were only too eager to resume, or in most cases to start, their careers as civilians, a few had applied to extend their engagement by volunteering to serve with the Occupation Forces. As announced in May 1919, however, there were ‘no vacancies for NCO Pilots, Observers and Aerial Gunners.’8 Applicants were to be advised that they could be considered for further service only if they were prepared to take up some other trade for which they might be considered suitable.

The situation was allowed to drift until July when an edict was issued to the rapidly shrinking remnant of the RAF still on the Continent to the effect that ‘all NCO Pilots, Observers and Aerial Gunners’ were to be despatched to the Reinforcement Pool at Arques whence they were to be shipped in batches of ten to Halton where those still prepared to remain in uniform could expect to be remustered, typically as storemen or clerks or to work in a disciplinary capacity.⁹ The surviving responses to this trawl indicate that there were at least seventeen NCO aircrew still on the books in France and Germany. Sixteen of them were sergeant observers; there were no pilots. The odd man out was reported as an AC1 aerial gunner who was not recommended for retention.¹⁰

It may well be asked whether it had been wise to disrupt wartime manning practices and to dispose of so much expertise so hastily. In the light of subsequent events, it seems quite clear that it had been a mistake. This had plainly not been apparent, however, at a time when the dominant considerations would have been the clamour for demobilisation and budgetary constraint. Wise or not, what amounted to a pilots-only policy had been implemented and, since Sir Hugh Trenchard was to reign as CAS for the best part of eleven years, it was here to stay. By 1930 the concept of the omnipotent pilot would be so deeply embedded within the air force psyche that nothing short of an imminent major war would serve as grounds for seriously questioning the logic which lay behind this perception.

Meanwhile, shortly after the Armistice, the appointment of Aerial Navigation Officer had been introduced.¹¹ As previously noted, by the summer of 1918 observers had become so closely associated with navigation that O/400 and V/1500 squadrons were entitled to have one on strength in the rank of captain to act as Navigation Officer. In view of this, one might have expected that observers would have been required to fill the new post-war appointments. In the event most, probably all, of them went to pilots. At headquarters these officers were expected to provide specialist advice to the various staffs. At squadron level they held the keys to the Map Store and were responsible for swinging all of the compasses held on charge by the unit. It was originally anticipated that they would also establish the quadrantal errors on aircraft fitted with wireless direction finding equipment, indicating that it was expected that this technique would soon become commonplace.

Like the direction finding equipment, however, the Aerial Navigation Officer soon faded away. Eventually those units which were still considered to need a resident navigational expert had their establishments annotated to reflect a requirement for one of their officers to have formal responsibility for the supervision of air pilotage.¹² In the meantime, responsibility for swinging compasses had been diluted so that, in the absence of a suitably qualified officer, they could be swung ‘by an officer who is considered by the CO to be competent to carry out this work’;¹³ which sounds very much like a euphemism for ‘whoever was available’.

In June 1919 the RAF published its plans for peacetime post-graduate training.¹⁴ Two schools were to be set up to run courses in applied navigation – for pilots. Andover was to run a series of air pilotage courses, training up to fifty officers per year in practical day and night cross-country navigation. Another forty were expected to attend an annual long navigation course at Calshot. This, the so-called ‘Long N’, was to cover more advanced techniques, including wireless direction finding.

Both programmes proved to be wildly overoptimistic. In the event, Andover ran just one course which started in September 1919. It had thirty-eight students when it began but by the time it ended three months later priority postings and demobilisation had taken their toll and only sixteen were left – and four of these were assessed as failures. Calshot was a little more successful to begin with, running year-long courses in 1920, ‘21 and ‘22, albeit never with more than ten trainees, but subsequent intakes were reduced to one or two students per year until 1932. On the other hand, three-month air pilotage courses had been reinstated. Now run at Calshot, these provided post-graduate instruction in practical navigation for up to thirty officers per year, which was more than enough to satisfy the RAF’s limited requirement for such specialists.

A DH 9A, J7086, of the Helwan-based No 47 Sqn, typical of the two-seat aeroplanes flown by the early permanent air force. In January 1920 the Air Ministry announced that pilots were to carry out the duties of observers but it subsequently failed to provide enough of them to fill both cockpits. This was probably just as well, because most pilots were disinclined to take a back seat, so the second member of a crew usually turned out to be a volunteer ground tradesman.

By this time, despite the introduction of the rank title of observer officer, it had long since been made quite clear that there was to be no place for observers in the exclusively ‘pilots only’ club which the peacetime RAF had become. Any lingering doubts on this score had been removed in January 1920 when the Air Ministry had published the following statement:15

‘In view of the decision that practically all officers remaining in the Royal Air Force are to learn to fly, all pilots may in future be employed in any capacity as crew of an aircraft, ie as observers, gunners, photographers, etc. It should be noted, that as no provision has been made for observers in the permanent Air Force, all officers are to be considered available for the duties of observers, etc from the date of this Order.’

As this Order implied, any observer who was offered a permanent commission was required to undergo a flying training course, after which he would trade-in his flying ‘O’ for a set of pilots ‘wings’.¹⁶ By mid-1921 the Air Force List contained only 152 commissioned observers.¹⁷

1921-24. The RAF dispenses with its commissioned Observers in favour of part-time, non-commissioned Aerial Gunners.

By 1921 the effectiveness of air power in colonial peacekeeping situations had already been convincingly demonstrated during a brief and, more importantly, an impressively cheap campaign in Somaliland. As a result, in 1922 the RAF was given overall responsibility for the maintenance of stability in Iraq and it was to be engaged in similar operations in Palestine, the Aden Protectorate and on the North West Frontier of India throughout the inter-war years. To begin with most of the aeroplanes used for these tasks were DH 9As and Bristol Fighters, these being progressively replaced by Wapitis, Fairey IIIFs, an assortment of Hart variants, Gordons and, finally, Vincents. All of these aircraft were two-seaters, as were many of the bombers flown by home-based squadrons. Rather than retaining some observers, however, the RAF decided simply to ignore the experience of 1914-18, electing instead to misemploy ground tradesmen as part-time aircrew.

Following the uncertainties of the early post-war period, interim arrangements for the provision of crewmen were announced at the end of 1919, as follows:¹⁸

a. Single-engined landplane or seaplane squadrons. Not more than one aerial gunner per aircraft.

b. Twin-engined landplane squadrons. DH 10s and Vimys – not more than two aerial gunners per aircraft; O/400s – not more than one aerial gunner, one fitter and one wireless operator per aircraft.

c. Four-engined landplane squadrons, ie V/1500s. Not more than three aerial gunners, two fitters and one wireless operator per aircraft.

d. Flying boat squadrons. Not more than one fitter and one wireless operator per aircraft.

e. Airships. Not specified, except that crewing was to be in accordance with the pattern established for aeroplanes and that crew pay would be allowed only for airmen constituting ‘the actual flying crew of a ship.’

A variety of bombs, including the RL 520 lb and RL 112 lb on display at the Armament and Gunnery School’s remote site at Leysdown circa 1922. (Edwin Newman via San Diego Air & Space Museum)

Notwithstanding the evident need for crewmen, as with most of its officer observers, the RAF proceeded to dispense with its remaining professional NCO back-seaters. In this case, however, it was to wipe the slate completely by abolishing all of the non-commissioned wartime aircrew trades other than that of the pilot, a handful of whom escaped the cull.19 Although they had been remustered to ground trades, a number of ex-aircrew continued to serve in the peacetime air force so it was possible, for a while, to misemploy them to fill the RAF’s remaining back seats. This could be only a temporary measure, however, and it soon became necessary to start finding replacements.

To begin with, the Air Ministry restricted the internal recruiting of aerial gunners to non-technical personnel of Trade Group V, ie those required to meet only the minimum educational standard and who were on the lowest pay scale.²⁰ Could this have been an indication of a continuing lack of appreciation among the upper echelons of the Service of the level of competence actually required of a back-seater? Whatever the reason, this policy did not prevail for very long. Perhaps because too few aircrafthands proved to be of the necessary calibre, or because they failed to volunteer in sufficient numbers, or possibly because the Service wished to offer an interesting opportunity to other personnel, the selection field was soon broadened to permit airmen of any trade to fly as gunners.²¹

The definitive arrangements for providing peacetime aerial gunners, all of whom were to be employed on a part-time basis, were published in 1921.²² Any airman who had logged 50 hours of combat flying during the war was accepted without further instruction, so long as he was able to pass the specified tests. There were not nearly enough of these veterans to meet the Service’s need, however, so it was necessary to start training airmen volunteering from the ranks. Successful candidates serving in the UK were to be sent to the Armament and Gunnery School at Eastchurch where they were to attend a six-week course.²³ Thereafter they were expected to return to the school every three years to renew their qualification.

Unfortunately, there were no dedicated armament training facilities in overseas Commands and in these cases training had to be carried out at squadron level. Since much of the RAF was employed on colonial peacekeeping or garrison duties during the 1920s this meant that, in practice, a substantial proportion (possibly the majority) of aerial gunners was trained, somewhat informally, under local arrangements (shades of 1916). Despite the lack of proper schools, gunners trained abroad were supposed to qualify to the same standards as those demanded at home and to pass the same tests. Since it was impractical to expect gunners stationed overseas to visit Eastchurch every three years to reclassify, they were required to renew their qualifications annually.²⁴ This proved to be easier said than done, however, and quality control tended to be variable.

The point should perhaps be made that, while the only recognised non-pilot aircrew trade was that of the aerial gunner, airmen acted in a variety of other airborne capacities as, for instance, wireless operators, photographers and bomb-aimers. There were no formal courses for these other activities, however, so it was necessary to employ suitably qualified tradesmen and/or to organise the appropriate instruction at squadron level. Apart from needing airmen to carry out specific tasks in the air, it was also customary for fitters, riggers and, to a lesser extent, armourers to be included within the informal ‘aircrew’ complement of a squadron. This was particularly so in the case of units flying relatively large aircraft and/or those which might operate away from base, especially flying boats. Many of these flying tradesmen were dual-qualified as gunners, but this was not an essential requirement.

All airmen employed on flying duties were entitled to draw crew pay at a rate of two shillings per day, those additionally qualified as gunners drawing a further sixpence as duty pay. While half-a-crown a day may not seem much, it actually represented a substantial supplement to an airman’s pay at that time, the basic daily rate for a leading aircraftman of Trade Group V in 1921 being four shillings. The payment of both of the additional allowances was directly related to established posts. It was permissible, if undesirable, for duty pay to be drawn by gunners held surplus to establishment, so long as they maintained their currency, although their unit was also expected to take appropriate action to correct the anomalous manning situation. By contrast, the issue of crew pay was very strictly controlled and it could be issued only to airmen specifically held against a unit’s establishment for flying duties.

The method used to calculate the numbers involved was adjusted from time to time but in 1924, for instance, crew pay could be issued to one airman for every aircraft on a two-seater squadron, two per aircraft on a three-seater squadron and four per aircraft on larger types. Of these totals, twelve appropriately qualified airmen could draw duty pay as gunners on two- and three-seater squadrons and twenty-four on units operating larger aircraft. In all cases these totals were to be reduced by the number of officer observers actually on strength (there still being handful in harness), although, conversely, a vacancy caused by the absence of an established observer officer could be filled by an additional airmen.25

In 1923 the Air Ministry had granted its aerial gunners a degree of distinction by authorising an appropriate badge, a gilded winged bullet, to be worn on the upper right uniform sleeve.²⁶ Unfortunately, this gesture was somewhat devalued by the fact that the regulation that had authorised the gunners badge had simultaneously introduced an equivalent emblem for Physical Training Instructors (PTI). The implication was plain. In the eyes of the Air Ministry, the status of an airman who was prepared to risk life and limb by flying, and even, on occasion, being shot at, appeared to be on a par with those who pumped iron in the gymnasium. This impression was reinforced by the value of the PTI’s badge, which turned out to be exactly twice that of a gunner’s!²⁷ If there were any lingering doubts as to who really counted in the RAF of the 1920s, these could be resolved by comparing allowances. A First Class PTI attracted qualification pay at a shilling-a-day, twice the rate for a gunner, and even a Second Class PTI drew eightpence.²⁸ In fact, the sixpenny scale for gunners was the lowest of the six rates of qualification pay then being issued.

1923-26. Despite some reservations, and an ineffective attempt to create a reserve, the remaining first-generation Observers are allowed to fade away.

Meanwhile, while the RAF had been adapting to making-do with part-time gunners, what of its remaining stock of commissioned observers? This had continued to waste away until, by the summer of 1923, there were a mere seventy-three left, only about two dozen of whom might still be regarded as having been engaged (as observers) in activities directly associated with flying. Most of the others were attending courses, serving on the staffs of specialist schools or filling a variety of staff, instructional or administrative appointments.²⁹

The ‘winged bullet’, which was introduced in 1923, continued to be issued until it was superseded by a new cloth design at the end of 1939. This one was awarded to LAC Dennis Conroy on 29 April 1938. (Dennis Conroy)

By 1924 the flying ‘O’ had become such a rarity that Gp Capt J D Boyle was so surprised to come across someone wearing one that he wrote to the Air Ministry to ask whether this was still appropriate. It was confirmed that, although it was no longer awarded, the badge was still current and that it could be worn by any personnel whose records showed that they had been authorised so to do.³⁰

While professional observers were becoming increasingly scarce, their passing did not go entirely without comment. For example, in a report on recent activity in Iraq in 1923, Gp Capt Arthur Longmore lamented that, ‘There were occasions when the need for a trained Observer in the back seat became very apparent.’³¹ Remarks such as this will have served to draw attention to the operational implications of the rapidly diminishing numbers of observers and may have been one of the reasons that led the Air Ministry to convene a meeting to review the situation in 1924.

Defending the status quo, Gp Capt P B Joubert (the Deputy Director of Manning) pointed out that current war establishments³² already provided each two-seater squadron with three pilots to carry out observer duties³³ and that his department considered that this, along with airmen gunners, was sufficient. Speaking for the operations staff, Sqn Ldr R M Drummond disagreed, contending that the demands of long-range reconnaissance, advances in radio equipment and the complexity of the Course Setting Bomb Sight (CSBS) would call for more officer-grade operators. Some very justifiable reservations were also expressed over the possibility of the RAF’s being obliged to send gunners, ranked as mere aircraftmen, to advise army staffs in the field and the acceptability of this at brigade and divisional level.

It was eventually agreed that, when operating at its wartime strength of eighteen-aircraft (versus twelve in peacetime), each single-engined bomber and army cooperation squadron would require at least six officers to act as observers. This was not considered to be necessary on twin-engined bomber squadrons, as these were already established to have two pilots per aeroplane, the second of whom could fulfil the functions of the observer.34

This decision having been taken, it remained to find a means of providing the additional manpower, since the RAF no longer had the numbers of commissioned observers that it now required. The provision of more pilots was considered to be an undesirably costly option. The reinstatement of observers was also seen to be uneconomic, as they were not regarded as being necessary in peacetime. The Army was a possible source of trained observers, but there were doubts as to whether their availability could be guaranteed in an emergency. In the end it was decided to rely on the Air Observers Section which was to be created within the forthcoming Special Reserve.³⁵

Needless to say, because the RAF had persuaded itself that it did not need observers, no provision had been made for them within the Reserve of Air Force Officers (RAFO) as originally constituted. When, in 1923, it had first been suggested that there might actually be some merit in enrolling a few of them it had provoked a debate as to their classification. Since observers were aircrew, one might reasonably have expected them to have been registered within Class A which had been set up to cater for pilots. This presupposes, however, a perception of the status and value of non-pilot aviators which would not be acknowledged for another quarter of a century. In 1923 nobody even so much as suggested that it might be appropriate for pilots to make room for back-seaters within their exclusive Class A. It was proposed, therefore, that reservist observers should be shoehorned uncomfortably into Classes B or C as nominal ‘technical’ officers, the difference being that those in Class B were liable to recall to undertake an annual training commitment (an option which the Ministry was not obliged to exercise) whereas those in Class C were not. In response to a proposal submitted by AMP, AVM O Swann, it was eventually decided that ‘100 good ex-War Observers’ should be entered in Class B with the Trenchard-minuted proviso that ‘training cannot be given to them in any way at present.’³⁶

While the increases in wartime establishments decided in 1924 had been duly implemented, little progress appears to have been made with recruiting the necessary reserve of commissioned observers by 1926 when the Air Ministry next reviewed the situation.³⁷ In essence, the 1926 meeting, which was chaired by AVM Sir Ivo Vesey,³⁸ had been convened to re-examine the assumptions which had previously led to the decision to sustain some commitment towards professional, albeit reservist, observers.

Representative of the rapidly dwindling numbers of observers of WW I, this is Sqn Ldr George Elliot Godsave, still wearing the flying ‘O’ that he had earned in France where he flew with Nos 7 and 5 Sqns in 1916. Subsequently regraded as an Equipment (later Technical) Officer, he spent much of 1917-18 at the Admiralty Compass Observatory. Having gained a permanent commission in the peacetime air force, Godsave attended the first Long Navigation Course whence, still a Technical Officer, albeit now with an N2 category, he joined the cadre of the moribund School of Air Pilotage at Andover.

Following a second stint at the Admiralty Compass Observatory, he was posted to Iraq where, after promotion to squadron leader, he assumed command of No 4 Armoured Car Company in 1925 (which roughly dates this picture). The obligation to become a pilot (which was implicit in the acceptance of a Trenchardian permanent commission) finally caught up with him when he returned to the UK and he gained his ‘wings’ at No 1 FTS in 1929, thus eclipsing one of the few remaining WW I flying ‘O’s. After further service at Calshot and the Air Ministry, Godsave retired in February 1935.

To judge by his very non-standard beret, it would seem that little regard was paid to dress regulations while operating in the field in Iraq and, while it is difficult to be sure from a black and white picture, the gold rank lace suggests that Godsave may have been wearing (out) one of the early pale-blue-with-gold-rank-braid uniforms. (RAF Regiment Museum)

One of the more significant contributors to the debate was OC 39 Sqn, Sqn Ldr H V Champion de Crespigny, one of three Squadron Commanders who had been summoned to participate in the discussion. He argued that, so long as they were drawn from the higher trade groups, airmen gunners were perfectly capable of handling the CSBS and of dealing with photography, wireless and so on. The problem was not one of competence, but of time, it being contended that ‘the training of an individual for gunner duties in a bombing squadron was more difficult and lengthy than the training of a pilot.’ De Crespigny went on to inform the meeting that, within a peacetime bomber squadron, it had become a common practice for each flight to assign one of its wireless operators permanently to flying duties as a gunner. In effect, these men were being employed as full-time aviators and it was readily apparent that the ‘air efficiency of (these airmen) was far superior to that of the other Air Gunners39 in the Squadron.’

This experience indicated that gunners could represent a workable solution to the problem of providing the manpower required to fill the posts established for observers. Furthermore, it was considered by many of those present that, provided that they were properly trained, because they would be in current practice, regular airmen were actually a better prospect than reserve officers. The ideal would be for the gunner to be recognised as a discrete trade and for these men to be employed on a full-time basis. That proposal was registered for later consideration but the meeting was primarily concerned with determining the future of the observer officer. Should any more effort be expended on attempting to breathe new life into this moribund category, or should it finally be allowed to expire? A great deal of weight will, no doubt, have been attached to the views of Air Mshl Sir John Salmond who, as AOCinC ADGB, was the RAF’s senior field commander. His representative stated bluntly that in his master’s opinion ‘officer observers could be dispensed with.’ The meeting concluded:⁴⁰

‘That officers for observation duties should be deleted from the Peace and War Establishments of Bombing Squadrons (single engine), and that they should be replaced by Air Gunners.’

This decision settled the fate of the professional observer for the next thirteen years, although the Air Ministry conveniently forgot to do anything about replacing them with the necessary full-time gunners. Despite this, however, there were still a few officers who thought that the RAF had made a mistake. One of them was Sqn Ldr J O Andrews who, while at Staff College in 1926, wrote:⁴¹

‘I believe that efficient, experienced observers are necessary to any multi-seater squadron, and that it is worthwhile affording them the same treatment as pilots, particularly if the Royal Air Force is being rapidly expanded under stress of war. Why not Flight Lieutenant and Squadron Leader Observers on a scale commensurate with the relative observers strength in the Service?’

Students passing through Andover were perfectly entitled, perhaps even encouraged, to express views which were out of sympathy with mainstream thinking, but they were hardly likely to provoke a change in policy.

At much the same time the Air Ministry conducted a survey of the status and employment of its remaining commissioned observers. Since there were so few of them (and two were already flight lieutenants), it was decided to dispense with the unnecessary complication of the separate rank of observer officer. HM King George V was asked to sanction this. He duly obliged and the rank was formally abolished in July 1926. The handful who were left became flying officers, although they retained an O annotation in the Air Force List.⁴²

Two years later the 1926 survey was updated. This exercise revealed that the Air Force now boasted only twenty-three annotated observers. Interestingly, all but two of these veterans of WW I were ex-RNAS, rather than ex-RFC, personnel. Most were serving on engagements which were due to terminate in 1932 or ‘33 but there were a few who had the option of serving to age 49 or 50 which, in theory, meant that the RAF might not dispose of the last of its commissioned wartime observers until as late as 1943.⁴³ The point should perhaps be made that, although the RAF may have had only twenty-three officers actually serving as annotated observers, as Gp Capt Boyle had discovered, there may have appeared to be a few more because other veterans, who were now engaged in quite different activities and/or who had yet to be recatergorised as nominal pilots, may still have been wearing their old flying ‘O’ badges.

1926-29. The inadequacy of Air Gunners as a substitute for Observers becomes increasingly apparent.

Meanwhile, what of the airman gunners who were supposed to be filling the breach? On 1 February 1926 their rate of crew pay was cut by 50%, to just one shilling.⁴⁴ In the main, this will have been a consequence of the Churchillian Treasury’s deflationary policies.⁴⁵ On the other hand, because corresponding cuts were not imposed on other specialist allowances, it is difficult not to see it also as a reflection of the RAF’s lack of regard for its flying tradesmen. At the same time the regulations were tightened up so that an air gunner had to be currently in receipt of crew pay in order to draw his duty pay, effectively closing the loophole through which sympathetic COs had previously been able to continue to pay an overborne gunner his daily sixpence.

With the passage of time, the practical implications of trying to make do with air gunners had begun to manifest themselves with increasing clarity. As AOC Wessex Bombing Area, AVM Sir John Steel, pointed out at the end of 1926:⁴⁶

‘The decision to withdraw all officer observers from day bombing squadrons has made it necessary to teach air gunners in these units bomb aiming, air pilotage and photography in addition to their duties as gunners. To master these subjects and to carry out the necessary practices is a whole time job which cannot be undertaken by an airman who is filling a vacancy in the establishment for some other purpose.’

Fig 22. Trades of airmen being employed as gunners on single-engined day bomber squadrons at the end of 1926.

In other words, while the RAF had dispensed with observers, it had proved to be a false economy, because their jobs still needed to be done. Pilots were supposed to have been doing this work since January 1920 (see page 132) but there were not enough of them to man all of the crew stations in all of the RAF’s aeroplanes, besides which most of the pilots who were available were disinclined to sit anywhere other than in the driver’s seat. The de facto situation, therefore, was that the Service had merely substituted inadequately prepared, and part-time, airmen for professionally trained full-time officers – and it was still hoping to get away with it. In the light of Steel’s observation it is of some interest to consider the trades of the men serving as gunners with his day bomber squadrons at the turn of 1926 (see Figure 22).

The rules governing the provision of gunners at the time stated that those drawn from Trade Groups I to IV were ‘not to exceed 25% of the authorised establishment’ with the remaining vacancies, ie 75% plus, being filled by airmen from Trade Group V.⁴⁷ There was a further constraint to the effect that NCOs in technical trades would be considered ‘only exceptionally’.

Since being a nominal gunner on day bombers actually involved discharging all of the functions of an observer, Steel expressed some reservations over the suitability of Trade Group V personnel for such demanding tasks. Indeed he appears to have been sufficiently concerned about this to have bent the rules because, as Figure 22 shows, more than 60% (as opposed to less than 25%) of the gunners flying with his day bomber squadrons had actually been drawn from Trade Groups I-IV, most of them, 57%, being from technical trades.⁴⁸ There was another argument against using Trade Group V men as air gunners because it meant that, on the ground, skilled airmen had to be misemployed on unskilled work in their place. But the real problem was the part-time policy and, echoing the view aired (noted and marginalised) at the March 1926 meeting referred to above, Steel recommended that whoever occupied ‘the back seat must devote his whole time to it and must be borne on the establishment for that purpose.’

The problem was rather different on night bombers, but no less acute. Since twin-engined aircraft were provided with two pilots, one of whom was responsible for navigation and bomb-aiming, there was no need for the gunners on night bomber squadrons to be trained as observers. On the other hand, for night flying, especially in the winter, it was considered essential that the front gunner, who was always supposed to be a qualified wireless operator, should be competent in his basic trade. The establishment did provide for adequate numbers but the prevailing employment policy involved wireless operators emerging from basic training being posted directly to squadrons in order to gain a minimum of flying experience before moving on elsewhere.⁴⁹

This had proved to be a cart-before-the-horse arrangement as experience had shown that a Wireless Operator Mechanic (WOM) fresh out of Flowerdown (later Cranwell) after his three-year apprenticeship, really needed to spend six-to-nine months at a ground station to consolidate his basic skills before he was in a position to gain full value from training in the air.⁵⁰ The upshot was that the significant proportion of very green wireless operators actually available on squadrons had their hands full just trying to cope with their primary trade so that little progress was being made with gunnery. Filling the rear gun position was less of a problem and Steel accepted that aircrafthands were adequate for this purpose, although an establishment of only five per squadron had proved to be insufficient and he wanted this raised to eight.

Above – This Virginia, J7437, was among the aeroplanes operated by the Electrical and Wireless School at Cranwell to provide the apprentice wireless operators of the early 1930s with a modicum of airborne experience. Below – It was named, very appropriately, after the Old Testament prophet Habakkuk, who appealed ‘How long, Lord, must I call for help, but you do not listen?’ (Edwin Newman via San Diego Air & Space Museum)

Figure 23 illustrates the highly unsatisfactory manning situation on night bomber squadrons at the end of 1926 when only 15% of the wireless personnel nominated to fly as air gunners were actually qualified as such.⁵¹ As a result, it became necessary to grant considerable latitude in the interpretation of the regulations spelling out the qualifications demanded of gunners which had been in force since 1921. In principle, all UK-based gunners were still supposed to spend six weeks at the Armament and Gunnery School (and to return there to be reclassified every three years) but, as the backlog reflected in Figure 23 shows, it would seem that Eastchurch simply lacked the capacity to handle this task. ⁵²

If a convenient course was not available, therefore, from 1927 it became permissible ‘as a temporary measure’ for Squadron Commanders to authorise duty pay for an airman who had already been flying as a gunner for two months. In the fullness of time such men were still supposed to go to Eastchurch where they were to be tested shortly after arrival and, if considered satisfactory, immediately returned to their units without having to complete the full six weeks.⁵³

As a result of this concession it became increasingly common for gunners to receive practically all of their training at unit level, formal certification being endorsed by a brief visit to Eastchurch when such an excursion was mutually convenient. With the passage of time the ‘when’ began to be construed as ‘if’ and this interpretation gained a degree of legitimacy in 1929 when air gunners were added to the establishment of Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force (AAF) squadrons. In the case of these ‘week end warriors’ it was specifically stated that their training was to be an exclusively unit responsibility. There was no requirement for these men to attend a formal course, although it was intended they should be tested on the ground by a visiting officer from Eastchurch. Practical qualification tests in air firing and bombing were to be completed under squadron arrangements during the annual practice camps held at one of the permanently established RAF stations.⁵⁴

Fig 23. Manning position with respect to wireless operators and/or wireless operator mechanics available as air gunners on twin-engined night bomber squadrons in December 1926.

This relaxation of the rules relating to reservists may have appeared to have set a precedent, but the change was not really all that innovative. After all, in-house training and annual reclassification under local arrangements had been the norm in overseas commands for several years. All that had happened was that the Air Ministry had recognised the validity of these procedures, imported them and applied them to selected home-based units. That said, while the regulations may have been more relaxed overseas, it was proving to be no easier to maintain the necessary numbers there than it was at home. For example, in March 1928 Iraq Command recorded that, while more were under training, it actually had only twenty-nine qualified air gunners on strength against an establishment for forty-three.55

In 1928 HQ Iraq could muster only 67% of the qualified gunners to which its squadrons were entitled. At the time, this DH 9A, E802, was on charge to No 30 Sqn, which would have been one of the units involved. (Chaz Bowyer)

While juggling with the regulations may have represented a pragmatic means of solving the problems involved in providing part-time gunners, it also represented a perceptible lowering of standards. Although the RAF would not, at the time, have admitted (or probably even have recognised) that it was starting to paper over the cracks, that is precisely what it was doing. As part of this process, and notionally endorsing the practice reported by OC 39 Sqn in 1926, fulltime gunners were actually established on single-engined day bomber squadrons in 1927.⁵⁶ What had plainly been needed to take the place of observer officers had been several fulltime airmen gunners per flight. The Air Ministry had seriously short-changed itself, however, as it had authorised only one full-time gunner per squadron, albeit in the rank of corporal. Two years later a full-time corporal gunner was added to the establishment of all twin-engined bomber squadrons.⁵⁷ By 1933 some units had been established to have as many as three full-timers, but this still fell a very long way short of what de Crespigny, Steel and others had been angling for.

While a few airmen were now being employed as gunners on a full-time basis, it should be appreciated that they were not career aviators. All of them were dual-qualified and, once a gunner had completed his stint as a flyer, he was expected to revert to his original ground trade. In the meantime he was temporarily mustered as, for instance, an air gunner (fitter) to distinguish him from a part-timer who would be a fitter (air gunner), ie primary duty always first followed by secondary duty in parentheses. The initial introduction of full-time gunners involved only a handful of men but it represented the first indication that the Service was beginning to appreciate that total reliance on part-time aircrew might not really be a viable proposition after all.

1927-33. The cracks, in the pilots-only edifice which had been erected in 1919, begin to widen.

By 1927 the RAF had had eight years’ experience of relatively stable peacetime conditions which was enough to show that all was not well with its manning policy. While the provision of adequate numbers of air gunners had been achieved by some judicious corner cutting, other, and far more serious, difficulties were beginning to emerge. Most of these problems stemmed from the fact that the Service’s officer corps was composed (almost) entirely of pilots.

Before examining a few of the issues which this raised, it may be helpful to outline the make-up of the RAF’s three-element officer/pilot constitution. Much less than half of the RAF’s pilots were career officers. Most of the rest were civilian entrants, serving on (initially four-year) short service commissions, supplemented by a few seconded RN and Army officers.⁵⁸

In the autumn of 1921 the RAF had introduced a third category when it had also begun to train a limited number of its non-commissioned personnel as pilots.⁵⁹ These men were to be drawn from serving airmen, rather than being directly recruited, and preference was to be given to those who were already qualified as gunners. They were to receive two shillings per day instructional pay while under training. On gaining their ‘wings’ they were to be promoted to sergeant, their daily rates of pay being 12/6d for men drawn from Trade Group I, 11/6d from Trade Group II and 10/- from Trade Group III. The remaining wartime NCO pilots who had maintained, or who subsequently regained, their currency were to be paid at the basic Trade Group II rate of 8/6d plus four shillings per day qualification pay.

An airmen pilot was expected to fly for at least five years after which he had the options of extending his service or reengaging with a view to securing a pension. When he ceased flying he would revert to his ground trade but those who had been given accelerated promotion to sergeant would then have to wait at least two years before being considered for elevation to flight sergeant. This scheme proved to be both popular and successful and by 1928 it was envisaged that up to 15% of pilots would be NCOs in the future, thus reducing the overall requirement for (more expensive) officers.60

Practically all of the RAF’s difficulties were associated with the first group, the Cranwell-trained career officers. Some of the more significant problems are outlined below.

a. The overall manning concept, which underpinned the peacetime Service, depended upon all career officers developing a secondary skill, but experience had shown that some were less enthusiastic about pursuing this aspect of Service life than they were about flying.

b. Having been trained in an alternative discipline, career officers were not subsequently employed permanently in that field. It was necessary, therefore, to provide a constant flow of replacements. In effect, therefore, there was an expensive overprovision of underused specialists.

c. There were very few specialist appointments for officers above the rank of flight lieutenant. As a result, most of those who were promoted (and most Cranwell graduates were promoted) promptly ceased to practice in their secondary field which meant that their expensively acquired skills were wasted.

d. Following on from the above, since practically all specialist posts were filled by junior officers, they were able to exert little real influence on policy. Thus, while some of them may have been able to see defects in the system and/or find better ways to do things, their advice could be all too easily dismissed.

e. In some fields, particularly engineering, there was some difficulty in providing the numbers of specialists required.

Although it had not been clearly identified by 1928, within two years another problem would have been registered. In order to provide Armament Officers at unit level, it was proving to be necessary to withdraw young pilots for appropriate technical training within a year of their having joined their first squadrons. At this stage of their careers they were barely competent to handle their primary tasks, let alone to take on secondary responsibilities, especially as they were unlikely to return to their original units. The resultant instability did little to consolidate a pilot’s flying skills and his youth and lack of seniority gave him little credibility as a specialist.⁶¹

All of these trends were manifesting themselves against the background of another serious problem. The RAF’s officer corps was the wrong ‘shape’. Ideally, it should have been a pyramid. Through an accident of history, it was actually pear-shaped, and steadily becoming more so. This situation had arisen because, when its foundations had been laid in 1919, the peacetime Service had been officered by young wartime pilots and relatively young wartime generals. Over the ensuing years there had been an annual intake of fresh young officers into the bottom of the system but there had been comparatively few retirements from the top. By 1927 the earliest Cranwell graduates were reaching the stage at which they could reasonably expect to move into junior executive appointments while some of the wartime veterans were overdue for promotion to more senior ranks, but there were insufficient vacancies in both cases.

This was a complicated problem to solve and it is not necessary to discuss here all of the remedial measures that were implemented by the Air Council. Suffice to say that these amounted to a substantial restructuring of the officer corps and included a number of early retirements to clear the blocked passages within the promotion fields. There was, however, one innovation which is worthy of closer consideration. It was decided both to introduce (a few) specialist appointments at squadron leader and wing commander level and to reduce the overall requirement for career officers to become specialists by about 20%. Some of the surrendered posts were to be filled by civilians, but most were to go to warrant officers. Employing these men meant that, by exploiting their years of practical experience and their skilled craftsmanship, the Service was able to complement (or perhaps to compensate for) the purely academic knowledge of its pilot/technical officers. At the same time the creation of these additional posts had significantly improved the career prospects of noncommissioned personnel.

Despite this change in emphasis, in principle, the Air Council remained firmly wedded to the concept of a pilot-dominated air force. So long as pilots could be relied upon to do more or less everything, it was believed that ‘the danger is avoided of developing technical branches out of touch with flying and fighting requirements, and out of sympathy with the officers who fly and fight.’⁶² This may have been true in theory, but for this philosophy to have been valid the RAF’s pilots needed to be capable of actually doing everything. In practice many of them could not and/or did not want to.

While Fg Off (later Gp Capt) F D Tredrey was not one himself at the time, he has left us a contemporary impression of attitudes towards, what many regarded as being, the less desirable aspects of a career officer’s lot in the mid-1930s:⁶³

‘… if you’ve a permanent commission, away you go for real solid bookwork, to blossom forth as what KRs are pleased to call a specialist officer. If it’s navigation you’re selected for, a year of logarithms and nautical tables, spherical trig and astronomical theorising is your misfortune. Engineering means two awful years of toil in workshops mixed with dusty reading. Armament and signals are the other two left. They all give you grey hairs.’

While the lack of enthusiasm reflected here would not have been universal, of course, there can be no doubt that many young pilots would have much preferred to have stayed in the cockpit, rather than being obliged to return to the classroom. Furthermore, since their qualifications were gained through attendance at what were essentially academic courses, most specialist officers, particularly engineers, lacked much relevant practical ability. To keep an aeroplane flying one needed to be able to bend copper pipe, operate a lathe, panel-beat, sew fabric, splice and glue a timber joint, grind valves, tune a carburettor, balance a crankshaft or a propeller and so on. Although they would have been shown how to do such things during their courses, most of the RAF’s middle and senior management were incapable of actually doing many of them adequately themselves.

In his autobiography, Air Cdre Patrick Huskinson, who was trained as an armament specialist at Eastchurch in 1923-24 recalls that:64

‘Day after day I broke down and assembled Lewis and Vickers guns, bombs and primitive bomb and gun sights left over from the war. But the work I did was bleakly unprofitable. To the end I knew nothing, because I had been told nothing, of the designing and manufacture of any weapons whatever. I could scarcely have learned less about armaments if I had gone by mistake to a school for advanced organ-grinders.’

The inter-war years were an era in which craft skills were still valued and those who possessed them were respected. Officers who lacked much practical ability were inevitably held in low esteem by the work force.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the officer in charge of engineering would always have been given the credit if his unit achieved a notably high degree of technical efficiency. In reality the achievement was generally more attributable to the flight-sergeants, than to the flight lieutenant – and the aircraftmen knew it. So, despite the Air Council’s policy, there was (is and always has been) a divide between air and ground crews. The way to bridge this gap is by fostering professional excellence in both spheres, leading to mutual respect, not by amateurish interference in fields in which one lacks expertise.

The increasing reliance being placed on warrant officers as engineers from 1928 onwards represented the thin end of a wedge. Two years later, in order to relieve the burden being imposed on young pilots the principle was extended to permit warrant officers to fill appointments as Squadron Armament Officers on single-engine day bomber and army co-operation squadrons, both at home and in the Middle East.⁶⁶ This wedge was to be driven further home in 1933 when it was decided to grant permanent commissions to selected and suitably experienced warrant officers. They were to be given the rank of flying officer and serve as specialists in a variety of technical fields.⁶⁷ They were not to be dignified by the creation of their own branch, however, nor could they expect to be promoted. In the Air Force List they appeared on the pages immediately preceding warrant officers under the headings of ‘Commissioned Engineer (or Signals or Armament or Photographic) Officers’.

During the later 1930s far more complicated aeroplanes began to enter service and in much larger numbers than before. This trend made the unsatisfactory nature of the RAF’s management of its technical affairs increasingly apparent and pressure began to mount for the establishment of officers dedicated to such tasks. As one, clearly disgruntled, pilot obliged to work as an engineer, put it in 1935:⁶⁸

‘The engineer in the Service must be a specialist. At present he is not. In fact he is scarcely an engineer at all! He is inadequately trained, and in some cases has but little stomach for the job. In spite of himself he is inefficient!’ (Having identified what he perceived to be the drawbacks in the RAF’s traditional approach, he went on to ask:) ‘How is this sorry state of things to be rectified? In the opinion of the writer the only solution lies in the formation of a separate Engineering Branch of the Service.’

The experience gained from employing specialist technical officers was so satisfactory that in July 1939 the Air Council did decide to re-establish a Technical Branch.⁶⁹ This came into being in 1940, shortly after the reinstatement of administrative officers (see pages 187 & 189). It would take just as long for commissioned non-pilot aircrew to reappear, but the way ahead was clear for those who could read the signs. Unfortunately, if understandably, when the mould first began to crack in 1927-28 there was no one who could.

1932-34. Increased attention begins to be paid to the neglected art of air navigation.

It is interesting to observe that, in reviewing its requirements for technical officers in 1928, the Air Council had decided that the proportions of specialists required to work in the fields of engineering, signals, armament, photography and navigation would be 30:9:7:1:1.70 These figures suggest that, despite the RAF’s celebrated advocacy of the doctrine of strategic air power, it was actually devoting relatively little effort to fostering the technologies and techniques which would permit such a concept to be realised.

A page from the strip map produced to assist pilots to find their way while following the furrow that had been ploughed across the desert between Amman and Baghdad in 1921.

This was particularly true of navigation which had to be conducted accurately if aeroplanes were to be employed effectively. Unfortunately, the more esoteric aspects of navigation had never appealed very much to the majority of pilots. As a result, its development had been badly neglected and by the early 1930s it was acknowledged that the standards being achieved were far too low.

It is arguable that this was because the RAF had disposed of the people who should have become its professional navigators – its observers. By 1934, only twelve officers annotated as observers remained.⁷¹ Of these only two had managed to beat the system by attaining the most junior of senior ranks. They were Sqn Ldr L J Chandler, who had carved himself a niche as a signals expert, and Sqn Ldr C Porri, who had become a specialist in photography.

No longer having any aircrew dedicated to its practice, the RAF had maintained only a token interest in air navigation during the 1920s and it had made virtually no attempt to exploit the potential represented by the tiny handful of career officers who had studied the subject in depth. There was some familiarity with navigational techniques within the specialised world of flying boat operations but even these relatively long-legged aircraft rarely ventured out of sight of land. On the whole, for the average squadron pilot, the navigation training being provided in 1930 was little, if any, better than it had been in 1918.

Testimony as to contemporary attitudes towards navigation within the RAF, in some circles at least, has been left us by ‘Bill’ Pegg, later Chief Test Pilot to Bristols but, in 1926, Sgt A J Pegg of No 43 Sqn. As he recalls:72

‘Navigation was considered to be a purely theoretical business and, particularly for the fighter pilot, not of much practical use at all. The compass was used only as a very rough guide, and one always maintained visual contact with the ground. In fact, the standing joke in those days was to solemnly look up the railway time tables with the idea of following a suitable train to one’s destination.’

One of the Mongoose-powered Tutors operated by the Air Pilotage Schools at Northolt and later at Andover.

That having been said, it should perhaps be recorded here that there was one worthwhile navigational development between the wars, the introduction of Route Books. The first of these was published in 1922 to support the Cairo-Baghdad Air Mail. Essentially a combined flight plan and strip map, supported by amplifying notes, it described and illustrated the entire 850 miles in considerable detail.⁷³ This booklet was subsequently amended and updated and in 1930 it was joined by a set of similar documents covering the entire London-Singapore trunk route. From 1937 onwards, further books were published covering other imperial connections such as Kano-Port Sudan and Aden-Karachi. Separate editions were available to cater for landplanes and seaplanes. These enormously useful books were the ultimate in ‘Bradshawing’ but they were not the answer to navigation so much as a substitute for it.⁷⁴

Having finally begun to recognise the inadequacy of its navigational skills, the Service began to take training a little more seriously. As a first step, a temporary ‘Air Pilotage School’, equipped with Mongoose-powered Avro Tutors, was established to operate as a third flight within No 24 Sqn at Northolt. Between November 1931 and February 1932 this unit ran a total of five two-week courses. There was then a pause, presumably while the results were evaluated.

Since Calshot was unable to mount an Air Pilotage Course in 1931, pending the establishment of the new Air Pilotage School at Andover, No 101 Sqn stepped into the breach to host a navigation course in early 1932. The flying exercises were conducted in the squadron’s Sidestrands, like this one, K1992.

In August 1932 the Air Council announced a new policy towards the provision of navigation training.⁷⁵ In September the four Tutors at Northolt were transferred to Andover where a new Air Pilotage School was to be opened in 1933. Initially, the new school was intended to provide two-week courses which were to be attended by all career officers between their fourth and sixth year of service, ie as they were becoming eligible for appointments as Flight Commanders. Once qualified, Flight Commanders were to be held responsible for consolidating the rather sketchy introduction to air pilotage that the junior pilots under their command had received during their Flying Training School (FTS) courses.

At the same time all flying instructors were also required to qualify to the same ‘two-week’ standard as Flight Commanders with a view to improving the overall quality of instruction being provided during basic training. Flying instructors were not required to go to Andover, however, their training in navigation being integrated into their three-month CFS courses.⁷⁶

Increased attention was also given to the more advanced training still being provided by the Navigation School at Calshot. Although they now lasted for only eight months, the ‘long’ courses of 1932 and 1933 (known since 1929 as the Specialist Navigation Course) had three students each, instead of the more usual two, and later peacetime intakes were progressively increased to as many as fourteen (up to two places on each of the larger courses being made available to students from foreign or Commonwealth air forces).

The Navigation School was also still offering its three-month Air Pilotage Course but an increase in flying boat conversion work had meant that it had been unable to run a course during 1931. To fill the gap, a somewhat ad hoc thirteen-week course was conducted at Andover between January and April 1932, the practical content being flown in Sidestrands of No 101 Sqn, with a graduate of the 1929 ‘Long N’ course, Flt Lt N H D’Aeth, added to the strength to act as the navigation instructor. This temporary arrangement, which may well have served to highlight the degree to which Calshot’s course had become biased towards maritime operations, would prove to be the last Air Pilotage Course conducted against the old syllabus.

The choice of the Saro Cloud amphibian to equip the new Air Pilotage School at Andover seems a trifle bizarre and probably betrays the strong maritime tradition within the RAF’s navigational community (such as it was) in the early 1930s. This one, K2898, was initially delivered to Calshot as a seaplane trainer but it eventually found its way to Manston where it flew with No 48 Sqn and the School of Air Navigation. (Chaz Bowyer)

Taking the navigation element of Calshot’s lengthy flying boat conversion course as its basis, a more broadly-based curriculum was devised. This became the syllabus of a new thirteen-week course responsibility for which was transferred to the new Air Pilotage School at Andover which was to be commanded by Wg Cdr J K Summers, a graduate of the second (1920-21) ‘Long N’ course.77 Some of the output from the new course would be recycled to become instructors within the training system but most were destined for bomber squadrons where, identified as the Squadron Navigation Officer, they were to relieve the various Flight Commanders of their responsibility for improving the generally low standard of navigation.

Had they been introduced several years earlier, these changes might have done the trick but by 1933 it was already too late. The RAF was about to embark on a series of massive expansion programmes which would consistently outrun its ability to provide adequate training in air navigation (and much else besides). Had there been a sound foundation on which to build, it might have coped, but, as a result of the neglect of the 1920s, there was not.

Note on terminology.

In January 1935, perhaps to increase awareness of the increased attention being paid to training in air navigation, that term was adopted in place of air pilotage. As a result:

a. the Air Pilotage School at Andover was renamed as the Air Navigation School (see Note 77);

b. the thirteen-week Air Pilotage Course became the Short Navigation Course, its graduates becoming ‘Navigation Officers’ instead of ‘Air Pilotage Officers’, and

c. the Manuals of Air Pilotage and Air Navigation became Manuals of Air Navigation, Vols I and II (while retaining their original identities as APs 1234 and 1456).

In the Air Force List, appointments that were to be filled by graduates of the new Short Navigation (soon to be known colloquially as the ‘sn’) Course (or the old Air Pilotage Course) were now annotated with an sn, rather than the old p. Graduates of the Specialist Navigation Course retained their individual N symbols in the gradation lists with their appointments annotated with an n if they were specifically associated with navigational duties.⁷⁸

________________________

¹      AMWO 973 of 27 August 1919.

²      AIR8/6. A copy of Sykes’ ‘Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on the Air-Power Requirements of the Empire’ of 9 December 1918 is on this file and the text, less the Annexes, is reproduced as Appendix VII to his autobiography From Many Angles (1942).

³      AIR1/17/15/1/84. A copy of the ‘Trenchard Memorandum’ is on this file and it was reproduced verbatim in Flight for 18 December 1919.

⁴      TNA T1/12341. On 18 March 1919 the Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction that had been appointed to consider questions relating to the post-war air force published a memorandum that broadly outlined the RAF’s likely manpower requirements, both officers and men. It included the following statement: ‘The Committee considered the question as to whether a separate observer branch is required, and decided that such a branch is unnecessary, as these duties will be carried out by the Flying Officer; allowance has been made in the proposed Scheme for training to be given in these duties.’

⁵      Note that the establishment (AF/F/16), of five officer observers plus eleven NCOs recorded for an O/400 unit at Figure 14 (on page 96), had been superseded at the end of May 1918 by AF/F/38. The ex-RNAS faction would seem to have guided the hand that had drafted this document as it deleted all commissioned observers, leaving each of the ten aeroplanes with a notional crew of two officer pilots and just one NCO observer. The first unit scheduled to arrive in France manned against this establishment was expected to be No 215 Sqn. When Maj Gen J M Salmond learned of this he protested to GHQ at the lack of commissioned observers (his letter CRAF 2022/1G dated 27 June 1918 is on AIR1/533/16/12/114). Field Marshal Haig promptly relayed the GOC’s complaint to London. The result was the publication on 16 July of establishment AF/F/46 (later to be superseded by the very similar AF/IF/5). This reflected the specific requirements of HQ Independent Force and provided for a total of twelve officer (including two with the HQ Flight) and four NCO observers per squadron. Note, however, that AF/F/38 remained current until the end of the war and was still supposed to govern the manning of the two O/400 units operating under HQ RAF. In fact, when the war ended, the latter appear to have been conforming to neither scale; No 207 Sqn had ten officers and eight NCOs while No 214 Sqn had five and ten, respectively. Nevertheless, the most common practice by that time, as established by the five heavy bomber squadrons assigned to the Independent Force, was to fly with a three-man crew of one pilot and two observers, both of the latter usually being commissioned.

⁶      AIR1/460/15/312/96. Minutes of an HQ Independent Force conference held on 8 November 1918.

⁷      AIR1/1162/204/5/2529. HQ RAF letter AF 2315/2(A) dated 2 May 1919 laid down the intended establishment of No 216 (and 214) Sqn prior to its imminent redeployment from France to Egypt as fifteen pilots plus fourteen officer and twelve NCO observers. But, on the same file, a memo of 22 June identifies the officers actually involved; there were three pilots and one observer (Lt J W E Richards) in the train party (which had left Marquise the previous day), and twenty-pilots and one observer (Capt E D Harding) in the air party.

⁸      AIR1/1036/204/5/1455. Air Ministry letter C.85253/M4a dated 5 April 1919.

⁹      Ibid.. HQ RAF letter RAF/2367(A) dated 21 July 1919.

¹⁰    AC1 Daniells, R (216349) is something of a wild card, as he should have been a sergeant. Was he, perhaps, some sort of administrative hangover from 1917, an old-style aerial gunner who had, for some reason, failed to make the switch to observer and thus to acquire three stripes, or had he fallen foul of the system and been reduced to the ranks?

¹¹    Aerial Navigation Officers were introduced by AMWO 104 of 23 January 1919. This appointment should not be confused with that of the wartime Air Navigation Officer most of whom had been specialist Technical (née Equipment) Officers, rather than aircrew.

¹²    AMWO 439 of 12 August 1926 introduced the annotation p in the Air Force List to distinguish officers serving with units as navigation specialists, this presumably implying previous attendance at an Air Pilotage Course, although this was not specifically stated to be a prerequisite. Similarly, an a, e, s or ph indicated that the officer, ie pilot, concerned was responsible for, and therefore had at least some acquaintance with, armaments, engineering, signals or photography. Advanced qualifications in these and other fields, acquired via courses lasting up to a year (later as long as two years) were indicated by a series of upper case symbols which had been introduced in 1923 (by AMWO 37 of 25 January). These symbols were printed alongside an individual’s name in the gradation lists, that associated with the Long Navigation Course, for instance, being an N.

¹³    AP 958. KRs&ACIs, First (1924) Edition, Chap XII, Sect II, para 691.

¹⁴    AIR1/616/16/15/329. AO 1338 of 21 June 1919.

¹⁵    AMWO 19 of 8 January 1920.

¹⁶    AMWO 866 of 31 July 1919 dealt with the award of permanent commissions. It included the statement that officers ‘who are not flying officers will […] be required to qualify as pilots within 12 months from 1 August 1919.’ The only exceptions were to be Stores Officers and certain Technical Officers. AMWO 1051 of 18 September 1919 published the specific rules governing the acquisition of pilots badges by observers and non-aircrew officers. In the event, the system was unable to cope with this task within the year allowed and some officers were still being retrained as pilots in the late 1920s. Technical Officers were to be another short-lived breed, incidentally; by 1922 they too had been dispensed with, their functions subsequently being discharged by omniscient pilots.

¹⁷    It may be of some interest to note that when the first Course assembled at the RAF Staff College in April 1922 it included one observer, Flt Lt E B C Betts. This was a one off anomaly, and short-lived, as Betts promptly reported to No 1 FTS on graduation to become a pilot, thus permitting him to attain the ultimate rank of air vice-marshal.

¹⁸    AMWO 1295 of 18 December 1919.

¹⁹    AMWO 70 of 22 January 1920 abolished the trade of the wireless observer, those who remained in uniform being remustered as wireless operators (mechanic) or wireless operators, depending upon their qualifications. Similarly, AMWO 187 of 26 February remustered all NCO observers as aircraft hands (aerial gunner).

²⁰    AMWO 109 of 9 February 1921.

²¹    AMWO 271 of 14 April 1921.

²²    AMWO 624 of 4 August 1921.

²³    Formed at Eastchurch in April 1920 as the School of Aerial Gunnery and Bombing, it was renamed on 1 April 1922 as the Armament and Gunnery School. It was restyled again on 1 January 1932 when it became the Air Armament School.

²⁴    In practical terms, an air gunner maintained his currency by completing a specified number of camera gun exercises, firing live ammunition during an annual practice camp and cleaning and maintaining his Lewis gun.

²⁵    AMWO 311 of 8 May 1924.

²⁶    AMWO 204 of 12 April 1923. There was uncertainty in some quarters as to whether the new badge had any impact on the old flying ‘O’. AOC India, AVM Game, for instance, sought guidance in his 1753/1/Air dated 26 June 1923. The Air Ministry’s response, 442529/23/P.2 of 24 August, confirmed that an airmen gunner entitled to a flying ‘O’ could continue to wear it, in addition to a winged bullet (see AIR5/482).

²⁷    AP 809. Gunners badges (Section 22D/Ref 238) cost 2¼d each while those for PTIs (Section 22D/Ref 239) cost 4½d.

²⁸    AMWO 109 of 9 February 1921 provided details of current rates of pay and allowances for all non-commissioned personnel. Since inflation was not a significant factor at the time, there were few variations in these rates over the next twenty years.

²⁹    The Air Force List for June 1923 shows that twelve observers were serving with maritime air units (Nos 3, 230 and 267 Sqns and Nos 401, 440 and 441 Flts); five were assigned to HMS Ark Royal; one was with HMS Argus and each of Nos 2, 5, 6, 11, 47 and 216 Sqns still had one observer on strength. Thirteen were at flying training schools where most of them were being retreaded as pilots. There were three observers on the station staff at Calshot, two at Leuchars and one at Gosport. Fourteen were serving in various capacities at ground training units, including the Electrical and Wireless School, the Armament and Gunnery School, No 1 School of Technical Training (Boys), the Boys Wing at Cranwell and the Schools of Army Co-operation, of Photography, of Naval Co-operation and of Balloon Training. One was with No 1 Armoured Car Company; another was at the Air Ministry with most of the others being distributed between sundry Group and Wing Headquarters or at one of the RAF’s several Depots.

³⁰    AIR5/498. Boyle’s query was contained in HQ Inland Area letter IA/300/721/4/P1 dated 25 September 1924. The Air Ministry responded on 17 October 1924 with its 539294/24/S.7.

³¹    AIR5/1253. From a paper entitled ‘Some Notes on RAF Co-operation During Operations in Kurdistan, March to June 1923’ written by Gp Capt A M Longmore of Air HQ Baghdad.

³²    AMWO 159 of 6 March 1924 (which is primarily concerned with the distribution of airmen pilots) summarises the contemporary aircrew establishment by type of squadron.

³³    These three officers were not specifically annotated as observers. Since all pilots were considered to be capable of carrying out the duties of an observer, a unit was simply provided with three more pilots than it needed to fill its front seats, each individual’s subsequent employment being at the CO’s discretion.

³⁴    AIR5/3 51. Minutes of an Air Ministry meeting held on 20 March 1924 to discuss the provision of officers for observer duties.

³⁵    Although the Air Force Constitution Act of 1917 had made provision for reserve and auxiliary forces, it was 1925 before the first Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force units, Nos 502 and 602 Sqns respectively, were formed.

³⁶    AIR2/237. Minute by CAS (Trenchard) dated 5 March 1923 on Air Ministry file 412070/23.

³⁷    The RAFO section of the Air Force List for March 1926 includes forty-four officers who had been graded as observers during WW I, less than half of the target figure. Since some of these men had not qualified until the late summer of 1918, however, it is unlikely that many (any?) of them will have seen enough active service to have established whether they actually met the stated criterion of having been ‘good’ ex-wartime observers. Furthermore, since they were Class B reservists, it is quite possible that some of them may actually have registered for service in a technical discipline, rather than as observers.

³⁸    Sir Ivo Vesey was actually a soldier (a colonel who had held the temporary rank of major-general since 1918) who had been loaned to the Air Ministry where, as a temporary air vice-marshal, he filled the appointment of Director of Organisation and Staff Duties from 1923 to 1928. There were other examples of the Air Ministry’s ‘borrowing’ senior officers from the other Services in the early days, eg RAdm Sir Cecil Lambert who was Director of Personnel in 1919-21.

³⁹    AMWO 24 of 7 January 1926 had directed that ‘air’ was to be used in place of ‘aerial’, thus for instance, the previously conventional aerial gunner and aerial reconnaissance became the air gunner and air reconaissance.

⁴⁰    AIR5/3 51. Minutes of an Air Ministry meeting held on 18 March 1926 to discuss the establishment of observers in bombing squadrons.

⁴¹    AIR1/2388/228/11/91. Andrews had spent nine months flying as an observer with No 5 Sqn before training as a pilot at the end of 1915. This extract is taken from an account of his previous Service experience written at the RAF Staff College in 1926. He retired in April 1945, by then AVM J O Andrews CB DSO MC*.

⁴²    AIR30/191. Sir Samuel Hoare’s submission to the Palace of 28 June 1926 is on this file; it is annotated, by hand, ‘App’d GRI’. The abolition of the rank of observer officer was subsequently promulgated by AMWO 394 of 15 July 1926.

⁴³    AIR2/291/666683/26.

⁴⁴    AMWO 59 of 28 January 1926.

⁴⁵    Winston Churchill’s reign as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) was notable for a drive to return to the Gold Standard and to restore the pound to its pre-war value. What this meant in real terms is open to debate but it certainly imposed considerable strain on the national economy and was, arguably, a contributory cause of the General Strike of 1926. Despite the RAF’s air gunners having previously been obliged to contribute to the sinking fund at a rate of a shilling a day, it had also increased the country’s vulnerability to the recession which followed the Wall Street crash of 1929.

⁴⁶    AIR8/1359. AVM Steel’s observations are taken from an unreferenced and undated paper he submitted to CAS at the end of 1926. The subject was actually accident prevention but Steel considered that inadequate and/or inappropriate manning was a contributory factor at a variety of levels and his Annex D dealt with non-pilot aircrew.

⁴⁷    Para 482 of King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions (1924 edition).

⁴⁸    See Note 46. Figures from Steel’s Annex D.

⁴⁹    AMWO 491 of 9 September 1926.

⁵⁰    Between mid-1918 and 7 August 1929, when responsibility for it passed to Cranwell, the training of RAF wireless tradesmen had been carried out at Flowerdown. Originally known as No 1 (Training) Wireless School, the unit had been renamed the Electrical and Wireless School on 12 December 1919. The apprenticeship scheme had been introduced with the arrival of the First Entry in January 1922.

⁵¹    See Note 46. Figures from Steel’s Annex D.

⁵²    AMWO 581 of 28 October 1926, the latest regulation governing the selection, mustering and posting of air gunners, required names to be submitted to the Officer i/c Records who was then to arrange a course at the Armament and Gunnery School ‘when a vacancy arises’.

⁵³    AMWO 347 of 26 May 1927 revised the terms under which a gunner was to qualify. While the regulations still appeared to be fairly rigorous, they actually contained provisions which made it relatively easy (and permissible) to short-circuit the system.

⁵⁴    AMWO 147 of 7 March 1929.

⁵⁵    AIR5/1291, Iraq Command Monthly Operation Summaries, Vol V, 1927-1929.

⁵⁶    AMWO 457 of 14 July 1927.

⁵⁷    AMWO 63 of 24 January 1929.

⁵⁸    AMWO 781 of 7 July 1919 had published the details of the arrangements for short service commissions. The original scheme offered four-year engagements (strictly speaking three, plus the option of a year’s extension, although four became the standard engagement from 17 November 1920) followed by four years of service on the reserve. AMWO 598 of 28 July 1921 subsequently introduced the options of extensions to five, six or seven years on the active list.

Building on this trend, AMWO 427 of 21 June 1928 introduced a medium service scheme under which selected short service officers were given the option of extending their original, by now five-year, standard engagements to a total of ten years, such an undertaking attracting a preferential rate of gratuity. The demands of the expansion era meant that by the late 1930s many short service officers were serving up to seven years on the active list while medium service could be extended to eleven years – see Air Ministry Order (AMO) A.225/1937 of 15 July. The regulations were subject to frequent amendment during the later 1930s, the term ‘medium service’ finally being abandoned – see AMO A.228/1939 of 22 June.

⁵⁹    AMWO 706 of 8 September 1921.

⁶⁰    AIR20/6228. A lengthy paper (dealing with accident rates) on this file contains an analysis comparing NCO pilots (actually employed on flying duties) to commissioned pilots (ranked as squadron leaders and below), between 1925 and 1935. NCOs represented 5·5% of the total in 1925, 13 9% in 1930 and 171% in 1935.

On 18 July 1940 the Director of Manning, Air Cdre J W Cordingley, minuted on file A.82118/40 (AIR2/8179) that, with respect to qualified pilots, the most accurate figures that he could produce indicated that, boosted by RAFVR sergeants, the proportion of airmen pilots had virtually doubled to 33·8% by the outbreak of war. The actual figures were:

⁶¹    This problem is didcussed in the opening paragraphs of AMWO 676 of 23 October 1930.

⁶²    AMWO 426 of 21 June 1928, from which the quotation is taken, contained an analysis of the RAF’s personnel management problems and summarised the remedial steps that were to be implemented.

⁶³    Frank D Tredrey, Pilot’s Summer (1939), pp45-46.

⁶⁴    Huskinson, op cit, p26.

⁶⁵    In a letter published in Flight for 17 June 1948, for instance, a correspondent referred to ‘the contempt of the pre-war ex-apprentice for his “specialist” officers, who knew little and cared less about his trade …’

⁶⁶    AMWO 676 of 23 October 1930.

⁶⁷    AMOs A.110/1933 and A.111/1933 of 13 April reintroduced specialist technical officers and defined their terms of service. It was then envisaged that about 60% of engineering posts would continue to be filled by officers of the General Duties Branch. When the scheme was introduced, of course, practically 100% of engineering posts were already filled by pilots so the initial requirement for professionals was relatively small. It was expected to be satisfied by the commissioning of seven engineer officers, one or two signals officers and one armament officer per year.

⁶⁸    The quotation is taken from an article which appeared in the Royal Air Force Quarterly, Vol VI, No 4 (1935). It was written by a flight lieutenant with an E annotation but published anonymously, as was the practice at the time. The selection of articles for publication was entirely at the discretion of the Editor and their appearance in print did not imply any form of Air Ministry endorsement. The Editor (C G Burge) had his finger firmly on the Air Force’s pulse, however, and he would have felt perfectly justified in using a piece which articulated the resentment felt by pilots who were obliged to give up flying to practise some other trade for which they often lacked much aptitude and in which they had little interest. While the original article was a trifle emotive, it served to prompt others, eg RAF Quarterly Vol VII, No 1 (1936) and Vol IX, No 4 (1938). While these later submissions tended to adopt a more measured style and took issue with some of the detail in the first offering, they still supported the idea of establishing a professional body of engineers.

⁶⁹    AIR 6/57. The establishment of a dedicated Technical Branch was formally proposed by AMP, AVM Portal, in a paper, EPM 108(39) dated 30 June 1939. While implementation would have to await Treasury approval, the proposal was formally endorsed by the Air Council at a meeting held on 4 July.

⁷⁰    In view of the proportions envisaged in 1928, it is of some interest to consider the actual position ten years later. The Air Force List for June 1938 identifies a total of 190 miscellaneous commissioned (ie ex-warrant) officers, three of whom had managed to become flight lieutenants. The numbers specialising in engineering, signals, armament and photography were 123, 37, 22 and 3 respectively, which was tolerably close to the original forecast. Far more attention had been paid to navigation during the 1930s, however, and, in the event, responsibility for it had been wholly retained by the General Duties Branch. On the other hand, while the anticipated commissioned navigation specialists had failed to materialise, pilots were busily divesting themselves of another of their traditional chores and by June 1938 there were five specialist Physical Training Officers.

⁷¹    AIR10/1746. Observers were now so rare that when the first edition of AP 1358, ‘Dress Regulations for Officers of the Royal Air Force’ appeared in 1929 it contained no reference to the ‘O’ badge, although it must still have been worn by the last of the diehards.

⁷²    Bill Pegg, Sent Flying (1959), p45.

⁷³    The air mail route across the largely featureless terrain between Amman and Baghdad was marked by a track which was first ploughed across the desert in 1921 and subsequently ‘refreshed’ as required. This was eventually superseded by a 1,200-mile pipeline laid in 1932-34 to connect, via Haditha, the oilfields of Kirkuk to a Mediterranean terminal at Haifa (there was a second pipeline running across French-controlled territory between Haditha and Tripoli). Oil began to flow to Palestine in January 1935 and thereafter an aircraft needing to make an intermediate stop did so at one of the airstrips established alongside the pumping stations at H2, H3, H4 and H5, or at any of the dozen or so intervening landing grounds. A map showing the location of these as at 1932 is on file within AIR5/1255.

⁷⁴    ‘Bradshawing’, RAF patois for the practice of navigating by reference to railway lines and stations, was named for the contemporary guide to British railway timetables which was published by Messrs Bradshaw.

⁷⁵    AMO A.233/1932 of 25 August.

⁷⁶    Until this requirement was levied the CFS had not had an officer on its staff specifically appointed to deal with air pilotage, ie with a p annotation. To provide the necessary expertise, Flt Lt C E Chilton, a graduate of the 1931 (No 12) Specialist Navigation Course, was posted in from No 209 Sqn with effect from 6 February 1934, making the 42nd Flying Instructors Course (13 February-12 May) the first to address navigation to a significant degree.

⁷⁷    Formally established at Andover on 5 May 1933 as the Air Pilotage School, the unit was renamed the Air Navigation School on 25 January 1935 (see Note 78). On 6 January 1936 it, and the Navigation School from Calshot, moved to Manston where, notionally on the same day, the two units were merged to create the School of Air Navigation (SAN). The first CO was Andover’s Wg Cdr J K Summers with his eventual successor, Calshot’s Wg Cdr P D Robertson (another ‘Long N’ alumnus having attended No 8 Course in 1928-29), as Chief Instructor, his post being annotated with an n. For the remaining years of peace (the school moved to St Athan on the outbreak of war) Manston became the RAF’s centre of excellence for navigation training. The SAN ran the Specialist Navigation Course (by now further reduced to just six-months), the three-month ‘sn’ Course, another course of similar length, specifically tailored to meet the needs of the increasingly land-based general (ie maritime) reconnaissance role, and eventually offered specialist training in astro.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that in his book The Paladins (1990), John James states that the first course for commissioned ‘navigators’ began at the School of Air Navigation in June 1938. This is incorrect. Although they were attending a variety of courses in navigation, practically all prewar students passing through Manston were pilots. A few observers did eventually begin to go there, to attend a specialist course in astro, but not until June 1939 and even then they were all NCOs. In point of fact the RAF had no commissioned observers until 1940 and the aircrew category of ‘navigator’ was not introduced until 1942.

⁷⁸    AMO A. 16/1935 of 24 January.