Chapter 20

1939-40. Early changes in wartime recruiting policy.

The declaration of war in September 1939 brought an immediate end to the scheme for the provision of air crew which had been introduced in the previous January, long before it had had time to mature. The wartime demand for observers meant that it was quite impractical to expect them to spend an initial three years as wireless operators (air crew) and, since it was clearly not essential for all gunners to be qualified as wireless operators, direct recruiting of ‘straight’ air gunners was introduced. As a result, the peacetime aim of eradicating the distinction between dual-qualified wireless operator/air gunners and ‘straight’ air gunners had also to be abandoned.

The initial wartime policy governing the provision of air observers (and airmen pilots) was published in September 1939.1 It stated that observers courses for Service entrants would be suspended forthwith and that all subsequent intakes into civil air navigation schools (and flying training schools) would be directly recruited RAFVR personnel.

Ever since January 1939 it had been intended that volunteer reservists should be distinguished from regular servicemen, and from ex-regulars with a reserve commitment, by an appropriate badge. This emblem was not actually approved until September, however, when its introduction became a matter of some urgency as a result of the wartime policy of universal enrolment within the RAFVR. For officers the badge was to take the form of a small gilt ‘VR’ monogram to be worn on the uniform collar. Airmen were to wear an embroidered ‘VR’ immediately below the eagle at the top of each jacket sleeve.²

Apart from the fact that no further regular airmen (or officers) were to be engaged until further notice, the wartime arrangements also meant that airmen who were already enlisted as groundcrew were no longer eligible for consideration for flying duties as pilots or observers.³ The new regulations were amplified in November when it was made clear that this constraint had also applied to the provision of both wireless operators (air crew) and air gunners.⁴

Seen here as an acting sergeant (acting observer) with No 44 Sqn at Waddington in October 1939, Harry Moyle had still to be granted permission to wear an ‘O’ badge when his aircraft was shot down into the North Sea by over-enthusiastic Spitfire pilots of No 602 Sqn on 21 December, an incident which the crew was fortunate to survive. Because of the prevailing (although not yet exclusive) policy of Hampden crews having two pilots, one of whom acted as navigator, Moyle had been flying as the lower rear gunner on this sortie. (H Moyle)

It would seem that Air Chf Mshl Sir John Steel (among others) was somewhat confused by the distinction between a wireless operator (air crew) and a wireless operator (air gunner). This was a trifle unfortunate, since Sir John, who was AOCinC Reserve Command at the time, was responsible for the recruiting of all such personnel. He eventually sought enlightenment from the Air Ministry who patiently explained that there was only one trade, not two, the second term being unofficial.⁵ Nevertheless, since it was clearly a better descriptive title and already in widespread use, AMP decided to adopt it. This decision was formally announced in February 1940, when it was stipulated that an airman’s qualification as an air gunner was to be added (where applicable) in parentheses after his basic trade.⁶ In other words, the category of wireless operator (air crew) had been superseded by that of the wireless operator (air gunner) – the WOp/AG.

1939-40. The wartime RAF begins to afford Observers a greater degree of recognition.

Under the regulations originally published in 1937 (see page 157), and which were still current, an observer had to have completed six months’ service on a squadron before he was entitled to wear a flying ‘O’. This period was even longer than that required in WW I when so many back-seaters had been wounded or killed in action, denied even the token distinction of being able to wear an observers badge on the grounds that they were still on probation. This highly unsatisfactory situation had finally been put right in the summer of 1918 and a similar arrangement was clearly needed now that another war had broken out, a suitable regulation eventually appearing in April 1940.⁷

Left to right, Sgt G E R Parr, Fg Off J A Douch and Sgt R J Bassett, a typical Blenheim crew, photographed shortly after joining No 18 Sqn when it was being rebuilt following the fall of France. The observer is easy to identify; he is the one whose tunic lacks a badge – a fairly common anomaly until August 1940. (G Parr)

This permitted AOCs to authorise an airman to wear a flying ‘O’ so long as he had passed an appropriate course (even this was not necessary if he had previously been a qualified, pre-war-style, full-time air gunner) and had been recommended by his CO ‘as the result of operational experience.’ Precisely how much operational experience was not laid down but it was now clearly within a CO’s gift to authorise an acting observer to put up his badge when he returned from his first sortie, although this did nothing for his bank balance, as he still remained a nine-shillings-a-day acting sergeant until he had satisfied the ‘six months on a squadron’ clause.

While attendance at an ‘appropriate course’ may have been relatively easy to arrange in the UK, this was not the case in overseas commands, which still lacked permanent facilities dedicated to the training of any air crew other than pilots. Although a makeshift navigation school did operate briefly at Abu Sueir in 1940, its chief purpose was to provide short (‘sn’-style) training for pilots and it is unlikely that any airmen observers ever attended this course.8 On the other hand, it is worth recording that concern over the scarcity of qualified air crew eventually led to 50% of the capacity of No 4 FTS being earmarked for the training of observers (and gunners – see below), the first nine-week course beginning on 26 August 1940.⁹ The last of the thirty-eight observers to be trained at Habbaniya graduated in March 1941.

Despite the ‘operational experience’ concession granted in April 1940, there were substantial, indeed growing, numbers of badgeless, underpaid, acting sergeants (acting observer) having to serve out their mandatory sentences of six months on probation. In August it was decided to waive the requirement for operational experience so that all acting observers were now entitled to wear a badge as soon as they completed their training.¹⁰ The same provisions applied to those WOp/AGs and air gunners who had been remustered to acting observer without having to attend a formal course (see below); they too were immediately entitled to wear a flying ‘O’.

While the automatic right to wear a badge will, no doubt, have been appreciated, this gesture had had little effect on the material status of an observer. It took another three months, by which time the country had been at war for more than a year, for the RAF grudgingly to accept that the observer of 1940 really did deserve much the same degree of recognition as had been afforded his predecessor of 1918. In October the requirement for a period of probationary service with acting rank was finally abolished.¹¹ Thenceforth, all observers emerged from training on exactly the same terms as pilots, that is to say, wearing their badges and ranked as temporary sergeants drawing 12/6d per day.

1939-40. Early wartime improvements in the status of Gunners.

Once the shooting had started there had been a marked increase in respect for gunners and, because they were now very different animals from observers, a distinctive badge had been introduced for them in December 1939. The new emblem resembled the observers badge to the extent that it had only one wing but the design of this wing differed subtly from that of the original. In place of the ‘O’ there was an embroidered brown laurel wreath enclosing the letters ‘AG’ in white.¹² The new badge was to be worn by officers on being posted to a unit as an air gunner following a course of instruction and by airmen who were mustered as air gunners and who had served, or were serving, as such since 3 September. The ‘AG’ badge rendered the old winged bullet obsolescent, although personnel who had qualified for one, but who were no longer available for employment as gunners, were still permitted to wear it, as (until July 1940) were observers and pilots who had previously been gunners.¹³

A pre-December 1939 Whitley air gunner flying on operations as an LAC with his trade still indicated by the winged bullet on his sleeve. (Air Historical Branch)

When the RAF went to war all of its airmen pilots and observers (at least those who were officially recognised as such, and there were many de facto observers who were not – see below) wore the three stripes of a sergeant and were paid 12/6d per day (or nine shillings in the case of acting observers). By comparison, depending upon his performance in training, an air gunner flying on operations might be no more than an AC2 of Trade Group V, in which case he would have earned as little as two shillings per day. He still drew his shilling-a-day crew pay, of course, and his sixpence gunners pay, although both of these were forfeit whenever he was unavailable for flying duties for more than fourteen consecutive days. Furthermore, if he was mustered within Trade Group V solely as a gunner, ie with no basic trade (other than aircrafthand), he had no realistic career prospects beyond the classification of leading aircraftman (LAC). In short, apart from being socially segregated from the men with whom he was supposed to fly and fight as a member of a team, a gunner was paid less than a third of what they earned.

All of this was reminiscent of some of the more unsatisfactory aspects of the RFC’s man-management during WW I but, since no one appeared to remember any of this, the ground was having to be covered again.

The AG badge introduced in December 1939, the design of which was reflected in all subsequent non-pilot flying badges until 2003.

Under the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that a detectable sense of grievance became evident within the community of gunners. While the introduction of a ‘proper’ badge had been appreciated, it had been no more than a cosmetic gesture. In fact, it had actually managed to focus attention on gunners, without having done anything of any substance to improve their circumstances. The Service authorities were well aware that an unsatisfactory state of affairs existed (after all, they had created it) and on 16 December 1939 Air Mshl Portal convened a meeting to consider the problem. It was agreed that something positive needed to be done and, as a holding measure, a statement was released to the effect that the status and pay of gunners was being reviewed and that a further announcement would be made shortly.14

‘Shortly’ turned out to have been a little optimistic. The delay in improving the lot of the gunner was due to the Treasury, who had first to be convinced that gunners really were as important as the Air Ministry claimed, and then persuaded to foot the substantial bill which would result from giving them all SNCO status. Inevitably, the eventual result was a compromise. With effect from 27 May 1940 (five months before this privilege was extended to observers) all WOp/AGs and straight air gunners were to be automatically granted the rank of temporary sergeant on completion of their training, although they were to be paid at inclusive rates of only 7/9d and 7/- per day, respectively.¹⁵ In effect, therefore, while many gunners still had a basic trade to which they could revert (in their ‘real’ rank), so long as they remained on flying duties, they were now recognised as being fully-fledged members of the ‘air crew élite’. That there had to be a pay differential between gunners and pilots/observers was unfortunate, but it was considered to be a reasonable reflection of the relative demands made by these occupations and was, in any case, the best that could be squeezed out of the Exchequer.

Sadly, the Order which elevated gunners to SNCO status was not actually promulgated until 27 June. As a result, practically all of the gunners who died flying in the Battles and Blenheims of the Advanced Air Striking Force during the fall of France did so as corporals or aircraftmen. The same was true of those who lost their lives during the early operations of Bomber and Coastal Commands.16

As they had done in 1939, when they had been obliged to give house room to hoards of young observers, the denizens of the RAF’s sergeants messes grumbled about this second influx of ‘instant’ NCOs. As one of the beneficiaries of the new regulations, Roger Peacock, put it:¹⁷

‘Like all changes, it took some getting used to, particularly among senior NCOs in ground trades who might well have served fifteen years before advancing to the same rank as that handed out to an eager eighteen-year-old after only six months in the service. But they soon realised that it was unfair to bear grudges; most of the new sergeants did not live long enough to justify a grudge.’

Although all recognised gunners were entitled to be temporary sergeants by mid-1940, some of those who had qualified long before 27 May were already substantive SNCOs in their own right within their original trades. Some of these men would have been out of pocket at the new inclusive rate of pay. Provision was made, therefore, for anyone who would be financially better off drawing a combination of his basic Trade Group pay plus crew pay plus gunners pay to continue to do so. Unfortunately, there was a flaw in this arrangement which was not immediately apparent.

To reflect the instability caused by wartime conditions, the two additional elements paid for flying duties had not been tied to established posts since 3 September 1939, although this was a back-dated concession which had not actually been announced until the following April.¹⁸ So long as he was fit to fly, therefore, any wartime gunner could have his 1/6d per day. Unfortunately, the old ‘fourteen day rule’ had not been rescinded, so that a sick or wounded gunner was quite likely to lose both his crew and his qualification pay. As operations intensified this became a relatively frequent occurrence and a cause for some justifiable complaint, since gunners on the inclusive rate did not have to pay this forfeit. Since there were still significant numbers of senior gunners preferring to draw their basic pay plus 1/6d as late as 1943, the fourteen days was extended to ninety-one with effect from 1 June of that year.¹⁹

As the RAF adjusted to wartime conditions, it became apparent that something needed to be done to rationalise the position of the remaining old-style pre-war airmen gunners, many of whom were still on active service. Special arrangements were introduced for the real old hands who had qualified before the introduction of the January 1939 scheme. Many of these men had accumulated a substantial amount of flying time during which (and supplemented by incidental courses and the experience gained at Armament Practice Camps) they had picked up most of the skills of an observer. Indeed, some of these gunners were actually flying as observers where appropriately qualified men were still unavailable. Their position had been recognised in January 1940 and, provided that they could pass certain tests and had their CO’s blessing, these men could be granted the rank of acting sergeant and remustered as acting observers.²⁰ This gave them a standing similar to that of a newly qualified direct entrant in that they drew the same nine shillings a day for the next six months during which, if they flew operationally, they just might be authorised to wear a flying ‘O’.

If circumstances did not provide an opportunity to fly on operations, and thus the possibility of putting up an observers badge, an ex-gunner could continue to wear his ‘AG’ badge, or perhaps even an old winged bullet. This concession was withdrawn on 7 July, however, when it was ruled that one could wear only the badge of the category in which one was currently being employed (see Note 13). It seems most unlikely that many COs would have pressed their de facto observers to remove their gunners emblems but, even if they did, they would not have been badgeless for long. Only three weeks later the ‘operational experience’ rider was waived, which immediately entitled all acting observers to wear a flying ‘O’ (see Note 10).

Most of the gunners serving overseas on the outbreak of war were still in-house trained part-timers. They were invited to choose between remustering as air crew or reverting to their ground trades, mostly as wireless operators or wireless operator mechanics. Like those at home, airmen who elected to become air crew would automatically have become entitled to wear the ‘AG’ badge from December 1939 and most should subsequently have been made up to temporary sergeant with effect from 27 May 1940.

Being a long way from London, and thus less able (or, perhaps, less inclined) to seek advice from the oracle, it would seem that there may have been some variations in the interpretation of the regulations in Egypt. For instance, as an armourer with three years’ experience as a part-time gunner with No 208 Sqn, Cpl Dennis Conroy was made up to acting sergeant and remustered as a full-time air gunner in September 1940.²¹ Two months later he was posted to No 70 Sqn at Kabrit, but in his original trade. Unfortunately, this involved the forfeit of his recently acquired third stripe, although he was permitted to retain his flying badge, thus creating the rather anomalous situation of an ‘AG’-badged groundcrew corporal.²²

While HQ RAFME may have been a trifle cavalier with the status of some of its air gunners, it did make an effort to provide them with some formal instruction. Where possible, gunners stationed in Egypt attended a locally organised ‘top up’ course run by the Pilot Reinforcement Pool at Ismailia.23 While these courses improved the technical knowledge of those who were already qualified as gunners, and provided some insight into the complexities of power-operated turrets for those more accustomed to a Scarff ring, the content was also deemed to be sufficient to permit additional wireless personnel to be formally remustered as WOp/AGs. The content of the nominally two-week (the hours count actually indicates a full fourteen days) syllabus is outlined at Figure 27. Nine courses were run between July and December 1940; precise details of the numbers involved are lacking but the total throughput was more than 100, including at least fifteen officers.

Fig 27. Syllabus of the fourteen-day air gunners courses run at Ismailia between July and December 1940.

As with observers, HQ RAFME also set up a more formal means of providing additional gunners by making suitable arrangements at No 4 FTS (see Note 9). The first four-week course began at Habbaniya on 23 October 1940, the last of a total of fifty-two (mostly officer) air gunners graduating in March 1941.

1939-41. The introduction of commissions for Air Gunners and the creation of the Administrative and Special Duties Branch.

With war imminent, the Air Ministry had finally recognised, what must surely have been obvious for years, that its GD officers, ie its pilots, would be quite incapable of administering the Service once the shooting started. An Administrative and Special Duties Branch (A&SD) was therefore instituted within the RAFVR (and shortly afterwards within the AAF and the RAFO) into which directly recruited, and retired regular, officers could be drafted, mobilised or called out (as appropriate) for nonflying duties in the event of an emergency.²⁴ War was declared five days later.

No 4 Air Gunners Course which ran at Ismailia in August 1940. Left to right, back row: Cpl Douglas (No 216 Sqn); Sgt L C Murray (No 45 Sqn); Sgt C Richardson (No 45 Sqn); LAC C Blackshaw (No 45 Sqn); LAC Mackay (No 216 Sqn); LAC Smith (No 113 Sqn). Front row: AC1 G Pattison DFM (No 211 Sqn); AC1 Marshal (No 45 Sqn); AC1 R H C Crook (No 45 Sqn); WO A E Pell (Instructor); AC1 Shelton (No 216 Sqn); AC1 E J Cook (No 55 Sqn); AC1 Ashton (No 6 Sqn). Most (probably all) of those who were not already wearing three stripes would have been made up to temporary sergeant shortly after attending the course.

So far as air crew were concerned, an important aspect of the late-1918 position remained to be restored, the introduction of the commissions for non-pilots which had first been publicly hinted at in January 1939 (see page 176). The most pressing need was perceived to be for officer gunners, as it had long been clear to Bomber Command that the standard of gunnery at squadron level left much to be desired. This was hardly surprising, of course, as the vast majority of pre-war gunners had been informally trained under local arrangements. There was little in the way of doctrine and only vestigial supervisory arrangements. As a result, the AOCinC had been pressing for the establishment of a suitable unit to devise and refine techniques and tactics, to train instructors and to produce specialist officers to fill staff appointments and to act as Gunnery Leaders.²⁵ This demand was finally satisfied on 6 November 1939 when the Central Gunnery School (CGS) opened at Warmwell, its first course commencing on the 15th.²⁶ While this unit would inevitably be commanded by a pilot, if it was to have any real credibility it would need to have at least some officer gunners on its staff, hence the urgency attached to the granting of commissions.

Because of the significant budgetary implications, the Treasury has a role to play in determining commissioning policy and the Air Ministry had opened negotiations over the provision of officer gunners as soon as war had been declared. Sanction for gunners to be commissioned was eventually obtained from the financiers on 19 October. Selection began immediately, with rather disappointing results. Sqn Ldr C R Lloyd reported that:27

‘Out of some 45 RAFVR LACs interviewed up to date, only 3 had been to public schools, and although some 50% were recommended, only about 9 could be described as suitable to a peacetime standard. The remainder were definitely war standard and NOT officer class.’

Lloyd sought men who would exhibit ‘quickness of mental reaction, dependability in an emergency and fighting spirit’, all of which were characteristics which he clearly associated with the ‘officer class’. But Lloyd’s complaint was only superficially to do with the British bugbear of ‘class’; his real problem lay within the, presumably hastily drafted, early regulations governing the selection of officers for air gunnery duties. These permitted a pre-war RAFVR LAC gunner to apply for a commission at the age of 18, whereas a wartime direct entrant had to be 28. The pre-war recruits were eager and forthcoming, but much too young and immature, while the age limit imposed on wartime entrants excluded much of the best material.

The first handful of gunner officers was secured under somewhat ad hoc arrangements²⁸ but these had been regularised by February 1940 when air gunners were formally introduced as a specialisation within the General Duties (GD) Branch.²⁹ The Air Force List for that month, the first to feature gunners, contained the names of two flight lieutenants, one flying officer and 106 pilot officers. All of them were members of the RAFVR with the seniority of individuals being antedated by up to three months. .

There was no specific quota for officer gunners and, this initial tranche having satisfied the immediate demand, subsequent commissions were granted on an ‘as required’ basis, the aim being to create only the numbers required to fill the relatively few established officer posts. This sufficed until December 1940 when the Australians announced that they intended to commission 3% of air gunners on graduation. The problem with this proposal was that current guidance assumed that an officer gunner would previously have demonstrated fighting qualities and leadership in operational service and required him to be capable of instructing in gunnery and advising Squadron Commanders on equipment and tactics. Clearly, this ruled out a newly qualified gunner and, since it did not reflect RAF practice, the Air Ministry advised against this initiative.³⁰ Nevertheless, the Australians had persevered and had urged Canada and New Zealand to follow suit.³¹

There followed a flurry of signals, in the course of which the Air Ministry made a further attempt to dissuade the Australians while pressing the Canadians not to conform. The outcome was that Ottawa insisted on introducing an ability to award some immediate commissions, but agreed to trim the quota to just 2%, while the Australians heeded the UK’s advice and rescinded their original decision.³² Since this still left the situation out of balance, and since the Canadians were now adamant, in April 1941 the UK gave in and, for the sake of uniformity, endorsed and adopted the 2% quota.³³

This arrangement did not persist for long, however, and in July, following a reappraisal of the situation, it was agreed that up to 10% of WOp/AGs could be commissioned on graduation plus a further 10% after they had accumulated some operational experience. The proportions for straight air gunners were to be 5% and 15%.³⁴ The Dominions duly adopted these figures which remained in force for the rest of the war – in the RAF at least.

1939-40. The reinstatement of commissions for Observers and for officers of the reconstituted specialist ground branches.

In September 1939, at much the same time as the Air Ministry had begun to consider commissioning gunners, it had also started negotiations regarding the commissioning of observers (and pilots) but with little apparent effect. In December ACAS, AVM W S Douglas, drew attention to the fact that there were still no commissioned observers, despite provision for them having been specifically included within the January 1939 air crew scheme. Indeed, commands had not, as yet, even been asked for recommendations. Douglas acknowledged that the overall performance of observers had been disappointing but he found it hard to believe that there were no suitable candidates for commissioning at all.³⁵

While there was considerable concern over the competence of early wartime observers (see pages 199-200), the delay in the granting of commissions was more to do with quantity than quality. The Treasury was not contesting the idea of officer observers, but it was disputing the numbers involved. The Air Ministry wanted 50% of all observers, and pilots, to be commissioned. The Treasury was content with 50% of pilots but would initially agree to only 30% of observers. Air Mshl Portal considered this to be unacceptable because it undercut the principle of equal career prospects which, it was claimed, was inherent in the terms of service of all NCO air crew.36

After some more haggling the Air Ministry effectively won its case in January 1940. In the near term, while prewar recruits of various kinds were still passing through the training system,³⁷ the commissioning quotas had to allow for the fact that many of these people had actually enlisted on the understanding that they would become officers on short service terms, an undertaking which the Air Force felt more or less obliged to honour. The interim arrangements provided for the following to be the additional proportions that would be permitted to graduate as officers:³⁸

a. 100% of all potential officer pilots being trained at Cranwell;

b. up to 33% of airmen entrants being trained as pilots at other SFTSs, and

c. up to 33% of airmen entrants being trained as observers.

Note that all pilots being trained at Cranwell were still graduating as officers and, despite the fact that the cadet entry scheme had been suspended in September 1939, the same privilege would continue to be extended to wartime recruits who entered the Service via this rather special portal.

Once the pre-war backlog had been cleared, the system would be dealing exclusively with wartime RAFVR recruits, all of whom would be inducted as airmen; thereafter the commissioning quotas were to be up to:

a. 100% of all potential officer pilots being trained at Cranwell;

b. 45% of pilots trained at other SFTSs and

c. 50% of observers.

The combination of 100% of ex-Cranwellians plus 45% of the rest approximated to 50% of all pilots being officers, the same proportion as was envisaged for observers. It should be stressed, however, that these figures were the upper limits and there was no obligation to grant immediate commissions to that level on graduation.

Naturally enough, the Air Ministry was concerned at the adverse implications of over-commissioning and, to ensure that this did not occur, it set up a system to monitor the situation. The returns indicated that by the end of April 1940 153 pilots had been commissioned on completion of training (19-4% of the output) to which could be added a further 206 who had been commissioned from the ranks while on active service, making an overall 45·6% of the 787 who had emerged from the SFTSs since the beginning of the war. By comparison only 84 ab initio observers had been commissioned on graduation and none had yet been commissioned on active service, just 7·8% of the 1,082 who had been turned out by the training machine.³⁹

This was not as unfair as it seemed, of course, because provision for the commissioning of pilots had been available from the outset whereas formal arrangements for the commissioning of observers had not been put in place until the beginning of April 1940 (see below) so officer pilots had been multiplying for some eight months whereas observers had been permitted to join them for only the last four weeks of the period under review.

In the event the Air Ministry’s fears proved to have been groundless. Once it had stabilised, it transpired that the wartime system actually granted immediate commissions at a rate well below the permitted maximum. The situation was formally reviewed again in the autumn of 1940 when it was agreed that, while the overall 50% quotas should be retained, as a rule no more than 33% of pilots and observers should graduate as officers, with the remaining 17% being available for commissioning from the ranks on active service (see page 221 for commissioning percentages to the end of 1942). At the same time, because the international and bilateral training arrangements that had been set up with the various Dominions were beginning to produce results, it was agreed that the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa should be urged to adopt the same policy. With some minor variations, they did, thus ensuring that the global commissioning pattern was more or less standardised.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, as with the first officer air gunners, it had been necessary to adopt a somewhat flexible approach to the provision of early officer observers. Since there was no such animal as an officer observer at the time, the first few had to be commissioned as nominal air gunners.⁴¹ Proper commissioning arrangements for observers were finally announced in April 1940.⁴² For the first time since 1926 a separate listing of observers appeared in the Air Force List for June; it contained forty-two names. As with the air gunners, they were all members of the RAFVR, their effective dates of seniority ranging from 10 March to 28 April.

Three weeks after the introduction of commissions for observers, an A&SD Branch was established within the RAF, ie the regular air force, both it and its RAFVR predecessor (see page 187) being organised internally to identify its members as specialists in Administration, Marine Craft, Intelligence, Photography, Physical Training or Special Duties (eg courier or cypher work).⁴³

The same Order also created a Technical Branch for Armament, Signals and Engineering Officers. Ironically, this innovation was to see many pilots hoist on a petard which was entirely of the Air Force’s (and therefore their own) making. In the process of creating, and then sustaining, the myth of the omnipotent pilot, the RAF had failed to provide itself with the professional technical back-up that it really needed. When the new branch was created most of the qualified engineers who were immediately available were regular officers, that is to say, pre-war pilots who had done the appropriate mid-career specialist course. Any pilots who wished to join the Technical Branch were encouraged to do so, but those who were already qualified as engineers ‘shall be so employed, whether or not they apply for a transfer.’⁴⁴ There can be little doubt that Trenchard had failed to see that one coming back in 1919, and one imagines that some of the pilots who found themselves pitchforked into engineering ‘for the duration’ may have found it hard to forgive him for denying them the opportunity to win a DFC.

Two years later the Air Ministry launched a further appeal for suitably qualified GD officers to volunteer to transfer to the Technical Branch on the understanding that they would ‘retain rates of pay and seniority at least as good as those to which they have established a right as members of the general duties branch.’⁴⁵ This chicken would come home to roost with a vengeance in 1950 when flying pay was introduced for GD officers and, even more so, when the rates were increased in 1956 to such an extent that a junior squadron leader’s income was raised by some 38% (see pages 296-297). Despite the assurances given in 1942, the Air Ministry of the mid-1950s declined to recognise the case for an award of flying pay to those officers who had responded to the wartime appeal, not even to those who had maintained their flying currency and/or those who actually continued to fly in the course of carrying out their engineering duties (see Notes 33 & 34 to Chapter 29).

Nevertheless, despite these incidental latter day complications (which were largely confined to pilots), the loop had finally been closed in April 1940. It had taken more than twenty years for reality to overcome wishful thinking but, so far as observers were concerned, the situation which had prevailed as long ago as 1918 had at last (almost) been restored.

1941. Further improvements in conditions of service, particularly for Observers.

In the peacetime air force the numbers of noncommissioned personnel serving as flight sergeants or warrant officers had been fixed by the establishment of each specialisation within each Trade Group. There was also a time factor involved in that a specified number of years had to be served before an individual was eligible for consideration for promotion. So far as the pre-war direct entrant air crew introduced in 1939 were concerned, it was most unlikely that any of them would be considered eligible for promotion until the early 1950s and the arrangements for wartime entrants had made no provision for any of them to serve in ranks above that of sergeant.46

Despite the limitations imposed by the lack of appropriate tools with which to do his job in the early years of WW II, the observer was acknowledged to be an indispensable member of a crew and he received a steadily increasing degree of recognition. Demand for such men led to recruiting campaigns specifically designed to attract more of them. This one dates from 1941.

The passage of time soon changed the perspective, however, and by 1941 it had been decided to ‘establish an overhead proportion’ of posts for senior airmen air crew. WOp/AGs and air gunners were to be considered for early promotion to flight sergeant while the ceiling for pilots and observers was set at warrant officer.⁴⁷ The only preconditions for consideration were that a candidate had to have served six months in his current rank and have his CO’s recommendation. There was a small price to pay for this prospect of accelerated promotion, in that air crew with a basic trade would no longer figure on the promotion roster of their original Trade Group. They did have some preserved rights, however, which ensured that, should they be obliged to revert to their original trade, they would assume the rank and seniority which they would have attained had they not become air crew. Since, as air crew, they were only temporary sergeants, this might well involve having to forfeit their three stripes, but it did at least mean that they would not have lost ground compared to colleagues who had chosen not to volunteer for flying duties.

These provisions, along with the introduction of commissions for non-pilots, represented substantial improvements in the conditions of service of all air crew. The only remaining problem was that of differential rates of pay (to which reference was last made on page 169). Cadet pilots were still drawing flying instructional pay at a rate of two shillings per day while observer cadets were entitled to only 1/6d. In April 1941 attention was drawn to this unfair practice by the AOCinC Flying Training Command, Air Mshl L A Pattinson, who managed to explain the problem within a single (if rather lengthy) sentence:⁴⁸

‘It is important that during their period of training air observers should not feel themselves to be regarded as in any way of less importance than pilots and the discrimination in the rate of flying instructional pay is calculated to promote a feeling of inferiority on the part of air observers under training, particularly when it is borne in mind that a proportion have been relegated to air observer training after failing to pass through a course of flying instruction and, therefore, have experienced an actual drop of 6d a day.’

It is interesting to note Pattinson’s use of a word with such negative connotations as ‘relegated’. This was a trifle unfortunate, as it suggests that, despite his rational egalitarianism, and his public championing of the cause of the observer, even he may have subconsciously considered observers to be ‘second best.’⁴⁹

The AOCinC went on to point out that observers were bound to be at a financial disadvantage anyway, because they took longer to train which meant that they spent more time as (low paid) cadets than the pilots with whom they had been recruited. He acknowledged that recent changes in perspective had opened up the possibility of a few observers being promoted to flight lieutenant, or possibly even to squadron leader, but in general their career prospects were very poor when compared to the opportunities available to pilots.⁵⁰ To continue to cheat them out of sixpence a day, almost as soon as they had signed-on, served only to aggravate an inherently unsatisfactory situation.

Another paragraph from Pattinson’s letter is worth quoting in full:

‘I understand that the payment of a lower rate of flying instructional pay to air observers is based on the higher flying risk borne by pilots whilst under training in that they fly themselves whereas air observers are normally flown by experienced pilots. I suggest that that argument is not one that can justify a lower rate of pay to the cadets themselves, since the majority of young men who fly would much prefer to take their own risks of being involved in a flying accident when flying as pilots than when being flown as passengers.’

Does that sound familiar? The Bailhache Committee had made much the same observation as long ago as 1916 (see page 32). The fact is that all air crew are inevitably obliged to face the same hazards as those confronted (and sometimes caused) by pilots or, as one WW II WOp/AG has put it, ‘you had to trust your life constantly to people who might not value it as highly as you did.’⁵¹ The point was (and still is) that non-pilot air crew are rarely able to exert more than a marginal influence on their eventual fate. Twenty-five years after Bailhache’s Report the RAF’s administration was still paying its back-seaters less than its pilots, just as their predecessors in the RFC had done – and with just as little justification. Pattinson’s appeal finally put an end to this discriminatory practice by restoring the situation that had prevailed in 1918. Flying instructional pay was standardised at the higher rate in July 1941.⁵²

1941. The introduction of the Observer (Radio), née Radio Operator (Air).

The earliest airborne interception (AI) radar sets became available, on a very limited trials basis, shortly before the outbreak of war but it was the summer of 1940 before an operationally viable system (AI Mk III) began to appear.⁵³ At this stage, few, if any, of the men who operated this revolutionary equipment were qualified as air crew; most were ‘boffins’ or volunteer ground tradesmen with an appropriate technical background or practical experience as wireless mechanics or operators. By the winter of 1940-41, however, the multi-seat night fighter (initially Blenheims, soon to be supplanted by Beaufighters and ultimately Mosquitos) had demonstrated its worth and established itself in squadron service. Since AI radar had passed its field trials and was now becoming a standard piece of equipment it was necessary to make more formal arrangements for the people who handled it. As a ‘temporary measure’, therefore, the new air crew category of the radio operator (air), which was to be paid at the WOp/AG rate of 7/9d per day, was introduced in January 1941.54

The AI Mk III in a Blenheim (displays on the left, power unit on the right) was mounted on a transverse shelf just behind the rear face of the rear spar in the area immediately forward of the turret – a mirror image of the radio installation which was on a transverse shelf aft of the turret. The radar operator knelt on the floor, facing forwards, to peer into his screens. (via Graham Warner)

It was envisaged that some of these men would be found among ground tradesmen who would, after appropriate training, be promoted to temporary sergeant. Others would be drawn from the qualified air gunners who were being rendered redundant by the rolling re-equipment programme which saw three-man Blenheims being replaced by two-seat Beaufighters. Those gunners who wished to stay with their squadrons, and were prepared to take up the challenge of using the new equipment, were remustered as radio operators (air gunner). The new trade also made it possible to rationalise the anomalous position of the original ‘non-air crew’ operators who had been flying since the previous summer so it was possible to antedate remustering to radio operator (air) to as early as 5 August 1940.⁵⁵

Apart from coaxing signals from the early, and often temperamental, radar equipment, the ‘radio’ operator needed to be able to visualise this data as a three-dimensional picture. Using this information, and in conjunction with advice provided by ground-based controllers, he then had to guide his pilot to a position from which the contact could be visually identified and, if appropriate, engaged.⁵⁶ It was soon appreciated that the members of a two-seat night fighter crew were interdependent. Just as in the Bristol Fighter of 1917, operational success came only with teamwork which demanded mutual trust and respect, in addition to a high degree of professional skill and airmanship.

In December 1940 the AI/ASV School, which had been set up at Prestwick two months earlier, was redesignated as No 3 Radio School. By the spring of 1941 it was turning out increasing numbers of airmen who then passed on via an Operational Training Unit (OTU) to night fighter squadrons where they were flying operationally as radio operators (air). Unlike their colleagues who were already badged as air gunners, however, these men had no emblem to distinguish them as air crew. In April 1941 AOCinC Fighter Command, Air Mshl W S Douglas, wrote to the Air Ministry to ‘strongly urge that very early approval’ be given to the introduction of an appropriate badge, the letter being accompanied by a drawing of a suggested single-winged design.⁵⁷

A week later the Deputy Director of Manning, Gp Capt T F Thompson, chaired a meeting which (despite its specific title) considered the provision of non-pilot air crew for the Beaufighters of both Fighter and Coastal Commands.⁵⁸ Among other matters, the meeting noted that the personnel who might become radio operators (air) could include pilots and navigators who had been withdrawn from training and possibly, if insufficient numbers were forthcoming, direct entrants. Since none of these men would be qualified to wear either the observers or the air gunners badge, it followed that a new, third, emblem for non-pilot air crew would be needed. That issue was referred to the Director of Personal Services for resolution.

The bureaucratic wheels began to turm and examples of four variations on the theme of the design submitted by HQ Fighter Command were prepared. At the time, however, the informal policy at the Ministry was to minimise the authorisation of new badges, not least because so many were being introduced (by all three Services) that the embroidered badge industry was having problems meeting the demand. Had there been no other considerations, therefore, it is likely that relatively little priority would have been afforded to solving Fighter Command’s problem.

The four alternative designs that were considered for what was to become the RAF’s third non-pilot flying badge. The option selected, the third from the left, was a minimal adaptation of the emblem that had recently been introduced for air gunners. This decision effectively set the pattern for the eight additional air crew badges that would be introduced on various dates during the rest of the century. (AIR2/6225)

During a visit to Middle Wallop on 7 May 1941 HM King George VI, seen here talking to Sgt Rawnsley of No 604 Sqn, asked why some air crew were unbadged. Speedy staff action ensured that they soon were.

Coincidentally, however, as described by (then Sgt) ‘Jimmy’ Rawnsley, while meeting a number of air crew in the course of a visit to Middle Wallop on 7 May, HM King George VI commented on the fact that some of No 604 Sqn’s AI operators were wearing air gunner badges while others had no badge at all.59 The difference was explained and the King subsequently ‘expressed (a) wish that a badge should be awarded to this class of aircrew personnel.’⁶⁰ That was all it took to fast-track the authorisation of the new badge.

Interestingly, despite the reservations of the gunnery fraternity, who had only recently successfully resisted an attempt to high-jack their emblem for the benefit of flight engineers (see pages 196-197), the new badge was modelled on that of the air gunner with the ‘AG’ motif simply being supplanted by an ‘RO’. CAS approved the design on 14 May and an example of the proposed badge, along with an explanation as to why it was required, was submitted to the Palace where it received the King’s personal endorsement on the 20th.⁶¹

It is evident, however, that while protocol had dictated that it was necessary to follow this procedure, it had been taken for granted that there would be no difficulty in gaining royal approval. Nothwithstanding the acknowledged problems being experienced by the industry, ‘exceptional measures’ had been taken to order 150 ‘RO’ badges, which Messrs Hobson & Sons had undertaken to deliver by 21 May. Since that was just one day after the King initialled the submission, it is quite clear that the order must have been placed in advance.

Before the month was out an AMO had been published announcing the introduction of the new badge.⁶² It was to be worn, on the authority of an AOC, when a trainee, who was not already entitled to wear an observers or an air gunners badge, completed a course at an OTU. AI operators already flying with night fighter squadrons when the new emblem was introduced were automatically and immediately entitled to wear one on the basis of their having previously passed a three-week course at No 3 Radio School followed by, what had amounted to, a period of probationary operational service.

Only six weeks later the category was redesignated as that of the observer (radio)⁶³ – ‘OR’ – but the badge remained as ‘RO’. At the same time, rates of pay were raised to equate to those of pilots and other observers, that is to say 12/6d per day for a sergeant (plus 6d per day war pay⁶⁴) and direct entrant recruiting was introduced in addition to the existing provision for the remustering of serving airmen and the transfer of officers from other branches.

This led to a sharply focused recruiting campaign, an Observer (Radio) Selection Board being formally constituted within the Air Crew Reception Centre at Regents Park on 10 August 1941, although work had actually begun as early as 7 July. Having fulfilled its function, the Board was disestablished on 21 January 1942 by which time it had interviewed 2,596 candidates, 992 of whom had been selected for training at No 3 Radio School.65

The replacement of Coastal Command’s three-man Blenheims with two-seat Beaufighters created a demand for observers who were capable of handling Morse at speeds previously associated only with professional wireless operators. This one is R2198 of No 252 Sqn.

1941. The introduction of the Observer (W/T).

At much the same time as Fighter Command’s unique requirements were being satisfied by the creation of the specialist category of the observer (radio), HQ Coastal Command was facing a rather similar issue. Coastal Command’s heavy fighter squadrons had originally been equipped with three-man Blenheims but by the spring of 1941 these were being superseded by two-man Beaufighters. When this had happened in Fighter Command the tendency had been for many of the WOp/AGs already on strength to be retained as AI operators, at the expense of observers who became surplus to requirements. The opposite occurred in Coastal Command where long-range operations over the sea dictated the retention of the skills of a professional navigator. By the summer, it was apparent that this had left a serious gap in capability, because effective long-range communications implied the use of Morse at, at least, eighteen words per minute. Since an observer’s (and a pilot’s) ability to read Morse peaked at only eight words per minute during training (and will probably have tended to deteriorate thereafter) it was clear that neither pilots nor observers were able to handle this task adequately.

The solution was to train selected observers as wireless operators to create the sub-specialisation of the observer (W/T) who was to wear a standard flying ‘O’. Having previously undertaken a fourteen-week signals course after passing through an Initial Training Wing (ITW), the first batch of observers (W/T) began their eight-week navigation course at No 6 Air Observers Navigation School (AONS) at Staverton on 30 August 1941.⁶⁶ The provisional syllabus, to which should be added 60 hours of air exercises, is sumarised at Figure 28.⁶⁷

Fig 28. The provisional syllabus against which observer (W/T) training began in August 1941.

The observer (W/T) would eventually morph into the Nav(W) but there was deemed to be no requirement for them in the post-war air force and training ceased in May 1946.⁶⁸

1941-42. The introduction of the Flight Engineer.

The first of Bomber Command’s new generation of heavy bombers, the Stirling, began to enter service in August 1940 to be followed by the Halifax in November. Neither of these types would be committed to operations until early 1941 but their arrival provoked a major reappraisal of the way in which business was conducted on what was beginning to evolve into a flight deck, as distinct from the traditional cockpit. The most significant characteristic of the new aeroplanes was that they had four engines and it had long been anticipated that managing these, and the associated fuel system, would demand more time than the average squadron pilot could afford to devote to this task, not to mention a greater degree of technical expertise than many of them could be expected to possess.

Large, four-engined aeroplanes were not an entirely new phenomenon, of course, as the RAF had been operating Sunderland flying boats since 1938 and Short Singapores for several years before that. Coastal Command had been able to adapt to these aircraft relatively easily, however, as many of its gunners were qualified as fitters, rather than as wireless operators. Very prudently, when gunnery had become a fulltime trade in 1939, Coastal Command had negotiated a concession which had permitted it to retain what had now become a unique category of dual-qualified fitter/gunners (see page 175).

While Coastal Command had always made adequate provision for handling the technical complexity of four-engined aircraft, Bomber Command had not given much serious consideration to the constitution of the crews that it would need to operate its forthcoming aeroplanes. This was a little surprising as it had had plenty of notice because, as early as 1936, the specification that had resulted in the Stirling had called for a six-man crew, including two air gunners, ‘the one at the amidships station to be a fitter and in charge of the engines instrument board.’69

Things had moved on since 1936, of course; the Stirling project had been realised and Handley Page’s contemporary twin-engined design had materialised as the Halifax, which, since it now had four engines, had also been provided with an engineer’s station. This problem was eventually addressed in January 1940 at an Air Ministry meeting convened to ‘consider the number and composition of the crew of certain bomber aeroplanes.’ The Chairman, Air Cdre R H MS Saundby, stated that:⁷⁰

‘It was also desirable, with a view to obtaining the best possible performance from the engines, to have someone to watch the engine instruments which, in future multi-engined aircraft, would be situated away from the pilot’s dashboard. No member of the present authorised crew would be able to undertake this work in addition to his normal duties. It was proposed, therefore, that this duty should be undertaken by an additional member of the crew who would receive special training in the running of engines. The necessary training might be obtained at an engine factory but it would be necessary to select fitters for the duty.’

The provision of a fitter II/air gunner for the Stirling and Halifax was readily agreed, his designation being altered to flight engineer/air gunner a month later. On the other hand, ‘as it was only a twin-engined aeroplane, a Flight Engineer to watch the engine instruments would not be required’ for the Manchester, the third of the RAF’s new ‘heavies’.⁷¹

So much for the decision to provide flight engineers, which was clearly taken in good time, but little progress was made thereafter until the following July when the Air Ministry wrote to HQ Bomber Command to point out that the knowledge gained by Group Engineer Officers, who had recently attended a course run by Rolls-Royce and Bristols, would be useful in arranging the training of flight engineers. Bomber Command’s very prompt acknowledgement asked for a statement of policy regarding the recruiting and training of flight engineers while pointing out that its Group Engineer Officers were far too busy to become involved themselves.⁷² This provoked a prolonged silence and, despite at least three hasteners from Bomber Command, it was mid-November before the Ministry began to react.

Looking more like the engine-room of a ship than the inside of an aeroplane, this is the front face of the main spar of a Stirling; the substantial hand wheels opened cocks that provided the flight engineer with a means ofjettisoning fuel. His normal station was well forward of this on the starboard wall of the fuselage – see page 213. (G R Pitchfork)

The upshot was that TMech, Wg Cdr Rowland Costa, visited Nos 7 and 35 Sqns (the only units involved at this stage) and discussed the problem with a number of responsible officers at station and group level. He presented his findings in a four-page memorandum which represented the first attempt to define what a flight engineer might be expected to do, who he should be, what his status should be and how he should be trained. Although some of its specific recommendations would not be implemented, this document effectively served as the blueprint for the new trade.⁷³

Thus it was that, as the first of the Stirling and Halifax squadrons were preparing to become operational, neither unit had any personnel who were formally recognised as being flight engineers. The fact that this trade did not even exist could not be allowed to interfere with the prosecution of the war, of course, so expediency became the order of the day. Pending the publication of a formal policy, therefore, Wg Cdr Costa was obliged to sanction the introduction of inhouse training at squadron level. On 7 February 1941 No 35 Sqn’s diarist noted:⁷⁴

‘It being necessary for an Engineer to be included in the air crew to fly with Halifax aircraft, the following airmen, of Fitter trade, were specially selected and trained in this squadron by Sgt S L C Watt (late Observer with the A&AEE and awarded the AFM on 24 December 1940) and passed out as Fight Engineers and were promoted to the rank of Sergeant on this date wef 1 February 1941:

568825, Cpl Aedy, R G (Fitter II)

569526, Cpl Ogden, G H F (Fitter II)

567891, Cpl Wheeler, H E (Fitter II

902598, AC1 Hill, F W (Fitter IIE)

922470, AC1 Willingham, N (Flight Mechanic E)’

Thousands more would follow them, but these five men, and Watt, were the first to be publicly acknowledged as flight engineers and they flew No 35 Sqn’s first Halifax sorties on 10 March as sergeants. It is possible that the status of their instant promotions may have been a little uncertain at first, but, pragmatic as ever, officialdom soon caught up and the new trade, and its associated rank, had been formally recognised before the end of the month (see below).

Meanwhile, much the same thing had been happening at Oakington where No 7 Sqn had noted on 23 January that: ‘Records informed us that, as they were unable to provide Sergeant Engineers, we were to proceed with training of ACs for this duty, as tentatively arranged beforehand.’ But when No 7 Sqn mounted its first operational Stirling sorties in February, its flight engineers were all still ranked as corporals and LACs. The first sergeant did not appear in the squadron’s F541 until March and it was June before they were all wearing three stripes.75

It should be appreciated, incidentally, that the addition of a flight engineer had increased the notional⁷⁶ crew of a heavy bomber from six men (two pilots, an observer, two WOp/AGs and a straight gunner) to seven – a 16% increase in the manpower bill.

With Bomber Command’s four-engined ‘heavies’ having embarked on their operational careers, the Air Ministry was finally galvanised into action. In February 1941 a meeting of concerned staffs took Costa’s initial conclusions and refined them to produce a formal scheme covering the provision of flight engineers; this was published a month later.⁷⁷ Recruited from the ranks of tradesmen already qualified in aero-engine technology,⁷⁸ these men were to be given three weeks of gunnery training at a Bombing and Gunnery School (or No 1 AAS at Manby) followed by a similar period of technical familiarisation with the appropriate airframe and/or engine manufacturer.

On completion of this sequence they were to be remustered as flight engineers, promoted to temporary sergeant in their original trade and designated as, for instance, a fitter II(E) (flight engineer). It is important to understand that, at this stage, they were definitely not regarded as air crew. Indeed, arguing that the ‘flight engineer is not a member of a crew but a tradesman performing the duties of his trade in the air’, there were some, notably among those who had to fund these arrangements, who did not even see the need for them to be automatically elevated to sergeant rank.⁷⁹ Since they were still regarded as ground crew, flight engineers remained on the promotion roster for, and were paid (as sergeants) at the rate applicable to, their parent trade, plus the old one shilling per day crew pay and, because they were notionally qualified as gunners, sixpence qualification pay.

In 1941 the ‘gunners union’ succeeded in preserving the still unique design of their ‘AG’ badge by preventing its being adapted for the benefit of the new flight engineers, although they did concede that they would have to be allowed to wear it. This picture dates from this period and shows the twin ·303” Brownings in the Bristol B.I Mk IV turret of a Blenheim IV of No 45 Sqn. (Daphne Hughes)

Following the pattern established in 1915, when the original observers badge had been introduced, it was entirely predictable that flight engineers would expect to wear an appropriate distinguishing emblem. Indeed, as early as December 1940 Costa’s memorandum had recommended that, ‘An aircrew badge should be struck for the Flight Engineer.’ This had been among the matters considered at the meeting held in the following February when it had been concluded that, although a flight engineer would be qualified as an air gunner, it would be ‘more appropriate if the letters “FE” were substituted for “AG”.’⁸⁰ While this would appear to have been a reasonable and logical approach, it turned out to be a very contentious issue. At the time, early 1941, the air gunners badge was, like the flying ‘O’, unique and the Director of Personal Services (DPS) considered that it would be undesirable to ‘deface or disfigure’ it by changing the letters.⁸¹

The immediate consequence was that a sentence that had read,

‘Flight Engineers will be entitled to wear a flying badge, which will be similar to that worn by Air Gunners except that the letters “FE” will be substituted for “AG”.’

was hastily deleted from the draft of the AMO that was about to be published in March (see Note 77).

By the autumn of 1941 the availability of ASV radar created a demand for a member of the crew to be trained to handle it. This Whitley VII, BD622 of No 612 Sqn, is fitted with the characteristic ‘stickleback’ aerial array associated with ASV Mk II.

The debate rumbled on with one faction maintaining that, since flight engineers were regarded as being qualified as gunners, they ought to wear the ‘AG’ badge. The opposition, who were still pressing for a dedicated badge, considered this to be most unsatisfactory, arguing that, ‘the duties of the Flight Engineer are more analogous to those of the Air Observer than the Air Gunner’, and that, in any case, gunnery was, for him, little more than a ‘sideline’.⁸² But the upshot was that the ‘gunners union’ won the first round and on 1 May 1941 it was announced that flight engineers were to wear an unmodified air gunners badge.⁸³ There was another slight anomaly here because air gunners received their badges on completion of their instruction in gunnery, whereas flight engineers had to wait until they had finished their technical courses.⁸⁴ In several ways, therefore, the gunners badge fell somewhat short of meeting the essential criterion of being ‘appropriate’. Nevertheless, the decision had been made and there the matter rested – for the time being, at least.

1941-42. Evolutionary changes to the category of the Wireless Operator.

By the autumn of 1941 the availability of air-to-surface vessel radar (ASV) had become sufficiently widespread within Coastal Command to have created a requirement for specialist operators. Rather than repeating the traditional exercise of making air crew out of ground crew, it was decided to try making technicians out of an appropriate category of aviator. WOp/AGs who had already completed a flying tour were, therefore, offered the opportunity of volunteering for additional training after which they would be remustered as wireless operator mechanics (air gunner) (WOM/AG), retaining their air crew status throughout.⁸⁵ In July 1943 the recruiting field would be extended to include selected ground tradesmen, specifically wireless operator mechanics (WOM) and wireless and electrical mechanics (WEM).^{86 87}

Curiously, although the Order introducing the new category had stated quite clearly that it was to be identified as wireless operator mechanic (air gunner), some regulations published in mid-1942 referred to it as air gunner (wireless operator mechanic).⁸⁸ This may have been a misunderstanding, or perhaps mere carelessness, but the confusion appears to have been resolved by September and thereafter the original nomenclature is used exclusively. Here, WOM/AG will be used throughout.

In the spring of 1942 there was another significant change to the career structure of air signals personnel when a grading system was introduced.⁸⁹ All WOp/AGs were to be remustered as WOp/AGs Grade II with effect from 6 March. The rate of pay for a sergeant was now to be eight shillings per day, plus his sixpence war pay.⁹⁰ After a minimum of three months’ operational service (which old hands would already have accumulated) a WOp/AG could take a trade test, which was primarily concerned with the ‘WOp’ aspects of his duties. Those who were successful were elevated to Grade I which attracted an increase in pay of sixpence per day. Achievement of Grade I was also a pre-requisite for promotion to flight sergeant, which earned a further sixpence.

It soon became apparent that, despite the introduction of the ASV-qualified WOM/AG, all of Coastal Command’s remaining WOp/AGs would also need ‘to be conversant with the RDF organisation and procedures and to operate and maintain appropriate equipment’.⁹¹ Furthermore, with effect from 18 May 1942, proficiency in these skills was to be rewarded by the not inconsiderable bonus of an additional shilling-a-day qualification pay. WOp/AGs who were not already qualified to carry out what were termed ‘special wireless duties’ were required to attend suitable courses at a Radio Direction Finding (later Signals) School and an OTU, although in-house squadron training could be substituted for the latter. Within Coastal Command, to provide an additional incentive to unqualified WOp/AGs, annotation as an ASV operator was made an essential precondition for elevation to Grade I.

________________________

¹      AMO A.392/1939 of 21 September.

²      AMO A.378/1939 of 14 September.

³      It is a rather esoteric point, but it is perhaps worth observing that, while the suspension of internal recruiting had effectively reintroduced direct entrant sergeant pilots, it had not, in the strictest sense, reinstated the unpopular arrangements that had prevailed in 1935-37 (see page 168). The difference was that the men who had been recruited in peacetime had been enlisted into the RAF, whereas the new batch were to be members of the RAFVR, which had always admitted sergeant pilots. What was significant about the new intake of wartime reservists was that they were going to fly on active service alongside the pre-war regulars.

Similar provisions applied right across the Service, in all air and ground trades, in that (with the exception of apprentices) all recruits who joined up after the outbreak of war were inducted into the RAFVR and not the RAF which accepted no further ‘regulars’ until 1945. Almost inevitably, there were some instances of social friction between the ‘old sweats’ and the ‘for the duration only’ brigade. This never appears to have presented a serious problem, however, perhaps because most regulars were rapidly promoted so that they could marshal and supervise the flood of wartime entrants and this sufficed to preserve their superior status.

Although there were technical differences between the terms and conditions of service of RAF and RAFVR personnel, these were essentially superficial considerations. Within this book, these distinctions will be referred to only where they are significant. Otherwise any references to regulations, administrative procedures and the like affecting wartime RAF personnel should be understood to embrace equally those serving in the RAFVR.

⁴      AMO A.469/1939 of 9 November.

⁵      AIR2/4456. Letter from Air Mshl Portal to AOCinC Reserve Command dated 24 November 1939.

⁶      AMO A.94/1940 of 15 February.

⁷      AMO A.201/1940 of 11 April.

⁸      Established at Abu Sueir on 8 September 1939, the Pilot Training Unit was initially intended to provide refresher flying, twin-engined conversion (to Blenheims) and continuation training for surplus pilots held in reserve. It soon expanded its activities to include a modicum of ab initio training and, from February 1940, a short navigation course, the flying exercises being conducted on Ansons. (See Note 23.)

⁹      AIR2/3077. Shortly after the introduction of full-time air crew it was decided that RAFME ought to be self-sufficient in this respect, as it already was in the case of pilots. In February 1939 CAS (Newall) directed that a regional school should be established to train air gunners and observers. Initially expected to be at Abu Sueir, the projected location had changed to Amman by August but little tangible progress had been made by the following July when it was decided instead to exploit some of the existing capacity of No 4 SFTS at Habbaniya.

¹⁰    AMO A.537/1940 of 1 August.

¹¹    AMO A.803/1940 of 31 October. Note that this regulation included provision for all personnel already serving as acting sergeants (acting observer) to be remustered immediately as temporary sergeant air observers with effect from 14 September. Seniority among those affected was to be based on the dates of their original appointments as acting sergeants.

¹²    AMO A.547/1939 of 21 December announced the introduction of the air gunners badge, which was to become the model for all subsequent single-winged designs for the rest of the century. In his Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force (1961), p110, Sqn Ldr P G Hering relates that the prototype air gunners badge had featured thirteen feathers. While vetting the badge, CAS (Newall) observed that thirteen had probably been an unfortunate choice. Wg Cdr E H Hooper (of the Directorate of Personal Services) promptly produced a pair of nail scissors and the bottom feather was deftly removed before the design was submitted for royal approval. The original badge is still preserved as an attachment to King’s Order 392 which was endorsed by HM King George VI on 9 December (AIR30/271); on examination, it is just possible to persuade oneself that it might indeed have been pruned – or plucked.

¹³    AMO A.440/1940 of 7 July removed the concession that had permitted ex-gunner pilots and observers to wear the winged bullet because of the potential for confusion which could arise from people wearing two badges. In future air crew were to wear only one badge, which was to be that of the category in which they were currently serving, although, on ceasing to be employed on flying duties, an officer or airman could elect to wear any (one) of the badges to which he was entitled (except that officers did not wear the winged bullet).

¹⁴    AMO A.552/1939 of 28 December.

¹⁵    AMO A.416/1940 of 27 June.

¹⁶    A glance through the casualty lists in W R Chorley’s Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War, Vol 1 (1992), illustrates quite clearly that until mid-June 1940 practically all gunner casualties had been corporals or below. The exceptions were a handful of the first commissioned gunners and a few sergeants who will presumably have been SNCOs in their own right within their parent trade.

¹⁷    Richard Passmore, Blenheim Boy (1981), p156. ‘Richard Passmore’ was a pseudonym for Roger Peacock, a WOp/AG who flew in the Blenheims of Nos 90 and 40 Sqns from 1937 until he was shot down to become a POW in July 1940.

¹⁸    AMO A.231/1940 of 25 April.

¹⁹    AMO A.985/1943 of 7 October.

²⁰    AMO A.31/1940 of 18 January.

²¹    HQ RAFME appears to have been playing catch-up in the summer of 1940 as the remaining pre-war gunners in another of its units, No 45 Sqn, were all given their three stripes in September – see the author’s The Flying Camels (1995) p141.

²²    Dennis Conroy, op cit, p127.

²³    The Pilot Reinforcement Pool was formed at Ismailia on 24 June 1940, absorbing the resources of the Pilot Training Unit which had, until then, been running conversion and navigation courses at Abu Sueir (see Note 8). The first air gunners course began on 1 July and ended on the 13th; it had thirteen students, eleven of whom passed. After being restyled the Training Unit and Reserve Pool on 21 September, air gunner training continued until 10 December when the unit became the Middle East Reserve Pool, the training commitment being transferred to the newly established No 70 OTU. Although the OTU continued to provide training for air gunners in, for instance the manipulation of powered turrets, it does not appear to have sustained the basic course.

²⁴    AMO A.341/1939 of 29 August.

²⁵    AIR14/57. For example, Bomber Command letter BC/S.25181/CinC dated 14 July 1939 to USofS in which Air Chf Mshl Ludlow-Hewitt, refers to previous correspondence dating as far back as March, in all of which he had pressed for the establishment of a ‘centre for the study of gunnery problems’.

²⁶    There was an equally pressing need for a similar unit to study other aspects of bomber operations but this would not materialise for another year, the Bomber Development Unit eventually being formed at Boscombe Down as late as 21 November 1940.

²⁷    AIR2/6146. Memo from Sqn Ldr Lloyd to DDTArm dated 25 October 1939.

²⁸    A common (possibly the only) method was to exploit the A&SD Branch. Examples of early officer gunners commissioned via this channel include Flt Lt A H S Browne, Fg Off W H Carr-Birbeck and Plt Off W S Fielding-Johnson. The last of these, whose seniority dated from 6 November 1939, was a notable veteran of WW I. Fielding-Johnson had begun his flying career as early as 16 October 1915 when he had been attached to No 3 Sqn. Rated as a qualified observer on 15 December, he was wounded in action a month later. After recovering, he retrained as a pilot and he was eventually to claim six aerial victories while flying SE5as with No 56 Sqn. Having been decorated with the MC twice during WW I, he was to add a DFC during Round Two.

²⁹    AMO A.62/1940 of 1 February.

³⁰    AIR2/4700. The gist of this was conveyed in, for instance, an Air Ministry signal to the UK High Commissioner in Canada on 6 January 1941.

³¹    Ibid. Memo S.31 of 8 January 1941 from RAAF Liaison Officer at Australia House to S. 10b at the Air Ministry.

³²    Ibid. Memo S.31 of 12 February 1941 RAAF Liaison Officer at Australia House to AMP.

³³    Ibid. Air Ministry letter S.69366/S.7 of 23 April 1941 to AOC 25 (Armament) Group.

³⁴    Ibid. Air Ministry letter S.69366/S.7 of 25 July 1941 from Charles Evans (Principal Assistant Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Air) to AOCinCs and a similar letter of the same date to the various Dominion Liaison Officers.

³⁵    AIR2/4459. Minute from ACAS (AVM Douglas) to AMP (AVM Portal) dated 29 December 1939. Apart from provision for the commissioning of observers having been enshrined within AMO A.17/1939 further reference to this possibility had appeared as recently as 9 November in AMO A.476/1939.

³⁶    AIR2/2075. Air Ministry letter 773716/38 dated 22 December 1939.

³⁷    This involved, for instance, those who had originally been enlisted as Cranwell cadets, as RAFVR officer pilots, as RAFVR sergeant pilots and observers, as UAS entrants, as members of a UAS who were also sergeant pilots in the RAFVR, as direct entrant observers and those pilots (including many from the Dominions) who had signed up for short service regular commissions.

³⁸    Ibid. The agreed proportions were announced in the form of a ‘memorandum on arrangements for the allocation of candidates to pilot, observer or other crew duties and their selection for commissioned rank’, which was published under cover of Air Ministry letter S.41477/S.7(e)/1 dated 9 January 1940, and circulated widely to concerned units within Reserve Command.

³⁹    AIR2/8179. An analysis of RAFVR pilots and observers commissioned between 3 September 1939 and 30 April 1940 shows that of the 84 observers involved, 59 were tabulated as having been commissioned prior to 31 March 1940. Since this predates the introduction of commissions for observers per se, it is suspected that these men will have been commissioned into the A&SD Branch and/or as nominal air gunners. For a case in point, see Note 41 below.

⁴⁰    Ibid. Notes of a meeting held on 9 October 1940 under the Chairmanship of the Director of Postings, AVM P Babington.

⁴¹    As an example, consider Charles Kimber, a pre-war sergeant observer who attended the first Gunnery Leader’s Course at the CGS in November 1939. Returning to No 110 Sqn, he was commissioned on 17 January 1940 but as an air gunner, presumably because there was still no provision for observers to be officers. As a gunner, his name first appears in the Air Force List for May 1940. Despite his having qualified as a ‘Spec N’ in Canada during 1941 and navigated himself home via the transatlantic delivery flight of a Liberator, Kimber continued to be listed as an air gunner until as late as January 1942 when he was finally recognised as an observer.

⁴²    AMO A.188/1940 of 4 April.

⁴³    AMO A.228/1940 of 24 April. Note that by August 1940, the Air Force List no longer maintained separate sections for officers of the RAF, RAFVR, AAF and RAFO. All officers on active service were now combined into a single list with individual entries suffixed by RAFVR, AAF, etc in parentheses; later still these distinctions were reduced to mere symbols.

⁴⁴    Ibid.

⁴⁵    AMO A.133/1942 of 12 February.

⁴⁶    While regular and RAFVR airmen air crew who had been engaged prior to 3 September 1939 retained the notional rank ceiling of warrant officer, as laid down in AMO A.17/1939, the terms of service of wartime entrants were governed by AMO A.469/1939 of 9 November which made no provision for any rank higher than sergeant.

⁴⁷    AMO A.326/1941 of 8 May. Note that the initial promotions under these provisions were to be effective from 1 April.

⁴⁸    AIR2/2968. Letter FTC/55899/CA/DO dated 28 May 1941 from AOCinC Flying Training Command to the Air Ministry.

⁴⁹    While a pilot who had been suspended from training in the 1940s was plainly perceived to have been ‘relegated’ to observer duties, by the 1990s he was being ‘reselected’ to become a navigator. It meant the same thing in the end, of course, but it was more than mere semantics; the choice of words was (at least supposed to be) indicative of a change from a negative to a positive approach.

⁵⁰    Pattinson’s reference to flight lieutenant observers was presumably in connection with their gradual introduction as Station Navigation Officers but it would be another year before there was any realistic prospect of an observer becoming a squadron leader.

⁵¹    Richard Passmore, op cit, p213.

⁵²    AMO A.579/1941 of 31 July.

⁵³    Ian White, The History of Air Intercept Radar & the British Nightfighter 1935-1959 (2007). A few experimental ‘bread board’ sets (AI Mk I) were issued to No 25 Sqn’s, trials-dedicated, C Flight as early as August 1939. Beginning in February 1940, a number of Blenheim night fighter squadrons were issued with a handful of ‘productionised’ versions of this equipment as AI Mk II, but its limited performance parameters and poor serviceability were such that it did little more than provide some hands-on experience and an indication of the potential inherent in a fully developed device.

⁵⁴    AMO A.17/1941 of 9 January. While ‘Radar Operator’ would seem, today, to have been a more appropriate title for this new category, the American ‘radar’ (RAdio Direction And Range) did not begin to enter the RAF’s informal lexicon until 1942 and, because of the highly classified nature of such equipment, its use continued to be restricted. The use of ‘radio’ in this context was an oblique reference to what was then known as Radio Direction Finding (RDF). Within the RAF, the term ‘RDF’ was finally abandoned in favour of ‘radar’ on the authority of AMO A.863/1943 of 2 September, although the associated ‘Radiolocation’ was not formally discontinued until as late as 25 January 1945 (by AMO A. 80/1945).

⁵⁵    By the end of June 1940 Fighter Command had received more than thirty Blenheims fitted with the initial production model radar sets (AI Mk III), the first successful engagement using this equipment occurring on the night of 23 July when an aircraft of the Fighter Interception Unit destroyed a Do 17. On 12 August the unit received its first radar-equipped Beaufighter.

⁵⁶    The exception to this rule (there always seems to be one) was the Defiant, which was pressed into service as an interim night fighter in 1940, although these aircraft did not begin to be fitted with radar (AI Mk VI) until early 1942. The pilot of a radar-equipped Defiant II was obliged to interpret the displayed information himself and then position his aircraft so as to afford his gunner a firing opportunity – not an easy task, not least because peering into a flickering oscilloscope can have done little to enhance his night vision. That said, there are very few references to AI in the ORBs of Nos 96 and 264 Sqns, the only units believed to have been provided with radar, and no kills were credited to their Defiant IIs.

⁵⁷    AIR2/6225. Letter FC/365 dated 18 April 1941 from AOCinC Fighter Command to the Under-Secretary of State.

⁵⁸    Ibid. ‘Notes of a Meeting held on 25 April 1941 to Clarify the Requirements of Night Fighter Crews’.

⁵⁹    C F Rawnsley and R Wright, Night Fighter (1976) p129-130. Sqn Ldr C F ‘Jimmy’ Rawnsley DSO DFC DFM*, a pre-war airman gunner with No 604 Sqn became an early and, teamed with John Cunningham, notably successful AI operator.

⁶⁰    AIR2/6225. Memo from DPS (Air Cdre D Colyer) to AMP dated 12 May 1941.

⁶¹    AIR30/273. The badge was formally approved by HM King George VI when he endorsed King’s Order 439 on 20 May 1941.

⁶²    AMO A.402/1941 of 29 May.

⁶³    AMO A.503/1941 of 10 July.

⁶⁴    AMO A.672/1940 of 10 September had introduced war pay with effect from 31 August 1940 at the rate of 6d per day for airmen and 4d for airwomen, these rates being doubled in 1942 (see Note 90).

⁶⁵    AIR29/145. The ORB for the Observer (Radio) Selection Board records that, apart from screening likely candidates passing through the Air Crew Reception Centre, it went headhunting in the field, visiting, for instance, No 3 Personnel Reception Centre at Bournemouth, to cream off some of the newly qualified EATS graduates as they arrived in the UK, and a number of operational night fighter squadrons. For example, in the course of visits to Nos 141, 256, 409 and 456 (Defiant) Sqns, twenty-three experienced air gunners, from a total of seventy-two interviewed, were selected for remustering as radio operators (air gunner).

⁶⁶    AIR29/607. Presumably in association with this programme, No 2 SAN’s ORB notes that it ran No 1 u/t W/T Observers Course at Cranage between 6 October and 27 December 1941, but this appears to have been a one-off arrangement as the ORB contains no references to any further courses in the series.

⁶⁷    AIR2/8119. The provisional syllabus was published under cover of HQ Flying Training Command letter FTC/S.60877/Nav dated 29 August 1941.

⁶⁸    Ibid. In a memorandum, A.816821/DDTNav dated 27 May 1946, Gp Capt A V Bax, directed that the training of Nav(W)s was to ‘cease forthwith’.

⁶⁹    AIR2/2629. Specification B.12/36 published as 542743/36/RDA3 dated 15 July 1936.

⁷⁰    AIR14/9. S.40289 dated 27 January 1940, minutes of a meeting held on 8 January under the chairmanship of the Director of Operational Requirements (DOR)..

⁷¹    Despite its size, and the complexity of its 24-cylinder Rolls-Royce Vultures, the Manchester was bracketed with the Wellington and Whitley and, as such, it made do with two pilots. Unfortunately, the Vulture proved to be a troublesome failure which led to the Manchester’s being redesigned to become the Lancaster. Since the Lancaster had four engines, policy dictated that its crew should have included provision for a flight engineer but it had inherited the Manchester’s cockpit layout. As a result, some modifications were required and until these could be incorporated, despite a mid-1942 policy decision which dispensed with second pilots, some Lancasters continued to fly with two pilots until late in the year.

⁷²    AIR2/8348. Air Ministry letter A.54893/40/TMech dated 10 July 1940 from Wg Cdr R Costa (TMech) to HQ Bomber Command, and Gp Capt K M St C G Leaske’s response, BC/10271/Eng dated 16 July 1940.

⁷³    Ibid. Memorandum A.54893/40/TMech dated 10 December 1940.

⁷⁴    AIR27/379. No 35 Sqn’s ORB.

⁷⁵    AIR27/98. No 7 Sqn’s ORB.

⁷⁶    ‘Notional’ because it was not unknown for additional crewmen to be carried, eg an extra gunner to handle the nose turret, nominally the responsibility of the observer.

⁷⁷    AMO A.190/1941 of 20 March.

⁷⁸    Specifically, those ‘mustered as fitter I, fitter II, fitter II (engine) and fitter (aero-engine)’. This complexity was a legacy of the way in which airmen had been trained. Apprentices had originally qualified as either a fitter aero-engine or a metal rigger. AMO A.364/1932 of 29 December announced that henceforth they were to be trained in both fields to pass out as fitter IIs, appropriate cross-training being arranged to permit old hands to be remustered in the new dual trade. The first cohort to qualify as fitter IIs was Halton’s 25th Entry, which passed out in December 1935. After at least three years, a fitter II was expected to attend an advanced course at the Home Aircraft Depot at Henlow which would upgrade him to fitter I. Following the outbreak of war, the Halton course was shortened and the multi-skilled approach was abandoned. The first Entry to be so affected was the 35th which passed out on 18 September 1939 as what were now known as a fitter II (engine) or a fitter II (airframe).

⁷⁹    AIR2/8348. Minute 65 on this file dated 26 April 1941 by F2b, Mr W Taylor

⁸⁰    Ibid. Minutes of a meeting held on 12 February 1941 to consider matters relating to the qualifications of tradesmen to be employed as flight engineers.

⁸¹    Ibid. Minute 51 on this file, dated 10 March 1941, by DPS, Air Cdre D Colyer.

⁸²    Ibid. Minute 54 on this file, dated 12 March 1941 by TMech, Wg Cdr R Costa.

⁸³    AMO A.300/1941 of 1 May.

⁸⁴    There was an arcane logic to this sequence as it avoided the possibility of a prospective flight engineer failing to complete the technical phase of his training, leaving him as an already badged air gunner who would then have to be formally remustered to that air crew category – which was not what the individual had volunteered to do and not what the Air Force wanted either, because, if he were unable to use his engineering expertise in the air, his valuable skills as a ground tradesmen would be ‘wasted’ in a gun turret.

⁸⁵    AMO A.983/1941 of 27 November.

⁸⁶    AMO A.716/1943 of 22 July.

⁸⁷    From 1922 onwards the RAF employed dual-qualified wireless operator mechanics (WOM), a Group I trade, and Group II wireless operators (WOp). However, AMO A.422/1938 of 1 December remustered all WOMs into the new Group I trade of wireless and electrical mechanic (WEM), who were to supervise the less-skilled Group II WOps and, the recently (re)introduced, electricians, but it failed to specify the effective date. This led to considerable confusion at the time which was eventually resolved by the publication of AMO A.146/1939 on 24 April which made it clear that the remustering from WOM to WEM was to be understood as having been with immediate effect, ie from 1 December 1938. The kaleidoscope was given a further shake by AMO A.442/1940 of 4 July which reintroduced the Group I trade of the WOM, so for most of WW II there were WOps, WOMs and WEMs.

⁸⁸    Examples include AMOs A.551/1942 and A.746/1942.

⁸⁹    AMO A.424/1942 of 30 April.

⁹⁰    With effect from 1 October 1942 rates of ‘war pay’ were doubled to one shilling a day for airmen and eightpence for airwomen, this change being promulgated by AMO A.1114/1942 of 12 October.

⁹¹    AMO A.551/1942 of 4 June.