1945-48. The attempt to reinstate a pre-war-style ‘pilots only’ officer corps.
As early as 1941 some senior officers had begun to appreciate that the crucial importance of navigation made it necessary to afford a greater level of recognition to navigators or, as they still were at the time, to observers. This had eventually provoked a minor crusade in support of captaincies for non-pilots (see pages 265-268) and a similar campaign to extend their opportunities for attaining higher ranks. Sadly, AOCinC Bomber Command, Air Mshl Sir Richard Peirse, had felt unable to lend his support to the case for observer captains, or for observers to fill executive posts, but he was in favour of the conversion of ‘observers of outstanding merit to pilots after their first operational tour’. In other words, setting the clock back to 1917.
That said, Sir Richard recognised that something did need to be done to enhance the prospects of observers. At the time, Station Navigation Officers were only flight lieutenants, as were the Bombing Leaders on individual squadrons where there was no establishment at all for a Navigation Leader. Apart from imposing an unreasonably low rank ceiling, the overall effect of these arrangements actually emphasised the less demanding aspect of the observer’s job. He also pointed out that, while current planning envisaged that observers might eventually fill 50% of navigational staff appointments, this would still involve only relatively small numbers. As a result, the observer was ‘up against a brick wall; he sees contemporary pilots getting promotion while he himself can hope for little more than to become a Squadron Bombing Leader.’1
To maintain the pressure, Bomber Command fired off another letter two months later, specifically urging the early establishment of flight lieutenant observers as Squadron Navigation Officers and raising the rank of Station Navigation Officers to squadron leader.2 This persistence was finally rewarded in June 1942 when appropriate establishments were amended to reflect Bomber Command’s proposals, although it was 1944 before a similar upgrade was authorised for Coastal Command.
While these changes had provided a handful of observers with something which might, at a pinch, be passed off as a career structure, the Service was soon obliged to consider the future of its entire officer corps. The award of permanent commissions to RAF officers (in practice, only to pilots) had been suspended on the outbreak of war on the grounds that the future was so uncertain as to make it impossible to determine the number of regular officers that would be required. By 1943 it had come to the attention of the Air Ministry that the Admiralty and the War Office were both still offering permanent commissions. After some reflection, despite the improving war situation, the Air Ministry concluded that its original rationale had been valid and that it was still too early for the RAF to be entering into long-term commitments with individual officers. Nevertheless, this would eventually become appropriate and, in anticipation of this, it was decided to invite applications.3
Very large numbers of officers expressed an interest and by early 1945 it was apparent that it would take some considerable time to review all of the applications that had been received.4 Nevertheless, some of the conditions of service which were expected to apply had been more clearly defined by this time and details were circulated in March.5 Quite astonishingly, the RAF revealed that it had decided to insist that officers selected for permanent commissions in the GD Branch ‘who are not already pilots will normally be required to qualify as such.’ Disinterring this hoary old Trenchardian chestnut of 1919 vintage, demonstrated once again that old air force habits die hard.
At the time it was not known whether a separate Technical Branch was going to be maintained after the war. If it was not, however, engineering officers would have to be transferred to the GD Branch and those likely to be offered permanent commissions were put on notice that they too might have to learn to fly.6 In the event it was decided to retain a dedicated Technical Branch in which it was anticipated that ‘a proportion’ of officers would be trained as pilots, although this was no longer to be a precondition for the granting of a permanent commission.7
To some of the senior officers who could remember 1917, and there were still a lot of them about, all of this must have seemed perfectly reasonable. After all, in the ‘good old days’ an observer could not even attain the rank of captain without first becoming a pilot. Why change now? Because, while none of them had been permitted to attain very high ranks, a handful of non-pilots had demonstrated that they were quite capable of functioning as captains of crews and of commanding flights and squadrons.8 That is why.
It would seem, however, that, rather than being a considered response, the requirement for all holders of permanent commissions within the GD Branch to be pilots, as initially stated, may have been more of a knee-jerk reaction on the part of staff officers who had simply assumed that the system would wish to re-establish the pre-war situation. Fortunately, when the question was examined by a committee studying the Selection and Training of Officers of the GD Branch under the chairmanship of the Director General of Personal Services, AVM D Harries, it concluded that, while all Cranwell cadets and university entrants would still have to be trained as pilots, this need not otherwise be an essential precondition to the granting of a permanent commission.9
Despite this conclusion, there was no immediate public retraction of the previously published everyone-will-have-to-be-a-pilot policy, suggesting that some of the more influential officers lurking within the bureaucracy may have been reluctant to see this concession actually implemented. One also suspects that the air establishment’s apparent willingness to embrace a more liberal philosophy may have been more in the nature of a pragmatic acceptance of the inevitable than a considered choice. The fact was that, in the immediate post-war years, the training system simply lacked the capacity to indulge in such pointless exercises as training one sort of competent aviator to become another.
By the summer of 1946 the Air Ministry was having to come to terms with this situation and a statement was released to the effect that the question of flying training being a precondition of a permanent commission was under review and that no further applications for such courses were to be submitted until further notice.10 It was clear that the establishment was now having serious second thoughts about the viability of sustaining this time-honoured, if totally unnecessary, tradition. The following year it was announced that there was no prospect of the Air Force being able to offer the necessary flying training courses before 1949 at the earliest.11 The navigators-must-become-pilots requirement was finally withdrawn in May 1948.12
1945-48. The evolution of early post-war commissioning policy for aircrew.
As discussed in Chapter 28, in 1945-46 it had been anticipated that, once the transition from war to peace had been completed, the bulk of the Air Force’s flying personnel would be provided by the new breed of ‘sub-NCOs’. By relying so heavily on airmen aircrew in the future, it followed that there might be no need to reintroduce short service commissions. This, in turn, raised the tantalising prospect of an ‘ideal’ peacetime air force, that is to say, one which could be managed by a relative handful of officers, all of whom would serve on permanent commissions. (Post-war permanent commissions are discussed in Chapter 35).
Nevertheless, the pros and cons of short service commissions were given due consideration, although there were mixed feelings over reintroducing a pre-war practice which had sometimes been a rather contentious issue.13 To tide the Air Force over while these matters were being debated, extended service commissions had been introduced in 1945.14 There was the usual plethora of terms and conditions (and later amendments) but, in essence, the scheme offered wartime officers (of all branches, not just GD) terms broadly similar to those which would shortly be made available to wartime airmen aircrew (see page 281). Two periods were on offer, four years plus four on the reserve for non-regular officers, ie those commissioned from the ranks of the RAFVR on qualification or later, and seven years for ex-regular, ie pre-war, airmen who had been granted temporary commissions during the war.
It has been suggested (see page 284) that the beginning of the end of the 1946 Scheme could be discerned in 1948 when the shortage of tradesmen volunteers had obliged the Air Council to forego its ideal of having an exclusively internally recruited SEG workforce. In the context of pilots and navigators, the first symptoms of decay had actually appeared long before that. Unsurprisingly, many potential pilots and navigators seem to have failed to appreciate the attractions of flying as pseudo-corporals. So, to provide an added enticement, less than a year after the new concept had been implemented it had been decided to reintroduce the prospect of short service commissions. These arrangements, which were announced in February 1947, effectively replaced the transitional system of extended service commissions.15
Short service commissions were available in practically all branches, but, so far as flying personnel were concerned, only to pilots and navigators. Furthermore, while the direct recruiting of short service officers was envisaged for some ground branches, this was not (initially) to be the case for GD officers, most of whom were expected to be obtained by commissioning selected direct entrant airmen candidates on completion of their flying training. Apart from them, short service commissions were also on offer: to officers holding extended service commissions; to recently released officers who wished to re-engage; and to airmen currently serving as aircrew under the terms of the 1946 Scheme. Those who accepted such commissions were to serve for a total of six years, including any previous service as an airman, plus the usual four years on the reserve.
Unfortunately, in July 1947 an Order that amplified the terms of the recently introduced short service commission included a statement, tucked away in a footnote, that said: ‘At the present time, there are no vacancies for short service commissions for navigators.’16 This was to have a measurably adverse impact on morale (see page 301).
The initial response to the new arrangements was disappointing and in the spring of 1948 AMP, Air Mshl Sir Hugh Saunders, took the problem to the Air Council. There were three causes for concern. First, the current standard engagement was too short to permit pilots and navigators to develop their skills fully. Secondly, because engagements were short, the turnover was high, which drove up training costs. Finally, and most importantly, the terms presently on offer were simply failing to attract the numbers required. The solutions to these problems were self-evident – longer engagements and a juicier carrot.17
This soon led to a reversal of policy with respect to the recruiting of pilots and navigators. From September onwards civilians were offered ‘a guarantee of short service commissions’ so long as they could persuade the Selection Board that they were officer grade material.18 Confirmation of a commission, which would now involve eight years of active service, was conditional upon satisfactory performance during, and completion of, training. This development did not preclude the direct recruiting of noncommissioned Ps and Ns, which continued as before. The new arrangements also made provision for pilots and navigators who had been selected as officers, but who had subsequently failed to make the grade as such, to transfer to non-commissioned terms on an, initially, eight-year engagement.
Meanwhile, if a full career, offering all of the opportunities available to pilots, remained a rather vague prospect for navigators, it was even further out of reach for the SEG categories. Technically, they had been entitled to be considered for permanent commissions ever since these had been reintroduced in 1945 but this had initially presupposed that they were prepared to transfer to a ground branch, their options being extended in 1949 to include retraining as pilots or navigators.19 The bulk of the relatively small requirement for officers to serve as gunners, signallers and engineers had, therefore, continued to be met by retaining wartime veterans serving on emergency20 and/or extended service terms or by commissioning selected airmen aircrew as short service or branch (see Note 4 to Chapter 35) officers.
Furthermore, by 1948 the Air Force had concluded that ‘the duties involved did not merit officer status and the commissioning of SEGs, as such, ceased.’21 SEG personnel with the necessary potential could still be commissioned, of course, but into a ground branch, usually Secretarial or Equipment.
This had created a problem for serving SEG officers as they no longer had a viable career. Most of these men were expected to leave the Service in 1949-50 in any case, but some had engagements that would not run out until as late as 1954. They had the options of transferring to a ground branch or, if less than 31 years of age, they could apply for cross-training as pilots or navigators. In either case this would usually involve a formal transfer to short service terms.
1948. The ‘comparable careers for navigators’ policy.
When it had been announced that navigators appointed to a permanent commission were no longer required to become pilots the same Order had also stated that ‘all navigators entering the Royal Air Force should have career prospects comparable with those open to pilots’ (see Note 12). This pronouncement had actually been represented as being an extension of the comparable careers policy which, it was claimed, had been enshrined within the 1946 Aircrew Scheme. In real terms, of course, this had meant very little, beyond the fact that it took an N3 as long to make N2 as it took for a pilot to progress from P3 to P2. While the RAF evidently viewed this sort of meteoric rise as a ‘career prospect’, it would seem that most navigators had failed to recognise it as such, hence the need to point it out.
All of this had been the outcome of an examination of the future of the navigator conducted by the Post-War Manning Committee in 1947-48 sparked by the considerable difficulties that were being encountered in recruiting enough of them. The committee had concluded that the ideal solution would be to do away with navigators altogether and to provide all pilots with comprehensive training in navigation (shades of 1937-38 – see pages 155 & 171). Accepting that this was impractical, not least because of a lack of training capacity, the committee’s second-best solution was to retrain navigators as pilots after one tour. Since the end product of that approach would have been an under-developed navigator-cum-inexperienced pilot, DCAS, Air Mshl Sir Hugh Walmsley, insisted that ‘navigators should be kept as a specialist category. To be both a first-class pilot and a first-class navigator (is) beyond the capacity of any but the most exceptional officers.’22
A sign of the times. By the end of the 1940s the aircrew manning situation was beginning to cause concern. This was particularly true of navigators which gave rise to a recruiting campaign specifically aimed at them. This advertisement began to appear in the aviation press in 1949.
It is a little surprising that the cross-training option was still being promoted with much enthusiasm by anyone in 1948. Perhaps it was a question of light blue being disinclined to seek the advice of dark blue, but the fact is that by this time the RN had accumulated sufficient recent experience of ‘all-purpose aviators’ to have been able to conclude that they did not represent a practical solution to the manning problem. Ever since 1945 the Navy had been training only pilots, whom it required to be equally competent as back-seaters, while converting many of its remaining observers into pilots.23 By 1948 the admirals had concluded that this had not been such a good idea after all and they were on the point of abandoning the practice. The cross-training of naval aircrew ceased in 194924 and at much the same time the training of dedicated observer officers, with similar career prospects to those of pilots, had been reinstated.25
Meanwhile, the RAF had completed its deliberations and had accepted that there was no practical alternative to the permanent retention of navigators. When submitting his recommendations to the Air Council Standing Committee in March 1948, AMP, Sir Hugh Saunders, had stated that ‘there can be no doubt that the mental capacity and professional skill required of a navigator is as high, if not higher, than that required for a pilot. It is obvious therefore that the career open to navigators as a class must be not less attractive than that open to pilots.’26 His recommendations were accepted in principle and, after some refinement, the Air Council subsequently stated, quite unequivocally, and as previously noted, that navigators ‘should have career prospects comparable with those open to pilots’ and that ‘navigators shall be selected for permanent commissions in the GD Branch in the same proportion as pilots.’ Furthermore, it was noted that appropriate unit establishments were to be changed to permit navigators to fill appointments as Flight and Squadron Commanders.27
Few of the navigators of 1948 are likely to have been aware of the very similar announcement that had been made with respect to observers as long ago as June 1918 (see pages 113-114). In view of the way that that undertaking had been honoured, however, even if they had known about it, it would have been unlikely to have had a very positive effect on their morale. That aside, it is clear that there was little immediate evidence of the new ‘comparable careers’ policy being put into effect. This had given rise to sufficient dissatisfaction at the coal face for the Air Ministry to circulate a letter stating that the Air Council wished ‘to reaffirm that it is their firm intention to provide wider employment for navigators as soon as it becomes possible to do so’ and explaining that the unavoidable delay was due to a global shortage of navigators which precluded their being released from flying duties to fill the selected ground appointments that were an essential pre-requisite for a balanced career.28
If a letter from a disgruntled navigator published in the aviation press a few weeks later is anything to go by it would seem that this reassurance had cut little ice in some quarters. Signed ‘F/O RAF’ the letter read:29
‘… after seven years’ experience, both military and civil, and some 1,500 hrs, I am convinced that: (1) there is no future in it, official statements to the contrary notwithstanding; and (2) I’d far rather drive anyway.’
Despite these misgivings, the fact remained that the Air Force had publicly committed itself to providing navigators with similar opportunities to those which were available to pilots. Perhaps to underline this change in policy, from 1948 onwards the Air Force List recorded pilots and navigators on a common gradation list, rather than separately as had been the case since the reintroduction of commissioned observers in 1940.
1950. The introduction of a 100% commissioning policy for pilots and navigators.
The need to tinker with commissioning policy during the later 1940s was driven, in part, by the difficulties that the Air Force experienced in redefining itself during a period in which erstwhile allies, the USSR and China, became the potential opposition, leading to an increasingly polarised international political situation. By 1950 early post-war uncertainties had crystallised into an increasingly Cold War. This relative stability made it possible to take a longer-term view and thus to adopt a more radical approach to the provision of aircrew, including officers.
In November of that year, a few months after the restitution of traditional NCO ranks, it was declared that it was ‘the aim of the Air Council that all pilots and navigators shall be commissioned officers.’30 This did not mean that any applicant with the necessary flying aptitude would automatically be commissioned but that the Air Force would train only those applicants who were assessed as being suitable to hold a commission – which is not quite the same thing. This was a startling departure from the policy prevailing only three years before when the Service had been expecting to manage with mere P3s and N3s. The problem was that it had proved to be extremely difficult to obtain enough of either, as had been shown by the RAF’s consistent inability to find the navigators that it was supposed to have been providing for meteorological observation duties (see pages 309-310).
The Air Force was finally being forced to grasp a nettle which it had been carefully avoiding for years. However unwelcome, it was being obliged to accept the fact that the essential characteristics required of a pilot or navigator were much the same as those which were demanded of an officer. There were probably some who would still have disputed the truth of this, but even if there were, these dissenters could hardly have denied that people with the degree of intelligence, educational qualifications, speed of reaction, resourcefulness and other qualities necessary to be pilots or navigators were a valuable commodity. If the RAF wanted its share of this commodity it was going to have to pay the market price.
Within a rigidly hierarchical military structure, however, there was (at the time) an inextricable link between pay and rank. While some minor perturbations in pay scales could be tolerated, it would have been very difficult for such an institution to endorse an arrangement which might have involved, for instance, a twenty-year old ‘corporal equivalent’ Aircrew III aviator being paid more than (say) a forty-year old flight lieutenant in a ground trade.31 (But see page 338.)
The idea of making aircrew a separate third entity had been, in some respects, an attempt to avoid, rather than to solve, this problem. Since this concept had proved to be so unattractive, the RAF had had little alternative but to offer commissions to virtually all pilots and navigators, and even then it became necessary, as an added recruiting incentive, to top up their income by introducing specialist ‘flying pay’.32
This advertisement appeared in 1950 to announce the introduction of the 100% commissioning policy for pilots and navigators that remained in force, with only one short break in the mid-1960s, for the rest of the century.
Both at the time (1950), and in later years, there has been some debate as to the justification for paying some people extra merely for doing what they had volunteered to do. Lest there still be any doubt, it is worth quoting from Air Ministry policy letters on the subject. One stated, in 1952, that, ‘this additional emolument was introduced essentially to attract young men of high quality to take up flying as a career.’33 In 1956 another said that the main purpose of flying pay was ‘to induce men possessing the high qualifications needed for the performance of aircrew duties in peace or war to undertake a flying career’34 and this message was repeated more or less verbatim in 195 8.35 In short, flying pay was a recruiting carrot, plain and simple.
Flying pay aside, the imposition of what amounted to a universal commissioning policy meant that, to quote John James, the post-war RAF had effectively adopted the slogan, ‘if a man’s good enough to be a pilot (or a navigator–CGJ), he’s good enough to be an officer,’ which, to paraphrase Trenchard, was almost exactly the reverse of what he had been saying in the 1920s – that, ‘if a man were good enough to be an officer, he must also become a pilot.’36
While it was now official policy to recruit only officers as pilots and navigators, large numbers of NCOs were still serving in these categories. Over the next several years, many of these men would be commissioned, on a variety of terms, but others would not, in some cases because they were considered unsuitable but often because they chose not to change their lifestyle. For a time, and to a very limited degree, the NCO community was replenished by trainees who, having failed to make the grade as officers, elected to continue flying as sergeants. Inevitably, however, the numbers of non-commissioned pilots and navigators gradually declined, although they continued to fly until well into the 1960s, by which time most were ranked as warrant officers, ie as master aircrew.
As to the 100% officer policy – did it work? Yes – and No. By 1950, using the arrangements that had been in place since September 1948, about a quarter of the pilots, and almost half of the navigators, who completed their training were already doing so as officers. But, of the first 238 pilots and navigators to graduate after entering training under the regulations introduced in November 1950 only one failed to gain a commission.37 So the Air Council’s stated aim, ‘that all pilots and navigators shall be commissioned officers’ was clearly being achieved. But at what cost? The Command Research Officer at HQ Flying Training Command, F C Watts, concluded that: ‘This aim is being achieved by a lowering of the standard of personal qualities required for a commission. To reject aircrew pupils who, in the opinion of their instructors, are below previously laid down standards in personal qualities would result in a 40% reduction in the output of trained aircrew.’38
Not exactly a palatable conclusion but, while this exercise had served to quantify the position, the outcome can hardly have been much of a surprise. In effect, the Air Force was trying to have its cake while eating it and, for a while, it was going to have to live with the somewhat indigestible consequences. There were only two ways to restore the quality of the officer corps. It would be necessary either to attract higher grade candidates or to reduce the numbers required, since that would permit the imposition of more rigorous selection parameters.
The first option was a non-starter, as it implied the offering of an unaffordably juicier carrot. Fortunately, it would soon prove to be possible to reduce the numbers required because, once the Korean crisis had passed, and accelerated by the 1957 Defence White Paper, the RAF began to contract, a process that, at the time of writing (2013), has still yet to run its course.39 This progressive reduction in the size of the Air Force was accompanied (as discussed below) by much longer engagements. Since each individual would now spend more years in uniform, there would be a corresponding reduction in the demand for new recruits, which, in turn, meant that the Service could be more selective. So, while the 100% officer policy may not initially have been entirely successful, this was a transitional state and a more satisfactory balance between quality and quantity was gradually restored
1951-58. Navigators at Cambridge UAS.
To give the ‘comparable careers’ policy announced in 1948 some substance it was considered that, like pilots, some navigators ought to be drawn from the universities. As argued by AMP, Sir Hugh Saunders, in a paper raised in July 1949, it followed that this initiative would almost certainly have to involve the UASs.40 Oxford and Cambridge Universities were approached, the latter expressing some interest, and a year later the matter was laid before the Air Council. In October 1950 it was agreed to try a small-scale experiment at Cambridge.41
Wearing the colours of the UAS – a pale blue cheatline with a thin central stripe of dark blue – and with a small Cambridge University shield painted above (between the cabin door and the roundel) VV884 was one of a pair of Anson T.21s operated by No 22 RFS on behalf of the squadron’s Navigation Flight. (A Pearcey)
To cater for the trial two officers, a pilot and a navigation instructor, were added to the establishment of the UAS and No 22 RFS at Teversham was provided with an Anson T.21, a second aeroplane being added later. The initial intake, which was to commence training in the Hilary Term (January 1951), was to consist of up to eight undergraduates, which, allowing for a three-year academic course, implied that the membership of the Navigation Flight might eventually total as many as twenty-four. As was so often the case, however, recruiting of navigators proved to be difficult and in mid-1955 there were only ten of them on strength, less than half of the numbers authorised.
Perhaps more significantly, of the twenty-eight potential navigators who had been members of the flight up to that time (including the ten current incumbents), only one had actually signed-on for regular service (and only on short service terms, rather than taking a permanent commission). None of the others had indicated that they were likely to do so and, even more disappointingly, none of those still liable for National Service had opted to do it with the RAF!42 While there was just enough enthusiasm to sustain the Cambridge enterprise, its results were never sufficient to warrant the extension of the scheme to other universities.
During 1957 the future of the UASs was subjected to a thorough review, revealing some ambivalence over the aims underpinning them. Were they intended to be a source of recruits or merely a means of promoting ‘air mindedness’ among the great and the good of the future, and whatever the answer, did they justify their cost? The upshot was that, although their membership was to be reduced by some 30%, the UASs were to survive, but because its ‘recruitment value is negligible’ the retention of the Navigation Flight at Cambridge could not be justified.43 Training ceased on 6 December 1957, on which date the flight had twelve members, still only half of its authorised strength. The flight was formally disbanded on 1 February 1958.
1954-56. Early dissatisfaction with the ‘comparable careers’ policy – and the Cranwell question.
While the UAS initiative had been disappointing, if the ‘comparable careers’ policy was going to be seen to have any real meaning, it was essential that navigators should be permitted to attend the RAF College, since that was the only realistic means of gaining a secure footing on the RAF’s fast-track career ladder. It was all very well granting a few hand-picked navigators ‘PCs’ (ie permanent commissions) at a later stage, but it was difficult to make up the lost time and these Johnnies-come-lately never really enjoyed all of the privileged treatment which the Service reserved for its Old Cranwellians.
The ‘establishment’ had no illusions about this situation incidentally, as AMP made quite clear in 1949 when he stated that ‘it is generally accepted that the Cranwell or University entrant has advantages over the SSC (ie Short Service Commission – CGJ) officer appointed to a permanent commission and has in addition better prospects of advancement to higher rank.’44 This observation had been made in a paper raised to establish the case for navigators to be admitted to Cranwell; a proposal that was accepted by the Air Council.45 Unfortunately, however, this acceptance had been only ‘in principle’ and at the time it was deemed to be too difficult to put the idea into practice – although in 1953 sufficient room was found to permit the cadets of the Equipment and Secretarial Wing, who had been housed at Digby since 1947, to be accommodated at Cranwell.
With access to the RAF College still denied, by 1954 an overt sense of dissatisfaction with their promotion prospects was becoming apparent among navigators. This led AMP, Air Chf Mshl Sir Francis Fogarty, to re-examine, in the light of the ‘100% officers’ decision of 1950, the comparable careers policy which had been introduced in 1948. His investigation showed that the number of junior officer navigators being promoted did represent a reasonable reflection of their proportional representation within the GD Branch. Nevertheless, there were some discrepancies in this and in other respects, the numbers being selected for Staff College for example, and where these occurred the imbalance was invariably in favour of pilots.46
The most serious shortfall had been in the career management of young navigators caused by a seemingly permanent manning deficit. This had begun as early as 1947-48 when, in order to compensate for a shortage of pilots, some navigators had taken up offers to retrain. Unfortunately, it had subsequently proved to be impossible to balance this outflow with a corresponding increase in navigator recruiting. In 1949 AMP, Sir Hugh Saunders, had written that ‘we have barely sufficient Navigators for the squadrons’.47 Under those circumstances it had proved very difficult to provide commissioned navigators with the nonflying appointments in which, as budding career officers, they could gain the experience of administration which was essential if they were to move on to positions of greater responsibility in higher ranks.
Although the Air Council had long been aware of the adverse implications of this situation, because most navigators were still relatively junior in rank, it took time for sufficient evidence to accumulate to enable them to begin to perceive that, as a group, they were failing to make much progress. Nevertheless, by 1954 the problem was becoming increasingly apparent at Flight Commander level where a mere 4% of the 210 posts available at that time were being filled by navigators, rather than the ‘26%’ that might have been expected ‘if equal proportions of navigators and pilots were appointed’.48 Hence the growing crew room perception that the comparable careers policy of 1948 had been a sham.
In presenting this problem to the Air Council, AMP stated that ‘there was a widespread impression among navigators that this policy was not being implemented and a belief in some (other) quarters that the policy was unworkable and should be abandoned.’49 The question that the Council had to consider, therefore, was whether it should renege on its promise to navigators or stand by its earlier decision and restate the policy, bearing in mind what that implied in the long term in the context of captaincy and command. Six months of debate ensued, during which VCAS, Air Chf Mshl Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, among others, pointed out that if navigators were going to be seen to have the same status as pilots, some of them really would have to admitted to Cranwell.50
The operational CinCs were eventually invited to contribute their views. Bomber and Coastal Commands both came out in favour of continuing the comparable careers ‘experiment’. On the other hand, Fighter Command and 2nd TAF were opposed to any form of executive authority being vested in navigators.51 These reactions were entirely predictable, of course, and served only to demonstrate that people who tend to fly alone and in small aeroplanes are likely to have limited horizons.
The eventual outcome of these deliberations was a formal public restatement of the RAF’s commitment to comparable careers.52 Furthermore, it had been agreed actually to make provision for navigators at Cranwell. In January 1956, a mere seven years after it had been decided to admit them (longer than it had taken to defeat Hitler), the RAF College’s 74th Entry became the first to include navigators.
________________________
1 AIR2/8270. Bomber Command letter BC/S.22453/Air dated 17 December 1941 from AOCinC to USofS at the Air Ministry, Capt H H Balfour. AMT, AVM A G R Garrod, considered this letter to be of such significance that, on his recommendation, it was subsequently brought to the attention of the Air Council as memorandum AC 71(41).
2 Ibid. Bomber Command letter BC/S.22453/Air dated 15 February 1942 to Capt Balfour from AOCinC (but actually signed on his behalf by AVM Saundby).
3 AMO A.188/1944 of 2 March.
4 An idea of the scale of this task may be gained from The Aeroplane for 24 January 1947 which reported that the Selection Board had by then considered some 30,000 applications resulting in the award of about 1,000 permanent and 13,000 extended service commissions (see Note 14).
5 AMO A.297/1945 of 26 March. This order explained, inter alia, that the Air Ministry recognised the need to notify successful applicants as quickly as possible. The granting of permanent commissions was, therefore, done piecemeal, the first batch being announced immediately in AMO N.332/1945 of 26 March.
6 Ibid.
7 AIR20/4324. The Report of a Committee on the Future of the Technical Branch, chaired by Air Mshl Sir Roderic Hill and published in September 1945, presented a very convincing case for the retention of a discrete specialist branch to handle engineering matters. The Committee’s recommendations were accepted, a summary of the report, including details of the anticipated arrangements, being published as AMO A.1026/1946 of 12 December. For the record, it should be noted that the Technical Branch was reconstituted as the Engineer Branch with effect from 1 October 1966 (see DCI(RAF) S159 of 29 September 1966).
8 Some examples of wartime non-pilot executives are at Notes 60, 61 and 62 to Chapter 26. So far as numbers/ranks were concerned, the Air Force List for July 1945 records the names of twenty-five squadron leader navigators while the combined list for air gunners and WOps included twenty-one plus a single wing commander. By comparison, there were 2,721 wing commander and squadron leader pilots.
Two years later, with the initial post-war run-down approaching completion, the List named just seven senior officer navigators – five wing commanders and two squadron leaders; there were two wing commanders and two squadron leaders on the gunner/signaller list; there were now 1,343 wing commander and squadron leader pilots. Neither list, incidentally, had featured any flight engineers above the rank of flight lieutenant.
9 AIR2/6830. AMP (Sir John Slessor) submitted to the Air Council a summary of the Harries Committee’s proposals in his note AC 24(45) of 19 June 1945. With one or two minor reservations, the Air Council endorsed the content of AMP’s paper at its meeting 7(45) held on 17 July.
10 AMO A.766/1946 of 5 September.
11 AMO A.431/1947 of 29 May.
12 AMO A.410/1948 of 20 May.
13 The short service commission of the 1920s had been a purely RAF initiative and one which had been rather frowned upon by the other two Services, particularly the Army, who believed that all officers should be dedicated military men committed to serve on long-term, pensionable engagements. There was also a degree of opposition from other influential sectors, including educationalists and some politicians, who contended that it was not in the national interest for the Air Force to take advantage of the formative years of a young man’s career and then return him to society, ill-prepared for life, other than in the precarious occupation of an aviator. It could, of course, be countered that, having been expensively trained as a pilot, he was well placed to pursue a career in the (at least potentially) growth industry of commercial aviation and that, although he lacked a pension, his terminal gratuity was sufficiently generous to cushion his transition to civilian life.
It is evident that certain senior RAF officers were also unconvinced of the merits of the innovative short-service commission which led Trenchard to ask his Director of Personnel, Air Cdre O Swann, to prepare a letter from CAS to AOCs explaining the party line. It is not known whether the final version was ever distributed but AIR8/19 contains a copy of a draft dated 25 January 1922.
14 AMO A.775/1945 of 31 July.
15 AMO A.127/1947 of 13 February announced that short service commissions were to be reintroduced to replace the interim extended service commission, 31 March being the last date for applications under the earlier scheme.
16 AMO A.592/1947 of 17 July.
17 AIR6/95. AMP’s explanation of the problems was presented to the Air Council in his Memorandum AC(27)48 of 26 April 1948 which was considered at its meeting 6(48) held on the 27th. Following consultation with the CinCs, AMP’s refined proposals were presented in his Memorandum AC(40)48 of 26 June 1948, the eventual outcome being AMO A.733/1948 of 9 September.
18 AMO A.733/1948 of 9 September.
19 AMO A.900/1949 of 22 December.
20 AMO A.476/1939 of 9 November had made early provision for relatively large numbers of ground tradesmen to be commissioned for wartime service. These regulations were progressively refined until they were restated in AMO A.366/1940 of 13 June in which the phrase ‘for the duration of hostilities’ was subsequently amended (by AMO A.834/1941 of 9 October) to read ‘for the duration of the emergency’. Hence the term ‘emergency commission’, which referred to the specific arrangements whereby ex-regular, ie pre-war, airmen could be commissioned into the RAF while wartime recruits would be commissioned into the RAFVR. The granting of emergency commissions was terminated by AMO A.169/1948 of 19 February.
21 AIR20/9060. Minute AMPG 7296 of 13 November 1950 from R F Butler, PS to AMP, to the Secretary of State’s office outlining the position of SEG personnel with respect to commissions.
22 AIR6/91. This statement is recorded in the Conclusions of the Air Council Standing Committee’s Meeting 4(48) held on 1 April 1948 at which AMP, Sir Hugh Saunders, opened the discussion of his Memorandum SC(48)19 by summarising the deliberations of the Post-War Manning Committee.
23 This had been one of the many recommendations made by the Naval Air Personnel Committee which had been established in October 1944 under the Chairmanship of RAdm F H W Goolden to consider the manning of the post-war FAA. In many ways this exercise paralleled that being undertaken within the RAF by Air Chf Mshl Sir Sholto Douglas’ Committee on the Composition of Air Crew which had been set up in the previous month – see page 269.
The Goolden Committee’s First Report (ADM1/28005) was submitted on 23 February 1945 and its central recommendation regarding observers was subsequently accepted by the Board of Admiralty at a meeting held on 12 October 1945. The minutes recorded that the ‘functions of pilot and observer should be combined in one individual in time of peace but the necessity for ensuring under this system that a number of first-class specialist observers would be maintained must not be overlooked.’ This decision was promptly implemented by the publication of AFO 6053 of 25 October which offered observers the opportunity to retrain as pilots, thus making themselves dual-qualified.
24 AFO 1780 of 27 May 1949.
25 AFO 1612 of 13 May 1949.
26 AIR6/91. AMP’s memorandum SC (48)19 of 25 March 1948 which was considered by the Air Council Standing Committee at its Meeting 4(48) on 1 April.
27 AMO A.410/1948 of 20 May.
28 AIR2/4470. Air Ministry letter A.955207/47/SW.10(c) of 10 December 1948 from one of the Assistant Under-Secretaries of State, I V H Campbell, to a wide-ranging Distribution List.
29 Flight for 30 December 1948. It was clear that this correspondent would have always preferred to have been a pilot, the main thrust of his letter being to express his frustration at his failure to gain admission to one of the courses which he understood that the RAF was currently running to convert some of its navigators into pilots. That said, his preference does not invalidate his assessment of his prospects as a navigator.
There had been a wartime scheme under which aircrew who had completed an operational tour might apply to be retrained in a different category but these arrangements had been suspended before the war ended and were formally terminated by AMO A.473/1946 of 30 May. Thereafter cross-training is unlikely to have been a very common practice because offsetting a shortage of pilots by retraining a navigator would simply have transferred the deficit to the navigator column of the manpower ledger – and navigators were even harder to recruit. That said, AMO A.410/1948 of 20 May did include the statement ‘… some navigators may continue to be selected for pilot training …‘
30 AMO A.750/1950 of 30 November.
31 It could be argued that the specialist allowances and/or enhanced rates of pay that were drawn exclusively by aircrew represented the thin end of a rather obvious wedge that had long been inserted into this ‘inextricable link’. This wedge was driven further home by the introduction of Branch Commissions in the 1950s (see Note 4 to Chapter 35) and Specialist Aircrew in the 1970s (see page 334). The rank/pay link was finally, and specifically, broken by the Professional Aviator concept of 2003 (see page 338) which permits a flight lieutenant pilot on the maximum rate to earn the same as a junior group captain who is not drawing flying pay.
32 AMO A.780/1950 of 14 December. To be pedantic, flying pay was actually being re-introduced, although it had not been paid as such since 1919. Even that statement is only partially true because, until 1946, all officers of the GD Branch had always been paid at a different, and in most cases preferential, rate (shared with officers of the Technical Branch after that had been introduced) compared to those of other branches. With effect from 1 July 1946, however, this differential had ceased (see AMO A.514/1946 of 5 June) and thereafter flight lieutenants and above of all branches (with the usual exceptions of doctors, dentists and lawyers) were paid at the same rate. The only deviations from this rule involved GD pilot officers and flying officers, who were paid three shillings per day more than junior officers of other branches, and non-commissioned aircrew of all ranks who, under the terms of the 1946 Scheme, were paid at a preferential rate compared to ground crew (see page 280). Although these excesses were absorbed within the basic rate, rather than being paid as a separate allowance, a specific reference at para 17 of AMO A.514/1946 makes it quite plain that it was defacto ‘flying pay’.
33 AIR2/13469. Air Ministry letter A.119154/52/F.2 dated 21 March 1952 from E C Wood (AUS at the Finance Branch) to five AOCinCs and CinCs who were having problems with ex-GD officers who had voluntarily transferred to the Technical Branch in response to a wartime appeal on the understanding that they would not be financially disadvantaged as a result (see page 190). Some of these men, especially those who had maintained their currency, were claiming an entitlement to the recently introduced flying pay. These claims were dismissed.
34 Ibid. Air Ministry policy letter A.119154/52/F.2 dated 21 April 1956 from K H S Edwards (USofS at the Finance Branch) to numerous very senior Service addressees making it quite clear that, notwithstanding the fact that officers of other branches might sometimes fly in the course of their duties, flying pay was exclusively reserved for members of the GD Branch.
35 Ibid. Letter A.243640/56/F.2a of November 1958 from the Air Ministry to the War Office explaining the party line on the award of flying pay within the RAF.
36 John James, The Paladins (1990), p147.
37 AIR24/2137. FTC/S.100926/RB, HQ Flying Training Command Research Branch Memorandum No 52, ‘Commissioning Rates at Flying Training and Air Navigation Schools’ dated 14 August 1952.
38 Ibid.
39 In 1953 the RAF numbered in excess of 270,000 personnel to man 150 regular squadrons, ie not including a further twenty-six RAuxAF flying units. By the end of 2012 the RAF’s strength was down to thirty-three squadrons and 38,500 personnel and the Strategic Defence and Security Review of October 2010 (Cm 7948) had recommended that it should be further reduced to 33,000 by 2015 and 31,500 by 2020.
40 AIR2/9759. Paper raised by AMP and submitted to the July 1949 meeting of the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces Committee.
41 AIR6/79. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 15(50) held on 10 October 1950.
42 AIR2/12950. Report on the Navigation Flight by OC Cambridge UAS, Wg Cdr A Hughes, dated 17 June 1955.
43 AIR 6/115. From Note AC(57)74 submitted by AMP, Air Mshl Sir John Whitley, which stated that the closure of the Navigation Flight would save between £20,000 and £35,000 per annum. The disestablishment of the flight was approved by Air Council Meeting 20(57) held on 19 September 1957 (AIR6/110).
44 AIR6/92. Air Mshl Sir Hugh Saunders’ paper SC(49)14 of 27 May 1949, the conclusions of which were accepted in principle by the Air Council Standing Committee at a meeting held four days later.
45 AIR6/78. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 11(49) held on 16 June 1949.
46 AIR6/101. Paper AC(54)35 of 9 June 1954 submitted to the Air Council by AMP, Air Chf Mshl Sir Francis Fogarty.
48 AIR6/101. Paper AC(54)35 included some contradictory and thus potentially misleading figures. If navigators should have filled 26% of the 210 Flight Commander posts, that would suggest a navigator to pilot ratio of about 1:3. Yet a few paragraphs previously the same paper had stated that ‘the proportion of navigators to pilots (all categories and ranks of officers) is approximately 1:4’. Furthermore, by confining the figures to officers the global representation of navigators may have been minimised because, only four months later, another paper, (AC(54)56, which dealt with training navigators at Cranwell and was jointly sponsored by AMP and AMSO) stated that ‘the overall ratio of pilots to navigators in the Service is 2*4:1’. In 1949, incidentally, paper SC(49)14 (see Note 44) had contained three statements to the effect that the pilot:nav ratio was 2:1 and it was 2:1 again in 1958 (see page 332). Confucius would probably have said, ‘Beware statistics compiled by anyone other than oneself.’
49 AIR6/98. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 14(54) held on 5 July 1954.
50 AIR6/98. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 15(54) held on 15 July 1954.
51 AIR6/98. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 22(54) held on 2 December 1954.
52 AMO A.44/1955 of 10 February.