1950. The Korean War and problems with recruiting.
In response to the increase in international tension caused by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the RAF had substantially increased its planned annual intake of aircrew. This included a considerable increase in the number of National Servicemen being selected for pilot and navigator1 training, which now automatically involved their being commissioned. In practice, of course, by the time that a conscript had been provided with basic officer training, taught how to fly and converted onto an operational type, he was virtually at the end of his engagement.
The standard eight-year short service commission on offer at the time was too long to attract most conscripts so, in 1951, in an attempt to realise some sort of dividend on the substantial investment that was being made in training these men the Air Ministry introduced, exclusively for National Service pilots and navigators, a four-year engagement followed by four years on the reserve.2 It was hoped that, having tasted the delights of squadron life, a proportion of these men might then sign on for the full eight years and/or apply for permanent commissions. This scheme met with some success but the majority of conscripts still preferred to resume (or start) their civil careers, some of them, no doubt, finding jobs in commercial aviation.3
National Serviceman and Cranwell cadets (and a fortunate few who were selected for similar long-term engagements) aside, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the eight-year short service commission currently available to the majority of pilots and navigators in 1950 was the wrong answer. What was needed was a more flexible system and one which specifically included the option of much longer periods of service.
1950-57. The decline in the practical value of reservists.
One of the consequences of the Korean War was that in 1951 the RAF was authorised to recall up to 10,000 officers and airmen with a reserve commitment for fifteen days’ training4 and 1,000 RAFVR aircrew (mostly pilots) for three months of refresher flying.5 In addition, the Service mounted a recruiting drive which aimed to entice 500 qualified exnavigators into rejoining for an eight-year hitch. This created a huge demand for the facilities necessary to permit aircrew to maintain a degree of currency during their reserve commitment after leaving the Service. Some pilots did this by enlisting in the RAuxAF but most, along with the nonpilots, joined the RAFVR and kept their hands in by spending time with one of twenty-three6 civilian-managed Reserve Flying Schools (RFS), most of which had been set up in 1947-48.7 These schools were equipped with Tiger Moths (progressively replaced by Chipmunks from 1951 onwards) and, for the benefit of navigators and air signallers, Ansons. The RFSs lacked appropriate facilities for air engineers and air gunners, however, so limited provision was made for them, and indeed for all aircrew categories, to fulfil their reserve training obligations through short attachments to regular units.
One of the lessons learned from the Korean crisis was that it was no longer realistic to place too much reliance on reserve forces. It was becoming increasingly difficult, and expensive, to provide aircrew reservists with a means of maintaining even a notional degree of currency and this problem was bound to get worse with each successive generation of aircraft. Reservists could be recalled to the colours in an emergency, of course, and they could be given the necessary refresher training, but it would all take time, probably too much time, since WW III was not expected to last more than three or four days.
Doubts also began to be expressed over the viability of the RFSs in wartime, as the original plan, which had been to use them to provide elementary training for ab initio pupils, would be similarly confounded by the short timescale of a nuclear exchange. As a result, all but eight of the schools were shut down during 1953 and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, George Ward, also informed the House that the aircrew strength of the RAFVR was being reduced from 7,600 to 3,200.8
This reduction in numbers was accompanied by a new policy under which the RAF planned to sustain its front line strength in an emergency by relying on, what was to be known as, the First Reinforcement. In practical terms, this meant people who had been in current flying practice within the previous twelve months (ie regulars on ground tours, as well as reservists). Only about 1,000 of the total of 3,200 reservists fell into this category (essentially those who had most recently been discharged from active service and transferred to the RAFVR) and it was intended to keep them up to scratch by flying them with regular squadrons.9
The potential of the Second Reinforcement, which consisted of experienced aircrew (including regulars) who were substantially out of practice, could be realised only in the event of a period of tension long enough to permit them to be called up (in the case of the remaining 2,200 reservists) and refreshed as required. An RFS could offer no more than a few hours at the controls of a Chipmunk or the nav’s station of an Anson and it was clear that this scheme was increasingly inadequate, because these aeroplanes were hardly representative of current types, let alone the Hunters, Javelins and V-bombers that would shortly be entering service. It was concluded that there was little real point in continuing to require reservists to maintain what amounted to little more than a token degree of currency. It followed that the Second Reinforcement would not have a routine flying commitment and, their residual task having evaporated, the last of the remaining RFSs closed down in 1954.
1955-57. The introduction of longer term engagements and the end of conscription.
Meanwhile, to alleviate the shortage of trained manpower caused by the expansion of the RAF during the Korean War, demobilisation had been suspended in 1950, many regular personnel being kept in uniform for between six and twelve months beyond their anticipated release dates. In effect, they were being required to serve on longer term engagements and, ultimately, this was seen to be the only realistic way to meet the requirements of the future. To fight a nuclear war at little or no notice, or, better still, to provide a deterrent credible enough to prevent this happening, the RAF would need to have its front line permanently manned with fully-trained personnel.
This alone argued for the retention of aircrew for as long as possible, but there were other reasons too. A new generation of high performance combat aircraft (Canberras, Sabres, Hunters, Javelins, Swifts, Valiants, Vulcans and Victors) was planned to enter service during the 1950s. These aeroplanes would be more capable than their predecessors and, while some would be far more complicated, all would be much more expensive. The cost of training people to fly these more advanced aircraft could also be expected to increase remorselessly. One way to minimise this expense would be to reduce the number of people passing through the system, which could be achieved if each of them were to stay in uniform longer. Furthermore, lengthening the duration of active service would also allow an individual’s training costs to be amortised over a longer period. This ‘longevity principle’ was persuaded to yield even greater dividends in 1955 when it was decided to double the length of many flying tours, thus effectively halving the costs associated with running the Operational Conversion Units (OCU).10
To permit reservist navigators and air signallers to fulfil their obligations the Reserve Flying Schools were provided with Anson T.21s. This one, VV255, was with No 18 RFS at Fairoaks in 1951. (E Taylor)
While such an approach made good sense in purely financial terms, reducing throughput would also have the considerable advantage of easing the pressure on recruiting, because it was expected to be much easier to find one man who was prepared to serve for, say, twenty years than a succession of four men who were willing to serve for five years each. This was a particularly persuasive argument in 1955, when the recruiting situation was so depressing. For instance, only eight navigators had been selected during the first three months of that year, and there were reservations as to the real officer potential of some of those.
This observation had been made in a paper written by AVM A Earle to support a major change in policy which was then being advocated. It was being argued that, if the RAF was going to succeed in attracting adequate numbers of men of suitable calibre, substantial improvements would have to be made in the fields of status, pay, gratuities, pensions, resettlement facilities and the provision and standard of accommodation, particularly married quarters. In order to realise a worthwhile return on the considerable expenditure which this would involve, it followed that aircrew officers would need to serve on much longer engagements.11
For all of these reasons, the RAF had already decided to abandon short service commissions. Stating, once again, that its aim was ‘that all pilots and navigators shall be officers’, the Air Council introduced a much more flexible and comprehensive package in 1955.12 The revised scheme offered a variety of contracts, ranging from a twelve-year engagement (with the option of leaving after eight) to a permanent commission involving service to the age of 55.13 Within certain constraints, practically all pilots and navigators still serving as regular airmen, ie as NCOs, were entitled to apply for one or more of these types of commission.
At the same time the terms of service available to air signallers, air engineers and the remaining air gunners and air meteorological observers were restated to reflect detailed changes that had been incorporated over the previous five years.14 One point that is worthy of note is that, while National Servicemen could still apply for training as pilots (with the associated bonus of an automatic commission), this option had not been available to National Service navigators since 1953.15 The only other aircrew category still open to a conscript was as an NCO air signaller, but only at the cost of signing on for eight years, and thus becoming a regular.
By this time, however, conscription was becoming increasingly difficult to sustain politically and, while opinion within the military was divided, there were growing doubts as to its effectiveness. These reservations were felt particularly strongly within the ‘hi tech’ sectors, which included much of the RAF. Rather than providing its conscripts with technical skills, therefore, the Air Force had for some time been tending to employ its National Servicemen on relatively low-grade, menial and clerical tasks to insulate its élite regular tradesmen from such mundane matters.
One of a series of major shifts in defence policy announced in 1957 was an early end to conscription along with a swingeing reduction in the strength of reserve forces. In fact the flying units of the RAuxAF had actually been disbanded several weeks before the publication of the Defence White Paper. Since the last of the RFSs had already been closed down, the loss of the RAuxAF squadrons meant that there was no longer any practical means of providing worthwhile continuation training for ex-conscript aircrew. In effect, therefore, the disbandment of these units had made it inevitable that the training of National Service pilots would cease.16
1956. Rates of flying pay are substantially increased.
Meanwhile, something had begun to be done about pay and there had been some upward movement in 1954. Curiously, since poor recruiting was a major factor, those who benefited most from these increases were the squadron leaders and above, who were already in harness, rather than the flight lieutenants and below that the Service needed to attract. The effect was a marked increase in differentials so that, whereas a pilot officer had earned 45% of a wing commander’s pay in the 1920s, by 1956 he received only 27%.
Apart from an increase in basic pay, flying pay was now recognised as being an essential supplement to income, although the rates had not changed since their initial introduction in 1950. They were: seven shillings for a pilot officer, eight for a flying officer, and nine for flight lieutenants and squadron leaders. Since wing commanders and group captains could expect to fly less frequently, they drew only five shillings per day, falling to three shillings in the latter case after six years in rank.17
By 1955 the RAF was facing an increasingly critical aircrew manning situation. In the case of navigators this was so severe that by October the Service was unable to ‘find enough properly to man part of the Canberra force in Bomber Command (and it was anticipated that) a shortage of pilots will be upon us in a matter of months.’18 As a further incentive to recruiting and retention, it was decided to introduce a substantial increase in the rates of flying pay and, with effect from April 1956, a pilot officer drew eighteen shillings, a flying officer a pound and flight lieutenants and squadron leaders twenty-two shillings.19 A few extra shillings a day may not sound like a great deal but, as the figures for basic pay in 1956 at Figure 52 show, the new rates of flying pay came close to doubling the income of a junior officer of the GD Branch. The overall annual cost of this initiative was some £3.25M (about £68M at 2012 prices) and it is a clear indication of the seriousness of the recruiting problem that the Air Ministry had been able to persuade the Treasury to underwrite such a substantial increase in the ‘wages’ bill.
In the general context of rates of pay, it is worth pausing to observe how little these had actually changed between the 1920s and 1950s. Some examples of comparative rates of pay are at Figure 52 and it is a little surprising to see that in 1950 a junior officer was actually being paid less than he would have been in 1922.20
While these raw figures provide a crude indication of how pay had stagnated, they tell only half the story, because a deadly combination of taxation and inflation had more than halved the purchasing power of the pound. At six shillings in the pound, the basic rate of income tax in 1922 had been 30%; in 1950 it was nine shillings, a swingeing 45%, and this had fallen only marginally (by sixpence) by 1956. Inflation had been relatively insignificant until the late 1940s but from then on its influence had become increasingly corrosive.21 The cumulative effect of all this was that the pound in the wallet of a flight lieutenant in 1950 was worth only 55% of what it would have been worth in the 1920s, and by 1956 this had dwindled to just 42%.
Fig 52. Comparative rates of basic pay (on promotion) for General Duties officers in 1922, 1950, 1956 and 2000.
None of this is intended to suggest that servicemen were being particularly poorly treated. Similar declines in relative income were experienced by most sectors of British society during the early years of a slow post-war economic recovery. The final column has been provided to show that, reflecting the general increase in national prosperity, the position did improve considerably over the next fifty years or so. The startling increases in rates of pay are a little misleading, however, as much of this was absorbed by inflation, which reached an annual rate of more than 20% at one stage. Nevertheless, allowing for the fact that the basic rate of income tax had fallen to 22%, in real terms a wing commander at the turn of the century was at least twice as well off as his predecessor of 1922.
1949-62. The politics of ‘twin-wings for Navs’ in the post-war era.
Although it had been raised and dismissed in 1942 (see pages 224-225) and again in 1944-45 (see pages 271-272), it was almost inevitable that the question of twin-wings for navigators would come up again after the war. The catalyst turned out to be the RCAF which introduced a new style of badge for navigators (and another for radio officers) in August 1948.22 Very similar to the pilots badge in overall design, the central ‘RCAF’ monogram was supplanted by a globe bisected by a red lightning flash. The appearance of this rather stylish fashion accessory was bound to provoke popular demand for something similar in the RAF, especially as American navigators had always worn a double-winged badge. Furthermore, in the opinion of some navigators, the Air Council’s declaration of the previous May, that they were to have the same career prospects as pilots, provided ample grounds for claiming equality in badges.
In 1949, in order to assess the extent of the perceived demand for change, AMP, Air Mshl Sir Leslie Hollinghurst, found himself committed to another survey. This one was to be far more comprehensive than either of the two previous exercises. A letter was duly despatched to all home and overseas commands in September, which, allowing for the inclusion of No 90 Gp and the Rhodesian Air Training Group, provided thirteen returns. Replies were required by the end of November and a wide cross-section of opinion was to be canvassed, taking in the entire rank structure (which, so far as navigators were concerned, did not extend much beyond flight lieutenant at the time). The specific aim of the exercise was to ‘obtain the general consensus of opinion amongst navigators’ (NB not pilots – CGJ) regarding the introduction of a double-wing.23
With the exceptions of Maintenance and Bomber Commands, especially the latter, which were opposed to change, the rank and file supported the case for a doublewing. In one or two instances the majority in favour was fairly narrow but in some it was as high as four to one. It is interesting to note, however, that only two AOCinCs/AOCs endorsed the opinions of their subordinates. Eight, all of them pilots of course, unashamedly took issue with the views expressed by the men they were supposed to be representing by specifically opposing the introduction of a twin-winged badge; the remaining three declined to offer any comment.
The responses reflected a number of recurrent themes, some of which are noted below.
a. Many reports noted that support for change was very strong among younger navigators but that it waned with age and seniority.
b. There were several observations to the effect that twin-wings were perceived to be associated with captaincy and it was considered that their significance would be degraded if they were to be worn by non-pilots. (This observation patently failed to take account of the fact that non-pilots had been eligible for captaincy since 1942, which is some indication of how rare it still was for any of them actually to be appointed as such.)
c. It was evident that twin-wings were widely associated with status and awarding them to navigators was seen to be a way of demonstrating their alleged equality with pilots. This would also serve to differentiate them from the SEG categories.
d. Many of those who opposed change did so on the grounds of tradition and pride in their ‘N’ badges.
e. Some who responded simply disputed the assumption that navigators were in any way ‘second class’. Since they contended that they were not, they considered that there was nothing to be gained by changing their badge.
f. Many of the respondents who opposed the twin-wing advocated the re-introduction of the flying ‘O’ (probably betraying their age in the process).
The twin-winged navigators badge introduced by the RCAF in 1948. A similar badge, for radio officers, featured three red lightning flashes on a black background and in 1952 a third twin-winged badge, with a three-bladed propeller, was added for flight engineers.
The replies had all been received and collated by the end of 1949 and they were then passed to the Air Council for consideration. Opinion was divided. Some members suggested that the introduction of a double-wing might serve to improve navigator recruiting, which was, as ever, causing concern at the time. Others thought that such an esoteric consideration would be of little significance to the civilians, as yet unfamiliar with air force ways, that the Service needed to attract. There was concern over the possibility of an adverse reaction from pilots and a suspicion that introducing twin-wings for navigators would eventually be bound to provoke similar demands from the lineal descendants of the wartime ‘non-PNB’ aircrew categories.
Nothing was decided and on 1 March 1950, AMP minuted the file to the effect that he had better things to do and that it had been a mistake ever to have embarked on this exercise. He directed that, unless someone else raised the matter, no further action was to be taken for twelve months. A year later, the file was brought forward and, since no further correspondence had occurred, it was promptly put away again.
In July 1954 this sleeping dog was reawakened during the Air Council’s debate over the policy of comparable careers (see pages 288-289), and kept awake by continuing concerns over navigator recruiting. VCAS, Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman, suggested that the gesture of twin-wings might exert a positive influence in both cases. AMP was asked to investigate further. Although this exercise had led him to draw the personal conclusion that it would not be appropriate to change the ‘N’ badge, Air Chf Mshl Sir Francis Fogarty laid a variety of options before the Air Council for its consideration.24 At a meeting held in December AMP even displayed specimens of a number of possible twin-winged designs but members were still unable to reach a consensus over the desirability of introducing a new style of badge and AMP was asked to take further air force wide soundings.25 On 22 December he wrote to much the same thirteen headquarters as had been approached in 1949 (the only difference being the substitution of AHQ Malta for Rhodesia). They were all asked to test the water once again.
The responses had all been received by the end of January 1955 and they revealed that a significant shift in opinion had taken place.26 This time only one return was actively in favour of introducing a double-winged badge; eight were against. Four were evenly divided and in three of those cases, predictably as ever, the (pilot) CinCs threw their weight behind retention of the single wing. Much the same detailed comments were elicited as before and, once again, it was clear that attachment to the ‘N’ badge increased markedly with age and experience. It was concluded that the design of flying badges had little bearing on recruiting and the matter was dropped.
On looking back at the history of this question, a cynic might conclude that the Air Council had simply persisted in asking it until it finally got the answer that it had always wanted to hear. Be that as it may, the subject lay dormant until the autumn of 1962 when the question of twin-wings for navigators was raised once again, this time by CAS, MRAF Sir Thomas Pike. Not wishing to stir up the AOCinCs, the task of sounding out opinion was delegated to the Director-General of Personal Services, AVM J R Gordon-Finlayson, who dealt with commands at an equivalent rank level, ie via the Air Officers Administration.27 Once again, the feedback was represented as being strongly in favour of retaining the single wing, the only apparent dissent being expressed by NEAF. ‘Apparent’ because the responses will all have been submitted by pilots and, in view of their track record in such matters, one has reservations as to the extent to which navigators were actively consulted. There are also some grounds for suspecting that navigators may have been their own worst enemies in this matter and that the results of such polls as were taken may have been ‘fixed’.28
Whatever the truth, the result of the survey appeared to be another resounding rejection of twin-wings and CAS was advised to drop the matter.29 He did, and although the idea continued to surface from time to time, it was always on a relatively informal basis thereafter. The review of 1962, therefore, appears to have been the last time that officialdom gave the idea any serious consideration until the very end of the century (see pages 351-352).
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1 In point of fact, although the RAF had been training National Service pilots since 1949, this option was not made available to conscript navigators until the end of 1950; forty-three National Service navigators gained their ‘wings’ during 1951.
2 AMO A.376/1951 of 5 July.
3 AIR29/2688. The ORB for the Aircrew Selection Centre records that this ploy resulted in 142 National Service pilots and 269 navigators passing through Hornchurch to be re-selected as regulars.
4 These were mainly Class G reservists who were required to bring the Control and Reporting System up to strength in war. In the event only 8,600 were actually called up in 1951 with another 5,000 in 1952.
5 LAB6/593. The call up of the various categories of reservists was authorised by the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Training) Act of 1951.
6 There were twenty-five individually numbered RFSs but two of these Nos 4 and 13 were comparatively short-lived.
7 The post-war RFSs reinstated the provision for reservists to fly that had originally been introduced as early as 1923 (see Chapter 16, Note 42) and which had subsequently evolved into the network of ERFTSs of the later 1930s. Apart from their facilities permitting fully qualified pilots to ‘keep their hands in’ while fulfilling their reserve obligations, the RFSs could also certify that a direct entrant into the RAFVR could already fly to the standards required at the end of the basic phase of RAF flying training, notionally the minimum entry level. To recognise the achievements and commitment of these individuals AMO A.631/1949 of 8 September introduced, for each of the five aircrew categories, a preliminary flying badge which was to be awarded to RAFVR personnel who had demonstrated that they had reached the required (basic) standard. As they could be awarded to WRAFVR personnel, incidentally, these were the first RAF-sponsored flying badges that could be worn by women. Supplies of the pilots preliminary flying badge were immediately available and it was certainly awarded; it is still in use today at UASs. Supplies of the badges for nonpilot aircrew were not immediately available, however, and, because of the very limited training facilities provided for these categories, it seems unlikely that many (any?) will actually have been issued. The most likely candidates among back-seaters would have been the handful of navigators trained by Cambridge UAS (see page 292) in the early 1950s but Sqn Ldr (later Gp Capt) Hans Neubroch, who was OC CUAS in 1954-55, has indicated that none of his navigators were awarded their preliminary badges; indeed he states that he was not aware that such a badge had even existed – see the RAF Historical Society publication Royal Air Force Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (2003), p177.
8 ZHC2/1024, Hansard for 17 June 1953. Note that this was merely the latest in a series of reductions in the notional strength of the aircrew reserve, down, for instance, from 20,000 to 13,000 in 1949.
9 AIR6/100. Appendix F to paper AC53(55) of 17 November 1953, submitted to the Air Council by Mr Ward, noted that 332 pilots, 80 navigators, 65 air signallers, 141 air engineers and 164 air gunners of the RAFVR had been attached to regular units during the first ten months of 1953. This represented perhaps 80% of the significantly reduced annual reserve training commitment demanded by the new policy.
10 AIR6/118. At its meeting 15(55), held on 4 July 1955, the Air Council Standing Committee agreed virtually to double the duration of a standard flying tour on (initially) V-bombers and Javelins to four-and-a-half years. In practice, this might involve stints with two different squadrons but, and this was the point, the second one would not need to be preceded by a full OCU course.
11 AIR8/1882. Brief for CAS prepared by ACAS(Pol) dated 20 April 1955.
12 AMO A.110/1955 of 31 March.
13 The terminology used here is not precise. Commissioning arrangements are subject to continual change in an attempt to devise regulations which are mutually beneficial to the Service and to the individual. It is not considered necessary to explore this complication here, beyond noting that, although they were not all currently available, in 1955 a GD officer could be serving on: a Permanent Commission; a National Service Commission; a Direct Commission Scheme A; a Direct Commission Scheme B; a Short Service Commission; an Extended Service Commission; or a Branch Commission.
14 AMO A.111/1955 of 31 March.
15 ZHC2/1017, Hansard, for 19 December 1952. Mr George Ward announced in a Statement to the House that the number of National Service aircrew was to be substantially reduced and that they would ‘in future be trained as pilots only.’ This embargo lasted until November 1955 when opportunities for National Servicemen to be trained (in Canada) as navigators were reinstated, although this reprieve lasted for only two years, the last one being accepted by the Aircrew Selection Centre at Hornchurch in October 1957, when recruiting of all conscript aircrew ceased, opportunities in some categories having already been terminated as much as four years earlier.
For the record, between 1 April 1951 and 17 October 1957 (earlier figures are elusive) the numbers of aircrew selected by Hornchurch were as tabulated below (AIR29/2688):
These figure represented only the potential input to the training machine, of course, the output being reduced by training wastage; planning figures applicable to pilots and navigators in 1950, for instance, were 30% in initial, and a further 25% during professional, training and these did not change significantly throughout the period in question.
16 In fact, once the demands of the Korean War expansion had been satisfied, the main reason for continuing to train any National Service pilots had been to provide the notional 100 needed annually to sustain the twenty fighter squadrons of the RAuxAF. Although disbanding these units in 1957 had terminated the aircrew option, the National Service obligation remained and the last group of conscripts was not called up until as late as 17 November 1960 – according to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Veterans), Don Touhig MP, in a written answer to a question in the Commons on 27 February 2006. The last conscript airman was finally discharged in January 1963.
17 AMO A.780/1950 of 14 December.
18 AIR2/13469. Letter G.37031/MFW/10/55/20 of 19 October 1955 from Mr F Wood (AUS at the Air Ministry) to Mr J J Shaw at the Treasury.
19 AMO A.72/1956 of 29 March.
20 Rates of pay for 1922 are taken from AMWO 137 of 21 February, for 1950 from AMO A.780 of 14 December and for 1956 from AMO A.72 of 29 March. Those for 2000 are as published in RAF News for 16 February 2001.
21 See Chapter 7, Note 2. While the value of the pound had dropped somewhat in the mid-1930s, this decline had been reversed by the time that war broke out again so that its value in 1945 was virtually the same as it had been in 1921. So far as the dates reflected in Figure 52 are concerned, using the long term RPI, and assuming the purchasing power of the pound to have had a notional value of 1 in 2000, its value in 1922 had been £32.93, compared to £19.14 in 1950 and £14.67 in 1956.
22 Twin-winged badges were standardised for all current RCAF aircrew categories in 1952 when a similar emblem was introduced for engineers.
23 AIR2/10835. The correspondence relating to this survey is on Air Ministry file A.25201/49/P1.
24 AIR6/101. Paper AC(54)67 of 13 November 1954.
25 AIR6/98. Conclusions of Air Council Meeting 22(54) held on 2 December 1954.
26 AIR2/10835. The correspondence relating to this survey is on Air Ministry file A.25201/49/P1.
27 AIR2/18211. Letter A.355766/61/DGPS dated 16 October 1962, from AVM Gordon-Finlayson to all command HQs.
28 The author, who was serving on a squadron in Singapore in late 1962, recalls a notice being pinned up inviting navigators to append their names if they favoured the introduction of a twin-winged badge. The proposal attracted the support of most of the fairly numerous junior officers, including this writer. One of the squadron’s handful of grizzled old master navs took us all to one side and forcefully ‘explained’ the error of our ways, leaving us in no doubt as to where our loyalties ought to lie. Suitably chastened, most of us sheepishly crossed off our names. It is suspected that similar scenes, in which the age and experience of the few overcame the youth and enthusiasm of the many, may have been played out in crew rooms right across the Air Force. Being predominantly of the aged and experienced variety, most of the handful of relatively senior navigators at group and command HQs would have had strong sentimental ties to their traditional badges and, because of their elevated position within the chain of command, their stentorian voices would have been far more easily heard than the stifled murmuring filtering up from the coal face. Thus, through its liberal interpretation of the democratic process, did the ‘executive of the navigators union’ continue to delude itself into believing that its semibadges really did have as much significance as those worn by pilots and unwittingly connive at sustaining the second-rank status of their own trade, notwithstanding repeated assurances over comparable careers.
29 AIR2/18211. Unreferenced memo, dated 10 January 1963, from AMP, Sir Walter Cheshire, to CAS.