1917. The Navy finally recognises its Observers and introduces a distinctive badge for them.
Having considered the Navy’s lighter-than-air activities, it is convenient to review here some of the remarkable changes in the fortunes of the RNAS’s aeroplane observers which occurred during 1917. As noted in Chapter 4, the Admiralty had been relatively slow to acknowledge the need for professional observers and thus to provide them with adequate instruction or any tangible status. As the RFC had already discovered, however, there was an inevitability about this development. The question was not whether to recognise the observer but when? – and to what extent?
A major factor in persuading the Navy to accept that it really did need competent professional back-seaters was the experience gained during its pioneering attempt to establish a strategic bombing force in 1916-17. Although this enterprise was terminated before it had been permitted to realise its full potential, it taught many lessons. The type which had been selected to equip the majority of the force had been the Sopwith 1½ Strutter. Probably better known as an RFC two-seat reconnaissance-fighter, many of those operated by No 3 Wg RNAS at Luxeuil were single-seaters with an internal bomb bay.
On his return to England, Wg Cdr R B Davies, No 3 Wg’s erstwhile senior pilot, wrote a paper in January 1917 in which he noted that, despite their success, the Sopwiths had not been ideally suited to their appointed task.1 This was partly because their ‘pilots all have great difficulty in working any kind of sight while flying the machine’ and partly because the lack of a gunner made them extremely vulnerable. Davies recommended that future bombers should be two-seaters with the ‘passenger’ (sic) having responsibility for both bomb-aiming and defence. It was recognised that there would have to be a trade-off in terms of the bomb load which could be carried but, it was argued, the reduced weight of bombs would be more than offset by the increased accuracy with which they could be delivered. Furthermore, the provision of a self-defence capability, the effectiveness of which would be multiplied by flying in formation, would avoid the very expensive alternative of having to provide escort fighters.
If this advice was going to be acted upon, it was clear that the RNAS would require many more back-seaters and, since they were to have a clearly identified and crucial function, that they would have to be taken far more seriously. It is not known to what extent Davies’ report served as a catalyst in provoking action along these lines, but what is certain is that a comprehensive career structure for naval observers was introduced shortly after it was written. At a single stroke, with effect from 2 April 1917, the Navy introduced: direct recruiting into the RNAS (in place of the previous use of RNVR officers); distinctive rank titles (up to Captain RN equivalent); continuous rates of pay; and a realistic prospect of advancement, since observer officers were to be ‘eligible for command of Air Stations in the same way as Flight Officers.’2 Having previously been even less enlightened than the Army in its attitude towards its back-seaters, the RN had suddenly raised the inter-Service stakes significantly, as the rank of RFC observers was still constrained to that of lieutenant and they continued to be ineligible for executive appointments.
In June the enhanced status of the naval observer was further endorsed by the introduction of a distinctive badge – a gilt winged ‘O’. The Navy’s badge was to have two wings, in contrast to the RFC’s idiosyncratically asymmetric design, and be worn in the same fashion as the RNAS eagle, the wearing of which was thenceforth confined to pilots.3 It is also significant that the RNAS continued to permit its badges to be worn by any officers who were routinely obliged to undergo the risks attendant upon flying, including those who were still under training. This was in marked contrast to the RFC where an observer might have to risk his neck for six months or more before being permitted to wear a flying ‘O’.
Introduced in June 1917, the RNAS observers badge was worn on both sleeves above the rank lace.
The introduction of observer ranks applied equally to new RNAS recruits and to those (mostly RNVR) officers already serving as observers under the original arrangements. It should be appreciated, however, that the application of an (O) annotation in the RNAS Disposition List had not previously been considered to imply a permanent commitment to being an aviator, whereas the adoption of RNAS rank would. In the event, the majority of pre-existing observers did elect to transfer to the RNAS but a significant number did not. In fact, although they may well still have been associated with aeroplanes, several erstwhile observers had already traded-in their (O)s for some other annotation, eg (E) for Engineers or (W/T) for wireless specialists.
Of the original naval observers of early 1915, for instance, Lt D’Albiac was attached to the Headquarters staff of No 8(N) Sqn, but he was now working in an administrative capacity and his (O) annotation had already been replaced by an (R) – for Records. Another veteran of 1915, Lt O G G Villiers was with the RNAS Headquarters at Dunkirk but his original Observer specialisation had been superseded by that of Intelligence. Then again, Lt L H Strain, who had been serving in and around Mesopotamia and the Eastern Mediterranean since late 1915, kept his (O) annotation but remained with the RNVR. Thus, although all three continued to work with the RNAS, none of these men adopted observer ranks. Needless to say, it took several months to resolve the individual circumstances of each of the old hands, but the first two men to be publicly associated with the new titles appear to have been ObsrSLt M O F England and PObsrOr M W Moffat, whose new ranks were announced by the Admiralty as early as 17 May.4
The first fourteen observer sub-lieutenants to graduate from training under the new system materialised in August. Most if not all of these men (and the output of the next few courses) had been internally remustered to observer duties, as opposed to having been directly recruited. By January 1918 the Navy List recorded 256 officers bearing observer ranks. The three most senior of these were squadron observers, but more than half of the remainder were very junior probationary observer officers still under training.5
1917-18. The RNAS refines its Observer training system.
It will be recalled that Capt Swann6 had first complained about the inadequacy, indeed the lack, of naval observers in 1915. Almost two years later, despite a gradual increase in output from Eastchurch, the numbers being trained had been largely offset by the growth of the Service. Furthermore, many of the additional observers who were becoming available were proving to be of indifferent quality. On balance, therefore, very little seemed to have changed. Swann was moved to write to London again in August 1917.7 His comments were directed primarily at the shortcomings of replacement pilots, but his letter made it quite clear that he was equally dissatisfied with the abilities of observers. Swann considered that all aircrew arriving fresh from training were far too inexperienced to be committed to operations without extensive additional instruction and practice. Specifically, new pilots and observers were reported to be unfamiliar with the airborne environment, insufficiently practised in navigation, the taking of bearings, the use of W/T and in handling the few other instruments and tools which were available; furthermore, none of them had any grasp of the implications of working as a crew or of the need for mutual co-operation.
In fact, the failings of the system were already well understood by this time and, in association with the enhanced status of the naval observer, a determined effort had been made to introduce a more structured approach to aircrew training. In particular, the establishment of the Observers School at Eastchurch at the beginning of 1917 had made it possible to dispense with the previous series of makeshift courses. The RN schools in Portsmouth ceased to be involved in observer training from January 1917 onwards and the last course to pass through Roehampton left there in February.
Even the RNAS Depot found itself excluded from the system. The last group of prospective RNVR observers at Crystal Palace was transferred to the Observers School on 14 February and all subsequent intakes reported directly to Eastchurch. For the next twelve months Eastchurch was to have sole responsibility for all aspects of naval observer training, from initial military indoctrination right through to final graduation as professional aviators.
A significant advantage gained from concentrating all training at one unit was a considerable saving in time. Compared to the seven or eight months (sometimes as long as a year) required by the original scheme, observers were now being trained in four to five months. Their course embraced seamanship, Fleet tactics and ship recognition, aircraft construction, electricity, signals, photography, bombing, the machine gun, intelligence, W/T, navigation and meteorology, and plenty of ‘naval discipline’.8 As Oliver Swann’s letter suggested, however, the effectiveness of the training being provided may have left much to be desired – but then it always had so, in this respect, the new, streamlined approach was no worse than the old one and, being much shorter, it was at least cheaper.
Apart from producing observers, and continuing to function as a basic flying training school, by mid-1917 Eastchurch had become the recognised instructional centre for naval aircrew of all other trades. Aerial gunlayers, mostly destined for DH 4s or Handley Pages, spent two months there being introduced to air armaments, the syllabus covering the use and maintenance of machine guns, both Lewis and Vickers, and bombs and bomb-aiming. Following their technical training at Cranwell, W/T operators spent three weeks at Eastchurch to be checked out on the Lewis gun. ‘E’ ratings, the qualified engine fitters who doubled as gunners in large flying boats, made do with a fortnight’s Lewis gun course. Practical armament training for those passing through Eastchurch took place at nearby Leysdown were there were facilities for ground training and a small aerodrome to support air-to-air and air-to-ground live firing and practice bombing.
Having adopted a particularly aggressive stance from the outset, the RN had become directly involved in land-based air operations on the Continent (and elsewhere), had pioneered strategic bombing and had led the way in the development of heavy bombers. By late 1917 the RNAS had a substantial force of bomber squadrons stationed in France and these had become the major employer of naval observers and gunners. Before joining their operational units, these men spent some time at Manston flying O/400s and/or DH 4s with the Handley Page Training Squadron.9 Most of the remainder found their way into the maritime world of antisubmarine patrols, using both landplanes and seaplanes operating from coastal bases, while a few will have flown in shipborne floatplanes involved in Fleet reconnaissance and gunnery support work.
The Navy preferred to use two pilots on its large flying boats, so the number of observers directly involved in maritime operations was relatively small. Perhaps for this very reason, the RNAS never made much effort to provide them with a worthwhile introduction to their very specialised operating environment. Until 1918, therefore, observers earmarked to fly in floatplanes carried aboard naval vessels tended to be far less well prepared for active service than their pilots. For instance, on the grounds that they would become an integral part of their ship’s company, as early as 1915 the Admiralty had directed that, whenever possible, shipborne pilots were to be given some time at sea before being assigned to their first vessel. It was equally important that observers should be given the same sort of preliminary experience, of course, but it would be 1917 before anyone saw fit to provide any back-seaters with preparatory sea time.10
Similarly, it was not uncommon for shore-based seaplane observers to report directly to their first operational units on graduation from Eastchurch without ever having flown off water. With the steady proliferation of such anti-submarine flights, however, it eventually became possible to send some newly qualified observer sub-lieutenants to operational units for a few weeks of preliminary experience before taking up their first appointments. This innovation began to be introduced on a limited scale in August-September 1917, the units involved being the seaplane pilot training schools at Calshot and Lee-on-Solent and the patrol station at Cattewater.
From December onwards the programme was expanded with Yarmouth, Felixstowe and Killingholme taking over the bulk of the task. By early 1918 this procedure had come to be regarded as an integral part of the basic curriculum, rather than a post-graduate phase, and most of those who participated did so in the rank of probationary observer officer. An examination of the later careers of these officers indicates, a little surprisingly, that being sent to a seaplane station for the final phase of his course did not necessarily mean that an individual was destined for maritime operations. Many were, but a significant proportion were subsequently diverted to fly DH 4s or Handley Pages with the bomber squadrons in France.
Meanwhile there had been a significant change in the training sequence followed by naval pilots. Until the summer of 1917 they had been inducted into the Service via the RNAS Depot at Crystal Palace where the so-called ‘Disciplinary Course’ prepared them for commissioned service. Apart from the inevitable drill and PT, this course dealt almost exclusively with ‘OQ’s’11 and was broadly comparable to that provided by the RFC’s Cadet Brigade. On passing-out the trainees proceeded directly to preliminary flying training which embraced all aviation-related topics, both academic and practical. In August 1917 responsibility for initial officer training was transferred to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich (the first draft arriving there on the 27th), leaving Crystal Palace to concentrate on ratings.12
In November the Greenwich curriculum was considerably expanded to include a substantial aviation content. In addition to generous helpings of drill, it now covered the theory of flight, W/T, aircraft construction, aero-engines, armament, meteorology and navigation.13 The induction course for naval pilots now bore a close resemblance to that provided by the RFC’s Officers Technical Training Corps (see Note 13 to Chapter 14) – Cadet Wing – SoMA sequence, although further academic training continued to be provided at the elementary flying schools run by the RNAS at Vendôme, Redcar, Eastbourne and Eastchurch.
Although the Navy had formally recognised its observers in May, for a time the bulk of its intake continued to consist of RNAS personnel who had been unsuccessful in pilot training and serving officers who were transferring from other branches of the Service. Since these men would have already completed their initial training, Eastchurch was still able to cope with the relatively small numbers of ab initio pupils involved. As a result, no observers were sent to Greenwich during 1917, despite the advantage which they might have gained from being exposed to the recently enhanced aviation content of its syllabus. By the end of the year, however, direct recruiting of observers into the RNAS had begun in earnest and these freshmen did need to pass through Greenwich, the first intake arriving there on 17 February 1918.14
1917-18. Persistent problems with both quality and quantity in the RNAS.
Despite a gradual increase in numbers, the RN was still very short of qualified observers throughout 1917 and, to make matters worse, the quality of the intake into training was considered to be generally unsatisfactory. By November the Commandant at Eastchurch, Capt J M Steel, had become so concerned about this situation that he wrote to the Director of Air Services to let him know of his misgivings.15 Despairing that ‘the number of Observers will ever meet the requirement,’ he pointed out that the practice of selecting all the most promising candidates for training as pilots meant that those who did become observers inevitably tended to be ‘second best’. That Steel had a very poor opinion of these leftovers is clear from his comment that ‘to be a passenger in the air requires a standard of courage which the majority do not possess’ (this observation invoking echoes of the Bailhache Committee’s comments on the stress of flying as a back-seater – see page 32). Furthermore, many of the trainee observers who were not unhappy about flying wanted to be pilots and the apparent ease with which they could remuster siphoned off the best of what was available. Steel advocated a more robust, RFC-style approach – once selected as an observer, to satisfy the needs of the Service rather than the aspirations of the individual, there should be no prospect of retraining as a pilot until a substantial period of active service had been completed.
To overcome the shortage of suitable officers Steel proposed that consideration should be given to substituting gunlayer and/or wireless ratings where possible and examining the feasibility of training ratings for employment as observers with warrant officer rank. The RFC had already taken similar steps, of course, but it was unlikely that such measures could solve the RNAS’s problem, because Eastchurch was experiencing considerable difficulty in obtaining suitable men to be trained as gunlayers. As Steel wrote of recent intakes, ‘a large number are perfectly useless and in many cases do not want to go in the air again after their first flight. The material for this important work is slowly getting worse and I have already pointed out that unless steps are taken to get young, healthy and active ratings from the Navy or some other source the situation will become very serious.’ So far as the allocation of manpower resources was concerned, however, national policy dictated that the majority of young men fit enough to serve in the trenches should be directed towards the Army, which, to some extent, enabled the RFC to take its pick. The RNAS was obliged to make do with what was left, but only after the RN had made its selection. So much for quality.
So far as quantity was concerned, some idea of the scale of the naval training programme can be gauged from the fact that there were 127 trainee observers at Eastchurch on 17 December 1917. Of these, three were observer lieutenants and five were observer sub-lieutenants, the remainder being probationary observer officers. These numbers represented some improvement on the situation of a year before, but they were still not nearly enough. The RNAS was hopeful that its shortage of competent observers would be overcome by the formation of the RAF, since this was expected to provide access to a much larger pool of manpower. This proved not to be the case, however, and the fact that the problem persisted provoked strong suspicions that the new Service regarded maritime affairs as a secondary consideration.
In 1918 the RAF formed a series of Special Duties Flights to carry out inshore anti-submarine patrols. These flights were later ganged together to form squadrons, all of which were equipped with DH 6s. This one, C7863 was with No 244 Sqn at Bangor. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
This impression arose in part from the RAF’s failing to satisfy a naval request of April 1918 for no fewer than 200 qualified observers to be made immediately available for hydrophone training at Portland. This initial batch was required to be supplemented at a rate of fifty per month thereafter. There were other problems (to do with the training and availability of maritime pilots and the provision of aeroplanes, particularly torpedo carriers) and in August the Admiralty lodged a formal complaint with the Air Ministry over the RAF’s apparent neglect of naval interests.16 In the meantime the RN had been reassessing its air needs and by July it had calculated that the RAF would need to earmark no fewer than 1,600 of its observers in order to meet its naval obligations.
It is not known precisely how the Admiralty arrived at this remarkable figure but it is known that by August it was disputing an RAF proposal to reduce the projected number of maritime squadrons to have been formed by September 1919 from 130 (already a reduction on the naval ideal) to only ninety-five. The dynamic here was the submarine threat, which was primarily an Admiralty concern. The Air Ministry was contending that the RAF would make a substantial contribution to the anti-submarine campaign by attacking German industry and to this end it was planned that the Independent Force should be built up to a strength of some sixty-eight squadrons by the autumn of 1919, to which could be added the French, Italian and American contributions to the proposed inter-allied bombing force. The Admiralty was unconvinced, however, and objected to the expansion of the Independent Force which was plainly going to be carried out at the expense of units which could confront the submarine menace more directly.17 All of this was a rehearsal for the very similar inter-Service disputes over the application of air power in the context of countering the submarine during WW II.
Although the arguments of 1918 were conducted in strategic terms, there is sufficient surviving evidence to provide some idea of their practical implications in terms of manpower. For instance, as early as January 1918 the RNAS had produced a forecast of its aircraft establishment for the year.18 Leaving aside trainers, this had indicated that there would be a global requirement for 1,359 operational naval aeroplanes of all kinds, of which at least 694 would have required a back-seater of some description. This was only a planner’s estimate, of course, but it does provide some indication of the scale on which the Admiralty was beginning to think.
To this early projection could be added the demands created by the formation of the numerous land-based ‘special duties’, ie anti-submarine patrol, flights which were set up by the RAF during 1918 to supplement the ex-RNAS seaplane units already engaged on similar tasks, this force also being substantially expanded. To begin with most of the shore-based units were equipped with redundant DH 6 trainers, but it was intended to replace these in the medium term with DH 9s, possibly supplemented by some DH 4s and FE2s.19 Long-term planning envisaged the eventual use of Kangaroos, DH 10s and Vimys. All of these aeroplanes were bigger, more powerful and more capable than the interim DH 6s and would eventually have required properly constituted and qualified two- or three-man crews.20
Left – Having demonstrated that launching aeroplanes from a flying-off platform that had been built on the forecastle of HMS Furious was a practical proposition, the next obvious stage was to provide a landing-on deck aft of the superstructure, as seen here during trials with the airship SSZ 59. Unfortunately, the aft deck proved to be impractical due to the turbulent airflow. Ten of the first thirteen landings resulted in damage to the aircraft and the experiment was abandoned pending the provision of a totally unrestricted ‘flat top’ deck. Right – Pending development of a practical aircraft carrier, aeroplanes were flown from battleships and cruisers that had been provided with a platform mounted on a gun turret. Among the, at least, twenty-six ships that were equipped in this fashion was HMS Malaya, seen here launching a Sopwith 1½ Strutter from its B Turret. There was no means of recovering the aircraft so, unless they could reach a shore station, the crew was obliged to ditch alongside. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
The second area of expansion was in seagoing air power. During 1918 most of the Grand Fleet’s capital ships were modified to permit them to launch aeroplanes from turret-mounted platforms. Most of the aircraft involved were fighters but some were two-seaters, initially 1½ Strutters, and these would all have required observers. Furthermore, it was anticipated that two-seaters would be operated from aircraft carriers. The Parnall Panther had been specifically ordered for this purpose but, had the war continued into 1919, it is reasonable to suppose that established types such as the Bristol Fighter and DH 9A would also have been adapted for use at sea.21 Some idea of the scale of this programme is provided by a paper raised in August 1918 which envisaged that by mid-1919 the Grand Fleet would have fifty-four observers afloat aboard carriers with another thirty-four assigned to capital ships. These men would probably have had to be backed up by similar numbers ashore.22
While some of the above is conjecture, it is clear that maritime aviation was becoming a growth industry in 1918 and that it would require substantial numbers of back-seaters. Regardless of how the Admiralty had actually done its sums, however, its projected requirement was for 1,600 observers and it looked to the Air Ministry to provide them – and promptly.
Since the Admiralty had spectacularly failed to produce adequate numbers of observers while it had had responsibility for the RNAS, this was all a bit rich. In April 1917 the RNAS had been able to deposit only 181 qualified observers in the RAF’s newly opened joint manpower account, a mere 10% of the total. All of them were already committed, of course, and therefore non-negotiable. For the Admiralty to expect to be able to make an immediate withdrawal of an additional 200 men was stretching its credit to the utmost. Furthermore, since they clearly expected instant satisfaction, the admirals’ demands revealed how little they understood of the complexity of aircrew training or of how long it took.
The Air Ministry’s response to the Admiralty’s complaint acknowledged that there had been unavoidable delays, but it reassured the Navy that its requirements had all been receiving appropriate attention.23 In the specific case of the 200 observers required for hydrophone training, for instance, although the Admiralty had lodged its initial request in April, as claimed, it transpired that it had not actually provided specific details until as late as the middle of June. Not surprisingly, the RAF simply did not have 200 spare trained observers immediately to hand. Nevertheless, it had taken immediate steps to increase the numbers being sent to Eastchurch (by now an RAF station but still specialising in the training of maritime observers) and had established a dedicated hydrophone training facility by opening a new air school for this purpose at Aldeburgh. Twenty-two observers were actually made available for maritime duties during August; a further seventy-two were expected to graduate in September and thereafter it was anticipated that the requirement for fifty per month would be met. (Some notes on the development of hydrophones are at Annex E.)
The answer to practical sea-going air power was the ‘flat top’ aircraft carrier. This is the first such, HMS Argus, which joined the fleet in late 1918, just too late to see action.
Had the war gone on into 1919 it is probable that types like the Bristol Fighter and DH 9A would have operated from carriers. This ‘Ninak’ was engaged in carrier landing trials aboard HMS Eagle in June 1920. (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)
Despite further increases in recruiting, however, the RAF was already overstretched, since it was now obliged to fill the cockpits of all of the multi-seat naval aeroplanes which it had inherited. This problem was exacerbated by the imposition of an RFC-style manning policy in place of that of the RNAS. As previously noted, for instance, it had been a widespread naval practice to use two pilots, rather than a pilot and observer, in heavy aircraft like Handley Pages. The RAF generally preferred to use only one pilot per aeroplane which inevitably created an increased demand for observers.
It was also necessary to readjust the significant imbalance between observers and gunners on ex-RNAS two-seat bomber squadrons to conform to RAF establishments. While rationalising the manning of the naval two-seater squadrons based in France was a relatively straightforward exercise, it turned out to be a fairly protracted business among the ex-RNAS formations based in southern Italy (No 6 Wg) and around the Aegean (No 2 Wg).24
All of this aside, the RAF was still well short of providing the manpower required for the 200 squadrons which had been authorised (for the RFC) a year before, so the Admiralty’s demand for 1,600 fully-trained maritime observers was obviously going to take a long time to satisfy (but see pages 122-123).
________________________
1 AIR1/113/15/39/35. Paper entitled ‘Remarks on Experience Gained in Air Raids and on Probable Requirements as to Types of Machines in the Future’ by Wg Cdr R B Davies, dated 4 January 1917.
2 Admiralty Monthly Order 1648, which published the details of the observers rank and career structure, was not actually promulgated until 5 May 1917 so its effective date of 2 April was retrospective. It was superseded on 6 December by Monthly Order 4359 which provided further amplification of the arrangements.
The accompanying table lists RNAS observer ranks and shows how these equated to those of the RN and their approximate relationships with those of the Army. Note that military and naval ranks did not always relate directly. For instance, differences of opinion as to whether an Observer (or Flight) Lieutenant in the RNAS corresponded to a Captain or a Lieutenant in the RFC were to cause complications when the air services were merged (see page 103). Another example is provided by a naval aviator under training in early 1918 who, although on the very bottom rung of the ladder, appeared in the Navy List. As a mere Flight Cadet, his opposite number in the RFC did not yet figure in the Army List (see Chapter 7, Note 21).
RNAS Observer |
RN |
Army |
Observer Captain also holding Captain RN rank |
Captain |
Colonel |
Observer Captain not ranked as a Captain RN |
Commander |
Lt-Colonel |
Wing Observer |
||
Squadron Observer (of eight year’s total seniority or when in command) |
Lt Commander |
Major |
Squadron Observer (of less than eight year’s seniority) |
Lieutenant of four year’s seniority (but senior to all Flight Observers) |
Captain |
Flight Observer |
Lieutenant of four year’s seniority |
|
Observer Lieutenant |
Lieutenant |
|
Observer Sub-Lieutenant |
Sub-Lieutenant |
Lieutenant and/or 2nd Lieutenant |
Probationary Observer Officer |
Midshipman |
2nd Lieutenant; later Flight Cadet |
All observer officers (including those under training) wore the winged ‘O’ once these had been introduced (see Note 3). but the complex pattern of rank equivalence necessitated modifications to the badge to permit the status of certain RNAS officers to be distinguished so that their precedence compared to other naval officers would be apparent. Thus, for instance, an observer captain who was not ranked as a captain RN, and who therefore wore commander’s rank lace, had a single gold star above his flying badge to differentiate him from a wing observer, who wore the same rank lace but who did not sport a gold star. The comparative status of the three RNAS ranks equating to lieutenants RN was indicated by the addition of two gold stars for a junior squadron observer and one for a flight observer while an observer lieutenant simply wore an unadorned badge. Similar refinements were applicable to the eagles worn by naval pilots of equivalent seniority and rank.
3 The wearing of the RNAS observers badge was authorised with effect from 1 July 1917 by Admiralty Monthly Order 2322 which was promulgated on 22 June. The regulations specifically included the wearing of the badge by probationary observer officers, ie it could be worn by any observer, trained or otherwise. Instead of being confined to the left sleeve and shoulder, as in the past, however, the new badge was to be worn on both sleeves, above the rank lace, and, when appropriate, on both epaulettes. This ‘doubling up’ reflected a recent change to the regulations governing the wearing of the RNAS eagle which had been announced by Weekly Order 2106 of 8 June. Although this Order had made no provision for flying badges to be worn on the left breast by naval officers, as observed at Chapter 4, Note 8, it is known that this is how they were generally worn on khaki uniforms. Since this practice does not appear to have been sanctified by formal legislation, however, it seems that officialdom must simply have regarded it with a Nelsonian eye.
4 Previously a probationary flight officer and a petty officer, respectively, England and Moffat had both recently been recategorised as observers after having been suspended from pilot training at Vendôme. In the former case this was actually a reversion to a previous grade. England had been a member of one of the earliest cohorts of RNAS observers to pass through the original school at the Clement Talbot Works in 1915. He had subsequently seen active service at Dunkirk before embarking on his unsuccessful attempt to become a pilot, hence his rank of observer sub-lieutenant, which indicated that he was already qualified.
5 Prior to the introduction of the rank of probationary flight officer (by Admiralty Weekly Order 2027 of 25 August 1916) directly recruited RNAS aircrew, ie pilots, had been commissioned on entry as flight sub-lieutenants. Thereafter, however, although they were specifically authorised to wear the RNAS eagle on their sleeves, they had the effective status of midshipmen while under training, confirmation of their commissions in the rank of flight sub-lieutenant being conditional upon their successful graduation from Cranwell. Up to three month’s antedated seniority could be granted on commissioning, depending upon the standards achieved while under instruction.
Until May 1917 naval observers had also been commissioned before commencing their professional training, in their case as RNVR sublieutenants, but the introduction of a career structure for them as full members of the RNAS brought with it the rank of probationary observer officer. From then on, all directly recruited naval aircrew, pilots and observers, were trained as quasi-midshipman.
6 Oliver Schwann anglicised his name in April 1917.
7 AIR1/663. Letter 7/B, dated 9 August 1917, from Captain Swann to the Director of Air Services.
8 Details of the training syllabus to be completed by a W/T observer were published in Admiralty Weekly Order 2416 of 29 June 1917. The ‘W/T’ annotation was regarded as being particularly significant (not least because it attracted an additional allowance of three shillings per day) and arrangements were made to ensure that all pre-existing observers were adequately qualified.
9 With the transfer of the Handley Page Training Squadron to Stonehenge on 19 January 1918, an independent DH 4 School, commanded by Sqn Cdr E T Newton-Clare, was set up at Manston on 11 February.
10 The first observers to be given some preliminary sea time appear to have been Sub-Lts G H Elliott, A A N Haywood and R StH Clarke who were attached to the battleship HMS Orion on 3 March 1917. The next was Sub-Lt F L Morrison who joined HMS Renown in June. Such instances continued to be rare, however, and most observers reported to Manxman, Vindex, Riviera, Pegasus, Ark Royal and the other seaplane carriers without the benefit of having had any previous time afloat.
11 OQs – Officer Qualities, a catch-all title, covering responsibilities towards subordinates, leadership, discipline, protocol, naval law (and lore), general deportment and social conduct, and so on.
12 RNAS ratings had originally been inducted into the Service via the Sheerness Training Establishment, which is believed to have been set up for this purpose in the autumn of 1914. Established to provide similar facilities for prospective officers, the RNAS Depot opened for business at Crystal Palace on 1 May 1916. Shortly afterwards the training of non-commissioned personnel was transferred to the Depot, the only RNAS unit at Sheerness by the end of the year being a kite balloon facility. Although officer training subsequently moved to Greenwich, Crystal Palace continued to function as the ‘boot camp’ for non-commissioned RNAS recruits until the system began to change following the creation of the RAF. Apart from disciplinary training, the RNAS Depot may also have provided mechanic ratings with some technical instruction on airframes and aeroengines.
To conform with naval book-keeping procedures, incidentally, personnel assigned to Greenwich and Crystal Palace were carried on the notional strength of HMS President II. This was standard practice for most naval personnel serving ashore in the Greater London area, including those who had previously passed through the original observer and W/T operator schools at the Clement Talbot Works.
13 RNAS aviators had always been required to know rather more about navigation and the weather than their RFC counterparts. From September 1916 (as laid down in Admiralty Weekly Order No 2337), and probably even earlier, navigational topics specifically addressed during basic training included: great and small circles, the rhumb line and the Mercators chart, the triangle of velocities, radius of action, interception of a moving target, eg a ship, the uses of the compass, its errors and the means of correcting them, variation and deviation, and so on. The RNAS meteorology syllabus considered: the composition of the atmosphere; radiation, conduction and convection; the vertical temperature gradient; the circulation of the atmosphere and the effect of the Earth’s rotation on the wind; the variation of wind with height; the measurement of barometric pressure and its implications in weather forecasting; precipitation – dew, fog and clouds; the synoptic chart and its interpretation; etc. Although the RFC paid some attention to these matters they were not really studied in much depth by army flyers until late 1917 when, during the run-up to the creation of the RAF, naval practice began to have a significant influence on military thinking.
14 Following the formation of the RAF, the indoctrination of prospective naval aviators became the responsibility of the Cadet Brigade at Hastings. Greenwich received its last RNAS intake in March 1918 and by August the aviation training facility had closed down.
15 AIR1/663/17/122/692. Unreferenced latter from Commandant, East-church to the Director of Air Services, Cdre G M Paine, dated 30 November 1917.
16 AIR1/643/17/122/257. Admiralty letter M.022313 dated 8 August 1918.
17 AIR1/17/15/1/85. Paper GT5569 dated 31 August 1918 which was considered by the War Cabinet’s Air Policy Committee at its 5 September meeting.
18 AIR1/2131/207/115/3. Unreferenced paper dated 31 January 1918 giving projected Naval Flying Establishments for that year.
19 When these nominally operational units were first being established, apart from being equipped with obsolete training aircraft, some of the pilots assigned to fly them were only part-qualified. This is borne out by AMWO 585 of 3 July 1918, which required COs of Special Duties Flights to recommend, three weeks after the arrival of each new pilot, whether he should be authorised to wear his ‘wings’. This provision was subsequently endorsed by AMWO 794 of 8 August which effectively made provision for any pilot flying on active service to wear a flying badge and draw full flying pay, AMWO 795 making broadly similar arrangements for observers at the same time (see Chapter 13, Note 15).
On gaining his CO’s approval, a pilot who had graduated ‘B’ (see page 48 for an explanation of the graduation categories), and was thus already a 2nd lieutenant, was to be authorised to draw full flying pay. What was surprising, however, is that pilots who had graduated only ‘A’, and who were thus still mere flight cadets with about 25 hours flying under their belts, were also addressed by the regulations. If sanctioned by their CO, they too were to be promptly gazetted as 2nd lieutenants and authorised to draw full flying pay.
20 Establishments AF/H/76, for a six-aircraft flight of float seaplanes, and AF/H/123, for a six-aircraft flight of anti-submarine light bombers, provided for six observer officers in each case. On the other hand, presumably to accommodate the previous habits of ex-RNAS folk, AF/H/77, for a three-aircraft flying boat flight, made no provision for commissioned observers but did allow for three wireless and three engineering tradesmen to be mustered as NCO observers in the rank of corporal, which was somewhat confusing, as an NCO observer was, by definition, supposed to be a sergeant. This appears to have been of little consequence, however, as a moratorium was placed on such promotions on 16 April 1918 and flying boats continued to be crewed by two pilots and such gunner/mechanics and/or W/T operators as were considered necessary.
Excluding flying boat units, by November 1918 about one hundred semi-autonomous flights had been formed for maritime duties, some of them overseas and most of them by that time grouped into squadrons. At six per flight, this force alone could account for some 600 of the Admiralty’s total demand for 1,600 observers.
21 At the time of the Armistice, No 133 Sqn was expected to join the Grand Fleet in about February 1919; it was to have been equipped with DH 9As.
22 AIR1/17/15/1/85. Paper FA 30/15, dated 16 August 1918, dealing with air policy for the Grand Fleet in 1919 raised by the Admiral Commanding Aircraft Rear-Admiral E F Phillimore.
23 AIR1/643/17/122/258. Air Ministry letter B3158/D/CAS dated 16 September 1918.
24 It is not known why it took so long to bring these comparatively isolated and rather loosely structured units into line. It may have been a direct result of their remoteness, or of the instability arising from their sometimes frequent changes of base and/or of their being afforded a low priority. Furthermore, unlike the RNAS units in France, all of which had worked alongside (many of them under the direct control of) RFC formations, those operating in the ‘side-show’ theatres had had little experience of army-style organisation. This unfamiliarity may well have caused some of the more insular naval personnel involved to be less than enthusiastic about toeing the RAF line and, if so, this could also have contributed to the delay. All of this is conjectural but, whatever the reason, it is known that, despite their having been assigned RAF squadron numbers within the 200-series reserved for ex-RNAS units as early as 9 March 1918 (by AO 800 – AIR1/913/204/5/856), it was as late as September before these identities gained much currency around the Mediterranean, especially among the Aegean-based units.