Air Gunner training.
The training of air gunners in 1939-40 was complicated by two factors – the wide range of turrets that were in, or were about to enter, service (see Figure 431) and the inadequacy of the facilities. As previously noted, during the last weeks of 1939 seven of the existing AOSs were redesignated as B&GSs. No longer involved in navigation training, the B&GSs provided instruction in armament for both gunners and observers. The majority of the available aeroplanes were Battles, armed with a hand-held Vickers Gas Operated (VGO) machine gun, and Blenheim Is with a VGO in an early Bristol turret, supplemented by a few Whitley Is and Harrows.
In December 1939 an attempt was made to impose some sort of pattern on these arrangements by concentrating types of training aeroplanes in particular schools and then specifying where the output from those schools ought to be sent. For instance, No 9 B&GS at Penrhos, which still had some Demons on charge, was nominated as the primary source for Defiant gunners, while the majority of gunners destined for Whitleys were supposed to be provided by No 7 B&GS at Porthcawl because it was to have all of the available Whitley Is – but this was not an exclusive arrangement as Whitley men were also to be trained at Nos 8, 9 and 10 B&GS, none of which had any Whitleys at the time.2
Fig 43. The turrets that were in, or were expected shortly to enter, service as at December 1939; all guns were -303” calibre. (AW = Armstrong Whitworth; BP = Boulton Paul; FN = Frazer-Nash, ie Nash and Thompson by Parnall.)
As with observers and navigators, the Anson became the standard trainer for air gunners for much of 1942-44. This one, MG182, belonged to No 1 AGS at Pembrey and was armed with a Blenheim-style Bristol B1 turret. (MAP)
The Miles Martinet was the standard target-tug from 1942 until the end of the war. This one was on the strength of No 7 AGS at Stormy Down in 1943. (MAP)
Thereafter, the wartime gunner training system evolved through several stages, beginning in mid-1941 when, in the wake of the Millom experiment (see page 235), some B&GSs began to be converted into a second generation of, observer-only, AOSs while others became gunner-dedicated Air Gunners Schools (AGS) to which others were added to make an eventual total of ten. By this time, a substantial degree of order had been imposed on the available equipment and each school tended to operate one primary aircraft type supported by a fleet of target tugs, as in Defiants plus Lysanders, Blenheims plus Lysanders, or Bothas plus Battles. By 1943, most of the second-hand operational types had been replaced by the ubiquitous Anson with drogues being towed by the purpose-built Martinet. During 1944 the system began to contract with several of the AGSs disbanding while those that remained exchanged their Ansons for Wellingtons.
Turret training stands, a Bristol B1 at either end, but mostly Boulton Paul Type As plus at least one Type C (and, possibly, a Nash and Thompson FN64?) at the Central Gunnery School at Catfoss in 1943. (Aeroplane Monthly)
While the gradual provision of more appropriate aeroplanes had improved the quality of training, there had also been a 50% increase in quantity. In 1940 the ACRC/ITW sequence for a gunner had occupied some six weeks and he qualified for his badge after another six weeks at a B&GS. By mid- 1941 the B&GSs had been superseded by AGSs which were offering a variety of course, as summarised at Figure 44. This provided a good deal of flexibility, permitting gunnery training to be tailored to the requirements of differing categories of air crew; all straight air gunners did the full six weeks, WOp/AGs would do four or five while flight engineers, flight mechanics and WOM/AGs made do with three.3 The duration of training for a straight air gunner in 1943 typically involved two weeks at an ACRC and six weeks with Nos 14 or 15 ITWs at Bridlington followed by six weeks of preliminary ground instruction at No 1 Elementary Air Gunners School4 at Bridgnorth and another six weeks of practical work at an Air Gunners School. Following the closure of the elementary school in 1944, the length of the AGS course was doubled to twelve weeks.
Skeet shooting with a 12-bore shotgun mounted in a Nash and Thompson FN5 turret. (Aeroplane Monthly)
A trainee air gunner in a Boulton Paul Type C (Halifax Mks I & II nose and Hudson and Halifax Mks II & V midupper) turret mounted on a ground training stand. (Aeroplane Monthly)
In view of its brevity, the RAF never made any serious attempt to transfer gunnery training overseas and the bulk of its wartime requirement was satisfied by the home-based system which produced a total of 28,243 straight air gunners. Canada, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia also trained British air gunners, but on a relatively small scale, the Canadians contributing 1,392, South Africa 445 and Southern Rhodesia 1,591. These figures represented only a tiny proportion of the overall EATS output, of course; for instance, while the Canadian schools trained relatively few RAF gunners, they turned out another 12,917 for the RCAF, 244 for the RAAF, 443 for the RNZAF and 704 for the FAA. Furthermore, many of the air gunners who were enlisted in the air forces of the various Dominions actually flew with the RAF. For example, while the home-based Australian training system produced 991 air gunners to satisfy its own demands, it trained a further 2,295 RAAF air gunners specifically for service with the RAF.
Wireless Operator training.
The basis of pre-war wireless operator (air crew) training was a six-month course at No 1 (originally the) Electrical and Wireless School (E&WS) at Cranwell followed by a month’s gunnery at an Air Observers School. Although a second wireless school had opened at Yatesbury in 1938, capacity was still insufficient to cope with wartime demand and by November 1939 Air Service Training and Scottish Aviation had been commissioned to run Nos 1 and 2 Supplementary Schools of Wireless Telegraphy at Hamble and Prestwick respectively. The bulk of the instructional staff at these civilian-run schools consisted of hastily recruited ex-GPO telephone engineers and telegraphists.5
By mid-1940 the training sequence for, what were now, WOp/AGs generally involved four weeks of ‘square bashing’ at a Recruit Centre, followed by sixteen weeks of ground instruction at Hamble or Prestwick (following the demise of the two supplementary schools in 1940, the first stage was provided by No 10 (Signals) Recruit Centre at Blackpool), another eight weeks, including a brief introduction to airborne work,6 at Cranwell or Yatesbury and six weeks (18 flying hours) at a B&GS. Once qualified as a wireless operator, incidentally, before embarking on the specifically ‘aircrew’ phase of his training, it was not unusual for a prospective WOp/AG to be posted to a station to gain practical experience working in its Signals Section.
In August 1940 the training units at Cranwell and Yatesbury became Nos 1 and 2 Signals Schools, a third (No 4) being opened at Madley in August 1941.7 At much the same time, and as previously noted, the first of (eventually) ten dedicated Air Gunners Schools began to be formed in succession to the Bombing and Gunnery Schools, the first of them appearing in June 1941. In the meantime, Coastal Command’s gradual acquisition of ASV radar from 1940 onwards had introduced a requirement for specialist courses which were provided by No 3 Radio School at Prestwick. In the summer of 1942 this unit was redesignated as No 3 Radio Direction Finding School and joined in the autumn by No 4 at Carew Cheriton.
The last major change in the organisation of signals training occurred in 1943 when the Signals Schools and the Radio Direction Finding Schools were all retitled to become Radio Schools. There would eventually be fifteen such units in the UK, all of which were involved in one or more aspects of the training of radio and/or radar mechanics and/or operators for ground as well as air duties. Each unit tended to deal with a particular aspect of signals work, only Nos 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 12 and 14 Radio Schools being established as flying units. Of these, Nos 2 and 4, at Yatesbury and Madley respectively, handled the bulk of the basic wartime air crew training commitment. Nos 10, 11, 12 and 14 were also involved to the extent that they provided, largely postgraduate, courses tailored to the peculiar requirements of Coastal Command, notably the operation of ASV.
Meanwhile, when ITWs had first been established no provision had been made for them to cater for WOps. As a result, compared to other air crew categories, newly trained WOps had tended to be somewhat lacking in their awareness of general airmanship. Steps were eventually taken to redress this situation in November 1941 when Air Crew Wings were established at both Yatesbury and Madley. These provided ground personnel, already qualified as telegraphists, with what amounted to a quasi-ITW course. The syllabus included an academic content resembling that taught at a ‘proper’ ITW with the added bonus of a notional ten hours of airborne time (the legacy of the flying content of the original E&WS course – see Note 6).
Most wireless operators acquired their initial air experience on a Dominie (above – this one, X7398, belonged to No 2 RS at Yatesbury), fitted with a T/R 1154/1155 radio (below). Note the white peak to the trainee’s field service cap, denoting his cadet status. (Yatesbury Association)
This innovation was symptomatic of an overall improvement in the manning situation which permitted more time to be devoted to preparing WOps for service as air crew. The training philosophy that was introduced towards the end of 1941 involved a prospective WOp/AG’s being a fully qualified and experienced ground telegraphist before becoming air crew.8 This required a four-phase sequence which began with ten (later fifteen) weeks of initial training at No 10 (Signals) Recruit Centre9 at Blackpool during which, in addition to enduring the usual ‘boot camp’ regime, the ability to cope with Morse at ten (later eighteen) words per minute had to be demonstrated.10 The second phase comprised twelve (later fourteen) weeks of technical training at a Signals School followed by at least three (but sometimes as long as nine) months of active service as a ground operator at a station. The third phase involved eight weeks at an Air Crew Wing, the stamp of approval finally being applied on completion of up to eight weeks (but possibly as few as three) at an Air Gunners School.
Although this approach had the advantage of ensuring that the Service was well provided with ground operators, it was a very long-winded way to go about the provision of air crew and the sequence was revised during 1943. At much the same time, dedicated ITWs were established to provide initial training facilities for air signals personnel, Nos 18 and 19 at Bridgnorth and No 20 at Bridlington.11 By early 1944 the standard training sequence involved: three weeks at an ACRC, eight weeks at an ITW,12 five or six months (depending upon previous qualifications) at a Radio School (either Yatesbury or Madley) and as long as eight, or even twelve, weeks at an Air Gunners School.
It should be stressed that, while there was always a planned sequence of wartime courses, as indicated above, the plan changed several times. Furthermore, the ‘exigencies of the Service’ often had an impact on an individual’s progress through the system and deviations from the norm, including unscheduled periods ‘on hold’, were not unknown.
The other wireless trainer used in large numbers – No 2 Signals School alone had more than 100 on charge at the end of the war – was the Proctor. This one is Yatesbury’s NP184 (J D Oughton) with, below, the TR 1154/1155 installation for the trainee WOp in the right hand seat. (Yatesbury Association) As with other air crew categories, pilots with their Link Trainers and navigators with their DR Instructors (see page 237), WOps had a synthetic training device – the Harwell Box (right) which could be fitted with a variety of radios (T1083/R1082 in this case) to provide hands-on practice, including fault-finding and taking bearings with the manually adjusted loop aerial, in a simulated environment. (IWM CH1275).
While the training organisation had been evolving, as described elsewhere, there had been a number of changes in the nature of air crew specifically employed in the fields of communications. By late 1944 the functions of the wireless operator (air crew) of 1939, the WOp/AG of 1940 and the WOM/AG of 1942 were being discharged by the WOM(air) and the WOp(air). The introduction of the last two of these categories is discussed in Chapter 26, but it is convenient to note here the training sequences that they followed:
a. WOMs(air). Like WOM/AGs, WOMs(air) were internally recruited from a variety of qualified signals tradesmen. The general pattern of training began with preliminary processing at an ACRC followed by an ITW course. Appropriate instruction was provided at a Radio School to ensure that all of these personnel were technically skilled to a common Trade Group I standard. This phase was followed by airborne training and experience with the Air Crew Wing of the same, or possibly another, Radio School. In all, this process took between six and nine months, depending upon the candidate’s previous qualifications. On graduation from Radio School they became ‘S’-badged (see page 260) sergeants following which, since most WOMs(air) were destined for Coastal Command, many spent between six and twelve weeks at an Air Gunners School.
b. WOps(air). The training of WOps(air) was broadly similar to that of WOMs(air), but, since many of these men were directly recruited as civilians, there was less variation between individuals. Following induction via an ACRC and eight-weeks with No 70 ITW at Bridgnorth, a typical WOp(air) received his professional training at Yatesbury and/or Madley where he attended a twelve-week Technical Signals (Ground) course followed by a twelve-week Technical Signals (Air) course, the latter including at least 20, and possibly as many as 60, hours of airborne time in Proctors and Dominies. Having gained his ‘S’ badge, a WOp(air) could then expect to spend a month or so at an O(AFU) consolidating his skills alongside navigators and air bombers who had been trained abroad.
Despite some effort being made to provide flight engineers with a little air experience, most completed their training without ever becoming airborne. Nevertheless, from 1943 onwards, they were able to accustom themselves to the layout of the type for which they had been earmarked via realistic synthetic training rigs created from redundant airframes. This picture shows the business ends offour Lancasters, a Catalina, a Liberator, a Sunderland and a brace of Stirlings at St Athan.
As with air gunners, the RAF never made any serious attempt to relocate air signals training abroad and the wartime UK-based system turned out 27,190 air crew wireless operators of all kinds. Nevertheless, both Canada and the USA (under the Towers Scheme) offered additional training facilities for RAF WOp/AGs, the Canadians contributing 755 and the Americans another 662 (the last USN-trained WOp/AGs graduating in September 1942). Again, as with air gunners, these overseas figures represented only a fraction of the overall output. For instance, while the Canadian schools may have trained relatively few wireless operators specifically for the RAF, their total output included 2,122 for the RNZAF, 2,875 for the RAAF and no fewer than 12,744 for the RCAF. As with all other air crew categories trained under the EATS, of course, many of the men wearing the uniforms of Dominion air forces actually flew operationally with the RAF. For example, aside from the RAAF men trained in Canada, the home-based Australian training system produced 2,984 RAAF WOp/AGs for its own use and another 4,174 specifically for service with the RAF.
Flight Engineer training.
Despite the need for them having been identified well in advance, the RAF did very little to provide itself with flight engineers before the winter of 1940-41 when the requirement suddenly became urgent. As a result, the first few were obtained on a somewhat ad hoc basis, in effect, by misemploying qualified engine fitters (see pages 194-197). The flight engineer’s function soon gained a degree of official recognition, however, and they began to be acknowledged as quasi-air crew on completion of a three-week stint at a B&GS and a short manufacturer’s course.
Fig 45. The duration of preliminary training offlight engineers at St Athan was tailored to match their level of technical expertise on entry. This table summarises the various courses as initially agreed in February 1943. Fitter II(E)s, the most highly qualified candidates, by-passed this phase altogether.
Fig 46. The content (as at February 1943) of the seven-week applied course at No 4 SofTT which served to convert a fitter II(E) into a flight engineer and which was attended by all other prospective flight engineers on completion of appropriate preliminary training.
A year later the training sequence had been more formally defined, a qualified fitter selected for flying duties spending five weeks at an ITW before embarking on similar manufacturer’s and gunnery courses to those attended by his predecessors. The gunnery phase had evolved into a two-week course at Stormy Down’s No 7 AGS for Bomber Command’s flight engineers or a four-week course at No 10 AGS at Castle Kennedy for those destined for Coastal Command; by mid-1942 this had been standardised as two weeks at No 7 AGS for everyone.
This sequence was more protracted for a flight mechanic (engine) who had volunteered to fly, since, in order to permit him to be remustered as a fitter II(E) – the entry-level skill requirement at the time – he had first to be given the necessary additional technical training, and he also needed to pass the Junior NCO Course. By the late summer the technical training phase for a fitter II(E) candidate lasted six weeks, including a week’s attachment to industry, and the courses had been individually tailored to reflect the peculiarities of the Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster, Sunderland, Liberator and Catalina.13
At much the same time, the flight engineer had finally been recognised as being a fully-fledged air crew category and, in an attempt to obtain the numbers required, it was decided to broaden the intake to include airframe tradesmen. This involved their having to be given appropriate instruction on aero-engines at No 4 School of Technical Training (SofTT) at St Athan. This unit gradually began to assume responsibility for special-to-type instruction as well and attachments to industry eventually ceased during 1943.
Since the numbers required were still not forthcoming, direct recruiting was introduced in June 1943 and from that summer onwards the bulk of flight engineers were civilian entrants. Until then, those internal recruits who had attended an ITW had been sent to one of the units intended for prospective air gunners but, for the benefit of the new direct entrants, a six-week ITW syllabus, tailored to meet the specific requirements of flight engineers was published in September 1943.14 It was initially envisaged that flight engineers would be trained alongside gunners at No 16 ITW (Whitley Bay) and some of the early intakes may have been, but this approach was soon abandoned in favour of a dedicated unit. No 21 ITW was reassigned to flight engineers in September 1943, moving almost immediately from Torquay to Usworth where it stayed only briefly before taking up residence at Bridlington (from May 1944 this task was reallocated to No 90 ITW at Cranage).
On passing the six-week ITW course, prospective direct entrant flight engineers went to St Athan where they were given seventeen weeks of primary and seven weeks of applied technical training. Direct recruiting did not preclude serving airmen from continuing to volunteer for flying duties, of course, and those who did followed much the same sequence as civilian intakes, except that the length of their primary technical course was adjusted to reflect their level of expertise on entry.
The content of the various primary courses on offer in early 1943 is summarised at Figure 45 and of the common applied phase at Figure 46, the latter reflecting the course previously (and still) attended by a fully qualified fitter II(E) in order to convert him into a flight engineer.15 The sequence was rounded off by a two-week gunnery course at No 7 AGS, although to cope with the numbers some use was also made of No 1 AGS at Pembrey. On completion of this course an airman was awarded his ‘E’ badge and promoted to temporary sergeant.
In May 1943 problems at Nos 1 and 7 AGSs made it impossible to provide all flight engineers with air gunnery training so badges and sergeants tapes began to be issued at St Athan on what was initially intended to be a temporary basis, but this arrangement soon became permanent, subsequent gunnery training being provided post-graduation and confined to those who actually needed it, essentially flight engineers destined for Coastal Command.
It is worth pointing out, however, that flight engineer training was largely synthetic, involving rigs (some of which utilised redundant or salvaged airframes) and, until it was dropped altogether, much of their gunnery training had been conducted on ground-based facilities. As a result, flight engineers were unique among wartime air crew categories in that, certainly from May 1943 onwards, it was quite normal for them to qualify for their badges without their ever having flown in an aeroplane.
To satisfy the requirements of their own air forces, some flight engineers were trained in Canada, Australia and South Africa but not until 1944 and on a relatively small scale even then, the combined total amounting to just over 2,000 men.16 By contrast all 17,885 RAF flight engineers had been home grown at No 4 SofTT.17 At its peak St Athan’s population had exceeded 5,000 men, output sometimes running as high as 500 per week.
Operational and conversion training.
The underlying aim of the pilot training scheme that had been introduced in 1935 had been to deliver newly qualified pilots to their first squadrons in a fit state for their Flight Commanders to begin training them in operational procedures. Unfortunately, the necessary level of initial competence had never been achieved because the scale of the RAF’s expansion and the urgency with which it had been carried out had conspired to prevent the intended nine-month course from ever being introduced. The Service was well aware that it was failing to achieve its aim and as early as 1938 AOCinC Bomber Command had suggested the creation of an interim, post-FTS, stage during which pilots (and, presumably other air crew, although at this stage these still tended to attract little attention) could consolidate their newly acquired skills before proceeding to their squadrons.
This proposal had been accepted and it was planned to establish a ‘Pool’ within each group of both Bomber and Fighter Commands. Unfortunately, this plan was to be frustrated by a lack of resources, although some bomber squadrons were issued with a few Ansons to provide some additional training facilities. In the event, only No 11 Group’s Pool had opened before war was declared, presumably because the training requirements of pilots destined to fly short-range, single-seat day fighters were relatively modest compared to those of the crews of long-range, multi-seat, multi-engined night bombers.
If it had proved impossible to realise the ideal of a thirty-nine week intermediate/advanced pilot training sequence in peacetime, it certainly could not be done once war had broken out and the pre-war twenty-six week curriculum soon had to be reduced to just sixteen. It was still supposed to yield the same amount of flying time, however, so that even less time could be devoted to allied subjects. This made it even more important that a post-graduate phase be provided.
This was achieved in September 1939 when No 6 Gp was made responsible for the co-ordination of pre-squadron training, the necessary resources being found by transferring to its control a number of non-mobilisable bomber squadrons (see Chapter 18, Note 22). These were stationed in Battle-, Blenheim-, Wellington-, Whitley- and Hampden-equipped pairs to create units (which were being referred to as Group Pools by November) at which individuals could be formed into crews and given a few flying hours before moving on to join the squadrons of Nos 1-5 Gps respectively where they would complete their work-up.
Over the next few months it became clear that the original 1935 concept had never really been a satisfactory one, since it was totally inappropriate to expect an operational unit to carry out any significant training tasks during wartime – yet another lesson of 1914-18 which had been forgotten. What was really required was for all crews to be fully competent on reporting to their squadrons so that they could take their place in the front line more or less as soon as they arrived.
The Group Pool concept was not quite as sophisticated, as this so the system had to be revised yet again. In April 1940 the two notional squadrons embedded within each of Nos 1-5 Group Pools were formally disbanded. Their resources were reallocated to create five Operational Training Units (OTU), several others being formed within No 6 Gp at the same time. Thereafter, although there were to be many more refinements, the OTU stage became an integral part of the training sequence for the remainder of the war. Bomber Command subsequently formed many more such units, others being set up within Coastal, Army Cooperation, Transport and Fighter Commands and yet more being established overseas. Each unit tended to specialise so that in Coastal Command, for instance, there were separate OTUs to deal with crews earmarked for flying boats, long-range Liberators, maritime strike Beaufighters, photoreconnaissance Mosquitos and so on.
Since each command sponsored its own units their operational training systems differed but, because it was the largest and most complex, the subsequent development of the organisation dealing with heavy bomber crews provides the best example. Bomber Command’s OTUs generally flew a mixture of Whitleys and Wellingtons, eventually standardising on the latter, and these provided adequate pre-squadron experience until the arrival of the more demanding, second-generation ‘heavies’. Towards the end of 1941, therefore, a series of semi-autonomous conversion flights began to form to introduce crews emerging from the OTUs to the specific characteristics of Manchesters, Stirlings, Halifaxes or Lancasters. These units were collocated with, and served, a particular operational squadron. With one or two exceptions, they also took the number of the squadron with which they were associated so that, for instance, No 83 Conversion Flight was affiliated to No 83 Sqn. This arrangement lasted until the autumn of 1942 when the conversion flights were divorced from their parent squadrons and absorbed into a new series of quite independent Heavy Conversion Units (HCU). Thus, for example, No 1660 HCU was formed from Nos 61, 97, 106 and 207 Conversion Flights.
It was routine for pilots destined for Coastal Command to attend a comprehensive navigation course at a School of General Reconnaissance. The original pre-war (later No 1) SofGR was redeployed to South Africa in 1940 while the recently formed No 2 went to Canada. The latter left behind an element which became the nucleus of No 3 SofGR, which operated out of Squires Gate as the sole UK-based unit for the rest of the war. Until late 1943, No 3 SofGR was a major user of the Botha, like this one, L6250. (MAP)
By 1944 the training sequence for a typical crew earmarked to fly heavy bombers involved the pilot, navigator, air bomber, WOp(air) and tail gunner (and occasionally the mid-upper gunner) first coming together at an OTU where they were introduced to operational techniques and began to fly as a team. Since the Wellington lacked both an engineer’s station and a dorsal turret, however, the flight engineer always, and the second gunner usually, crewed-up at the next, HCU, stage.
For a time, most bomber HCUs operated only Stirlings and Halifaxes, so crews destined for Lancasters had to complete a further type-conversion at a Lancaster Finishing School (LFS). Ideally, at some stage during this sequence a crew would also attend a course at an Air Crew School. There, apart from being briefed on the latest tactical and technical developments, they might undergo a modicum of physical training along with practical and theoretical instruction in such topics as survival and escape and evasion techniques.
What all of this meant in time could vary considerably. One major determining factor was the rate at which crews were being lost. Another was the different policies adopted by different commands. It is impossible, therefore, to be precise but a heavy bomber crew passing through the system in late 1944 could generally expect to spend ten weeks at an OTU, during which they would fly about 80 hours, and six weeks at an HCU where they might accumulate another 40 hours. If it was required, an LFS course might last a fortnight and yield another 10-15 hours in the air, a course at an Air Crew School requiring another two weeks. On reaching their squadron, a crew would usually be given three or four shake-down flights during their first few days at which point they would be considered fit to fly their first operational mission. At this late stage of the war a bomber navigator could reasonably expect to have more than 250 flying hours in his log book [100 (AOS) + 30 (O)AFU + 80 (OTU) + 40 (HCU) + 15 (LFS) = 265 plus any additional airborne exper-ience acquired during initial grading and, in some cases, during a false start as a pilot] before he flew in combat, about three times as many as his predecessors of 1940 (and his pilot would probably have logged in excess of 400 hours).
This section has provided no more than a summary of post-graduate training during WW II, and that largely confined to Bomber Command. It should be appreciated, however, that the system was far more complex than this and that many air crew personnel attended additional courses at specialist training units, some Coastal Command navigators, for instance, may have accompanied their pilots while they passed through a School of General Reconnaissance.
Other, more specialised, units tended to be set up when a newly developed device was being introduced into service. Once the equipment had been produced in quantity and become a standard fit, instruction on its use was provided by one or more of the major training units or else the original unit became a mainstream school itself. An early example of this process is provided by the establishment of the AI/ASV School at Prestwick in October 1940 to provide instruction in the use of early airborne radar sets. Two months later this unit was to become No 3 Radio School. This pattern was sustained throughout the war, a much later example being provided by No 1323 Flt which was formed at the end of 1944 to teach the intricacies of the radar-aimed Automatic Gun Laying Turret which was about to reach the squadrons. Had the war gone on, there is little doubt that, once it had become a standard fit, gunners would have been taught how to handle this equipment as part of their HCU course.18
The length of air crew training and the run-down of the BCATP.
At the beginning of the war it was taking about twenty-five weeks to produce an unbadged, acting sergeant, acting observer, nominally qualified in bombing and gunnery as well as in navigation. Including the ACRC/ITW phase, by 1942 it was taking a basic navigator about thirty-six weeks to graduate as a badged sergeant or pilot officer. He would have been qualified solely in navigation, however, those requiring additional skills obviously taking longer to train, a Nav(B) requiring forty weeks and the most highly qualified category, the Nav(BW), taking sixty-four. By comparison, a contemporary pilot took forty-four weeks to earn his flying badge; an air bomber took thirty and a straight air gunner, twenty.
Never a universal fit, some early production Lancasters had a Nash and Thompson FN64 ventral turret and it made a limited re-appearance later in the war in aircraft fitted with the enlarged bomb-bay doors required to enclose the 8,000 lb HC bomb. The main drawback was the very limited field of view through the periscopic sighting system which made it extremely difficult to acquire and track a target, especially at night and when the bomber was taking evasive action. Providing the large numbers of additional gunners that were initially expected to be required to man a handheld under gun introduced in 1944 created a surplus when it was found that they were not actually needed.
It should be appreciated that, despite its significance to the individual, gaining his air crew badge represented only a half-way stage in his training because he still had to attend a succession of post-graduate acclimatisation, operational training and type conversion courses, not to mention lengthy voyages to and from Canada or South Africa, all of which more than doubled the time required. In broad terms, therefore, it took a bomber navigator who entered training in 1942 a minimum of sixteen months to reach his first squadron, more like seventeen if, as was quite likely, he had been required to attend a course at the Air Crew NCOs School or the Air Crew Officers School on arriving back in the UK.19
Even this represented a best case situation, as the time involved could be considerably extended by hold-ups in the system. For instance, a shortage of shipping could lead to an individual being stranded at Heaton Park or Ludlow before embarking for Canada or South Africa, or at Durban or Moncton on his way back. On arrival in the UK he might languish for several months at Bournemouth or Harrogate and there was more scope for delays after his (O)AFU before he began the OTU, HCU, LFS sequence, and then there would have been a couple of weeks of survival and evasion training at the Air Crew Commando School. From mid-1942 onwards, two-and-a-half years from enlistment to first operational sortie in a heavy bomber was about par for the course.
This was not as alarming as might at first appear, however, as the EATS/BCATP had been so successful in training PNB categories that a substantial surplus had been created by the end of 1943 and a further 3,000 were being added to the total every month. The UK-based system had also excelled itself so that Yatesbury, for instance, was holding more than 1,000 fully trained WOps(air).
All of this tends to suggest that wartime training was so badly co-ordinated as to be almost chaotic. It is an unfortunate fact, however, that it was (and still is) very difficult to arrange a precise match between training output and current demand and the more unstable the situation, the greater the margin for error. The root of the problem is the length of training which automatically defines the notice required of any change in future manning levels. Since the notional wartime recruiting and training sequence occupied well over a year, it followed that the system would have to be given at least that much lead time in order to adjust its intake. Needless to say, the uncertainties of the wartime situation, certainly until 1943, had meant that this sort of notice simply could not be provided. The only sensible thing to do under such circumstances was to cater for the worst case and this, in effect, was what had been done.
In the event, losses, while severe, had not been as heavy as some had predicted and the inevitable result had been an overprovision of flying personnel. While this had been expensive, in purely financial terms, it had actually saved lives because the only way to have dealt with a shortage of air crew would have been to truncate their training. This would simply have recreated the conditions of 1917 (and of 1940-41) with all that that had implied in terms of accident rates and operational ineffectiveness.20
While much of the air crew surplus of 1944 had been due to overprovision by the training machine, some of it had been caused by changes in policy. For instance, a surplus of gunners was inadvertently created by a 1943 decision which, leaving aside the ventral gun position that was already installed in some Lancasters, envisaged the provision of a ·50-calibre ‘Under Defence Gun’ in all heavy bombers.21 This meant that many more of Bomber Command’s aircraft were going to need three, not two, air gunners. Allowing for operational losses, the additional requirement for the period March-July 1944 was initially estimated to be 960 men.22 This figure did not, incidentally, include the extra gunners who would also be needed for the Liberator squadrons that were then being set up in Italy and India. This demand could be met from the available pool of surplus trained gunners but, in order to maintain the momentum of the programme, it was calculated that the output of air gunners would need to be increased by 290 per month.23
Above, the Halifax’s Preston Green mount with its single 0-5-inch Browning. Below, the gunner’s seat.
Following a lengthy series of trials, from February 1944 onwards Halifax IIIs began to appear fitted with a single ·50 inch Browning in a Preston-Green mounting installed aft of the bomb bay (see pages 214-215). Before the end of 1943, however, it had also been decided to make H2S a standard fit in all Main Force aircraft, newly built Lancasters beginning to be delivered with it already in place from March 1944 onwards. Since the belly-mounted radar scanner was clearly incompatible with a ventral gun position, this, along with the fact that ‘the under-gun position has proved to be less efficient in operations than was expected’, led to Bomber Command’s withdrawing its requirement for additional gunners in June.24 But by that time, of course, hundreds of additional gunners were already being trained.
The most significant consequence of the surplus of trained air crew was that it caused frustrating delays between courses.25 Since there was no urgent requirement for them to qualify, it was sometimes convenient to shunt batches of part-trained men into a siding rather than add to the numbers who were already backed-up in holding units.26 A cynic might suspect that cost would have been an even more persuasive argument, it being much cheaper to postpone the completion of training, because cadets were paid as mere aircraftmen, rather than as the sergeants or pilot officers that they would become once they had gained their ‘wings’.
At Ottawa in 1942 the participants in the programme had agreed to continue to underwrite the BCATP until 31 March 1945. This did not mean, of course, that they were necessarily also committed to sustaining its output at what was to become an extravagantly high rate. Following a further review of the Plan in February 1944, it was agreed to start an immediate, gradual run-down. The initial target was set at a 40% reduction in output over the next twelve months but even this still provided a considerable excess of trained air crew.
From all of the above, it is plain to see why so many air crew, especially pilots and navigators, who enlisted in the RAF in 1943 or later never managed to become operational.
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1 AIR14/16. Air Ministry letter S.58684/DofT dated 20 December 1939.
2 Ibid.
3 AIR10/2318. The June 1942, 1st Edition of AP1388D, The Standard War Syllabus for Training Air Gunners.
4 Similar in concept to the preliminary school for observers/navigators (see page 236) No 1 Elementary Air Gunners School (EAGS) was set up at Bridlington in April 1943, although it had moved to Bridgnorth to operate alongside No 1 EAOS/EANS before the end of May. The reorganisation of initial training arrangements in the spring of 1944 involved responsibility for all preliminary air gunner training being transferred to Bridgnorth where Nos 14 and 15 ITWs were reorganised on 21 April 1944 to become Nos 80, 81 and 82 ITWs, absorbing the collocated EAGS in the process.
5 It had originally been intended to open two more supplementary schools but, as with observers, there was some dissatisfaction with the commercially trained product and civilian participation was eventually abandoned early in 1941 in favour of an all Service-run system.
6 AIR10/1931. According to the September 1939, 5th Edition of AP1388, the Standard Syllabus for the Training of Pilots, Air Observers & Air Gunners at Training Establishments (Peace and War), WOps with the potential to be gunners were to be identified in the thirteenth week of training. For them, 35 hours was allocated to air exercises at the Electrical and Wireless School but this included such ancillary activities as ‘marching to and from the aerodrome’ and the actual airborne time amounted to just 10 hours: five flights, totalling 4 hours, in a ‘flying classroom’ (typically, at the time, a Valentia) and five more (6 hours) in a ‘single-engined aircraft’ (in 1939, probably a Wallace), although these were to be regarded as the minimum and additional flying was to be arranged if practical.
7 There were eventually seven Signals Schools altogether but only Nos 1, 2 and 4 were directly involved with basic air crew training.
8 AMO A.804/1941 of 2 October announced details of the new approach to the training of WOp/AGs and gave some indication of the standards expected. So far as Morse was concerned, an AC2 was expected to achieve eighteen words per minute, an AC1 twenty and an LAC twenty-two.
9 With responsibility for basic Morse training having already passed to Nos 19 and 20 ITWs, No 10 Recruit Centre ceased to deal with prospective air crew wireless operators and in August 1943 the unit was redesignated to become No 13 Radio School.
10 The basic Morse qualification test was at eighteen words per minute but most operators aspired to twenty-five or better. Morse at relatively high speeds required a degree of natural aptitude which, if lacking, accounted for the majority of suspensions from training.
11 No 20 ITW moved to Usworth in the autumn of 1943. In the following spring Nos 18 and 19 ITWs moved to Bridlington where they were merged to create a new No 70 ITW.
12 AIR24/674. The eight-week ITW syllabus for WOp/AGs was published as FTC/6079/2 dated August 1943.
13 AIR2/8122. Examples of these six-week syllabuses may be found on this file, eg that for the Halifax, for instance, being published by Technical Training Command as TT/14747/Air Trg dated 30 September 1942.
14 AIR29/634. A copy of the syllabus for flight engineers published on 20 September 1943 is appended to the ORB for No 21 ITW.
15 AIR2/8348. The suggested range of courses was initially considered at an Air Ministry conference held on 10 October 1942. With only minor reallocations of the amount of time devoted to individual topics, the proposal was formally submitted under cover of Technical Training Command letter TT/S.2788/Air Trg dated 21 January 1943 and effectively endorsed on 9 February by a note by TMech on file S.70262.
16 While most crew members in UK-based RAAF and RCAF heavy bomber squadrons were Australians or Canadians, as appropriate, practically all of the flight engineers were British – or, to be pedantic, RAF personnel (but see also pages 261-63).
17 AIR29/738. In point of fact, St Athan had become so oversubscribed by February 1944 that it became necessary to farm out the first ten weeks of the seventeen-week basic course to No 5 SofTT at Locking, this arrangement being sustained until the following November, by which time more than 3,500 cadets had been trained there.
18 There were many more such specialist schools, other examples include, for instance, the LORAN Training Unit which operated at Mullaghmore and Limavady in 1944-45, latterly as the Coastal Command Anti U-Boat Devices School, and the Pathfinder Force Navigation Training Unit which flew from Gransden Lodge and Warboys in 1943-45.
19 Although it did not formally adopt its title until December 1943, the Air Crew NCOs School had, in effect, been operating as such at Whitley Bay since the previous January when the resources previously allocated to No 1 Wg of the disbanded No 2 RAF Regiment School had been diverted to the task. Planned intakes were up to 480 per month with an overall capacity of as many as 2,000. The syllabus was much the same as that delivered to newly promoted ground tradesmen at the RAF NCOs School at Yarmouth. The eighteen-day course covered: colour-hoisting and parades; morale; welfare and discipline; ‘admin & org’; PT and games; leadership and Ground Defence Training.
The very similar Air Crew Officers School (ACOS) was set up at Sidmouth on 1 April 1943, its first course assembling on the 10th. It provided four weeks of general duties instruction for up to 1,500 students at a time. As with the NCOs, the course was primarily intended for newly commissioned EATS graduates who were supposed to attend between PRC and (O)AFU [or (P)AFU] – although this was neither essential nor exclusive; some EATS graduates by-passed the course while some officers promoted from the ranks in the UK were able to attend. To take No 7 Course, which began on 21 June 1943, as an example, it had 266 students drawn as follows: 195 from No 7 PRC; 4 from No 11 PDRC; 5 from No 12 PRC; 5 from Transport Command; 9 from ADGB; 14 from Coastal Command; and 34 from Flying Training Command. Of these 245 were RAF, 7 RCAF, 8 RAAF and 6 RNZAF. In April 1944 the ACOS moved to Hereford (Credenhill) where it remained until the end of the war.
20 This is a perennial problem. It had first been encountered in WW I when the response to a serious shortage of trained men in the spring of 1917 had resulted in a surplus by the autumn of 1918. There are many aspects to this problem but its severity is clearly proportional to the length of training, since that determines the necessary notice of any change in intake. Thus, since it took eighteen months or more to recruit and train a pilot in the early 1950s, it took that long to respond fully to the crisis caused by the Korean War. Conversely, the unexpected withdrawal of the Valiant in 1965 resulted in a surplus, because the next generation of Valiant crews was already in the training pipeline.
21 Although it was never a universal fit, some Lancaster Mk Is, and a few Mk IIIs, had been delivered with a Fraser-Nash FN64 ventral turret from very early in the production run and it was more common on Mk IIs. It began to be withdrawn from January 1944 and the only FN64-fitted Lancasters still operating by the end of that year were those aircraft of No 3 Gp which had been equipped to carry an 8,000lb bomb, a modification that involved fitting larger bomb bay doors and precluded the installation of H2S.
22 AIR2/2662. HQ Bomber Command letter BC/S.27730/Ops dated 7 February 1944 from Deputy SASO, Air Cdre H A Constantine, to the Director of Bomber Ops at the Air Ministry (Air Cdre S O Bufton).
23 Ibid. Internal Memo to VCAS dated 22 February 1944.
24 Ibid. HQ Bomber Command letter BC/S.27730/Trg dated 8 June 1944 from Air Officer Training, AVM A J Capel, to the Director of Operational Training (DTO) at the Air Ministry, Air Cdre P E Maitland.
25 For example, there is a letter in the correspondence column of The Aeroplane for 22 August 1941 from a man who had enlisted as a WOp/AG in February 1940. After a month at a Recruit Centre, he had spent five months employed on menial tasks as an AC2 aircrafthand while waiting for a course at a Signals School. He graduated as a WOp in November, by which time he had additionally volunteered, and been accepted, for pilot training. Since then he had been on hold on a squadron, awaiting an ITW course, as gunner or pilot, still an AC2 and still with no prospect of advancement after eighteen months in uniform. In his letter, in which hoped that the Editor might be able to use his influence to hasten his case, he made it clear that there were ‘hundreds’ of such ‘Forgotten Men’ in similar situations.
26 As early as March 1942 there were already more than 4,000 newly qualified, EATS-trained pilots in the UK awaiting operational assignments. To the staffs concerned with manning and planning they were known as the ‘Bournemouth Boys’ because they were held on the books of No 3 PRC at Bournemouth. It was this considerable surplus and the decision to delete the second pilot from bomber crews (which, because of those already in the pipeline, had the effect of adding significantly to the stockpile), thus substantially reducing demand, which permitted the SFTS course to be extended from seventeen to twenty-four weeks – a crucial element of the New Deal. Even so, it was estimated at the time that during the transition phase the surplus might peak at as many as 8,000.
In the event, by the end of August 1942 the total had actually dwindled to about 1,400, which was too few for comfort. By the end of the year it had been calculated that the ideal number of air crew (total of all categories) spending a notional six weeks in the pool should be 7,500 (2,700 of them pilots). This surprisingly large number actually represented a mere six week’s consumption and the previous summer had demonstrated the need for this kind of buffer when lengthy delays to transatlantic convoys had twice caused manning crises. In one case it had been necessary to starve the Fighter, Coastal and Army Co-operation Command OTUs for three weeks in order to sustain the strength of Bomber Command’s front line. The problem was complicated by the fact that the output of the overseas schools was more or less constant throughout the year whereas the uptake by the OTUs in the UK rose and fell in summer and winter. The upshot was that the pool was expected to peak at as many as 11,000 in early 1943. For related correspondence on this topic between Secretary of State, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and AMT, Air Mshl Garrod, in January 1943, see AIR19/297.