1951-57. The case for dedicated ‘Nav Rads’ to act as AI operators and the reinstatement of the Radio Observer.
The first batch of post-war navigators to become dedicated AI operators was drawn from No 1 ANS’s No 59 Course which was interrupted at the end of the basic phase when its fifteen students were abruptly posted directly to Leeming. There, on 28 August 1951, they became No 228 OCU’s No 121 Course, qualifying as AI operators on 20 October. The seventeen-strong No 122 Course, which began on 23 October, was similar, in that nine of them had been selected from the fourteen members of Hullavington’s No 64 Course, again at the end of the basic stage. Thereafter things returned to normal, albeit briefly, No 228 OCU’s diarist noting, with some evident relief, that, contrary to information previously received, No 123 Course had not included any ab initio students.
The rationale behind this departure from the norm has not been firmly established but it was almost certainly yet another consequence of the Korean War which had led to the metropolitan night fighter force being expanded and reequipped as a matter of some urgency. During 1951 all six cadres, of eight Mosquitos and ten crews, were being built up to full squadrons of sixteen Meteors or Vampires and twenty crews, creating a chronic shortage of ‘Nav Rads’.
The course at Leeming involved learning to interpret the information presented by AI Mk 10 radar, flying exercises being conducted in the Wellington T.18s and Brigand T.4s of the OCU’s No 1 Sqn. ‘N’ flying badges were awarded at the end of this phase at which point the students moved to No 2 Sqn to begin the actual ‘conversion’ process onto Mosquito NF 36s. This took another three months, No 121 Course eventually graduating on 14 January 1952.
It is evident, however, that like the ROs and pre-1944 Nav(R)s of WW II, the handful of men who had gained their flying badges in this fashion were, through no fault of their own, somewhat under-qualified as ‘navigators’.1 Nevertheless, the idea of dedicated AI operators had caught on and in February 1952 a formal syllabus was introduced for them at No 1 ANS.2 This was a twenty-eight-week course, in essence, the basic phase of the current thirty-six week all-through navigators course (see Figure 54 on page 302) and included the same 103 hours of flying time. From Hullavington prospective AI operators now proceeded to Colerne for specialist training.3
The RAF’s AI trainers for much of the 1950s were the Brigand T.4s and T.5s of No 228 OCU. (BAE Systems)
The results were not entirely satisfactory, however, and HQ Fighter Command reported a number of problems, some of them to do with the aptitude of trainees for the role of AI operator, but also specifically including reservations over the validity of using ‘part-trained’ navigators. In the event, it proved to be a relatively short-lived programme, only four intakes having completed the abbreviated navigation syllabus before the course was discontinued in June 1953.4 Coincidentally, as previously noted (see page 304), at much the same time, just as the RCAF was introducing dedicated AI training for its CF-100 back-seaters, the RAF was abandoning that approach.
The idea was not dead, however, and an element of the air staff at HQ Fighter Command was convinced that dedicated AI operators were a viable alternative to fully-trained navigators. Eventually, in 1955, SASO Fighter Command, AVM L W C Bower, formally proposed the introduction of specialised NCO radar operators for service in night/all-weather fighters.5 The training and personnel staffs at the Air Ministry had significant reservations over this initiative and, since the RAF had decided to commission all pilots and navigators as recently as 1950, it was a little surprising to find that, only five years later, a Command HQ was advocating reversing this trend by introducing a new category of NCO back-seater.
Nevertheless, Fighter Command’s proposal, which may have been given added impetus by the imminent receipt of Javelins, was being made against the constant backdrop of difficulties with recruiting navigators. It was the latter consideration that actually tipped the scales and persuaded the Air Council to introduce a new category of NCO aircrew in the summer of 1956.6 Strictly speaking, rather than introducing a new trade, this decision amounted to the reinstatement of an old one, that of the long defunct observer (radio) of 1941, thus granting the venerable ‘RO’ badge a second lease of life.
Fig 59. Overall time required to train an NCO radio observer in 1956 compared to a commissioned navigator.
While other options were available, most of these men, whether direct entrants or serving airmen, were expected to fly on, initially, five-year engagements. They were to be taught how to carry out interceptions using airborne radar following a course of basic navigation training which omitted astro and sundry other advanced techniques.
His NCO status and the limited scope of his professional training meant that a radio observer could be in productive service within a year of enlistment, little more than half the time required by a commissioned navigator. The comparative figures quoted at the time are at Figure 59.7 The employment of radio observers was superficially attractive, of course, since it represented an economic use of resources. On the other hand, it also represented an attempt to substitute a half-trained sergeant for a fully-trained officer. It was not quite a throwback to the days of the part-time gunner of the 1920s, but the same underlying principle was clearly at work.
There can be little doubt that the attempt to economise on training had been a serious misjudgement. This was amply demonstrated by the disappointing performance of newly-qualified ROs, twenty-two of the fifty who graduated with Nos 1-5 Courses at No 2 ANS being suspended from training at the OCU stage, nineteen of them for airwork, two on medical grounds (probably airsickness) and one for an unspecified reason.8
The new breed of back-seater, or those who managed to stay the course, served on night fighter squadrons where they flew alongside commissioned navigators and it soon became apparent that, given an equal degree of experience, there was little to choose between the professional competence of an NCO and that of an officer. Nevertheless, this situation had revitalised, potentially at least, the Bristol Fighter syndrome of 1917. That is to say that the effectiveness of a crew could, because of the difference in their status, sometimes be less than the sum of the capabilities of its individual members.
This was not the only echo of the past invoked by the reintroduction of radio observers. It will be recalled that, in 1943, which was not all that long ago, the Service had concluded that, to be fully effective, all AI operators needed to be properly qualified navigators (see page 264) and this had tended to be confirmed by the even more recent experience of 1951-52. The reinstatement of ROs had been yet another instance of the RAF’s lack of interest in its own history, preventing it from learning from the past and thus condemning it to repeat its mistakes.
Indeed, while this episode indicates that the RAF’s corporate memory must clearly have had less than twelve year’s capacity, and arguably less than five, there is evidence to suggest that it was actually less than two; either that or else we must conclude that the left hand of the HQ Fighter Command of the mid-1950s did not know what its right hand was doing. How so? Having entered training in September 1956, the first batch of second-generation ROs graduated from No 2 ANS at the end of the following February. This statement appears in HQ Fighter Command’s ORB for March 1957:9
‘New tasks for the OCUs include training five Radio Observers per month as direct replacements for Navs Rad in front line squadrons. This task has been queried with Air Ministry as this Command cannot afford to lose such a large number of experienced Navs Rad.’
Since ROs had actually been reintroduced in direct response to a relatively recent Fighter Command initiative, the moral of this story would appear to be, ‘Be careful what you wish for, lest your wish be granted.’
In the event, the output of radio observers was to amount to a little over 100 personnel trained on ten courses which passed through the system in 1956-57.10 By the mid-1960s they had practically all disappeared. Some had returned to civilian life; some had reverted to their ground trades while others, having been given the additional training which had originally been withheld, had been rebadged and commissioned as navigators.
1961-64. A final flirtation with NCO Pilots and Navigators.
A Defence Review conducted in 1959 envisaged that the RAF’s strength would increase significantly over the next ten years. By the following spring the figures had crystallised at 781 front line aircraft by 1970, compared to the 520 which had been the figure previously used for planning purposes. This implied a substantial increase in the numbers of pilots and navigators that would be required. But, unfortunately, as AMP, Air Mshl Sir Arthur McDonald, put it ‘recent experience has shown that there is considerable difficulty in recruiting each year even the current planned intake.’ In an effort to make up the anticipated shortfall, AMP proposed to reinstate sergeant pilots and navigators who, it was hoped, might eventually constitute as much as 15% of the required manpower.11
When it was necessary to carry a crewman in the RAF’s early small and underpowered helicopters it used volunteer ground tradesmen but, following the introduction of the Belvedere in 1961, there was increasing pressure for them to be replaced by rated aircrew. The idea of a dedicated new category was considered but rejected in favour of air engineers who began to join the squadrons in 1965. This was not a satisfactory solution and they soon began to be replaced by surplus air signallers but from 1968 onwards both were progressively supplanted by air quartermasters, later air loadmasters and, ultimately, the WSO (crewman). This Belvedere, XG474, belonged to the Seletar-based No 66 Sqn. (R C Sturtivant)
In 1961, therefore, with the short-lived radio observers already fading from the scene, the RAF continued its reversionary trend and reintroduced, albeit ‘on a limited scale’, recruitment of NCO pilots and navigators.12 The intake was expected to include both civilian entrants and internal recruits who had the necessary flying aptitude but who were considered to be unsuitable for commissioned service, plus any officer trainees who had failed to make the grade as such. After graduating from initial training with the rank of acting sergeant, they were to undergo flying training alongside their acting pilot officer colleagues.
The first NCO navigators began their professional training with No 2 ANS’s No 34 Course in November 1961. Peak loading occurred in July 1962 when the student body at Hullavington comprised 138 officers and thirty-nine sergeants. Intakes continued for eighteen months, the last NCOs graduating with No 51 Course in April 1964. Since the beginning of the scheme a total of fifty-eight navigators had passed out as airmen aircrew, compared to 198 as officers. To reward their performance during training some sergeants were commissioned on gaining their ‘wings’ and within five years practically all of the others who were still in uniform had become officers, demonstrating once again the very close correlation that exists between officer qualities and the characteristics of pilots and navigators. As a result of this experience, the RAF reverted to the 1950 policy of 100% officer intakes. This policy remained in force for navigators (and pilots) and their Weapons Systems Operator successors, until 2011 when training ceased.
1962 onwards. The introduction of the Air Loadmaster, née Air Quartermaster.
In 1945 Transport Command had failed to persuade the Douglas Committee that the RAF should recognise air quartermasters as aircrew (see page 270). Although the proposal had been turned down, there had always been much to do ‘down the back’ of a transport aircraft. These duties includeed, for instance: overseeing the loading, lashing down and unloading of cargo; ensuring that the weight and balance of the aircraft remained within limits; supervising passengers in flight; and assisting in the delivery of air drops.13 This sort of work, much of which tended to be delegated to the, often seriously overworked, air engineer, really was sufficiently complex, even critical, to have warranted the provision of a specialist crewman. The Service did employ airmen from the equipment trade as air quartermasters to help out, but it still declined to acknowledge them as aircrew. The perceived injustice of this situation was periodically aggravated by the fact that surplus signallers and gunners were also sometimes misemployed as quartermasters and air despatchers but, in their case, retaining their aircrew status and (after it had been introduced in 1950) full flying pay.
Transport Command tried again in 1952 but, once again, its submission was turned down. Even a request for air quartermasters to be allowed to wear the aircrew eagle was denied. Despite this rejection, one significant innovation was approved in 1952, the introduction of female cabin crew to replace the redundant air gunners who were then serving in this capacity on trooping flights to and from the Middle East. In view of the number of families involved, it was considered that it might be more appropriate to employ women and a trial period proved that this was indeed the case. Once this arrangement had become permanent, women gradually took on other aspects of the air quartermaster’s duties.
Another campaign for aircrew status was mounted in 1960, this time invoking the precedent represented by BOAC whose stewards wore a flying badge and drew flying pay. It was argued that RAF personnel involved in route-flying carried out much the same duties as their civilian counterparts, including in-flight catering, the safe custody of sensitive material, liaising with movements staff on the ground, and so on. Predictably, the 1960 submission was rejected, but the opposition was beginning to crumble.
A year later, with Comets and Britannias being joined by Argosys, and the Belfast, Hercules and VC10 in prospect, AMP, Air Mshl Sir Arthur McDonald, sponsored a formal case for the air quartermaster to be afforded aircrew status.14 This time, the Air Council concurred and the introduction of the new category was announced in May 1962.15
Although the RAF had dispensed with the category of the air gunner in the 1950s, the need for defensive armament, for helicopters, began to make itself felt in Borneo, Aden and Northern Ireland during the 1960s. The task of manning the gun, was assigned to the crewman using, initially, a Bren but this was soon superseded by the L7A2 GPMG as seen here, left, on the ramp of a Merlin. (Sgt G Olgiati, US Army) More intensive fighting in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan from the 1990s onwards led to gunnery training becoming an integral element of the OCU course and the introduction of heavier weapons, typically the 7·62mm M134 Minigun seen here, right, mounted in a Chinook. (SAC Kirwan/MOD)
AMP’s proposal had recognised the need for an appropriate, but as yet unspecified, flying badge and the Air Council’s endorsement had specifically required that an example be submitted for subsequent consideration and approval. This does not appear to have happened, however, and this writer has failed to find any evidence to indicate that the eventual badge was ever submitted to the Palace for approval. If that really was the case, it represented a break with a protocol that had been observed, by all of the air services, not just the RAF, since 1912.16
With or without royal endorsement, the new badge was a 1939-pattern single wing with a ‘QM’ motif. It was notable as being the first RAF flying badge which women were routinely entitled to wear,17 there being ten female air quartermasters on active service when it was introduced. Eight years later the air quartermaster was restyled as the air loadmaster; the monogram on the badge being changed to an ‘LM’.18 This writer has failed to unearth any contemporary correspondence providing a rationale for this change, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it may have been simply to conform with American practice.
When air quartermasters had first been recognised their training was carried out by Transport Command, mostly at Abingdon. Apart from the introduction of a mandatory initial training phase (see below) similar arrangements applied to air loadmasters, although this task was later transferred to Brize Norton. In 1983 responsibility for basic training was assumed by No 6 FTS at Finningley, permitting all airmen aircrew to be trained within the same unit, now restyled the Air Electronics, Engineer and Loadmaster School (AEELS). Because of the very different operating environments in which loadmasters could be required to work (ranging from the comfortable pressurised cabin of a TriStar, through the noisy, and sometimes draughty, hold of a Hercules to the wet end of a helicopter’s winch cable), it was necessary for them to go elsewhere for a lengthy special-to-type course before they gained their flying badges. In late 1995 the AEELS was transferred to Cranwell where loadmaster training became one of the responsibilities of the newly constituted Air Engineer and Air Loadmaster Squadron of the NAAS.
The Airmen Aircrew Initial Training School.
At the same time as a dedicated air engineer training course was being set up to run alongside that of AEOps at Topcliffe in the mid-1960s, another major innovation had been introduced. To ensure that all prospective airmen aircrew (ultimately including air loadmasters and air signallers) were made of the ‘right stuff’, it was decided to run them all through a common initial training course before they embarked on their professional studies. The nature of this course was very similar to the one attended by officers and it is arguable that this similarity provides yet more evidence to show that, regardless of their professional specialisation, officers and aircrew have to possess many of the same fundamental characteristics.
The first of these physically demanding, three-month courses began in July 1966 under the auspices of what became, in January 1967, the Airmen Aircrew Initial Training School (AAITS). Those who passed embarked on their professional training already wearing the gilt aircrew eagle in the vee of their chevrons, indicating that, although they had yet to earn their flying badges, they were already considered to have aircrew status. Along with the AE&AES, the AAITS moved to Finningley to become part of No 6 FTS in 1973. It moved again in 1995, to Cranwell, where it came under the aegis of the NAAS with effect from 3 January 1996.
There was a further rationalisation of facilities at Cranwell in 2004 as a result of which the AAITS was absorbed by the collocated Department of Initial Officer Training (DIOT). The combined organisation was restyled as the Officer and Aircrew Cadet Training Unit (OACTU) with the ex-AAITS commitment becoming the embedded Non-Commissioned Aircrew Initial Training Course (NCAITC).19
Navigators and helicopters.
Having made some reference to helicopters in the context of air loadmasters, this is a convenient juncture at which to consider the navigator’s involvement with rotary-wing flying. It had, certainly since the 1970s and possibly earlier, been commonplace for a helicopter unit to have a Squadron Navigation Officer on strength. His primary function was to maintain planning facilities but he would also fly whenever his particular skills were called for. A support helicopter (SH) squadron might have two or three more navigators flying as crewmen, while others flew in Wessex operating in the Search and Rescue (SAR) role, where the navigator would occupy the second seat in the cockpit before moving to the cabin to act as winchman. This was not the case in the Sea King, however, which always required two pilots.
While the support helicopters of the 1980s, like the Wessex and Puma, were routinely flown by a single pilot, the small arms threat had led to the adoption of two-pilot operation in Northern Ireland. The Chinook required two pilots in any case and, at the time of the 1990 ‘Options for Change’ defence review, a universal two-pilot (or at least two-men-in-the-cockpit) policy for helicopters was introduced and implemented during the 1991 Gulf War. Much of the immediate demand for additional manpower was satisfied by employing surplus fast-jet aircrew, including navigators, who were becoming available due to the withdrawal of the Phantom, another consequence of ‘Options for Change’. It was initially envisaged that a proportion, possibly as high as 35%, of left-hand seats20 might eventually be filled by navigators. The first five, one an ex-Puma crewman and four with a fast-jet background, were trained on a somewhat ad hoc basis at Shawbury’s No 2 FTS in 1991-92 prior to posting to Pumas and Wessex of the SH Force.
The course became increasingly structured over the next five years with ab initio students from No 6 FTS being included in addition to the re-roling of more ex-fast-jet navigators. The programme was not properly funded, however, and most flying was still being conducted on the back of exercises primarily intended for the benefit of trainee crewmen. These arrangement were eventually formalised in 1997 when helicopter training was ‘put out to contract’. No 2 FTS was disbanded on 30 March, its task being taken over, still at Shawbury, by the Defence Helicopter Flying School (DHFS). At much the same time, a dedicated rotary-wing stream was introduced as an addition to the pre-existing fast-jet and heavy options offered by Cranwell’s Navigator and Airman Aircrew School, later No 55(R) Sqn (see page 345). All student navigators did the elementary Bulldog (later Tutor) phase after which those selected for helicopters (for which the aptitude requirements were similar to those applicable to fast-jets) spent a little more time at Cranwell on the Bulldog/Tutor (rather than proceeding to the Tucano) before transferring to Shawbury where they qualified for their flying badges after gaining experience of rotary-wing operations on the Squirrels and Griffins of the DHFS.
The RAF’s acquisition of Shackleton AEW 2s (this is No 8 Sqn’s WL756) eventually led to the employment of airborne fighter controllers. They first began to appear in 1983, although the way in which the ‘FC’ badge was introduced appears to have represented a major departure from a procedure for which there was ample precedent.
Thereafter, while they probably never reached the potential 35% representation, substantial numbers of navigators flew as de facto co-pilots in the Wessex, Pumas, Merlins and Chinooks of the SH Force. While the navigator-in-the-left-hand-seat policy generally worked well, there was some resistance within the Chinook community and this, and declining numbers of navigators, led to a 2004 decision to standardise on 100% pilot operation. Cranwell’s ab initio rotary-wing option was withdrawn in 2005 and, with no more navigators being inducted, they began to fade from helicopter the scene. Some of the dwindling numbers of navigators returned to fly in both SH and SAR roles after being formally retreaded as pilots while those who remained continued to exert their positive influence. The first navigator to command a rotary-wing squadron was Wg Cdr M A Sharp who was appointed OC 7 Sqn as early as 1998 and at the time of writing (2013) the group captain commanding RAF Benson and its Merlins and Pumas is a navigator, as are the wing commanders commanding both Puma units, Nos 33 and 230 Sqns.
1983 onwards. The introduction of Fighter Controllers and Airborne Technicians as ‘aircrew’.
Following some exploratory work with Neptunes in the 1950s, the RAF eventually acquired an airborne early warning capability in 1972 when the Shackleton AEW 2 entered service. For the next ten years the business of watching radar screens and directing fighters was carried out by navigators, AEOs and AEOps. There was clearly a case for professional fighter controllers to be involved in such activities but, while they had been members of the General Duties (Ground) Branch since 1954 (see page 330), these men were not aircrew. Nevertheless, the prospect of the far more advanced Nimrod AEW 3 argued strongly for the employment of airborne fighter controllers to fly with No 8 Sqn. This innovation was accompanied by a new badge, a single-winged ‘FC’, the first of which were presented to Flt Lt H Montgomerie and FS R Steggall on 23 November 1983. Through some bureaucratic oversight (or administrative sleight of hand?), however, this badge appears to have been introduced without formal sanction.21 It was at this stage that the authorities charged with regulating flying badges should have stepped in, either to outlaw the ‘FC’ or to devise appropriate legislation to cover its use.
In 1991, after nineteen years of stalwart service, the RAF’s veteran Shackleton AEW 2 was replaced by the Boeing E-3 Sentry. (MAP)
Although there were a number of factors which argued against recognising fighter controllers as aircrew per se, this did not necessarily mean that these men should have been denied the right to wear a badge. A similar situation had cropped up in the past with parachute training instructors. Since they undoubtedly flew in (at least took off in, they often declined to land in) aeroplanes in order to do their jobs, it was decided that they should be permitted to wear an appropriate emblem. It was to be a 1939-pattern single-wing with a parachute symbol within the laurel wreath. The regulations authorising the introduction of this badge in 1945 included the statement that ‘parachute training instructors are to be granted honorary aircrew status’ and went on to define the training necessary to qualify.22 The authority for the issue of this badge, which still confers honorary aircrew status on its wearer, continues to be reflected in Queen’s Regulations today.23
Another possibility would have been to follow the precedent established by the Catering Branch in 1967.24 Selected personnel, trained as cabin staff for VIP flights, were mustered as air stewards and identified by a dedicated badge. Since they were not rated as aircrew in the conventional sense, however, this emblem was not based on the classic 1939-pattern and it was not awarded permanently in that it had to be relinquished if the wearer remustered out of Trade Group 19 to pursue some other specialisation. Furthermore, it was worn on the upper sleeve, rather than on the chest, although, as a badge for non-pilot flying personnel, it did have the very unusual distinction of having its ‘AS’ motif flanked by two wings!
Because fighter controllers were not aircrew, it would have been appropriate to pursue one of these options or to devise some other method of distinguishing them. In the event nothing was done to regularise the situation and aircrew-style ‘FC’ badges proliferated in a legislative vacuum.25
The Shackleton’s planned replacement, the Nimrod Mk 3 was to be equipped with far more sophisticated systems than the wartime AN/APS-20 radar carried by its predecessor and this brought with it a demand for greater technical support. From 1985, therefore, technicians, mostly of Trade Group 2, began to participate in the Nimrod trials programme. While these men flew regularly, however, they were not formally recognised as aircrew in that they wore no badge and drew crew pay rather than flying pay.
With the demise of the Nimrod AEW project in 1986, the RAF ordered the Boeing E-3 Sentry for delivery in 1990. NATO already had a jointly-owned, internationally-manned force of E-3s based at Geilenkirchen and the first complete RAF crew joined this unit in 1987. This team included a number of technicians, all of whom still lacked any form of distinguishing badge. The problem was subsequently aggravated by the arrival of additional fighter controllers who had not qualified for their ‘FC’ badges because they had not attended the course run by No 8 Sqn.
It is said that those who were embarrassed by their lack of an appropriate badge soon found a way to overcome this deficiency. Although the presentation of foreign flying badges may be accepted by RAF personnel, they may not be worn on RAF uniform.26 This prohibition could be neatly outflanked, however, because day-to-day dress on the NATO unit tended to be flying overalls, which were, arguably, not strictly ‘uniform’. As a result, RAF personnel were reportedly to be seen sporting an equivalent USAF emblem.
The badge problem was finally solved in August 1989 when a standard RAF pattern, single-winged ‘AT’ emblem began to be worn by what had become known as airborne technicians. Like the earlier ‘FC’ badge, there seems to have been no formal authority underpinning the introduction of this new emblem.27 By this time, however, the ‘FC’ badge was becoming increasingly familiar, because the fraternity of fighter controllers was now content to endorse the wearing of this (apparently) RAF-sponsored badge by men who had gained their flying experience on NATO-operated Sentries.28
In the meantime, while NCOs of Trade Group 12 had been flying as controllers for several years (on the strength of a suitable specialist annotation), to meet the anticipated demands of the RAF’s own Sentry force, the dedicated trade of NCO fighter controller had been introduced in 1989.29 The regulations specifically stated that these men could expect to be employed on flying duties but, curiously enough (or, on reflection, perhaps not – because it never appears to have been formally sanctioned), reference to the ‘FC’ badge was conspicuous by its absence, although they would certainly be worn by these NCOs.
No 5 Sqn’s acquisition of the Sentinel led to the introduction of a badge for imagery analysts in 2008. (Akradecki, aka Alan K. Radecki)
As latecomers to the flying game, the status of fighter controllers and airborne technicians has sometimes been a contentious issue and there is a body of opinion which maintained (and some still maintain) that neither were ‘real’ aircrew. For instance, having been transferred to the newly created Operations Support Branch in 1997, fighter control officers, were no longer even members of the GD Branch so, it was argued, they can hardly be regarded as professional aircrew.30 Similarly, NCO controllers and airborne technicians did not have to undergo the rigours of the course run by the AAITS, a hurdle which all other non-commissioned flyers did have to clear. Furthermore, both of the new categories drew flying pay only while they were filling a flying appointment, rather than on a permanent basis which has long been the case for ‘proper’ aircrew.
Because the status and conditions of service of the traditional aircrew categories had been relatively stable ever since the 1950s, it was hardly surprising that the new arrivals raised some eyebrows. For instance, while the precise terminology has changed over the years, it has always been a statutory requirement that flying badges are awarded on completion of, what is currently described as, ‘a prescribed course of flying training.’31 Everyone thought that they knew what that meant, until the advent of the ‘FC’ and ‘AT’ badges for which the definition of flying training had to be stretched to embrace in-house training at squadron (even a NATO squadron) level.32 Furthermore, it was difficult (this writer has actually found it impossible) to find any written authority for the introduction of either of these new badges (see Annex L).
All of that having been said, however, there are no absolutes where flying badges are concerned. If one looks back a little further than the 1950s one can find all kinds of practices which had official sanction at the time but which would seem very non-standard today. Without going right back to the ad hoc means of qualifying for a flying ‘O’ in 1915-16, one could cite examples such as: the award of ‘RO’ badges after a very brief period of instruction; the award of ‘E’ badges to people who had yet to fly in an aeroplane; the award (under AMO A.89/1942) of appropriate badges to de facto aircrew who had never been formally trained at all and the meteorological air observers who flew without a badge until the war was practically over. Then again, there have been many instances of permanent flying badges being associated with temporary crew pay. One could also add to this list the case of the parachute training instructors badge and its associated honorary aircrew status.
Furthermore, while the advent of the ‘FC’ and ‘AT’ badges may have caused a minor stir in the 1980s, this hardly compared to the culture shock which had resulted from the introduction of non-pilot aircrew as ‘instant’ sergeants at the beginning of 1939. The new badges were neither better nor worse than the more familiar ones, only different. But they differed in one critical respect. There was documentary evidence to validate the introduction of all previous badges. This was not the case with the ‘FC’ and ‘AT’ which had simply ‘materialised’; neither was underpinned by appropriate, indeed necessary, legislation.
It is interesting to reflect that, in days of yore, the staffs charged with protecting the sanctity of the RAF uniform and its associated badges, took their responsibilities so seriously that they spent the whole of WW II enforcing the regulations so as to prevent the erstwhile observers of WW I from wearing flying ‘O’s on their army tunics (see pages 272-274). Faced with a far more flagrant transgression of the rules in the 1980s, these ministerial guardians should surely have either outlawed the wearing of the unauthorised ‘FC’ badge or taken action to have it legitimised. They appear to have done neither for fifteen years, by which time the ‘FC’ badge was a fait accompli and, based on that precedent, the ‘AT’ badge had followed on.
When the first edition of this book appeared, this chapter ended as follows: ‘Who, one wonders, will be next to award themselves a flying badge? In the late 1990s there was talk of an airborne role for imagery analysts or, as they used to be called, photographic interpreters. Should this happen, and should they too decide that they ought to have a distinctive badge, one hopes that their ‘PI’ in the sky will be formally authorised by a DCI.’
How prescient was that?! On 26 June 2008 AOC 2 Gp, AVM A D Pulford, presented the first of the new ‘IA’ badges to airmen of Trade Group 11 and soldiers of the Army Intelligence Corps serving with No 5 Sqn. But – was there a DCI to validate this innovation – and had anyone bothered to ask the Queen?33
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1 It is not known to what extent the Air Force attempted to rectify this situation in arrears, but it did happen in at least one case. Almost a year after he had joined No 39 Sqn in the Canal Zone, Sgt Peter Verney recalls that his Nav Leader informed him that the Group Navigation Officer was concerned that he was not actually qualified as a navigator because he had not completed the full ANS course. He was, therefore, to validate his ability by a practical demonstration. This was to be carried out on a return flight from Fayid to Aqaba in a Valetta under the supervision of the crew navigator and with the log and chart subsequently being submitted to Group for analysis.
This sortie was flown on 12 September 1952 but ‘the round trip took under three flying hours, and the only available nav aids were my eyes and the map’, so there was very little for Group to assess. This was deemed insufficient and it was decided that Verney should navigate a Valetta back to the UK. This exercise was flown on 4/5 December, ‘although I only did the navigating on the Fayid to Luqa leg and part of the Luqa to Istres leg.’ Long afterwards HQ 205 Gp called for Verney’s log book which was returned with an annotation, dated 5 March 1954, to the effect that he had qualified as a navigator with effect from 14 December 1952. Thus did the Air Force paper over the crack. From an account of Verney’s RAF experiences, with particular reference to the Mosquito, in the period 1950-53, at www.mossie.org as amplified in subsequent correspondence with the author.
2 AIR24/2135. The twenty-eight-week navigation syllabus for AI operators was published in January 1952 as FTC/88848/10/Nav.
3 In February 1952 the element of No 228 OCU which dealt with basic AI interpretation was hived off to become The AI School which moved to Colerne in the following June where it was redesignated as No 238 OCU.
4 AIR2/12128. Air Ministry letter C.45588/51/ADT Plans, dated 15 June 1953, noted that instructions had already been issued for No 5 AI Course (which had been due to graduate from No 1 ANS on 27 May) to remain in situ to complete the full, by now, forty-week syllabus at Hullavington and went on to direct that Nos 6-12 AI Courses should also complete the forty-week syllabus and that no further short AI courses were to be run.
5 Ibid. FC/S.48265/Ops1 dated 6 April 1955.
6 AIR6/109. Conclusions of Air Force Board Meeting 11(56) held on 17 May 1956. This decision was implemented by AMO A.192/1956 of 8 August.
7 AIR6/149. The figures are taken from the 66th Report of the Post-War Manning Committee which was submitted to the Air Council as an annex to AMP’s Note AC(56)35 of 30 April 1956 in which Air Chf Mshl Sir Francis Fogarty recommended the reintroduction of NCO radio observers.
8 AIR24/2415. Noted in HQ Flying Training Command’s ORB for September 1957.
9 AIR24/2384. HQ Fighter Command ORB for 1957.
10 Nos 1-5 RO Courses, the first of them commencing on 26 September 1956, were trained by No 2 ANS at Thorney Island. Nos 6 and 7 Courses began there but in March 1957 they were transferred to No 1 ANS at Topcliffe which handled the remaining RO training commitment. No 10 Course having been cancelled, the last to graduate was No 11 which ended on 26 November 1957.
11 AIR6/129. Air Mshl McDonald’s paper AC(60)19 of 28 March 1960.
12 AMO A.193/1961 of 21 June.
13 Primary responsibility for the conduct of air drops is vested in soldiers, air despatchers. Originally furnished by units of the Royal Army Service Corps, since 1968 this function has been discharged by No 47 Air Despatch Squadron of the Royal Logistic Corps (née the Royal Corps of Transport) based at Lyneham until 2011when it moved to Brize Norton.
14 AIR6/150. AMP’s case was set out in his Memorandum AC(61)12 of 8 February 1961. It was considered, and its recommendations accepted, at Air Council Meeting 4(61) on 27 February (AIR6/131).
15 AMO A. 117/1962 of 16 May.
16 For a bief account of the way in which new flying badges were introduced until the system broke down in the 1960s, see Annex L.
17 ‘Routinely’ because some members of the WRAFVR will previously have qualified for the preliminary flying badge and in 1952 Plt Off Jean Bird became the first of a handful of women (also of the VR) to be awarded a standard RAF pilots badge.
18 DCI(RAF) S159 of 30 September 1970.
19 As a consequence of one of the recommendations arising from an Airmen Aircrew Sustainability Study conducted in 2002 by a team lead by Gp Capt P Williams, the term ‘airmen aircrew’ was superseded by that of ‘non-commissioned aircrew’ (NCA) with effect from 1 April 2003.
20 In marked contrast to the convention in fixed-wing aircraft, the captain always occupies the right-hand seat in a helicopter.
21 Most unusually, the introduction of the ‘FC’ badge was not endorsed by a Defence Council Instruction (DCI). This alone must raise serious doubts as to its official status prior to 1998 when it was, a trifle belatedly, at least included among the recognised flying badges listed under QR 206.
22 AMO A.1079/1945 of 8 November. The ‘parachute’ badge had been formally approved by HM King George VI when he endorsed King’s Order 577 on 7 October 1945 (AIR30/277).
23 QR 434(2).
24 DCI(RAF) S119 of 14 June 1967.
25 This official inactivity cannot be explained by ignorance of the situation, as the uncertain status of the ‘FC’ badge was brought to the notice of the MOD formally and in writing, by this (at the time still uniformed and serving on the air staff at HQ Support Command) writer in 1988.
26 QR 206(5).
27 Although ‘AT’ badges have been in circulation since 1989, the authority under which they were being worn remains obscure as, like the ‘FC’ badge, they do not appear to have been sanctioned by a DCI. Indeed it was not until as late as 2000 that the ‘AT’ badge even figured among the officially recognised emblems listed under QR 206 when a revised (fifth) edition of Queens Regulations was published. In accordance with long-established practice, incidentally, QR 206 lists all flying badges that have been awarded in the past, as well as those which are current; sadly, the compiler of the fifth edition appears to have overlooked the ‘QM’.
28 The first ‘AT’ badges were actually presented by the Commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to personnel serving at Geilenkirchen. According to a letter published in RAF News Issue 1063, seventy-five such badges had been presented by December 2002 at which stage there were thirty-eight established airborne technician posts. By that time the entitlement to wear an ‘AT’ badge was conditional upon satisfactory completion of a twenty-four-week course with the Sentry Training Flight at Waddington, this being followed by a six-year flying tour on Sentrys.
29 DCI RAF 31 of 10 March 1989.
30 DCI RAF 14 of 1 March 1996. Reversing the decision of 1954, the GD (Ground) Branch was abolished with effect from 1 April 1997, its place being taken by the newly established Operations Support Branch which embraced the RAF Regiment and to which former Fighter Control, Air Traffic Control and Intelligence Officers were transferred, along with the newly introduced specialisation of Flight Operations. Incidentally, since 2008, the erstwhile commissioned fighter controller has become an aerospace battle manager and his Trade Group 12 NCO counterpart an aerospace systems operator.
31 QR J727(1).
32 That the training provided failed to meet the essential criteria was made clear in an official statement made in 2000 which read, ‘Fighter Control personnel […] do not undergo a full aircrew training course’ – see page 353.
33 The answer to both of these questions appears to have been ‘No’. See Annex L.