Hermeneutics, understood as theory of interpretation, has developed under the influence of German philosophers such as Heidegger, Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Gadamer from a method for understanding texts or oral communication into an ontological category of which the scope has broadened towards understanding human life and existence as such (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2005). This development was triggered nearly a century ago and has found a place in the theory of a vast array of academic disciplines such as law, linguistics, psychology, theology, philosophy and also sociology. For sociology, hermeneutics concerns the understanding of the meaning that social actions or events have for those who participate in them. Yet the ‘structural-functional model’ (Kelly 1994: 82) prevailed for quite some time in sociology and therefore also in the study of leisure. Several scholars, in light of the limitations of the positivist paradigm, advocated a more comprehensive approach to the study of leisure. Coalter, for example, assessed quite some time ago that neither leisure studies (to his mind focusing on how leisure ought to be) nor leisure sciences (to his mind focusing on what leisure is) succeeded in adequately dealing with the meaning of leisure and its relationship to ‘wider sources of meaning and identity’ (1997: 256). He proposed that the notion of ‘contextualised’ meaning should receive more attention than before, because it could help to broaden the concept of leisure beyond ‘psychological notions of freedom and openness’ (McLean 1997: 274). In envisaging an agenda for the study of leisure in the twenty-first century, Coalter reaffirms the reasons why ‘leisure choices are made, and their situated meaning still remain the central, and largely unexplored, questions for leisure studies’ (1999: 513).
The challenges for studying the meaning of leisure activities and the ultimate purpose and meaning of leisure itself were picked up and a steady stream of publications on the meanings of leisure followed. Scholars investigated, for example, the meanings that hikers attached to their activities (Svarsted 2010); the meanings that Chinese people ascribe to leisure (Liu et al. 2008); the explanation of leisure experiences through focusing on beliefs and desires of people (Watkins 2013); the assessment and measurement of meaning construction in leisure (Ragheb 1996) and paradigms that could be used to study the meanings of leisure (Watkins 2000). Spracklen even dedicated a monograph titled The Meaning and Purpose of Leisure to the theme (2009). He investigated the contribution of Habermas to the understanding of the meaning and purpose of leisure and applied the relevance of his thinking to leisure domains like sport, popular culture and tourism. As a counter voice, Blackshaw, in relating to postmodernism and the fluid character of leisure, puts forward that leisure has become a hermeneutical exercise that provides people with a vast array of possibilities in making (a kind of) meaning that has its own authority (Bouwer and Van Leeuwen 2013: 587). He also states quite firmly that one should not ‘be asking after the meaning and the purposes of leisure, but should instead be asking after its use’ (2010: xiii, 154).
What apparently seems to be a contradiction in Blackshaw’s position is his way of distinguishing between the mere ‘theoretical’ reflection on what leisure is, and the ‘practical’ significance people allocate to their experiences of leisure pursuits. It is in concordance with Coalter’s thesis that focusing on ‘contextualised meaning’ could evoke new perspectives in the study of leisure. The question of what leisure is, Blackshaw holds, ‘is unanswerable’ (2010: 154). Yet, given the current interest leisure studies and leisure sciences have in themes like meaning and experience, and the purpose of this study, it seems important to address the conceptual foundations of key terms in the discussion about meaning, experience and their relatedness to leisure, and to at least try to tease out some of the most fundamental attributes, antecedents and empirical referents of these concepts. This challenge will be taken on in this section.
First, the terms ‘meaning’, ‘experience’ and ‘meaningful experience’ will be subjected to conceptual analysis. Second, the way leisure scholars have related to the theme will be addressed, and third, the insights gained from those analyses of ‘meaningful experiences’. In paving the way for reflection on the relationship between leisure and meaningful experiences, psychological, sociological and philosophical reflections will be used interchangeably. The study of experience and meaning was mainly done within the realm of psychology and to a lesser extent also of sociology. This is because the experience of meaning refers to a psychological state – within a specific context. It is impossible to fully explore the nature of these experiences and the conditions under which they emerged by abstract reasoning alone. Psychological and sociological insights will be used to feed philosophical reflection. Where psychology and sociology are oriented towards the factual, philosophy deals with conceptualisation and valuation (Przelecki 2000). Philosophy more likely reflects on questions like ‘what is meaning?’, ‘is our life meaningful?’ or ‘when is my life meaningful?’.
What is the meaning of ‘meaning’? The concept of ‘meaning’ has different meanings. In Dutch it is translated as zin or betekenis; in German as Sinn or Bedeutung; in French as sens; in English, for example, as ‘sense, purport, significance, value, worth, purpose and quality’ (www.oxforddictionaries.com and www.thefreedictionary.com). It is hard to define ‘meaning’, because in defining it, one already assigns meaning to the word. Although many disciplines acknowledge the importance of the word and the subject matter it represents, there is still no consensus about a unifying theory or conceptualisation about what constitutes the search for meaning (Grouden and Jose 2014: 29). The following definitions and descriptions of ‘meaning’ representing sociology, psychology, philosophy, theology and linguistics make this clear: ‘meaning is placing things in a framework in such a way that a person could deal with it’ (Borg ter 2003: 34); it is ‘the cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one’s existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, and an accompanying sense of fulfilment’ (Reker 2000: 41); it is ‘the shared mental representations of possible relationships among things, events, and relationships. Thus meaning connects things’ (Baumeister 1991: 15); ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able to do something about it or with it’ (Wolf 2010: xii); it refers to the ‘principles human beings use in structuring themselves as a totality, situating themselves within their living environment and relating to the development of this environment’ (Kruithof 1968: 505); the ‘existential interpretation of human existence based on the questions that emerge from the fundamental deficiency of human life’ (Stoker 1993: 15) and the ‘value, consequence or effect, and the indicative significance or purpose of an object, utterance or text’ (Van Woudenberg 2002: 16). Two theoretical levels underlie these definitions and descriptions: the linguistic and the foundational. The first is concerned with the nature and content of the ‘semantic value’ of an expression and the second with the facts that determine the semantic value of linguistic expressions (Cameron 2012: 1).
As far as foundational theorising on meaning is concerned: a lot of research has been done in the fields of (cultural) psychology and sociology (of religion). The meaning of a word, action or event is dependent on the framework or context within which it is used, is executed, takes place and is interpreted. Wong constructed a model of meaning that is based on a sense of purpose, understanding, responsible action and the evaluation of one’s life (2012: 637). His model relates to Baumeister’s thesis that human beings have four psychological needs for meaning, namely purpose (objective goals and subjective fulfilments), efficacy and control, value and justification, and self-worth (1991: 29–57). People make meaning in order to be able to adapt to and control their world and create a sense of belonging. They satisfy their need for meaning from different spheres of life such as ‘leisure activities, spirituality, relationship with others, and making a contribution to the wider community’ and ‘relationships, service, beliefs, life work, growth, pleasure, obtaining and health’ (Grouden and Jose 2015: 34); ‘family, work, interpersonal relationships, health, personal growth, standard of living, religiosity/spirituality, leisure/free time, community/service, life in general, and education’ (Delle Fave et al. 2010).
Meaning is a continuous movement between integration and disintegration in which significance is allocated to relationships, contexts, patterns of everyday life, past and future. ‘Meaning’ is made up of an interplay of different kinds of meaning, which roughly takes place on two levels: the everyday and the ultimate (also called the ontological, objective or existential) (Borg ter 2000: 23–28; W. Stoker 1993: 17; Park 2005: 297). Everyday meaning refers to general meaning in life and rests upon ‘personal beliefs, goals and subjective feelings’ (Park 2005: 297), while ultimate meaning refers to the framework in which people situate their existence in their search for the meaning of life. People use world view, c.q. religious systems to find answers to questions of contingency, responsible action and human fate. These answers belong to a domain that presupposes a connection with an external reality or power, an ideal, a coherent meaning complex, something that transcends the individual (Bouwer 2003: 15).
Philosophers have another perspective on the phenomenon of meaning. Susan Wolf points out that philosophical models of human motivation fall into two categories: that of self-interest (psychological egoism) and that of ‘something higher’ (impersonal universalism) (2010: 1). This distinction, she holds, also relates to the very structure of meaning. Meaning relates to human flourishing and human fulfilment (a personal element), but also to a connection with a value that lies outside the person (an objective element). Meaningfulness comes from something one loves, or which is worthy of loving. People engage with this ‘object’ of which the value ‘extends beyond its value for us’ in a positive way (Wolf 2010: 26, 29). Meaning is therefore an idea that captures a good life, which a person would want for himself and for those he cares for, but ‘which is neither subsumable under nor reducible to either happiness or morality’ (2010: 8). It is fully orientated towards what one regards as ‘the important’, worthy and having purpose.
Wolf’s ideas concur with the position of Dennis Ford. After exploring meaning through the lenses of eight approaches (myth, philosophy, science, postmodernism, pragmatism, archetypical psychology, metaphysics and naturalism) he concludes that, whatever perspective one takes to invest life with meaning and although there are quite some differences between those approaches, the search for meaning is always triggered by a ‘fundamental dissatisfaction’ with the way things are (Ford 2007: 252). One should assume that Ford refers to ultimate meaning here and not to instrumental or everyday meaning. Dissatisfaction leads to an increase in self-consciousness, which in turn leads one to distinguish between appearance and the real. For ‘meaning is located in or derived from a more real realm…. The real is dependent on the more real for meaning’ and ‘the meaning of the less real derives from the more real’ (Ford 2007: 253–254). Being able to answer the question of meaning presupposes engagement with transcendence. Every strategy people use to create meaning displays a movement towards experiences that are intrinsically meaning- or purposeful. Those are experiences that do not need any justification or explanation. Ford holds that meaning is an archetype that reflects personal experience of meaning, but it is always imbedded in a larger ‘impersonal, universal and timeless’ whole (Ford 2007: 258). Therefore meaning and purpose are regarded as ‘stronger and more fundamental attractions than right and wrong’. Although ‘cultural and ethical conflicts expose the way people invest their lives with meaning’, and presuppose different modes of meaning-making, it does not necessarily imply that one would come to different ethical decisions (Ford 2007: 263–264). Meaning, to his mind, is more fundamental than ethics.
Terry Eagleton ascribes three categories to the meaning of ‘meaning’: to intend or have something in mind; to signify something; and to perform an act which intends to signify something (2007: 57–58). When thinking about the meaning of life, he identifies two possible ends: happiness and its relational counter side love. Happiness refers to ‘the free flourishing of one’s powers and capacities’ and love to a state where ‘the flourishing of one individual comes about through the flourishing of others’ (Eagleton 2007: 166). This means that he sees no conflict between happiness and morality. The meaning of life, then, is ‘living in a certain way’ … is ‘not metaphysical, but ethical’ … is ‘what makes life worth living’ (Eagleton 2007: 164). Traditional philosophical reflection on the meaning of life also distinguishes between religion and morality, since they are historically seen as the frameworks in which answers are found.
John Kekes conveys several arguments, which will not be discussed here, why both religion and morality are incapable of answering the question about the (universal) meaning of life. These arguments rest upon the proposition that both accept a general source that presupposes and guarantees the meaning, namely God or cosmic order (in the case of religion) or moral principles (in the case of ethics). His solution to this dilemma is to proceed from a pluralistic perspective on the meaning of life, since meaningful lives could adopt different forms. It could be religious or moral, but also scientific, aesthetic and so on. There are no general answers (Kekes 2000).
In closing this section, it is also important to point out that Wolf and Eagleton hold that meaning should, conceptually speaking, not be identified or confused with concepts like happiness, well-being and satisfaction in life. Happiness, for example, is to Aristotle a kind of baseline in human life. It is the condition for well-being that, in turn, is the result of human thriving. Sirgy, for example, in quoting Hayborn, distinguishes between three philosophical perspectives of happiness: psychological happiness (hedonic or emotional well-being), prudential happiness (life satisfaction or the cognitive component of subjective well-being) and perfectionist happiness (eudaimonia or psychological well-being). None of these can be identified with meaning, but the perfectionist happiness can be regarded the most consistent with a meaningful life (Sirgy 2012: 7–18). More will be addressed in this regard in Chapter 5. So, meaning, although foundational, is instrumental in realising a happy life and reaching a state of well-being or satisfaction in life. It is the Vorstufe to happiness or well-being.
What is the meaning of ‘experience’? ‘Experience’ is a term loaded with significance and meaning. It is defined as the ‘accumulation of knowledge or skill that results from direct participation in events or activities’, ‘personal knowledge derived from participation or observation’, ‘knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has observed, encountered or undergone’, an ‘event or occurrence which leaves an impression on someone, by which one is affected’ (www.thefreedictionary.com and www.oxforddictionaries.com), ‘direct, observational knowledge of the world’ or ‘the sensory basis of this knowledge’ (Dretske 2005: 281). Experience refers to personal understanding, a feeling, a kind of (practical) knowledge or a skill, and an event, a happening, incident, adventure or ordeal. It thus has both a subjective component (the feelings, consciousness and personal understanding) and an objective component (the content, actual activity) (Sylvester 2008: 22).
When addressing the subjective quality of an experience, one will find that it is difficult to catch in one and the same word (experience) since the English language does not have adequate synonyms for it. One has to express the personal effect of an event or activity either by using adverbs or deriving it from the context in which the word has been used. The same applies to French, for example (expérience). However, the German language does have a useful distinction that grasps the nature and quality of experience. It distinguishes between Erlebnis and Erfahrung (in Dutch: belevenis and ervaring). The word Erlebnis refers to the ‘immediate’ experience of an event (positive or negative) and Erfahrung denotes the knowledge, wisdom or skills acquired through participation, reflection and interpretation. A qualitative distinction between these two concepts can therefore be made – as Boswijk et al. demonstrate. They regard Erlebnis as an ‘immediate relatively isolated occurrence with a complex of emotions that make an impression and represent a certain value for the individual within the context of a specific situation’, and call it ‘experience’. Erfahrung is called a ‘meaningful experience’ and denotes ‘the sum of all interactions that people have with their environment and with others’ (2007: 23–24) and also ‘a continuous interactive process of doing and undergoing, of action and reflection, from cause to consequence, that provides meaning to the individual in several contexts of his life’ (Boswijk et al. 2011: 2). Based on these definitions, Erfahrung encompasses and interprets the Erlebnis-experiences people have. Erlebnis is a subset of Erfahrung.
According to Erlich, the subjective quality of an experience has two modes. In each of these modes the subject and object of experience stand in a specific relationship to each other. The first mode of experience reflects the separate, non-identical nature of subject and object. The ‘overall tendency generated by this mode of experience is goal directed, and it aims for efficiency of function, task performance and evaluated accomplishment’ (2003: 1136). He calls this the ‘doing’ mode. The distinctive feature of the second mode of experience relates to a merger, identity, fusion, oneness. Subject and object are not separate from each other which ‘eliminates any need for intentionality and agency, direction and volition’ (2003: 1137). Erlich calls this the ‘being’ mode. The ‘being’ mode of experience supersedes the objectivity, causality and rationality of science. If one does not reckon with the ‘being’ mode of experience, then the understanding of human nature and experience would be incomplete. In addition, the ‘being’ mode underpins the human sense of being connected to everything around one: other people, nature and life. It also creates awareness of human values and ideals. These two modes are regarded as inborn; they always function next to each other, yet, depending on the situation, one will be dominant over the other (Erlich 2003: 1138–1139), and both are capable of evoking positive or negative feelings.
Now, does the positivity or negativity of an experience say anything about its truth or moral quality? Is experience always true and could it be right or wrong? Is all knowledge based on experience? In looking for answers to these questions, scholars conducted epistemological debates to reflect on assumptions like ‘experience is void of any content’ (non-propositional) or has a ‘belief-like’ content (propositional) (Dretske 2005: 281). In both cases it is hard to assess the truth, rightness or wrongness of an experience. If experiences do not have any content, then they cannot explain anything, which means that they cannot function as foundational for any claim about truth, right or wrong. On the other hand, if experiences are regarded to have content, on which grounds then could their truth, rightness or wrongness be established? Philosophers have tried to solve this dilemma by arguing that the truth of a belief is related to its coherence with other existing beliefs, and not to experience. Experience is seen as a cause and not a justification of knowledge (Dretske 2005: 281).
McDowell denounces this ‘coherentism’ position by arguing convincingly that knowledge cannot degenerate into ‘moves in a self-contained game’ (Oksala 2014: 394). Experience is conceptual in its very nature, since conceptual categories are already present before one has an experience. Without it, experience can never be interpreted and understood and therefore cannot be disregarded when reflecting on the epistemological basis of knowledge.
The epistemological value of experience is also a point of discussion among feminist scholars. This is important to notice because of the critical perspective and focus on meaning that feminism brings into the discussion. Scott, for example, (1991) holds that an experience is essentially discursive and the discourse that gives rise to experience is ideological. It also applies to social identity. However, she also conveys that experience belongs to the inner subjective realm of the individual who has lived through it. It bears witness to the individual’s personal inner truth and is therefore always right. Because of this very subjective nature of experience, the ‘evidence’ it advances is insignificant for any valid argumentation in second order discourse (Oksala 2014: 394). Rather, one has to work with the history of concepts because they provide the ‘evidence by which experience can be grasped’ (Scott 1992: 37). Scott’s position seemingly concurs with the ‘coherentism’ position conveyed above. Another scholar, Bartky, opposes Scott’s point of view and expresses great concern that (feminist) theorising relating to this subject matter might slide down to a ‘frictionless spinning in a void’ because it does not have any connection with reality and therefore with experience (2002: 14). It should not degenerate into an intellectual game. Oksala takes up this point and reintroduces the notion of ‘conscious-raising’ (2014: 398). People should realise that individual practices are always embedded in a context which means that their meaning is also embedded in a shared cultural context. Experiences should be studied since they reveal the fractures with ‘normative femininity, naturalized identity and the culturally scripted accounts of female experience’ and oppose current discourses for the very reason that they are ‘conceptual through and through’ (2014: 399). It calls for conscious and radical reflection on one’s own experiences in order to challenge widely accepted and ‘institutionalised’ experiences in society.
This paragraph will reflect on the construct ‘meaningful experiences’. It is important because the idea of experience and the meaning it creates has entered the study of leisure. Leisure services are keen to design and sell meaningful experiences to (potential) customers within the realm of the ‘Experience Economy’ – a construct that Pine and Gilmore introduce in their book The Experience Economy (1999). They argue that businesses are, apart from goods and services, expected to deliver emotional, authentic experiences to their customers. This is because people more and more regard experience as an economic value (1999: 22). Buyers of experiences want them to be memorable (1999: 12) and therefore companies have to stage experience by experientialising their goods and services (1999: 16). These experiences are meaningful to customers. Boswijk and his colleagues label this experience in the economical domain as ‘the act of undergoing something’ that eventually could satisfy people’s quest for meaning (Boswijk et al. 2007: 11). Hence their distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Yet they go beyond Pine and Gilmore’s position on the memorability of experiences. To their mind, people no longer find meaning in a memorable experience as such, but rather want to integrate their memorable experiences into a larger complex of meaning that embraces all experiences in a coherent and meaningful way, which leads them to coining the construct ‘meaningful experiences’, as explicated earlier. The question arises: is this construct logically consistent with the analysis made of its two components, ‘meaning’ and ‘experience’?
It is clear that meaning and experience are both fuzzy concepts. Does this apply to ‘meaningful experiences’ as well? To start with, the distinction between ‘experience’ and ‘meaningful experience’ seems rather artificial, since an experience is always interpreted and therefore always carries meaning of some kind. Even when an immediate experience has not yet been interpreted within the range of cumulative experiences, the individual allocates (preliminary) meaning to it. It could be positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant. Therefore, it is arguably plausible to hold that the ‘meaning’ component in this construct should receive prominence over the ‘experience’ component, since meaning is determinative for understanding the construct. The position Boswijk and colleagues take on Erlebnis and Erfahrung actually confirms this statement. They hold that the difference between these two ‘kinds’ of experiences lies in the emotions that are evoked by the immediate, sensual perception of what happened in a specific event or situation on the one hand, and the emotional impact of the sum of all interactions a person has on the other. A meaningful experience is related to reflection on and awareness of the value and direction of one’s personal life and one’s perception of the overall meaning of life as such.
This is, for example, reflected in Frankl’s seminal work on the nature, relevance and function of meaning in psychology. He identified several sources that are instrumental to experiencing meaning. These are ‘creating a work or doing a deed; experiencing goodness, truth and beauty; experiencing nature and culture and through encountering another unique being through loving them’ (Reker 2000:161). Much work has been done on meaning since then. Boswijk and colleagues identify ten characteristics of a meaningful experience which are based on empirical psychological study. These are: focus and utter concentration, altered sense of time, being touched emotionally, the process having intrinsic value, contact with the essence of the ‘object’, feeling of playfulness and pleasure, both active involvement and receptivity, feeling of being in control, balance between challenge and personal capacities, and a clear objective (2011: 3). Extensive research has also been done on the sources of meaning. Schnell, for instance, identifies twenty-six sources of meaning that can be grouped into four higher order dimensions: ‘vertical and horizontal self-transcendence; self-actualisation; order, and well-being and relatedness’ (Damásio et al. 2013: 1207).
People create or have meaningful experiences in different settings. Sometimes one specific setting harbours enough preconditions for facilitating a meaningful experience, while in other cases the individual will need an array of supplementary settings in order to ultimately have a meaningful experience. The economical domain is therefore not the only domain in which meaningful experiences can be realised. Individuals also find meaning in the personal sphere through expectations, ambitions, interests and concerns; in the sociocultural environment through contact with family, groups and the role one plays in the workplace or a club, and also in the physical environment through location, space and place. The meaningfulness of the ‘object’ of experience is in all of these contexts dependent on the way people experience time (Boswijk et al. 2007: 32–33). In addition, the meaning generated or found in a specific setting or domain of life could be in conflict with the meaning found in another domain of life. Yet the meaning of all the experiences gained in one or more domains of life depends on the perception an individual has of the overall meaning of his or her life (Steger and Dik 2009: 317). Meanings can therefore be of a different – lower or higher – order and can be contributive or subordinate to ultimate meaning in life.
‘Making meaning’ entails both the meaning allocated to or received from activity, experience and connectedness and the gratification derived from it (Muthert 2007: 189). It also relates to a ‘personal relationship to the world in which a person situates his/her own life within a broad frame of meanings such that experiences of purpose, value, coherence, connectedness, transcendence, competence, recognition, well-being and being motivated are the result’ (Alma and Smaling 2000: 23). Thus, the construct ‘meaningful experience’ is arguably the conceptual and evaluative referent of the interplay between activity or event and the nature of the related feelings of connectedness and gratification that an individual has. The ‘meaning’ component of this construct carries, as indicated, de facto more weight than the ‘experience’ component.
What, then, is the relationship between leisure, meaning and experience? Quite some interesting work has been done on this topic. Erik Cohen, for example, is known for the model called ‘modes of tourist experience’, which he introduced back in the 1970s (1979). His model focuses on the degree to which the individual takes distance from everyday life and moves towards the unknown and the Other. It is a movement from the centre of everyday reality towards a ‘centre-out-there’, being a point of orientation that lies outside the home environment. Everyday experiences are transformed or replaced by modes of experience that Cohen typifies as the recreational (keyword: entertainment), the diversionary (keywords: recharging energy), the experiential (keyword: (staged) authenticity), the experimental (keywords: recovering oneself) and the existential (keywords: ultimate nostalgia). Barnett, for example, approaches the structure of leisure experience from another perspective and identifies four dimensions or constructs she calls awareness, boredom, challenge and distress. This is to denote the kinds of experience which, in this case, young people attribute to activities performed in their free time (Barnett 2005: 131). However, Jaap Lengkeek modifies Cohen’s model and replaces the modes of experiences with metaphorical concepts. He bases his argument on Potter’s idea of ‘out-thereness’ as opposed to Cohen’s notion of ‘centre-out-there’. ‘Centres-out-there’ are manifold and fundamentally part of reality. They do not stand on their own, while ‘out-there-ness’ does have an independent quality. It presupposes the presence of the imaginative that, in turn, is expressed in and through metaphorical narration. A tourism experience – as a ‘centre-outthere’ – is to Lengkeek’s mind nothing more than the temporary replacement of one everyday reality with another everyday reality (Lengkeek 2001: 176). ‘Out-there-ness’ goes beyond ‘centres-out-there’ in the sense that it integrates ‘meaning, concepts and sensory observation’ whereby sensory observation is continuously placed in new contexts. In this way contexts are infused with new meaning (2001: 179). It stays dynamic. Therefore, Lengkeek holds, the concept ‘out-there-ness’ fits leisure experiences better, because they do not relate to solidified centres, but rather to ‘orientations and metaphorical references’ (2001: 180). The modes of experience expressed in metaphorical orientations, that suspend everyday reality, are the following: amusement (carefree separation from the ordinary); change (disassociation from everyday reality); interest (fantasy and attraction); rapture (climax of the suspension of the ordinary and the inaccessibility of the Other leading to amazement) and mastering (revealing the unknown and the birth of new beliefs regarding the previously unreachable ‘out-there-ness’) (2001: 81–182). John Kelly thinks along the same lines and conceives leisure as a modality of existence that is fed with actions and meanings that are infused from the imaginary into the real world. Leisure is an ‘autotelic and self-justifying experience’ that is not only shaped by different factors, but also shapes the external world (Kelly 2012: 242).
Another scholar, Michael Watkins, has done very interesting phenomenographic research on the way leisure meanings emerge and the different ways in which people experience the meanings of leisure (Watkins 2000, 2013; Watkins and Bond 2007; Watkins and Schulz 2007). He goes beyond the positions of both leisure science scholars, who accentuate the ‘inner world of mental processes’, and leisure studies scholars, who accentuate the ‘outer world of socio-cultural forces’ when studying the meanings of leisure. Watkins reflects on the phenomenal, contextual, temporal and valuational meanings of leisure simultaneously (Watkins and Bond 2007: 289–290). He distinguishes between four qualitatively different meanings of leisure, namely passing time; exercising choice; escaping pressure; and achieving fulfilment. The complexity of these leisure meanings varies according to dimensions such as context, intention, time, act, emotion and outcome (Watkins and Schulz 2007: 484). The outcomes of his research concur to a great extent with work done by other scholars (Watkins and Bond 2007: 303–304). Watkins claims to have demonstrated that leisure, phenomenologically speaking, is ‘a unified system of interrelated aspects and meanings’ with ‘variations in the structure of awareness’, of which, in turn, the phenomenal, contextual and temporal relationships are directly related to the experience of leisure itself. Meaning is understood as a ‘continuum of experiences’ that displays different levels of understanding (Watkins and Bond 2007: 303–305).
Ross Neville has another take on the relationship between leisure and experience. He assesses that leisure has been identified with either ‘through’ or ‘with’ experience (2014: 5). As far as the first scenario is concerned, leisure through experience, he puts forward that leisure has received an ‘evaluative-hedonic function’ (for example, expressed in consumer behaviour) that in extreme cases ‘took on a metaphysical position about the true character of leisure’, which, in turn, shows a correspondence between affective outcomes of leisure and individual states of mind (2014: 5). This is to say that the semantic function of leisure has gained more ground. The study of leisure could use qualitative, phenomenological and/or hermeneutical approaches to trace ‘units of meaning back to individuals’ experiences’ as an alternative way to describe leisure (2014: 5). Experiences are also regarded – apart from being a means to reveal the meanings of leisure – as the pivotal point around which these meanings revolve. This implies that the search for the purpose and meaning of leisure goes via epistemological inquiries into the inner lives of individuals (2014: 6). As far as the second scenario is concerned, leisure with experience, Neville detects an ontological or metaphysical commitment instead of an epistemological one. Leisure-as-experience supersedes activity or behaviour by being ‘a sphere of felt life’. It ‘elicits meaning without productivity’ and enables scholars to engage with a state of being that has been left aside for quite some time now. It relates to those forces of life that ‘refresh and renew’ (2014: 6). Therefore, he opts for a ‘meaning holism’ instead of ‘meaning experientialism’. Experience should not be seen as the beginning or method of reflection on leisure, but should, as a concept, be subjected to understanding itself. It should be conceived in ‘relational terms’ and as ‘an outcome of many agentive forces interacting’ (Neville 2014: 10–11). Leisure is, apart from ‘free time, non-obligatory time out of work, not work, a state of mind, a state of Being, skholē, an obligation to self-work’, Neville holds, above all: experience (2014: 11).
Some scholars express reservations about the way leisure and experience are connected. To mention only two: Charles Sylvester and Ken Roberts. Sylvester wants to demystify, as he calls it, the experience concept in the study of leisure. He argues that experience is increasingly seen as a tool for creating pleasure whereas the value of leisure experience for ‘healthier, more creative and more benevolent people’ does not receive the same attention. Experience should therefore not be regarded as a ‘state of consciousness’ or a ‘state of mind’: it limits experience to a private and subjective matter that embraces sensations, memories and emotions, while neglecting shared and communal experience (Sylvester 2008: 32). The experience concept should be replaced by themes like health, welfare and well-being (Sylvester 2008: 35) because – inspired by Jefferson – their inclination towards happiness includes the interests of others. In this sense leisure experience becomes virtuous: it embraces the involvement of others and expresses care and benevolence (Sylvester 2008: 37–38). ‘Valued – experiences’, the ‘experience of virtue’, go beyond the notion of pleasure conceived as a subjective sensation. It relates to the pleasure that arises from happiness. This concurs with the search for the meaning of leisure. Roberts wants to nuance the criticism on the place ‘residual leisure’ (‘left over’ time and money) should get in the study of leisure. He acknowledges that the problems ‘residual leisure’ creates for a wide range of issues in society (for example gender issues, violence, unemployment) give rise to the conceptualisation of leisure as experience (2006: 211–213). This movement was strengthened by the postmodern idea of the ‘decentring of leisure’ that was introduced by Chris Rojek into the study of leisure (1995). It entails ceasing to study phenomena ‘an sich’ (that is, apart from the perceptions and understandings people have of their experiences) and turning towards the meanings lay people ascribe to their leisure experiences. The study of these experiences produced two broad conceptions of leisure that people seek to realise in all areas of their lives: self-determination and fulfilment (Roberts 2006: 215, 221). Yet Roberts, considering the implications thereof for the sociological study of leisure, puts forward that experiential conceptualisation of leisure has its limitations as well. Apart from difficulties in doing empirical social research on leisure experience that covers large samples, it also creates a problem with assessing the nature of the meaning an experience could have when obtained in leisure time. How is it differentiated from a meaningful work experience, for example? People have ‘many kinds of experiences through their leisure’, which should all be studied, but not at the ‘expense of the conventional leisure concept’ (residual definitions) (Roberts 2006: 221). Roberts’ main point is that experiential definitions of leisure should be rejected while leisure experience should be studied.
All these different reflections on the interrelationships of leisure, experience and meaning are united in the fundamental philosophical notion of ‘the important’. ‘The important’ is a concept of value that cuts across other dimensions of leisure such as time, activity and space (Iwasaki 2008: 232). It lies embedded in the human quest for meaning and is therefore arguably the most essential feature of making or finding meaning. The scholarly investigations of the various functions or benefits of leisure experiences, or the ‘pathways to meaning’ such as well-being, positive identity, social connectivity, resilience and human development (Iwasaki 2008: 235), are part and parcel of one and the same process: finding meaning through pursuing the important. This leads back to Blackshaw’s position: leisure is dynamic and fluid, it is itself a process rather than a thing. Leisure, he claims, has become a hermeneutical exercise: it has ceased to be defined by ‘its good or bad aspects … work against leisure, serious leisure against casual leisure, leisure as freedom against leisure as constraint’ (Blackshaw 2010: 141–142). Rather, the essence of leisure lies in the search for pleasure, happiness and freedom, and its meaning has deepened into an appeal to ‘the unknown known’ – the secret of leisure that is uncovered in the search. Meaning in this sense does not refer to everyday meaning-making, but to ultimate or ontological meaning. Thus all orientations on the meaning of play, work, recreation, nature, art, sports, music, celebration, pleasure, fun, aesthetics, beauty, the sublime, time, health, well-being, happiness, travel, transcendence and so on conceived as leisure experiences (Erlebnis) can be seen as subsets of leisure as a meaningful experience (Erfahrung) that strives to get hold of the ‘importance’.
The hermeneutic turn in sociology gave rise to a more comprehensive approach to leisure. It has also lead to investigating leisure experiences, the meaning of leisure activities and the purpose and meaning of leisure itself. In addition, postmodernist thinking and the upswing of the experience economy also contributed to studying the experience and meaning of leisure. The purpose of this chapter was to reach some understanding of the attributes and antecedents of the concepts ‘meaning’, ‘experience’ and ‘meaningful experiences’ and their relatedness to leisure. This was based on philosophical reflection and conceptual analysis, and the work that has been done by scholars from different academic disciplines, including leisure.
‘Meaning’ is a dynamic concept that relates either to the linguistic sense or significance of a word or text, or to the significance of the interplay between activity, experience of, and the gratification derived from it. This chapter deals with meaning in its broader, non-linguistic use. Meaning relates to different phenomenological levels, for example the everyday and the ultimate, or the horizontal and the vertical. Everyday meaning rests upon non-reflected experience, whereas ultimate meaning refers to the purpose and direction an individual envisages for her life. The horizontal dimension of meaning relates to what happens between people and the vertical dimension relates to what happens between the individual and a higher, transcendent power or ideal. Another distinction that could be made is the search for meaning in life and the search searching for the meaning of life. In both cases no general, universally valid answers can be given.
As far as ‘experience’ is concerned: its definitional and operational properties remain largely elusive. What is clear, though, is that experience has both an objective and a subjective component. The subjective quality of an experience entails the feelings, knowledge, consciousness and relationship an individual has towards the object of the experience (content of an event or activity). It could be related to art, sports, reading, being in nature or performing an activity in nature, attending a theatre, making a trip to a foreign country, watching TV, having sex, and many more. Experience could have a positive or negative quality and displays either an Erlebnis or Erfahrung character. Whereas Erlebnis (experience) relates to the emotional response to sensory, immediate observation of or participation in events, Erfahrung (meaningful experiences) relates to the understanding of Erlebnis against the background of the sum of all experiences and meanings an individual could have. However, in order to have a complete understanding of the subjective quality of an experience it is important to reflect on both modes: the ‘doing-mode’ and the ‘being-mode’ of experience. The ‘being-mode’ facilitates awareness about connection with others, nature and the transcendent, and therefore conveys a more complete picture of human experience. In order to understand the epistemological quality of an experience (for example, its truth claims) it is untenable to ignore the discursive content of experience and to not acknowledge it as a basis for human knowledge. Feminist scholars have argued plausibly that experience should be studied within their contexts and self-reflection on personal experience be promoted. It concurs with what Gadamer calls the ‘subjectivisation of experience’ which is regarded as the basis for a philosophy of life that is critical of modern society (Neville 2014: 2–3).
‘Meaningful experience’, then, is a construct depicting the conceptual and evaluative referent of the interplay between activity or event and the nature of the related feelings of connectedness and gratification that an individual has. The ‘meaning’ component of this construct carries de facto more weight than the ‘experience’ component, although experience in the sense of Erlebnis also has meaning of some kind. It would therefore be more plausible to describe and define experience by virtue of the kinds of meaning they have. Kekes advocates a pluralism of meanings which all point towards a happy life and well-being. Wong relates it to a sense of purpose, understanding, responsible action and evaluating one’s own life.
The interplay between leisure and meaningful experiences has received broad attention from different perspectives within the study of leisure. Cohen, for example, focuses on different modes of experience in the context of tourism which he calls the recreational, diversionary, experiential, experimental and existential modes, while Watkins identifies passing time, exercising choice, escaping pressure and achieving fulfilment as indicators for the experiences people have of the meanings of leisure. Meaning is seen as a continuum of experiences with different levels of understanding. Neville puts forward that leisure is inseparably linked to experience. In fact, he holds, leisure is experience and can be identified through and with experience. The search for the purpose and meaning of leisure goes either via epistemological inquiries into the inner lives of individuals, or via a sphere of felt life that transcends mere leisure activity or behaviour. Critics of the way ‘experience’ is used within the study of leisure argue that, as a state of mind or a state of consciousness, it is too narrow and subjective to cover the full reach of leisure experience. The communal aspect of experience should be taken into consideration as well. This leads Neville to propose that scholars should rather investigate ‘valued experiences’ such as health, welfare and well-being because they go beyond leisure as a mere subjective sensation and concurs with the kind of gratification that is part of happiness. Roberts advises researchers to ignore experiential definitions of leisure because they cause problems when trying to assess the nature of the meaning an experience could have when obtained in leisure time. Nevertheless, he is in favour of studying leisure experiences themselves.
To come to a ‘general’ conclusion regarding the connection between leisure and meaningful experience: the ontological relationship between leisure and experience, not to mention the conceptualisation of ‘leisure experience’ and its meaning(s) to people, still remains evasive. It all depends on the answer to the question: ‘what is leisure’? Blackshaw holds leisure to be liquid and firmly believes that the question about its very essence is unanswerable. Leisure is just too dynamic and its meaning has deepened into an appeal to ‘the unknown known’. The secret of leisure is uncovered in the search for what human beings render to be ‘the important’ in their lives, which arguably is a prefiguration of what is regarded as the meaning of their lives. The question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ seems rather pretentious, because it suggests that a singular act of explanation could embrace the meaning of the totality of existence. Yet there is arguably enough (conceptual and empirical) evidence to assume that leisure does appear to be able to convey at least a portion of an answer, even though the question itself seems rather unintelligible. If human beings are able to, in leisure (time), (try to) create a life they want to live and that is inspired by the important, they must just, now and then, understand themselves, life and the universe a little bit better (Bouwer and Van Leeuwen 2013: 595).
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