The idea of leisure has been conceptualised, expressed, preserved and changed over time. The different historical representations of leisure that have been explicated in the first chapter start with the leisure ideal advocated by the ancient Greek philosophers, entailing the centrality of the good life and human happiness, and end – full circle – with the modern view of leisure as a positive science that is instrumental to human flourishing and happiness. It has been noted that the whole range of different leisure ideas seem somehow related to ‘the very essence of being or becoming human’. The essence of being or becoming human, in turn, relates to the ontological question about what (human) life essentially is. Possible answer(s) to this question circle around naturalistic, biological statements like ‘life is a process of dynamic renewal’, ‘all life is cellular’, ‘life is based on DNA software’ (Venter 2012); psycho-biological statements like it is associated with a ‘capacity for mental activities such as perception and thought’ or philosophical descriptions like ‘life is the characteristic property of living substances or things’ (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1999: 504) or ‘life may be considered as a landscape through which we travel in different ways’ (Naess 2002: xi).
These ‘digital’ and ‘poetic’ descriptions of the essence of life are not necessarily each other’s counterparts or opposites. They can both live in one and the same chest as Yacobi demonstrates: ‘life is a process of dynamic renewal, characterized mainly by metabolism, reproduction, internal regulation, growth and adaptation’ (2014: 40) but ‘life is also a series of moments and memories. Some of these have to be endured and others, who are more agreeable, are perceived or interpreted as good’ (2015: 90). Painter-Morland takes the ‘cohabitation’ of these two perspectives a step further by connecting the animate and inanimate to each other in quite a profound way. In following Deleuze, she argues that inanimate life should not be regarded as the ‘passive object of man’s activities’, but rather as having the ‘capacity for agency’ itself (2013: 492). Life is seen as ‘material forces and flows’ (2013: 484) which ‘becomes the capacity to affect and be affected’ – also in relation to nature (2013: 493). Both modalities of life complement what human beings conceive as reality and give way to the ontological notion that life essentially is about ‘experimenting with different kinds of “becomings” ’ (2013: 492). In this line of thinking the ‘essence of being’ or ‘becoming human’ could be conceived as a dynamic state or endeavour that embraces and integrates the personal, social and natural or environmental. (Human) life emerges from human interactions with these domains, is given form in these domains and is led by humans in these domains. This calls forth philosophical questions like ‘what then is the nature of these interactions?’. Does life have an ultimate end or meaning, or a specific value? How do human beings (attempt to) realise what is perceived to be life’s end? Or – as concluded at the end of Chapter 3 – how do individuals uncover ‘the important’ in their lives?
These questions have occupied the minds of scholars for centuries now and are from a philosophical perspective characterised as ethical questions. Ethics has to do with life and is, among others, defined as ‘the study of life’ (Painter-Morland 2013: 484), a ‘discipline that reflects normatively on practical human life’ (Den Hartogh et al. 2013: 15), the art of living, depicting life as ‘the material out of which … we are gradually constructing a work of art’ (Thompson 2010: 13), the concern with ‘how people ought to conduct their lives’ (Sylvester 1987: 173) or seeking ‘a reasoned defence of how we ought to live’ (DesJardins 2014: 14). This resonates with the major philosophical concern of the ancient Greeks: ‘how can one live a good life?’. This was the leading question Plato and Aristotle, for example, reflected upon. As has been explicated in Chapter 1, Plato held that living a good life boiled down to making the right choices and doing the right things through involvement in play. And for Aristotle ethics was linked to the understanding of human life. He put forward that the pursuit of a good life was guaranteed by involvement in or having leisure (skholē), perceived as the highest ideal humans should strive for. The adjective ‘good’ in the ‘good life’ is fundamentally a normative concept and is linked to leisure. The connection between this ideal of leisure and ethics therefore seems inextricably tight.
Yet, despite the presupposed centrality and principality of the relationship between leisure and ethics, leisure scholars acknowledge that an omission of ‘ethical considerations in contemporary models of leisure’ exists (Lovelock 2015). This has lead to a call for papers issued by The Annals of Leisure Research in 2015 that will address ethical issues in the field of leisure. In another vein, the World Leisure Journal (Robertson 2015) detected the need for reflecting on happiness and sent out a call for papers – also in 2015 – that address the interrelationships between leisure and happiness – an issue that also touches upon the very nature of leisure, as will become clear further on. These foundational issues seem to be back in the centre of scholarly attention (again).
The aim of this chapter is to philosophically address the (inter)relationships between leisure and ethics against the background of the ontological value they have for reflection on the leisure idea. First, the question about the nature of ethics will be investigated by reflecting on its basic concepts, the nature of moral reflection, the most common approaches regarding theory and the possible end(s) or purpose of the good life. Second, the way leisure scholars have perceived and addressed the connection between leisure and ethics will be put to the fore and, third, an attempt will be made to further explore their interconnectedness and construct the foundational basis of a leisure ethic.
Ethics, also conceived as moral philosophy, is one of the five main domains of philosophy. The other four are epistemology (the study of knowledge), metaphysics (the study of the nature of reality) aesthetics (the study of values in art or beauty) and logic (the study of argumentation and the principles for sound reasoning). Ethics relates to what is morally good or bad, right or wrong conduct. It studies moral values, beliefs, principles and theory. But fundamentally, ethics addresses only one question: ‘how should we live our lives?’ (DesJardins 2014: 13). This section reflects on the nature of ethics, approaches to the study of ethics and the end(s) or purpose of (good) human life.
Two key concepts used for situating and clarifying the nature of ethics are ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. These two concepts demarcate the study of human behaviour in the context of moral philosophy. And yet, there is no consensus about their exact meanings. Some scholars use them interchangeably (e.g. Cohen 2004: 12). Singer (2015) attributes this lack of conceptual consensus to the way ‘ethics’ is understood: it is associated with a discipline that has morality as its subject of study, but it is also equated with it. Other scholars make a distinction between them – sometimes in quite different ways. Ethics, for example, is – apart from reflection on right and wrong behaviour – also associated with ‘personal preferences, emotional responses, religious beliefs, social expectations and genetic determinism’ (Lynn 2007: 790). This makes the domain of ethics rather bigger. As far as ‘morality’ is concerned, the philosopher Rachels deems it impossible to come up with ‘a simple uncontroversial definition’ of what it actually is. There are just too many conceptions of what it means to live a moral life (1999: 1). Yet, when one reflects on the connections between the nature of knowledge and ‘beliefs and justification’ it is for the sake of epistemological clarity quite important to make a distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. The ideal to reach universal consensus based on one single principle could be greatly jeopardised when it is confronted with cultural diversity (Batteau and Trainor 2014: 98–99). Now, what do these two, closely related, concepts etymologically mean?
The term ‘ethics’ is derived from the Greek ethikos, which, in turn, comes from the word ‘ethos’. ‘Ethos’ means ‘habit, custom, conventional’ (DesJardins 2014: 14) or ‘character, manners’ (Skorupski 2003: 203). This has lead to ethics focusing on the rules and conventions of a society or community that steer the conduct of its members on the one hand, but also on the feelings of people and their reasons for acting in a specific way, on the other (Skorupski 2003: 204). ‘Morality’ is derived from the Latin word mos (plural mores) and also means ‘custom’. In popular usage ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are seen as synonyms. And – as indicated earlier – (some) scholars use them as synonyms as well, because morality refers to a way of life in which the norms and values of a society or community are reflected. This formulation shows a big overlap with the description of the meaning of ethics. Ten Have et al. point out that ‘morality’ can be used in two ways: it can have a more general (or broader) meaning that is analogous to ‘ethics’ depicting conduct that is in accordance with the conventions of a certain society or community, or a specific (or narrow) meaning that is synonymous with positive qualifications like ‘good, desirable, right or permissible’ (1998: 10). The opposites of ‘morality’ in the general sense of the word are ‘a-moral, or non-moral or non-ethical’, and its opposite in its specific meaning is ‘immoral’. When it comes to making sound moral or ethical decisions, Rachels holds, one needs to underpin one’s arguments with good reasons and also consider the interests of everyone involved. This he calls the ‘the minimum conception of morality’ (1999: 19), which should be taken as a starting point irrespective of the theory used. So, for the purpose of this section it is sufficient to conclude that ‘ethics’ as a discipline, as moral philosophy, refers to the study of the language of morality, the justification of ethical norms and the development of congruent ethical theories (Knoepffler 2009: 18). In other words, it concerns the ‘study of morality and the application of reason to elucidate specific rules and principles that determine right and wrong for a given situation’ (Crane and Matten 2007: 8). ‘Morality’, in turn, is concerned with ‘the norms, values, and beliefs embedded in social processes which define right and wrong for an individual or a community’ (Crane and Matten 2007: 8).
Ethics is therefore rationalised and codified morality and has been subjected to reflection, study and debate for more than 2000 years. Philosophical renditions of the foundations of morality have shifted over time (Burns 2008:13). It would therefore go too far to convey a complete sketch of the historical development of moral thinking over the past centuries. For the purpose of this chapter, only a few lines will be drawn which reflect only on the major ethical positions in history.
Ethics originated when people started to reflect on the best way to live their lives. In the premodern era, philosophers looked for the foundations of morality in ‘the nature of man, his place in the cosmos, and his constitutive relationship with the divine’ (Burns 2008: 9). To act morally was to realise one’s very nature. Metaphysics and teleology (telos means ‘purpose’) steered moral thinking in this period. In the modern era, the limelight turned towards the human mind. Knowledge ‘begins not with metaphysics or teleology but with epistemology’ (Burns 2008: 11). Human beings cannot know the things themselves, but can only realise understanding when they deem the object of knowing to be ‘sensible’ and empirical. Thought itself becomes the new foundation of moral thinking and reality consists of mechanical processes. This leads to the Kantian notion that morality yields ‘categorical imperatives’, meaning that human behaviour can be steered by universally valid principles. The ‘post’-modern period founds moral thinking (largely, but not solely) in language and action, which enhances the accessibility to the moral domain. Pre-existing entities are rejected as unsuitable and invalid for building foundations. Moral questions should be analysed on the basis of the consequences of human behaviour. At the same time, the need for theories that provide ontological foundations for morality became stronger in the moral discourse towards the end of the previous century.
This very brief (and incomplete) historical sketch can be seen as the bedrock of a variety of ethical theories that the modern ethicist has inherited. There is no theoretical consensus about moral issues, their fundamental nature and the principles that could be implemented in solving ethical dilemmas (Baggini and Fosl 2013: xv). Yet, in order to get a general view of the broad domain ethics is concerned with, it can be helpful to distinguish between the major areas of study and the ethical approaches they embrace.
Different ways of organising ethics can be traced in literature. One way of mapping the terrain of ethics is to distinguish between theoretical ethics and applied or practical ethics (Gras-Dijkstra 2009: 97) – despite the fact that applied ethics fully incorporates theoretical ethics. Theoretical ethics – as one of the pillars upholding the roof of ethics – is oriented towards the criteria that explain the essence of morality and is usually divided into three branches: meta-ethics (is concerned with the nature of moral judgement and the foundations or principles of ethical theory), descriptive ethics (studies the beliefs of people about morality) and normative ethics (examines the standards and principles applied to assess the rightness or wrongness of actions themselves, and is therefore sometimes called ‘prescriptive’). In turn, normative ethics – in reflecting on the moral or ethical quality of behaviour or an action – applies different ethical approaches that can be characterised either as ‘traditional’ or ‘contemporary’ (Gras-Dijkstra 2009: 100). Traditional ethical approaches entail three main ethical theories called deontology (focuses on the duties to be followed and the principles that lead to right and good actions), teleology – also called ‘consequentialism’ – (focuses on the goal of an action and the consequences that behaviour has for self or others) and virtue ethics (focuses on the quality of character one should acquire in order to be able to act in a good or right way). Consequentialism is probably the most widely used approach to moral decision-making in ethics and is based on the philosophical assumption that all action is aimed at a specific goal and that all that is has an inherent purpose (telos). The main theories that resort to consequentialist approaches are utilitarianism (looking for the greatest good or happiness for the greatest number of people), hedonism (pursuing pleasure or happiness as a goal in life) and egoism (acting to the benefit of oneself) (Thompson 2010: 71–79). Contemporary ethical approaches can be roughly divided into three categories as well. They are the ethics of (human) rights, fairness and justice; ethics of care, empathy and compassion; and virtue ethics, which is a refinement and further clarification of the traditional virtue ethics. Modern theories of virtue ethics also reflect on the character traits of the actor, but broaden its scope to include eudaimonism (the final goal of action is human flourishing, well-being or happiness) and phronesis (having practical wisdom in order to decide which virtue is applicable in a specific situation) (Gras-Dijkstra 2009: 131).
The other pillar that upholds the roof of ethics is applied or practical ethics. It might look like a contradiction in terms, since ethics fundamentally is concerned with practice and therefore by definition ‘applied’ or ‘practical’. Yet the concept ‘applied’ was coined and ‘institutionalised’ due to moral discourses about, for example, the legitimacy of war, freedom and sexuality, civil rights and developments in the field of medicine that dominated the public domain in the United States from the 1960s onward (Haldane 2003: 492). Professionals in different fields experienced the need to reflect on the responsibilities they have and the moral edges to which their actions could take them. Different fields of application have seen the light such as business ethics, medical or bioethics, ethics of law, media ethics, environmental ethics, animal ethics, consumer ethics and also leisure and tourism ethics. So, applied ethics studies the way in which moral awareness has been put into practice (by professionals); and the way in which theory could be or has been implemented (by professionals) with the purpose of solving ethical dilemmas within a specific realm of reality. However, it should be noted that some scholars make a distinction between ‘applied’ and ‘practical’ ethics. Lynn, for example, regards ‘applied’ ethics as the application of ‘the answers from theoretical ethics to concrete cases in a top-down, linear and deductive manner’, whereas ‘practical’ ethics ‘seeks out the best answer by integrating what we learn from a concrete case about a moral problem and the conceptual insights that help us best understand and resolve that moral problem’ (2007: 791). Practical ethics, in his mind, is concerned with hermeneutics: it is ‘an ethics that is simultaneously conceptually rich and situated in real life’ and that seeks moral understanding by ‘accounting for person’s intentions, concepts, meanings, interpretations and communications’ (Lynn 2000: 6).
There are more ways of plotting the study domain of ethics. One way relates to filtering out the ‘thematic content’ from the rather structural explication given above by proceeding from four meta-ethical perspectives, namely virtue, rights, utility and care and starting to argue from there towards happiness and flourishing (based on virtue); justice, fairness and autonomy (based on rights); pleasure and fulfilment (based on utility and use); and relationality without constraint or pressure (based on care and empathy) (Picard 2013: 59). Another approach also starts with meta-ethics (explicating the foundational assumptions, conceptualisation and classification of the main ethical positions), but proceeds to fundamental ethics (reflecting on norms and values and the foundational structuring of ethics) and closes with specific fields or domains in which norms and values are applied and conflicts and dilemmas are identified (Knoepffler 2009: 15). However, whatever the mode in which the study of ethics is structured or organised, the foundational aim – as explicated above – remains the same, namely to reflect on the preconditions for leading a good life and/or on the different kinds of becoming (human). Reflection on leading a good life or becoming human embraces an ethical dialogue that has two functions overlapping each other. On the one hand, it utilises ethical ‘critique’ in examining how ‘worldviews, social institutions, decisions and actions’ affect human lives (Lynn 2007: 791). This could be labelled ‘mode 1 ethics’. On the other hand, reflection on the preconditions for leading a good life also includes ethical ‘vision’. Vision is utilised to anticipate ways of improving human life; of optimising ‘becoming’ in the sense of ‘proactively pressing for positive changes in states-of-affairs that are either wrong or in need of improvement’ (Lynn 2007: 791). This second function of ethics could be labelled ‘mode 2 ethics’.
In concluding this paragraph, a few lines will be dedicated to the end or purpose of ‘the good life’. According to Sylvester an end refers to conceiving something as being good in itself; as having intrinsic goodness and which therefore ‘is chosen for its own sake’ (1987: 174). The end, purpose or ultimate value of the good life, then, can be seen as the encompassing ethical goal towards which human behaviour and actions are directed. As indicated earlier, Aristotle holds this ethical goal of the good life, or the highest aim in human life, to be eudaimonia. The concept ‘eudaimonia’, the highest human good, consists of two Greek terms, namely, eu (good) and daimon (god, spirit, demon). Eudaimonia literally means ‘good spirit’ or ‘blessed with good godliness’ (Holowchak 2004: xi) or ‘being true to one’s inner self’ (Begum et al. 2014: 314). It is usually translated into English as ‘happiness’.
In modern times scholars from a wide range of disciplines have attempted to fill happiness with conceptual meaning such as ‘the greatest good, pleasure, highest level of satisfaction, the power to overcome fears, obeying God or having a good conscience’ (Begum et al. 2014: 314); a condition of enjoyment and feeling good (Layard 2005: 12); feeling excited (young people) or peaceful (elderly people) (Mogilner et al. 2011: 401). Yet, apart from ‘pleasure’, philosophers also conceive happiness as virtue, the ‘fulfilment of human nature’, ‘our natural end’ and ‘something impossible for us to obtain’ (Pawelski 2013: 247). There exists no universal consensus about the exact meaning of happiness since it is quite subjective and individually bounded. However, the attitude, life view or moral stance that takes happiness to be the ultimate goal or end of life is called hedonism.
Hedonism, broadly speaking, is concerned with ‘maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain’ (Peterson 2006: 78). This applies to both sensory or bodily and intellectual pleasures (Thompson 2010: 74). Hedonism is about human well-being (Stebbins 2014: 28) and influences moral choice and drives human behaviour. Ayn Rand warns that happiness should not be taken as a standard, an abstract principle that steers human choice and behaviour in the ‘achievement of a concrete specific purpose’, but rather as the ‘purpose of ethics’. She holds that happiness can be achieved best by accepting one’s life as one’s primary concern and pursuing the ‘rational values it requires’, but not by posing it as an undefined primary concern that steers one’s life (Moen 2012: 115). Although Rand’s position on morality and ethics evokes resistance in a wide circle of philosophers due to its egoist foundation, her warning to be critical of the ‘standard’ that leads human action should be taken seriously.
But ‘eudaimonia’ harbours other meanings than ‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’ alone. Huta, for example, argues that it is better to translate eudaimonia as ‘flourishing or excellence’, since Aristotle’s explication of eudaimonia transcends or encompasses the happiness denotation. Aristotle holds eudaimonia to be ‘active behaviour that exhibits excellence or virtue in accordance with reason and contemplation’ (2013: 202). Eudaimonia is the end or purpose of a life that expresses both intellectual virtues (practical and pure theoretical thinking) and character (or moral) virtues. Although all three kinds of virtue are deemed important for the good life, Aristotle favours the pure theoretical virtues that can be reached through contemplation (Brown 2003: 611–612). Whereas ‘happiness’ refers to moral goodness only when activities have lead to it (Brown 2003: 612), eudaimonia is about self-fulfilment (Yacobi 2015: 85), and, conceived as flourishing or excellence, it fundamentally embraces ‘moral goodness as an integral part of the good life’ (Brown 2003: 612, emphasis ours).
In sum, living a life that is good is a ‘way of being’ (Van Zyl 2015: 184) and leads to eudaimonia (happiness/well-being, flourishing/excellence). Hedonic approaches mostly focus on those actions that lead to happiness and evaluate them either on deontological or consequentialist bases, while eudaimonic approaches are more concerned with the worth and value humans allocate to issues in life, and the way these values are reflected in ‘feelings, reactions, attitudes and desires’. They ponder upon the question of what kind of human being one wants to be (Van Zyl 2015: 184) and therefore often consult virtue ethics.
This section explores how leisure scholars have conceived the interconnections between ‘contemporary’ leisure and ethics. Interest in this connection emerged relatively late in the twentieth century, and the scholarly spirit to explore their interconnections is still quite half-hearted. A random consultation of a few major works in the field of leisure studies published in previous years shows an explicit entry or chapter on leisure and ethics to be completely lacking (for example, Bull et al. 2003; Cross 2004; Rojek et al. 2006; Opaschowski 2008; Best 2010; Blackshaw 2013). Sylvester’s study of academic literature between 1900 and 1983 that in one or another way relates play, leisure and recreation to the highest good (an ultimate end) seems to form a prelude to what would become an increasing, yet unsteady stream of publications from the 1990s onwards. Sylvester identifies the factors typifying the ends of play, leisure and recreation as ‘religion, the intrinsic value of self-expressive activity and associations with art, freedom and happiness’, and the factors typifying the means as ‘free time’ and ‘refreshment’ (1987: 181–182). The ultimate end of life, the authors under investigation hold, rests on ethical beliefs that are instrumental in shaping human lives. Ethical beliefs are foundational, but also have practical implications. The nature of those beliefs is not generally agreed upon, which entails that the meanings attached to the ultimate ends of leisure, for instance, call for different solutions to problems (Sylvester 1987: 183). Thus the good life is expressed in different domains of life – as is the case with leisure. Both the good life and leisure ‘entail high levels of personal control, more widely expressions of freedom, and greater citizen empowerment’ (Sylvester 1987: 183).
The keynote address that Harold Smith, president-elect of the American Association For Leisure and Recreation (AALR), gave on the Intermountain Leisure Symposium in 1987 arguably sparked off interest in and research on the interconnections between leisure and ethics (Smith 1987: 6–7). He noticed that the AALR’s cause of enhancing ‘life and living’, c.q. ‘quality of life’ mainly focused on an ‘environmental ethic’ and pleaded to complement it with what he called a ‘human ethic’ (Smith 1987: 7). The study of the impact of alcohol abuse on the lives of people should also consider the values that steered activities within the realm of quality of life. At the end of his speech, Smith announced the initiation of two initiatives in the years to come: first, the establishment of an ethical code in leisure and recreation and second, the organisation of the first international symposium on leisure and ethics in Boston in 1989.
The proceedings of this symposium in 1989 were published in an anthology titled Leisure and Ethics: Reflections on the Philosophy of Leisure (Fain 1991), and were meant to stimulate academic reflection and discussion. The collection is framed by five themes: leisure, ethics and philosophy; moral life and professional practice in leisure science and service; moral development and leisure experience; global perspectives on leisure; and multidisciplinary works in leisure and ethics (1991: 327). The contributions revolve around the moral implications of leisure in different domains of society such as culture, games, management, sports, recreation and education against the background of – as the subtitle suggests – the philosophy of leisure. Philosophical issues discussed regard moral leisure, classical leisure, liberty and leisure, democracy, the good life and transcendence, theology and the environment. Fain states, in confirming De Grazia’s analysis, that leisure as an ideal has been lost in modern society and replaced by ‘an ideal of free time or of the good life’ which especially materialises in ‘the people’s enjoyment of whatever industry produces’ (1991: 9). Leisure should be conceptualised as a value-laden concept again since freedom and moral reflection belong to its very core. In addition, it is not to be conceived as ‘one thing, one time or one state of being’ since it means ‘different things to the same people over time’ (Fain 1991: 23). Because leisure is the ‘freedom to choose how one “ought” to live’, it requires moral reflection on questions like ‘what “ought” I to do?’, ‘what “ought” I to be?’ and ‘what “ought” I to become?’ (Fain 1991: 30, 316). This moral connection with leisure, Kaplan expected, would lead to philosophy receiving a more substantial place in the leisure discourse than was the case at the time (twenty-five years ago) (Kaplan 1991: 44), but, looking back, it was not the case. Where ethics was indeed studied in relation to moral dilemmas within the field of leisure, philosophical reflection stayed behind. Applied ethics gained more ground than theoretical philosophical dialogue with leisure and was connected to a vast array of sectors within the leisure industry. It will be demonstrated next by explicating the place ethics received within two relatively large leisure sectors: recreation and tourism. In each case, several examples will be mentioned, which will be concluded by philosophical reflection from a leisure scholar.
First, as far as the dialogue between recreation and ethics is concerned: McNamee and Brackenridge build a case for integrating philosophy into the study of leisure and by reflecting on the scope of ethics in leisure research they take a first step in reflecting on this connection (1998: 28). They noticed that applied ethics was gaining terrain in different sectors of academia and society and saw it appearing in leisure publications as well. They distinguish between ethics as social science and ethics as moral philosophy. In the first case, sexual issues like sadomasochism and nightclubs, women and rural deprivation, delinquency, gender issues, tourism, sports were mentioned, but not subjected to moral analysis (1998: 30). In the second case, ethics as moral philosophy, McNamee and Brackenridge identify themes that they regard fit for an agenda for leisure research. These items concern sexual harassment and abuse, fair play and coaching – all in the context of sports. Ethical reflection should include policies, codes of conduct and practice, organisers, coaches, players, service delivery and management (1998: 32). Five years later, in his entry on ethics in the Encyclopedia of Leisure and Outdoor Recreation (2003: 155–157), McNamee mentions several emerging fields in leisure that, to his mind, would call for ethical reflection in the years to come. These are business ethics, environmental ethics, existential ethics, feminist ethics, management ethics and sports ethics. He lays a firm theoretical basis and as a right-minded educator demonstrates patiently what impact deontological, consequential and virtue-based theories could have on ethical decision-making – especially in the environmental ethical domain. McNamee’s main concern regards the issue of leisure rights because, in maximising leisure opportunities for as many as possible, individual and minority rights are often ignored or even violated (2003: 155).
McLean and Yoder put forward that recreation and leisure services are not presented in a moral vacuum. These services exceed mere pleasure and fun and have to reckon with the ethical responsibilities of the personnel towards clients, colleagues, society and nature (2005: 7). McLean and Yoder draw attention to themes like sexual harassment, safety, whistle-blowing, gambling, marketing, natural environment, professional behaviour, codes of ethics, culture, tourism and therapeutic recreation, and especially focus on the techniques and processes that can be used to solve moral dilemmas in professional practice.
Henderson zooms in on the relationship between sustainability and leisure and, like McNamee, addresses the interferences between the negative impact of overconsumption and pollution on the environment (2014: 71). She emphasises, on the one hand, the leisure rights people have from a justice perspective, but also the universal responsibility mankind has for ‘the integrity of humans and the conservation of environmental resources’ on the other (2014: 77). Leisure should focus on the way the principle of justice could be applied in favour of a better life for people and formulating policies in support of that. For Henderson the biggest challenge is that justice and sustainability link ‘diversity with unity, freedom with common good, short-term with long-term objectives for personal lifestyles, professional practice and leisure scholarship’ (2014: 77).
Van Leeuwen offers theoretical-philosophical support for contemplating the relationship between leisure and ethics. The central question regarding this relationship is ‘what am I allowed to do in my leisure time?’. In looking for an ‘answer’ he identifies principles in the leisure domain itself that could give direction to individuals when trying to make the right choices, or which could be effective when they evaluate aberrant or deviant forms of leisure (2011: 48). These principles are related to both the economic and psychological domains. The economic realm with its focus on the maximisation of profit is often the prime context in which leisure activities are deployed, whereas the psychological realm relates to the ways in which people consciously attempt to realise their freedom of choice in a meaningful manner. It also relates to the ability to tolerate the choices of others. (2011: 48). Van Leeuwen focuses on the psychological aspect. Two factors that frame or stimulate ethical awareness are laws and personal responsibility. He takes life to be a playground on which ethical awareness and a good leisure life could be exercised. Life harbours chances for encounters and adventures which could enhance self-development. It is all about implementing ‘playfulness’ – a hidden structure in the leisure concept itself – in different practices of life. (2011: 51). Through sports, for example, people can learn how to be competitive; how to exert ‘fair play’ and do justice; how to be cooperative and unselfish; and how to cherish a healthy body and a healthy spirit (2011: 50).
The second sector to be addressed is tourism. Castañeda points out that, between 1960 and 1980, tourism was viewed either as intrinsically ‘good’ or intrinsically ‘bad’ (2012: 47). This judgement rests upon the impact tourism had on different sectors in society. It was considered ‘good’ when it enhanced economic potential and quality of life, and ‘bad’ when it corrupted cultures, fostered crime, destroyed the environment and spread diseases (AIDS) (Ahmed et al. 1994: 38). The negative impacts, at least at the beginning of the 1990s, were categorised under the headings of ‘development ethics in the Third World; social and physical impacts resulting from tourism; and the ethical nature of the actions of individual travellers’ (Fennell and Malloy 2007: 28). Castañeda argues that the notion of ‘good or bad’ should not be leading in ethical reflection within this sector, because using it as a guide boils down to a moralisation of tourism, which is quite monolithic in character. It should rather pursue an ‘ethicalisation’ of tourism, which takes both pros and cons of activities, as well as its beneficiaries and victims, into account.
Lovelock and Lovelock support this position. They also regard the ‘impact-approach’ within tourism as a failure and advocate a sustainable tourism that goes beyond being a mere process, that is ‘more than impacts or outcomes and more than staying within laws and regulations’. Sustainable tourism should be conceptualised as an ethic itself (Lovelock and Lovelock 2013: 8). This has lead to defining the ‘obligations, duties and responsibilities’ of agents and also to reflecting on the ethical value of the ‘planning, design, implementation, development and regulation of tourism’ (Castañeda 2012: 48). In addition, it also resulted in the establishment of different codes of ethics such as the Tourism Bill of Rights and Tourism Code (1985) and a Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (1999/2007).
To be brief: a business ethics model is currently driving ethical reflection within the tourism sector. It occurs on different levels. All stakeholders involved, professionalism and related principles of good behaviour, the interactions between employees, with customers, society, the environment and other life forms are also taken into consideration when reflecting on the relationship between ethics and tourism. Important practical issues mentioned in literature are, among others, the effects of tourism on poverty, human rights, indigenous peoples, corruption, pricing, marketing, climate, animals, children (sex tourism and child labour), waste, hunting, medical tourism and disability (Lovelock and Lovelock 2013; De Leeuw and Kannekens 2013: 235–239). Ethical reflection within the tourism sector has – apart from the applied ethical approach towards the issues mentioned above – mainly become focused on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of businesses in the sector and, more specifically, on sustainable tourism and environmental ethics. This is because of the current global sense of urgency regarding climate change. Yet there are scholars that criticise this development. Burns, for example, on a more philosophical level, pleads for an ethical approach within academia and professional practice that overcomes the instrumental value of the tourism ‘product’ (people, cities, landscapes, artefacts, etc.). By this she means that, in trying to satisfy the personal pleasure and needs of ‘the customer’, the ‘product’ should not be marketed in terms of economic objects and commodities, but in terms of its intrinsic value (2015: 124). People, cities, landscapes, places, artefacts and animals have a higher value than consumptive value alone. Reflection on sustainable tourism should be complemented with tourism ethics in general.
Welten conveyed similar critique on the current one-sided focus on the environment and climate. The social aspect of sustainable tourism threatens to be lost out of sight. Central to the phenomenon of tourism is the tourist himself. The tourist sector cannot answer the question ‘when am I a good tourist?’ (Welten 2013: 153). Only the tourist can account for his own attitudes, expectations and behaviour in a world that is not to be conceived as a wish list, but as the stage on which human beings form their identities. Welten regards the tourist as a cosmopolitan that embodies – in the words of Appiah – an ethics in the world of strangers (Welten 2013: 176). The core of the cosmopolitan ethics is hospitality, a mentality or attitude which does justice to both one’s own frame of reference and to that of the stranger – by being open to self and other and by realising a meaningful encounter between ‘me and them’. The cosmopolitan transcends the embarrassing tourist gaze, acknowledges the collateral damage which artificial ethical labelling of tourism as ‘good for the economy’ or ‘community-based tourism’ can cause, and cherishes the redistribution of freedoms (Bauman) (Welten 2013: 176). The cosmopolitan is able to transcend the incarnated freedom of a tourist who is looking for ‘real life out there’ where the other is often regarded as a mere object. Through hospitality, the other receives a face again.
How do these pursuits relate to the postmodern notion of ‘liquid leisure’? Blackshaw, who offers his own account of the construct, says relatively little about the ethics of liquid leisure, but there are some leads in his 2010 book. For instance, he puts forward: ‘leisure itself does not include ethics of any kind, but when people freely engage in leisure together they establish their own ethics’ (2010: 47). He also holds that value statements about leisure can only have valid conceptual meaning if it reckons with the different categories of leisure practices, which entails a ‘good of its kind rule’ (2010: 46). This position seems to be oriented towards the good that is to be realised in activity and interaction, and less towards the good life as a ‘way of being’ or a ‘way of becoming’. However, although he did not work it out extensively, there is another lead in his liquid leisure paradigm that steers towards reflection on the interrelationship between ethics, leisure and postmodernity. It is the notion of the ‘art of life’ (2010: 148). The art of life, Blackshaw poses, is related to ‘self-government’ (2010: 145); it is ‘an individual concern’ depicting an ‘autonomous and authentic life’ that fundamentally has an ‘interdependent responsibility for the self and the Other’ which forms the basis for a ‘universalizable ethical mode of existence’. The art of life offers the potential for being one’s own ‘completed self’ (2010: 150). It is about wisdom. It is about the very essence of skholē. This calls for reflection on the foundations of a leisure ethic, which arguably is intrinsically connected to the notion of the ‘art of life’.
An ethic can be seen as a set of moral principles or values that is pursued by an individual or group. It is a guiding philosophy or a kind of consciousness that has moral importance (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethics). An ethic denotes an end, a purpose or a major objective (Kaplan 1991: 42). A leisure ethic then – often contrasted with a work ethic – holds leisure itself to be a value base, an ultimate good that should be pursued for its own sake (Baumeister 1991: 129). More specifically, a leisure ethic is ‘related to one’s involvement in leisure, relaxation, playfulness and recreation as the main means to personal fulfilment and is independent of work attitudes, i.e. the ‘Protestant work ethic’ (Cunningham et al. 2012: 425). The value of leisure, Parr holds, is related to the fact that it is ‘an essential ingredient in living a fully human life’ and it serves ‘no other purpose than to reconnect with, to be at one with, the totality of human existence’ (2009: 91–92). Living a fully human life implicitly relates to living a good life, the pursuit of which, as Aristotle stated, is guaranteed by involvement in or having leisure. Hereby ethics and leisure are intrinsically tied together in their relatedness to a good life, to eudaimonia. As a guiding philosophy, or consciousness having moral importance, a leisure ethic could therefore arguably be seen as synonymous with an ‘art of life’. Both focus on a way of being, on becoming human, and in Blackshaw’s terms, on an autonomous and authentic life and an ethical mode of existence. The art of life has become a new and an important form of Western morality.
The art of life, philosophically taken, can briefly be described as learning to deal with oneself and the world in such a way that life becomes meaningful and good in accordance with a personal moral orientation (Dohmen 2014: 22). In making life a work of art, the subject – as the word ‘art’ indicates – is concerned about having a good life, learning the skills that belong to this form of art and making life beautiful (Van Tongeren 2014: 17–18). Throughout history, scholars have reflected on the question ‘how should I live?’. The ancient Greeks found the answer in practical wisdom that was, for example, characterised by self-knowledge (Socrates), moral education on behalf of the absolute good (Plato), virtue ethics (Aristotle), hedonism (Epicurus) and a kind of autonomy that is related to the universal reason (Stoics). A good life entails self-knowledge, another orientation and better habits, and should – according to the ancient Greeks – be exercised together with friends (Dohmen 2014: 22). The fundamental moral principle expressed in classical art of life is seen as self-care that, in turn, entails both an ethics and aesthetics of existence. It is about leading a good and beautiful life (Dohmen 2008: 55, 59).
In late modern times it was Hadot, who held philosophy to be a ‘way of life’ (Van Tongeren 2014: 111) that was cosmic-religious in nature, and Foucault who adopted the theme of self-care from the ancient Greeks, but criticised them for their belief in a naturalist essentialism, that depicted an absolute moral standard (Dohmen 2014: 22). Foucault believed that a modern art of life can never ignore the notions of power, freedom, governmentality and self-care.
Two important European exponents of an art-of-life philosophy in the twenty-first century are the German and Dutch philosophers Schmid (2002) and Dohmen. The golden thread in their philosophies is ‘self-responsibility’, which fundamentally is a moral or ethical category. ‘Self-responsibility’ presupposes an ethics of ‘self-realisation’, of optimal self-development. (Van Tongeren 2014: 121–122). It is an ideal of personal excellence which is especially expressed in acts that are related to praxis (not poiesis). This means that the purpose of life does not lie in its eventual product, but in the way in which it is realised (Dohmen 2010: 95). Concrete examples of current lifestyles reflecting an art of life can be found in life as a practice of freedom (expressed through maximum openness fed by continuous transcendence), spirituality (characterised by mysticism, spatiality, temporality, wisdom), Zen living (realises inner change in oneself), virtue-ethics (a life of excellence expressed by a character that nurtures style and gratification), hedonism (embraces pleasure, enjoyment and joy) and aesthetics (reflects the deeper dimensions of meaning, coherence and depth in life) (Dohmen 2008: 85–127). Van Tongeren concludes that modern art of life seems to be a remarkable mix of self-perfection; a flourishing, happy life that is indifferent towards that which does not lie within one’s power; and faith in autonomy and personal ability (2014: 132). The sociological pendant of ‘art of life’ is arguably Giddens’ notion of ‘life politics’. He holds it to be lifestyle politics that flows from ‘freedom of choice and generative power’ and creates ‘morally justifiable forms of life that will promote self-actualisation’, and develops ‘ethics concerning the issue “how should we live” … against the backdrop of existential questions’ (1991: 215). However, the art of life is fundamentally a positive endeavour that, although embracing ethical behaviour, does not specifically – and conceptually – focus on it. Neither is it concerned with the conveyance of information on good practices as such. It relates to living a good and beautiful personal life. Knowing how to live is called ‘wisdom’ (sofia and phronesis) and is a necessary condition of the good life (Osbeck and Robinson 2005: 82). ‘Art of life’ might therefore be regarded as a kind of ethics which could be designated as a mode 3 ethics.
The guiding philosophy behind a leisure ethic, then, could be seen as an art of life that revolves around self-care, self-development, self-perfection, self-realisation, self-responsibility within the framework of an ethics and aesthetics of existence. The leisure ethic fundamentally concerns self-morality, wisdom and becoming fully human with eudaimonia as the beckoning horizon.
There are different (kinds of) leisure ideas that all seem to be related to the essence of being or becoming human. Becoming human relates to the attempt to reach one’s destination in the flow of life, which itself is a dynamic process of change, adaptation and growth on different levels of aggregation in society. Philosophically speaking, life is all about experimenting with different kinds of becoming; it is about interacting with the different domains of life. This leads to posing ethical questions such as how human beings then experiment with becoming human and what they perceive the end of life to be. It is assumed that humans pursue ‘the important’ in their lives, which at least expresses a value that is regarded to be good. The quest for the ‘good life’ is what the ancient Greeks considered to be the leading question of philosophy. It is fundamentally an ethical question. Since the ancient Greeks regarded skholē as the highest ideal humans can strive for, it follows that a very firm connection between leisure and ethics can be presupposed. Despite this interconnection, leisure scholars did not do much work on the interrelationships between them. More specifically, theoretical-philosophical reflection on the interconnections between leisure and ethics lagged behind.
In exploring the possible connections between leisure and ethics, the nature of morality and ethics, ethical theory and the end(s) or purpose of the good life were explored first. Morality concerns the values, norms and beliefs that steer the behaviour of individuals or groups, while ethics – as moral philosophy – can be seen as the study of morality and the application of principles and rules in the judgement of right or wrong behaviour or practices. Three main forms of moral reasoning are usually applied when evaluating behaviour or practices: deontology, consequentialism and virtue-ethics. All three forms of reasoning are concerned with finding ‘answers’ to the primordial question of humanity: ‘how should we live our lives?’ or, a bit more formal: ‘what is a good life?’. Scholars usually regard the Aristotelian view of the end or purpose of (a good) life – ‘eudaimonia’ – as the leading principle for human behaviour. Eudaimonia is most often conceived as a hedonic category, which entails that human activity is essentially performed for the sake of happiness, pleasure and well-being and is often judged on the basis of deontological or consequentialist reasoning. However, another interpretation of this concept holds human flourishing and excellence to be central to becoming human. This (eudaimonic) perspective usually applies value-ethical reasoning in judging human behaviour and/or practices.
Leisure scholars mainly used an applied ethical approach to evaluate leisure practices. It has been demonstrated by work that has been done in two large fields of the leisure industry: recreation and tourism.
In the recreation sector, sexual harassment and abuse, fair play and coaching, but also policies, codes of conduct and practice, organisers, coaches, players, service delivery and management have been identified as themes of study when it comes to ethics. In addition, it has been stated that the principle of justice should be leading when considering the integrity of both human beings and the environment. Yet another perspective regards ‘playfulness’ as a leading moral principle within leisure practices, because it enables human self-development within the boundaries of the law and personal responsibility.
In the tourism sector, ethical reflection has moved from mere ‘impact-driven’ analysis of practices to a more comprehensive approach that embraces all stakeholders involved. This widens the scope of ethical reflection to include professionalism and related principles of good behaviour, the interactions between employees, with customers, society, the environment and other life forms as well. Issues like poverty, human rights, indigenous peoples, corruption, pricing, marketing, climate, animals, children (sex tourism and child labour), waste, hunting, medical tourism, disability and so on are more and more treated with the framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR) – as a central exponent of business ethics. The notion of cosmopolitanism has been conveyed as a central moral principle in the field of tourism. It means that people act as moral agents in a world of strangers by practising hospitality. ‘Real’ hospitality liberates the freedom of both the tourist and the local from its colonial constraints.
However, there is more to be said about the relationship between leisure and ethics than merely reflecting on the application of moral principles to leisure practices alone. The question about the ontological foundation of a leisure ethic has to be answered as well. The liquid leisure perspective portrayed by Blackshaw hints in the direction of an ‘answer’. It induces reflection on the notion of ‘the art of life’ – which is more and more seen as a new form of Western morality. The art of life is concerned with having a good life, learning the skills that belong to this form of art and making life beautiful. It is about self-care, wisdom, and an ethics and aesthetics of existence. The foundational layer underneath a leisure ethic concerns responsible self-development and wisdom beckoned by eudaimonia. This thesis induces the conclusion that ‘leisure’ should conceptually be distinguished from ‘free time (activities)’. Leisure is rather the structuring principle or ethic underneath free time (activities), since its scope is broader than activities and time alone. It is about becoming fully human.
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