Appendix 1: Impunity and accountability factors

Table A.1 Power holders and institutions that may affect impunity and accountability

Factor	Impunity	Accountability
Power distribution at moment of transition and over time	Little or no political replacement. Former authoritarians retain strong influence and secure exit guarantees by threatening authoritarian reversal or renewed violence. Power-sharing between former combatants, all of whom were implicated in atrocities and therefore have a shared interest in installing and preserving amnesty. Incoming authorities open to accountability but subject to veto players (economic and other elites) who oppose accountability.	Political alternation: authoritarian regime or combatant state is replaced by incoming political authorities not directly implicated in previous atrocities. Former authoritarians and previous combatants implicated in atrocities have limited or no residual political influence or veto power. May include transition by collapse (outgoing regime militarily, economically, or otherwise discredited). Negotiated or supervised replacement: international supervision or underwriting of transitional arrangements that requires minimum levels of HR and TJ compliance.
Role of military and police in formal political arrangements (where military/police were involved in atrocities)	Military/police retain strong formal or de facto political influence and are committed to defending former repressive actions. High command from periods of repression or political violence are not renewed or replaced. Military/police have high levels of formal and economic autonomy from civilian political institutions. Military justice system is allowed to deal with cases of alleged atrocity.	Subordination of military to civilian rule where civilian politicians have an interest in accountability. Reduced military influence in the political sphere: downsizing, geopolitical realignment, abandonment of National Security Doctrine. Military reform through generational replacement or modernisation (e.g. because of desire to participate in peacekeeping operations, for which minimum HR requirements apply).
Influence of other actors	High continuity in public administration. Majority public opinion and main sources of domestic political support are hostile or indifferent to accountability pressures.	Lustration, vetting, or gradual (generational) replacement of high-level civil servants and security forces personnel, and/or explicit recognition and repudiation by existing personnel of previous atrocities. Majority public opinion and/or minority activist groups with access to external support create political incentives for pro-accountability change.

Table A.2 Policies and prevailing norms that may affect impunity and accountability

Factor	Impunity	Accountability
Government and public policy discourse about past atrocities	Widespread official and public denial or justification of past atrocities. Calls for ‘turning the page’ on grounds that dealing more vigorously with the past will hinder reconciliation. Calls for understanding and forgiveness (in Latin America, often couched in Christian religious imagery and language and supported by ecclesiastical authorities). Ambiguous or evasive language about past atrocities; reluctance to assign specific or differential responsibility. Notion that both sides are equally to blame is known in Latin America as la teoría de los dos demonios (theory of the two demons).	Unequivocal social and official repudiation of past atrocities. Full accountability seen by new authorities as necessary for establishment of rule of law. Explicit commitment to overturning amnesty provisions. Commitment to a new social pact with state-citizen relationship recast on the basis of rights. Incoming authorities have HR issues central in their campaign and manifesto promises.
International environment	Prevalence of National Security Doctrine and/or War on Terror ideology. Close/strategic allies are sceptical of or hostile to TJ or international HR law. Regional multilateral HR institutions are non-existent or have little leverage over the country in question. Economic, military, or political dependence on anti-HR or anti-TJ entities.	Post-World War II evolution of norms away from impunity (reflected in creation of International Criminal Court, etc.). Close/strategic allies are committed to TJ and international HR law. Regional multilateral institutions have leverage and norm convergence around HR. Economic, military, or political dependence on pro-HR or pro-TJ entities.
Government and justice sector response to international environment	Absent or limited compliance with international HR norms and with decisions by regional/international courts and institutions.	High or increasing levels of compliance with international HR norms and with decisions by regional/international courts and institutions.

Table A.3 Legal–institutional factors that may affect impunity and accountability

Factor	Impunity	Accountability
Constitutional and institutional reform	Lack of constitutional/institutional reform.	New constitution, and/or reform of previously compromised or collusive institutions, to improve democratic responsiveness and/or respect for rights.
Justice sector	Formal justice system historically weak, institutionally underdeveloped, and/or lacking popular legitimacy or confidence of elites. Justice system previously instrumentalised by authoritarian regime or by one side in internal conflict in order to shield perpetrators.	Formal justice system historically strong, enjoying popular legitimacy and confidence of elites. High degrees of judicial independence, at both court level and level of individual judges.
Justice sector	Absent or limited justice sector reform, including personnel replacement; or reforms that deliberately or incidentally impede continuity of pre-reform investigations. Inquisitorial system maintained.	Substantial judicial reform, including generational change in key judicial figures and/or changes in their receptivity to accountability claims. Modernisation and technical change, especially strengthened police investigative and/or forensic capacity. Change from inquisitorial to adversarial system. (This shift took place in much of Latin America in the 1990s. Its effects are, in theory, indeterminate for accountability, as attitudes of new state prosecutors can vary. In practice, it is usually accompanied by strengthening of compliance with international standards.)
Creation of permanent human rights infrastructure	TJ and HR issues dealt with ad hoc and sporadically by mainstream institutions or political authorities, with little continuity.	Creation of dedicated TJ or HR entities with institutional solidity and public access (e.g. through an ombudsperson).

Table A.4 Other factors that may affect impunity and accountability

Factor	Impunity	Accountability
Level of continuing violence (political violence or common crime)	Persistence or irruptions of specific political violence (by state and/or non-state actors) may derail or inhibit TJMs. High or rising levels of common crime may reinforce authoritarian nostalgia, discredit HR discourse, lead to calls for hard-line policing (la mano dura), and discourage reform/reduction of security forces.	Steep fall in levels of political violence. Moderate or stable levels of common crime. Demobilisation or explicit abandonment of armed tactics by non-state combatants.
Civil society HR organising	Low levels of HR organising by civil society actors; civil society HR organising drops due to less urgent situation and/or loss of external support and funding. HR movement intentionally sidelined by incoming political forces.	Presence of significant number of civil society HR groups interested in deepening TJ actions. Groups acquire high traction or visibility through judicialisation and/or strategic domestic, regional, and international alliances. Incoming political forces receptive to demands from HR movement.
Demand for accountability	Limited demands by survivors/relatives for accountability due to desire to move on, absence of trust in judicial system, small numbers of survivors, fatalism or indifference as to likelihood of success, and fear of reprisal.	Strong demands for accountability. ‘Demand inflation’ may be based on earlier achievements or on demonstration effects of events in other countries (e.g. the ‘Pinochet effect’).
Profile of victims	Victims are predominantly rural, poor, or otherwise excluded groups with little organisational experience, few resources, and few external connections. Weak/unorganised exile community.	Victims are predominantly urban and middle class with organisational experience, access to resources, and strong national and/or international networks. Motivated, vocal, and organised exile community.
Proportion of population affected by fatal violence	Fatal violence affected a small sector of the population, such as a minority ethnic, religious, or political group, leading to invisibility. Fatal violence was widespread, affecting all sectors of the population, with so many deaths that accountability is not seen as feasible.	Fatal violence at levels that impede invisibility but do not paralyse demand for accountability or possible response.
Life-cycle issues	Perpetrators, victims, and their relatives may want to leave the past behind and allow the next generation to escape the legacy of violence.	Towards the ends of their lives, some survivors or victims’ relatives may want a last push to obtain closure. Some perpetrators may acquire a confessional impulse.
Public sympathy for former authoritarians or combatants	High levels of residual support for outgoing authoritarians or for one or both parties to the civil conflict. Low levels of social repudiation of past violence, with absent or muted repudiation by new authorities. Heroic myths: romantic portrayals of past violence by participants, media, or other influential actors. Discontent with current political or economic situation: authoritarian nostalgia and/or calls for radical or violent change.	Low levels of residual support for outgoing authoritarians or for one or both parties to the civil conflict. High levels of social repudiation of past violence, including clear repudiation by new authorities. Absence of heroic myths: past violence not portrayed in favourable terms by participants, media, or other influential actors. Level of economic and social stability permitting attention to and financing of unresolved TJ legacy questions.
Global networks	Restricted or censored citizen access to global networks of information, documentation, and HR organisations. No legislation mandates transparency or access to information.	Ample citizen access to and participation in global networks of information, documentation, and HR organisations (although former combatants and authoritarians can also be strengthened by network opportunities). Legislation on transparency and access to information is in place and enforced.
Unexpected and/or external events	Political unrest; new social or political violence such as assassination of a major political figure; major economic crisis; security emergency (including rise of organised crime and other illegitimate power-holding).	Revelations, accidental and otherwise, leading to new demands (e.g. discovery of Paraguay Terror Archive in 1992, scheduled US State Department declassifications, Pinochet arrest).

Note: HR = human rights; TJ = transitional justice; TJM = transitional justice mechanism.