CAPTAIN RENAULT: I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.
CASINO ATTENDANT: Your winnings, sir.
—CASABLANCA (MOVIE, 1942)
Gambling, Speculation, and Investment
IN THE PUBLIC EYE, it all looks like gambling, and sometimes it is. Wall Street confuses things further by calling all of its customers “investors.” Awkwardly, every investment involves some form of speculation about future events. More dangerously, many who believe that they are investing are actually speculating. The distinctions matter because investors gather information and manage risk and uncertainty differently than speculators.
My aim in this chapter is to warn you away from unintentional gambling and from speculating on prices, psychology, and topics that are unknowable. Unlike at casinos, most of the people who gamble on Wall Street aren’t aware that that’s what they are doing. Some categories of speculation deserve their bad reputation, while others are necessary for our whole capitalist system to exist. People speculate to prepare for the future when vital information is missing and sometimes unobtainable. In my opinion, you’ll invest more profitably if you speculate on factors that affect the stream of profits generated by an enterprise, rather than on market prices or crowd psychology.
The spectrum splits along two dimensions. First, event or holistic? Are you looking for an identifiable trigger or catalyst to produce a winning trade, or rather for a holistic (comprehensive, long-term) sense that capital and income are secure? Second, is this well-researched or not? Have you done thorough research, sloppy research, or none at all?
The possible combinations of an event-based trade with diligent, slapdash, and no investigation into whether the odds are favorable, are mapped out in table 3.1. I would call an event-based trade based on careful research a shrewd speculation. With casual research, it becomes a reckless speculation. With zero research, it’s gambling. Likewise, the same range of depth of research can be mapped out for holistic trades. An investment is the product of thorough research that indicates that capital is broadly secure and an adequate return should be earned. Cursory research and a holistic approach add up to a risky investment. A generalized faith that somehow everything will come up roses, without supporting evidence, is gambling.
Table 3.1
Possible Combinations of Levels of Research and Focus of Research
|
Event |
Holistic |
Thorough research |
Shrewd speculation |
Investment |
Sloppy research |
Reckless speculation |
Risky investment |
No research |
Gambling |
Gambling |
Know the Odds
Once you have grasped probability and statistics, gambling usually loses its charm. There’s a famous story about a team of card counters from MIT, but they weren’t gambling—because they had analyzed their chances. When you don’t know your odds, or care about them, gambling truly is a tax on ignorance. For example, suppose collectively lottery players get back only 65 percent of the proceeds from ticket sales. Probabilistically, you lose 35 percent of your money the second you buy the ticket. The final outcome is typically a complete loss.
I did once gamble in financial markets, but at the time I thought I was speculating on interest rates. I’m sure most stock market gamblers do it unwittingly, as I did. As I discuss later, I quickly made, and lost, what was then a huge amount of money to me, bullheadedly thinking that my early victory proved that I was right. Some telltale signs of gambling include betting on discrete events, near-instantaneous timelines, use of leverage, overcommitment to one story, and no way to gauge whether the odds are in your favor.
Unwise Speculations
Speculation, properly done, isn’t gambling. Like sex, speculation has a shady reputation but is universally practiced, often enjoyed, and none of us would be here without it. Going back to the Latin root word, speculare means “to observe or look out as from a watch tower.” The only way we can prepare for and possibly shape what fate brings us is if we observe and try to imagine it. Businesses must somehow anticipate what customers might want, where materials will come from, and the quantities required. Investing can’t be done without conceiving when and how capital might be in danger, or where it might be super-productive. The process of envisioning and creating the future can never be flawlessly logical, but without it rational economic man has no basis for his calculations.
Investors must unavoidably speculate, but many of the most popular topics of speculation are not amenable to research that gives them an edge. Among the most treacherous speculations are on share prices, commodity prices, and crowd psychology—unless you have something that can tell you that you are wrong, like a notion of fair value. If markets are efficient, past price movements should tell you nothing about the future path of prices. If true—and it is true enough—this means that research into historical price changes won’t be rewarded.
The logic of price momentum is shifting and fickle. Numerous studies have shown that in the short term, rising prices do accurately predict further gains, and declines accurately predict further losses, sometimes even more powerfully than indicators of value. About a year or so later, momentum starts to reverse, so traders must be nimble. In the Internet age, it seems utterly ridiculous that momentum reflects slow dissemination of information or underreaction to news. More likely, momentum reflects overreaction to news, social proof, and piling on. That said, companies often dribble out bad news, and the issues that cause falling profits are often slow to fix. Value buyers must ensure that their expectations have been shaken down enough.
Momentum is a fast-paced game with a complex interplay between how far out you look, and how far out you think the crowd is looking. Consider a game in which each participant enters a whole number between zero and one hundred. The winner is the one who chooses the number, rounding down, nearest to half the average guess of the other participants. So have you picked a number yet? Some people might enter fifty, which is the average of numbers between zero and one hundred. But if you are aiming for half of the average guess, you might divide fifty in half and pick twenty-five. Knowing that your opponents might also do that calculation, it might be better to guess twelve. Long-term investors try to look out as far as the eye can see. Further iterations would indicate six, three, and one. A mathematician would say that at the limit, the endgame is zero.
When this game is played in real life, the winners gaze a step or two ahead, but no further. Those who answered fifty or twenty-five weren’t thinking enough about second-order effects, the reactions to events. For example, a sharp spike in a commodity price will bring on more supply, which might blunt price momentum. Look slightly ahead and ask: If these are the obvious facts, how are others likely to respond? Because it’s a game, it all depends on who else is playing. Conversely, zero never wins in these games because other participants rarely consider how it ends. Still, to me, speculating on how long others will remain shortsighted verges on gambling.
Research into group behavior can pay off, but usually not with the exact date and number sought by speculators. Stock market bubbles occur when traders latch onto a compelling initial premise and extend the logic too far. Speculators take rising prices as proof that they were correct. Their error becomes apparent to them only in the fullness of time. People avoid reason until they have tried everything else. If you fancy that there will be clear signs as to when the party will wind down, as most speculators do, you will surely be drawn into the thundering herd, despite knowing the inevitable result.
The other set of impossible inquiries lies in the distant haze. For example, the current dividend yield of the S&P 500 is 2 percent. At that rate it would take you fifty years to recover your purchase cost in dividends. Should we therefore handicap whether in decades hence the economy will be in a boom, chugging along, or depressed? I don’t know enough to say. Instead, I look for situations in which it is less absurd to visualize the distant future and steer away from speculations that would be upended if I somehow did know the state of the economy decades out.
Speculations of Enterprise
Topics that are worth speculating on include whether management will make the right decisions when the time comes, whether an industry is prone to failure because of commoditization, obsolescence, or financial overreach, and what a security’s value might be. Because we’re anticipating responses to challenges and opportunities that have not yet presented themselves, no one really knows. However, the track records of executives and industries can provide useful indications. For example, bricks-and-mortar retailers will have to sell on the Internet, or risk being destroyed by Amazon. My speculations center on which categories of merchandise will move more slowly to the Internet, how Internet and in-store transactions might combine, and which chains have the systems and adaptability to serve customers in both formats.
It’s impossible to invest successfully in early stage biotech and Internet companies without speculating on whether the science works, whether customers will like the product, and how large the potential market might be. If you’re clueless about beta agonists or B2B CRM wave analytics, and why customers might want them, and you buy the shares anyway, you’re gambling. But for savvy insiders who are close to the industry, the payoffs can be incredible. Without the specialized category of extreme speculators called venture capitalists, many of these science projects would never get the cash needed to turn ideas into products. Progress depends on this sort of speculation, in which income and certainty about the future are afterthoughts.
Investors focus on the cash that can be paid out as dividends by a business over its whole life, while speculators key off discrete events. When a stock is pitched as a play on anything, stop. We are being offered a speculation that will succeed only if other factors are less decisive than the one in focus. For example, airline stocks are touted as plays on falling oil prices, but this trade might fail on weak traffic, fare price wars, labor disputes, or bungling management. In betting parlors you can pick identifiable risks, but with stocks the attractive risks are bundled with less attractive risks.
Certainty That Capital Is Safe and Returns Are Adequate
Ben Graham, the father of value investing, wrote, “An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return.” This opens up the issues of (a) what an adequate return would be, (b) how we judge that principal is safe, and (c) how much analysis is enough.
An adequate return is the greater of the rate currently available in the market or whatever you think is acceptable. While expected yields on bonds are readily quoted, for stocks they must be inferred, with a wide margin of error. Just because you require a higher return does not give it to you. In 2017, some bonds in Japan and Europe carried a negative yield, meaning bondholders get back fewer yen or euros in the future than they invested. Ugh! The alternatives are to hold cash or another asset, which may also offer lousy returns. An investment is always rooted in price and current circumstance; today, some investment-grade bonds (despite the label) are no longer investment vehicles.
If shares are partial interests in enterprises, not just numbers on a screen, the certainty we seek must emanate from the business itself. Training our minds on businesses rather than stock prices moves us in the right direction. We’re not equally equipped to analyze every security or industry, but if we focus on spots where we are conversant, we’ll be more certain that we’ve put together the evidence properly. By entrusting our capital only to honest and capable executives, we reduce the risk of malfeasance. Some industries are brutally competitive and change relentlessly, and some companies depend on the kindness of bankers. Go elsewhere, where there’s more safety.
With stocks, the certainty that the principal value is safe is more metaphorical than with bonds, but is quantitative in both cases. Buying a one-dollar security for sixty cents provides a wider margin of safety than paying eighty cents. However, value is a forecast, so my dollar might be your seventy cents. Other than cash, many accounting numbers are estimates, so one company’s dollar of earnings might be reported as a different number elsewhere. With stocks, safety of principal consists of an ample margin of safety calculated using prudent forecasts on a company following conservative accounting principles.
Diligent research increases certainty, both real and perceived. It also reaches a point of diminishing returns. Repeated exposure to variations on the same news can lead us to exaggerate its importance. Some information has a short shelf life and can become stale before a decision is reached. Our minds can handle only a limited number of facts at the same time—the consensus is around seven—so more inputs don’t improve decision-making. It’s more about recognizing patterns than about solving a polynomial equation. Above all, because we’re trying to foresee the remote future, some answers must remain forever murky.
Too many investors don’t think enough about information just slightly out of view and spend too much time on news that has been endlessly retweeted. After reviewing the quarterly earnings reports of a company for many years, I get a feel for which drivers matter. Getting that feel will take much longer if you review the reports only as they arrive rather than studying those that came before. Of course, news is available 24/7, and history takes digging. For the present-minded, a crooked or inept executive is newsworthy only if he or she has done something outrageous lately. Businesses that are overextended or suffering from changing times or competition draw attention only when they’re actively crashing.
Tilt the odds in your favor by viewing data over longer time horizons and through the lens of large statistical groups. For example, I can’t predict the day-to-day fluctuations of the market a year in advance, but I find it useful to know that, measured from their daily highs to their lows, there have been twenty-five 20 percent bear markets since 1928. Most unnerving! Oddly, the S&P 500 has had a total return loss worse than 20 percent in only six of those eighty-seven years. Many bear markets had been preceded by blow-off spikes or were followed by sharp snapback rallies that offset the worst of the damage within the year. Statistically, as observations are added over time (or more members of the group are observed), the central tendency is likely to emerge. Instead of making point estimates, I think of ranges.
Diversification can increase the certainty that unforeseen events won’t blow up your portfolio. The fortunes of some industries, like airlines, rise as those of others fall, like oil producers. If you really don’t want to speculate on oil prices, you might buy shares of an airline and an oil producer. While diversification reduces risk, it doesn’t go away, even when you diversify across the entire market. Investors in an S&P 500 index fund bear only that unavoidable market risk and not the idiosyncratic risks of specific stocks. However, if you are any good at judging value, over time you should expect to beat the market, and diversifying across a portfolio of undervalued stocks should reduce the chances of a total bomb.
Distracted from Value
Technology is an extension of human behavior, and while in some ways it makes us better investors, it is an even greater boon to gambling and pulls us toward it. The good news first: Modern search and screening software is a massive timesaver for locating statistically attractive securities. Google also makes it easier to find news articles, industry information, and competitive analysis. The EDGAR system, the federal online library of corporate annual reports, is a miraculous and underused resource. Earnings conference calls are usually now open to everyone, everywhere on the Web.
The Internet is also an advertising and news medium that competes for your attention, usually by appealing to your lizard brain. The commercial intent of the Internet is to distract you with ads; attention-grabbing items of doubtful provenance make great clickbait. All of this distraction leads to multitasking. If you’re doing multiple things at once, they all have to be pretty mindless. In that vein, here’s a vivid, probably apocryphal story: A New York investment analyst, while attending to her iPhone, stepped into traffic and perished. Don’t multitask while investing!
The average holding period for New York Stock Exchange–listed stocks has fallen from around seven years in 1960 to four months in 2016. These statistics are doubtless distorted by the most hyperactive traders, but I suspect median holding periods are shorter too. High-speed computer networks have made online trading cheap and super-easy, and now there’s an arms race among algorithmic traders. With dedicated on-exchange servers and data lines, high-speed traders have cut trade execution times to milliseconds. The ease, speed, and cost of trading are terrific, but they make it too easy to dart in and out of securities on a whim. Treasury bonds change hands several times a year, on average.
Keep Your Thinking Cap On
Speculation can appeal to us because it involves identified catalysts, specific situations, and finite timelines—but these can also be drawbacks. With equities, a specific play like fuel prices and airlines is occasionally derailed by factors that speculators had pushed to the background. Also, when you limit your ability to patiently wait until your idea bears fruit, your investments become more speculative. For example, options have a preset expiration date, and margin debt must be paid back, which involuntarily shortens your time horizon.
Here’s a quick checklist to be sure you actually are investing, not gambling:
1. Are you thinking about the profits of the enterprise as a whole, over time?
2. Have you investigated enough to feel fairly certain about your conclusions?
3. Will the business remain stable enough to say that your capital is secure?
4. Is it reasonable to expect an adequate return?
Investors in index funds will interpret these questions differently than stock-pickers. For indexers, the profits are for all five hundred of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s index (S&P 500), not a specific enterprise, so a different sort of investigation is required. Many of the sources of uncertainty for an individual stock—including crooked or inept management, obsolescence, and financial failure—are reduced by diversification. While the index is a very complete form, you can also diversify through individual stocks. Part V of this book looks more at the topic of what returns to expect, both for indexes and for specific stocks.