In his first inaugural address, President Thomas Jefferson urged a new spirit of unity in the wake of the most acrimonious campaign to date. “Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle,” the new president asserted, further declaiming, “We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans. We are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”
Unity and concord were uppermost in the president’s mind at the inauguration, and he quickly set out to govern under the impulse of this aspiration. Two trends that developed between Jefferson’s inauguration in 1801 and the campaign of 1804 helped to produce a calmer political climate: the growing popularity of Jefferson in response to notable achievements in his first term, and the continued growth of the Jeffersonian Republicans at the expense of the Federalists. It was becoming apparent that the party of Alexander Hamilton was waning in membership and influence. New England remained a Federalist stronghold, but the rest of the nation was gradually becoming dominated by the Republicans, increasing their influence in state legislatures as well as holding their gains in the federal Congress.
Jefferson’s administration negotiated the Louisiana Purchase, oversaw the expiration of the despised Alien and Sedition Acts, successfully deployed the navy led by Stephen Decatur in a heroic campaign against the Barbary pirates, and benefited from the end of hostilities with France (it is important to note that it was Federalist and former president John Adams who actually negotiated the resolution of the crisis). Moreover, Jefferson had allayed the concerns of more moderate Federalists by incorporating friendly policies toward commerce and manufacturing as well as sustaining Hamilton’s national bank, a branch being opened in New Orleans shortly after its acquisition from the French. In effect, Jefferson, whose political principles are universally contrasted against Hamilton’s, in practice adopted some Hamiltonian measures. Known for his record of criticizing the strong, activist, and ambitious executive recommended by Hamilton, President Jefferson would himself prove to be the strongest and most energetic chief executive to serve between Washington, the first president, and Andrew Jackson, the seventh. In sum, taxation was light, federal expenditures had been cut and the federal payroll reduced, the national debt cut by $6 million, and all the while the economy enjoyed a sustained period of growth.
By leaving untouched many of Hamilton’s economic programs, most notably the national bank, the opposition was deprived of its own ammunition. Federalists found it exceptionally difficult to mount a viable campaign against the popular Jefferson. They attempted to criticize the Louisiana Purchase, but Jefferson’s obvious coup in the peaceful acquisition of such an immense territory was difficult to challenge with any credibility, and certainly the American public was by and large not averse to the addition of an enormous tract of land that simultaneously cleared away an ambitious European power from the frontier. Their criticism of Jefferson’s defense policy could only fall on deaf ears in light of the intrepid Decatur mission (which was, in Lord Nelson’s view, “the most bold and daring act of the age”) and the resolve that Jefferson exhibited in protecting American interests abroad. Denied any real political traction, in the end, the Federalists were reduced to falling back on worn incriminations of Jefferson’s demagoguery and alleged atheism, scandalmongering about the president’s relationship with Sally Hemings, a slave attached to the Jefferson plantation at Monticello, and deriding the president for the inland beaching of a gunboat in a Georgia cornfield in the aftermath of a hurricane—an act of God that had nothing to do with the president and everything to do with his critics clutching at straws. Jefferson’s case for reelection in 1804 was as strong as any incumbent, then or now, could expect.
One of the more important features of the campaign and election of 1804 was the solidification of the caucus system, the first hint of which had informally appeared as early as 1796, and then again in 1800 under some noticeable criticism; but within four years of that controversial election, it would be taken for granted as routine. “King Caucus,” as it would come to be called, especially as a pejorative by its critics, was effectively employed by congressional Jeffersonian Republicans in the summer of 1804 and was reinforced as the preferred method of nominating candidates for president on into the early to mid-1820s. Jefferson had no problem receiving the unanimous endorsement of the Republican caucus in February 1804 (considered to have been the first real congressional nominating caucus in history, although it is believed that informal caucuses met in the two previous campaigns). But Vice President Burr, his political fortunes rapidly deteriorating, was no longer considered a viable candidate for the second spot on the ticket. A replacement was therefore needed, and the caucus overwhelmingly supported the candidacy of New York’s George Clinton, who received 67 out of 108 votes cast by the caucus, his nearest competitor, John Breckinridge of Kentucky, winning just 20—and the incumbent Burr winning none. (With the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in September 1804, the issue of which candidate was nominated for what office was now clear.) Burr, who was never trusted by Jefferson and who was nothing more than a vice president by title, ran for governor of New York but was soundly defeated, due in large part to Alexander Hamilton’s vehement—and highly personal—public opposition. The sudden collapse of Burr’s once promising political career was accelerated later that year when he repaid Hamilton with fatal pistol fire. Burr, who in 1800 tied Jefferson for Electoral College votes for the presidency, coming as close to any man in American history to winning the presidency without becoming president, had quickly become a pariah.
By and large, the Federalists were a party in trouble. They lacked both vigorous organization and popular appeal outside of New England (where they still remained strong), although some stalwarts were active in Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina. The new states recently admitted in the West were decidedly Republican. Unlike the Republicans, the Federalists did not adopt the caucus system, and throughout much of 1804, there was little discussion among Federalists about the nomination of a candidate for president. Without controversy, and largely through the support of Federalist-aligned newspapers, South Carolina’s Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, one of the heroes of the XYZ Affair, and New York’s Rufus King, a close ally of Hamilton, were tapped for the presidency and vice presidency, respectively. Once again, both parties carried forward the traditional North-South strategy. Republicans campaigned with enthusiasm throughout the various states and even promoted a set of doctrinal statements resembling a modern platform. But the Federalists were less inclined to participate in such popular politics. In some states, Federalist proponents were utterly invisible. However, several Federalists did seem to understand the need to make the party more accessible and appealing to the general voter. Before his death, a pragmatic Hamilton recommended that the party become more democratic in its procedures, admitting that the party needed to at least partially emulate the Republican style if it was to remain viable. While Republican political rallies and celebrations were more common, in some states the Federalists did make a show of it, but it was becoming clearer that the party was in danger of breaking apart. While some Federalists perceived the need for a more competitive presence in the campaign arena, other party leaders, particularly those in Congress, were simply not interested.
A group of Federalist diehards in New England, led by Fisher Ames, George Cabot, Stephen Higginson, Theophilus Parsons, and Timothy Pickering, confronted with what was to them the ignoble prospect of Republican domination in the rest of the Union, dramatically concluded that New England’s only hope was to secede from the Union. Forming what would be called the “Essex Junto,” as many of their members were from Essex County in Massachusetts, they appealed to Hamilton, whom they considered to be their philosophical inspiration, for support and leadership. Hamilton was unimpressed with their designs for secession and had abruptly spurned their overtures. Burr, Hamilton’s nemesis, has been thinly connected to this group, but the evidence as to his support of or participation in a secessionist conspiracy involving the Essex Junto is still a matter of controversy and likely untrue.
Jefferson and Pinckney attempted to remain aloof from campaigning, as was the custom of the time (operating under the prevailing maxim, “The gentleman does not seek the office, but the office seeks the gentleman”), and they succeeded, for the most part, in exhibiting a quiet detachment. The campaign did at times deteriorate into scandalmongering and character assassination, but it was nothing compared to the viciousness of the campaign of 1800, in part due to the realization from nearly all quarters that Jefferson’s reelection was guaranteed. Jefferson’s association with Sally Hemings was again trotted out by his opponents, and he was continually accused of harboring irreligious doctrines and questionable morals. Regarding the more relevant policy matters, some of the president’s critics attempted to take issue with the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, but these efforts were too difficult to take seriously. For the most part, Jefferson demurred to engage in any potshots against the Federalists, but at one point, he referred to the opposing party as a “prigarchy,” a swipe at the Federalists’ alleged “priggish” attitudes and “aristocratic” pretensions.
Electors were chosen more democratically throughout the Union in comparison with previous elections. Seven states chose their electors via at-large popular voting, and in four other states, selection was determined, with some variation, by district. State legislatures chose electors in only six out of the seventeen states, a marked change from four years earlier when ten of sixteen state legislatures selected electors. This represented a prevailing turnaround in attitudes regarding the selection of electors, indicating that a democratization of the process of presidential selection was under way.
It was no surprise to anyone that Jefferson won in a landslide. His 162 electoral votes was, at that time, the highest total number earned by any candidate for president since the institution of the Electoral College; conversely, Pinckney’s 14 votes was the worst showing of any candidate in a presidential election to that point. Owing to the Twelfth Amendment, the vote totals for the presidential and vice presidential candidates for the first time matched those of their running mates. Jefferson interpreted his triumph as a sign of renewed unity throughout the republic, and he wistfully reflected upon the late president Washington’s vision of a unified republic beyond the reach of the divisive effects of faction. That vision was shortly to be thwarted, as partisanship would regain its influence in subsequent campaigns. The election of 1804 was a landslide that hastened the unraveling of the Federalist Party; but it would soon become evident that the election of 1808 would give them a second chance.
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McDonald, Forrest. The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987.
Peterson, Merrill D. Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.