Despite a level of popularity during his incumbency reminiscent of Andrew Jackson and even George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, far and away the greatest president since Abraham Lincoln, decided to respect the informal two-term tradition by not seeking the 1908 Republican presidential nomination, even though it could have been easily his for the taking. From 1904 through 1908, Roosevelt had pursued an aggressive domestic and foreign affairs agenda. This was the age of muckrakers, or investigative journalists who scrutinized and exposed corruption and the abuse of power in politics and hardship and injustice in society as a whole, and Roosevelt was just the president suited to respond to this accordingly.
Additionally, the Roosevelt administration, in combination with a friendly Congress, addressed the serious problem of child labor, along with the debilitating working conditions for labor in general. The president and Congress responded to calls for reform in the insurance business and for closer supervision of the transportation industry (particularly the railroads) and interstate commerce; all told, the Republican president Roosevelt vigorously supported a major expansion of federal regulation extending deep into the private sector. The passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act provided for the establishment of the Food and Drug Administration. The Meat Inspection Act gave the Department of Agriculture responsibility for regulating the meatpacking industry. Roosevelt forthrightly spoke out and acted against the “dull, purblind folly of the very rich men; their greed and arrogance,” against “the least attractive and most sordid of all aristocracies which regarded power as expressed only by its basest and most brutal forms, that of mere money,” and “fortunes swollen beyond all healthy limits,” and he envisioned an American prosperity and power that was not won at the expense of the laboring class. For this reason, he is rightly numbered among the more progressive thinkers and politicians of his time, and certainly among the more reform-minded presidents in American history. Indeed, with the exception of President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, no president had been as actively committed to extensive social reform as Theodore Roosevelt had up to this point. For these and a number of other reasons, too many to detail here, Roosevelt would be a tough act to follow for any candidate.
As the administration moved into its final months, the leading candidates for the Republican nomination were initially two Ohioans: Secretary of War William Howard Taft, a close friend of Roosevelt’s who had vast experience in both the judicial (a former judge) and executive branches (serving in the administrations of presidents Harrison, McKinley, and Roosevelt); and Senator Joseph Foraker, who, as governor of Ohio in the 1880s, was appointed by Taft himself to his first post in public service, judge of the state superior court. Foraker and Taft were the only candidates who enjoyed any support at the national level. Taft was not a typical candidate. Not really a politician, Taft’s heart’s desire was to return to the bench and perhaps someday reach the Supreme Court (a dream eventually realized). By disposition more conservative than President Roosevelt, they had nonetheless struck up a strong friendship in the 1890s. In spite of Taft’s own tendency to think for himself, he was often perceived as a mere imitation of the Great Man, a perception that was scarcely justified. Foraker, who by the election of 1908 had grown to dislike Taft in spite of their past connection, was also conservative, and he joined Taft; the powerful Speaker of the House, Joseph B. Cannon of Illinois; and Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Elihu Root of New York (another close friend whom Roosevelt had initially considered his likely successor before eventually leaning toward Taft) as the candidates with the most initial support. Additionally, candidates such as Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, Charles Evans Hughes of New York, and Vice President Charles Fairbanks of Indiana drew the interests of party members who were seeking candidates who were viewed as either moderate or as leaning slightly toward the party’s Old Guard wing. The progressive wing of the party, associated with the president’s reformist vision, was represented most prominently by Robert M. La Follette Sr. of Wisconsin. Vice President Fairbanks also openly sought the nomination, but Taft was Roosevelt’s choice and had been so privately since at least late 1905, a preference that the president formally announced to the public in March 1907. Fairbanks, without Roosevelt’s support, was to be numbered among the also-rans.
For Taft, the president’s blessing was an endorsement that was difficult for anyone in the party to ignore. Still preferring a return to the service on the courts rather than election as chief executive, Taft admitted as late as the summer of 1908 that he would rather see Root or Cannon nominated; but after enough cajoling from Roosevelt, not a person easily refused, as well as from other members of the president’s cabinet and his wife, Helen Taft, he accepted the inevitable and assented to the Republican candidacy.
The Campaign of 1908 included the introduction of the presidential preference primary: a political event that some Republicans, such as Hughes, hoped would wean the nominating process away from the control of the influential political machines and their bosses. Although by some accounts the first official presidential primary occurred in Oregon in 1910, it is clear that the new approach to presidential selection was already under way at least two and perhaps even as much as six years prior. A forerunner of the primary had already been conducted by the Democratic Party in Florida during the Campaign of 1904, when voters within the general party participated in the selection of their delegates to the convention. In 1908, Republicans held primaries in four states: Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Ohio. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin chose delegates backing their favorite sons Knox and La Follette, respectively, while California indicated support for Taft. The significant primary occurred in Ohio, where two favorite sons, Taft and Foraker, were on the ballot, and where Taft won an impressive victory. This in effect abruptly eliminated Foraker as a serious candidate, and by the time of the convention, he was no longer under consideration. With Foraker now out of the way, Taft was without any serious challenge.
With the full blessing of President Roosevelt, the Republican Party decisively nominated Taft on the first ballot. Taft won 702 first-ballot votes to 262 for the rest of the field, Knox and Hughes leading the also-rans with 68 and 67 votes, respectively. The candidate from the progressive wing, La Follette, inspired only 25 votes. For the vice presidency, the convention chose, again on the first ballot, James S. Sherman, a member of the House of Representatives from New York. At the convention, a spontaneous, raucous celebration occurred in response to an affectionate tribute to Roosevelt, a display of emotion that was much more uplifting and protracted than the celebration that followed Taft’s nomination, a fact that was not lost on either the delegates at the convention or Taft himself. Roosevelt was out of the running, but it was clear that he was, by consensus and acclaim, still the party’s truest champion.
Once the encomiums for Roosevelt subsided, the Republicans turned to their platform, wherein they sought to abate major disagreements festering between the pro-business and progressive wings of the party. To keep the support of progressives, the platform endorsed shorter work hours for employees and a system to compensate employees for workplace injuries. The platform also endorsed legislation directed at providing greater workplace protection for women and children. To maintain the support of the business community, the platform reaffirmed the party’s commitment to protective tariffs and embraced what was called “reasonable regulation” of business. Unlike Roosevelt, Taft lacked credentials in the progressive movement. However, Taft went out of the way during the Campaign of 1908 to underplay his corporate ties and to highlight his strong support for the progressive policies of the Roosevelt years.
William Jennings Bryan had been the Democrats’ candidate in the Free Silver campaign of 1896 and again in the (quasi) anti-imperialism campaign of 1900, losing both times to McKinley and Roosevelt, respectively. Even more than President Roosevelt, Bryan’s name evoked the aspirations and ideals of progressivism, and he continued to embrace that vision as passionately as before. All the progressive positions were long held by Bryan, such as labor reform, regulation of industry, tariff reform, the banning of child labor, term limits, popular election of the U.S. Senate, the initiative and referendum, a federal income tax, bimetallism (although as an issue, it had diminished in importance), and foreign policy positions stripped of the imperialist hue associated with McKinley-Roosevelt. It was only in Bryan’s attitudes toward immigration (especially the controversial issue of Chinese immigrant labor, which he opposed and hoped to prevent) that he seemed to introduce an additive to his straight progressive line. More than Roosevelt, who was loath to engage in the rhetoric of class conflict, he excoriated the moneyed elite, openly regarding them to be a “menace to civilization.” For Bryan, monopolies, protective tariffs, a financial system that favored the rich, and imperialism were destroying the Constitution and the American system in general.
Still known as the Great Commoner, Bryan opposed privilege at every turn, demanding thorough and immediate reform in contrast to what he considered to be a feeble gradualist approach followed by the president, and he vehemently stood against those conservatives in his own party who wanted to repeat their failed strategy of the previous election when they nominated the Bourbon Democrat Alton B. Parker. Even though the Roosevelt administration was progressive and had supported many of Bryan’s proposed reforms, he continued to argue that the president’s “conservatism” diluted any real reforms and thus called for a “bold new program” that would finally deliver the decisive reforms that were really needed. Nonetheless, some in the media spoke of a possible alliance between Roosevelt Republicans and Bryan Democrats, a progressive Roosevelt-Bryan alliance, as it were, to push reform; and Roosevelt himself, who had once called Bryan a dangerous demagogue, now softened, referring to his old rival as “kindly” and well-meaning, and seemed amenable to working with the Bryan Democrats. But Bryan was less receptive to the idea; he regarded himself as the true radical, and he was not taken in by Roosevelt’s self-described label as a “progressive conservative.” Still, Bryanite (i.e., progressive) Democrats and progressive Republicans were in accord in many issues, and were capable of recognizing their common ground. Bryan once informed Roosevelt that the president would have his support when he agreed with his own positions, and in some cases he had endorsed Roosevelt’s actions. But when he found himself at odds with the president, he would speak with his customary intensity and boldness.
Additionally, Bryan’s religious views became more pronounced and publicly interwoven into his overall critique of American society, politics, and culture, and he increasingly exhibited an evangelical tone in his speeches and pronouncements. He viewed himself as a voice for the social gospel, which understood egalitarian social reform as a moral and political imperative directing all sincere Christians in an effort to promote a more just society. These social gospel views embraced by Bryan were in direct opposition to the then-popular “gospel of wealth,” a self-interest credo that justified the accumulation of riches, which had become a popular message for some during the Gilded Age especially but also into the early twentieth century. With President Roosevelt out of the running, Bryan was easily the most progressive major figure on the national scene. But Bryan would still have to overcome Roosevelt’s legacy and charisma.
The Democratic convention, which was held in Denver, the first western city to host a national nominating convention, tapped Bryan without controversy. Even his old rival, former president Grover Cleveland, put aside his former animosity toward Bryan and quietly stated his support. Bryan joined Cleveland as the only other candidate from a major party to earn three party nominations for the presidency (Cleveland’s were consecutive), an achievement that only Franklin Roosevelt would eventually surpass. Indiana’s John W. Kern was unanimously nominated for the second spot on the ticket. The progressive wing of the party had, over the past four years, successfully regained control of the party, rendering the Great Commoner’s nomination a rubber stamp. Still, the Bryanites realized the importance of party unity, particularly when going up against Taft, who might draw away some needed votes from the conservative wing of their own party. Therefore, much like the Republican platform, the Democratic platform sought to balance the concerns of conservative Democrats highly critical of increased government spending, and progressive Democrats who sought greater protections for workers and additional steps to reduce the concentration of economic wealth in corporate America. Consequently, the Democratic platform called for a significant reduction in government spending and opposed protective tariffs that produced revenue for the federal government to then, as the criticism held, simply waste. The platform also reaffirmed the exclusive authority of the states over matters of domestic concern. To satisfy the Bryanites, the platform called for much more vigorous enforcement of anti-trust laws, expansion of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the business practices of railroads, a constitutional amendment to permit the adoption of a personal income tax, the establishment of a department of labor to represent the interests of workers, and the establishment of a national bureau of health to safeguard the sanitary conditions of factories, mines, and tenements. Following Bryan’s lead, the platform also sharply criticized the imperialistic policies of recent Republican administrations.
Both the Socialist and Prohibition parties nominated presidential candidates. The Socialist Party again nominated, also for a third time, Eugene V. Debs of Wisconsin for the presidency, with Benjamin Hanford of New York as his running mate (for the second time). The Prohibition Party nominated Eugene W. Chafing of Illinois, to be joined by Ohio’s Aaron S. Watkins for the vice presidency.
Significantly, the Campaign of 1908 saw the first commercially recorded campaign speeches. At the request of the Thomas Edison National Phonograph Company, Bryan agreed to record a number of campaign speeches. Not wanting to be placed at a political disadvantage, Taft agreed to make recordings of a number of his campaign speeches. In the end, Bryan and Taft recorded some twenty-two campaign speeches. During the campaign, the recordings were frequently played at public meetings. Topics addressed by Bryan in his recordings included (1) imperialism, (2) popular election of senators, (3) the tariff question, (4) guaranty of bank deposits, (5) labor, (6) railroads, (7) trusts (monopolies), (8) the publication of campaign contributions, and (9) “swollen fortunes” and their effect on American democracy. In his recording on imperialism, for instance, Bryan called for the “independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government [could] be established.” Bryan’s speech on the guaranty of bank deposits proposed that all national banks should be required “to establish a guarantee fund for the prompt payment of the depositors of any insolvent national bank,” a policy that would eventually be established under a future president. Recorded topics addressed by Taft included (1) encomiums for President Roosevelt, (2) the military, (3) postal savings banks, (4) comments regarding the progress of African Americans, (5) claims that the Democratic Party prevented national prosperity, (6) the rights of labor, (7) the Republican Party as the party of agriculture, (8) the possible effect of a proposal for jury trials in contempt cases, (9) foreign dependencies (Taft had once served as governor of the Philippines), (10) foreign missions, (11) trusts, (12) the anticipated functions of a Taft administration, and, for the sake of levity, (13) Irish humor.
Naturally, the Republican campaign sought to portray Taft as the true successor to Theodore Roosevelt. Throughout the campaign, Taft took moderate or even progressive positions on a wide range of issues. In sharp contrast to previous Republican campaigns, the party found it necessary to send Taft out on the campaign trail. Taft was a capable campaigner, but he lacked the oratorical skills of Bryan. He had help from others, such as Knox, La Follette, Albert J. Beveridge (a historian and progressive senator from Indiana), and most importantly, President Roosevelt himself, the only man alive who could rhetorically outduel Bryan. Throughout the campaign, Bryan attempted to tie Taft and the Republican Party to big business and industry by attacking the Taft campaign for not making public the sources of its campaign contributions. As expected, Bryan depicted Taft and the Republican Party as the friend of high-finance fat cats and the enemy of workers and unions. Not surprisingly, Taft and the Republican campaign sought to define Taft as the best guardian of economic prosperity. An economic recovery in the summer of 1908, reversing setbacks experienced in the previous year, helped the Republicans in their arguments that they, not Bryan’s Democrats, were the party of growth. More conservative than Roosevelt, La Follette, and Beveridge, Taft attempted to downplay his ties to big business and industry by expressing support for the right of workers to join unions and to strike.
Political songs again made their way into the campaign. One such song, “Get on the Raft with Taft,” became the most popular Taft campaign song and slogan, and it included within the lyrics an interesting line: “Get on a raft with Taft. . . . He’ll save the country sure, boys, from Bryan, Hearst, and graft. So all join in, we’re sure to win. Get on a raft with Taft.” The phrase “from Bryan, Hearst, and graft” sought to remind voters of Bryan’s failure to effectively deal with the Standard Oil influence peddling scandal, which implicated high-level officials in both parties. During the middle of September 1908, powerful newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst released a number of letters indicating that a number of Republican as well as Democratic leaders had accepted payments from the Standard Oil Company in return for blocking legislation that the powerful company opposed. The letters implicated Republican senator Foraker of Ohio and Democratic governor Charles Haskell of Oklahoma in the influence-peddling scandal. Of particular embarrassment to the Bryan campaign, Haskell also served as the treasurer for the Democratic National Committee. The scandal initially seemed to favor Bryan, who had railed against the close relationship between big business and the Republican Party—Foraker had, after all, once been mentioned by some Republicans as a possible successor to Roosevelt. But Bryan’s inexplicable refusal to criticize Haskell permitted the Republican Party and President Roosevelt to expose the apparent hypocrisy and use the scandal to discredit Bryan’s incessant attacks against big business. Taft was afforded the luxury of not having to address the controversy, for Roosevelt eagerly took the lead in storming Bryan and challenging him to distance himself from Haskell. Although Haskell resigned as treasurer, the damage to Bryan’s campaign was already done.
As the election approached, Bryan lost confidence when facing Taft on policy and thus resorted to personal attacks. He criticized the religious beliefs of Taft, a Unitarian, arguing, apparently without consulting the Constitution, that rejection of the Trinity disqualified a man from holding the White House. Bryan also battled conservative elements within his own party who preferred the cautious policies of former president Cleveland. This led Bryan to soft-pedal some of his more progressive views and left him to fall back upon ad hominem tactics. Above all else, the potent combination of Taft’s own substantial credentials as an accomplished and dedicated public servant and Roosevelt’s prestige and energy made the GOP ticket formidable and, in the end, victorious.
The Bull Moose personally took the reins and charged forward, tirelessly campaigning on behalf of his friend and chosen heir. Bryan held a chance against Taft one-on-one; but he was thoroughly overshadowed by the progressive achievement and inexhaustible personal power of Taft’s irrepressible ally, the heroic Rough Rider. Frustrated again, the Great Commoner led his party in defeat a third time. On reflection, Taft recognized the critical role that his friend President Roosevelt had played in his own election, and he also acknowledged the importance of support from a unified business community that viewed the Great Commoner as undesirable, as well as drawing some votes from labor in the aftermath of Hearst’s unanswered attacks on Bryan. Taft was also helped by visible support from the Catholic and Jewish communities, two constituencies that represented solid and potentially pivotal voting blocs. Democratic crossover was also important, and Taft reminded reporters, “You must remember that I was elected by Democratic votes, probably polling almost as many as McKinley did in 1896.”
In the end, Taft won almost 7,700,000 popular votes and 321 electoral votes, carrying every state outside of the Democrats’ southern bloc except Colorado, Nevada, and Bryan’s home state of Nebraska. While the South was held by the Democrats, the GOP swept the Northeast, the Midwest, and the Pacific coast, and it ruled the West with the exception of the three states mentioned above. Taft won decisively in New York and Pennsylvania, which at that time were the two powerhouse states in the Electoral College, holding 39 and 34 electoral votes, respectively. In Illinois, the state that held the third-highest number of electoral votes, Bryan could not quite manage 40 percent of the popular vote. Texas, with 18 electoral votes, was the biggest state won by Bryan, but he only managed a plurality there. Debs and the Socialists, along with Chafin and the Prohibition Party, won approximately 700,000 votes combined, with the Socialists taking the lion’s share at just over 420,000, which was an increase of nearly 20,000 compared to 1904.
Thus William Howard Taft would enter the White House as the nation’s twenty-seventh president, and the second president of the twentieth century that had been, to this point, largely defined by Roosevelt, McKinley, Hanna, and Bryan. Whether or not Taft himself was capable of emerging as a political force in his own right remained to be seen, but there was no question at the time that following Roosevelt promised to be Taft’s most formidable challenge.
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