The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, instantaneously and irrevocably changed the Bush presidency. It would also, consequently, shape the Campaign of 2004. Pushing aside his domestic agenda with its ambitions to promote “compassionate conservatism” and a new bipartisan mood of governmental pragmatism, President George W. Bush announced a worldwide war on terrorism that led directly to the deployment of the power of the U.S. military overseas, destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and moving into Iraq to dislodge the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein on the premise that the dictator was harboring “weapons of mass destruction” that had destabilized the region and that now posed a threat to the interests of the United States and her allies. Thus the Bush administration, fully expecting a presidency marked by peace, prosperity, and pragmatism, was suddenly transformed into a wartime presidency, buoyed by bipartisan unity in response to the attacks and initially riding a wave of popular support upon which President Bush enjoyed the highest presidential approval rating ever recorded (Bush’s rating was 90% ten days after the terrorist attacks, slightly higher than the record set by his father, George H. W. Bush, in 1991 during another wartime crisis) and sustained favorable ratings through 2002 and even into the spring of 2003.
But controversies emerged that began to alienate many voters; thus by early 2004, President Bush’s approval ratings were oscillating back and forth across the 50 percent threshold, and by that summer, his ratings reached their lowest point. Nonetheless, the polls continued to rise and drop, and it was clear that while he no longer enjoyed the “rally around the flag” effects that invariably follow international crises, many Americans were behind his efforts to fight terrorism. A growing number, though, had turned against Bush, either criticizing the nature of the effort itself or criticizing Bush for what they perceived was an incompetent response to international terrorism. Moving toward campaign season, Bush firmly held the loyalties of the GOP, as no challengers emerged. Hence the 2004 version of the Bush-Cheney campaign would be directed at moderate independents, outside the party, knowing that it could fully count on its Republican base and that it could not win over the liberal Democrats, nor would it be likely for the campaign to persuade even most moderate Democrats. Regardless of ideological persuasion, all knew that the 2004 campaign would become a referendum on the Bush administration’s prosecution of the war on terrorism.
As President Bush was unopposed in his own party, the 2004 primary contest was entirely within the Democratic Party, where a large field of candidates lobbied for support. The front-runner, beginning in the summer of 2003, was former Vermont governor Howard Dean, who had amassed an impressive campaign war chest owing in large part to his ability to use new media (particularly the Internet) for fund-raising and dissemination of his campaign materials. Other candidates in the field were North Carolina senator John Edwards; retired general Wesley Clark; Connecticut senator Joe Lieberman, who had run for the vice presidency on the Gore ticket in 2000; former Illinois senator Carol Moseley Braun; former Missouri representative Dick Gephardt; Reverend Al Sharpton; Senator Bob Graham of Florida; Ohio representative Dennis Kucinich; and Massachusetts senator John Kerry.
While the nomination appeared to be up for grabs, Dean held a commanding lead in all the polls leading up to the Iowa caucus. In Iowa, most analysts predicted a battle between the well-funded, Internet-driven Dean campaign and Gephardt, who was well known and supported in the Midwest; but pre-primary polls hinted at a different story, revealing Kerry and Edwards to be in better shape than expected. These signs were confirmed the following day as the caucus votes were tallied, revealing a stunning win for Kerry at 38 percent, with Edwards placing second at 32 percent. Dean, who had been considered by many as just one or two steps away from coronation, showed a dismal 18 percent, his purportedly strongest rival Gephardt taking but 11 percent. The Dean camp was sent reeling, and the candidate made matters worse by a frantic post-caucus performance marked by a now-infamous high-pitched scream—ostensibly intended to whip up enthusiasm for his now-wounded campaign, but in effect providing grist for the eager comedian and the hostile pundit—that effectually in one stroke blunted any possibility of a comeback. It was referred to in the press as a meltdown for Dean; but looking back at the images, it seems less disintegrative than desperate. But at the time, Dean’s seemingly manic scream conveyed the wrong image to the voters, one that did not evoke presidential timbre; and it was but a matter of time before Dean was winnowed out.
In New Hampshire, Kerry again gathered the highest total, winning there with 36 percent to Dean’s second-place tally of 26 percent, a better showing than Iowa for Dean but still ten points below the new front-runner. Edwards finished in a tie for third place with Clark at 12 percent, Lieberman taking around 9 percent. Following New Hampshire, Kerry won five more primaries before Edwards won convincingly in South Carolina, bordering his home state of North Carolina. Edwards also managed a first-place tie with Clark in Oklahoma, and it was thus evident that Kerry was now the sole leader, with Edwards a rising challenger. Meanwhile, Dean did poorly, his campaign obviously spent and going through the motions. It was Kerry’s nomination to be had from this point on, sweeping every primary on Super Tuesday with the exception of Vermont, which gave its native son Dean his second and last victory (the other being in the District of Columbia) of the 2004 primary season. Dean had in effect withdrawn, but a small number of diehard supporters still voted for him right to the bitter end. With Kerry’s sweep on Super Tuesday, Edwards withdrew, clearing the way for Kerry’s nomination by acclamation.
At the national convention, Kerry was formally nominated, tapping Edwards to run with him on the ticket’s second spot. The convention highlighted Kerry’s record of public service, including his heroism in the Vietnam War, which was followed by a period of personal disillusionment that led to his open opposition to the war. Two speeches drew the attention of the viewing audience: former president Clinton’s nomination speech on behalf of Kerry, and an opening address by a young candidate for the U.S. Senate from Illinois, Barack Obama. Obama’s keynote speech was a scene-stealer, reminiscent of past seminal speeches delivered by figures other than the party nominees in past conventions, such as Ronald Reagan’s 1964 nominating speech for Barry Goldwater at the Republican convention, Democratic representative Barbara Jordan’s speech in 1972, Senator Edward Kennedy’s speech in 1980, and Governor Mario Cuomo’s speech in 1984. Speaking of the “audacity of hope,” Obama exhorted Americans to embrace a more optimistic vision of the American future and, with a “righteous wind” propelling them forward, to meet all challenges ahead. Like Reagan’s eloquent speech in 1964, it was a breakthrough moment for an important, rapidly ascending figure in American political life.
In the post-convention campaign, the Democratic Party was confronted with issues revolving around the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus it faced the difficult task of supporting, on the one hand, the many sacrifices of the various members of the U.S. armed forces while, on the other hand, as forthrightly and as patriotically as possible, criticizing the foreign and military policies of President Bush’s wartime administration. The platform attempted to state the terms: “Today, the Bush Administration is waging a war against a global terrorist movement committed to our destruction with insufficient understanding of our enemy or effort to address the underlying factors that can give rise to new recruits. This war isn’t just a manhunt.” The platform sharply criticized the Bush war effort for allegedly failing to build an international coalition in support of its military and foreign policy goals. To counter charges that the Democratic Party was weak on defense, the platform called for the expansion of the armed forces to reduce the strain on the National Guard and Reserves. “We will add 40,000 new soldiers—not to increase the number of soldiers in Iraq, but to sustain our overseas deployments and prevent and prepare for other possible conflicts. This will help relieve the strain on our troops and bring back more of our soldiers, guardsmen and reservists. We are dedicated to keeping our military operating on a volunteer basis. We are committed to management reform both to ensure that our defense funding is spent effectively and to help pay for these new forces,” the platform explained. With respect to the domestic agenda, the Democratic platform promised affordable health care for all Americans and the adoption of advanced technology to improve the environment while creating new jobs. The platform also continued to oppose perennial Republican proposals to pass constitutional amendments that would ban abortions and that would legally define marriage as solely between a man and a woman.
The Republican platform, in addition to maintaining its positions on abortion and same-sex marriage, praised President Bush for his prosecution of the War on Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The platform recounted, “When America was struck by terrorists on September 11, 2001, President Bush immediately realized that it was an act of war, not just a crime. Working with Congress, the President drew up plans to take the fight to the enemy, vowing to bring the terrorists to justice, or bring justice to the terrorists.” The platform promised to continue to fight terrorism on every front. With respect to domestic issues, the platform reaffirmed Republican support for allowing younger workers to divert part of their Social Security contributions to personal investment accounts. Additionally, the platform reaffirmed Republican support for the objectives of the No Child Left Behind education reform law enacted by Congress in a bipartisan effort during the first year of the Bush administration, in the pre-9/11 world of interparty comity.
The Bush campaign employed a dual strategy, the first element depicting the president as an effective wartime leader. The second element involved using attack ads aimed at defining Kerry as a stereotypical “tax-and-spend” liberal Democrat who was too weak on defense and thus unprepared to face enemies abroad. The Bush campaign used the slogan “Safer, Stronger” to convey the message that the president had both restored the nation’s security and military power in the wake of 9/11 and revived the nation’s economy after the bubble burst during the dot-com bust of the late 1990s during the Clinton administration. To raise doubts with respect to Kerry’s ability to serve as commander in chief, the Bush ad campaign accused Kerry of having supported massive cuts in major weapons systems and even blocked the use of body armor for the troops.
The most effective of the attack ads, now known as the “Any Questions?” ad, was produced by an independent group working out of Texas. In a move reminiscent of the attempt in the 1852 campaign to discredit the military valor of Franklin Pierce, who fought in the Mexican-American War, the ad was aimed at impugning Kerry’s otherwise vaunted military record during the war in Vietnam, and it involved interviews with former military personnel who served under Kerry as their commander on a U.S. Navy Fast Patrol Craft, or “swift boat”—small and quick naval patrol boats that would steam upriver in an attempt to interdict the flow of enemy supplies downriver, and to engage the enemy when the opportunity arose. Those interviewed alleged that Kerry had lied with respect to the events that led to his being awarded the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star. Besides claiming that Kerry prevaricated regarding his Vietnam heroics, those interviewed attacked Kerry for his April 22, 1972, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his testimony, young Kerry entered the political spotlight for the first time in his condemnation of American involvement in the Vietnam War, an act that many of his former comrades-in-arms considered to be at the very least insubordinate. As one would expect, Kerry denied the claims of his former swift boat crew regarding his combat record, and he defended as an act of patriotism his decision to speak out against the conduct of the war in Vietnam. But the Bush attack had been particularly effective, casting considerable doubt on Kerry’s willingness to engage a dangerous enemy such as al-Qaeda and similar terrorists, thugs, and bullies.
Kerry’s counterpunch was also basically two-pronged. The first part of the Democrats’ strategy involved familiarizing voters with Kerry’s biography to convince them that his personal attributes were equal to the task of the presidency. The second sequence in the counterpunch was to hit back at Bush, drawing attention to what was perceived among the Democrats as the many serious failures of the administration, and most critically, the decision to invade Iraq in force based on vague and unproven allegations that the Hussein regime was actively developing and storing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) without sufficient hard evidence to justify the military action.
By and large, while many voters were indeed confused or angry over the manner in which the war in Iraq was justified, Kerry faced a difficult campaign. Polls indicated that many states were solidly behind President Bush, with Kerry realistically holding almost no chance of gaining any ground in those areas of the country that were solidly with the president; hence the Kerry campaign selected a strategy to canvas and stump hard in key battleground states that he might be able to win over to their side should events cut their way. Much like the Campaign of 2000, these battleground states were, for the most part, Florida (which had been infamously tight, and confused, in 2000), Missouri, Arkansas, West Virginia, New Hampshire, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Washington, Oregon, Colorado (not as close in 2000 as other swing states, but shaping up, according to the polls, as very tight), and Ohio. Again, much like the 2000 election, the outcome of the election hinged upon turning out the respective core groups of each party. To win, the Bush campaign needed the support of white, middle-class male voters and social conservatives as well as to break even with women. The Kerry campaign needed to turn out union members and African Americans and to win over more women voters.
Catholic voters were also in play. While historically the clear majority of Catholics had supported Democratic candidates (with a minority backing Republicans), since the mid-to-late 1970s, the trend had been in a different direction, with Catholics more divided in their party allegiance, mostly owing to discomfort with the Democratic Party’s public positions on certain moral issues, primarily abortion, that were incompatible with Church doctrine. Democrats had appealed to Catholics in the past, given their commitment to a more progressive social agenda with regard to problems such as poverty; but since the 1970s, the allegiance between the majority of Catholics and the Democrats had been seriously weakened. Hence the Democrats would have to win back Catholic voters if they were to boost their chances in purple states (i.e., states that were neither “red,” or Republican, nor “blue,” or Democratic—viz., the battleground or swing states) and possibly pull an upset. Kerry was himself an observant Roman Catholic, only the third Roman Catholic to be nominated by a major party for the presidency (the other two, Al Smith in 1928 and John Kennedy in 1960, were also liberal/moderate Democrats from the Northeast; Kennedy, like Kerry, was from Massachusetts), but his position on abortion was not entirely in line with the teachings of the Church; hence Kerry was not as appealing to the more conservative elements among the Catholic voters, who were more likely to support the Protestant Bush based on his more traditional views regarding certain social issues, and who were growing in numbers and influence. Liberal and moderate Catholics would still support Kerry, but the Catholic vote as a whole was not the solid bloc that had helped Democrats, with some exceptions, since the nineteenth century.
When the dust settled, President Bush was reelected by winning just over 62,000,000 votes, or 50.7 percent, to Senator Kerry’s approximately 59,000,000 (about 48.3%), with Ralph Nader returning, this time as an independent, to win just over 460,000 votes. The Libertarian candidate Michael Badnarik managed to win around 397,000. The states won by Bush and Kerry in 2004 were almost identical to those states that were won by Bush and Gore in 2000, the only differences being New Mexico, which was won by Gore in 2000 but by Bush in 2004; and New Hampshire, which was the only northeastern state to vote for Bush in 2000 but which now, in voting for Kerry, gave the Democrats their first solid northeastern bloc since 1992. This time around, Bush won decisively in Florida, allaying fears by some analysts that another deadlock in Florida might possibly be repeated.
In looking at the finer grain at the county level, the trend set in motion in the 1990s and more clearly observed in 2000 was becoming even more evident; the Republican Bush won heavily in suburban and rural counties throughout the country, and especially in the interior, while the Democrat Kerry dominated the larger metropolitan areas and their urban cores scattered across the country, as well as counties along both the California and northeastern coasts. This trend appears to be the dominant pattern within electoral politics, at least for the moment. It has been noted that had Kerry won in Ohio, a reversal of the election of 2000 would have occurred, with Kerry winning the White House via the Electoral College (the electoral votes of Ohio, not Florida, this time making the difference) over Bush’s win in the popular vote, with the only difference being that Bush would have lost with a majority given this alternative scenario. But according to data on statistician Mike Sheppard’s MIT Web site detailing the easiest way to reverse any given election, the 59,000 votes that separated Bush from Kerry would have been slightly more difficult for Kerry to win than a switch of votes across Colorado, New Mexico, and Iowa that would have more likely given Kerry an Electoral College victory than the switching of sides in Ohio alone. Had Kerry won just 2,995 more votes in Iowa, another 5,030 votes in New Mexico, and then another 49,762 votes in Colorado, he would have managed a total switch of 57,787 votes, almost 2,000 fewer than a scenario in which he would gain over 59,000 votes in Ohio, and thus he could have won the election via those states. In other words, according to this source, the Bush-Kerry election was not nearly as close as some have believed; whereas the previous election, Bush over Gore, was indeed one of the closest elections in history, thanks primarily to Florida (Gore enjoying a much more significant margin in the national tally), and one in which the Electoral College made all the difference. Indeed, had just 29,525 votes changed in Nevada (which Bush won by only 21,500 votes) along with Iowa and New Mexico (and still giving Colorado to Bush), the Electoral College would have resulted in a tie at 269 to 269, even though Bush would have easily held a majority in the popular vote in that scenario.
Whether the Bush-Kerry contest was close or not, it is clear that the Bush presidency—in spite of the many controversies associated with it owing to the questions involving the war in Iraq as well as the manner in which the White House was first won in 2000, and in spite of the embattled nature of the last two years of the Bush administration—would nonetheless define the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, as crucial as the Bush White House had been in shaping American politics at the start of the millennia, it would not be the last word in that first decade; and in 2004, no one could anticipate the manner in which politics in the United States would dramatically change in the campaign and election of 2008.
Boller, Paul F., Jr. Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington to George W. Bush. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Ceaser, James W. Red over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov.
Institute of Politics, Harvard University. Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2004. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
Sabato, Larry. Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election. New York: Longman, 2005.
Shaw, Daron R. The Race to 270: The Electoral College and Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Sheppard, Mike. “How Close Were U.S. Presidential Elections?” http://www.mit.edu/~mi22295/elections.html.