Presidential campaigns are markedly regular; from election to election, patterns emerge, tendencies are charted, and affinities are asserted. Variation is certainly expected, as nothing in politics is exactly the same as it was before; and yet there are structures and propensities that both frame and steer the development of any given presidential contest. Among those structures that frame an election, the condition of the economy stands as preeminent. Few, if any, factors are more important than the economy in determining the outcome of an election. This is especially the case when an incumbent is standing for reelection, but even when there is no incumbency to be defended, the party that holds the White House is typically boosted when likely voters are confident and hopeful about the economy. A strong or stable economy always helps the party of the incumbent, whether or not the incumbent is eligible for or working toward reelection. Moreover, unease about the economy is, in almost every case, the principal cause of an incumbent’s failure to gain reelection. Reelection efforts by presidents Herbert Hoover, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush were thwarted by the economic situation during the year prior to the general election. Events abroad can also influence a campaign, particularly international crises that are perceived as a threat to national security or that have stirred controversy at home. Two instances spring readily to mind: the outbreak of World War II, which led to President Franklin Roosevelt breaking from the unwritten two-term tradition to successfully run for and win a third term; and perceptions formed in the media and within public opinion regarding the conduct and purpose of the war in Vietnam, prompting incumbent president Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from the 1968 campaign. Less dramatically, but no less significantly, diplomatic success can also boost the efforts of an incumbent, a notable example being the stunning diplomatic achievements of the Nixon administration in opening China and improving relations with the Soviet Union; another example is the Middle East shuttle diplomacy conducted by Henry Kissinger on behalf of President Nixon. Realistically, the economy is ultimately beyond the control of any single political actor, and while an incumbent president, through the application of policy decisions in tandem with other actors within Congress and the executive branch (notably the Federal Reserve Board), can indeed influence the economy in both positive and negative ways, in the end no president can singlehandedly steer or subdue economic forces. Every president learns quickly the ancient tension between free will and fate. Foreign events are different from domestic economic affairs only in that the response of the president is more directly and visibly influential, but again, they are dependent on numerous other actors (e.g., foreign heads of state) beyond the president’s control. That said, while many actors and variables make it difficult for a president to influence the decisions of foreign governments and the actions of all other foreign actors, the manner in which a president responds is more evidently critical to the way in which crises abroad are managed when compared to domestic problems and situations, particularly economic ones. In any event, these two factors—the state of the economy and the presence or absence of international crises—are likely to be the most important elements in shaping the outcome of a presidential election. These factors are also related to presidential approval ratings among likely voters in cases involving the prospect of reelecting an incumbent. Even more than apparent standing in polls that measure support from among a pool of candidates, a favorable rating in job approval is a more reliable indicator of an incumbent’s strength moving toward and throughout the campaign season from its opening to the eve of the general election. Approval ratings are doubtless directly influenced by perceptions formed around the condition of the economy as well as a president’s success in managing crises and other important issues involving situations abroad. And they do matter. While it is often claimed that incumbency adds additional electoral armor to a president, such a claim is not in accord with the reality of elections over the past few decades. Beginning with 1972, eight incumbents have run for reelection, and over one-third (three of eight) were not returned to the White House: Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, the younger Bush, and Obama were reelected; however, Ford, Carter, and the elder Bush were turned out of office. This reality strengthens the case for the predominance of the state of the economy as well as the situation abroad, for the three incumbents who failed to return to the White House all were confronted with a distressed economy; and in the case of President Carter, economic problems were accompanied by lingering frustrations with a crisis abroad—the Iranian hostage crisis that defined the last fourteen months of his presidency.
Another factor in predicting the outcome of a presidential campaign may simply be the length of time in which a party has held the White House. In cases where the two candidates appear to be viewed equally favorably, voters may choose the candidate from the party that has recently been out of power, a result of voters collectively seeking a change of direction for its own sake. However, this is less certain as an influence when compared to other factors such as a slowed or stressed economy, a crisis situation abroad, and an incumbent’s approval rating. From 1969 to January 1977, the Republican Party held the White House, and even though the Democratic nominee, former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter, managed to unseat the incumbent Republican president, Gerald Ford, in a close election in 1976, the voters quickly turned back to the GOP in the next election. The Republicans then managed to protect occupancy of the White House for three more terms through 1992, thus losing only one presidential election—one that occurred in the wake of the tumultuous Watergate scandal—between 1968 and 1988, a period of twenty years covering six elections, five of which were won by the GOP. The Democrats managed to control the White House from 1933 to January 1953, another twenty-year period, but it must be allowed that four terms were won by Franklin Roosevelt, a singular statesman who served during extraordinary and dangerous times (the Great Depression and World War II). In any event, while there may be something to the desire for change among voters—change for its own sake—it is decidedly less reliable as a predictor than the health of the economy or threats from abroad. Party unity, particularly unified support among party insiders, also contributes to the success or (when that support is attenuated) failure of a candidate’s campaign. President Carter, already hampered by economic uncertainty and burdened by the Iran hostage crisis, lost the confidence of his party’s leadership, and even though he managed to deflect a serious challenge for the 1980 nomination from Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy, his position had been significantly weakened moving into the general campaign against a charismatic Republican challenger, former California governor Ronald Reagan, who had managed to build solid support both within the party leadership and among the rank and file. But even if the GOP had nominated a weaker candidate, or had the Democratic Party thrown its full support behind their incumbent, President Carter may have still encountered difficulties in securing reelection, given discontent at home with regard to the economy and growing public impatience over the protracted Iran hostage crisis, which had initially stimulated public support of the president, though that support deteriorated as the crisis lingered. Additionally, the manner in which the media treats the candidates before and during a campaign can contribute to the outcome. No doubt Senator John Kennedy’s 1960 campaign benefited from the favorable way in which the press treated not only him but also his family, especially his youthful and sophisticated wife, Jacqueline Kennedy. This is not to say that the press won the election for Kennedy or that Kennedy glamor was sufficient in gaining the White House; there were certainly other, more substantive factors involved; but the press had been fascinated by the Kennedy family both prior to and during the campaign, and a certain mythology was already being woven around the Kennedy charisma, the photogenic and telegenic images of “Jack and Jackie” captivating the media and embraced by a significant segment of the American public. If we were to imagine that Senator Lyndon Johnson had managed to win the Democratic nomination in 1960 instead of Senator Kennedy, we would naturally wonder how press coverage might have been different. How would the media have treated Johnson? How would Vice President Richard Nixon, the GOP nominee that year, have been treated by the press in a campaign involving Johnson as his rival rather than the more magnetic Kennedy? Any answer would rest, of course, on pure speculation, but the question might prompt us to consider the role that media coverage plays in the promotion, however inadvertent, of a specific candidate. Charismatic candidates, such as either of the Roosevelts, Kennedy, Reagan, or Bill Clinton, unsurprisingly attract media attention, and a comparatively controversial candidate such as Barry Goldwater or George McGovern will also draw pointed coverage, but with a different, more negative slant.
Finally, the outcome of a presidential campaign is to a large extent shaped by ongoing voter allegiance to one of the major parties. Protestations aside, nearly all likely voters are to some degree partisan, even when they are not explicitly affiliated with or active in a particular party. The voter that genuinely remains undecided on the eve of the election is rare; most already are committed to the candidate of one party or another, regardless of who manages to win the nomination. Campaigning is important in helping to spur voters to the polls, and in a tight election, the conduct of a campaign is important in winning over the small number of voters who are genuinely independent; but in the end, most voters are not moved to abandon their previous voting patterns. There is considerable inertia in the dynamic, and a successful campaign knows how to ride that inertia.
These factors—the state of the economy, the magnitude of events abroad (and, significantly, whether or not an incumbent president effectively responds to those events), the level of unity and support within the nominee’s party, and the manner in which campaigns and candidates are covered throughout the media—serve as the principal preconditions affecting the success or failure of a presidential campaign. Doubtless other interesting factors and apparent correlations can be identified and examined, but these conditions are constant, providing presidential forecasters with the necessary regularity needed to encourage confidence in predicting the outcome of an upcoming election.
Regularity is a fact of life in the cycle of presidential campaigning; still, it is fair to say that no two presidential elections are identical. There are constants in the cycle of elections, but owing to the unpredictability of human behavior, there are enough variations to ensure that each campaign will possess characteristics of its own. The campaign season leading into the 2016 election, even in its earliest stages as they have unfolded through the summer, fall, and winter of 2015/early 2016, has already earned a distinction of its own. Were one to glance back to late spring 2015, one would observe a field of candidates led by apparent front-runners in both major parties: the clear Democratic front-runner being former First Lady, former New York senator, and former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; and the provisional Republican front-runner being former Florida governor Jeb Bush—thus another Bush-Clinton contest was already anticipated by numerous commentators, analysts and party insiders. Both the Bush and the Clinton families have stamped a deep impression on American political culture in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries beginning with Senator Prescott Bush, who won national office in 1952, and on the Clinton side, the ascent of former Arkansas governor Bill Clinton to the presidency forty years later. With the exception of the campaign and election of 2012, a member of either the Bush family or the Clinton family has prominently participated at some point in every presidential campaign since 1980: George H. W. Bush was elected to the vice presidency in 1980 and 1984, elected to the presidency in 1988, and lost reelection in 1992 to Bill Clinton, who was subsequently reelected in 1996. In 2000 and 2004, Texas governor George W. Bush, son of President George H. W. Bush, was himself elected to the presidency; and in 2008 former First Lady (as the spouse of President Clinton) and New York senator Hillary Clinton ran for, and nearly won, the Democratic nomination for president. Had it not been for the astonishingly rapid ascent of Senator Barack Obama, Sen. Clinton would have secured the nomination and would likely have been elected president that year. Now, in 2016, Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush once again represented their respective families in the pool of presidential candidates. Including the 2016 campaign season that is now under way, this brings to a total of nine the number of presidential campaigns in which a Bush or a Clinton—in two instances both—has or have been involved in a substantial way, either in a general election as a candidate for the presidency (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004) or vice presidency (1980, 1984) or as a frontrunner or leading candidate during a campaign for a party nomination (2008, 2016). The campaign of 2012 is the only one since 1976 in which neither a Bush nor a Clinton was a candidate for their respective party’s nomination. Nonetheless, name recognition and family pedigree aside, neither Secretary Clinton nor (especially) Governor Bush campaigned unchallenged. Indeed, campaign events throughout the summer and early fall of 2015 exposed vulnerabilities in both candidates that had not been anticipated prior to their respective announcements. Jeb Bush, the favorite among party insiders, failed to answer the unexpected and rapid ascent of Donald Trump, his campaign unable to gain traction once it became clear that Mr. Trump’s idiosyncratic approach held an enduring appeal for a significant segment of GOP voters. In February 2016, Bush withdrew from the race following a disappointing showing in the South Carolina primary.
On the Democratic side, Vermont senator Bernie Sanders, known for deeply engrained and unorthodox ideological propensities atypical of a serious presidential candidate, quickly emerged as a compelling alternative to what many had initially assumed would be, in effect, a coronation for Secretary Clinton as party standard-bearer. By mid-summer, three other Democratic candidates announced their intentions: former Maryland governor Martin O’Malley, former Virginia senator Jim Webb, and former Rhode Island governor, senator, and erstwhile Republican Lincoln Chafee (as a Republican, Governor Chafee supported Democratic candidate Senator Barack Obama in 2008, and he later officially joined the Democratic Party in 2013). By October 2016, both Chafee and Webb had withdrawn their candidacies, leaving only Clinton, Sanders, and O’Malley. Since announcing in April 2015, Sanders commanded an abundance of media attention through his posture as a crusader against what he and his followers perceive to be a political system manipulated by a corrupt plutocracy that has supplanted the democratic ideals toward which the American polity has historically aspired. For disciples of the Sanders message, Clinton is too closely associated with Wall Street financial interests who are perceived as existentially tainted with the sin of greed, big banks deemed inimical to the public good, and what they believe to be the unresponsive and corrupt Washington Beltway establishment disconnected from the needs and ideals of the majority of Americans. Even though her past and even her current tendencies exhibit a history of progressive attitudes and sympathies, Clinton has over the years become so deeply entrenched in the establishment, at least in the judgment of the Sanders camp, that the amount of separation between her policies and those of some of her Republican rivals is thereby deemed inconsequential. In the forum of ideas and the arena of attitudes, those who adopt positions advanced by the Vermont senator generally regard Clinton, and Democrats of her kind, askance, and in some cases even with contempt. Whether or not this is a fair assessment of Sec. Clinton’s record—and one could make a case for her record as a consistent liberal—it is the case that Sanders has stood out as the alternative candidate—the candidate claiming for himself genuine progressive credentials and the truer, more consistent vision for an authentically fair society. Through his clarion call against the system, Senator Sanders seems to have resonated with a new generation of voters. Nonetheless, Clinton, a major political figure since the 1992 presidential campaign that led to the election of her husband, cannot be so easily dismissed. This was not the case, through November 2015, with the early Republican front-runner, Governor Jeb Bush, who, at least on appearances, seemed eminently dismissible. Moving into 2016, the Bush campaign failed to make headway.
The Republican field in 2015 was one of the more heavily populated in presidential campaign history. As stated above, in the late spring of 2015, the apparent (but by no means overwhelming) front-runner was Jeb Bush, whose candidacy was grounded primarily in name recognition and broad support from establishment party insiders. However, even the earliest polls indicated that his support within the base was thin. In the first few months of 2015, other candidates managed to draw sufficient interest, most notably former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, Kentucky senator Rand Paul, and former Massachusetts governor and 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney. In early January 2015, Romney briefly considered joining the race for a third consecutive run at the presidency, but in the end he demurred, likely owing, as speculation might have it, to lack of support within the “invisible primary,” that unseen or at best only partially observed aspect of a presidential campaign wherein a prospective candidate not only tests the possible level of financial support but also, equally importantly, seeks the provisional approval of the party establishment (i.e., public and semi-public endorsements from party insiders, recognized activists, credentialed partisans, and prominent officeholders). With Romney no longer available, the principal challenger to Bush’s front-runner status seemed in the early stages to be Wisconsin governor Scott Walker, who at least through late spring 2015 showed well in polls conducted in Iowa, leading with as much as 21 percent in the Quinnipiac poll of May 6. Other candidates in the field by late May included Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, New Jersey governor Chris Christie, neurosurgeon and conservative commentator Dr. Ben Carson, business executive Carly Fiorina, South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham, former Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum, former New York governor George Pataki, and former Virginia governor Jim Gilmore. Among this group, Bush remained the establishment front-runner; but in some early polls, Walker, Huckabee, and Paul drew better numbers. Nevertheless, even though Bush was not the obvious front-runner according to the polling numbers, his status as the principal candidate in the race seemed plain to most students of campaign politics, and if any single candidate seemed to be his strongest challenger, it would have been, at least on appearances during the early period of the campaign season, Governor Walker. Walker’s early numbers in the polls aside, another Bush-Clinton contest in the general election seemed to be a strong possibility.
This situation suddenly changed with the garish entrance of billionaire real estate magnate and television celebrity Donald Trump, who officially announced his candidacy on June 1. Mr. Trump was soon joined by former Texas governor Rick Perry, current Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal, and current Ohio governor John Kasich. The Trump campaign immediately proved to be a formidable force. Mr. Trump’s larger-than-life personality quickly grabbed media attention, and his unfiltered, shoot-from-the-hip, astringent rhetorical style and take-it-or-leave-it attitude appealed to a percentage of the Republican rank and file who, in a way similar to supporters of Senator Sanders among disenchanted Democrats, had grown weary of politics as usual, wary of establishment elites, and wanting a personality who would speak candidly to their frustrations. Exuding a confidence that nearly everyone—supporters and detractors alike—recognized as brazen and that some would perceive as arrogant and even outlandish, and emitting what was for many the alluring magnetism of the wildcat outsider, Trump launched a meteoric ascent to the top of the polls. By mid-July, the polls revealed a dead heat between Mr. Trump and Governor Bush, and within another two weeks, Trump was pulling well ahead of Bush, Walker, and the rest of the field. In one poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC News, Trump polled at 24 percent, with Walker placed well behind in second at 13 percent. By August, it was clear that Trump’s early support was more than a temporary surge or anomaly and that his campaign was on the move, enjoying a substantial lead in every nationwide poll. Meanwhile, after having peaked in mid-July at around 17 percent, Bush’s numbers suffered a steady decline. As Trump moved rapidly upward, Bush steadily declined toward the lower tier. Thus, by the first week of August, Trump was polling 23–24 percent across a number of polls nationwide, while Bush and Walker were holding at around 12–13 percent. When Trump broke 25 percent (mind you, in a crowded field of sixteen candidates), Bush and Walker both dipped into single digits, with Walker’s descent being particularly rapid, a situation that no one had anticipated two months earlier. Bush was at that point a distant third behind Mr. Trump and Dr. Carson, who had also begun to show more promising polling numbers beginning around mid-July. In mid-September, Trump peaked at 30 percent and Carson, surprisingly, reached 20 percent, while the rest of the field, including Bush and Walker, clustered below 8 percent. Walker’s campaign would not recover, and he would be among the first candidates to withdraw from the race.
Even though it remained reasonable to argue that in spite of his chronically poor showing in the polls, Bush was in fact still the front-runner through autumn 2015 because of his connection to establishment insiders—the leader in the “invisible primary,” as it were—credulity was stretched by Trump’s substantial and sustained lead. According to Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight, by assigning points to party endorsements—ten points for an endorsement from a sitting governor, five from a senator, and one from a member of the House of Representatives—a candidate’s position in the invisible primary, or what Mr. Silver refers to as the “endorsement primary,” can be more tangibly tracked. Over the six months prior to November 2015, Bush’s endorsement points hovered between thirty and forty, by early January 2016 reaching 46 points by this metric. Meanwhile Trump, even as late as early January, did not, according to Silver’s criteria, possess a single point or a solitary endorsement (by February 2016 Trump would finally receive four endorsements—including Gov. Chris Christie’s—for 22 points). Even so, the perception shared across the media up to early January holds Trump as the true front-runner. On January 6, according to an average of national polls calculated by RealClearPolitics, Mr. Trump still drew around 35 percent nationwide among Republican participants, with Sen. Cruz making significant inroads and placing at 20 percent. Sen. Rubio—who at that point enjoyed second in the invisible primary as measured in the first week of January—showed slightly over 11 percent, and Dr. Carson, who for a short time appeared to be Mr. Trump’s principal challenger, slipping back into single digits. Bush’s popular appeal ebbed irreversibly, his money and political capital squandered regardless of his strong position in the invisible primary. Not only was Gov. Bush ineffective in meeting the challenge from Mr. Trump, who overtook him in all polls, he was also surpassed by, at various times, Dr. Carson, Sen. Cruz, and Sen. Rubio, unable to even assume the position as the top contender to Trump’s front-runner status, his poll numbers consistently showing single digits.
Whether or not Trump (the leader in the polls) or Bush (consistently stronger in the invisible primary through insider endorsements) could be identified as a true front-runner, a curious phenomenon emerged in the presidential campaign of 2015/2016. Quite unexpectedly, Trump’s lead in the polls inexplicably survived a series of controversial statements, discourteous and even vulgar language, and impolitic claims tendered with apparent disregard for self-restraint, observations and assertions that would have caused irreparable damage had they been uttered by more typical politicians. In his remarks about immigration and undocumented aliens, Trump not only insulted many voters of Hispanic descent, but he also committed himself to indicting the government of Mexico with the charge of collusion. It was the kind of gaffe that prompts ordinary candidates to plaintively abase themselves with immediate and earnest apologies, or, more likely, ending a campaign entirely; however, Trump, rather than apologizing or even attempting an excusatory explanation, forcefully reasserted his claims, “doubling down” in the argot of punditry. Through tweets complaining of the debate moderation of Fox anchorwoman Megyn Kelly, Trump posted comments disrespectful of Ms. Kelly in particular and women in general. Again, Trump did not apologize for the gaffe but instead dismissively explained it away. Significantly, these comments did not damage Mr. Trump in the polls, at least in the long term. Rather, his numbers continued to rise even after the inflammatory remarks about undocumented immigrants, and while his numbers dipped two percentage points shortly after the episode involving Ms. Kelly, within two weeks that trend had reversed toward his polling peak in mid-September. Trump’s rise to the top was also unhindered by a brief controversy over comments, perceived as unseemly, regarding the war record of Arizona senator John McCain, the GOP nominee in 2008. To be fair to Trump, the full context of the remarks reveals an intent apart from what was reported in the media and perceived throughout the public, but it nonetheless was broadly perceived that Trump was impeaching McCain’s reputation as a war hero. Yet, in the midst of this, whether the perception aligned with the reality of his intent or not, Trump did not lose any momentum at the polls. Trump has lambasted Syrian refugees and proposed unconstitutional and uncivil prohibitions against all Muslims, used crass language while referring to Hillary Clinton’s failed 2008 campaign, and in general continues to speak without filters and without consequences, at one point committing embarrassing and adolescent comments about Sec. Clinton, another time egging on, and then repeating on mic, a Trump follower’s crudely inappropriate insult against Sen. Cruz at a campaign event. These and other statements, either uttered during the multi-candidate “debate” showcases that began in July, or at press conferences, during speaking engagements, or posted on Twitter, have not impeded his popularity. To the contrary, each unsavory or controversial comment was followed by improved numbers in the polls. By sheer force of personality, Trump achieved an unprecedented position wherein he could speak without reservation or forethought about any subject and remain unscathed in the backlash, every time seemingly gaining strength in inverse proportion to the level of criticism against him. Certainly there have been other major party candidates in the past who were able to speak with a frankness eschewed by typical candidates: President Theodore Roosevelt relished the bully pulpit and was successful at speaking his mind, President Harry Truman was well known for his straight-shooting candor, Arizona senator Barry Goldwater made no apologies for the intensity of his convictions, Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy could display an intellectual’s high-minded disregard for standard campaign protocols, and New York senator Robert Kennedy exhibited an atypical fearlessness in challenging his audiences with a flinty indifference to the risk of provoking a hostile reaction. But Mr. Trump’s knack for casually trumpeting confrontational comments or personal insults while deflecting the consequent outcry has been unique. In a way, Trump entered the scene as a new political species: the major party candidate of no consequences; and it is this that made him sui generis.
During the first of the GOP debates, Trump was indeed a domineering presence. By contrast, a nonplussed Bush, described as tepid in his campaign appearances and ineffective on stage during the debate events, seemed either unwilling or unable to deflect the Trump charge. Owing to the unusually crowded field, the first two debates were divided into upper and lower tiers, with candidates qualifying for the “top card” of the debates based on their success in the polls. In the second card, Carly Fiorina, who polled quite low initially, drew the most attention and the most acclaim, adding strength to her position in the polls and consequently qualifying her for a slot in the second debate’s first card, where she appeared to be the candidate on the move with, at least for the moment, the best chance at challenging the dominance of Trump. In that same debate, Senator Rubio also began to show promise, and Dr. Carson, managing to avoid mistakes, sustained his steady drive upward toward the second spot behind Trump. Fiorina managed to peak at around 11 percent, third behind only Trump and Carson, but owing to her controversial claims regarding allegations targeting abortion practices within Planned Parenthood, her support quickly eroded. By the third debate, she was polling just over 5 percent, having lost, at least based on the polling data, over half of her temporary support. By mid-autumn, Carson’s numbers pressed Trump, whose lead across the national polls was now around five percentage points. In some polls, Dr. Carson actually gained a slight lead; but it must be noted that the several polls varied considerably. By Halloween, Carson’s best showing was a four-percentage-point lead in a CBS/New York Times poll; however, in most polls, Trump still led the pack by just under 5 percent, his biggest lead being ten percentage points in both the Monmouth poll and the ABC/Washington Post poll. After steady performances in all three GOP debate showcases, including a particularly strong effort in the third debate, Rubio replaced Fiorina as the candidate with momentum, showing third across the polls nationwide as well as in most of the specific polls conducted. Rubio’s best number was 13 percent, reached in the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. Rubio had been gradually gaining more attention in the preceding weeks, but it was in the third debate on October 28 that he managed to energize his campaign though his firm and cool-headed reaction to a badly misfired criticism aimed in his direction by Bush, who thereby appeared to be an increasingly desperate candidate. With aikido-like agility, Rubio deflected Bush’s awkward schoolyard gibe, which had in effect accused the senator of shirking his sworn responsibilities to his constituents, with a deftly executed move that reversed the weight of the clumsily delivered (and obviously scripted) charge, directing it back upon his accuser. Bush’s condescending jab, met by Rubio’s decisive block, put the governor on the ropes where he remained throughout the rest of the debate while Rubio and Sen. Cruz seemed to score the most points. Additionally, at one moment during the debate, Bush, in an attempt to interject a modicum of levity, generously offered to plant “a warm kiss” on any Democrat who was “for cutting taxes,” an unappetizing jest so self-consciously and uncomfortably delivered that it was less likely to raise a knowing chuckle and more likely to give a serious person the willies. In the aftermath of the debate, even observers amenable to Governor Bush came away with the impression that his campaign was perilously close to collapsing. Loyal Bush supporters openly expressed disappointment and frustration, and Bush himself was forced to admit that he was not a good debater. Following the debate, it seemed that Bush’s only remaining hope rested on the fundamental fact that the Bush campaign held in reserve a dragon’s hoard of money—and, one would expect, the ongoing support of the largest number of established party insiders. The money and the endorsements did not give Bush enough juice to make a credible run, his campaign continued to spiral down and land foul, and ultimately he withdrew following a weak result in the South Carolina primary. Bush’s failure again demonstrates that it takes a lot more than money and establishment credentials to be elected president.
The third Republican debate as a whole was poorly conducted. The candidates vocally criticized the behavior of the moderators both during and after the debate—for example, Senator Cruz gained approval and real momentum for his impatient criticism of the media during the event—and proposals to cancel the next scheduled event were openly submitted. In previous campaigns, a decision to postpone or cancel a debate showcasing prospective nominees several months before the Iowa caucus would have received, at best, passing notice in the media, and likely on the national level; but given the recent emphasis assigned by candidates and media alike to these early debate events, the prospect of such a postponement or cancellation bears a new degree of import. (The proposed postponement was not implemented.) Indeed, these early debate-style showcases have exhibited more significance in the process than they could have had in past campaigns, even the debate-saturated Campaign of 2012. In that campaign, eventual nominee Mitt Romney was the established Republican front-runner throughout, regardless of gaffe-riddled incidents within each debate and the cycle of other candidates surging from the middle of the pack to the ostensible lead. Such incidents only meant that the reality of Romney’s front-runner status was not always congruent with appearances derived solely from the polls. In the 2015 lead-in to the 2016 season, Governor Bush’s steady decline seems to have been accelerated owing to his bland performance in the debates and at other speaking engagements, and not just because of the Trump juggernaut. Unlike previous presidential campaigns, these early intraparty debates have drawn large national audiences, in unprecedented numbers to the detriment of the one candidate who should have been in the best position to strengthen his credentials months before the first caucus in Iowa. As it happens, in part owing to the debates, and in part to other speaking appearances and events, political outsiders Donald Trump and Ben Carson, and to a lesser degree Carly Fiorina (although her fortunes eventually turned in the other direction), drew far more interest and (at least in the polls) support than the purported choice of the party insiders. Throughout the months of November, December, and January, Cruz and Rubio continued to enjoy far more success in the polls than Bush, even though the quality of the debates deteriorated noticeably, the polls showing that no one seemed to care that the intraparty debates, especially on the Republican side, were embarrassingly unprofessional, the behavior of the candidates increasingly immature. After months of shouting each other down, the candidates faced off in the Iowa caucus, where Sen. Cruz scored the first victory of the official primary/caucus cycle. By contrast, Jeb Bush’s negatives were the highest among the field according to polls conducted in December and January, and his performance in Iowa and subsequent primaries was dismal, although he attempted enthusiasm after a weak fourth-place finish in New Hampshire. Significantly, Sen. Rubio gained considerable momentum in the endorsements that mark the invisible primary, garnering as of January 2016 more endorsements from prominent insiders than any candidate other than Jeb Bush, and then surpassing Bush in early February following the Iowa caucus and New Hampshire primary. Bush’s aimless drifting in the doldrums compromised his credibility before the voting public and within the media. Careful students of presidential campaign politics are prompted to ask just exactly to what degree can a lead among endorsements and a bountiful campaign war chest compensate for a candidate’s strategic errors, tactical miscues, and casual overconfidence. Will Bush’s enervated campaign signal a new trend in presidential campaign politics with regard to the invisible primary that is shaped by the endorsements of prominent insiders? Having scored 150 endorsement points (Sen. Cruz well behind with only 34 endorsement points), Rubio’s lead in endorsements may still provide some friction against the growing Trump bandwagon, but it remains too early to tell as of this writing. As of late February, Mr. Trump had finally managed to win some endorsements but still had a weak endorsement score of 22, behind both Rubio and Cruz as well as Gov. Kasich. As political science professor Marty Cohen has observed, these “early endorsements in the invisible primary are the most important cause of candidate success in the state primaries and caucuses.” Should Mr. Trump manage an end run around the party establishment by relying strictly on the polls, it will represent an anomalous case in the study of the nominating process. It will remain to be seen what this anomaly may mean in the long term.
On the Democratic side, Secretary Clinton, also the early and clear front-runner for the nomination in the spring of 2015, had appeared vulnerable to an energetic and captivating challenge from Senator Sanders, a candidate moving against her from the left. Throughout the summer, Clinton’s campaign seemed dormant as Sanders, touring the country and drawing large, animated crowds, received substantial attention from the media. Indeed, Clinton’s campaign for a time seemed to resemble the troubled, lackluster Bush campaign, exacerbated by ongoing allegations of wrongdoing and incompetence in responding to the tragedy in Benghazi, Libya, while she was secretary of state under President Obama. Clinton seemed unconcerned about the lassitude that had slowed her campaign, and she also appeared unable to shake off criticisms over the Benghazi incident. Consequently, for a few weeks during the summer of 2015, there were serious conversations revolving around the possibility that Vice President Joe Biden might announce his intention to run for the nomination. In the end, Vice President Biden, still mourning the sad loss of his son on May 30, 2015, withdrew his name from consideration on October 24. This announcement came within the same week as Clinton’s strong performance in the first Democratic debate and her successful appearance before a congressional committee investigating the Benghazi incident. (Vice President Biden has recently expressed regret over his decision.) The revival of Clinton’s fortunes animated by her debate performance may have been the decisive factor in the grieving vice president’s decision to step back from the campaign and yield to Clinton. Perhaps more importantly, in the invisible primary, Clinton currently (as of late February 2016) enjoys a score of 474 “endorsement points,” according to the metric used at FiveThirtyEight (i.e., ten points for a governor’s endorsement, five for a senator’s, and one for a member of the House). Sanders has just two endorsements for a score of two points, a clear indication that only one candidate—Sec. Clinton—holds any genuine support among the party establishment. Nevertheless, the fact that she is such a potent establishment force is one of the reasons more disillusioned Democrats identify with Sanders.
The Iowa caucus was narrowly won by Sec. Clinton, and the New Hampshire primary provided a more substantial victory for Sen. Sanders, which was followed by another close but significant win for Clinton in Nevada.
Sanders, in spite of his status as underdog and antiestablishment outsider, remains a compelling figure. For the first time in decades a presidential candidate with authentic left-wing proclivities and a progressive voting record in the Senate has been taken seriously by the press as well as by a visible number of likely voters, drawing large, enthusiastic crowds in sharp contrast to Sec. Clinton’s more subdued campaign. That Sanders unabashedly defines himself as a democratic socialist while still managing to hold sustained media attention and enjoy unexpectedly strong numbers in the polls lends further credence to the unusual properties of the 2015/2016 campaign season to date. A candidate with Sanders’s ideological proclivities is typically more likely to poll well below 5 percent nationally in a presidential campaign; thus if a candidate as far to the left as Senator Sanders, even though he is behind Clinton in nearly every measure, still manages to poll in double digits, it must indicate something different when compared to other presidential campaigns. Socialists candidates like Eugene Debs and Progressive candidates such as Robert LaFollette have appeared in the past, and even drawn considerable support, but they were not seeking the nomination of one of the two major parties nor did they receive the sustained media attention now witnessed by the Sanders campaign. In the long term, the Sanders campaign may prove to be anomalous, but at present it reveals developments within the Democratic Party that cannot be ignored. In a close general election, Clinton, if she is the nominee, will need votes from Sanders supporters; thus her campaign must rhetorically adjust to at least some of the concerns and frustrations of the progressive left.
In the 2015 Democratic intraparty debates, both Clinton and Sanders, as well as O’Malley, performed well. Clinton put to rest growing anxiety over her abilities as a presidential candidate, and Sanders demonstrated before a national audience that his efforts are those of a serious and thoughtful politician. The contest between the candidates was initially congenial even though hackles were temporarily raised over an incident involving a computer security breach committed by Sanders operatives against the Clinton organization. Sen. Sanders has apologized for any possible improprieties, an apology accepted by Sec. Clinton. In later debates, the interaction between the candidates was more tense, although when compared to the GOP debates, more civil by and large if nonetheless more strained than the earlier events. In the most recent debate, the candidates continued to address a variety of substantive issues, from the recent shootings involving law enforcement and African Americans that have spurred movements such as Black Lives Matter, to issues such as ISIL/ISIS and the contemptuous criticism of the campaign rhetoric of Republican candidate Donald Trump. Following the debates, while Sen. Sanders appears to be sustaining his momentum, a more thorough examination of the polling data reinforces what many analysts have been claiming since she lost her attempt at the nomination to Sen. Obama in 2008; to wit, Hillary Clinton remains the likely Democratic nominee for the 2016 general election.
Predicting the outcome of a presidential campaign is an inexact and mildly risky commitment, even though there are reliable predictive measures available to us, such as (most notably) the condition of the economy, as well as numerous other factors, such as those mentioned above. Based upon events as they unfolded from April through October 2015, it would appear that the more likely GOP nominee is still difficult to discern. At this point, Trump, winner in New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina, and Cruz, who won in the Iowa caucus, lead the pack in the polls, but Rubio is not far behind the latter. The events of the summer and fall, 2015, and the first two months of 2016, have seriously fogged the prognosticator’s crystal ball. It is unlikely that either Trump or Cruz will lose ground in the polls any time soon. Trump’s gaffe-proof, reverse-English, tough-talkin’ persona has proven to be a persistent strength on the campaign trail (but holds no persuasive power within the party establishment). In the weeks ahead Cruz should continue to draw enough support to push the leader, especially given his success as the winner of the Iowa caucus. There are clear signs that Rubio, who polled nearly even with Cruz in Nevada, may be able to fuel his current momentum if he continues to perform with confidence and resolve in future campaign events, whether at the national level or within the various primary and caucus contests that will open in early February. With the disappearance of Jeb Bush, there is a better chance for Kasich to move up in the polls, as he now appears to be the more appealing alternative to those seeking a comparatively moderate nominee. It is unlikely that Kasich will overtake Trump or displace Rubio as the leading alternative, but he may show strength in primaries outside the South. Should Cruz or Rubio and Clinton both win their respective party nominations, for the first time in the history of U.S. presidential elections, both a woman and an Hispanic would serve as major-party standard-bearers, thereby making 2016 a significant cultural moment on the same level as 2008. Should Clinton manage to deflect Sanders’s progressivist charge—and it seems likely that she will—and should Bush reanimate his campaign and regain the confidence of the voters as well as the endorsements of the party leadership, then we would witness a second presidential contest between a Bush and a Clinton. Prima facie, the possibility that both of the antiestablishment candidates, Trump and Sanders, could win the nominations of their respective parties remains, but the months ahead should reveal a different outcome. Having won in Iowa, Nevada, and most notably a landslide victory in the South Carolina primary, Hillary Clinton seems to have finally energized her campaign. While the Sanders camp remains hopeful, it is unlikely that their candidate can now regain sufficient momentum to match Clinton.
Be that as it may, it must be acknowledged that any prediction made so early in the campaign season lacks reliability—a lot can happen in the months remaining prior to the party conventions and the general election of 2016. And yet, based on long-term trends in presidential campaigning, it is safe to say that should likely voters perceive the economy to be stable and growing, however gradually, a Democrat—more likely Hillary Clinton—should hold the White House for his or her party in 2016. A brief glance at the constants and variations within the electoral map over the past few elections might serve as a baseline indicator for 2016. In doing so, one of the first questions to be raised is whether or not the eventual Republican nominee can persuade enough voters in the handful of battleground states to support a party change in the White House. Since Bill Clinton defeated the incumbent president George H. W. Bush in 1992, Democrats have won over 300 votes in the Electoral College four times (370 in 1992, 379 in 1996, 365 in 2008, and 332 in 2012). Republican candidate George W. Bush won in 2000 and 2004 with 271 electoral votes (a tenuous single vote above the required minimum) and 286 votes, respectively—the latter being the second-lowest percentage of electoral votes, 53.2 percent, won by a winning incumbent (President Woodrow Wilson was reelected with 52.3% of the votes in the Electoral College in 1916). Beginning with the 1992 election, a majority in the popular vote has been won only three times—50.7 percent for the incumbent president George W. Bush in 2004, 52.9 percent for Senator Barack Obama in 2008, and then just over 51 percent for incumbent president Obama in 2012. While the GOP dominated both the electoral vote and the popular vote in the 1980s (the Reagan-Bush years), since 1992 the Democrats have enjoyed more success both among the electorate and within the Electoral College. Part of this can be attributed to voting patterns in California, which at fifty-five electoral votes is the colossus of the electoral map, and since the first election of Clinton in 1992, it has become a reliably Democratic prize. California has not been, by any stretch of the term, a battleground state since (at best) the 1988 campaign when the difference in California was less than 5 percent. Indeed, since 1992, the difference between Democrats, who consistently win California, and Republicans has shown double digits in all six elections, the GOP’s best showing since 1992 in California being 10 percent behind the Democratic candidate in 2004, when incumbent president Bush won reelection. In itself, this is a decisive factor, as no candidate has won California and lost the election since President Ford in 1976; thus it is evident that if the Republican Party is to strengthen its overall performance in the Electoral College, significant changes must occur in the Golden State. Republicans have commanded Texas, the state with the second most Electoral College votes, over the same time period, but the gap between the two states is seventeen votes in California’s favor. New York and Florida, with twenty-nine each, are the states with the next highest electoral votes, and Republican candidates have not won in New York since President Reagan’s landslide reelection in 1984. Florida has famously been the most important battleground state since 2000, a purple state that can swing either way. That said, Barack Obama’s victories in Florida have been convincing, outpolling his Republican rivals, Sen. John McCain (2008) and Gov. Mitt Romney (2012), by 9.5 million against the former and around 5 million against the latter, figures that might serve as a prelude to a trend shifting Florida from purple to blue. The election of 2016 will prove a still more important indicator.
In other words, barring a sudden and improbably wide-ranging shift in electoral patterns, Democratic candidates are guaranteed 84 electoral votes in California and New York alone, and they have an even chance or better at winning Florida’s 29, which, if that were to be the result, would deliver to their ticket 113 votes from just these three states. Republicans can rely on the 38 electoral votes in Texas, and at best can add Florida’s 29, should the election swing in that direction, for a possible, best-case scenario total of 67 electoral votes among those two states, which, compared to the 84–113 that the Democrats are likely to win in 2016, is decidedly insufficient. Additionally, the two states with the fourth highest amount of electoral votes, Illinois and Pennsylvania, have been won by Democrats in every election since 1992, the election of the elder Bush in 1988 being the last time a Republican candidate won in either of those two states. Moreover, while Pennsylvania has at times been described as a battleground state, the popular vote there has in fact only been close on two occasions since 1992—around a 3.5 percent margin for Vice President Gore in 2000, and just over 5 percent for incumbent President Bush in 2004. Illinois has not been close since the Republicans won there by 2 percent in 1988 (the elder Bush versus Michael Dukakis after running a weak campaign); since then, Democrats have won Illinois by no less than 8 percent (in 1992) and at least 10 percent in every other election during that time period. Of the big-ticket states, only Florida (29 electoral votes) and Ohio (now claiming 18 Electoral College votes) have been won by Republicans since the Reagan-Bush years (when both states were won by the GOP in three consecutive elections—1980, 1984, and 1988). The elder Bush won Florida in a losing effort in 1992, and the younger Bush won both Ohio and Florida in 2000 (including the improbably narrow and controversial Florida count resolved by the Supreme Court) and 2004. Additionally, Michigan, which still delivers 16 electoral votes, has also been won consistently by Democrats since 1992, the elder Bush in 1988 being the last Republican to win there. Even Mitt Romney, who has a public family history in the Wolverine State, was unable to mount a credible challenge there, losing Michigan by over four million votes. All told, these electorally dominant states have, by and large, been the province of the Democrats since the Clinton election in 1992, with the few exceptions noted above. In other words, this hard fact alone illustrates the current favorable position enjoyed by any given Democratic nominee in the current political environment.
Nevertheless, any economic downturn between now and November 2016, along with intensified crises abroad as well as the possibility of lowered approval ratings for the current incumbent Democrat (President Obama), may cause the White House to again be occupied by a Republican. Nevertheless, unless the long-term economic outlook does turn in another direction, the odds for a Democratic victory are stronger. At the opening of 2016 and just weeks from the beginning of the caucus and primary season, Hillary Clinton appears to hold the advantage moving toward the 2016 general election. Barring a serious reversal of economic fortune, she is at present the likeliest person to succeed President Obama.
Bycoffe, Aaron. “The Endorsement Primary.” FiveThirtyEight. http://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-endorsement-primary/. November 6, 2015.
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Issenberg, Sasha. The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012.
Politico.com. Accessed November 6, 2015.
Reston, Laura. “When Endorsements Matter: Marco Rubio and the Race to Win the Invisible Primary.” New Republic, November 3, 2015. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/123332/. Accessed November 6, 2015.