“Frontloading” is a term that describes the late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century trend of states moving their presidential primaries to earlier and earlier times on the electoral calendar. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the presidential primary season ran from late January/February through June. State primaries and caucuses were distributed throughout these months, giving presidential candidates opportunities to visit and campaign in most states. Moreover, this type of scheduling permitted candidates to raise money throughout the primary season, and the slow accrual of delegates made it possible for a candidate to gain momentum for an unexpected, come-from-behind victory.
By the Campaign of 2000, most states began to schedule their primaries and caucuses as early as possible, hoping to benefit from the media coverage and tourism benefits enjoyed by traditionally early states such as Iowa and New Hampshire. The end result was that by March 14, 2000, Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush had both garnered enough delegate support that each was guaranteed his party’s eventual nomination. This effectively eliminated the role of later primaries and caucuses from the selection process; voters residing in those states had no meaningful say over their party’s nominee, as that decision had already been made before they even had a chance to go to the polls. Candidates like Republican hopeful John McCain, who lacked the name recognition of George W. Bush, found themselves denied of the opportunity to mount an effective campaign. McCain’s victory in the Michigan primary came far too late in the primary season (February 22) to enable him to earn any momentum—too many delegates had already been awarded to Bush.
States adapted quickly to this turn of events, and more states scheduled their primaries at earlier dates in the Campaign of 2004. In that election, Republican incumbent George W. Bush and Democrat John Kerry had earned their parties’ nominations by March 9, 2004—again, despite the nominating conventions being months away. After the 2004 elections were over, both the Democratic and Republican national parties attempted to limit frontloading for the first time. Both parties adopted rules that would penalize states that held elections prior to February 5 in the upcoming Campaign of 2008. The Democratic Party, in an attempt to be sensitive to legitimate concerns from states that claimed that the needs of their region were being ignored, let states apply for exemptions to the rules; this process led to the creation of new, early slots for the South Carolina primary and the Nevada caucus. The Republican Party offered no such exemptions; however, its rules penalized only early primaries, not early caucuses. Despite warnings from both political parties, two states plunged ahead and scheduled primaries prior to February 5. Michigan held its primary on January 15, 2008, and Florida held its primary on January 29, 2008. The Democratic Party required that all of its candidates remove their names from the Michigan and Florida ballots, and that no candidate actively campaign in either state. Michigan and Florida lost all of their voting delegates to the Democratic National Convention (although an agreement was eventually reached on a restoration formula, but this occurred months later). Hillary Clinton alone remained on the Democratic ballot in Michigan, which she claimed was an oversight (although she later attempted to claim those delegates). The Republican Party reduced the convention delegations of Florida, Michigan, and South Carolina by 50 percent.
The scheduling of early primary dates by Michigan and Florida in the Campaign of 2008 did not occur in isolation. As a consequence, New Hampshire was compelled to reschedule its primary to an even earlier date, and Iowa was compelled to schedule its caucus to a date prior to the New Hampshire primary. Until 1976, the New Hampshire primary had been held in mid-March. In the 1980s, it crept up to the end of February. In 2000, it was moved to February 1, almost three weeks earlier than it was four years before. By 2004, it had slipped into January, and by the Campaign of 2008, it had been pushed up to January 8.
After the Campaign of 2008, both political parties once again resolved to deal with the problem of frontloading. While the Republican Party had initially been pleased that its nominee, John McCain, had sewn up the nomination early in the campaign season, thus avoiding the potential for fracturing party unity, the neck-and-neck race between Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama garnered constant media attention throughout the spring. As the Democratic candidates battled each other through June, the Republican nominee was sidelined by the media, and Republican voter enthusiasm waned as their party’s race wound down. Rather than generate ill will and long-term grudges, the protracted Democratic contest seemed to generate voter enthusiasm and interest among Democratic voters.
Both parties sought to generate this same kind of enthusiasm for the Campaign of 2012. Working together, they negotiated an agreement that banned January primaries and permitted only four states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina) to hold campaign events prior to March 1. Moreover, the Republican Party also barred states that held primaries in February or March from using a winner-take-all delegate allocation. (The Democrats already allocated delegates proportionally, regardless of when a primary was held.) Florida, Michigan, and Arizona all held primaries prior to March 1, and all ran afoul of the rules (and incurred the delegate reduction penalty). Missouri’s primary was held on February 7, but because it was not used for the purpose of delegate allocation (rather, it was a “beauty contest” primary), the state was not penalized. Colorado and Minnesota held their caucuses in February; however, only the first phase of the caucuses were held in that month, and delegates were awarded at a later phase, thus no party rules were violated. It appeared quite evident that the penalties imposed in the 2008 and 2012 elections were not sufficient to deter many states from violating political party rules on primary election scheduling.
The Campaign of 2016 marked a departure from these recent trends. No primaries or caucuses were scheduled for January for the first time in two decades. The Iowa caucus was slated for February 1, and the New Hampshire primary was scheduled the following week, on February 9. The next campaign event did not occur until the South Carolina primary on February 20 (the Republicans) and 27 (the Democrats), followed by the Nevada caucuses (February 20 for the Democrats and February 23 for the GOP). Other states’ primaries and caucuses were held on March 1 or thereafter, ending with a series of state primaries on June 7 (including CA, MT, NJ, NM, and SD), the District of Columbia primary on June 14, and the culmination of a series of state caucuses in mid-June. This created a more compressed schedule but also provided for smaller allotments of delegates throughout the campaign season, rather than a few large allocations early on. Because GOP events held prior to mid-March also entail a proportional instead of a winner-take-all allocation of delegates (similar to the Democrats, who use proportionality for all events), such a system seems designed to make the playing field more competitive in scenarios where there is no clear nationwide front-runner. When there is a consensus on a front-runner, and when that front-runner enjoys national rather than regional support, most systems do not impair such candidates from handily winning their party’s nomination. However, frontloaded schedules clearly advantage those who are well positioned to quickly consolidate electoral gains; systems that are not frontloaded make it easier for candidates who are competitive, but who are not overwhelming favorites, to stay in the race; they also tend to placate elements of the party rank and file who may otherwise believe that their concerns are not being heard. And, as the Democratic primary season of 2008 demonstrated, systems that provide a more level playing field may lengthen the duration of the primary season when there is more than one competitive candidate (or, potentially, when the candidate field is one that is overwhelmingly weak and without a clear favorite).
See also Super Tuesday
Busch, Andrew E. The Front-Loading Problem in Presidential Nominations. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003.
Frontloading HQ. http://frontloading.blogspot.com/. Accessed October 13, 2015.
The Green Papers. “2016 Presidential Primaries, Caucuses, and Conventions Chronologically.” http://www.thegreenpapers.com/P16/events.phtml?s=c. Accessed October 13, 2015.
“Thrusters v. Laggards: The High Tide of Frontloading Has Passed and Now Seems to be Ebbing.” Economist, April 20, 2011.