In 1957, economist Anthony Downs published his classic work, An Economic Theory of Democracy. This theoretical work described how, in a two-party system, savvy candidates would attempt to strategically position themselves close to the center of public opinion, which generally meant that they would avoid portraying themselves as extremely liberal or extremely conservative. According to Downs, this strategic positioning would invariably mean that candidates from both political parties would take similar positions on many issues to maximize their potential appeal. “Median voter theory” has come to describe any campaign strategy in which the party or candidate attempts to target the median voter, or the voter in the center of public opinion. This often goes hand in hand with candidates’ strategies to target the middle class, or to target potential swing voters.
In the Campaign of 2004, incumbent president George W. Bush, with campaign director Karl Rove, employed a risky reelection strategy that disregarded the median voter. Rather than attempt to portray Bush as a moderate Republican, as they had done in the Campaign of 2000 (by calling him “a uniter not a divider,” among other things), they ran on the candidate’s conservative record in office instead. Unlike Governor Bush, who had had to contend with a Democratic legislature, President Bush had a Republican legislature and had little need to compromise with his political opponents. Moreover, the country was engaged in controversial wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush and Rove saw little advantage in attempting to appeal to moderates; rather, they engaged in an extensive effort to mobilize the Republican base, particularly the evangelical Christian component of the base. They relied on grassroots organizations for support and requested church directories to engage in better microtargeting. The strategy worked—Bush squeaked out a close victory over Democratic nominee John Kerry in 2004.
By the Campaign of 2008, the nominees of both political parties were once again attempting to appeal to a range of potential voters near the political center. Republican nominee John McCain and his running mate, Sarah Palin, aimed squarely at “Joe Six-Pack,” enlisting the efforts of Joe the Plumber in their attempt to target the average American worker. Democratic nominee Barack Obama focused on the middle class as well, promising better jobs, better health care, and an end to the now-unpopular war in Iraq. In the 2012 presidential campaign, Republican challenger Mitt Romney frequently stressed the difficulties confronting the middle class throughout his campaign, and to great effect in his first debate against incumbent President Obama. However, it was not so much Gov. Romney’s position on the health of the middle class as his attention to voter attitudes that evinces, in his case, the importance of the median voter. A passing remark by a senior campaign adviser in the Romney camp, Eric Fehrnstrom, aptly matches the concept behind median voter theory. “I think you hit a reset button for the fall campaign,” Fehrnstrom observed in commenting about the need to modify strategies and campaign progress. “Everything changes. It’s almost like an Etch-A-Sketch. You can kind of shake it up, and we start all over again.” The Etch-A-Sketch remark boomeranged on the Romney campaign, as it inadvertently reinforced the popular and ongoing criticism of Romney as an insubstantial flip-flopper, and it offered grist for criticism from other candidates, including Sen. Rick Santorum, a rival for the GOP nomination, and incumbent president Obama. The Etch-a-Sketch comment made by one of his closest advisers was, inadvertently, a much more explicit acknowledgement of median voter theory. It seemed to suggest that Gov. Romney was saying and doing things to position himself strategically with voters rather than from principle or adherence to central values, and that these positions would be altered at will as the electoral need arose.
President Obama, throughout his administration, has attempted to convey his desire to avoid political extremism and attachment to fixed ideological positions, with mixed results, as his critics on the right remain skeptical, and those on the left respond with disappointment. Gov. Romney was in a similar situation during his run for the GOP nomination in 2012, caught between the influential right wing of the party and those seeking a return to a more moderate tone.
Jacobson, Gary C. A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People. New York: Longman, 2010.
Shear, Michael D. “For Romney’s Trusted Adviser, ‘Etch A Sketch’ Comment Is a Rare Misstep.” New York Times, March 21, 2012. nytimes.com/2012/03/22/.