There are numerous schools of thought governing attitudes on foreign policy. Most political scientists believe that there are four primary approaches to the U.S. role in the world: liberal internationalism, realism, neoconservatism, and isolationism.
Realism is a school of thought that emphasizes containment and deterrence of the enemy. An overriding concern in realism is long-term political stability and clarity in the understanding and protection of the national interests. This desire for stability has often led foreign policy realists to support unsavory regimes that did not adhere to American political ideals (for example, the shah of Iran, or more recently, deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and the ruling family of Bahrain), as long as those regimes contributed to regional stability and did not threaten U.S. interests. In short, realists are more concerned with how other nations act on the global stage than they are with how those countries are run internally. During the Cold War, realism guided the arms race with the Soviet Union, which was viewed as a necessary investment to deter an attack on the United States. And realism influenced the decisions to engage in military action in Korea in the 1950s and Vietnam in the 1960s, when it appeared that the Soviets were expanding their sphere of influence in Asia.
Neoconservatives, on the other hand, favor a more activist foreign policy. According to historian Francis Fukuyama, neoconservatives are concerned with democracy, human rights, political institutions, and the belief that U.S. foreign policy should pursue moral ends. In many senses, neoconservatives share the goals of foreign policy liberals. However, there are some key differences. Liberals generally seek nonmilitary means to pursue these goals, and they believe in the ability of international organizations and negotiated, multilateral agreements as the means to create a just and peaceful world. Neoconservatives tend to be more skeptical of organizations like the United Nations and feel that it is unnecessary to rely on alliances with other nations, and they are more willing to commit to unilateral action in addressing crises abroad. They believe that military force can be an effective, decisive means to create a more peaceable world, as long as it is used for moral ends. Neoconservatives seek to undertake regime change, they are not averse to preemptive war, and they believe in American exceptionalism, which generally means that they view the United States as having a special role to play in the world (as the sole superpower) and they believe that exporting American democratic principles (and institutions) to other countries is a desirable goal.
While neoconservatism has been influential among both intellectuals and political activists in both political parties, it remained outside of the mainstream for members of the general public until recent years. Among members of the Republican Party, neoconservatives were a decided minority until the Campaign of 2004, when many rallied around President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney’s use of military force as a tool for expanding democracy in the Middle East. For many voters, this was the first they had heard of neoconservatism. While Democratic nominee John Kerry was critical of the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq (once it had been established that Iraq had lacked the weapons of mass destruction that Bush and Cheney used to justify the conflict), he did not claim that he would end military involvement in the region. Nor did Kerry suggest that the United States should withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. Rather, it appeared that Kerry was tacitly accepting the neoconservative argument that force was sometimes necessary to produce more benevolent and peaceable rulers.
Democratic nominee Senator Barack Obama rejected the basic tenets of neoconservatism in the Campaign of 2008, calling for a quick withdrawal of troops from Iraq. However, Obama supported the use of force in Afghanistan because, he argued, the Taliban government had initiated an attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Obama viewed the war in Afghanistan as primarily defensive in nature. Since that time, Obama sent troops to a third country—Libya—as part of a multilateral force to protect civilians from human rights abuses, and to support the rebels in their attempt to overthrow the existing regime.
The behavior of the Republican presidential candidates in the Campaign of 2012 ranged from outright isolationist on some occasions to a more traditional neoconservative viewpoint on other occasions. For example, early in the campaign, few candidates were willing to endorse the use of U.S. military forces in Libya, and many pressed for a quicker withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Yet most advocated bombing Iran in order to prevent it from developing a nuclear arsenal, and several candidates also suggested that the United States use its military resources in order to depose Fidel Castro. Moreover, all of the candidates (except Ron Paul) professed strong support for the notion of American exceptionalism and endorsed increased spending on defense. Since he was elected president, Barack Obama has altered his approach to foreign policy in ways that reflect more of a realist perspective. He has endorsed a policy of targeted assassination of terrorists abroad (including terrorists who are American citizens), he has stepped up the use of drones in order to pursue military objectives while minimizing the use of American troops, and he has continued many of the foreign policy objectives of his predecessor. At the same time, he has withdrawn American troops from Iraq on schedule and set a quick timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Thus, while Obama has appeared willing to use military force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, he seemed to be more sparing in terms of the number of troops he is willing to use and the duration for which he is willing to use them.
The behavior of the Republican presidential candidates in the Campaign of 2016 have so far exhibited a seeming resurgence of neoconservative attitudes with regard to the use of military force, particularly in confronting threats from ISIL/ISIS; however, it is always difficult to be sure of the sincerity behind the beating of war drums on the campaign trail. It is one thing to entertain the tactic of “carpet bombing” an enemy abroad as Sen. Cruz has publicly submitted for the public’s approval, but quite another thing to issue the command from within the White House.
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Fukuyama, Francis. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
Halper, Stefan, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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