The outcome of American presidential elections is determined not by the popular vote, but by the number of states a candidate can win. The worth of each state is, in effect, that state’s number of Electoral College votes. On first blush, it may appear that candidates would concentrate their resources on the states with the most electoral votes, since winning these states results in the largest payoff. However, another important factor to consider is that candidates have limited sums of both time and money available to them. These limitations force candidates to act strategically. Candidates would prefer not to invest resources in states where the outcome is near certain, preferring instead to put their dollars and time to work in those states where they will be most useful—namely, where the election is expected to be close. These are the states most commonly referred to as “battleground states” (or “swing states”).
Voters in battleground states are barraged with televised ads throughout the campaign season and are favored with candidate visits. They are also targets for mobilization efforts by candidates’ campaigns, political parties, and other activist groups. And they turn out to vote in higher numbers than do citizens who live in less competitive states. Political scientists believe this is because these voters have lower information costs, more effort is spent in mobilizing them, and they are also more likely to believe their vote will count.
Throughout much of American electoral history, political parties have had geographic bases of strength. And in many political eras, a single party has been dominant. Thus, the number of states where the political parties have been competitive has waxed and waned over time. For example, after the Civil War, the Republican Party entered a political era in which they were dominant, which meant that Republican presidential candidates had many states in which they faced little electoral competition. After Reconstruction ended, the Democratic Party once again dominated the South, a position of power that strengthened as southern states moved to strip African American voting rights through the imposition of Jim Crow laws. “The Solid South” refers to the era, roughly from the post-Reconstruction era to the early to mid-1960s, when the Democratic Party was the only viable political actor in this region.
From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, the electoral competitiveness of many states increased as the Democratic stranglehold on the South loosened, Rockefeller Republicans competed with liberal Democrats in the Northeast, and the Midwest continued to provide opportunities to both major parties. By the 1990s, political analysts observed that many states had become fairly predictable in their voting behavior. New England states, with the exception of New Hampshire, opted for Democrats in most presidential elections. Southern states, with the exceptions of Florida, Louisiana, and Arkansas, were generally voting Republican. States in the Midwest, such as Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, routinely voted Republican as well. Not only were many states becoming predictable, but the number of states where one party won by a landslide were becoming more common. In half of all states, the winning presidential candidate’s margin of victory usually exceeded 10 percent.
By the Campaign of 2000, only a handful of states were deemed by the press to be battleground states. Most political analysts designated fourteen to twenty states as swing or battleground states, although that list narrowed considerably in the months leading up to the election. For both the Campaign of 2000 and the Campaign of 2004, the states labeled as battleground states prior to Election Day were virtually identical. After all of the votes were in, only a few states in 2004 were truly competitive. The winning candidate’s margin of victory was less than 8 percent in only thirteen states (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin). In 2000, New Mexico selected Al Gore by a very narrow margin; John Kerry fared better in that state in 2004.
In the Campaign of 2008, the picture changed as the resources of the candidates changed. Specifically, Democratic nominee Barack Obama opted to forgo public funding in both the primary season and the general election. While donations to the Obama campaign were still subject to federal donation limits, Obama was free to raise as much money as he could within these constraints, and to spend as much as he raised. In 2008, it is estimated that Obama’s campaign spent $740.6 million.
John McCain, on the other hand, opted out of public funding for the primary season but accepted public funding for the general election, a decision he soon came to regret. Because candidates who accept public funding are subject to spending ceilings, McCain found himself with far fewer resources in the fall of 2008; his campaign spent only $227.7 million. He was forced to abandon his campaign in states like Michigan, which was considered a battleground state, to shore up support in states like Indiana, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia—places that had been considered safe Republican states, but where Obama had been spending a lot of time and money, and where polls were showing him closing in on McCain.
In June 2008 The Washington Post listed sixteen states as battleground states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In eight of those states, all of the four preceding presidential elections were won by the same political party. Only three states could claim an evenly divided history of presidential voting over the four previous elections. And all but three states were on the list of states that had competitive outcomes in 2004. Of the battleground states listed by the Washington Post that June, Obama won all but Missouri in November. Additionally, Obama picked up Indiana, which had been considered safe for Republicans, and one electoral vote from Nebraska (one of only two states that does not allocate all of its electoral votes to the popular vote winner in the state).
In the Campaign of 2012, the candidates of both major political parties opted out of the public funding system. Barack Obama, the Democratic nominee, raised slightly more money in direct campaign donations ($715,150,163 to Romney’s $443,363,696), whereas Mitt Romney, the GOP nominee, relied more on his super PAC and other outside groups to raise and spend money on his behalf ($804,815,645 to Obama’s $423,568,154). Both candidates had similar resources, and the battleground contracted significantly relative to 2008. Only five states were decided by less than 5 percent of the vote: Ohio, Virginia, Florida, Colorado, and North Carolina. Those states received more than three-quarters of all of the advertising spent by candidates and outside groups during the general election campaign, and almost all of the candidate visits during this time period, according to an analysis by the Washington Post. Indeed, half of all ad dollars were spent in Florida, Ohio, and Virginia alone.
Experts anticipate a similar set of battleground states in the upcoming campaign of 2016. Florida, Virginia, Ohio, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Colorado are expected to continue to be competitive, and Nevada may be as well. Changes in voting laws may influence the competitiveness of North Carolina in the short term—although states such as North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, and Arizona may become more competitive in 2020 or 2024 as a result of ongoing demographic changes that are more likely to reduce the dominance of the Republican Party in those states. Conversely, demographic shifts in states such as Michigan and Wisconsin may work to the GOP’s advantage during this same time period.
See also Blue and Red States; Campaign Finance Reform
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