Few events in Korea’s premodern history are more important than the establishment of the Chosŏn state under the Yi dynasty. It was more than a change of dynasties; it was a long-term attempt to create a society in conformity to Confucian values and beliefs. The effort, while involving close study of Chinese models, contributed to the further evolution of a distinctive Korean cultural and political entity. Today when Koreans talk of “traditional society” they generally are referring the culture and society that emerged during this period.
The dynastic founder Yi Sŏng-gye, after deposing the last Koryŏ monarch, made himself king. He was posthumously designated King T’aejo, the first of the Yi dynasty that was to rule Korea to 1910. Yi Sŏng-gye placed his supporters, who he named “Dynastic Foundation Merit Subjects,” in key positions, and these men dominated Korea for the next few decades. They established the institutions of the new state and promoted the ideals of Neo-Confucianism. The new government officially named the state Chosŏn so that the period of Korean history from 1392 to 1910 is referred to as either the Chosŏn or the Yi dynasty period. To mark a new start for his new dynasty Yi Sŏng-gye and his supporters in 1394, believing the geomantic force of Kaesŏng was exhausted, established a new capital at Hanyang (today called Seoul). Careful consideration based on geomantic principles went into the selection. The city was protected on the north by mountains, and on the south by the Han River. It was also a practical location since it was in the agriculturally rich and centrally located Kyŏnggi region. The location on the Han River, one of the major rivers of Korea, assisted in communicating with the interior. The actual construction of the city was largely left to Yi Sŏng-gye’s successor T’aejong (r. 1400–1418), who in 1404 and again in 1412, summoned more than one hundred thousand corvée laborers to build the palaces, government buildings, city walls, and gates. The city was modeled on Chinese imperial capitals, albeit on a smaller scale, with the main streets laid on a north-south, east-west grid. Seoul soon came to be the great city of Korea, the center of government, learning, the arts, and commerce—a place it has occupied ever since.
Yi Sŏng-gye justified the new dynasty with the concept of the Mandate of Heaven (Chinese: keming; Korean: hyŏngmyŏng). According to Yi and his supporters the last years of the Koryŏ saw rule by immoral men who ruled through puppet kings. Confucian belief was that the ruler must be a person of integrity and virtue who sets a moral example or else the harmony between Heaven and Earth can not be maintained, there will be calamities, and the people will become restless. This, according to Yi, had happened in the years after Kongmin when self-serving, evil officials ruled through weak monarchs. To further justify his assumption of power the dynastic founders argued that the legitimate line of Wang kings had died out with Kongmin. In such a situation there was no recourse but to assume the throne. “The ancestral altar must surely be returned to the man of virtue and the great throne should not be left vacant too long. With merit and virtue, the public mind can be won. The ranks and offices [of government] should be correctly reestablished to pacify the people’s discontent. I, lacking virtue, decline [the offer of the throne] repeatedly for fear that I may not be competent to carry the burden. Everyone is saying, however, that the Heavenly mandate has already been manifested in the popular will. No one should resist the public will. Nor should he go against Heaven. Holding this [principle] firmly, I have decided, with humility, to follow the public will and to accept the throne.”1
The new dynasty carried out important reforms, most notably land reform. Prior to his assumption of the throne Yi Sŏng-gye carried out a comprehensive land survey, destroying old registrars of public and private land. The court created a new set of land registrars with the intention of making sure that less land escaped taxation. The king confiscated the huge holdings of the Buddhist temples, a move that weakened institutional Buddhism and that was enthusiastically embraced by the anti-Buddhists among his followers. The former temple holdings were redistributed to his supporters and added to the tax base.
The new dynasty was largely the creation of an alliance of military men such as Yi and a group of scholar-officials eager to reform society by creating a new state based on Neo-Confucian principles. The most important of these officials was Chŏng To-jŏn. Chŏng was from Ch’ungch’ŏng Province in southern Korea. His father was a government official from the lesser aristocracy. Most of his lineage had served as hyangni (local government officials). A student of Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Saek (1328–1396), he was appointed to the National Confucian Academy faculty when Yi Saek became its head. Chŏng To-jŏn was driven into exile for pro-Ming sentiments by Yi In-im in 1375. After living in poverty in a small village he went to Yi Sŏng-gye’s remote frontier camp and became his chief political adviser. When Yi came to power Chŏng used his influence to secure key positions. As a civilian head of the armed forces command he worked toward abolishing private armies and creating a new central army under civilian control. His most important contribution was drawing up the Statutes for the Governance of Chosŏn, an outline for the new government.2 Many of the institutions of the new dynasty were based on this outline.
A central part of Chŏng To-jŏn’s program was land reform. In late Koryŏ most land was in the hands of large landholders. Most peasants worked as tenants paying a customary one-half their crops in rent. Based on the Confucian ideal that the ruler governed in the interests of the welfare of his people, as well as the practical need to bring more land under government taxation, he called for converting all land into public land. This would then be distributed equally among all the peasants, who would then pay a small portion in taxes. Chŏng To-jŏn cited the idealistic picture of Zhou China in the Rites of Zhou, which had become part of the Confucian canon, to justify this proposal. While too radical for adoption, it illustrates the idealistic zeal of Chŏng and many of his colleagues.
Chŏng and others wanted to end the relationship between Buddhism and the state. Late Koryŏ Neo-Confucianists such as Yi Saek had been critical of Buddhism. They chided monks for their moral laxity and their involvement in politics. The example of Sin Ton, who served as King Kongmin’s chief advisor, was a case in point. Neo-Confucianist reformers were also critical of the expense of supporting temples and of elaborate rituals. Temples, they felt, owned too much land, reducing the tax base. Some officials of the new dynasty such as Chŏng To-jŏn regarded Buddhism as an undesirable alien faith. Buddhism, in their opinion, did not respect the social relations that held society together. Its tradition of celibacy was a threat to family and lineage, and its concept of abstract universal love was inimical to the graded love of Confucianism that gave primacy to family, then to friends, and then to neighbors. It encouraged withdrawal from society, not active participation in it. This harsh antipathy was not shared by Yi Sŏng-gye or by many of the members of court. It was a minority view at the start of the dynasty; however, it gradually prevailed. Consequently, Buddhism retreated from playing an active role in state affairs. There was some backsliding. King Sejo (r. 1455–1468), for example, was a vigorous patron of Buddhism, but the connection with Buddhism and the state was eventually broken.
Yi Sŏng-gye, nonetheless, emphasized continuity, not radical change. At the onset of his reign he ordered that all the rites of the Koryŏ be observed. Most Koryŏ officials were kept. Only a small number of those were purged, such as the distinguished scholar Chŏng Mong-ju, who while supporting the movement for reform remained loyal to the old dynasty. In general, the change of dynasty was relatively smooth and bloodless. One of the major issues in Korean history has been whether the establishment of the Yi dynasty marked a revolution or simply a change of dynasties. The answer may be, while it was more than a simple change of dynasties it was not quite a revolution. The new dynasty brought a number of new individuals and clans into the seats of power, and restructured or newly created the institutions of government. Most of all, the promotion of Neo-Confucianism gave the new Chosŏn state a more rigid ideological orientation than had been the case in Koryŏ or Silla.
Many, if not most, of the great families that dominated late Koryŏ society survived into the new dynasty. Rather than a replacement of one dominant social group by another, a number of new people joined the ruling aristocracy of landed officials and scholars. Indeed, most of the Neo-Confucian reformers came from aristocratic families. Kwŏn Kŭn (1352–1409), one of the leading members of the new government, came from the Andong Kwŏn clan, one of the most illustrous families under the old dynasty.3 Yi Sŏng-gye himself represented one of the small number of new number of men, mostly of a military background, who joined the old elite. Although Yi later claimed to be of a long distinguished family from Chŏnju in southern Korea, his family actually came from the northern frontier. Yi’s family may have been of northeast Asian tribal origin. His father, Yi Cha-ch’un, rose to prominence during the Mongol period as a military commander and cooperated with Kongmin to retake the northeast region occupied by the Mongols. Yi Sŏng-gye, his second son, distinguished himself in campaigns against the Red Turbans, the Japanese pirates, and the Mongols. So while the dynastic family and some of its supporters were new members of the elite, most of officialdom came from the old aristocratic familes.
Furthermore, the change of dynasty did not mean a sharp ideological change. Neo-Confucianism had already begun to gain adherents in late Koryŏ. Nor was Neo-Confucianism itself an entirely new way of thinking. To a large extent it was a revitalization of Confucian values and ideas of government and society that had long influenced Korean culture. One major change was the anti-Buddhism of the new dynasty. But as mentioned above most Yi officials did not completely reject Buddhism, and it continued to have some hold on society; even many members of the royal family supported temples and consulted monks.
If the establishment of the Yi dynasty did not mark an immediate radical change, it nonetheless helped to set in motion a significant transformation in Korean society. Although Neo-Confucianism grew out of the long tradition of Confucian thought, it was revolutionary in its insistence that the state and society be structured according to the moral principles that governed the universe. While the initial changes were not revolutionary, eventually under the influence of Neo-Confucianism Korean society and culture went through profound changes. As a result of Neo-Confucianism, Korea under the new dynasty did see major changes in the family, the role of women, the conduct of the yangban, and art and literature. In the long run then, what took place in Korea is sometimes called a Neo-Confucian Revolution. These changes, however, took place gradually over several centuries. Only by the eighteenth century did Korea become the model Confucian society that most modern Koreans see as “traditional.” Therefore, the dynasty inaugurated profound change, but in a more evolutionary fashion. Indeed, one could argue that the continuity between early Chosŏn Korea and the Korea of Silla and Koryŏ is just as striking as the changes.
At the apex of the Chosŏn state was the king. Under him was a complex set of bureaucratic institutions to carry out his rule. The highest organ of government was the Ŭijŏngbu (State Council).4 It was similar to the Privy Council of Koryŏ except that it had fewer members, only seven. Members reviewed important matters then gave their opinion to the king. After receiving his decision the State Council then transmitted it down the bureaucracy. The State Council had general powers of surveillance over all government offices and affairs, which were known as sŏsa, general supervisory authority. The three highest-ranking members, the High State Councilors, were especially important. The king frequently referred to them, and they often carried out public policy independently of the other members. No other position held as much prestige as being a High Councilor, and they tended to hold their positions for long periods of time. The four junior members tended to have little influence and held positions for shorter periods. In the early days Merit Subjects, people appointed to high office by the king in return for aiding him in some way, dominated High State Councilor positions. Most State Council members, however, came up through the civil examination system. Gradually during the long Yi dynasty the State Council declined in importance.
The day-to-day administration was carried out by the Yukcho (Six Ministries): Personnel, Taxation, Rites, Military Affairs, Punishments, and Public Works. Personnel was in charge of nominations for office, certification of appointments, ranks, titles, evaluation of the performance of officeholders, and conducting special procedures for recruiting personnel. Taxation carried out censuses, maintained population registers, made land surveys and land registers, collected taxes, distributed funds, and maintained warehouses. Rites handled foreign relations, supervised the schools and examinations, licensed monks, and supervised state ceremonies. War included the supervision of post roads, beacon fire communication systems, fortifications, and weapons production. Punishments was the judicial branch of government in charge of both civil and criminal cases. Works dealt with construction and repair of public buildings, bridges, roads, state mining and lumbering operations, and the production of articles for state use by the corps of state artisans. Each ministry was headed by a board consisting of three or four ministers. Their direct access to the king made the ministers important.
Another important institution was the Sŭngjŏngwŏn (Royal Secretariat), an organ that transmitted documents to and from the king. At times it acted on its own without regard to other government bodies. There were six members, each in charge of dealing with one of the Six Ministries. Two recorders in the Royal Secretariat kept diaries of daily activities; their careful recordings were one of the sources for the Sillok, the official record of the reign (see below). These institutions were modeled on those of China, but fit the Korean pattern of rule by councils or committees of aristocrats.
There were eight provinces, which are still the provinces of Korea today: Kyŏnggi, Ch’ungch’ŏng, Kyŏngsang, Chŏlla, Hwanghae, Kangwŏn, Hamgil (today called Hamgyŏng), and P’yŏngan. Each had a centrally appointed governor and six government departments based on those of the central government. The provinces were divided into counties of which there were several types. The number of counties varied somewhat, but were around three hundred. Each was headed by a centrally appointed county magistrate. The county magistrate was an important figure who represented the state at the local level. Each county also had a Hyangch’ŏng (Local Agency) organized by yangban residents, which wielded considerable influence. The Local Agency was directed by a chwasu (overseer) and his assistants and undertook responsibilities for assisting the magistrate, rectifying public mores, and scrutinizing the conduct of the county’s petty functionaries, called hyangni. The Local Agency served as a power base for the local yangban. To counter the power of the local elite a Kyŏngjaeso (Capital Liaison Office) in Seoul for each county, headed by central government officials from that county, existed to see that the Local Agency served the central state’s, not local, interests.
The Yi rulers maintained the basic classification of officials into the yangban (two sides) consisting of munban (civil officials) and the less prestigious muban (military officials). The tradition of discrimination against military officials resumed and became more pronounced in the later years of the dynasty. Officials as in Koryŏ were graded into nine ranks, a practice developed in China a millennium earlier. Each rank was subdivided into senior and junior ranks such as senior first rank and junior first rank to make a total of eighteen grades of officials. The most elite of the officials were those of senior third rank and above, known as the tangsanggwan. Strict protocol and sumptuary laws governed the behavior and respect given to each rank.
One of the important institutions of Korea was the censorate, an institution with no exact counterpart in Western institutional history. Although borrowed from China, the censorate in Korea had far more power. The censorate existed in the Koryŏ period when it was known as the Osadae. It played a greater role during the Yi dynasty. Under the Yi the censorate was known as the Samsa or three institutions. The two chief institutions that made up the censorate were: the Sahŏnbu (Office of Inspector-General) with six members, that dealt with political issues, official conduct and public morals, and the Saganwŏn (Censor-General), which scrutinized and criticized the conduct of the king. A third institution, the Hongmun’gwan (Office of Special Advisors), was created in 1478. Its members maintained books in the royal library, composed royal epitaphs and eulogies, and compiled state-sponsored texts. It also served as a panel of advisors to the king on policy and principle, and gave lessons on history and the orthodox Chinese writers. The Hongmun’gwan had seventeen members, mostly younger officials.
The censoring organs were the moral guardians or moral police of the state. They had the unique right to investigate the backgrounds of all those who were appointed to office to find out if they were morally fit to serve or if they had the proper aristocratic background. They also saw to it that no one with dishonorable or disloyal ancestors would serve the state. They reviewed the actions of officials and of the king himself, and issued moral condemnations for improper conduct. Since good Confucians made no distinction between private and public conduct, the censors carefully scrutinized the private as well as public lives of officials. They also reviewed the behavior of the general public and issued ethical guidelines. Most officials served as censors for only short periods, yet while in office censors, often quite young, frequently carried out their responsibilities with persistency and zeal. At times the censorate was used as a base for power by ambitious individuals and factions. Since most censors were well schooled in the tenets of Neo-Confucianism and were firm adherents of them, the organs acted as one of the institutional bases for the great undertaking of making Korea a model Confucian society.
Another base for Neo-Confucian reformist zeal was the Kyŏngyŏn (Classics Mat) (Kyŏngyŏn). Modeled on the Song China jingyan advocated by the Neo-Confucianist thinkers Cheng Yi (1033–1108) and Zhu Xi, the Classics Mat was instituted as a lecture program that in 1392 was organized with a staff of twenty-one. Although the first three Yi kings seldom attended, the fifteenth-century king Sejong attended daily. Later in the fifteenth century it met three times a day. Censors, historians, and a royal secretary attended. Since members of the censorate often supplied and conducted the lessons, the Classics Mat contributed to an increase in the power of censorial organs. At these sessions the reader would read and lead a discussion of the Confucian classics and commentaries on the classics by such luminaries as Zhu Xi. To further edify the monarch, historical works were included in addition to the Neo-Confucian texts. Readers could digress from texts to discuss implications for current affairs. The Classics Mat was designed to guide the monarch; it served as an agency for promoting Neo-Confucian concepts at court.
Another feature of the Yi dynasty was the significant role of the state historians. They too promoted Neo-Confucian ideals. The monarchs and officials of the Yi dynasty took history seriously as a guide to statecraft. Three High State Councillors supervised the Ch’unch’ugwan (Bureau of State Records), the official government archives. Daily records were kept by officials from the Yemun’gwan (Office of Royal Decrees). Low-ranking posts were usually held by young bureaucrats who held great prestige despite their age. Due to their importance, a careful and elaborate procedure took place for selecting them. They were to be free of vested interests and it was thought that their youthful idealism would keep “their brushes straight.”5 Careful daily records of all proceedings at court were kept. Historians followed the king and recorded both his conversations with officials and his facial expressions as well. No official business could be transacted without their presence. The records were not made available to the king. In contrast to Ming China where the first Ming emperor insisted on seeing what had been recorded, similar requests from Yi monarchs were denied. At the end of each reign the Sillok Veritable Records was compiled. This was a multivolume, detailed account of each reign.
Chosŏn-era Koreans regarded history and the role of the historian as matters of great importance. As good Confucian scholars they viewed history as an indispensable source of guidance for those that governed and as a source of moral tales providing examples of virtue and vice that would instruct all who read it. Since history was valuable for instruction for both governance and morality, historical works were included in the Classics Mat. Through their writing of history, Yi dynasty historians promoted the ideals and principles of Neo-Confucianism. Because of history’s vital role in governance, great efforts were made to preserve the historical records. Four copies of the daily record of proceedings at court were kept, one in Seoul, and one each in the provincial cities of Sŏngju, Ch’ungju, and Chŏnju. This precaution served the dynasty well when the Japanese invasions destroyed all but the Chŏnju archives. The government then had all records copied and established new archives at remote islands and mountains.
To understand the past in order to guide them in their endeavor to create a moral society, scholars at the beginning of the dynasty began the work of compiling an official history of the Koryŏ. The Koryŏ sa (History of Koryŏ), after going through several versions, was completed in 1451. It reflected the Confucian commitments of its authors, who neglected to give any special attention to Buddhism. Furthermore it justified the establishment of the new dynasty by painting the later years of the Koryŏ as a time of decline when the dynasty had lost its mandate from heaven. Today it is the primary source for the Koryŏ period. In 1452, the Koryŏ sa chŏryo (Abridged Essence of the Three Kingdoms), a shorter official history in the p’yŏnnyŏn (annalistic format), was independently compiled. It contains information not found in the Koryŏ sa. Several other officially sponsored histories were compiled during the early Yi. One of the most significant is the Tongguk t’onggam (Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom), compiled by Sŏ Kŏ-jŏng in 1485. This covered all of Korean history from Tan’gun to the fall of the Koryŏ, and was possibly the most widely read history in the Chosŏn dynasty period. Another important work was Han Paek-kyŏm’s (1552–1615) Tongguk chiri chi (Treatise on Historical Geography). Han’s history influenced later historiography with his theories on the origins of the Three Kingdoms and the location of the three Han tribes.
Most officials in Chosŏn Korea were selected through the examination system. Since serving in office was the most prestigious occupation as well as a vital way to protect a family’s interest it became the goal of most ambitious families to have a son who passed the exams. In a society where no other culturally sanctioned avenue to power and prestige existed, the exam system was of enormous importance. While education was recognized as an end in itself, in practice, it was also understood to be a means of social mobility and status selection. Potential office seekers had to go through a series of highly competitive examinations. These civil examinations were divided into the lower-level sokwa or sama exams where a student could choose to take either the saengwŏn (classics) or the chinsa (literary) exam. The passage of these exams did not secure an official post, but it did bring certain privileges, such as eligibility for government office and exemption from military duties. Most importantly it qualified its successful passers for the higher civil exam called the taekwa or munkwa, which was the real vehicle to high government office.
The lower-level sama or sokwa exams began at the provincial level. First, hopefuls took the ch’osi or preliminary exam at their province’s capital. Those who succeeded in these provincial exams could take the metropolitan exam in Seoul. To insure representation from all parts of the country a quota was established for the number of candidates from each province and from Seoul. Those selecting the classics exam wrote two essays. In the first they explicated the meaning of a short passage that was given from one of the Five Classics of ancient China: The Classic of Changes, The Classic of History, The Classic of Songs, The Spring and Autumn Annals, and the Classic of Rituals. For the second essay they wrote on the issues involved in several passages given from the Four Books, the most revered works of Confucianism: The Analects of Confucius, The Book of Mencius, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean. Those who chose the literary exam were required to compose one pu (rhyme-prose) and one old-style poem, each based on a topic and rhyme given at the examination. A candidate could sit for both exams. Passing both brought great honor. Successful examinees received a white diploma presented by the king. This degree enabled the recipient to enroll in the National Academy in Seoul and to sit for the higher-level civil examinations. It generally did not result in an appointment for office. Since the Yi dynasty, holding a degree was important to confirm social status; for many this was enough and they returned home to play prominent roles in their local communities.
The higher level exam, the taekwa or munkwa was the real gateway to public office holding. Passing the higher civil examination was not easy and most lower exam passers never succeeded. There was no limit to how often one could take the exam, and some persistent candidates took it many times, well into old age. There were three stages to this exam. The first was a preliminary provincial-level exam. In taking the classics exam one had to write an essay on the Five Classics and the Four Books and another essay on an assigned topic. For the literary exam candidates had to compose a formal memorial or report and a dissertation on an assigned topic. The second stage was the metropolitan exam in Seoul. The third stage was the chŏnsi (palace exam) taken under the supervision of the king. The top thirty-three examinees received the coveted munkwa. All exams were triennial and were held throughout the dynasty until they were abolished in 1894, with the exception of 1594 and 1597 during the Japanese invasions and 1636 during the Manchu invasions. In addition to the triennial exams special exams were held from time to time. This practice of holding special exams became more common during the late Yi period.
Although a few men of commoner status may have been allowed to take the exams in the early years of the dynasty, they served chiefly to allocate official positions among members of the yangban aristocratic elite. The examination system acted as the main selection device for the limited number of government posts. Formal education was largely organized around preparation for the exams. Another feature of education and the examination system during this period is the incongruity between the ideal of meritocracy implied by the system and the reality of a society that emphasized bloodlines and kinship. For while in many ways Korea became the Confucian society par excellence, it was dominated by a hereditary aristocratic elite. The Neo-Confucianism that developed in Song China and that became the reigning orthodoxy in Korea in the fourteenth century had a strong egalitarian streak that emphasized the perfectibility of all men. It assumed that each individual was capable of benefiting from education and of achieving moral enlightenment. Neo-Confucianism emphasized the need for society to be governed by men of talent and virtue, which could best be demonstrated by mastery of the classics, self-discipline, and personal conduct. In conformity with this ideology, the schools and the civil examinations were opened to all except outcaste groups (see chapter 7), but in reality a number of practices arose that limited access to both state schools and the exams. In addition, preparation for the examinations required many years of study. Those parents who could afford to finance lengthy studies and hire tutors had an enormous advantage. And as studies have shown, Korean society was one where family lines, along with rank and hierarchy, were of vital importance. In reality, therefore, the examination system and the schools associated with it primarily served as a means of allocating power, privilege, and status, all closely associated with officeholding, among members of the yangban aristocracy.
Unlike in China there were no exam halls in Korea. All exams were conducted in the open. A fence would be put up around an area and candidates would have to take the exams with no protection from the elements. Many complained of enduring rain and snow. In the eighteenth century some examinees began to set up tents. Cheating was always a problem. Common forms of cheating were having someone take the exam for a candidate and collusion between the examinees. Bribery and nepotism were also a problem. Others cheated by smuggling notes written on thin paper and stuffing them up their nostrils, which led to the slang term “wisdom storage” for nostrils.6
The degree holders formed an important elite. Because of the law of avoidance, another Chinese practice, officials could not serve in their home localities. This meant that the local country magistrates and other local officials were usually not familiar with the area they administered. Degree holders living in the community were able to advise the official on local conditions. Degree holders also formed organizations such as samaso that acted as both social organizations and local pressure groups. Since taking the exams was such an intense experience, those who took and passed the same examinations often formed tongnyŏnhoe (classmate organizations) whose members met at regular reunions.7
Not all officials were recruited through civil examinations. Some came to office through the ch’ŏn’gŏ (recommendation system). Senior civil and military officials of the third rank and above submitted lists of three worthy men every third year to the Ministry of Personnel. If the ministry approved, the men could be appointed to office. Appointment was not automatic, and the candidate would be tested on one book of the candidate’s choice from the Four Books and the Five Classics. Provincial governors, too, would sometimes recommend local men for submission to the Ministry of Personnel as candidates to be examined. The total number of officials appointed this way was not large, and it never rivaled the use of civil examinations as a way of recruiting the men who administered the state. Nonetheless, the recommendation system had its supporters among the elite. The recommendation system appointees were called yuil (people of merit and integrity). The practice went back as early as Han China and was used during the Koryŏ. It was based on the same Confucian principle of government by men of merit as the civil examinations. Many scholars and officials regarded the examinations as an inadequate or incomplete method of selecting worthy individuals. Recommendations were seen as a way to find such worthies who had been overlooked by the exams. Some scholars, such as Cho Kwang-jo in the sixteenth century, wanted to abolish the examination system and rely exclusively on recommendations.8 Despite its champions, the recommendation system was strictly of secondary importance as a method of recruiting officials. In general yuil possessed less prestige than the exam passers and held only low-ranking posts. Another method of securing an office was through purchase. This practice, called napsok pogwan (appointment through grain contributions), was usually done during emergencies. This was a method of the state to raise money; often it meant only that a prestigious degree was purchased, not an actual appointment to office. Many degrees were sold this way during the Japanese invasions of the late sixteenth century, but at most times it was not common.
Education in traditional Korea was valued as a means of personal self-cultivation and as a way of achieving status and power. An individual could become virtuous through the study of ethically oriented Confucian classics. He could go on to play an informal role as a moral exemplar and as a teacher and advisor to others, thus enhancing his status and influence in society. As in other East Asian societies, Koreans highly esteemed the written word and the prodigious efforts needed to master the accumulated body of literary and scholarly works. Furthermore, the examination system reinforced the importance of learning.
In order to have a supply of educated men from which to select officials, the early Yi dynasty leadership established a fairly comprehensive network of schools. These schools were seen as a means of establishing loyalty, maintaining orthodoxy, and recruiting officials. Basic education was provided for by village schools known as sŏjae or sŏdang and by private tutoring. The sŏdang remained the most common institution of formal education in Korea until well into the twentieth century. At a more advance level, a system of hyanggyo (state-sponsored local schools) existed to prepare students for the civil examinations. These included the sahak, four schools organized in four of the five districts of Seoul, and schools established in each of the provinces. The sahak in Seoul accepted one hundred and sixty and later just one hundred students in each of its schools. There were over three hundred hyanggyo (the figure varied somewhat over time) throughout the countryside. The state fixed the number of students assigned to each of these schools in the fifteenth century, ranging from thirty to ninety. Students entered at around the age of sixteen and at about the age of eighteen or nineteen were allowed to sit for the lower-level civil exams. Admittance to a hyanggyo brought with it the coveted status of yuhak that included exemption from military duty and eligibility for taking the civil service exams. At the pinnacle of Chosŏn education were those who passed the sama (lower-level examinations) and entered the Sŏnggyun’gwan (National Confucian Academy). These students were generally eighteen or nineteen years old when admitted. Sometime between the ages of twenty and twenty-three they would compete for the munkwa, the higher civil service examination.
The basic structure of Chosŏn schooling was set up in the early fifteenth century; however, there were significant changes during subsequent centuries. The official schools experienced a gradual decline. Although they continued to function until the end of the nineteenth century, their role as agents of advanced schooling was challenged by the sŏwŏn or private academies that emerged in the middle of the sixteenth century. Unlike the hyanggyo, which were usually located in administrative centers, the sŏwŏn sprang up in the countryside. They functioned as rural retreats for the literati, and as shrines to honor scholars and officials, as well as centers of learning. About 680 sŏwŏn were founded by the end of the eighteenth century, and they served as important bases for political factions until most of them were closed in the decade after 1864.
Education trained the cultivated generalist. There was disdain for the specialist and for technical training that prevailed into recent times. Although chapkwa, specialized technical exams, existed for certifying doctors, astronomers, interpreters, and other needed professionals, they remained far less prestigious; education was basically of a nonspecialized, literary nature that has remained the preference of most Koreans. The people who took the specialized exams were largely from the chungin class, not the yangban aristocracy (see chapter 7).
Literacy in Korea among males was probably high by premodern standards, and most likely increased in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An indication of this is the growth in private academies that promoted education among the yangban class. But even commoner boys attended village schools where an ability to read basic moral texts was considered essential to being a good husband, father and neighbor. In addition, literacy no doubt brought about advantages in legal disputes and enabled individuals to keep informed of government regulations. Literacy among commoners was facilitated by the use of the Korean alphabet, han’gŭl (see below). There was also a thriving popular literature of adventure stories and romances, an indicator of high rates of literacy. For commoners schooling was confined to sŏdang village schools. These consisted of a teacher and boys of different ages, often quite young. The sŏdang became a feature of Korean village life. Literacy among females was very low and largely confined to a small number of elite women; some of these, however, were highly educated by private tutors. Another exception was the kisaeng, the refined female entertainers (see chapter 7).
The scholar-teacher held an exalted position. Since organized religion was peripheral to Chosŏn society, it was the school and the teacher, rather than the temple and the priest, that served as the principal source of ethical counsel. Consequently, the scholar obtained an almost sacred status. The learned man was more than a scholar or teacher: he was the moral arbiter of society and source of guidance at the village as well as the state level. Thus, the value placed on learning and the position of the teacher in society were extremely high. Teachers, scholars, and earnest students were vested with considerable moral authority. This was the basis for the tradition of remonstrance, the right to issue formal protests based on ethical principles. It was the duty of the scholar to criticize the actions of the government, including the king; since Confucianism perceived the universe as a moral order, improper behavior on the part of officials and rulers threatened that order. Scholars and lower-ranked officials wrote memorials, and students at the Sŏnggyun’gwan held protest demonstrations when they felt that those in positions of authority were not adhering to ethical standards or were improperly performing rituals. Students in the Academy periodically withdrew from school in mass protests, with nineteen such incidents recorded in the reign of King Sukchong (1674–1720) and twenty in the reign of King Sunjo (1800–1834).9 This tradition of equating education and scholarship with moral authority, hence giving students and scholars the right and duty to criticize officialdom, has been one of the most persistent features of Korean education. It is a tradition still felt in Korea today.
The Chosŏn state was based on an agricultural society. The prosperity of the state was a result of the improvements in farming that eventually resulted in an increase in the population. Since the bulk of the population consisted of peasants and it was they who paid most of the taxes and provided most of the labor, the state was vitally concerned with agriculture. New farming methods developed during the Song period in the Yangzi River Valley and in southern China known as the “Jiangnan Farming Techniques.” These involved improved strains of rice, intercropping, and the use of wet field rice production in which rice was planted and then transplanted in shallow flooded paddies. Wet field farming allowed for repeated cultivation of the same field. Korea’s climate, colder and drier than the southern Chinese regions, hindered the spread of these techniques, but in the middle of the fourteenth century the new methods of transplanting rice were beginning to be practiced in Korea. It was not until the seventeenth century that this more intensive style of agriculture became dominant in the southern part of the country. However, it was already increasing the ability of the southern provinces Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang to increase production and support more dense populations in the early Chosŏn dyansty.
A number of other improvements in farming occurred. Farmers were beginning to make greater use of fertilizers; that meant less time letting the land remain in fallow. Under local government supervision hundreds of small reservoirs were constructed to minimize the impact of drought, and better strains of seed came into use. Interest in agricultural improvements by the elite is reflected in the appearance of agricultural manuals. Koreans had long been familiar with Chinese agricultural manuals; now they produced their own, adapted to local conditions. The first known agricultural manual, Nongsa chiksŏl (Straight Talk on Farming), was compiled in 1430. It was followed by other published works on farming. New land was brought under cultivation. According to the national land-tax records the amount of arable land, which totaled about 930,000 kyŏl at the beginning of the fifteenth century, had reached 1,700,000 kyŏl by the middle of the sixteenth.10 These records are notoriously unreliable and much of the land went unreported to evade taxation, but they do suggest that a considerable expansion of agriculture occurred during the early Chosŏn dynasty.
With potentially dangerous tribal peoples to the north and Japanese raiders on the coast, the Yi rulers were aware of the need for a strong military. Indeed, the dynasty was founded by a general. One of the first challenges of the early monarchs was to create an effective central army. With this in mind, T’aejo, the first Yi king, established the Ŭihŭng Samgunbu (Three Armies Headquarters) to provide central control over the military. In the early years of the dynasty members of the royal family maintained personal armed retainers. King T’aejong (1400–1418) abolished these private forces, bringing all soldiers under the authority of the Three Armies Headquarters. The era of private armies came to an end in Korea. Only the central state now had military forces. Sejo, in 1464, reorganized the army into the Owi Toch’ongbu (Five Military Commands Headquarters). The five commands were named after the regions of the country where they were stationed: Center, West, East, North, and South. The divisions were divided into five pu (brigades), which consisted of four t’ong (regiments), and these in turn were divided into yŏ (companies) and tae (platoons). Professional soldiers had to pass a series of tests, and these soldiers were supplemented by chŏngbyŏng (conscripts) in the capital garrisons. Beyond this were the provincial armies. Each province had an Army Command and Navy Command with control of provincial garrison forces called chinsugun stationed in chin (garrisons). Under this chin’gwan system district magistrates would assume defense of their own walled towns. Peasants were assigned as garrison forces serving on a rotation basis.
In the fifteenth century Korea maintained a policy of military vigor. But with the frontiers secured (see below), the army and navy went into a decline. The rise of Neo-Confucianism also contributed to this decline. Confucian officials tended to take less interest in military affairs and viewed military men with contempt. Yangban avoided the military while soldiers were recruited primarily from the peasantry and treated poorly. Since few volunteered, the state supplied the armed forces with men through the popŏp (Paired Provisioner) system. A team of two or three able-bodied men was supported while on active service by the provisioners, who supplied the conscripted soldiers with fixed amounts of cotton cloth. They were similarly supported when their turn to serve came up. This system was unpopular and ineffective. Conscripts under the Paired Provisioner system were poorly trained and had low morale. Peasants evaded service whenever they could. The decline in the military forces led to the disastrous defeats when the Japanese invaded in the late sixteenth century and the Manchus invaded in the early seventeenth.
Early Chosŏn foreign policy centered around securing its legitimacy, establishing correct relations with China, and securing its borders from the threats of its tribal neighbors on the Manchurian border and from Japanese pirates along the southern coasts. Establishing friendly relations with Ming China was a central component of the new political and social order established by the founders of the Chosŏn dynasty. Yet relations remained tense between the Ming and the Chosŏn courts during the first years of the Cho-sŏn. The Chinese looked at Korean attempts to establish their borders at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers with great suspicion. Memories of Koguryŏ and Parhae control over Manchuria mixed with fears of a Korean-Jurchen alliance. Several embassies were turned back on various excuses, such as that the horses sent as tribute were unfit. To mollify the Chinese, members of the royal family such as Prince Pangwŏn were sent to the Ming court at Nanjing as hostages. The Yi officials wanted good relations with China for ideological as well as practical reasons. China was the home of the sages, of Confucius, Zhu Xi, and of civilization. The Yi kings sought Chinese recognition as a way of legitimizing themselves as bearers of civilized values. Ming suspicions soon waned and relations improved in the early fifteenth century.
The Chosŏn court operated in a hierarchical world order. Its external relations were a matter of placing foreigners in that hierarchy and treating them accordingly. At the top of the hierarchy was Ming China, with which it maintained friendly relations in China’s tributary system. The first Ming emperor limited Korean tribute missions to once every three years, but these later became annual and then three times a year. The court dispatched regular embassies to Beijing at New Year’s, the emperor’s birthday, the birthday of the crown prince, and the winter solstice. It also sent special embassies when an emperor died or when a new Korean king was enthroned. Technically these were tributary missions in which the Korean king offered tribute to the Chinese embassies, but in reality they were opportunities for both sides to engage in trade. Koreans traded horses, furs, cloth, and above all prized Korean ginseng and imported silk, medicines, books, and Chinese porcelains. These embassies also served as opportunities for Korean scholars to collect books, meet with their Chinese counterparts, and keep abreast of cultural trends in China by attaching themselves to the embassies. Korean kings claimed legitimacy by being enfeoffed by the Chinese emperors. The Chinese emperors, by confirming the right of Korean kings to rule, ensured peaceful relations with Korea and reinforced their own pretensions to being universal rulers. Koreans were generally well regarded in China for their scholarship and adherence to Confucian cultural norms, and Korean officials were usually seated closest to the Chinese officials at diplomatic functions, indicating the high rank of Korea in the Chinese world order.
This did not mean that relations were always free from problems. Ming officials were sometimes suspicious of Korea’s attempts to establish friendly relations with the Jurchen tribes of Manchuria. Disputes arose over official Chinese histories. In one it was reported that Yi Sŏng-gye had murdered the last four Koryõ monarchs, confusing him with Yi In-min. Korea sent an embassy to the Ming capital of Nanjing to ask that the correction be made. Yet the mistake continued to pop up in Chinese records. From time to time other incidents arose between Seoul and Beijing when the Koreans became offended at what they thought were erroneous and unflattering accounts of Yi kings in the Chinese records.
Early Chosŏn kings gave considerable attention to pacifying the nomads along their northern border. The principal threat came from the Manchurian Jurchen tribes. Yi Sŏng-gye, himself a skilled horseman and archer, had extensive experience fighting Manchuria-based warriors, including the Red Turbans who invaded in 1361. He began a policy that was pursued with some success by T’aejong (1400–1418) and Sejong (1418–1450) in using a threefold approach of launching vigorous military campaigns against the Jurchens, encouraging them to trade peacefully, and seeking to “civilize” them. The Koreans did this by opening trading posts where the tribal people could peacefully exchange their horses and furs for agricultural products and manufactured goods. Borrowing from an old Chinese practice, the Chosŏn court awarded tribal leaders with degrees and titles. One tribal leader, Yi Chi-ran, was awarded the highest honor of Merit Subject. Some Jurchen were enrolled in the Korean military, including the Royal Palace Guard. Tribal people living along the border were encouraged to marry Korean women and adopt Korean customs. Some of the tribal peoples did so and became assimilated into Korean society.
Nonetheless, tribal unrest still occurred. King Sejong launched more military campaigns, built six forts along the Tumen River, and carried out a resettlement policy. Sejong established the borders of Korea along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, approximately where they have remained to the present day. To make sure these new borderlands became a permanent part of Korea, he colonized them between 1431 and 1447 with thousands of Koreans, mostly from the heavily populated southern provinces. This action largely fixed the northern borders of the kingdom, and these areas have been an integral part of Korea ever since. Despite these efforts the rugged, mountainous northeastern region that made up Hamgyŏng Province remained for generations a frontier at the periphery of central government control. In 1453, the area’s military commander, Yi Ching-ok, revolted against the government in Seoul with the support of some Jurchen tribes, declaring himself king of a new dynasty. The royal forces put down the revolt, but another sprang up in 1467 led by a local official, Yi Si-ae, who attempted to gain Jurchen support. This too was suppressed by dynastic forces.
Japanese pirates posed another problem. The increased frequency of wako raids in the fourteenth century contributed to the troubles of the last Koryŏ kings. Japanese pirate raids started becoming common in the thirteenth century; after 1350 they increased in frequency and scale. Some consisted of more than three hundred ships and penetrated deep inland where they looted and abducted thousands of Koreans to be sold as slaves. Koryŏ tried to negotiate with the government of the shogun in Kyoto, sending a mission as early as 1367. The weak central government of Japan, however, had little control over the western region of the country where local feudal lords found the raids highly lucrative. A successful military expedition against the pirate base of Tsushima in 1389 brought only temporarily relief.11The early Chosŏn rulers applied a policy of military raids against pirate bases coupled with attempts to persuade pirates to trade peacefully.
Particularly troublesome was the island of Tsushima across the Korea Straits, whose feudal lords were among the principal sponsors of pirate raids. In 1419, the Koreans launched a massive attack with 250 ships to destroy that base. Shortly afterwards the Japanese shogun Yoshimitsu offered to suppress pirates in exchange for a copy of the Korean Tripitaka. The Yi government then presented him the Buddhist collection in over six thousand volumes. But the central government of Japan maintained little control over the lords in the western part of the country. In 1443, Seoul established an agreement that allowed Japanese merchants to trade at several authorized ports along the southern coasts. This proved profitable enough for the rulers of western Japan that they no longer encouraged pirate raids. The ports were temporarily closed in 1510 when Japanese residents in the ports rioted and again in 1544 following a pirate raid.12 Thus the Koreans eventually adopted an effective carrot-and-stick policy toward the Japanese similar to that used to control the Jurchens. This kept the coasts mostly peaceful until the end of the sixteenth century.
Besides the relations with China, Japan, and the northern tribal peoples, Korea maintained trade and contact with other Asian lands. Active trade and diplomacy existed with Okinawa (Ryukyu Islands), which until 1609 was an independent state. An embassy was sent to Thailand in 1393, and envoys from Java arrived in Korea in 1397.13 There were some Korean merchants in Okinawa and in Southeast Asia. However, trade with Southeast Asia was generally carried out indirectly through Ryukyuan and Japanese merchants in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus Korea participated in a wider Asian world of trade and contact beyond East Asia, but only peripherally. Korea had no direct contact with Europe before the seventeenth century. The first European known to visit Korea was a Jesuit priest, Gregorio de Cespedes, who arrived in 1597 in the company of Japanese invaders.
After a century and a half of peaceful relations with its neighbors Korea suffered from a destructive series of invasions. The first, and most devastating, came from the Japanese. In Japan, a bloody struggle for power among feudal lords temporarily ended when a powerful warlord, Hideyoshi, unified the country. Hideyoshi then launched an invasion of Korea with the intention of using the peninsula as a base to conquer China. It is unclear if he was motivated by megalomania or a desire to direct the energies of warriors harmlessly abroad. Or perhaps the invasion of Korea was merely a continuation of his drive to extend his power, the next step after he had brought the autonomous domains of western Japan under his control. Hideyoshi assembled a quarter of a million men for what was probably the largest overseas invasion in history before the twentieth century. Korean officials received rumors of preparations for an invasion by 1591, but debated among themselves over the reality of the threat and only made some inadequate efforts to strengthen their defenses. When the initial contingent of fifty-two thousand troops landed in Pusan on May 23, 1592, they overran the coastal fortifications that were defended to the death by the local commander. The Japanese forces then advanced quickly up the peninsula. Their foot soldiers were armed and well trained in musketry, which they used to great effect. One unit of Japanese would fire volleys of muskets into the Korean forces, overwhelming them with musket power, while other units would attack with swords on the right and left flanks, decapitating as many as they could. Korean troops, who would defend themselves by massing together, were then slaughtered in great numbers. So effective were Japanese tactics that three weeks after the start of the invasion the Japanese captured Seoul and then pushed north.
The Chosŏn court fled ahead of the enemy advance, abandoning the defense of the capital to slaves and commoners. Disgusted onlookers jeered and even threw stones at the royal entourage as it made its way to Ŭiju on the Chinese frontier. Slaves in Seoul took advantage of the chaos to burn palaces and offices and to destroy the registers that documented their status. After a pause for regrouping and supplying their forces, the Japanese under General Konishi captured P’yŏngyang on July 23. A second wing under General Kato Kiyomasa and General Nabeshima advanced northeast to the Yalu and Tumen rivers. The Korean army disintegrated under this massive and well-organized invasion. In desperation the Koreans appealed to China for help. The Chinese, fearful of this new threat from the east, responded with assistance. Led by General Li Rusong, himself of Korean descent, the Ming forces entered in January 1593 and defeated Konishi in battle at P’yŏn-gyang in February. The Chinese then advanced south, but did so too fast and were halted. Then the war began to stalemate in a way similar to the later Korean War.
Unlike the Korean War where Koreans fought on both sides, Koreans were united in their resistance to Japan, and after a poor initial showing they resisted more effectively. Peasants often fiercely fought to defend their villages from these strange, dangerous outsiders. Local yangban, monks, and others formed resistance bands called ŭibyŏng (“righteous armies”). Among the more effective groups were ones led by Cho Hŏn in Ch’ungch’ŏng province in south-central Korea, Kwak Chae-u in the southeastern province of Kyŏngsang, and Kwŏn Yul in the southwestern province of Chŏlla. While most were defeated, they made the Japanese position difficult, and along with the pressure from the Chinese forces they forced Hideyoshi’s troops to withdraw to the southern coastal areas. Especially successful was Admiral Yi Sun-sin (1545–1598), who waged a naval campaign that destroyed hundreds of Japanese ships and made supplying and reenforcing Japanese troops costly. Yi came from a family of officials but chose to take the military rather than the civil examinations. He served as an officer along the northern frontier and later in Chŏlla. Alarmed by the reports of a possible invasion, he launched a last-minute shipbuilding effort. Yi experimented with new weapons and tactics. His most ingenious innovation was the kobuksŏn (“turtle ship”), an ironclad ship designed to withstand Japanese cannon fire and to ram and sink its opponents’ vessels. These were the world’s first ironclad ships. The turtle ships proved to be highly effective. The first ship was completed just days before the Japanese landed. Yi with the help of his turtle ships led an effective naval campaign that prevented the Japanese from using the western coastal route to transport supplies and reinforcements to their army in the north of Korea, making resupplying their army in Korea from Japan hazardous.
With the war stalemated by 1594, the Chinese withdrew their forces to Manchuria and the Japanese to the southern coastal ports. A period of diplomacy began. Chinese diplomats came to Japan, but the negotiations revealed how little the Chinese and Japanese knew each other. The Chinese were willing to recognize Hideyoshi as the “king” of Japan and allow the Japanese to enter the Chinese tributary system. Hideyoshi in turn offered to form a marriage alliance with the Chinese emperor. Interestingly Hideyoshi offered to divide Korea, with the southern provinces coming under Japanese control and the northern parts under Chinese authority, thus roughly anticipating the division of Korea that the United States and the Soviet Union carried out three and half centuries later. Eventually negotiations broke down and the Japanese launched a second massive invasion in 1597. This time the Koreans and the Chinese under General Yang Hao were better prepared and limited the advance of the Japanese. Meanwhile, Yi Sun-sin, who had been removed from his post due to court intrigue, was given back his naval command. He scored a major victory at Myŏngnyang near Mokp’o. While chasing the retreating Japanese ship he was killed by a chance shot. Today he is remembered as a national hero and one of the world’s great naval geniuses. Suffering defeats at sea and stalemate on land, the Japanese generals withdrew their forces to Japan to participate in the jockeying for power that followed Hideyoshi’s death in late 1598.
The invasions, while a failure, were highly destructive since the Japanese, like the Mongols earlier, used a scorched earth policy to overcome resistance. As a result they left behind a ruined countryside and a legacy of bitterness and fearfulness of the Japanese among Koreans. The viciousness of the conflict was symbolized by the thirty-eight thousand ears of Chinese and Korean forces sent back to Japan by military commanders as proof of their military successes. These were pickled and buried in Kyoto in the Mimizuka (Mound of Ears). The conflict provided later generations of Koreans with heroes from the fighting monks and peasants to Admiral Yi. It also led to a temporary and partial breakdown in the social order as slaves took advantage of the war to seek freedom. A court in desperate need of money sold official titles to commoners and even outcastes. These titles, however, did not become hereditary. While the Ming only intervened when it became clear that the Japanese were a threat to Chinese security, the invaluable assistance of China reinforced Korea’s tributary ties and its emotional connection with the Middle Kingdom. The conflict also brought Korean influence to Japan. Japanese forces brought back thousands of Korean captives. These included the scholar Kang Hang, who played a major role in introducing Neo-Confucian philosophy to that country, and potters whose rough-hewn Korean wares would influence Japanese ceramic traditions.
Hardly had Korea recovered from the Japanese invasions when it faced a new threat to the north with the rise of the Manchus. The Manchus were a Jurchen group who under their leader Nurhaci united the tribal peoples of what is now called Manchuria. In 1616, Nurhaci established the new state of Jin, a name derived from the Jurchen state of the twelfth century that conquered northern China. The Manchus then began attacking Chinese garrisons in the northeast. The Ming court called upon the Korean king for assistance. Realizing how vulnerable Korea was to a Manchu invasion, King Kwanghaegun sought to avoid becoming involved. When he sent forces to assist the Ming he secretly instructed his military commander to observe which way the battle was going, and when Manchu forces appeared to be emerging victorious the Koreans surrendered without fighting. Korea did not remain neutral for long. Kwanghaegun was overthrown in a power struggle led by some angered by his lack of support of the Ming, who had a generation earlier come to Chosŏn’s rescue. The new group that placed Injo on the throne in 1619 pursued a pro-Ming, anti-Manchu policy.
Shortly afterward, Yi Kwal, a military officer who felt that his family had not been properly rewarded for his part in the coup, seized control of Seoul, forcing the court to flee. Yi Kwal was soon defeated. The new pro-Ming court then provoked a Manchu invasion of Korea in 1627. The court fled to its traditional refuge of Kanghwa Island while the Manchu forces looted P’yŏngyang. Bowing to reality the Koreans negotiated a tributary relationship with the Manchu recognizing them as elder brothers and accepting tribute payments of gold, cloth, and horses. The Korean court, however, still pro-Ming, broke off its tributary relations and allied itself again with Ming in 1636. Nurhaci’s successor Abahai, who now styled himself emperor of the Qing dynasty, invaded Korea to secure his southern flank as he struggled to conquer China. Crossing the frozen Yalu River in the winter of 1636-1637, Manchu cavalry forces advanced quickly and captured Seoul. Injo retreated to a fortress south of the capital while members of the royal family and their entourage fled to the safety of Kanghwa. Injo and his forces, after holding out against a Manchu siege for weeks, surrendered when news arrived that the Manchus, succeeding where the Mongols had failed, had captured Kanghwa and with it the royal family. Injo then pledged his loyalty to the Manchu rulers. Seven years later the Manchu captured Beijing and the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming.
For the next three and a half centuries Korea served as a tributary of the Qing dynasty. The Koreans, however, entered the relationship unwillingly, and hostility toward the Manchus remained strong. Some, such as the military commander Im Kyŏng-ŏp, sought to renew hostilities. A number of Koreans were held hostage, including two princes, Pohyŏn and Pongnim; the latter became King Hyojong (r. 1649-1659). Hyojong upon becoming king prepared to support Ming loyalists who were fighting the Qing in China and planned for an attack. The Qing, however, eventually put down the loyalists and Koreans came to accept the reality of Manchu rule. The Koreans thereafter maintained correct if not enthusiastic relations with the new dynasty (see chapter 8).
Yi Sŏng-gye (reign name T’aejo) established the longest of Korea’s dynasties, which lasted until 1910. In fact, the Yi, which ruled for over five centuries, was among the longest royal dynasties in world history. The succession to the throne, however, did not always go smoothly. Suffering from illness T’aejo abdicated in 1399, which led to a struggle among his sons, each backed by different powerful officials. One son reigned briefly as King Chŏngjong before being deposed and sent to exile in Kaesŏng by a younger brother, Prince Pangwŏn. The latter became King T’aejong (r. 1400–1418). T’aejong was an active and able monarch, trained in and committed to Neo-Confucianist principles. His reign saw the confiscation of Buddhist monasteries and the strengthening of the military. One of his moves to consolidate royal power was the establishment of the hop’ae identification system in 1413. Under this system high-ranking officials wore ivory identity tags, lower-ranking officials wore tags of deer horn, and yangban wore yellow poplar wood tags, while commoners wore small square wooden tags. Large square wooden tags were worn by outcastes and slaves. Tags of yangban and officials gave their titles, those of commoners their name, place, and date of birth. Tags of slaves also provided information on the complexion and height of the tag holder. Each male from the age of fifteen was to make his own identity tag, which would then be stamped with a government seal by an official. Although only intermittently enforced, the hop’ae system provides an illustration of the attempt by the Yi rulers to establish an orderly, controlled society where everyone had a set place. It facilitated census taking, tax collection, and keeping track of migration and runaway slaves.
T’aejong, following the precedent of his father, abdicated in favor of his son, who became King Sejong (1418–1450). Today Sejong is regarded by Koreans as their greatest monarch and his reign is seen as a high point of Korean culture. Sejong successfully strengthened the northern frontier, establishing the present boundaries of Korea. He founded the Chiphyŏnjŏn (Hall of Worthies), a learned body that created the Korean alphabet, han’gŭl (see next chapter). Sejong was a patron of scholarship, the arts, and sciences, which all flourished during his reign. The monarch carefully attended the Classics Mat lectures, studied the classics diligently, and generally adhered to the role of the virtuous ruler who acts as a moral exemplar. Furthermore, he was an able administrator. Dutifully seeking to ensure an heir he fathered eighteen sons. Under his reign the throne reached a heightened prestige.
Nonetheless, Sejong was unable to ensure a smooth succession. Korean kings suffered from their involvement in court intrigue, and rather than an orderly father-to-eldest-son succession, a confused struggle for power often followed. Sejong was succeeded by a son and a grandson; the latter was deposed by his uncle who reigned as King Sejo (r. 1455–1468). Sejo’s usurpation of the throne was accompanied by bloody purges of officials from rival factions in which hundreds were executed or banished into exile. These included six distinguished scholar-officials who became known as the Sa yuksin (Six Martyrs) and six high-ranking officials who resigned in protest. Since the latter were not executed they became known as the Saeng yuksin (Six Ministers Who Lived). Later, these ministers who supported the deposed king would be held as models of loyalty and virtue. Sejo tried to concentrate power in his own hands and limit that of the high-ranking officials. To that end he abolished the State Council and had the Six Ministries report directly to him. Despite his ruthlessness Sejo was an able as well as a strong-willed ruler. His attempt to bend the monarchical-aristocratic division of power in his favor, however, did not survive him. Shortly after his death Sŏngjong (r. 1469–1494) resumed rule through the high officials and presided over a prosperous state where the arts and scholarship flourished.
While most of the early Yi dynasty monarchs were strong and capable rulers, they were not always able to secure their throne from rival factions. Two conspicuous failures were Yŏnsan’gun (1492–1506) and Kwanghaegun (1608–1623), both of whom were deposed. Yŏnsan’gun has received a reputation for ruthlessness. The king attempted to strengthen royal authority by abolishing the Censor-General, the Office of Special Counselors, and the Office of Royal Lectures (Classics Mat). As tension arose between the king and much of officialdom a report appeared that his mother Lady Yun, who had died when he was only four, had been murdered as a result of court intrigue. The king responded with bloody purges of officials and other members of court. Many were killed; sometimes their corpses were dug up and mutilated. His officials deposed Yŏnsan’gun and demoted him from king to prince (hence his title “gun,” meaning prince, instead of the usual honorific royal ending, cho [progenitor] or chong [ancestor]). Historians have depicted him as a depraved tyrant who wasted state revenues, ravished young women, defiled temples that he turned into pleasure palaces, confiscated land and slaves of officials, and seized the homes of thousands of commoners near the capital.
Yŏnsan’gun’s alleged depravity and cruelty provided a negative example for later monarchs, and his removal from office an example of the limits of royal authority. The other Yi monarch demoted to “prince,” Kwanghegun (r. 1608–1623), was by contrast an able monarch. He sponsored scholarship, rebuilt the historical archives that were destroyed by the Japanese, and conducted foreign policy with skill. But he fell victim to the struggles among two factions of officials—the Northerners who supported him and their rivals the Westerners (see below). The Westerners deposed him and placed their own royal candidate on the throne as King Injo (r. 1623–1649). The fates of Yŏnsan’gun and Kwanghaegun were in contrast to Ming or Qing China, where officials never deposed an emperor.
The political history of Chosŏn was in good measure the saga of intrigue among aristocratic factions in maneuvering for political advantage, as well as the story of the struggle of monarchs competing for authority with powerful aristocratic families. Factionalism often made political affairs tense and dangerous during this period. The fierce competition among aristocratic factions led to four “literati purges” that are famous in Korean history: the Purge of 1498, the Purge of 1504, the Purge of 1519, and the Purge of 1545.14 These sometimes violent power struggles led to the death and exile of many high-ranking officials. Koreans have often considered factionalism as one of the curses of their politics. The term “faction” can be misleading, however, implying that these were merely struggles for power. Factions often represented lines of policy differences, which in turn often had an ideological basis, with factional leaders claiming to represent the correct path to virtue. Some of these differences dealt with foreign policy issues such as whether to support the Ming in its conflicts with the Manchus. Korean officials often faced difficult choices in dealing with dangerous neighbors, with dire consequences if their policies failed. Passionate disputes over these issues were understandable. Factional struggles were intensified by the nature of Neo-Confucian ideology and its interpretation. Since court ritual and behavior, and the personal morality of officials, were considered necessary for a harmonious society, every activity by the members of the court and by high officials was scrutinized. The censors had the right to review and rebuke improper conduct whenever they saw it. All this led to an often oppressive atmosphere in the capital in which the performance of seemingly minor rituals and/or minor breaches of conduct could led to demotion, exile, or occasionally execution. Exile could mean being sent for many years to live in remote places, such as on one of the many tiny islands that dot the west and south coasts.
In the late sixteenth century, these factions solidified into clearly identifiable groups. During the reign of King Sŏnjo (1567–1608) a dispute arose between factions of powerful officials, led by Kim Hyo-wŏn and Sim Ŭigyŏm, over appointments to influential posts in government. Since Kim lived in the eastern section of Seoul, his followers in the dispute became known as Tongin (“Easterners”) and Sim’s followers became known as Sŏin (“Westerners”). The rivalry between these two groups soon centered over a successor to King Sŏnjo. The king had no sons by his legal wives but had thirteen sons by his concubines. A dispute arose when the Westerners backed one of his sons by a concubine as crown prince and the Easterners opposed this. Then the Easterners divided into Namin (“Southerners”), those who were willing to accept this decision, and Pugin (“Northerners”), who took a hard-line opposition to having an illegitimate son as crown prince. Thus four major factions were formed. These factions later split further into subgroups such as “Great Northerners” and “Lesser Northerners.” These factional struggles become entangled in foreign policy disputes, with the Northerners in the 1620s seeking to avoid involvement in the Manchu-Ming conflict and the Westerners pursuing a more pro-Ming policy. By the mid-seventeenth century the major factions were Noron (Old Doctrine), Soron (Young Doctrine), Pugin (Northerners) and Namin (Southerners). The first two were the result of a split among the Westerners. These groups, sometimes called the sasaek (four colors), remained the four major factions into the nineteenth century. Loyal disciples followed their masters so that the factions remained tied by family and political loyalty over generations.
Since the yangban had to a great extent become a service nobility and the number of high-ranking posts was limited, the factions centered around the competition for office, and the power and prestige that came with it. Ideology played a role as well, since faction members often took different sides on questions of interpretation of Confucian doctrine and its application to various situations. An example of factional rivalry over ideological disputes was the Mourning Rites controversy in the seventeenth century. This dispute arose over a disagreement on the proper mourning period for one of the wives of King Hyojong (see chapter 8). This led to a difference of opinion by the leaders of two rival factions. The dispute led to a purge of one faction and the coming of power in 1674 of another and to an eventual counterpurge in 1689.15 Each dispute left a legacy of bitterness and resentment that was passed down over generations, making factionalism deeply rooted.
Although the voluminous historical records kept during the Yi dynasty read as a perpetual and vicious struggle for power, these conflicts and intrigues usually involved only a small number of elite officials and high-ranking aristocrats in the capital. That is, the factional conflicts were largely confined to a small upper stratum of society; they did not mean the country at large was in turmoil. Yi politics and the moral language it was couched in were convoluted, contentious, and occasionally violent. Yet, for the most part the institutions of the state worked well and functioned for nearly five centuries without breaking down. In fact, no ruling dynasty in China, Japan, Southeast Asia, or Europe (except, perhaps, the Ottomans) lasted so long without a major upheaval. The bureaucracy was staffed by well-educated people, who more often than not owed their positions as much to successful performance in the state-administered civil, and to a lesser degree military, examinations as they did to their family connections. Many took their duties and responsibilities seriously, trying to adhere to the ethical standards they had studied since childhood. In short, Korea under the Yi dynasty enjoyed centuries of stability. It was also a resilient state that survived the destructive Japanese and Manchu invasions without radical institutional or political change.
Yun Hoe [1380–1436], deputy Director of the Hall of Worthies, and others submitted the following memorial [in 1424]:
We consider the harm of Buddhists to be prevalent still. Since the Han period the reverence for Buddha has been increasingly fervent, yet neither happiness nor profit has been gained. This is recorded in the historical books, which Your Majesty has certainly perused thoroughly. Must you therefore wait for your ministers to tell you?
We think of all the heterodox teachings, Buddhism is the worst. The Buddhists live alone with their barbaric customs, apart from the common productive population; yet they cause the people to be destitute and to steal. What is worse than their crimes? Beasts and birds that damage grain are certainly chased away because they harm the people. Yet even though beasts and birds eat the people’s food, they are nevertheless useful to the people. Buddhists, however, sit around and eat, and there has not yet been a visible profit.
—From the Sejong sillok 23:27a–b
Sin Ch’ŏjung, a licentiate at the Royal Confucian Academy, and one hundred and one others went to the palace and tendered the following memorial [in 1424].
Those Buddhists, what kind of people are they? As eldest sons they turn against their fathers; as husbands they oppose the Son of Heaven. They break off the relationship between father and son and destroy the obligation between ruler and subject. They regard the living together of man and woman as immoral and a man’s plowing and a woman’s weaving as useless.
If monks were forced to return to their home villages; if they were treated as men fit to join the military; if they were made to settle down in order to increase their households; if we burnt their books in order to destroy their roots and branches; if their fields were requisitioned in order to distribute them among the offices; if their bronze statues and bells were entrusted to the Office of Supply in order to mint copper cash; if the utensils they use were handed over to a ceremonial office in order to prepare them for official use; if within the capital the temples of each sect were divided up among the offices without buildings; if the temples outside the capital were all torn down in order to build postal stations and school buildings; if for funerals the Family Rites of Zhu Xi were exclusively relied upon, then, in a few years, the human mind would be corrected and the heavenly principles clear, the households would increase, and the number of soldiers would be complete.
—From Sejong sillok 23:30a–32b
Ch’oe Yong-ho, The Civil Examinations and the Social Structure in Early Yi Dynasty Korea: 1392–1600 (Seoul: Korean Research Center, 1987), 67.
Chai-sik Chung, “Chŏng Tojŏn: ‘Architect’ of Yi Dynasty Government and Ideology,” in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed. William Theodore De Bary and Jahyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 59–88.
Michael C. Kalton, “The Writings of Kwon Kun: The Context and Shape of Early Yi Dynasty Neo-Confucianism,” in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed. William Theodore De Bary and Jahyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 89–123.
This outline of institutions and translations follows Edward W. Wagner, Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1974).
Choe Yong-ho, “An Outline History of Korean Historiography,” Korean Studies 4 (1980): 1–27.
Choe, Civil Examinations, 79–80.
Choe, Civil Examinations, 34.
Choe, Civil Examinations, 19.
Michael J. Seth, Education Fever: Society, Politics and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2002), 8.
Yi Tae-jin, “The Influence of Neo-Confucianism in the 14th-16th centuries,” Korea Journal 37, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 5–23. A kyŏl was actually a unit of crop yield that varied from two to nine acres depending on the fertility of the land. The figures do suggest an overall increase in acreage.
William E. Henthorn, History of Korea (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 132.
Kenneth Robinson, “From Raiders to Traders: Border Security and Border Control in Early Choson, 1392–1450,” Korean Studies 16 (1992): 94–115.
Henthorn, History of Korea, 158.
Wagner, Literati Purges, 23–120.
Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Constructing the Center: The Ritual Controversy and the Search for a New Identity in Seventh-Century Korea,” in Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea, ed. Jahyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler, 46–90 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard-Hollym, 1999).
Peter H. Lee and William Theodore De Bary, eds., Sources of Korean Tradition, vol. 1, From Early Times through the Sixteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 312–13.
Lee and De Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition, vol. 1, 313.