The exploration of motion pictures in search of dialogue and action relating to economic theory has been one of the more fruitful advances in the economic education literature in recent years. Scholarship in this genre of the economics literature dates back at least to Leet and Houser (2003), and includes works by Mateer (2004), Dixit (2006), Sexton (2006), Girardi (2007), Mateer and Li (2008), Mateer and Stephenson (2011), Geerling (2012), Samaras (2014), Carrasco-Gallego (2017), and Asarta, Mixon, and Upadhyaya (2018). Sexton (2006), for example, explains how the concepts of inflation, tradeoffs, opportunity cost, and elasticity can be found in films such as Austin Powers, Rudy, Space Jam, and Forrest Gump, respectively. More recently, Mateer and Stephenson (2011) find public choice economics principles related to voting, logrolling, and rent-seeking in movies such as Wag the Dog, The American President, and Aviator.
Although the number of unique movies that are tied to various economics concepts through the 11 studies listed above is noteworthy, none of these studies includes a reference to a war-related film or television movie. There are, however, a handful of studies not listed above, dating back to 2004, that examine the economics content of war-related movies. Thus, this small body of literature both forms the foundation of this particular volume of essays on the subject and represents the gap in the economics literature that this volume aims to fill. These studies are reviewed in the next section of this chapter.
Foundational research on war movies and economics
Two studies by Mixon and Treviño (2004a and 2004b) apply the tools of game theory to describe themes in the war-related movie Schindler’s List (Keneally and Zaillian, 1993).1 Schindler’s List is set in World War II Poland and focuses largely on the Nazi Holocaust. The movie follows the activities of Oskar Schindler, a German industrialist who has, at the beginning of the movie, taken possession of an enamelware factory that employs Jewish slave labor. In this position, Schindler interacts with Amon Goeth, the SS commandant of the Paszow Labor Camp in Poland, which incarcerates Schindler’s factory workers. The main plot of the movie relates to Schindler’s efforts to rescue his factory workers from the Nazis’ Holocaust apparatus. A number of economics concepts are addressed throughout the movie, some of which support the main plot, while others relate to the central theme of the movie.
The public choice concept of rent-seeking in Schindler’s List
One of the early scenes in Schindler’s List integrates the public choice economics concept referred to as rent-seeking which was developed by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) and describes how individuals and groups lobby government (authority) for economic benefits and other privileges.2 Schindler is portrayed as being skillful in the practice of rent-seeking. As Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 494) point out, the movie opens with Schindler building relationships with German SS officers in Poland, shortly after Germany’s conquest of that country in September of 1939. More specifically, Schindler is shown in the movie ordering an associate to provide gifts to SS and German Army officers, including fruits (the real “rarities”), German cigarettes, Cuban cigars, dark chocolates, cognac, champagne, nylon stockings, and sardines (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 498). These are all examples of the types of in-kind perquisites described in Mixon (1995), Mixon, Laband, and Ekelund (1994), Laband and McClintock (2001), and Sobel and Garrett (2002) that constitute a substantial portion of the total rent-seeking or lobbying activity in society, and, in this case, represent favors from Schindler to secure contracts from the SS and German Army for enamelware. In fulfilling these contracts, Schindler’s goal of using World War II to amass a personal fortune would be realized.
Profit maximization in Schindler’s List
Schindler’s effort to amass a personal fortune by selling enamelware would best be realized by attempting to maximize profits. Upon taking possession of the enamelware factory, referred to as Deutsche Emaillwarenfabrik Oskar Schindler, Schindler hires Itzhak Stern, a Jewish accountant. Schindler explains to Stern that the business needs Jewish financial capital in order to survive, and that he (Schindler) would offer Jewish investors enamelware as a return on their investment. In return for establishing contacts with Jewish financiers, Stern is made manager of the factory and instructed by Schindler to avoid hiring Poles. Stern is instead instructed by Schindler to hire skilled and unskilled Jewish workers, who are paid 7 Reich marks and 5 Reich marks per day, respectively (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 494).3 When questioned about this decision by Stern, Schindler replies, “Poles cost more … Why should I hire Poles?” This passage, among others, portrays a clear picture of Schindler as a profit-maximizer.
Strategic games, player types, asymmetric information, and signaling in Schindler’s List
In order to describe the central plot of Schindler’s List, Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 493) develop a model wherein Schindler, the movie’s hero, and Goeth, the movie’s villain, are seen “as rivals in a sequential game, the outcome of which depends upon important strategic behavioral concepts.” To establish a foundation for their model, Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 494) cite Dixit and Skeath (1999: 21–22) in pointing out that opponents in a strategic game are purposive rational players who know that the others are such as well. Thus, they recognize one’s incentive to exaggerate or even lie, and consequently they will not accept unsupported declarations. That is, opponents can be convinced only by objective evidence or by actions that are credible proof of one’s information (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 494). Such actions, as Dixit and Skeath (1999, 22) explain, are called signals, and strategies that use them are referred to as signaling (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 494). Here, Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 494) indicate that such a strategy is employed when a player “establishes and uses a reputation” for personal gain.
Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 494) also refer to the strategic management literature in setting up their model. For example, Weigelt and Camerer (1988) assert that one’s character is privately known information that establishes one’s “type.” Each player knows his or her own type but is often uncertain about his or her rivals’ types. In these situations, players form beliefs about rivals’ probable types from their rivals’ reputations (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 494). As Dixit and Skeath (1999) indicate, knowledge of one’s own type, and of a rival’s type, allows for the possibility of an asymmetric information advantage. This is consistent with the story in Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 494), wherein Schindler advantageously conceals his own type, via signaling, in the presence of knowledge about Goeth’s type.
The final element of the model developed by Mixon and Treviño (2004a) is historical context regarding the Nazi Holocaust. As they assert, the Nazi Holocaust was the result of a systematic plan by the German government to eradicate Europe’s Jewish populations, and the SS characters in Schindler’s List are depicted as active participants in this process. Early in the movie Schindler begins to develop a reputation as a profiteer who is at least unopposed to the Third Reich’s policies regarding Jews (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 495).4 The scene described in the previous subsection of this chapter provides an example by which this reputation was acquired. Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 495) provide others, such as when Schindler receives word that one of his workers was executed and his sole complaint to the SS about the episode concerned the negative effect that losing the worker would have on his factory’s profits. Additionally, at one point in the movie Stern leaves the ghetto without his work permit and is arrested and placed on a train bound for Auschwitz. After using his favorable position, acquired through rent-seeking, to rescue Stern, Schindler berates Stern for carelessness that resulted in lower profits (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 495). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, as the Jewish population is moved from the Krákow ghetto into the Plaszow labor camp, Schindler explains to Goeth how such a forced relocation resulted in a lost work day at the enamelware plant. This scene provides Goeth’s initial glimpse into the profiteering reputation that Schindler had begun to develop with other SS officials (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 495).
The examples above provide a glimpse of Schindler’s fledgling reputation as a profiteer that developed in the early scenes of the movie. At the midpoint of the movie, Schindler’s attitude toward his Jewish workers begins to change, and he changes course from the profiteering path to one where he is concerned with their welfare.5 At this point, Mixon and Treviño (2004a) argue, the further building of his reputation as a profiteer is a conscious act, or signal, on Schindler’s part. Examples of Schindler’s deception in this regard include Schindler’s outward indifference to Goeth’s hobby of randomly shooting Jews from the balcony of his Plaszow villa, Schindler’s exuberant participation at Goeth’s nightly parties, and Schindler’s (feigning) outward concern over Goeth’s excessive alcohol consumption and general health (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 499).
The game-theoretic model developed by Mixon and Treviño (2004a and 2004b) has three players: Nature, Schindler, and Goeth. As the first mover in the game, Nature sets Schindler’s type as either “mean” or “kind” (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 496). Players unfamiliar with Schindler’s character assign probabilities to Nature’s determination, where p represents the probability that Nature has set Schindler’s type as “mean,” and 1−p represents the probability that Nature has set Schindler’s type as “kind.” Next, as shown in the extensive form or game tree in Figure 1.1 depicting this sequential game, Schindler proposes, near the end of the movie when the Soviet Army is pushing westward into German-occupied Poland, to purchase the Jewish workers from Goeth, who as third mover, has the option of accepting (“trade”) or refusing (“no trade”) Schindler’s proposal. If Goeth, whom Nature has determined to be a “mean” type, refuses Schindler’s proposal, the game ends. If he accepts Schindler’s proposal, the game continues with Schindler acting as the fourth mover in deciding whether ultimately to “protect” (“don’t protect”) the Jewish workers from the death camps (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 496).
Figure 1.1 Schindler’s List game
Source: Mixon and Treviño (2004b).
As Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 496) explain, the payoffs depicted in parentheses in Figure 1.1 represent the potential rewards to both Goeth and Schindler, respectively, from their bargaining over the fate of the 1,100 Jewish workers. As shown in Figure 1.1, Goeth’s payoffs are higher when the Jews are ultimately not protected. As Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 496) state,
Thus, Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 496) assert that in his dealings with Schindler, Goeth prefers that the workers be exterminated rather than gain their freedom, and that the Nazi Holocaust policy be carried out irrespective of his own financial considerations. As such, Goeth’s preferred outcome is “trade Jews” followed by “don’t protect,” while he ranks “don’t trade Jews” above “trade Jews” followed by “protect.”
The payoffs in Figure 1.1 indicate that a mean-type Schindler has the same preference structure as Goeth, while a kind-type Schindler prefers “protect” following Goeth’s decision to “trade” (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 496). Among the other two outcomes, Schindler prefers “no trade” to “trade” followed by “don’t protect,” given that Schindler would not be responsible for the deaths of the 1,100 Jewish workers in the former outcome. If one assumes, as Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 496) do, that both players (1) prefer positive payoffs to zero or negative payoffs, and that neither player (2) is concerned with the distributional (relative) aspects of the payoff structure (see Beil and Beard, 1994), then, as Figure 1.1 illustrates, Goeth does not have a dominant strategy. In other words, if Goeth thinks Schindler will ultimately choose “don’t protect,” then Goeth will choose “trade,” whereas if Goeth believes Schindler will ultimately choose “protect,” then Goeth will choose “no trade” (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 496).
As Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 496) point out, Goeth would correctly reason that a mean-type Schindler would ultimately choose “don’t protect” and that a kind-type Schindler would ultimately choose “protect.” Knowledge of Schindler’s type would assist Goeth in making a utility-maximizing decision in this case. As pointed out above, however, one’s type is privately known information, and, as such, the first two decision nodes for Goeth, the third mover in this sequential game, are in the same information set (Bierman and Fernandez, 1993), as depicted in the rectangular area in Figure 1.1. In this case Goeth must make an assessment, involving p and 1−p, about Schindler’s type in order to “look forward and reason back” (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991; Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 497). This process relates to a general principle in sequential move games that each player should attempt to determine his opponent’s future responses in order to calculate his own best move, which is referred to as backward induction (Dixit and Skeath, 1999).
In attempting to predict Schindler’s ultimate decision regarding “protect” or “don’t protect” should Goeth choose “trade,” Goeth relies on past experience and what he observes about Schindler’s character from previous contexts in assessing p and 1−p (Dixit and Skeath, 1999: 31). This is where Schindler’s signaling is important (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 497). By strategically building upon his prior reputation as a profiteer who is at least tacitly supportive of the Third Reich’s Holocaust policies, Schindler has convinced Goeth that he (Schindler) will not ultimately protect the Jews should Goeth choose “trade.” Thus, Goeth chooses “trade” and Schindler transfers millions of Reich marks to Goeth in return for the 1,100 Jews, whom Schindler immediately moves to a munitions factory in Czechoslovakia (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a: 497). While Goeth perceives, at the time of the trade, a payoff structure of (2, 2), Schindler saves the 1,100 Jews, resulting in a payoff of (−2, 2).
Reservation prices, consumer surplus, and producer surplus in Schindler’s List
Near the end of the movie, when Schindler proposes to purchase the Jewish workers from Goeth, an important portion of dialogue occurs between the two that relates to other economics concepts. When Goeth decides to sell the workers to Schindler, Schindler seeks to acquire information about Goeth’s reservation price by asking, “What’s a person worth to you?” In response, Goeth turns the tables on the reservation price exploration by stating, “No, no, no, no. What’s one worth to you?” Mixon and Treviño (2004a: 499) assert that this portion of dialogue reflects each person’s attempt to estimate the size of the economic surplus involved with this potential trade in order to establish a stronger bargaining position. As the demander, Schindler wants to ascertain how much Goeth is willing to accept (i.e., Goeth’s marginal cost) for each of the 1,100 Jews. As the supplier, Goeth is attempting to gather information on how much Schindler is willing to pay (i.e., Schindler’s marginal benefit) for each of the 1,100 Jews. These two sums will, once the price is successfully negotiated, determine the consumer surplus and producer surplus associated with the transaction (Mixon and Treviño, 2004a and 2004b).
Schindler’s List in other contexts
Four years after the two studies by Mixon and Treviño (2004a and 2004b), a study by Macy and Terry (2008) provides some economic education assessment instruments that relate to movies with economics content. In doing so, it presents a lengthy list of films and movies that includes the war-related film Schindler’s List (Keneally and Zaillian, 1993) that is discussed in the previous subsections of this chapter. Although no specific assessment instrument is provided by Macy and Terry (2008) for Schindler’s List, and, therefore, this film is not explicitly tied to any specific economics principles, it is included by Macy and Terry (2008) among a group of movies whose focus relates to corporate governance, ethics, and society. Given the movie’s focus on the Nazi Holocaust, it is likely that issues relating to genocide and ethics serve as the primary reason for inclusion of Schindler’s List in Macy and Terry (2008), and not the game-theoretic elements involving the movie that are the focus of the earlier study by Mixon and Treviño (2004a and 2004b).
Next, over a five-month period during 2015, while attending various conferences and teacher workshops, economists Dirk Mateer, Brian O’Roark, and Kim Holder asked an interesting question (Mateer, O’Roark, and Holder, 2016: 204) to more than 100 economic educators – what’s your favorite film you use to teach economics? The question elicited well over 100 separate films, which the authors ranked based on the frequency of responses. Among the list were two war-related movies – Gladiator (Franzoni, Logan, and Nicholson, 2000) and Schindler’s List (Keneally and Zaillian, 1993) – both which were tied at 50th in the overall ranking (Mateer et al., 2016: 214).6 However, as in the case of Macy and Terry (2008), Mateer et al. (2016) did not provide examples of the economics content in either Schindler’s List or Gladiator.
The modern theory of bureaucracy in Conspiracy and Valkyrie
The modern theory of bureaucracy developed by Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986), and that is the focus of much of Mixon (2019), also provides the foundation for a study by Mixon (2010) that examines economics content in two separate World War II-related movies – Conspiracy and Valkyrie. As Mixon (2019) points out, the modern theory of bureaucracy extends the neo-classical concepts of competition to the public-sector realm. As Breton and Wintrobe (1986: 909) explain:
Citing Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986), Mixon (2019) adds that when bureaucrats exchange, they engage in a form of competition that occurs in bureaus when superiors require services from subordinates that are paid for by superiors. There is also a competition between bureaus, and between networks in a bureaucracy, for resources, as well as a competition between bureaucrats for jobs. These forms of competition in services are likely to take the form of coming up with new ideas, new initiatives, new policies, or projects that advance the aims of those at the top of the bureaucracy, leading to what is now often called entrepreneurship (Breton and Wintrobe, 1982 and 1986; Mixon, 2019).
The features of a bureaucracy that promote competition among bureaus in the Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986) model include overlapping lines of command, confusion of jurisdictions, and duplication of responsibilities of bureaus. In arguing these points, Breton and Wintrobe (1986: 913) add that when many diversified branches (i.e., bureaus) of a bureaucracy enjoy considerable degrees of independence, the competition among bureaus results in greater productivity. Another indicator of competition among bureaus is, according to Breton and Wintrobe (1986: 914), the imprecision of the orders emanating from the top of the bureaucracy. In other words, when orders are not specific or are not directed at specific individuals or bureaus, they will elicit a large response from diverse quarters within the larger bureaucracy.
As Mixon (2010: 105) indicates, Conspiracy (Mandel, 2001) “is rich in instances wherein aspects of Breton and Wintrobe’s (1982 and 1986) … model of bureaucracy … are superbly reconstructed in the story” of the Nazi Holocaust, given that it focuses solely upon the 1942 Wannsee Conference, wherein the Final Solution is approved by a cadre of figures at or near the top of the Nazi hierarchy.7 Primary among them are Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Reich Central Security Office (RHSA) who chaired the Conference, and Adolf Eichmann, Heydrich’s deputy who would play a prominent role in the Nazi Holocaust from 1942–1944. At the beginning of Mandel’s (2001) portrayal of the Conference, which is based on the sole surviving copy of the minutes of the meeting, a succession of terms including “expel,” “eliminated,” “eradicated,” and “emigration” are discussed in the context of plans that were either contemplated or employed by the Nazi bureaucracy in dealing with Europe’s Jews (Mixon, 2019). Heydrich addresses confusion surrounding these imprecise terms by reading aloud from a memo from the top of the Nazi hierarchy authorizing a “solution” to “the Jewish question” in Europe (Mixon, 2010: 105–106). More specifically, the memo authorizes a solution involving “emigration or evacuation in the most favorable way possible” of Jews living in the German sphere of influence within Europe (Mixon, 2010: 106).
At the end of the reading, Conference participants grapple with the imprecision of the term “evacuation,” which Heydrich takes to mean “cleansing,” itself an imprecise term (Mixon, 2010: 106).8 As Mixon (2019) adds, in a scene that Mandel (2001) likely included for dramatic effect, Heydrich is then pressed by Conference attendees to judge some of their own interpretations of the term “evacuation.” This discussion reaches a crescendo when Heydrich is interrupted by Rudolf Lange, the Reich Security Service (SD) Chief of Latvia, which Germany had conquered in the preceding months, and the following exchange occurs:
Lange: I have the real feeling I “evacuated” 30,000 Jews already by shooting them in Riga. Is what I did “evacuation”? And when they fell were they “evacuated”? There are another 20,000 at least waiting for similar “evacuation.” I just think it is helpful to know what words mean.
Eichmann: If I might, I think it’s unnecessary to burden the record … [interrupted by Heydrich]
Heydrich: Yes! In my personal opinion they are evacuated.
Mixon, Sawyer, and Treviño (2004a) and Mixon (2019: 44) asserts that Heydrich used the memo’s imprecise language to establish competition among the several bureaus constituting the Nazi bureaucracy in 1941–1942, turning each of them into rival power centers. As pointed out in these studies, and as shown in Table 1.1, the 15 Conference participants, including Reinhard Heydrich, Adolf Eichmann, and Heinrich Müller, represented no fewer than 11 different bureaus within the larger Nazi bureaucracy (Mixon et al. 2004a: 859; Mixon, 2019: 45–46). Moreover, not only were the various bureaus constituting the SS bureaucracy represented at the Conference (e.g., the Reich Central Security Office and the Reich Security Service), attendance by Willhelm Stuckart, Erich Neumann, Roland Freisler, Martin Luther, Gerhard Klopfer, and Friedrich Kritzinger ensured that the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, the Reich Ministry of Justice, the Reich Foreign Office, the Nazi Party Chancellery, and the Reich Chancellery would each have a chance to compete for the informal rewards that would accompany provision of the types of informal services that would successfully execute the Final Solution to the Jewish question (Mixon et al. 2004a: 858–859; Mixon, 2019: 45). This element of the modern theory of bureaucracy is masterfully portrayed in Conspiracy.
Table 1.1 Participants of the Wannsee Conference
| Conference participants | Bureau |
|---|---|
| SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich | Chairman, Reich Central Security Office (RSHA) |
| Gauleiter Dr. Alfred Meyer | Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories |
| Reichsamleiter Dr. Georg Liebrandt | Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories |
| Secretary of State Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart | Reich Ministry for the Interior |
| Secretary of State Erich Neumann | Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan |
| Secretary of State Dr. Roland Freisler | Reich Ministry of Justice |
| Secretary of State Dr. Josef Bühler | Office of the Government-General of Poland |
| Under Secretary of State Dr. Martin Luther | Reich Foreign Office |
| SS-Oberführer Gerhard Klopfer | Nazi Party Chancellery |
| Ministerialdirektor Friedrich Kritzinger | Nazi Party Chancellery |
| SS-Gruppenführer Otto Hofmann | Race and Settlement Main Office (RuSHA) |
| SS-Gruppenführer Heinrich Müller | Reich Main Security, Gestapo Chief |
| SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann | Reich Central Security Office (RSHA, Subs. IV-B-4) |
| SS-Oberführer Dr. Karl Schöngarth | Reich Security Service (SD) Chief of the Government-General of Poland |
| SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Rudolf Lange | Reich Security Service (SD) Chief of Latvia |
Sources: The Simon Wiesenthal Center; Mandel (2001); Snyder (1989).
The modern theory of bureaucracy developed in Breton and Wintrobe (1982) also accounts for horizontal trust networks in bureaucracies. These exist between officials who operate at approximately the same level in a bureau or bureaucracy, and tend to work in opposition to the goals of those at the top of the hierarchy (Breton and Wintrobe, 1982). As such, these types of associations are seen as inefficient (Mixon, 2010: 107). As Mixon, Sawyer, and Treviño (2004b) and Mixon (2019) point out, the history of the Nazi regime provides insightful examples of the types of horizontal networks described in Breton and Wintrobe (1982). Primary among these is the (unsuccessful) July of 1944 plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, which was organized by several high-ranking members of the German Army’s command staff.
Two of the leading figures in this plot were Friedrich Fromm and Friedrich Olbricht, each of whom held the rank of Generaloberst in the German Army. Fromm was head of the German Home Army, which was established by Hitler and designated to take over the security of Berlin and other large German cities (under the codename Valkyrie) in the case of a revolt by the millions of foreign workers living in Germany during the war (Mixon, 2019: 106). Olbricht, who was in charge of the supply section for the German Home Army, carried the main responsibility for organizing and initiating the assassination. In that position he tasked then-Oberstleutenant Claus von Stauffenberg, Chief of Staff in the German Home Army, with amending Valkyrie in a way more useful to the conspirators than its original formulation.
As Mixon (2010) indicates, the movie Valkyrie (McQuarrie and Alexander, 2008) highlights the above element of Breton and Wintrobe’s (1982) concept of horizontal trust networks in his portrayal of one of the leading figures in the plot to kill Hitler.9 For example, in a critical scene in Valkyrie that depicts von Stauffenberg meeting, for the first time, the plot’s organizers, he is impressed by what he learns about the lofty positions the other conspirators hold (or once held) in various branches of the larger Nazi (German) bureaucracy (Mixon, 2010: 109). As also indicated in Mixon et al. (2004b), these positions generally fell under the military/intelligence, diplomatic, political, and civil corps of the Nazi (German) bureaucracy.
Although the conspirators failed in their attempt to assassinate Hitler, historians suggest that much of Hitler’s attention after July of 1944 was focused on his obsession with seeking revenge against those who betrayed him. That this obsession came at the expense of proper conduct of the war, and Hitler’s original Holocaust-related aims, attests to the inefficiency, at least from the perspective of those at the top of the Nazi bureaucracy, generated by horizontal associations.
War movies and economics: building on the foundation
As the previous section of this chapter indicates, the existing body of academic research on war movies and economics is relatively shallow, covering perhaps only three motion pictures (Schindler’s List, Gladiator, and Valkyrie) and a single television movie (Conspiracy). As the remainder of this volume indicates, however, the potential for academic research related to war movies and economics is deep, as it expands the library of academic work on this subject to, as indicated in Table 1.2, almost 15 motion pictures and television movies. The various chapters included in this book cover ancient wars, such as the Third Servile War between Rome and the slave army led by Spartacus, to modern conflicts, such as the ongoing Afghanistan War led by United States forces.
Finally, the economics concepts described in these war movies are also vast, ranging from the core principles of economics, such as specialization and division of labor, to game-theoretic concepts, such as commitment devices and ultimatum bargaining. In addition to these and others, concepts from the management (leadership) literature are also discussed, such as how an organization’s performance depends upon its leaders’ stock of human capital in the area of risk-taking in instantaneous decision-making contexts.
Table 1.2 War movies with economics content
| Band of Brothers Conspiracy The Dirty Dozen Dunkirk (1958) Dunkirk (2017) Gladiator Lone Survivor | Memphis Belle Saving Private Ryan Schindler’s List Spartacus: Vengeance Spartacus: War of the Damned Stalag 17 Valkyrie |
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