5
The private provision of a public good
An examination of Hollywood’s adaptation of the Third Servile War
Over the three-year period from 73 BC to 71 BC, two large armies clashed in a war that threatened the existence of the world’s greatest political military power – the Republic of Rome. Known by historians as the Third Servile War, the clash pitted two private armies, one consisting of escaped Roman slaves and led by a gladiator champion known as Spartacus, and the other consisting of several privately financed Roman legions led by Marcus Licinius Crassus, the richest man in the world. The war produced a number of notable military feats that have been told and retold in the annals of history. It also provided a novel example of the private provision of a public good that economists have included alongside others, such as lighthouses and police protection.
The public economics aspects of the military engagement represented by the Third Servile War are recounted in the television movie series titled Spartacus, with particular coverage in the final two of the series’ four seasons, Vengeance (DeKnight, 2012) and War of the Damned (DeKnight, 2013). After a brief discussion of goods typology in economics, including historical examples of the private provision of public goods and a primer on the history of the Third Servile War, this chapter explores various aspects of the private provision of “national defense” through scenes from both Vengeance and War of the Damned.
Goods typology in economics
In his seminal work on public expenditure theory, Samuelson (1954) identified “personal consumption goods” as goods that can be divided among individuals, and “collective consumption goods” as goods that are enjoyed in common, or such that one individual’s consumption does not limit another individual’s consumption of the same good. Although Samuelson did not develop the concept of public goods (Adam Smith did), his 1954 article became the foundation of the modern theory of public goods (Smith, 1776; Pickhardt, 2006). Additional theoretical models were later developed to encompass a wide spectrum of ownership-consumption arrangements, such as club goods (Buchanan, 1965) and common goods (Hardin, 1968).1
Today, many introductory microeconomics textbooks include a section categorizing the types of goods based on two qualities: rivalry in consumption and excludability. Goods are rival in consumption when one person’s consumption of the good decreases the availability of that good for others to consume. When a good is excludable, individuals who do not pay for the good can be prevented from consuming it. Pure private goods are rival in consumption and excludable. Pure private goods include tacos, automobiles, and personal electronics. In contrast, pure public goods are non-rival and non-excludable. Thus, the benefits from these goods are enjoyed in common and individuals who do not pay to use the goods cannot be prevented from consumption. Pure public goods include lighthouses and national defense. Club goods, such as amusement parks and video streaming services, are excludable but non-rivalrous in consumption. Common goods, or common pool resources, are rivalrous in consumption but non-excludable. These shared goods are often subject to overuse, such as overgrazing or overfishing.
Some of the principles discussed above can be illustrated using the diagram in Figure 5.1, depicting the degree of non-excludability on the y-axis and the degree of non-rivalry along the x-axis (Holcombe, 1996, 110). A soft drink represents a pure private good in that it is excludable and is rivalrous in consumption. Thus, soft drinks, and other goods resembling it in terms of excludability and rivalry in consumption are placed in the lower left corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1 (Holcombe, 1996, 109). Goods fitting a typology exhibiting rivalry in consumption with costly exclusion (i.e., non-excludability) are common goods and include irrigation systems (canals) that run by the fields of each farmer in a rural community. The water in the canal is a private consumption good (i.e., it is rivalrous in consumption) that would be difficult for the farmers to exclude from overuse by members of their group (Holcombe, 1996, 109).
Figure 5.1 Characteristics of public goods
Source: Holcombe (1996: 110).
Many goods have varying degrees of rivalry and non-excludability (Holcombe, 1996). City streets exhibit non-rivalrous consumption as long as they are not congested and are relatively costly to exclude people from using. Under these conditions, they are located near the upper right corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1 (Holcombe, 1996, 109). Streets in a residential neighborhood are relatively uncongested, but might have a guardhouse to limit entry, placing them near the lower right corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1 (Holcombe, 1996, 109). On the other hand, city streets in a busy urban area will be congested and more difficult to exclude people from using, pushing them toward the upper left corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1. Interstate highways tend to have greater traffic than residential streets and, with fewer points of entry, are also relatively easy to exclude (using tolls), placing them away from the lower left corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1 (Holcombe, 1996, 109).
Next, movies and television broadcasts can be enjoyed by many people without any single person’s enjoyment being diminished, thus pushing them far beyond the example of the soft drink in terms of collective (non-rivalrous) consumption (Holcombe, 1996, 109). However, movies are shown in theaters, and television broadcasts can be scrambled, placing them at the lower end of the non-excludability scale. Given these combinations of characteristics, movies and television broadcasts are club goods located closest to the lower right corner in the diagram shown in Figure 5.1 (Holcombe, 1996, 109).
Lastly, Holcombe (1996, 108) asserts that national defense provides perhaps the best example of non-excludability given that once some people in an area are protected from foreign aggression it is virtually impossible to prevent others in that area from the same protection. Additionally, given that it can be consumed by additional citizens without reducing the consumption of it by existing citizens, national defense also rates highly along the non-rivalrous consumption dimension. The combination of these two notions places national defense nearest the upper right corner of the diagram in Figure 5.1, which is where public goods reside (Holcombe, 1996, 109–110).
Private provision of public goods
Economists have, dating back decades, often considered the private provision of public goods. These considerations have at times focused on some of the more often-used examples of public goods, such as lighthouses and national defense. Many are perhaps familiar with Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase’s (1974) analysis of private lighthouse services provision in England from 1614 through the early portion of the 1800s. Others may recognize the long tradition in the Austrian school of questioning government provision of national defense. These, and other public goods that have historically been privately provided, are the subject of the subsections below.
Lighthouses
Throughout much of the history of economic thought, beginning with Smith (1776) and continuing through Mill (1848), Sidgwick (1887), and Pigou (1932), the lighthouse served as one of the primary examples of a public good. This trend continued through multiple versions of Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson’s principles text (e.g., Samuelson, 1964 and 1980) and into the modern era of economic education. Interestingly, however, one of the now most well-known studies of the private provision of public goods is Coase’s (1974) analysis of lighthouse services provision in England. As explained in Coase (1974), authority over lighthouse services provision in England is maintained by Trinity House, whose petition for incorporation was granted in 1514 by King Henry VIII. Trinity House’s first lighthouse was established at Caister and Lowestoft around 1614, although several decades would pass before a second lighthouse was established (Coase, 1974). In the interim period, all British lighthouses were privately constructed and operated.
The era of private provision of lighthouse services began in 1614, when Trinity House failed to answer a petition to erect a lighthouse. In response, the petitioners secured a patent from the British Crown to build the lighthouse and levy tolls, prompting British Parliament to later sign individual acts granting other private citizens the right to build and operate lighthouses (Coase, 1974, 364). In later cases, tolls that varied by lighthouse and shipment tonnage were collected by either private operators or customs agents. In response to increased private competition, Trinity House began to imitate Parliament by granting leases to private individuals to operate lighthouses which, in return, granted Trinity House title to a portion of the profits (Coase, 1974, 365). By 1816, 34 of England’s 46 lighthouses had been built privately (Coase, 1974).
Following the framework in Coase (1974), Sechrest (2004) provides examples of the private provision of lighthouse services in both Canada and Hawai’i. Moreover, both Sechrest (2004) and Mixon and Bridges (2018) provide examples of private lighthouse provision in Colonial America. Sechrest (2004) and Mixon and Bridges (2018) provide the example of Lumbert Tavern Light in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. This light was erected by Zaccheus Lumbert above his tavern in 1759 and operated as a private aid to navigation until 1818 (Sechrest, 2004; Mixon and Bridges, 2018). Lastly, Mixon and Bridges (2018) also provide several examples of privately-owned lighthouses in the modern-day U.S., such as Stamford Harbor Light in Stamford, Connecticut, Bristol Ferry Light in Bristol, Rhode Island, and Hyannis Light in Hyannis, Massachusetts.
Police protection
The benefits to members of the general public of police protection also fit into economists’ description of a public good. Even so, recent research by Heaton, Hunt, MacDonald, and Saunders (2016) indicates that more than one million individuals in the United States are employed in private security and law enforcement. Heaton et al. (2016) examine the relationship between a privately funded university police force and crime in a large U.S. city. They find, following an expansion of the jurisdictional boundary of the private police force, substantial beneficial impacts of the deployment of private police on public safety, with violent crime in particular decreasing over the long run (Heaton et al., 2016).
Relatedly, another recent study by MacDonald, Klick, and Grunwald (2016) employs a natural experiment in which a private university increased the number of police patrols within an arbitrarily defined geographic boundary. Capitalizing on the discontinuity in patrols at the boundary, these authors estimate that the deployment of extra private police decreased crime in adjacent city blocks by 43 to 73 percent (MacDonald et al., 2016). Thus, they demonstrate, in the case of police protection, the utility of the private provision of a public good.
National defense
Research by Holcombe (2008), Coyne (2015), and Coyne and Lucas (2016) indicates that national defense has supplanted the lighthouse as the quintessential example of a public good in popular economics textbooks. In their analysis of 50 economics textbooks, Coyne and Lucas (2016) find that although textbooks overwhelmingly present national defense as a public good, they rarely mention the possibility of government failure in its provision. More specifically, they find that while 94 percent of sampled texts cite national defense as an example of a public good, only 24 percent mention national defense in treatments of government failure or public choice. Moreover, 96 percent of the sampled texts discuss the “free-rider” problem as an argument for the state provision of public goods, such as national defense (Coyne and Lucas, 2016, 66).
These trends exist alongside a tradition of considering the merits of privately provided national defense. This tradition was largely developed within the Austrian school of economics (e.g., see Rothbard, 1978; Cordato, 1980; Hummel, 1990; Hoppe, 1998). In this tradition, Cordato’s (1980, 396) case is based upon the Austrian theory of efficiency, which is seen in terms of the purposeful behavior of individuals in seeking to attain a goal. In the Austrian economics context, “an efficient course of action would be to apply means that are consistent with attaining the desired goal or program of goals[, where i]nefficiency arises when means are chosen that are inconsistent with the desired goals” (Cordato, 1980, 396). To this Cordato (1980, 397) adds that Austrian economists do not see societal efficiency apart from individual efficiency, given that society cannot have goals apart from those of the individuals within it (see also Kirzner, 1963). Thus, the Austrian approach to efficiency, and also to knowledge and coordination (see Kirzner, 1963; Holcombe, 2014), means that the neoclassical notion of market failure cannot be used to justify government intervention in order to address inefficiencies (Cordato, 1980, 400). Instead, the provision of services such as national defense are to be provided by the market, as demand conditions warrant. Moreover, the fact that these services cannot be priced where marginal cost equals marginal benefit has no bearing on efficiency from an Austrian point of view (Cordato, 1980, 401).
An empirical study by Conybeare and Sandler (1993) of state-sponsored violence, that of the privateering of French and Spanish merchant shipping by British ship owners during England’s wars with France and Spain (1625–1630), is consistent with the Austrian approach to the provision of national defense described by Cordato (1980). As they assert, privateering “was simply piracy licensed by the state … in return for which the state took a share of the captured … cargo … [, and wherein t]he motive for private individuals to engage in privateering was obviously profit” (Conybeare and Sandler, 1993, 880–882). Data presented by Conybeare and Sandler (1993) from 1625 to 1631 reveal that average industry profits were £1,980 per month, or £105 per privateer.
As summarized by Holcombe (2014, 106), Rothbard’s (1978) argument within the Austrian tradition is two-pronged, asserting (1) that wars are fought among national governments, and thus would not exist if there were no governments, and (2) without a government to surrender, it would be virtually impossible for an aggressive nation to effect a complete surrender of another nation. In attesting to the latter point, Holcombe (2014, 116) adds that the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan near the turn of the twenty-first century represent empirical examples wherein the most powerful country in the world faced a myriad of difficulties in its attempt to take control of two small, poor nations.
Also in the Austrian economics tradition, Hummel (1990, 92) concedes that national defense, as it is provided by the State, satisfies both of the characteristics of a public good. However, he chooses to focus on the non-excludability criterion. In doing so he clarifies the meaning of “national defense,” stating that the traditional view is that it protects people’s lives, property, and liberty from foreign aggressors. Hummel (1990, 94) asserts that this view is distinct from the view that national defense represents the protection of the State and its territorial integrity, meaning that the defense of the people and the defense of the State constitute separate issues.2
This approach is consistent with the notion presented in Hummel (1990) that the State often engages in military conflicts that are unrelated to the defense of its people.3 Additionally, even in defensive wars the State sacrifices the defense of its people to the defense of itself, the latter of which is a non-excludable good that the State has enormous incentives to provide and for which the benefits will accrue to small groups (Hummel, 1990).4 Defense of the people, on the other hand, is a non-excludable good whose benefits are spread broadly across a large number of individuals. Thus, as Hummel (1990, 104) concludes, to the extent that the free-rider obstacle works against market protection of liberty it makes for an even more substantial obstacle to the State’s provision of that same good.
Lastly, in an interesting contribution to this body of literature, Leeson, Coyne, and Duncan (2014) point out that the free-rider problem that plagues national defense, and leads markets to underprovide it, also plagues national offense, which, again, would lead markets to underprovide it as well. As Leeson et al. (2014, 53) suggest, this latter point regarding the underproduction by the private sector of national offense in the presence of free riding implies that privatization of national defense would, under certain likely conditions, lead to the efficient level of national defense as well as a more peaceful world (Leeson et al., 2014, 53).
As indicated in the subsections above, the private provision of public goods has been a feature of the history of economic thought for many decades. In fact, historical evidence indicates that lighthouse services provision was successfully carried out in England during the period spanning from the early seventeenth century through the early nineteenth century and in America during the colonial period and extending, with intermittent breaks, to the present. The same can also be said, as attested to above, for police protection. The remainder of this chapter extends this exploration to the private provision of defense through the history of the Third Servile War.
The Third Servile War: a primer
The Third Servile War, also known as the Gladiator War or the Spartacus Revolt, was a slave rebellion led by the gladiator Spartacus against Roman armies from 73 BC to 71 BC5 The war began as a revolt by a band of 70 gladiator slaves led by Spartacus that escaped from a gladiator training school in Capua, shown in Figure 5.2, and sought refuge near the foot of Mount Vesuvius (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017).6 Once there, Spartacus recruited Crixus and Oenomaus, also former gladiators, to serve as his lieutenants (Czech, 1994). Before the number of slaves constituting Spartacus’ rebel force could grow, Rome dispatched a militia force of 3,000 men under the command of Claudius Glaber to defeat the slave army. Glaber was successful in driving Spartacus’ force up Mount Vesuvius, at which point Glaber decided to surround and starve the slave army. However, Spartacus displayed tactical skill in moving his forces down the mountain and launching a surprise attack that scattered Glaber’s militia force (Ray, 2017).7
Figure 5.2 Geography of the Third Servile War
News of the victory attracted additional slaves and foreign fighters to the rebels’ cause, thus increasing the size of Spartacus’ army. In response, two legions of militia under the command of Publius Varinius took the field against the slaves in the Campania region, south of Capua (Czech, 1994), as shown in Figure 5.2.8 However, before the Romans could initiate an offensive, Spartacus’ army escaped undetected and travelled southward to the Lucania region, shown in Figure 5.2, winning small victories over elements of Varinius’ force along the way (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017). Once there, they defeated Varinius’ force in a series of battles. Fresh off its second major victory, Spartacus moved his army back to Campania where it defeated a Roman corps under the command of Gaius Thoranius, giving the rebels most of the southern portion of Italy (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017).9 At this point, Spartacus advocated a march to the Alps and escape from Rome. Crixus, however, sought to defeat Rome, and took 30,000 men from Spartacus’ main force and splintered away to raid nearby villages (Czech, 1994).
The slave army suffered its first defeat when Crixus’ force was beaten in Apulia by two Roman legions led by Quintus Arrius. Both Crixus and 20,000 men were lost in battle (Czech, 1994). Still, the main portion of Spartacus’ army defeated 10,000 Roman soldiers led by Caius Cassius on its march toward the Alps (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017).10 It was at this point that the Roman Senate turned to praetor Marcus Licinius Crassus (115 BC–53 BC), a Roman politician, businessman, and military leader, thought to be one of the richest individuals in history, to confront Spartacus’ army (Wallechinsky and Wallace, 2009).
Marcus Licinius Crassus was the second son in a distinguished Roman aristocratic family. Although his family was not particularly wealthy, Crassus’ father, Publius Licinius Crassus, had been a Roman consul, governor of Iberia, and highly decorated military leader (Ward, 1977; Frediani, 2019).11 In the late Roman Republic, there was a system of established private property rights, and Roman citizens were allowed to own property (Stephenson, 1891). Members of the aristocracy, including Crassus, amassed significant wealth through the acquisition and inheritance of property. Although Roman aristocratic values limited profitable opportunities for members of the ruling class, investment in agricultural land was considered one of the few honorable endeavors (Ward, 1977).12 Large agricultural estates provided revenue from rents for the owner. Like many of his peers, Crassus took advantage of Sulla’s proscriptions, purchasing a large number of landed estates auctioned off at bargain prices (Adcock, 1966; Marshall, 1976; Ward, 1977; Frediani, 2019).13
Crassus and other Roman elites were also active investors in urban real estate (Craver, 2010), and Rome was a city heavily prone to fire. A good businessman, Crassus maintained a private fire-brigade, consisting of slaves, to protect his property as well as to pressure other property owners to sell their land to him in exchange for enlisting his fire-brigade to extinguish the blaze (Ward, 1977; Marshall, 1976; Adcock, 1966; Frediani, 2019). Crassus acquired a lot of property through such means and also used his own builders and architects to restore the properties (Marshall, 1976). In modern-day America, fire protection is generally considered a public “service” that is provided for at the local government level in a variety of ways. Yet Crassus, through the use of his large enslaved workforce, was able to offer private provision of this public good.14
As with fire protection, Crassus and other members of the ruling elite developed a private system of national defense. For Crassus and other Roman elites who wished to advance politically, the ability to organize and maintain a private army was crucial to political and military success. In fact, Crassus is once quoted to have said that no one who wanted to be a first-rate political power in Rome could achieve such a position unless they had amassed a large enough fortune to support an army with their own income (Marshall, 1976; Ward, 1977). Crassus was not alone in his thinking, and as Ward (1977, 69) argues, “in the turbulent world of the Late Republic, no one who aspired to be one of the great political forces in the state, a princeps civitas, could afford to be without a loyal army to back him.”15
Through business practices such as those highlighted above, Crassus would eventually amass a fortune, in 55 BC estimated to be approximately 7,100 talents, or between 170 million and 200 million sesterces (sestertii), which was (approximately) equal to the total annual budget of the Roman treasury (Ward, 1977).16 This allowed him, when called upon by the Roman Senate to confront Spartacus, to raise at least six new legions, personally advancing the funds required, while also assuming personal command of the two consular legions already in the field (Vervaet, 2014). Thus, with the remnants of forces defeated by Spartacus, Crassus had eight Roman legions at his disposal. Facing this formidable force, Spartacus halted his march to freedom. Instead, he reversed course and after defeating two of Crassus’ eight legions, he moved his army to the Strait of Messina, where it became trapped in Bruttium by Crassus (Shaw, 2001). There, Crassus directed the construction of a 32-mile ditch and rampart structure across the toe of Italy in order to limit the mobility of the rebels (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017).
Again, Spartacus showed tactical skill in directing his forces, under the cover of an evening snowstorm, to bridge the ditch, scale the ramparts, and defeat the Romans. The rebel force then moved toward Lucania, but was hampered by the decision of two of Spartacus’ commanders, Gannicus and Cestus, to split from the main force in order to plunder nearby villages (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017). This decision proved disastrous, as Crassus managed to soundly defeat the force, at a cost of more than 12,000 rebels, outside of Bruttium (Czech, 1994; Ray, 2017). In response, Spartacus moved the remaining rebels to the mountains near Petelia where he once again defeated multiple legions of Crassus’ army. There he decided to make a stand, but his army was destroyed by Crassus, and Spartacus died in combat (Ray, 2017).
The Spartacus series: a clash of two private armies during the Third Servile War
Before delving into the various public goods aspects of the Third Servile War as recounted by the television mini-series Spartacus, we first recount how episodes in that series portray the historical record of the military conflict between Crassus’ private Roman legions and Spartacus’ slave army. This sub-section is followed by a discussion of how the series portrays the private provision of national defense.
Hollywood’s adaptation of the Third Servile War: a brief review
Hollywood’s adaptation of the Third Servile War encompasses seasons three and four of the four-season Spartacus television mini-series (DeKnight, 2012 and 2013).17 As shown in Table 5.1, season three’s 10-episode series is titled Vengeance, and opens with “Fugitivus.” This episode begins shortly after Spartacus and his private army of former slaves have escaped from the gladiator training school in Capua. For weeks Spartacus’ force has been hiding underneath the streets of Capua, terrorizing the Roman population and defeating small bands of Roman scouts stationed there in order to protect the city (DeKnight, 2012). As this episode progresses, Glaber is dispatched by the Roman Senate to confront the growing threat posed by Spartacus’ army (DeKnight, 2012).
Throughout episodes two, three, and four, Spartacus’ army moves southward from Capua. In doing so, two separate forces led by Spartacus and his top lieutenant, Crixus, respectively, defeat small bands of Romans during the journey (DeKnight, 2012). In episode five, titled “Libertus,” Spartacus’ army arrives at the foot of Mount Vesuvius, taking up command in an abandoned Greek temple. They are joined there by another of Spartacus’ lieutenants, Gannicus, who is also a former gladiator champion. Spartacus’ private army remains at the foot of Mount Vesuvius through episode eight, training in preparation for the imminent threat they face from Glaber’s militia (DeKnight, 2012).
Table 5.1 Third Servile War in the Spartacus series
| Season | Season Title | Episode | Episode Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Vengeance | 1 | “Fugitivus” |
| 2 | “A Place in this World” | ||
| 3 | “The Greater Good” | ||
| 4 | “Empty Hands” | ||
| 5 | “Libertus” | ||
| 6 | “Chosen Path” | ||
| 7 | “Sacramentum” | ||
| 8 | “Balance” | ||
| 9 | “Monsters” | ||
| 10 | “Wrath of the Gods” | ||
| 4 | War of the Damned | 1 | “Enemies of Rome” |
| 2 | “Wolves at the Gate” | ||
| 3 | “Men of Honor” | ||
| 4 | “Decimation” | ||
| 5 | “Blood Brothers” | ||
| 6 | “Spoils of War” | ||
| 7 | “Mors Indecepta” | ||
| 8 | “Separate Paths” | ||
| 9 | “The Dead and the Dying” | ||
| 10 | “Victory” |
Source: DeKnight (2012 and 2013).
In episode nine, titled “Monsters,” Spartacus’ army defeats a Roman militia led by Varinius. However, Glaber’s larger militia force arrives and pushes Spartacus and his army from the temple and up to the summit of Mount Vesuvius, where it is seemingly trapped (DeKnight, 2012). In the final episode of Vengeance, Spartacus and a few of his men descend the cliffs of Mount Vesuvius, surprising and defeating Glaber’s militia force. However, one of Spartacus’ top commanders, Oenomaus, is killed in action (DeKnight, 2012).
In the first episode of season four of the mini-series, which is titled War of the Damned, viewers are introduced for the first time to Marcus Licinius Crassus, who has been requested by the Roman Senate to fund a reinforcement roster of 10,000 men to be sent to aid existing armies in the field that are fighting Spartacus (DeKnight, 2013).18 Shortly thereafter, Crassus sends his son, Tiberius, with an offer to a materiel supplier that is meant (presumably) to fund the Senate’s request. Next, episode two of War of the Damned, titled “Wolves at the Gate,” depicts additional rebel victories, eliminating the need for the reinforcements that were to be funded by Crassus. Instead, the Roman Senate names Crassus imperator, and sanctions the raising by Crassus of six new legions to meet the threat posed by Spartacus’ private army (DeKnight, 2013).
At this point in War of the Damned, Spartacus’ private army has captured the walled city of Sinuessa, located at the northern border of the Campania region. It did so with a small force that entered under disguise, and then defeated a group of Romans guarding the gate (DeKnight, 2013). In the episodes that followed, a group of Roman soldiers led by Julius Caesar, Crassus’ lieutenant, secreted into Sinuessa and recaptured the gate and, subsequently, the coastal city (DeKnight, 2013). This move forced Spartacus south, where he was trapped on the Italian toe by Crassus’ 32-mile ditch and rampart structure – itself another amazing feat for a private army.
The two private armies begin to play a cat-and-mouse game during episode seven of War of the Damned, which is appropriately titled “Mors Indecepta.” First, Crassus establishes what appears to be his headquarters atop a loosely guarded ridge on Spartacus’ flank (DeKnight, 2013). The headquarters is instead a ruse, unoccupied and only nominally protected in an attempt to lure an attack from Spartacus. Upon attacking the post, Spartacus recognizes the ruse and barely escapes with remnants of his attacking force (DeKnight, 2013). Shortly thereafter, Spartacus orders an attack on the ditch and rampart barrier, capturing it and the ground beyond and using the opportunity to escape northward (DeKnight, 2013).
During the final three episodes, Spartacus’ army is divided when Crixus and a large force fight their way to the outskirts of Rome (DeKnight, 2013). There, Crixus’ force is defeated by a large Roman army and he is killed. Following up on the defeat of Crixus’ forces, Crassus sets his sights on Spartacus’ remaining rebel army, winning a decisive battle that results in the deaths of Gannicus and Spartacus (DeKnight, 2013). Fearing the legend of Spartacus will spark a similar desire in other slaves held by citizens of the Roman Republic, War of the Damned ends with an order from Crassus to crucify all rebel prisoners and to align the crucifixes all along the Apian Way as a warning to slaves entering the Republic from ports to the south of Rome (DeKnight, 2013).
Some economics of Spartacus’ private army
As season three of the Spartacus series (i.e., Vengeance) begins, viewers get a clear picture of the difficulties facing Spartacus’ private army, as it pillages stores of grain from vendors in Capua and as it struggles to provide weaponry for all of its troops (DeKnight, 2012). The deprivations faced by Spartacus’ rebel army illustrate the concept of the under-provision of a public good (i.e., defense) by the private sector. Throughout episodes two, three, and four, as Spartacus’ army moves southward from Capua it frees other slaves and captures additional stores of food along the way (DeKnight, 2012). The victories over small bands of Romans during the journey by the separate forces led by Spartacus and Crixus also provide their private army with a few additional swords and other weapons (DeKnight, 2012). Lacking production capacity, pillage and plunder was likely the sole option available to Spartacus for privately providing for his rebel army.
During episodes five through eight, while Spartacus’ army is encamped at the temple next to Mount Vesuvius and training for the coming battle, the dialogue between Spartacus and his lieutenants focuses, at times, on their lack of proper weaponry (DeKnight, 2012). This issue is at least partially addressed in episode nine when the rebel army defeats Varinius’ militia, a result that leads to the capture of many Roman swords and shields. In fact, at the moment of victory, dialogue between the rebel leaders focuses on the fortune of capturing such high-quality materiel for carrying on their war against Rome (DeKnight, 2012).
The first episode of War of the Damned, titled “Enemies of Rome,” depicts Spartacus’ private army growing, through victories over various Roman legions, in both numbers and weapons and other materiel (DeKnight, 2013). From there the series moves to the rebel army’s capture of the walled city of Sinuessa. Once in hand, Spartacus and Gannicus bargain with a Sinuessa blacksmith over the production and sale of military-grade swords. In return, Spartacus offers large payments using Roman coins captured from previous pillaging and plundering (DeKnight, 2013). These scenes depict Spartacus addressing the private provision of a public good using the market mechanism, as his agreement with the Sinuessan blacksmith represents a private contractual arrangement.
As War of the Damned nears its end, viewers see that the rebels comprising Spartacus’ private army are generally well equipped, with many wearing various armored uniforms, some mounting horses and forming a rebel cavalry, and others forming archery units. At this point Spartacus’ private army is clearly an effective fighting force that warranted the respect of the Roman Republic. Thus, it could be stated that something much closer to the optimal level of provision of this public good was occurring near the end of War of the Damned than what had occurred nearer the beginning of Vengeance.
The previous point offers a transition to details from the Spartacus series that relate to the effectiveness or efficacy of the private army led by Spartacus. After being forced to the summit of Mount Vesuvius during the final episode of Vengeance, Spartacus and a few of his men daringly descend the cliffs of Mount Vesuvius in an effort to flank Glaber’s militia. As depicted in this episode, they did so using rope made from vines that were growing on the mountaintop (DeKnight, 2012). Once they reached the base of the mountains they commandeered Glaber’s catapults and began hurling fire balls at the bulk of the Roman militia, which remained in tents. The bulk of Spartacus’ army then attacked from the rear, retaking the Greek temple (DeKnight, 2012). As stories of this feat circulated, this astounding military victory by Spartacus’ private army would surely have been a subject of the tactical military education of Roman (and other) generals in the future.
Later in the series, during War of the Damned, Spartacus’ private army captured the walled city of Sinuessa using a small force that entered under disguise and then defeated a group of Romans guarding the gate (DeKnight, 2013). This particular tactic is reminiscent of the well-known “Trojan horse” gambit employed during the Trojan War more than a millennium earlier. Additionally, after Spartacus’ army relinquished control of Sinuessa and became trapped at the toe of the Italian boot by Crassus’ 32-mile long ditch and rampart structure, Spartacus brilliantly surmised that such a barrier would likely be lightly fortified. He then ordered an attack under the cover of a nighttime blizzard, employing the frozen corpses of fallen rebels to cross the ditch, and in doing so his army took the barrier and the ground beyond, using it to escape northward (DeKnight, 2013). When the bulk of the Roman forces arrived at the scene, it stood in amazement at Spartacus’ military acumen.
Some economics of Crassus’ privately funded Roman legions
Shortly after the introduction of Marcus Licinius Crassus in War of the Damned, he is depicted receiving a request by the Roman Senate to finance a reinforcement roster of 10,000 men to be sent to aid existing armies in the field that are fighting Spartacus (DeKnight, 2013). After agreeing to the request, he tasks his son, Tiberius, to present an offer of 350 denarii and two lugera of land to a materiel supplier in order to (presumably) fund the Senate’s request. This bit of early dialogue involving Crassus hints at his wealth, which establishes his ability to create a private army to combat Spartacus. The ancient measurement of two lugera that is mentioned by Crassus is equivalent (roughly) to 1.244 acres, and the land to which Crassus refers is likely a portion of his own real estate holdings in Rome. A modern-day equivalent of this portion of Crassus’ offer might be the value of a similarly-sized plot of land in an urban area of the U.S., such as New York City. Econometric models presented in Albouy, Ehrlich, and Shin (2018) suggest that the average value of an acre of urban land in the U.S. is equal to $511,000 and that an acre in New York City, what could be considered the modern-day equivalent to Rome, is valued as high as $123 million. Using these figures and assuming Crassus intended the transfer of two lugera of property within Rome, then this portion of his offer to the materiel supplier to fund 10,000 reinforcements would have perhaps been as much as $150.6 million.
After the legions to which Crassus’ privately funded reinforcements are expected to join are defeated by Spartacus, Crassus is commissioned by the Roman Senate, under the title imperator, to privately raise six Roman legions (DeKnight, 2013). Again he utilizes the services of his son, Tiberius, to purchase the necessary materiel. Ultimately, Crassus accepts an offer of 120 denarii for fully equipping each soldier, again hinting at his vast wealth. Given that Roman legions of the late Republic consisted of 6,000 men and that Crassus funded six new legions (Vervaet, 2014), his private army numbered 36,000 men, costing him 4.32 million denarii. 19 If one assumes Crassus re-outfitted the two existing consular legions, then costs incurred equipping these additional 12,000 men would have amounted to 1.44 million denarii. Given estimates that the modern-day equivalent of $29.16 to one late Roman Republic denarius, outfitting each soldier in Crassus’ private army with a sword, helmet, shield, armor, and footwear would have cost him somewhere between $126 million and $168 million.20 Of course, the food stores, other war materiel (e.g., catapults), and auxiliary support (e.g., horses, followers’ camp staff), and reinforcements (replacements) would have added substantially to or even dwarfed the figures in this range.
Having spent an enormous sum outfitting his legions, it is clear to viewers that the deprivations faced by Spartacus’ rebel army were not a concern to the soldiers commanded by Crassus. In fact, when inspecting the swords and other weaponry samples presented by the private supplier, Marcus and Tiberius Crassus marvel at the quality and craftsmanship, indicating that their private legions would be better equipped than traditional Roman legions (DeKnight, 2013). Thus, scenes such as this illustrate under-provision of a public good, such as national defense, by the private sector is not necessarily an inevitable result.
What about the effectiveness (efficacy) of the fighting force commanded by Crassus? The answer to this question lies in examples of the performance of Crassus, Caesar, and the soldiers under their commands. For example, in recapturing the coastal city of Sinuessa the small force led by Caesar that secreted beyond the walls successfully executed the Trojan horse-like gambit used by Spartacus to capture the city (DeKnight, 2013). In fact, Caesar was instructed by Crassus to become unshorn, enhancing his (Caesar’s) ability to mix with the rebels once inside Sinuessa. Added to this is the decision by Crassus to construct the 32-mile ditch and rampart structure across the toe of Italy that trapped Spartacus’ rebel army for a time – itself another amazing feat for a private army. Moreover, during episode six of War of the Damned, when Spartacus escorts Gannicus to view the obstacle for the first time, Gannicus asks, “How is such a thing possible?” To that Spartacus replies, “Nothing is beyond reach for the richest man in the Republic” (DeKnight, 2013).
Finally, to these examples is added the scene in episode seven of War of the Damned titled “Mors Indecepta” where Crassus establishes what appears to be his headquarters atop a loosely guarded ridge on Spartacus’ flank (DeKnight, 2013). As indicated earlier, the headquarters is actually a ruse, as it is unoccupied and only nominally protected in an attempt to lure an attack from Spartacus. Upon attacking the post, as stated previously, Spartacus barely escapes with remnants of his attacking force (DeKnight, 2013). As in the case of Spartacus’ private rebel army, the Roman legions under the command and private funding of Crassus perform admirably and, at times, innovatively.
Despite Crassus’ military achievements against Spartacus’ private force, his political rival Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (i.e., Pompey the Great), ultimately took the credit for the victory, receiving the highest military honor of Triumph, as his forces were also involved in the final battles (Frediani, 2019). Years later, Crassus died in pursuit of military glory – the one thing that, despite all of his wealth and political triumphs, had always eluded him (Frediani, 2019).
Conclusion
Although the history of economic thought includes recent forays into the private provision of public goods using the case of national defense, there has been relatively little investigation into the application of economic theory to military endeavors. As discussed in this chapter, the Third Servile War, fought between two private armies during the latter years of the Roman Republic, provides such a case, and one that threatened the existence of the world’s most dominant political entity at the time. The public economics aspects of this substantial military engagement are clearly on display in Hollywood’s adaptation of this history in the television mini-series Spartacus. As portrayed in this series, the private armies led by Roman politician and businessman Marcus Licinius Crassus and gladiator champion and escaped slave Spartacus both proved to be effective fighting forces, earning victories over one another, and in the process displaying remarkable ingenuity and innovativeness.
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