Chapter 11 “Great and Universal Uneasiness”

ON SEPTEMBER 9, the Independent Chronicle, one of Boston’s leading republican newspapers, articulated in acerbic prose the mood of Massachusetts. “We have waited long enough to have . . . a particular account of the Penobscot expedition,” its editors wrote. “From the various accounts we have had, the general report stands thus . . . [O]ur irregular troops made an irregular retreat . . . in imitation of an irregular Brigadier, and a new-­fangled Commodore, without any loss, excepting the whole fleet.” Then, in a portentous flourish, the editorial concluded, “The question now is, Who is to blame?”1

The Great and General Court of Massachusetts, unquestionably in accord with the local press of Boston, was pondering the same question. Within hours of the appearance of the Independent Chronicle perspective, John Hancock, speaker of the Massachusetts House, sent up to the Council Chamber a resolution, premised on the “great and universal Uneasiness” occasioned by the failure of the Penobscot Expedition, creating a committee of inquiry to investigate the “causes of the said Miscarriage.”² Privately irate over the timidity of the mission leaders in failing to vigorously pursue the enemy at Majabigwaduce, the council members were eager to interrogate, through their appointed committee, the land and sea officers of the expedition. Confidence in the efficacy of such an inquiry, however, was not universally shared. “What will arise from ignorant militia-­men being examined by an ignorant court ’tis impossible to tell,” wrote Israel Keith, a former deputy adjutant-­general to William Heath.³

Nine legislators and military officers were appointed to the committee, with each given broad investigative authority to summon and examine any person or document thought necessary to further the assigned purpose of the body.

Chairing the committee was fifty-­one-­year-­old Artemas Ward. As the first major general in the Continental Army under George Washington, Ward had become a well-­known political force in the Massachusetts legislature, serving for many years in the House of Representatives and, by 1777, in the Executive Council. “A plain man, a solid citizen, upright and conscientious, one who did his duty modestly and effectively,” wrote Scribner’s Monthly years after his death. “[H]is life offers little to fascinate and much to respect.”4

As Paul Revere languished under house arrest, he churned with anger and brooded over the audacity of his enemies to levy such scurrilous allegations against him. And he wasn’t alone in his sentiments. Though public opinion had turned against him, some in the town believed that his removal from command had been a miscarriage of justice perpetuated by those in government. “The indelicacy with which Col. Revere was treated by the Council in the manner of his arrest,” wrote Israel Keith, a supporter of Revere, “would have disgraced a sergeant in the army of General Washington.”⁵ On the day that the council formed its committee of inquiry, however, it discharged Revere from his previous house arrest order and commanded him to stand in readiness to appear before the body for the purpose of offering testimony regarding the Penobscot Expedition.⁶

Immediately following his release, Revere stalked about Boston in a near-­frenzied quest to distinguish friend from foe. Many members of the Massachusetts Artillery Train remained loyal to their commander and offered their assistance in the upcoming inquiry, while others on the expedition, mostly those included in General Lovell’s camp and in alliance with Todd and Carnes, would clearly be acting against him. Revere sought out his friend William Heath, who was at the time a major general of the Continental Army; and though he asked for no influence or favor, he wrote in great detail about the specifics of the mission, the reasons for its failure, and his poor treatment upon arriving home. “I am left in a worse situation than if I had always been a friend to government,” confided Revere.⁷ While the council members and the Massachusetts government as a whole grappled with the overall causes of the military defeat and how the attendant financial burdens would be defrayed, Revere was consumed, perhaps justifiably so in light of the allegations against him, with squarely confronting his accusers and clearing his name. The inquiry into the Penobscot Expedition would be, to Paul Revere, a referendum on his personal character as well as the malevolence of his enemies.

In the ensuing weeks, summonses were delivered by the Massachusetts Council to virtually every sea captain and land officer of the Penobscot Expedition, compelling their attendance before the committee of inquiry, which was to convene on September 22 at Faneuil Hall in Boston. Such was the level of concern for the preservation of order and decorum during the inquiry that the Council appointed a band of civil officers, deputies, and constables from Suffolk County and the Town of Boston to stand guard during the proceedings.8

Even before the first witness was called—indeed, even before he was appointed by the council as chairman of the committee—Artemas Ward had given ear to the pervasive rumors floating about Boston and had drawn some conclusions regarding the major players in the ill-­fated expedition to Maine.

“[O]ur friend Wadsworth’s conduct,” he wrote to a colleague, “is spoken of with universal applause, as judicious and brave. Brigadier Lovell is well spoken of, that he did everything in his power. The commander of the fleet is cursed, bell, book, and candle by many . . . Lieut.-­Col. Paul Revere is now under an arrest for disobedience of orders, and unsoldierlike behavior tending to cowardice, etc. As soon as the siege was raised, he made the best of his way to Boston, leaving his men to get along as they could (as it’s said). I hope the matter will be thoroughly enquired into, and justice done to every individual officer.”⁹

For Paul Revere, justice would prove to be an elusive ideal. Though an incendiary complaint had been lodged against him, there was no talk of, nor had he requested, formal court-­martial proceedings to inquire specifically into the charges. For the time being, individual justice would have to be found within the constraints of the state-­ordered inquest into the Penobscot Expedition as a whole.

It has been argued that, perhaps, Massachusetts harbored a self-­seeking interest in the political demise of Dudley Saltonstall. If blame for the failure of the expedition could be foisted upon the commodore—a Continental officer—then, went the argument, responsibility for the massive attendant financial loss could justifiably be placed on the shoulders of the United States government.10 Whether aware of this proposition or not, on September 7, 1779, the Navy Board Eastern Department issued a warrant for Saltonstall’s court-­martial.

On September 14 Saltonstall and a bevy of compelled witnesses gathered in the forecastle of the frigate Deane anchored in Boston Harbor, prepared to give testimony on the commodore’s conduct during the Penobscot Expedition. As the hearing was about to begin, however, an unexplained “requisition” from the Navy Board together with a resolution of the General Court arrived demanding an adjournment of the proceedings to September 28.

Angered by the irregularity, Saltonstall complained that such a delay would prejudice his defense since several of his key witnesses, each naval captains, were “ready for the seas and resolved to embrace the first wind.” The president of the court-­martial, Captain Samuel Nicholson, granted the adjournment. However, out of a willingness “to show every indulgence to Captain Saltonstall, and wishing the whole of their proceedings might evince a spirit of impartiality,” Nicholson petitioned the legislature to retain the witnesses in Boston through the extended hearing date.¹¹

Mysteriously, Captain Nicholson’s statement on the subject remains the last official record of proceedings against Saltonstall arising out of his conduct on the Penobscot Expedition. As Gilbert Nash points out, “The most careful search among all known sources of information fails to discover any further traces of this court-­martial, although several of the accredited histories, and general tradition, state that he was cashiered and pronounced forever incapacitated for holding governmental office . . . That such was the result in his case there can be little doubt . . . from the fact that he disappears from that time, and is never heard of afterwards in the public records.”¹²

Whether Dudley Saltonstall was ever formally convicted in the court-­martial proceedings against him seems to be an academic question. What is known is that he never served on another government vessel, and following the inquiry into the Penobscot Expedition, the Massachusetts General Court decreed him to be “incompetent ever after, to hold a commission in the service of the State.”13

Since its construction in 1742, Faneuil Hall had long been a focal point of Boston politics, commerce, and entertainment. Donated to the town by Peter Faneuil, whose full-­length portrait still adorns its walls, the building served as the backdrop for nearly every celebration, oration, or angry mob of revolutionary-­era Boston. “In old Faneuil,” wrote William Babcock Weeden, “that guild of temple traders and aldermen, butchers and clerks, hucksters and civic magistrates, the spirit of the people conceived an embryonic nation.”¹⁴

On Wednesday, September 22, 1779, the various officers of the Penobscot Expedition—thirty in number—nervously gathered in the capacious amphitheater of Faneuil Hall. Dressed in the same military waistcoats, breeches, and boots they had worn throughout the arduous journey to and from Maine, the men presented at once a sight of both honor and indignity. The voices that filled the hall, Paul Revere’s included, were distinctively Bostonian. With a characteristic suppression of the Yankee “r” that derived from generations of East Anglian immigrants,¹⁵ the officers spoke in hushed and reverent tones befitting the circumstances.

Sworn written statements, or “depositions” as they were called, were required earlier from the men to ensure that their respective narrative accounts were memorialized in the event that travel or domestic obligations prevented their appearance at the hearing. Without the assistance of lawyers, who were generally discouraged in such proceedings so that costs could be minimized, each witness was expected to read his deposition into the record in open court and then be questioned by the committee members or other witnesses.¹⁶ Because the early expectations of the Penobscot Expedition had been so lofty and since the results had been so distressing, the mood at Faneuil Hall was tense and heated.

The panel members, likely adorned in satin robes and powdered wigs, as was the custom, filed into the hall and took their places before the collection of witnesses and interested observers. Artemus Ward, Francis Dana, Timothy Danielson, Brigadier General Jonathan Titcomb, the Honorable James Prescott, the Honorable Major General Michael Farley, Colonel Moses Little, and Major Samuel Osgood, came from a broad and distinguished spectrum of legislative and military backgrounds and brought a clear understanding of the legal and martial issues that would be the subject of the inquiry. Chairman Artemus Ward gaveled the proceedings into order and called the committee’s first witness to the chair. Recently home from his travels through Indian country, a grim and wary Solomon Lovell approached the erudite panel, raised his right hand, and swore to tell only the truth of what he knew.

The chairman began the examination by reading into evidence the council’s orders to the general given at the outset of the expedition. “You being appointed by the General Court of this State to the Command of the land forces raised and to be raised for the purpose of Dislodging the Enemies of this State who have taken Post at Penobscot . . .” Ward’s voice reverberated throughout the hall, each word no doubt piercing Solomon Lovell with somber remorse. “You will in all your operations consult with the Commander of the fleet . . . in Endeavoring to Captivate Kill or destroy the whole force of the Enemy there both by Sea & Land.”17

Upon acknowledging that he had, in fact, received such orders from the council, Lovell then delivered a day-­to-­day account of the Penobscot Expedition from its inception to the final defeat nearly a month later. His narrative was rendered reflexively and without hyperbole, stating only salient facts in an impassive manner befitting his position as a general. On several occasions, the committee interrupted Lovell in order to hear the testimony of other witnesses who could not linger, and thus he delivered his statement in sporadic fashion over three separate days.¹⁸

Lovell began his testimony by pointing out the deficiency in the number of troops available to him for the expedition. He stated that on his arrival at Townsend on July 21 there were only 873 rank-­and-­file infantrymen on hand, and accordingly he requested that his militia officers scour the countryside in an effort to augment the numbers. “Notwithstanding,” he testified, “I concluded to go on to Penobscot.”¹⁹

Lovell explained that upon taking the heights of Majabigwaduce on July 28, he had learned from prisoner accounts that the British at Fort George numbered approximately one thousand. “Upon this, I ordered lines to be thrown for our defense in case of an attack.”

“Did you request the Naval Commander to co-­operate with you at the time you effected your landing, or during that Day or any time after?” a member of the committee asked.

“I did not at the time of my landing or during that day—except to furnish the Marines.”20

Buttressed by the minutes of the respective councils of war and by copies of various letters among the officers, however, Lovell went on to express his unambiguous opinion that Commodore Saltonstall did not exercise sufficient fortitude in the implementation of the council’s orders. “I think there was a rational probability of success if the navy had cooperated with me after I had taken possession of the Heights of [Majabigwaduce],” testified Lovell.²¹ The ultimate illogicality of the dual coequal land and sea leadership roles was unequivocally articulated by the general: “I requested Commodore Saltonstall to destroy the Shipping. He asked me if he destroyed the enemy’s Ships whether I could storm the Enemy’s Main Fort. I told him I could not with my land forces only . . . He then replied, his Ships might suffer.”²²

During the second day of Lovell’s testimony, Captain Nathan Brown of the privateer Hunter was called by the committee and asked whether the enemy ships could have been destroyed without General Lovell first taking the fort.

“In my opinion they could,” replied Brown.

“Why was the attack not made?”

“My Opinion was [that] our Shipping would receive more damage in the attack, than we could reap benefit by the destruction of [the] enemy Shipping—The damage we should have received would have been mostly from the Fort, as it is probable the enemy’s Shipping would not have fired more [than] once or twice.”²³

After the completion of Brown’s testimony, John Carnes, captain of the privateer Hector, was called and promptly swore that “[f]rom the time we arrived ’till the enemy’s reinforcement appeared in sight our Ships lay almost inactive . . .”²⁴ Though Carnes admitted that a naval attack could only have been undertaken at great risk of fire from Fort George, he adamantly opined that “our Navy might have destroyed the Enemy’s fleet at any time before the arrival of . . . reinforcement[s].”

Carnes went on to state that on the first appearance of enemy ships in Penobscot Bay, the American fleet might have been saved had clear and unequivocal orders been given by the officers. “I don’t know that any orders were given for Burning our Fleet,” said Carnes. “I burnt my own Ship without.”

In a stolid procession over the next seven days, each of the naval captains and land officers commanding the expedition took the witness chair and provided a disturbing image of indecision and neglect. One by one, the men described in vivid detail the perils and follies of their mission—from the Nantasket departure to their fiery retreat—and uniformly condemned Dudley Saltonstall for the failure of the Penobscot Expedition. “[I]t was always in the power of Our Fleet to have destroyed the Enemy’s Shipping without any assistance from the land Army until the arrival of their Reinforcement,” stated Titus Salter of the Hampden.25

Concurring, John Williams, captain of the Brig Hazard, testified that if the enemy ships had been attacked and destroyed, Fort George “must have surrendered.” Williams insisted that the commodore had been informed of this opinion by several officers; yet, on every occasion, he refused to press the attack though frequently urged of the dangers of delay. “Whenever any proposition was made for attacking the enemy’s ships,” claimed Williams, “the Commodore opened his Council by Preaching Terror.”²⁶

And on it went. Captain Allen Hallet of the brig Active testified, “During the four days that I continued in the Harbor of [Majabigwaduce], it is my opinion we might have attacked & destroyed the enemy’s fleet without any assistance from the land Army, & I was surprised that they did not go in during that time.”²⁷ Hallet informed the committee that when he questioned the commodore on his unwillingness to act, “He made me no answer, but turned from me.”²⁸

First Lieutenant George Little, who had brazenly confronted the commodore on the Penobscot River, stated in meticulous detail the specifics of the altercation and, when asked if it had been in the power of the Rebel navy to destroy the enemy fleet without the assistance of General Lovell, he unflinchingly responded, “Yes, with the greatest ease at any time before the arrival of the reinforcement.”29

John Cathcart, captain of the Tyrannicide, was asked the same question and retorted, “It was, and the Grand forts too . . .”³⁰ And Joshua Davis, commander of the transports, informed the panel that he “to My great Surprise Saw the Explosion of Several Armed Ships—they might have been Very Easily Defended.”³¹

Though Dudley Saltonstall’s name appeared on the list of witnesses summoned to testify at the committee of inquiry, there is no record of evidence offered by him or on his behalf. His formal account of events, if it ever existed, is lost to history.

Paul Revere attended every day of the inquest at Faneuil Hall. Wearing the formal officer’s uniform of the Massachusetts Artillery—a blue woolen waistcoat trimmed in red with white cross belts, vest, and breeches—he listened intently to the testimony, broodingly awaiting the attacks on his character that he was sure were coming. While the committee grappled with the root causes of the expedition’s failure, Revere, fixated on his own reputation, ruminated on the motivation of his enemies and, without the benefit of a lawyer or legal training, evaluated witnesses and formulated his defenses.

As Revere’s adversaries clearly had collaborated against him, a fact later admitted by Carnes when he stated that he was “desired” by others to file his complaint,³² so too had Revere sought out the assistance of perceived allies and solicited their supportive statements for the hearing. Thus, on September 24, Phillip Marett, the acting lieutenant aboard the Sky Rocket—and Revere’s first cousin—informed the committee that while on shore at Majabigwaduce he “saw Colonel Revere who always appeared as he always did . . . as an Active and Diligent officer.” Marett further testified that, upon the retreat up the Penobscot River, Revere was asked one evening by the captain of the Sky Rocket to come aboard and “drink some Grog,” but Revere had refused. “[H]e told him he could not stop for he was trying to Collect his men.”³³

Joseph Whipple, a surgeon in Revere’s artillery regiment, specifically responded to Thomas Carnes’s complaint addressing the allegations charge by charge as best he could. “[I] saw an order, for Colonel Revere to send Cannon etc, properly Officered and manned, which was Obeyed . . . ,” said Whipple. “[As to] neglect of duty . . . I don’t know an Instance of . . . [As to] Unsoldierlike behavior I was not a judge of, And I never knew that Colonel Revere had any trial of his bravery.”34

And Andrew McIntyer, lieutenant of artillery, provided a glowing account to the committee of Revere’s leadership during the assent of Majabigwaduce. In direct opposition to Carnes’s charge that Revere was not engaged in the hauling of cannons to the heights, McIntyer testified, “Colonel Revere was constantly with us giving directions. [The] afternoon we Opened the Battery, [he] was there most of that afternoon, giving directions; he Visited the Battery, several times a day, every time I was on duty, which was almost every other day. Whenever there was an alarm I always found him there. I never Knew him absent from Camp, without he left word where he was gone . . . I do declare that during the whole expedition, in my opinion, he behaved himself like a good Officer.³⁵ And, in an obvious swipe at Carnes, McIntyer informed the committee that during the attack, several of Carnes’s marines approached Revere and told him they could not locate their commander. Later, according to McIntyer, Carnes came upon the artillerymen and “he went up to Colonel Revere, and shook hands with him . . .”³⁶

But by and large, the testimony presented to the committee weighed heavily against Paul Revere. After Phillip Marett had bolstered his artillery commander, Captain Perez Cushing castigated him. Painting a picture of a petty and resentful malcontent, Cushing described to the panel an occasion where General Wadsworth had directly ordered him (Cushing) and a number of artillerymen to deliver three cannon to the mainland battery in an attempt to reach Captain Mowat’s ships from the north. As he prepared for the task, Cushing’s testimony continued, he informed Revere of the general’s order and immediately saw the indignation rise in his commander. “[H]e said he thought he ought to have been consulted by the General before a detachment was made from his Corps,—but said get your Men.”³⁷

Directly contradicting Revere’s assertion that he had searched desperately for his company during the disordered retreat from Majabigwaduce, Cushing angrily testified that Revere had abandoned him and his men on the shores without orders or direction. “I tarried at the place where he left me . . .’till near Dark, waiting for Colonel Revere and orders, then I proceeded to the place where our Men landed, met some of them coming up & in the whole collected about forty . . . Colonel Revere had an Opportunity to have given orders to me, or to the Men, before we left the River & I expected to have received orders from him, but did not.”38

Following up on a particular anecdote that had been swirling around Boston, a member of the committee inquired whether Cushing had ever heard chatter from the general’s marquee to the effect that no matter how long the siege continued Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere could not be relied upon with orders. “I heard such conversation,” replied ­Cushing.³⁹

Revere glared angrily at his artillery captain but dared not offer a question to counter his testimony.

On Saturday, September 25, several more sea captains were called to the witness chair, each providing detailed accounts of the expedition and opinions as to the causes of its failure. As a postscript to his deposition before the committee, Captain John Williams described the travails of his sailors in hauling the eighteen-­pound cannons up the cliffs of Majabigwaduce and recounted their anger in the apparent absence of Revere and his artillerymen. “I do not recollect that I Saw a Soldier pull a Rope, or assist in getting up the Guns,” observed Williams indignantly. “I observed it in the time, & thought we had not the assistance from the [Artillery] Train I expected.”⁴⁰ Captain John Cathcart, who also provided assistance with the cannon, joined Williams in his assessment and swore under oath to its accuracy.⁴¹

By the start of the following week, the committee had heard from the militia leaders Samuel McCobb and Jeremiah Hill, who each had provided compelling accounts of the land assaults on Majabigwaduce, as well as the unfortunate circumstances of the Rebel retreat. On the morning of Wednesday, September 29, however, all eyes were fixed on General Peleg Wadsworth.

A Harvard-­educated schoolteacher by trade, Wadsworth was eloquent with the written word, and his deposition flowed with effusive description, in sharp contrast to that of his lower officers. “The Failure of the Expedition under Enquiry,” began the general, “seems to me to be owing principally to the Lateness of our Arrival before the Enemy, the Smallness of our Land Forces, & the uniform Backwardness of the Commander of the Fleet.”42

Wadsworth enumerated a series of unavoidable delays at Nantasket attendant with the initial arrangement of the fleet and the perils of bad weather, but then placed the blame squarely on Paul Revere, who along with some of his men had spent the evening before the departure at home in Boston. “[T]he whole Fleet was obliged to heave to for several hours to wait for the Ordnance Brigg,” testified Wadsworth.⁴³

After modestly concurring with General Lovell’s account of the heroic ground assault upon the heights, Wadsworth focused the balance of his narrative on his efforts to mount a defense after the sorrowful retreat from Majabigwaduce—and on his frustration with Paul Revere.

As the committee listened intently, Wadsworth described returning to the transports after locating an appropriate upriver location to fortify, only to find the ships clustered and ablaze. He testified about his need for Revere’s Castle barge in the perilous rescue of the small schooner that had torn away and drifted toward the enemy. Though the schooner contained a crew of imperiled men and provisions, “I was directly opposed by Lieut. Col. Revere who said that I had no right to command either him or the Boat & gave orders to the contrary.”⁴⁴ “The Reason Lt. Colonel Revere gave for the Boat’s not going off to the Schooner,” Wadsworth tersely complained, “was that he had all his private baggage at Stake.”⁴⁵

Wadsworth testified that, amid Revere’s protestations, “He was promised An Arrest as soon as the Army should be collected.”⁴⁶

At the conclusion of the general’s statement, a member of the committee inquired if he recollected asking Colonel Revere to cut out the embrasures for the Rebel breastworks on the heights.

“I am not positive that I asked him, but had thoughts in my Mind why I had not seen him there at the fixing [of] the Batteries,” came the response.

“[Was] Colonel Revere . . . missing on Shore?”

“I saw him but seldom on shore during the first week after our landing.”47

At that, Paul Revere leapt to his feet and approached the witness. His black artillery boots were scuffed and worn from his travels through the wilderness of Maine, though the limp that he had developed on the journey was now only barely perceptible. With the sprightly deportment of a state’s attorney, he began firing questions at Peleg Wadsworth.⁴⁸

“Do you recollect,” began Revere with characteristic Yankee enunciation, “my carrying you to a place & showing it as a proper one for getting up the Cannon & cutting a Road?”—the word “proper” sounding more like “propah.”

“I remember being on a Bank with Colonel Revere and pitching on a place to get up the Cannon, where we afterward got them up.”

“Do You remember sending for me to go to an Island to the Eastward of Hackers Island to find a post to annoy the enemy’s Shipping?”

“I Remember you went with me,” responded Wadsworth. “I don’t recollect sending for you, but don’t think it improbable . . .”

Thomas Carnes then rose and approached the general.⁴⁹ Sensing an opportunity to attack his nemesis and recalling a statement made by Captain Cushing regarding the distrust that Lovell and Wadsworth harbored for Revere, he offered, “Did you say or hear General Lovell say that if the siege Continued seven years, if it was possible to avoid it he would not order Colonel Revere to take any Command?”

Refusing to engage Carnes in his personal quarrels with Revere, Wadsworth responded, “I have no recollection of the sort, or even that it ever was in my Mind,—if I had said it, ’tis probable it would have left some traces in my mind.”

Artemas Ward then impatiently interjected the fundamental question.

“Did you during the siege discover any inattention or backwardness to duty in Colonel Revere? He asked.”

As Revere braced for the answer, Wadsworth paused in reflection and tactfully replied, “I did not see him so frequently in Camp as I expected—This was in my mind in the time of it . . .”⁵⁰ Wadsworth then described Revere’s less-­than-­enthusiastic record of votes during the various councils of war and how his opinions were always at variance with his own. The inference, of course, was that Revere had consistently voted to end the siege and retreat the army.

Following General Wadsworth’s testimony, the commander of the ordnance brig, the Samuel, was called to the witness chair. Captain James Brown informed the committee of the great panic and confusion that imbued the fleet as the armed vessels chaotically stormed past the transports in the narrows of the Penobscot River. “[F]inding no assistance,” lamented Brown, “I asked Colonel Davis, ‘What I should do?’—he answered me, that He did not know what to do!”51 Brown testified that as the British ships approached in the distance, he was left with no choice but to run the brig ashore and flee into the woods.

Captain Carnes, emboldened by his examination of General Wadsworth and determined to continue the focus on Revere, asked Brown if he recalled when Revere received the billet ordering him to appear before General Lovell to explain his absence from the shore. After providing a confused response to the question, Revere then asked the captain, “How often did I come on board the Ordnance Brig, after our baggage was carried on shore?”⁵²

“Very seldom,” replied Brown. “[Y]ou was not on board every day & when you came ’twas on particular business to shift yourself or to do something relative to the service—I particularly remember that you several days, sawed off the fuses of the Shells . . . & seemed always anxious to be on shore as soon as possible . . .” Brown then turned to the panel and added, “Colonel Revere refused to stay & drink Coffee & dine when I had asked him.”⁵³

Thomas Carnes was then called to the witness chair. As Revere watched with piqued indignation, Carnes introduced himself to the panel as commander of the marines aboard the ship Putnam, and then he immediately launched his tirade against the artillery commander.

Beginning with the events of July 28 and the assault upon the cliffs of Majabigwaduce, Carnes testified that Revere and his men were to land as a reserve corps and were to keep to the rear as close to the main force as possible.

His Corps landed, to the left, of the Marines. I supposed him to be with them, but did not then see him [until] some time after the Marines was engaged, they kept on the beach, till the troops had got possession of the heights, and did not come to the top of the heights, till some time after the troops had halted . . . Colonel Revere left his men on Shore and went on board the Transport at Breakfast time, and Dinner time, towards evening, he went on board again . . . and for Several days after he could not be found.54

Carnes testified as to General Lovell’s displeasure over Revere’s absence from the lines and recounted the order and personal billet that was issued directing him to encamp on shore with his men. He stated that Revere was seldom present to provide instruction or direction to his artillerymen, and he disparaged his ability as a commander of artillery and his understanding of the cannon under his control. “I thought it impossible that a Colonel of Artillery, should make such bad shot, and know no more about Artillery,” said Carnes.⁵⁵

Though infuriated by Carnes’s statements, Revere, lacking in any legal training, conducted only a short and ineffective cross-­examination of his rival, choosing instead to present his defenses through the testimony of friendly witnesses. He was incensed that Carnes, as the proponent of the charges, had even been permitted to testify and offer evidence in furtherance of his own complaint. Revere clearly felt abused by the process and especially by committee member Francis Dana, who according to Revere, “treated me as though I had been a malefactor, and he State’s Attorney; they even admitted Carnes, who was my accuser, to be an evidence against me.”⁵⁶

Yet now, when given the opportunity to cross-­examine his rival and set the record straight before the committee and his countrymen, Revere faltered. With his mind racing with anger and incredulity, he gathered himself and managed to ask Carnes only whether he had ever seen orders directing the artillerymen to land on July 28 as a corps de reserve.

Perplexed by the question, Carnes replied simply, “Yes.”⁵⁷

On the same day, September 29, the committee called another of Revere’s enemies, Major William Todd, to offer his sworn statement. Surprisingly circumspect, Todd focused his lengthy deposition primarily on the military maneuvers of General Lovell’s men and the maddening difficulties he had encountered with the commodore. “[I]t was easy . . . ,” opined Todd, “for our Fleet to have attacked & destroyed the enemy’s shipping at any time before the arrival of the enemy’s reinforcement.”58

Without specifying names, but unquestionably referring to Paul Revere, Todd then informed the committee, “Some officers’ Conduct in my Opinion very unsoldierlike, Some Commanders of Corps seldom with them.”⁵⁹ More detailed allegations, specifically directed against Revere, followed. He criticized those under whose care the ordnance brig—­perhaps the most important of the transports—rested, including the “Commanding Officer of our Artillery,” and scolded that had the stores been properly secured during the retreat, a defensive stand might have been successfully achieved.⁶⁰ Todd accused Revere of failing to move upriver with his men to refortify during the retreat despite orders for him to do so, and he reiterated General Lovell’s surprise at Revere’s inattention to duty and frequent absence from camp. “I heard General Wadsworth say . . . that if the siege continued seven years (if it was possible to avoid it)—he should not ask him to take any Command.”⁶¹

Perhaps the most damning allegations against Revere came from his commissary of ordnance, Gilbert Speakman. Admittedly requested by Thomas Carnes to produce a written statement of “what I know concerning the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Revere at Penobscot,”⁶² Speakman recounted a litany of offenses allegedly committed by the artillery commander.⁶³

He informed the committee of how, when ordered to bring some guns onto Nautilus Island after its capture from the British, Revere bristled. “[H]e could not think the General meant for him to go, but believed ’twas a mistake . . .”

Speakman stated that a few days later some of General Lovell’s men had asked Revere to borrow his Castle barge but were refused. “He replied he wanted it himself,” said Speakman. “[He] said he brought that Barge for his own use & not for the General’s.”

Speakman testified that General Lovell had openly wondered if Revere, by his continued absence, purposefully was keeping himself “out of the way.” He then recounted how Major Todd, at the insistence of the general, had prepared a billet for delivery to Revere demanding that he attend the general’s marquee to address the problem and how Revere had scoffed at the issue after meeting with Lovell. “[H]e made a trifling matter of it,” said Speakman.

And finally, Speakman described how, upon the first day of retreat up the Penobscot River, Major Todd had delivered the general’s order to Revere that he remove the cannons from Nautilus Island and secure them for use in a fortification to hinder the advancing British fleet. According to Speakman, Revere refused the order saying that he had no boat available, though he would later gripe that he simply chose not to risk his men on such a mission. Then, continued Speakman, Revere examined his original orders and stated that since he was mandated by the Massachusetts Council to be under the general’s command “during the Penobscot Expedition,” and since, for all practical purposes, the expedition had ended, he no longer considered himself bound by the general’s orders.

On Friday, October 1, the final day of the hearing, Revere requested that General Lovell be recalled to the witness chair. Though angered and befuddled by the testimony against him, Revere finally had formulated a strategy of defense that focused on clearing his name of the primary charges before the committee.

In a series of questions designed to refresh Lovell’s recollection of certain events, Revere attacked the premise that he had somehow purposefully absented himself from the Rebel camp or the danger of battle on Majabigwaduce.64

He stood reverently before the general and slowly began, “Did you on the 28th of July, the day you landed on Magabigwaduce, see me, with the Corps I commanded?” asked Revere.

“Yes.”

“Do you remember that you ordered me to follow you with my men, and that we followed you up the steep, and kept close to your rear, till you Ordered me to halt? That just after you halted, you Ordered me to git a field piece on Shore; I asked you, if I should take one of my companies to do it, that you answered me yes.”

“Yes,” replied Lovell, “I remember the whole.”

Revere then skillfully took the general back through a succession of mutual dealings on Majabigwaduce in which Lovell had issued orders to gather or reposition certain artillery and equipment, and to which Revere dutifully had complied.

“Was there a day,” continued Revere, “from the time we landed on Majabigwaduce, to the day we retreated up the River, but what you saw me at least twice a day?”

Lovell paused in reflection, then replied, “I do not recollect every day but remember I [saw] you often.”

No doubt pleased with the response, Revere ventured, “Did you ever send, or Give me an Order Verbally which I did not obey?”

“No,” said Lovell, “except on the day after we retreated.”

Not wishing to pursue this, Revere quickly changed topics. He removed a small piece of paper from the pocket of his breeches and studied it for a moment.

“Did you on the Evening of the 29th of July send me a Billet . . . to wit, The General is surprised that he had not seen Colonel Revere & desires he would wait upon him immediately?”

“Such a Billet was sent but I cannot recollect the time when,” replied Lovell, and then to Revere’s satisfaction, he added, “And the Colonel waited upon me immediately & satisfied me that he had been well employed.”

Thomas Carnes watched with mounting frustration as the general seemed to bolster Revere’s defense. It was now time for him to remind Lovell of certain other events that bore upon Revere’s actions and character at Majabigwaduce.65

Sensing that he had become a mere instrument in a battle of personal invective, however, Lovell clearly had now turned hostile toward Carnes and appeared less willing to assist in his campaign against Revere. As Carnes approached the witness chair, he studied the general, measuring his patience and hoping that the questions would enlighten rather than irritate.

“Do you Remember,” began Carnes, “. . . Sending for Colonel Revere several times whilst we Lay on [Majabigwaduce], and Received for Answer he was not to be found?”

“I did once,” responded Lovell.

“Do you Remember of Saying, at Several times that you was Surprised of Colonel Revere’s Inattention to his Duty?”

“I do not remember it.”

“Do you Remember of Saying Let the Siege Continue as Long as it will, you should not Desire, or order Colonel Revere to take any Command?”

Lovell shifted in his chair and appeared angered by the question. “I do not remember saying any such thing.”

“Do you Remember,” persisted Carnes, “when you sent the orders for some Pieces of Artillery to be carried on [Nautilus] Island, whether You meant for Colonel Revere to go himself or to order some officer to go?”

“I expected he would see it done,” tersely replied Lovell.

Recognizing that extensive inquiry could only be counterproductive, Carnes ventured one final question.

“Do you Remember Giving Colonel Revere orders to Retreat up the River with his men, as you was determined to fortify?”

“Yes,” responded the general. “He answered [that the] Ordnance Brig was destroyed and there were no Cannon to make a Stand . . .”

Carnes returned to the gallery benches believing that the matter was concluded, but the committee, apparently fascinated by the exchange, was intent on continuing Lovell’s examination. Directing him to remain in the witness chair, the panel began asking questions.66

“Do you Remember,” inquired the committee, “. . . seeing any thing of Colonel Revere after you gave him orders to go up the River with his men till you [saw] him in Boston?”

“I do not,” replied Lovell. He paused for a moment and then, with the demeanor of a man who wished to unburden himself, began speaking about Revere’s activities after the Rebels won the heights of Majabigwaduce—though he had not been directly asked about the topic.

“I ordered Colonel Revere to land with his Men, with their Muskets. In about an hour after our landing I ordered him to take one of his Companies and the Cannon on shore from on board the transport.”

With Paul Revere listening intently from the gallery, General Lovell’s voice seemed to rise with anger.

“I gave no permission to Colonel Revere,” he continued, “to go on board the Transport to Dine, Sup, lodge or Breakfast . . . but expected he was on shore with his Men, till the contrary was represented to me, which occasioned my order of the 30th of July to him to encamp with the Corps on Shore with the Army.”

In an effort to place on the record that which the committee already knew, one member then asked, “Did you write to the Council to give Colonel Revere a reprimand for his unsoldierlike behavior?”

As Carnes no doubt smiled derisively from the gallery, Lovell replied, “Yes, and I had reference to his disobedience of the order of the 15th of August [to retreat up the river with his men] . . . And his leaving the army without permission.”

At once clarifying but also confusing the issue of Revere’s behavior on the Penobscot Expedition, the committee closed their examination of General Lovell with one final question.

“When Colonel Revere lodged on board,” asked a member of the panel, “did you consider it as a disobedience of orders?”

Lovell reflected for a moment and then, choosing his words cautiously and with precision, responded, “I did not consider it as a disobedience of orders for I had given no orders that he should be on shore, but expected that he & every other officer that had any thing to do with the army, should be on shore.”

Artemas Ward had heard enough. After ten days of angry finger-­pointing and heated exchanges, of vivid descriptions and mournful narratives, the testimony finally was concluded. On the afternoon of October 1, 1779, he gaveled the hearing closed and adjourned the inquiry into the failure of the Penobscot Expedition.