The sun was going down when Jackson’s squad was ordered to defend the tunnel road. The tunnel was directly above the medical aid station and led north to the town of Tanyang. Jackson’s squad was to protect the area at night. In addition to Jackson, the squad included James Carroll; Corporal Virgil J. Collins, Assistant Squad Leader; Sergeant David “Tank” Clarke, BAR man; Sergeant Curtis Courts, radio telephone operator; and Corporal Richard H. Glover, rifleman. The men moved into position and remained until about 2100 hours, when they moved back and joined the other half of the squad. The enemy had pinpointed their location. From this fallback position, they still had the tunnel in sight, and in fact could see through the tunnel.
Jackson sat at the head of the squad, his legs crossed and a rifle in his lap. He remained in that position for three hours until about 2400. In the early hours of 7 January, the 2d Ranger Company experienced its first contact with the enemy since arriving in Korea on 30 December 1950. The enemy was closing in to infiltrate the Tanyang area, block the pass, and disrupt the flow of supplies to the front. Glover, in position just a few feet from Jackson, spotted a Korean soldier crawling beside Jackson under the protection of the ditch that ran along the road. Glover lifted his rifle and fired, hitting the enemy at least twice.
A scattering of shots were fired. “Tank” Clarke threw a white phosphorous (WP) grenade. If he had thrown a fragmentation grenade, it would have hit some of the squad members in the ditch. The WP ignited the roofs of nearby shacks, lighting up the whole area. Glover and Courts leaped over the bank and joined the rest of the squad. There were now four men on the other side of the bank; Jackson was the last man to make the leap. Once on the safer side of the bank, Jackson counted his men and found everyone present. All around them, however, the crust of the frozen snow and ice was cracking with the sound of people running on its surface. Every Ranger in the squad knew the noise wasn’t 2d Ranger Company moving; it was the enemy closing in on their position.
Jackson spread out his squad to form a line about ten yards long. When they were in proper position, enemy could be heard running toward their front and both flanks—the enemy was everywhere. Jackson’s squad opened up, spraying the area with heavy fire. By now, it was between 0300 and 0400 hours. The heavy defensive fire held back the probing enemy infantry.
Sergeant Jesse “Babe” Anderson brought half a squad into the area to relieve Jackson. Once off the line, Jackson looked for the place where Glover had shot the enemy. They found blood and evidence that the enemy had dragged their wounded man away. Jackson and his men followed the red trail to the village, where Jackson interrogated an old Korean man, pointing to the blood on the snow that had led them to him. The Korean made a motion, shaking his arms like he was a chicken. Jackson knew this was a damn lie. All that blood in the snow could not have come from killing a chicken. The old man and his family were hiding the guerrilla! This guerrilla had gotten so close that if Jackson had stood up he could have touched the enemy soldier in the center of his back. That’s how close the enemy was able to get to this squad of Rangers. In fact, when Anderson relieved Jackson’s squad, he found two live enemy grenades lying nearby in the snow. Had it not been for Glover’s vigilance and marksmanship, the whole squad might have been wiped out.
Sergeant First Class Isaac E. Baker’s outpost was positioned near the road close to the old schoolhouse building. The only man with Baker was Sergeant Edward Posey, armed with a BAR. At the squad CP three other men were concealed in a large crater hole. About 0500 hours, one of the men noticed a light in a hut north of the outpost. The few locals remaining in the village had been warned about lights and movement at night, so Baker issued a warning and fired a shot into the hut to extinguish the light. Under the cover of darkness, Communist guerrillas had sneaked into the town to attempt a move along the ditch beside the road toward the Ranger positions. Now, they simply attacked the Company position, mainly from the north, where they had infiltrated between the Artillery and 17th CPs farther north along the road. Their fire was returned by the 2d Platoon, which was occupying that sector.
Baker and Posey left the squad CP and started moving forward down the road to reinforce the squad’s position. They were promptly met by a number of enemy infantry pouring out of the village. Posey encountered two enemy, who opened fire on him and on Baker. Posey aimed his BAR, killed his first two enemy soldiers, and continued to the squad position on the road in front of the village. What Posey was unaware of was that Baker had been fatally wounded. He would only learn of Baker’s death after the firefight ended. Baker died at daylight, just before a helicopter could fly to a mobile Army surgical hospital (MASH). Unfortunately, during these early days of the helicopter, its flight ceiling and weight capacity were very limited, especially in cold weather. Captain Allen and Lieutenant Queen, meanwhile, ran from the Company CP to that sector to assess the unfolding situation. First Sergeant Lawrence D. West was told to notify Regiment that Baker was dead, which he did with an SCR-300 radio. As the men learned the hard way, death came quickly in Korea.
The unit also learned the need for constant security at Outpost 3. This outpost was on a small knob, about 150 yards to the west and in the rear of the 17th RCT Aid Station. Sergeant First Class William Hargrove, as Assistant Squad Leader of the 3d Squad, 2d Platoon (Lieutenant Vincent Wilburn and Master Sergeant “Dude” Walker commanding), was stationed at the outpost, facing west. Sergeant Hargrove had with him Privates First Class (PFCs) Julius Victor, Wheeler Small, Jr., Craig “Lil Man” Paulding, and George Thomas. They had one LMG, two BARs, one M–1, and one carbine. Each Ranger also carried a .45 caliber pistol, and several grenades were at their position.
The mission for this group was to: (1) guard the rear approach down the railroad tracks, (2) guard the tunnel entrance, and (3) guard the trail over the hill into the village of Tanyang. Outpost reports were required every thirty minutes and were made by calling into the Company CP via power telephone land line. Some of the telephone lines were laid to each outpost on a common party line, so that most of the outposts could listen to, and talk with, each other. At this time Wilburn was on duty in the CP, receiving the reports.
About 0530 hours Hargrove reported that he heard movement in the vicinity of his position but could not see anyone. Wilburn checked with nearby Outpost 2, but they had nothing to report. About 0545, just as it was getting lighter, Hargrove spotted a group of enemy soldiers approaching from the direction of the tunnel. He opened fire with his machine gun and dispersed the enemy. The firing alerted the rest of the men in the company, who started moving into their positions. Meanwhile, Hargrove’s LMG, however, froze up after it had fired the first couple of rounds. He instructed Small and Victor to open up with their BARs. Victor fired approximately two magazines before he stopped, frozen solid. (It was during this engagement that the Rangers learned that a regular coat of oil caused a weapon to freeze in very cold weather and that, contrary to normal procedures, weapons should be only lightly wiped with oil under intensely cold conditions.) With their automatic weapons frozen, PFCs Paulding and Thomas exchanged fire with an enemy force of unknown strength using their individual weapons. At least one of the enemy soldiers slipped in close enough to pitch a fragmentation grenade into the outpost position, wounding Small and Paulding. Small was hit in three places and Paulding was temporarily blinded by the explosion. Realizing that the enemy knew his exact position and outnumbered his crippled force, Hargrove ordered his men to withdraw to the reverse slope of the hill, and then quickly administered first aid to Small and Paulding. While all this was transpiring, Thomas began throwing hand grenades over the hill at the unseen enemy.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Queen, Sergeant John “Rigger” Ford, Sergeant Marion “Mighty Mouth” Alston, Master Sergeant “Dude” Walker, and a litter team from the medics had worked their way from the rear of the aid station to the bottom of the knob. There they met Hargrove and his outpost group. The litter team carried Small, while Victor and Thomas walked to the aid station on their own. While under sniper fire from nearby higher ground, Hargrove returned with Queen’s group to re-occupy the knob. The entire action lasted about twenty to thirty minutes.
About the same time, Outpost 5 and Road Block “Able” were also attacked. Road Block “Able,” under the command of Lieutenant Pryor, had been taking intermittent fire all morning, and at daybreak the Rangers manning that outpost were forced to take to the hills with only light combat gear. When they tried to re-enter the perimeter without first calling in, the personnel of Road Block “Able” drew small arms fire.
By 0700 hours the company occupied the perimeter in force. The earlier enemy efforts were nothing more than light probing actions. The main attack arrived about this time from north of the village of Changnim-ni, adjacent to and north of the perimeter. At 0715 hours the 32d RCT around Tanyang Pass, in response to the 2d’s reports, also reported that it was under attack. Enemy strength appeared to be as high as one hundred soldiers.
Road Block “Baker” had not been heard from since 0600 hours because its radio battery had succumbed to the cold temperatures and quit two hours earlier. (More lessons learned: during cold weather the radio battery’s life was shortened by about one-third, the battery had to be changed frequently, and the radio operator could not set the radio down in the snow. In the future, the Rangers mounted the SCR–300 on a pack board to keep it out of the snow. This also allowed the convenient carrying of other essential combat accouterments, and enabled easier carrying and handling.) When the Rangers stationed at Road Block Baker were fired upon, they returned fire at the guerrillas attempting to slip into the village.
By daylight, about 0745 hours, the guerillas were driven off without any penetration. A patrol was sent into town. Heavy patrolling continued around the town and in the hills. Intelligence reports later indicated that the enemy had been of the 1st Guerrilla Division, 5th Guerrilla “Ghost Corps.”
The Tanyang fight was 2d Ranger Company’s first direct confrontation with the enemy. A declassified report15 from the 32d Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division boiled down the Rangers’ combat at Tanyang this way: “The main event of 7 January 1951, was the attack of the North Korean guerrillas on Tanyang. At 2345, 6 Jan., 20 unidentified Koreans approached Road Block “A.” The Rangers fired on them and they dispersed. Then at 0530 small arms and automatic weapons fire started in the South part of Tanyang and shortly after fighting had broken out all over town.”
For his part in the action, Sergeant Hargrove was recommended for the Bronze Star.
During the next few days several Rangers were hospitalized due to cold weather injuries. Ranger Wheeler Small, who was wounded at the railroad tunnel outpost, recalled:
I was more concerned about riding the ambulance back down the mountain road than I was about the injuries. The road was so narrow that only vehicles going in one direction were allowed on the road, at any one time. Sometimes the convoys or any single vehicle was ambushed. I would not let them put me in the ambulance without my weapon. I was the only American in it; the others were Koreans. We got stopped several times by sniper fire. When we reached the field hospital, I was the only one alive.
But he was alive. Sergeant First Class Isaac E. Baker, however, was not. Baker was the company’s first man killed in action (KIA)—which, as it turned out, he had predicted.
In 1948, before going into combat in Korea, Sergeant First Class Baker taught drill and tactical field training for the dismounted soldier at Fort Bragg. He trained, among others, SGM William Bates of the 558th Medical Collecting Company. Judging that his best path to a promotion was with an airborne unit, Baker went to Jump School and found his way to 2d Ranger Company.
When the 2d Ranger Company landed at Yokohama and received passes from Camp Zama, Baker headed for the Cross Roads NCO Club in Yokohama. The 558th had left Bragg as a unit for deployment with the mission of taking all wounded soldiers on the flight from Korea to Japan. Baker knew that the 558th medics had arrived in Japan and would have found a friendly bar. Baker went looking for, and found, Bates. Baker told Bates he had no money because he had bought his son a dry cleaning business in the States as a source of income. Bates tried to buy Baker a drink, but he refused. He didn’t drink anymore, he wasn’t hungry, and he was really just there for the companionship. “I don’t think I am going to make it back,” he told Bates. “My time is up! If I don’t go to
Korea on Wednesday, I’ll see you back here on Saturday.” But he went to Korea. And it was the last time Bates saw Baker alive.16
The declassified command report of the 32d Infantry17 relates enemy activity on 10 January 1951. A division artillery aerial observer reported three companies of enemy infantry moving south through the mountains east of Tanyang. The 32d Infantry’s Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) Platoon exchanged long-range fire with ten to fifteen enemy near Pyongdong-ni. The 3/32 was relieved by the 1/31 coming up from the south near Andong by 1200 hours. The 3/32 was reinforced with a platoon of tanks, a 4.2mm mortar platoon, and Battery C, 48th Field Artillery Battalion, which moved to blocking positions northeast of Tanyang, to meet the 10th North Korean Division.
During the period of 11 to 13 January, heavy enemy contact continued around Tanyang, with estimated enemy strength at battalion-to-regimental sized units. On 13 January, the 1/32, minus Company C, moved east-northeast from the aid station near Changnim-ni toward Majori-ri. The battalion came in on the move, with only a brief attack order issued. The order of march down the trail toward Majori-ri was Company B first, followed by the command group and the Rangers. Queen separated from 2d Ranger Company to guide Company A along the north ridge line in an attempt to outflank the village where an estimated enemy battalion was located. Queen knew the terrain because he had led patrols over that same route the previous week. His assistance was needed because Company A lacked maps and was unfamiliar with the terrain. Queen noticed that the unit seemed to arrive late and the men were carrying full field packs with pup tents attached. They did not drop any individual equipment, in stark contrast to Queen, who knew the advantages of traveling light and had only an M-1 with an extra bandoleer and a blanket cut like a Mexican serape for shelter. Queen did not see the battalion 81mm mortars go into position, and the trail was too narrow for 75mm Recoilless Rifle movement. The men of Company A had great difficulty climbing and moved in single file.
As the rest of 2d Ranger Company prepared for combat on that cold January morning, nearly every man was double loaded with ammunition because it was so difficult to re-supply in such mountainous terrain. As one of the 1st Platoon BAR operators, “Tank” Clarke carried his weapon and helped carry ammo for the 60mm mortar. The Rangers moved for a few miles along a railroad track that made it difficult to walk, which made the miserable march that much harder.
On the evening prior to the attack, a patrol of several Rangers moved up into the mountains and fired on some Koreans to their left front. The enemy did not appear to take any casualties. The men ate cold C rations before bedding down in the snow. According to Clarke, they were too cold and tired to try to chop through the frozen ground. The next day they awoke, stiff and freezing cold, and headed out to meet the enemy.
The Rangers followed Company B down into a valley, slipping and sliding all the way. Traversing the mountain single file, they came to a village. As they approached the small collection of huts, they passed some dead cattle and a few dead civilians. Either the civilians had gotten in the way of the conflict or they were dead guerrillas from the previous days’ air strikes or artillery fire—it was impossible to know which. Making their way up a ravine, the Rangers came upon some young civilian men. The word was out: young Korean men who were not in the army or in uniform were either guerrillas or deserters. Some of the men from Baker Company or Battalion were ordered to guard them closely and, if in doubt, shoot them. The Koreans were shot down while trying to escape, and the Rangers never gained any intelligence from them, which they would later regret. What Battalion headquarters did not know was that the enemy may have been watching as their men were killed.
The squad that Clarke was with moved farther up the valley while Baker Company started to climb the slope toward the huts. They had just seen some North Koreans killed while hiding behind a haystack. Without warning, a sharp small arms fire broke out and hit Baker Company squarely in the front. Private Frank King, Jr., was sitting on top of a rock eating a can of beans when a bullet struck him. Tucker heard Koreans screaming “Banzai! Banzai!” as King keeled over. Private First Class Herman L. Rembert was a few yards behind Sergeant Jackson, who was leading 1st Platoon. Rembert was hit in the chest and killed. Sergeant Harold Johnson, assistant squad leader to Sergeant First Class Daniel Boatwright, 3d Platoon, was hit in the helmet and right leg. With one man killed and several wounded in a handful of seconds, Jackson, Clarke, and the others took cover behind a large boulder. They could not see the enemy, but they could hear his gunfire. With a large rock protecting them, Clarke and about six other men in his group took stock of their situation and returned fire.
Sergeant First Class Freeman, 1st Platoon Sergeant, yelled “put some fire on the hills!” Clarke and Corporal Lawrence “Poochie” Williams did as ordered, blazing away with their BARs. Clarke removed the bi-pod from his weapon during the firefight because the enemy always went after the automatic weapons; his BAR was a less conspicuous target without the bi-pod. Members of the squad set up the mortar as best as they could without a base plate and dumped all the rounds toward the enemy on the surrounding hills. Despite the heavy return fire, bullets rained down around the boulder position, which did not give as much protection as the Rangers had hoped. As they also quickly discovered, some of the enemy fire was coming from behind the boulder.
It was at this time that Williams was struck in the head. He was killed immediately. His corpse almost dropped on top of Clarke, who heard Jackson yell, “Sergeant Freeman, Poochie got hit in the head!” There was nothing they could do for him. The bullet that hit Williams entered the top of his head and came out in front of his eye. Williams hated wearing a steel helmet, and wasn’t wearing one when he was hit. Some of the men wondered later whether a helmet might have saved his life, but there was no time to think of such things in the heat of battle. Shortly after Willams was killed, Jackson had a bullet rip open the tip of his chin, and Glover, who was on Jackson’s left, was hit in the neck. Glover was soon hit a second time in the neck, this time fatally. Just then another man near Clarke, Private First Class Robert St. Thomas, was struck in the foot. His feet were so cold that he could hardly feel the wound. St. Thomas peeled back his shoe-pack and asked Clarke, “Is that a bullet hole?” Clarke assured him that it was indeed a bullet hole.
With two men killed and several wounded, the squad spread out because its position behind the boulder was drawing too much enemy fire. By this time Clarke had used up all but one magazine of ammo and had lost contact with the ammo bearers, one of whom was Corporal Isaiah Woodard. Men were still being hit all around Clarke. He had saved the last magazine to use for covering fire in a retreat. That time arrived when some of Company B came down the valley yelling everybody out!
Clarke was certain that St. Thomas had gotten out safely, but he was mistaken. As he would later learn, St. Thomas was killed in action. The last time Clarke remembered seeing him alive was when he commented on the bullet hole in his foot. Moving back, Jackson ran across a rice paddy as enemy bullets sprayed the ground around his feet. When he spotted a large ditch he jumped into it for safety and crawled up the bank. Standing no more than ten yards from him was a Korean shooting to his left. The enemy soldier did not see Jackson, who leveled down on him and squeezed off two rounds before his carbine jammed. Jackson later recalled that St. Thomas was positioned in the direction the enemy was firing; he was sure the Korean was shooting at St. Thomas.
The shower of enemy gunfire continued. During the withdrawal Clarke passed Corporal J. T. Holley, who had been hit in the back and could not move. Holley was asking Clarke to help him to cover (he refused to leave the fight) when Sergeant Boatwright was hit twice. Clarke helped Boatwright gain shelter beneath a ledge but, thinking they would regroup and counterattack, left Holley where he was. Unfortunately, they did not regroup as Clarke expected. Instead, the North Koreans moved in and executed the seriously wounded—the same way they perceived their own men had been executed at the start of the skirmish. Although Rangers are not supposed to leave their wounded behind, the CO had ordered their immediate withdrawal. On the way out, Dude Walker was providing covering fire with an M-1 rifle, yelling, “Come on out. I got you covered!” Clarke realized his error regarding Holley too late to rectify it. It was a mistake that haunted him for a long time. Had he understood the situation, they could have tried to drag Holley out against his wishes.
Up on the ridge, the Rangers regrouped and gathered some of their walking wounded. Lieutenant Bernard Pryor, 1st Platoon Leader, staggered up. He had been hit at the top of the head and blood was streaming down his face. The bullet had gone through the top of his helmet and skimmed his scalp. The Rangers tried to get him on a litter but he refused. After a few moments, he collapsed and several South Korean porters carried him to the aid station.
After they broke contact with the enemy, the Rangers began to dig in for defense. They knew the Koreans would counterattack. Clarke, who was still out of ammo for the BAR, began to empty M-1 clips to fill BAR magazines. They dug in and the fighting went on into the night as the enemy counterattacked, but Company B held the enemy off with machine gun and small arms fire.
Weathersbee, who had badly sprained an ankle during an earlier patrol, was due to be evacuated but received permission from Lieutenant Allen to stay on light duty at the aid station. When the aid station was attacked, he and others repelled the enemy. Before the attack, Robert St. Thomas, one of the Company’s cooks, had come in, loaded himself down with ammo, and yelled, “I’m going up into the mountains.” He volunteered for the mission and did not return. Once the wounded started coming in, Sergeant Teedie P. Andres moved from man to man, performing his duties as a medic. Weathersbee heard him say, “They are all dead.” One of the dead was St. Thomas.
Much later, William “the Ghost” Washington arrived at the aid station with an injury to his hand. He told Weathersbee that he had had to play dead while North Korean guerrillas stripped him of his boots and tried to cut his wedding band from his finger. As artillery shells started falling, the Ghost—true to his nickname—got up, returned to friendly lines, and made it to the aid station.
When Lieutenant Queen heard of the firefight over the radio and learned that Captain Allen was wounded, he rushed back from Company A, which never got into the fighting. Queen went to the aid station to pick up those Rangers who had been left behind or who, like Washington, had been treated and were ready to go back into combat. He also picked up all of the ammo at the aid station and took command of the company, placing the 1st Platoon on the ridge line perimeter facing east, where he had left Company A.
Wounded men such as Pryor were evacuated by helicopter, which set down about five miles from the aid station where the altitude was low enough for it to land. The less-seriously wounded were sent by ambulance to the closest MASH.
The next day, the Rangers learned that sixteen men from Company B had been killed at Majori-ri, and one wounded soldier from Company B was carried from the fighting with his guts protruding from a wound and tied to a pole, but miraculously survived his injuries. Eight Rangers were declared KIA: Corporals Richard Glover, J. T. Holley, Milton Johnson, and Lawrence Williams; PFCs Frank King, Jr., Charles Scott, and Robert St. Thomas; and Private Herman L. Rembert. Both Pryor, who was shot in the head, and Estell, whose right arm was seriously injured when a bullet shattered the bone, were removed from the area and evacuated by helicopter.
The Morning Reports made out in Division Rear and signed by Warrant Officer Junior Grade Pilgrim listed eight 2d Company Rangers among the wounded: Sergeants First Class (SFCs) Daniel Boatwright, Harold Johnson, and William Lanier; Sergeants Teedie P. Andres, Lawrence Estell, and William E. Thomas; and PFCs Legree Aikens and James R. Davis, Jr. Not included were Corporal James Fields, who was evacuated after the Majori-ri firefight with delayed frostbite, and Lieutenant Warren Allen, CO, who was seriously wounded. Allen was taken to the aid station but chose not to be evacuated. He remained at his post with the company while his wounds were treated by the company medics.
In Special Order Number 11, the 32d Infantry awarded the Combat Medical Badge to four medical aid men of the 2d Ranger Company and the Combat Infantry Badge to five officers and 108 enlisted men of 2d Ranger Company. On 16 January, the Rangers were attached to the 2/31st after just forty-eight hours with the 1/32d Infantry. As they marched out, they passed a lot of dead communists.
Many of the WACs who had traveled on the Butner with the Rangers of 2d Company, including Corporal Lorraine West, were stationed at Yokohama and would see Rangers when they were on R&R or, if wounded, at the Yokohama hospital. According to West:
The Korean Conflict became a reality when the wounded arrived. The first casualties were frostbites. There were very few WACs who were not touched by the loss of friends or loved ones. The Rangers came to Yokohama for R&R in varying shifts, so we kept in touch. It was always a reunion and it was always a good time, but they had changed. The skin was ashy, the Mohawk haircut gone, no longer sleek, the eyes dull but alert. The tone was quieter, with little or no discussion of battles. They told about the severity of the weather, the usual chow comments, the terrain, and how good it felt to have the comforts and pleasures Yokohama offered. The fatigue remained. The camaraderie remained. The pride remained. They were warriors.18
The Morning Report of 17 January relates a twelve-mile march made in four hours from Changnim-ni north to Tanyang, which has to be an error. It is unlikely we averaged three miles per hour with winter combat gear, in extreme cold vapor barrier rubber boots (called Mickey Mouse boots) while battling such cold weather. The real distance is estimated at three to five miles, which is a much more realistic movement by foot under those conditions.
The Morning Report of 19 to 20 January shows that the Company trains (Supply and Mess Sections) joined the Company at Tanyang when, in reality, they had arrived almost two weeks earlier (7 to 8 January) at Changnim-ni (aid station). By 24 January, the Company was still in Tanyang and had more non-battle casualties going into the hospital—primarily colds, pneumonia, and frostbite to hands and feet—than wounded returning. So the present-for-duty strength was soon down to seventy enlisted men. Errors and delayed entries were common in the Morning Reports because they were made out by Division Rear every day, while the report made out in the Company tactical CP was disregarded. Since Division Rear based the Morning Reports on medical admissions and discharge reports that were frequently incorrect, the Morning Reports often did not reflect the true status of the Company.
The declassified Command Report of the 32d Infantry for 29 January19 indicates that the 2d Rangers moved from attachment to the 32d to attachment to the 17th Infantry, when they moved on to Chechon. Upon reaching Chechon, Weathersbee came off quarters and rejoined the 2d Platoon, which went into the mountains with a Korean unit. Unfortunately, the South Korean unit moved out of the area during the night without notifying anyone—including the Rangers.
Many Rangers reported that soldiers were evacuated through the 144th Field Hospital for frostbite. (Being in a combat action, they were considered later to have been WIA.) This was becoming a widespread problem.
By January 1951, the 8th Army had suffered 1,791 cases of frostbite, and the 121st Evac Hospital, Youngung-Po, had handled 850 cases. The incidence rate among the troops was 34 per 1,000. It soon became necessary to open a cold injury treatment center at Osaka Army Hospital, Japan.
Black soldiers suffered more than whites, even in integrated units where the differences in motivation, training, and discipline were minimal. Lower-ranked soldiers, especially privates and privates first class, suffered beyond their proportional numbers. There were more casualties in combat units than in support units. Also, younger (eighteen to twenty-four years) soldiers appeared to be more susceptible than men over twenty-five. This may have been due to the lack of self-discipline and false beliefs. Soldiers from the warmer states were more subject to cold injury than those from the colder and northern states. The winter cold also took a heavy toll among the Chinese POWs, of whom ninety percent appeared to have varying degrees of frostbite. American footgear, the shoe-pack, didn’t provide the protection needed during active combat because use of dry, clean socks, insoles, and foot massages were impossible to carry out, either on the move or at temporary, uncertain halts for those in the foxholes.
The weather was bitterly cold, fed by the bone-wracking wind from the north that penetrated the combat clothing left over from WWII. The 7th Division at the Chosin Reservoir area treated one hundred seventy four frostbites, of which eighty-three were from the 31st Infantry. The 1/32d attached to the 31st suffered the most casualties, although only eighteen of them were unable to quickly return to combat. More than two hundred men were hospitalized by the U.S. Navy medics. A typical case of only twelve hours’ exposure might require toe amputations, closure, and grafting, with up to one hundred days’ hospitalization.
Water-soluble medicines froze; plasma had to be warmed for almost an hour to be usable. Even Colonel Chauncey E. Dovell, 8th Army Surgeon, suffered frostbitten feet while visiting the 2d Infantry Division. Senior medical officers knew the same thing had taken place during the Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944-1945, when some 46,000 Allies fell victim to the weather. The Far East Command knew of the severe Korean winters from the American Occupation Forces’ experiences in 1945-1946, but was still unprepared.
Second Company remained at about seventy percent strength present for duty during the period of 1 through 10 February. The company was in Chuch’on-ni, Korea, having arrived there via a motor march of twenty miles in six hours from Tanyang. On 11 February, the 2d got its first completely new man, Sergeant Stewart Strothers, who was neither a Ranger nor a paratrooper. An ordinary soldier who arrived via the regular Army pipeline, Strothers was originally from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and had been a pre-med or pharmacy student. The first non-jumper assigned to the unit, 2d Ranger Company made him third medic and was glad to get him because it was so under-strength.
On 6 February, a request for a spot check of Ranger performance from the Pentagon reached Eighth Army and was passed down to the appropriate division CGs. Major General Claude B. Ferenbaugh followed it up with comments regarding 2d Ranger Company on 30 July, 1951:
During this period you were faced with many difficult and daring assignments. You participated in steady, large-scale advances, tactical withdrawals followed by counter-attacks and pursuit of the enemy, and countless patrols.
You were handicapped at times by the lack of replacements for your combat losses but at the same time willingly accepted responsibilities of the missions normally assigned to an infantry rifle company with twice the number of personnel.
It as by virtue of superior leadership, unusual courage, and dogged determination on the part of each of you that you were consistently able to accomplish each mission and secure each objective with dispatch, honor and distinction.
Your outstanding cooperation, devotion to duty, aggressiveness, and esprit has been a constant source of satisfaction to me ever since I assumed command of the Division. Your departure is a distinct loss and will be felt keenly by all of us who remain.
[11 Feb 51] GAINS
Strothers Stewart ER 13259657Pvt2300 RaceN
Dtd of enl Jun 48 term of enl 3 yrs ETS Jun 51 O/S sv 11 dt elig ret
US Aug 52 asdg & jd fr 7th Repl Co 7th Inf Div APO 301 Par 33
SO 38 Hq 7th Inf Div APO 7
[18 Feb 51] RECORD OF EVENTS
Reld fr atchd 32rd RCT and atch 17th RCT departed Chechon by mtr march arrived Kum-a-ri approx 1000 hrs distance 8 miles
[20 Feb 51] GAINS
Buford, David TRA16180797Sgt5745
Asgd and jd eff 17 Feb 51 fr 7th Repl Co 7th Inf Div APO 7
Par 35 SO 34 Hq 7th Inf Div APO 7 dtd 16 Feb 51 add Info unk
RECORD OF EVENTS
Departed Kum——ri———- hrs Arrived village of Chunchon-ni 1100
Hrs Advance with 17th RCT village of Chuchon 0900 hrs
Entered village 1100 hrs slight enemy resistance 2 enemy troop killed
On 22 February, the Rangers were attached to C Battery, 49th Field Army Battalion, for its security as they advanced north together. The company departed Chuch’on-ni about 0730 hrs. in a motor march, riding on ammo trucks whenever possible. The snows were melting and the streams and rivers were flowing very rapidly. What had been a small stream only days earlier was now a raging torrent of water that presented unanticipated dangers. On the way back to the front line, when crossing onto an island in the Pyongong Ang River, Corporal James Oakley, BAR man, lost his footing in the river and was swept rapidly downstream. Men from the 2d ran downriver and tried to, but could not, catch him. Another hour was spent searching the banks downstream for about a mile, to no avail. Oakley’s body was found several days later by another unit. His loss was greatly felt, not only because he was well liked, but because his was not a combat-related death. In the midst of the dangers faced by the Rangers, it was tragic to lose a man because of the weight of the equipment he was carrying, none of which he was able to jettison into the river in time to save himself from drowning.
The battery moved on and took up a position with the remainder of the battalion and conducted its fire mission all night. The concussion from the muzzle blasts shook the squad tents so much that sleeping was almost impossible. During the setting-up and reconnaissance of the position, the Rangers found a lot of human bones that had been covered up by the snows and were only now becoming visible. They figured they were the remains of enemy civilians, because no uniforms or equipment were found.
While in this area on 24 February, the orders for Sergeant First Class James Freeman’s battlefield commission finally came through. He was now a Second Lieutenant. He had been acting as the officer leading the 1st Platoon since Lieutenant Bernard Pryor was evacuated on 14 January. The day before, 2d Lieutenant Cliette (3d Platoon leader) had been promoted to 1st Lieutenant, so appropriate insignia for 2d Lieutenant Freeman were available within the company. His parachute and glider qualifications were noted on the Morning Report. We couldn’t have too much of a promotion party because the booze that we had stashed in the company field desk was never found, and Class 6 rations (i.e., whiskey) had not started. Freeman received his promotion in the hospital.
The Morning Report for 25 February shows the following census: Asgnd–108; Duty–65; and Abs/ LD–43. About this time, Mary, Lieutenant Allen’s wife, learned of the seriousness of the wound her husband had received on 14 January at Tanyang Pass, and wrote inquiring about his condition. He wrote back to her, saying that he thought he had told her about the thirty stitches in his chest and that he was not in the hospital. Little did she yet know of her role in his survival: the prayer book she had sent him the previous December while en route to Korea had deflected the bullet that entered his chest. The book’s metal cover saved Allen’s life. He also told his wife that Major General David G. Barr, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, had made some awards to the men, and he had received a Silver Star. Reporters from Our World and Ebony had taken pictures. As always, Allen reported to her about the men, particularly that Private First Class James Allen, from Fayetteville, was now in the unit. In the aftermath of Warren’s injuries, Mary decided to begin planning their house; this would give both of them something to think about besides the war.
About the same time 2d Ranger Company received a warning order to send an advance party to Eighth Army (Rear) in Taegu. Queen took a company jeep and Weathersbee, Corporal Glen Jenkins, Jr., and two other Rangers with him. They traveled through the day because the roads were now much safer than before. According to Weathersbee, the advance party stopped at the 1st Ranger Company CP (attached to 2d Infantry Division) and learned from one of the CP guards that the unit was down to 27 men present for duty. The advance party arrived in Taegu the next day and reported into G-3, where they were housed in a dormitory-type building and learned that 4th Company, their sister unit from training days at Fort Benning, was in town.
Morning Report
[27 Feb 51] RECORD OF EVENTS
Reld atchd 17th RCT departed Chuchon by mtr march 0700 hrs Arrived Taegu 2000 hrs distance traveled approx 200 miles billeted R - R Gen Taegu Korea
The members of the Rangers’ advance party to the Eighth Army parked their truck by the PX, which was open, but they could not go inside because they were too dirty. The soldiers in the compound were very clean, but the Rangers were filthy and looked like they had been in the field for six weeks—which is exactly where they had been. An MP went into the PX and bought beer and candy for them with the money the Rangers had brought over from Japan. When Queen returned, the advance party awaited the arrival of the rest of the company.
All during the month of February, 2d Ranger Company had been operating with a company strength varying between 61 to 70 percent present for duty, with some of those sick in quarters. On 28 February, when the company was attached to the 187th ARCT, APO 301, Lieutenant Antonio “Red Horse” Anthony arrived with a group of 32 Ranger replacements. The majority of these replacements came from the 80th AAA Battalion and were well known to the men of 2d Ranger Company. Lieutenant Anthony’s red hair and large head—so large that his helmet would only fit properly if he first removed the helmet liner—gave him his nickname. Anthony had received a battlefield commission while serving with the 92d Infantry Division in Italy during World War II. He had trained these replacements as part of the 7th Ranger Company, which had been so designated in the second and third cycles but later was converted to replacement training. They did not take the special winter training at Camp Carson, Colorado, with the 3d, 5th, and 8th Companies, because there was not enough time—they were needed in Korea because 2d Ranger Company was so under strength. The Rangers who arrived as replacements included Corporals Homer Bush, John E. Nunley, Carl D. Hall, James Taylor, and Uthel Morris.
The company was billeted in squad tents in an apple orchard northwest of K-2 Airfield, Taegu, Korea. At the same time many wounded men returned from the hospital. Some of them had heard the rumors about a possible combat jump and eagerly made their way to rejoin the unit. Assigned strength was now up to 125, with 100 ready for duty. The 2d Ranger Company established and operated its own mess in the Apple Orchard marshalling area. Lieutenant Pryor returned to duty and took over as Assistant XO. Pryor’s return meant Queen could shed some of the extra duties he had been performing: handling operations, performing XO duties, and acting as administrator. Pryor was still a little woozy on his feet and, like some officers, had to ride the company trains into the forward combat area.
The food received during the billet in the orchard at K-2 was eatable. Some of the Buffalo Rangers ate so ravenously that First Sergeant Lawrence West established “The Combat Greasers Badge”—a chow hound award for the heaviest eaters. He awarded several badges, all displaying a GI mess-type spoon with a wreath around it like the CIB or CMB. Some of the awardees were Herculano “Heavy Duty” Dias, McBert “Leave Nothing” Higginbotham, and William “Greaser” Weathersbee. Between combat missions the Rangers of the 2d Company enjoyed what they had, and continued to display the camaraderie that others on the Butner had noticed during their trip across the Pacific.
The 2d Ranger Company soon had enough men to reorganize into three rifle platoons, plus a mortar section, under Lieutenant Anthony. Lieutenant Pryor took over duties as the Assistant XO and Allen was promoted to Captain on 1 March. The 5 March Morning Report finally mentioned James Fields’ 14 January evacuation after the Majori-ri firefight to Michigan Veterans’ Hospital.
The company began serious physical conditioning during its stay in the apple orchard. A guard was posted at the entrance, but the units ran up that dusty road for a couple of miles each day. During the first week of March, some of the Rangers got their hard-earned and well-deserved promotions, as follows:
[2 March 1951]
Collins, Norman, Corporal
Gordon, Andrew, Corporal
Hargrove, William, Sergeant First Class
Hodge, Roland, Corporal
Lofton, Matthew, Jr., Corporal
Company Order #3 Promotion to Private First Class (E-3) UP if AR 615-5 and SR 615-5-1:
Adams, Edward D., Private First Class
Arnold, Eugene V., Private First Class
Carrell, James E., Private First Class
Gibson, Culver V., Private First Class
Gray, Walter S., Private First Class
Hall, Carl D., Private First Class
Holland, Floyd, Private First Class
Morris, Uthel, Private First Class
Plater, James, Private First Class
Scott, Samuel, Private First Class
Strothers, Stewart, Private First Class
Taylor, James, Private First Class
Whitmore, Joseph, Private First Class
Reduced to Private (E-2): Peteress, James Jr.
[13 Mar 51] Prcht jump was made by members of the unit on 7 & 8 Mar 51, No casualties. Asgd: 125 Duty: 105
[22 Mar 51] Special Orders received from 7th ID and 187th ARCT
Andrade, Anthony, Private First Class
Alston, Marion, Sergeant
Carroll, James, Corporal
Courts, Curtis, Corporal
Higginbotham, McBert, Sergeant
Lesure, David, Corporal
Murphy, Jack, Sergeant First Class
Plater, James, Corporal
Rhodes, William, Corporal
Woodard, Isaiah, Corporal
The 187th ARCT received unqualified replacements as airborne troops, including specialists such as Captain James Miller, a surgeon from 2d Battalion. He needed to become qualified for the pending combat jump. All members of the 2d, whether cook, surgeon, or BAR man, had to be qualified paratroopers, so everyone needed the right training and certification. The regiment set up a week-long course of conditioning and practiced landings from the back of a cargo truck. The candidates made three jumps at that height and were awarded their wings. Captain Miller returned to the 187th ARCT and served with distinction in combat. Two others, Floyd Holland and Stewart Strothers, also completed the program, as announced in the Morning Report of 24 June 1950.
SO 38, 23 Hqs 187th ARCT—UP AR 600-70, Change 4, dtd 24 Jun 50…are rated qualified and awarded the Parachute Badge, having completed the modified jump course, as per VOCG.
2d RANGER CO
Holland, Floyd ER13259651 Strothers, Stewart ER33724491
[17 Mar 51] RECORD OF EVENTS
A prcht jump was made by members of this orgn on 16 Mar 1951 Two (2) EM lightly injured.
Herculano Dias Sergeant and Kirk P. Adkins Sergeant
Queen remembers only one other black replacement in addition to Doc Miller in the 187th ARCT. Sergeant First Class Menny Mosby from the 503d/80th AAA was in the S-2 (Maps) Section. Mosby later became a First Sergeant and retired as a Warrant Officer–3, in charge of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Commissary, Washington, D.C., in the early 1980s.
The Rangers of 2d Company knew the good times between combat were not going to last forever. With various materials in short supply, they indulged in some moonlight requisitioning. Sergeant John “Pop” Jones, the 2d Ranger Company’s Mess Sergeant who had volunteered for the Majori-ri attack and received the Silver Star for outstanding bravery, attested that one of the most important duties of mess personnel—beside being able to fire up the stoves and put out a hot meal within an hour—was to scrounge, beg, borrow, or steal rations. The company ordered rations, supplies, and ammo on a two- to three-day cycle through the Regimental S-4 of the unit to which it was attached; but by the time the requisitions came in, 2d Ranger Company had often moved on to another regimental attachment without its supplies. This brought on the frequent necessity for members of the company to moonlight requisition vehicles to transport their own supplies, lest they end up without any after a couple of days. The 4th Rangers had similar experiences, and had to be fed by other line units. Second Company never sent its kitchen/supply train with the attached unit’s train, but kept it up near the tactical CP, close to the 60mm mortar positions (except on the Munsan-ni jump).
Moonlight requisitioning was easy in Taegu. The area was loaded with dumb, friendly non-combat units that utilized vehicles to visit the PXs and the whores of the local “cathouses.” The occupants were careless and the Ranger units were in need of transportation—especially jeeps and larger ¾-ton trucks. The trucks were easy to steal but harder to hide, so the Rangers replaced them with more appropriate jeeps that could make it over the rough front-line trails.
Corporal William Tucker and Sergeant First Class Norman Collins couldn’t tell the difference between the American and British vehicles. A jeep is not just a jeep: the British jeep of this era had a more square shape and was slightly larger than its American counterpart. Also, the jeep that Tucker and Collins “requisitioned” had the British Union Jack insignia painted on the sides of the hood! A British MP challenged them because neither looked like Her Majesty’s soldiers. Lieutenant Freeman, who could pass for white, told the British officer to take the damn jeep and get moving. Needless to say, this avoided possible courts-martial for Tucker and Collins, who did not make that mistake again.
Garland, who drove for Allen, managed to get at least one jeep, and Corporal Glen Owens liberated two ¾-ton vehicles, which were then used as weapons carriers. Second Company had the stencils and markings ready for Master Sergeant Robert Watkins, 3d Platoon, who was a sign painter in civilian life. By the time the 2d Ranger Company returned to the front, their motor pool had grown large enough to need a Motor Corporal/Mechanic to operate. The 2d Ranger Company left Taegu with three jeeps, two weapons carriers, and two deuce- and-a-halves—a good haul of much-needed equipment and a testament to the Rangers’ ability to infiltrate and evade. Later, Sergeant Watkins also made helmet stencils that looked like parachute wings, and the 2d Rangers began to stand out among the troops in their dress.
About the second week of March, word arrived that 2d Ranger Company would jump behind the lines to capture Hill 303, overlooking Chunchon, in the central jump. It was a joint mission with 4th Company. Our DZ was on the north side of the Imjin River, about 100 yards wide but “shallow.” Queen was a little worried because we had already lost one man (Oakley) in water in what was supposed to be a small stream. He also knew from experience that any type of water landing was extremely hazardous. Once Hill 303 was captured, the Rangers were to hold it until contact (link-up) was made with the 25th Infantry Division or 1st Cavalry, which were coming up from the south. The jump, however, was called off when the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Division reached Chunchon ahead of schedule, with less resistance than anticipated.
Around 20 March, Weathersbee was told to report to Captain Anderson, 4th Company. Weathersbee and another sergeant were given a map of Chunchon and asked to make a sand table (a miniature replica of the terrain using dirt or sand and symbols representing forces) of the planned Chunchon operation (“Operation Ripper”). But when they finished, they learned the mission was cancelled. Instead, they were handed a map of Munsan-ni and told to get to work.