“If a man has a tent roof of caulked linen twelve braccia broad and twelve braccia high, he will be able to let himself fall from any great height without danger to himself.”
—Leonardo da Vinci21
The model Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) had been set up under TO&E No. 7-87, dated 17 October 1950, Department of the Army. But it is doubtful that any actual company followed the TO&E to the letter. One of the advantages a Ranger commander received was that he could organize and table the unit to fit the mission. Most of 2d Ranger Company’s missions were infantry in the attack, so this is what we sought to do.
If this was our primary mission, the disadvantage was the lack of sufficient manpower to sustain an attack for a prolonged period because of a lack of trained replacements. Second Company was forced to rely on the good graces of General Ferenbaugh, 7th Division commanding general, to draw some of the colored troops that the 2d’s commanders knew of from both the official and unofficial pipeline. The segregation policy gave 2d Ranger Company access to replacements that ordinarily would not have been available—meaning if the system actually had been open, in keeping with President Truman’s Executive Order 9981. The reality was that in those years—after the declaration of Executive Order 9981, but before the Army was in full compliance with the new ban on segregation—Army integration policy was often modified according to the interpretations of high-ranking officials who did not support desegregation.
General Edward M. Almond, commander of the X Corps, the unit to which the 2d Ranger Company was attached in Korea, was one such official. In a 1953 interview, Almond aired his views: “When you say you have to have ten percent Negroes [in the Army], you are lowering the combat efficiency of the Army.” Almond defended these opinions, which were seen as racist by the black press and others: “People think that being from the South, we don’t like Negroes. Not at all. But we understand their capabilities. And we don’t want to sit at the table with them.” When a division commander in Korea noted that whites and blacks trained together at Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, and asked Almond why he refused to mix black troops into the all-white infantry battalions, Almond continued to claim that blacks were incompetent, cowardly in combat, and so unreliable that they posed a danger to white soldiers.22
Another tactical disadvantage was that frequent movement of the unit necessitated increasing the size of the unit’s administrative augmentation force. For every man placed in an administrative role, you have to rob the line of rifle strength. Some prime examples are cited below:
—Because SCR-300s were used in the platoons, instead of a PRC-6 used by the platoon leader, messengers became radio operators.
—With no mortar and/or artillery forward observers, another SCR-300 was required to contact higher headquarters, usually at the battalion or regimental level.
—Having no assigned vehicle drivers necessitated removing Rangers from combat positions to serve as drivers. Even in combat an informal motor stable is needed for preventative and routine vehicle maintenance.
—Without a company armorer to care for the myriad of weapons and ammunition, fulfill their need for repair or replenishment, and reserve weapons in standby for special missions, these roles fell to combat personnel.
—Air-to-ground radio and the AN/GRC-9 radio (use of which was a three-man operation) were operated without specialized personnel.
—There were no Assistant Platoon Sergeants or Section Leaders.
Weaponry provided another tactical disadvantage. The most prevalent Ranger weapon was the BAR, which was used to counteract the Burp Gun (a Chinese sub-machine gun or AK-47). Second Company did not get Thompson submachine guns, which were comparable to the Burp Gun—with the exception of Lieutenants Pryor and Anthony, who had captured ones. The weight of a BAR and its ammo was more than the M-1, the standard-issue U.S. Army rifle in Korea. Contrary to the Geneva Convention, Ranger medics carried carbines. Queen frequently had to order Sergeant William E. “Rabbit” Thomas, company medic, to fall back behind the second squad so he would not get involved in the firefight before he could care for the wounded.
Ranks were not always matched to positions. A squad leader might be a Staff Sergeant or Sergeant First Class, while a good BAR man might be a Sergeant and was almost always a Corporal. A rifleman, an assistant BAR man, could be a Corporal. Constant casualties created frequent vacancies, and requests for promotion orders were rarely turned down by headquarters. The authorization of relatively high ranks in a Ranger company did cause a few problems later when the units were inactivated and the men were sent to the 187th ARCT, because of a lack of vacancies and doubt in the minds of some about their abilities. But the Rangers did not have to take a reduction to private, as the “Triple Nickelers” did after the initial cadre was trained.
The news of an impending airborne operation was an open secret because the 187th and the Rangers remained in the marshalling area adjacent to the Taegu Airfield (K-2) for almost three weeks, from 27 February to 23 March 1950. The Rangers who were hospitalized in Japan and Korea also guessed as much because many of the doctors discharged them early. Rumors spread by a slip of the tongue through the troops and the local civilians involved in the preparations. Lieutenant Cliette reported back to duty on 3 March, three days after the unit arrived in Taegu, after he had been hospitalized on 20 February and promoted to 1st Lieutenant on 23 February. Returning from the hospital via troop train to 2d Ranger Company, Cliette reported that the military police riding on the trains received word to have all 187th Paratroopers and Rangers unload and get on the first available transportation to Taegu.
In addition to the replacements Lieutenant Anthony brought from CONUS, the 2d had returnees from several other hospitals, including Rangers George Rankins, Clinton Cleveland, Jude P. St. Martin, Herman C. Jackson, Anthony Andrade, Charles O. Lewis, Edward L. Posey, Edward D. Adams, Harold Johnson, Roland Hodge, Smead H. Robertson, and Robert S. Gray, as well as Craig Paulding and Wheeler S. Small, Jr., who had been wounded at Majori-ri but talked their way into an early release from the hospital after hearing the rumor of an upcoming combat jump. This would be the first combat jump ever made by U.S. Rangers and by all-black troops.
The tents in the marshalling area were lined up to form a company street, among the remnants of the apple orchard. Except for keeping the units within the orchard, there was no attempt at camouflage because the North Korean “Bed Check Charlie” aircraft had not gone any farther south than Seoul. The U.S. Air Force had established air superiority, and there were elements of the 80th AAA Battalion from 82d A/B Division around the airfield, as well as Eighth Army (Rear) in Taegu.
Weathersbee recalled that one day when the unit went out for a practice jump, he saw Ted Williams, the famous baseball player for the Boston Red Sox. Williams, a reserve aviator, had been recalled to active duty as a major in the Marine Corps, and his unit was flying a mission out of K-2 airfield. Weathersbee went over to say hello and shake his hand. While there he also saw Captain Forrest Walker, formerly 3d Battalion, 505th, who was being rotated to the States from the 2d ID. Captain Walker had served with distinction and been awarded the Silver Star by General Ridgway, although the award had been ordered stopped by General Almond, and Walker was reassigned to the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry.23 Men like Weathersbee admired Walker for leading Company E, 9th Infantry Regiment, in the mid-January recapture of Wonju, on the central front. The fact that prejudice had kept Walker’s well-earned Silver Star from him only made him more of a hero.
While Weathersbee worked on a sand table for the Munsan-ni drop (part of Operation Courageous) with a Sergeant First Class from 4th Company, the Rangers established a separate sand table because it was well known that the RCT table would be very busy with briefings. Besides, everyone was utilizing the talents found in their own units. The jump, part of Operation Tomahawk (23 March), would be at Munsan-ni, about twenty-four miles northwest of Seoul. Operation Tomahawk was the Eighth Army’s new plan that, it was hoped, would cause a panicked withdrawal by the enemy. Operation Killer (21 February to 7 March) had failed to accomplish a rapid enemy movement, but after Seoul fell to UN forces during Operation Ripper (7 March to 31 March), the Chinese were pulling back. The 187th was to drop twenty-five miles northwest of Seoul and an armored column was to link up with it there. The ground unit would be Task Force Growden, led by the 6th Tank Battalion, 24th ID, with artillery and infantry. The 2d and 4th Company Rangers were attached to the 187th and both would participate in the jump. Second Company would be distinguished by yellow chutes with yellow strips, and 4th Company by yellow chutes with red strips.
Operations Order 1 from the 187th RCT detailed the jump for 23 March 1951 at 0900 hours. The drop altitude was approximately 900 feet. The plan assumed that the paratrooper drop, followed by a linkup with U.N. forces from the south and east, would cut off enemy units defending the approaches to Munsan-ni. There was only one main road leading northwest from Seoul, and that road passed through Munsan-ni. Escape or withdrawal routes from Munsan-ni required ferry and ford crossings of the Imjin River. Taking control of Munsan-ni would destroy the enemy’s supply and communications routes from Kaesong to Munsan-ni and then southeast to Seoul. Second Company’s mission was to seize and hold Hill 151 until control of the hill could be passed to the 187th’s 2d Battalion.
The evening before the jump, the men of 2d Ranger Company went down to the airfield and fitted their chutes. The chutes were loaded onto the planes so they would stay dry, protected from any early morning dew. Each Ranger packed a duffle bag and a light combat pack with two days of C-rations, poncho, a 60-mm mortar round, and extra socks. No one carried a sleeping bag, but all had field jackets and a sweater or long-john top for chilly nights. Nearly everyone carried two hand grenades, one or two bandoleers of ammo, jump knives, and pistols. The leaders had flashlights and binoculars. Queen had the company telephone, an EE-8, and the air/color panel, along with a blanket fashioned and sewn like a Mexican serape that enabled him to sleep with his weapons-hands covered, but free to operate his M-1 without delay. Everyone carried toilet paper in more than one location.
That evening, the company had a regular dinner, but it was a quiet night in which no one went over to the airbase to visit any of the clubs. Many stayed up late to write a last-minute letter home and check weapons. The bundles for the mortars and the light machine guns were packed and the chutes fitted and marked. Some Rangers attended a church service.
The men of 2d Ranger Company got up early the next morning—which also happened to be Good Friday. Sergeant Parks, Mess Sergeant, had some scrambled eggs, pancakes, and fresh (reconstituted) milk ready for the Rangers: a hearty breakfast, but definitely not a condemned man’s meal of steak, potatoes, and wine. Second Company’s men repeated the chant “Buffalo—Rangers!” as they marched to the airfield and located the C-46s that would fly them to the drop zone (DZ). They packed their bundles and marked them with blue ribbon, because the yellow strips the 2d had been ordered to use were not available. The colored strips made it easier for the Rangers to know which bundles to look for when they hit the ground, and perhaps to recognize and locate them quickly.
After a shout of “Buffalo” the Rangers boarded their respective aircraft and started chuting up. The C-46 was a good plane to jump from because it had two doors and a slow speed for jumping. The flight crew was a National Guard unit that had been called to active duty. Before boarding, Allen called the unit together for a moment of silent prayer. Dias didn’t have an appropriate jump-type chin strap for his helmet, so he tore up a bandoleer to make a chin strap. Even so, he lost his helmet in the “opening shock” and hit the ground without it. Over in the 1st Platoon aircraft, Allen was the jumpmaster. Lieutenant Freeman, platoon leader, was in one door of the C-46 and Corporal “Pretty Willie” Coleman, his radio operator, was in the other. Corporal Joe Wells and Corporal Cleaven McBride jumped with some of the 187th Headquarters and Headquarters Company men assigned to jump in one of the 2d Ranger aircraft. According to Dias, 4th Company Rangers A. B. Smith from Vidor, Texas, and Al Koop of Enid, Okalahoma, jumped with the 2d Ranger Company’s 1st Platoon because their aircraft was out of space.