Native American Private First Class William Van Dunk, a medic from 2d Platoon, was killed while clearing the forward slopes of the objective. He was one of the replacements brought over by Anthony in early March. Van Dunk was one of the first men on the objective when he was hit in the left hip/buttock. This was his first combat action, and it seems he got too excited. He was out in front of everyone else. Shock set in when he found out he was unable to move. His comrades only saw a small wound, but the bullet may have traveled up and hit his spine and caused internal bleeding. Van Dunk died on Hill 151 in less than ten minutes.
It all happened before the Rangers could do anything or get him down to the aid station or the Indian MASH unit. A silent wave went through the Buffalo ranks; one of their new men had been killed so suddenly and by such a seemingly small wound. Van Dunk’s death hung like a cloud over the Buffalo Rangers. His handsome, pale face, with chiseled features that reminded you of a movie star, was suddenly silent. Who had ever seen a first-time-in-combat-medic leading a Ranger attack? It was a sight to behold.
The Buffalo Rangers must have been one of the first units to take prisoners. Sergeant West was directing traffic in the company assembly area. As the company topped the first ridge and captured the heavy machine gun overlooking the DZ, several prisoners were taken there. Freeman, 1st Platoon, assigned Weathersbee to take them back to the edge of the DZ and deliver them to the prisoner of war (POW) compound, an open-air jail where captured enemy were collected and quickly interrogated by intelligence personnel for useful information. Weathersbee had four POWs when he started toward the POW cage. Corporal William Tucker, another Ranger from 2d Ranger Company, was in front of Weathersbee on the road guiding three more prisoners. Tucker stopped, waited until Weathersbee reached his position, and said, “You have more than I have.” With that he walked away and left his three prisoners, one of whom was wounded and being carried by the other two. Weathersbee now had eight POWs to escort to the compound. He had all of them take turns carrying the wounded prisoner, but by the time they reached the POW compound the wounded prisoner was dead.
A major at the compound looked at Weathersbee and exclaimed, “This SOB is dead! Why are you bringing me a stiff? You should throw him in a ditch or something.” The Major was acting as if Weathersbee was the enemy. Weathersbee’s thoughts flashed back to Tanyang Pass, when Jenkins had encountered enemy soldiers playing dead. Intelligence School had taught him that wounded or frightened prisoners were good sources of information, and the Major’s attitude made him angry.
Tucker, who was the second Ranger to share the prisoner escort duty, said that he saw the 187th Engineers using bulldozers to dig a trench. They were putting up barbed wire around a compound cage with concertina-type barbed wire strung out by the military police and the engineers. The engineers had dropped some heavy equipment on the first day in anticipation of taking prisoners.
On his way back to the unit Weathersbee met up with Pop Jones, who had three more prisoners. Jones told him that Van Dunk had been hit. The company was assaulting Hill 151 when Weathersbee rejoined it. When he spotted Van Dunk’s body, he looked it over to see where he had been shot, but didn’t see any blood. Machine guns were firing over the heads of the Rangers as they walked up the hill yelling “Buffalo!” Weathersbee rejoined his platoon.
After taking the hill, the company was subjected to some high-velocity artillery shelling, as if it was coming from a self-propelled or anti-tank gun across the river. There was no sign of the gun’s muzzle flash or smoke. It seemed to be hidden in a fold of a roadway running between two hills. It either was firing from partial defilade or firing and moving back into defilade after each shot. The shells skimmed the top of Hill 151 and landed on the DZ in the rear. Weathersbee later heard these shells inflicted some casualties among the gun crews set up in that area. The riggers had to scramble because they were still collecting parachutes and other equipment from the DZ.
Weathersbee’s platoon also received some sniper and small arms fire from across the river. Bullets whined overhead, just like in old cowboy movies. The Company Observation Post (OP) was right up in the front lines where the Imjin River and a small village on the north side of Hill 151 could be watched from the prone position. Boatwright was standing up near the Company OP when he was hit in the hand by sniper fire—anyone standing up would draw sniper fire. Queen rushed to Boatwright and offered him a cigarette to calm his nerves. Boatwright later teased Queen about the incident, because he thought Queen had seen too many John Wayne movies, where the hero takes a drag on a cigarette before immediately heading back into the thick of battle. Robertson was also wounded about the same time. A bullet bounced off the pistol in his shoulder holster and knocked him down. When he stood up, an artillery shell exploded next to him. The force of the blast picked him up and threw him to the ground. He never returned to duty with the unit. When some of the Rangers visited him in the 4th Evac Hospital, he still couldn’t hear too well.
Jackson, in the Mortar Section, recalled what he witnessed just before the company made the final assault on Hill 151:
We received a barrage of five or six artillery rounds. Suddenly, it stopped! I saw this big cloud of dust in the direction of Seoul. That cloud of dust was the movement of armor. Tanks breaking through, coming to our DZ, linking up with the paratroopers. These were our tanks that were breaking through the enemy lines, giving us some support and relief. The enemy shifted their fire from us, the 2d Rangers, to the tanks. The tanks were breaking through. We moved the mortars to the top of Hill 151 and dug in for the night.
After Hill 151 was captured, the three platoons held a line along the crest of the hill, from right to left as follows: Company CP on the right, 2d Platoon in the center, and 3d Platoon on the left, with the mortars in the center about fifty yards behind the CP. (See Sketch C.) When Queen realized that 4th Company had not been able to seize Hill 205, he suggested to Allen that 2d Ranger Company get permission to attack the enemy facing 4th Company from their left flank. 2d Ranger Company, however, was attached to 2/187th, while 4th Company was attached to 3/187th. Allen didn’t act on Queen’s request because neither Regiment nor Battalion had requested any other information or action since the “Buffalos” had reported the capture of their objective.
Later in the afternoon, after the “Buffalos” began to dig slit trenches, Queen led a small patrol down to locate the 2/187th CP and get some LMG and 60 mortar ammo; but none was available. Queen saw Captain James (“Doc”) Miller, the only black officer assigned to the 187th, at the aid station and he asked Miller to send a litter jeep up the next morning to collect Van Dunk’s body. Miller had gone through a week’s jump training in the Taegu marshalling area, and the Munsan-ni combat jump was only his fourth one.
Queen also went to check with the Commo Officer and S-3 to see if a phone line was to be laid to the Company CP, because he had jumped with the EE-8 telephone for the hook-up. He offered to guide the wire team to the CP, if needed. But he did not receive a response and there seemed to be no specific plan, so he headed back to the CP on Hill 151. Most of the company was dug in by the time he arrived. The CP area was too crowded, so Queen found an abandoned enemy hole about twenty-five yards down the hill, between the CP, OP, and the mortars. He didn’t like the position at all. He would have to remain awake all night, or take the chance of being killed or maybe left out should any heavy action take place during the night hours. Queen carved the hole a little longer and put a seat in it. He made good use of his light pack and the Mexican fashioned blanket, for nodding off during the chilly night.
Sergeant Alston, the Commo Chief, had laid wire to all of the platoon CPs utilizing some company wire supplemented by abandoned enemy wire found on the hill. Each platoon carried a sound-powered telephone for this purpose, and all were hooked into the Company CP on a common circuit. The Ranger on radio watch would also man the phone. A whistle or a click using a battery would alert the operator on duty.
That day, the Good Lord had blessed the Buffalo Rangers in the Munsan-ni action:
—They made history as the first all-black Airborne Ranger unit to make a combat jump. The Buffalo Rangers demonstrated the great potential of black troopers. The 555th Parachute Battalion, America’s first all-black troopers, were not committed to combat in World War II because some doubt existed in the minds of the highest-ranking military officers about the black serviceman’s fighting ability and performance. Black volunteers during the Battle of the Bulge were overlooked. The time for the black soldier to prove himself didn’t come again until Korea;
—They had not taken heavy casualties, as they had at Tanyang Pass;
—Within the first 30 minutes, sixty percent of the unit was in the assembly area, and 1st Sergeant West was already taking aggressive action;
—The Buffalos were able to execute their mission within two hours after “un-assing” their aircraft;
—They were the first unit to capture their objective—Hill 151.
[23 Mar 1951] RECORD OF EVENTS SECTION
Departed Taegu Korea by plane 0750 hrs.
Destination Munsan-ni Korea.
Prcht jump on Munsan-ni made 0915 hrs.
1 EM killed in action.
2 EM wounded in action 2 EM lightly injured in action.
Mission accomplished. Morale of troops excellent.
In a letter to his wife dated 31 March, Allen wrote the following:
By now you will have read where the 187th and Ranger companies made a jump behind the enemy. The 2d Rangers were a part of the operation. It marks the first time in history that a Negro unit has made a combat jump. For the entire period that we were engaged, our casualty rate for the Company was one KIA and four others wounded slightly.
During the night, the enemy did not attempt to infiltrate 2d Ranger Company positions. About 2300 hours, submachine gun fire was heard in the right rear of the company position, down near the 2/187th CP. Flare shells were fired by the mortars and artillery units during the night. C-47 aircraft flew over the surrounding area and dropped huge flares. The moon was out and shining brightly, and the visibility was about 100 yards in our company sector. The temperature dropped steadily during the night, and Queen wished that he had brought the wool insert of a summer sleeping bag instead of his blanket. But he still would have been afraid to zip it up, lest he be unable to get out of it fast enough (plus, he wouldn’t be able to keep his rifle in hand inside a sleeping bag).
At first light, about one hour before sunrise, some squad-sized, small fires were built on the reverse slope of the hill to warm the assault rations. The enemy didn’t attack or fire on our positions until about 0830 hours.
Since the litter jeep didn’t come at daybreak on 24 March, Queen gathered a carrying party to take Van Dunk’s body to the aid station. At the same time search parties searched from the mortar position to the DZ for stragglers, ammo, and equipment. It was estimated that 2d Ranger Company had killed thirty enemy soldiers, wounded ten, and captured sixty on 23 March.
The enemy apparently had an OP on the opposite side of the Imjin River on Hill 191. However, his guns, either 75mm or 105mm, were masked or his observation limited to such a degree that he could not place fire directly on our position. The shells, which flew about ten feet overhead and sounded like a small freight train, hit back in the DZ area.
At 1300 hours, 2d Ranger Company was notified that it would be relieved of its position by the 1st ROK Division before 1800 hours. Queen remained in position with a covering squad from each platoon while Allen took the remainder of the company to report to 2/187th CP. About 1400 hours, Queen made a mistake and withdrew the remainder of the company, which was serving as the covering force. His orders, however, were “to remain in position until relieved,” so Queen had to return to Hill 151 with his men. While they waited for the South Korean soldiers to relieve them, the Rangers tested their rifles by firing at some ruins on the road along the Imjin. Queen, meanwhile, settled down inside his foxhole where, under slightly cloudy skies, he caught up on his sleep. About 1700 hours, when no relief column had arrived, Queen got a call from a messenger to hurry along and rejoin the company.
Queen reached the DZ road, where he met up with the remainder of the company. They had mounted the tanks of “C” Company, 6th Tank Battalion. The orders were to push twenty-six miles east to try to cut off a division of Chinese. There was one squad on each tank. By 2400 hours, the Rangers had moved only about six miles. The roads were too narrow and the tanks were unable to proceed. The company was ordered to remain with the tanks and protect them from infiltration by enemy infantry.
Meanwhile, the rest of the RCT had passed on. They had cows pulling carts, as well as Koreans and POWs helping to carry the equipment. It was reminiscent of the good old American ingenuity that the 82d A/B had used on its jump into Sicily during World War II, overcoming the lack of transport by confiscating and requisitioning all available farm animals, especially the small, stubborn, but hardy Italian donkeys.
Queen slept on the back deck of one of the cold tanks. The rear deck of a tank is a very warm place to sleep as long as those twin gas or diesel engines are running. Once the engines stopped in Korea, however, it got as cold as the South Pole. Queen didn’t seem to mind. The men were sent out about fifty yards to the flanks of the tank column to provide security against an enemy ambush or infiltration. They didn’t unroll their packs because no one knew when the word to move out would come down.
The 2d Ranger Company left the 6th Battalion tanks in place at daybreak on 25 March to join the remainder of the RCT. It started to rain pretty heavily. The Rangers caught a ride on some artillery trucks. They only made it about one mile before the trucks began to bog down in the muddy road, which was more like an unimproved wagon trail than anything else. They took off on foot again and marched to the village of Sinchon, where they arrived about 1200 hours. The 2d Ranger Company took up a position south of town on ridges overlooking the village of Chana-don, with the mission of guarding the RCT’s right flank and looking for a relief tank battalion coming from the south that would be its next link-up. Queen received some different colored flares that he gave to Wilburn, as the 2d Platoon was deployed forward. These flares were to be used for identification purposes and to mark front line positions. The Rangers settled into some old enemy foxholes and began preparing a meal using the last of the two days’ worth of C-rations.
The company CP was established in a hole about 4’ x 4’ x 4’, with a foxhole type entrance. It would have been a good hole for two men, but there were now five in the CP group: Captain Allen, Queen, Lawrence “Top Kick” West, Alston (Commo), and “Doc Rabbit” Thomas, medic. In addition to the packs and weapons, there were two SCR-300 radios (one SCR-300 radio was on the RCT operations net and the other was on the company command net), with EE-8 and sound-powered telephones as well.
The Rangers received more fuel for fires from the village, but their fires were soon doused because of the rain and for security reasons. Cliette’s 3d Platoon was on the left, Willie Coleman’s 2d Platoon in the front and forward, and Freeman’s 1st Platoon held the right. Anthony had the mortars around the CP. To the rear of 2d Ranger Company were the Indian MASH hospital and the RCT CP. Farther to the rear were the 4th Ranger Company and the RCT Security Platoon, which provided local security to the RCT Headquarters Company. Later in the evening Queen went to the RCT CP to try to get some fresh batteries for the SCR-300 radios and a telephone line to the CP. The helicopters were coming in during the rain to evacuate the wounded. Coleman’s platoon tried to get all of the people out of the village, but they wouldn’t move until one of Anthony’s mortar rounds, with which he was plotting nighttime concentrations, fell short within the village. Then everyone “got hat” and left in a hurry. During the afternoon and night no enemy contact was made.
Second Company remained in reserve until about 1000 hours on 26 March, when it was attached to the 3d Battalion. The battalion had orders to attack to the east. Queen stayed back with the 2d Platoon and a mortar squad to guard the aid station and wait for the tanks. The armor came through about 1500 hours. There were only about six tanks; the rest had been knocked out by mines or had developed mechanical failures. The aid station moved east while Queen and the 2d Platoon moved on the tanks. This group caught up with Captain Allen and the rest of the company about 1730 hours. Allen had skirted the right flank of the RCT and gone on a separate mission to contact the 64th Tank Battalion, 3d Infantry Division. The contact was made, and Allen would later tell Queen that he was never so glad to see anyone as he was to see the 3d ID.
The company advanced as far south as the Sam-chan River Bridge. About 1830 hours, just as it was getting dark, Allen ordered Queen to take Wilburn’s 2d Platoon to a hill he pointed out on the horizon, and ordered him to dig in there facing northwest. Queen was told that once he had his men in position, he was to move along the ridge line to the southwest until he met back up with Allen, who would give him further instructions at that time. Queen wanted to know more about the mission and the disposition of the other units, but Allen was adamant: “Hurry up and get them the hell into position!” Wilburn and Queen took off with nothing in mind except getting to the hill. It was already dusk and they wanted to be in position before it got completely dark.
The 2d Platoon advanced through a small village that was all boarded up. It looked as if everyone had gone on vacation. It took a short but steep climb to reach the top of the hill. Everyone was glad they did not have to fight for the high ground that night. Later, Wilburn remarked that he had seen some people running off the hill, but didn’t say anything at the time. When they reached the hilltop, the Rangers didn’t find any holes or abandoned equipment. The platoon spread out thinly and began to dig in. The soil was sandy and easy to excavate. Company CP was much farther away than anticipated, and Queen couldn’t find Allen—but he could raise him on the radio. He notified Allen that he would remain with Wilburn’s platoon for the rest of the night; even though there was a full moon, it was completely dark by this time. Queen, Wilburn, and radio operator Willie Coleman crowded together into a single hole. Little did Queen know that his night was just beginning.
After a short time, Wilburn and Queen decided to walk down the line to Freeman’s platoon, which was quite a distance away, to try to figure out what was happening. They soon discovered that Freeman didn’t know any more about the tactical situation than they did. He had no idea where the remainder of the company was, but he had received instructions over the radio to send a squad and contact Anthony’s mortars. When Freeman asked Queen to take Hargrove’s squad to the mortar position Queen, who had been hoping to find Allen and get a situation briefing, reluctantly agreed.
It took about an hour of struggling through the woods and calling “Buffalo” before they finally found Andrade, who led them to Anthony’s platoon CP. “Red Horse” didn’t know anything either, and he pointed to Cliette’s position, which seemed to be about another mile away! It was about 2200 hours before Queen returned to Wilburn’s position. A radio message from Allen was waiting for him: he would meet Queen the next morning.
About 2300 hours, a harassing and interdicting white phosphorus shell hit behind 2d Platoon’s CP, but no one was hurt. It was not until later that the Rangers learned that one of the battalions had had to evacuate a position after taking it during daylight hours. The unit had to make a night attack and retake it without additional assistance. A hell of a firefight broke out in front of the 2d Platoon that lasted about three hours. With the drama and exhaustion of the day behind him, a frustrated Queen finally sacked out with Wilburn and Plater in what appeared to be an abandoned winter wheat field.
On 27 March, the company was attached to the 1/187th at 0900 hours. Queen left 2d Platoon and moved down the hill and finally located the Company CP in a hut on the edge of the village facing a huge field of green rice or wheat. The large field consisted of about five acres, with growth more than two feet tall. Queen was still angry at Allen’s failure to meet him the night before. However, a hot cup of chocolate from First Sergeant West smoothed over the situation. At 1000 hours, the unit moved into a reserve position on the left flank of Hill 148, west of the Sinchon River. About 1400 hours, the Rangers crossed the river and joined Company C, 64th Tank Battalion. The area along the river bank was being shelled by what appeared to be a 75mm self-propelled gun off to the north. No one was hurt crossing the river, and contact was made with the tanks.
The harmless shelling continued intermittently for approximately thirty minutes. Farther south, about one-half mile down river, the engineers and P&A (Pioneer and Ammunition) Platoon built a ford for vehicles. The tank-infantry team moved forward to occupy a circular defense, with the Rangers dug in between the tanks. Friendly artillery fire was plotted in and around the team’s position. No contact was made with the enemy during the remainder of the day or during that night. The tank-infantry team was the all-black 758th Tank Battalion from the 82d A/B Division. The battalion had moved first to Texas, and then Georgia, and was redesignated the 64th Tank Battalion. Company C was commanded by Captain “Acie” McLain, with whom Captain Allen and Queen had served at Fort McClellan, Alabama, in late 1945. The Buffalo Rangers recognized, greeted, and visited briefly with many old friends from Bragg.
The company occupied its position on Hill 125 throughout 28 March, where it was reinforced by the 4th Ranger Company about 1300 hours. The 1/187th launched an attack just as the 4th Company moved into the line. The Rangers of 2d Company were ordered to hold their position until the small knob to the north was captured by 4th Company. The tanks supported the attack on Hill 507 by the 1/187th. The 4th Company, minus tank support and the 2d Ranger Company’s mortars, attacked and captured Hill 279 at 1500 hours. The 4th Company had only two platoons with it at the time because others had been split off for different missions. The battle was short but well fought by 4th Company. A 4th Company BAR man seemed to spark the attack. The enemy grimly held on to the reverse slope of the hill, showering the assaulting platoon with hand grenades. Jackson, of the mortar section, recalled the fire support missions and remarked, “I remember 4th Company attacking this mountain top; it was full of Chinese. It appeared as if every Chinaman in Korea threw grenades at them. And, after they threw the grenades, they ran like mad!”
According to Queen, it was a spectacular fight of platoon-sized units. Lieutenant Waterbury, platoon leader, was wounded several times but continued fighting until the hill was captured. Queen talked with Waterbury as he was on his way to the aid station in the rear. He was grinning about winning the Purple Heart. The entire unit was in high spirits, as they had been itching for a fight after having been misused as CP guards for so long.
The Buffalo Rangers moved into battalion reserve on Hill 148 east of the Sinchon River at 1700 hours. The company had hardly started to dig in when a blinding rainstorm blew up, forcing everyone to the nearest hole for cover. Queen slept in the sitting position in a half-dug cave with Lieutenant Chum and Lieutenant Kim, two Korean officers who were serving as interpreters. Chum seemed pretty unhappy because officers had to dig foxholes in the American Army. He was unhappy in 2d Ranger Company in general, and sought to rejoin 4th Company when it returned to Taegu. Two prisoners were taken during that day’s action, but no further contact was made with the enemy.
On 29 March, the Buffalo Rangers continued holding their position on Hill 148. At 1130 hours, Company A, 7th Infantry, 3d ID, passed through the company position to attack to the north. Officially relieved, 2d Ranger Company assembled within the 1/187th vicinity. All assembled personnel were moved quickly by trucks at 1330 hours. The RCT was officially relieved by the 3d Division at the same time.
The exact date, time, and place that the RCT company trains linked up and entered the air head are not shown on the Morning Report. No one remembers them physically being available until the 187th RCT was relieved and started the motor march back to Taegu. The men in 4th Ranger Company constantly complained about the lack of food, so 2d Rangers must have been in the same condition or had resorted to more “moonlight requisitioning.” On 26 March, First Sergeant Way of the 4th Ranger Company wrote in his diary, “Road march to Hill 146. Company getting just a bit hungry.”
[29 Mar 1951] RECORDS OF EVENTS
Departed the Village of Sinchon Korea about 1430 hours
29 Mar 51 by mtr march Arrived in Suwon Korea about
2000 29 Mar 51 trp psn were relieved by element of the 3rd
Inf Div Morale of troops excellent
Asgnd: 113Present for Dy: 105 Sick: 1Hosp: 6KIA: 1
[30 Mar 1951] RECORDS OF EVENTS
Departed Suwon Korea approximately 1100 hours 30 Mar 51
Arrived in Taegu Korea approx 0530 hours 31 March 51 Morale of troops excellent
The 4th Rangers, after relief, started back to Taegu via truck and rail. The 187th RCT returned to Taegu in army service. The 2d Rangers arrived back in Taegu about 0530 hours on Saturday, 31 March 1951. Sergeants David T. Buford and Herculano Dias were admitted to the hospital. Corporal Donald L. Felder was admitted to the hospital but would return to duty on 3 April. Corporal John W. Gould was assigned and joined from the 187th ARCT. Sergeant John “Pop” Jones was admitted to the hospital on 2 April and would not return.
In the Aftermath of the Historic Jump—Racial Booby Trap or Act of Sabotage?
[4 April 1951] Morning Report
RECORD OF EVENTS
Reld fr atch 187th RCT atchd 7th Inf Div Ltr TWX Eighth US Army (EUSAK) dtd 28 Mar 51 Departed Taegu Korea by rail at 1030 hrs arrived Andong, Korea 2400 hrs distance traveled approx 80 miles.
The 2d Ranger Company now had seven officers and ninety-five enlisted men available for duty. It continued northward, departing Andong about 0100 hours on Thursday, 5 April, and arrived at Chunchon at 1000 hours. The distance traveled was approximately seventy-five miles. The Buffalo Rangers billeted and rationed with the Netherlands (Dutch) Battalion that had been attached to the 38th Infantry, 2d ID, since December 1950 because of the division’s heavy losses.
The Buffalos reached the 7th Infantry Division Replacement Company at Chechon-ni and picked up fifty-two “leg replacements” on temporary duty for two weeks of training for possible formation of another Ranger company (or battalion). These men were a big, big surprise to everyone. The company strength for duty suddenly shot up by fifty percent (from 103 to 155). The two weeks of training were recorded on the Morning Report, but Special Order 96 stated that these men were assigned “for an indefinite period for training.”26
There were many suspicious thoughts about this surprise, as the regular wartime planned replacement system was just beginning to function and furnish timely replacements to the 8th Army. First, only the Negro replacements to the 7th Division were sent to 2d Ranger Company. Second, there was no advance notice of these replacements. Third, their military occupational skills (MOS) were extremely varied, including infantry, artillery, drivers, mechanics, and cooks. Fourth, they were neither airborne-nor ranger-qualified soldiers, nor were they volunteers for the same. Finally, they remained assigned to their regular units, but were on temporary duty “for training”—after having just completed thirteen weeks basic and advanced training.
The area around Chechen was chosen for billeting and training. At the same time, 2d Ranger Company also received a few triple volunteers or shove-outs from the 187th ARCT; these, too, were not expected. They were airborne- qualified but had not gone through Ranger training. The 187th ARCT already had a few Negro paratroopers and at least one black officer, Captain James Miller, 2d Battalion Surgeon. The question discussed among the veteran Rangers was whether these guys were quitters or eight balls.27
Terrell, John Jr.RA13348307 PfcMOS: 7475
Vails, Robert A. Jr.RA12327222 PfcMOS:7475
On 12 April, the company received another 113 Negro EM for training purposes. The company strength was now up to 269. These replacements were not only more infantrymen and artillerymen, but also included combat engineers, ordnance men, artillerymen, military police, quartermasters, and even a bandsman (a trumpeter who brought his personal instrument with him). On 16 April, another 78 EM were attached for training, so the company’s nominally authorized strength was now assigned. This group also included more infantry, engineers, ordnance, and a bandsman. Second Company was very glad to get the bandsman and taught him the American and Chinese bugle calls. He imitated Chinese bugle calls during combat training, and was used to jazz up the Buffaloes’ walking fire-attack. Throughout April, as fast as more black replacements were received, they were sent to the Buffalo Rangers. By the 23d of the month, the Company had 404 enlisted men. Numerically speaking, this strength easily constituted enough manpower to form nearly three companies (except for the lack of officers).
Within the Buffalo ranks everyone felt that General Ferenbaugh was a pretty straight shooter and fair in his reports about the unit’s service and combat performances. There were no records of courts martial, AWOLs, or poor performances under fire. On 6 February, he had reported that 2d Ranger Company was performing its assigned missions although at only sixty-one percent authorized strength, and praised its members for their specialized training and high esprit de corps. What Ferenbaugh didn’t know was the burning desire of the Buffalo Rangers to erase the myth—particularly among officers from the South—about black troops being unable and unwilling to fight except under white leadership. These feelings were directed primarily at General Almond, who had always blamed and castigated his black personnel for the World War II failures of the 92d ID in Italy.
At this time the Buffalo Rangers did not know that an evaluation and review was being performed by then-Lieutenant General Ridgway. The general had reached the conclusion that the expectations of Ranger companies to conduct long-range penetrations and raids on hostile installations were highly unrealistic. He believed that using Rangers in this manner was beyond their capabilities and invited their destruction. When Ridgway succeeded MacArthur as Far East Commander, he passed his views on to Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, who assumed command of the Eighth Army in mid-April 1951. Van Fleet ordered his G-3, Brigadier General Gilman C. Mudgett, to carefully survey and report on the Ranger situation. Within a month, General Mudgett reported the “conclusion that a Ranger battalion at Army level would meet with general approval.”28
Concerned about the employment of the Ranger companies under divisional control, Colonel Van Houten sent Lieutenant Colonel James Y. Adams to Korea as an observer of Ranger activities. Van Houten felt that each of the six companies was being deployed in a variety of what he considered faulty ways. In a personal letter to Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Van Houten expressed his concern about forming the companies into a provisional battalion under 8th Army control and attached to the 187th ARCT for operations, training, and logistical support.29 Ranger units should not be placed under the 187th ARCT’s operational control, he argued, because they would likely become just another airborne infantry battalion because the 187th was in need of replacements. Van Houten insisted that Rangers could still accomplish the missions visualized by General J. Lawton Collins if they were an independent unit under the control of Eighth Army.
On 12 May, one month after assuming the Far East Command, Ridgway reached the conclusion that too much attention had been placed on airborne missions. Van Houten submitted a draft TO&E for the Ranger battalion, a proposal he wrote to the Department of Defense in Washington to provide several recommendations about the Army’s racial situation involving the complex and touchy issue of black soldiers in the Eighth Army. Ridgway felt that the 24th Infantry Regiment should be deactivated and replaced with the 14th Infantry. The black personnel of the 24th would be integrated into other units on an individual-MOS basis. Ridgway concluded that the members of the other black units, the 3/9 (2d ID), the 3/15 (3d ID), and the 64th Tank Battalion, should be integrated with white personnel. Finally, Ridgway also moved to integrate the service units, as well as the 40th and 45th National Guard Divisions being deployed to Japan.
Ridgway took the high moral ground that it was un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught and subjugated in the manner we were. Plus, the change might ensure an esprit de corps that a fighting army needed. Ridgway’s idea was neither foreign nor a complete surprise to the Pentagon high command. Two other Army studies of blacks in Korea had recommended the same thing. The top leaders, Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe, G-1, and Taylor, G-3, also had endorsed and favored this “full” desegregation move. However, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace’s advice was to move slowly and carefully. Once the complete desegregation gate was opened, he cautioned, it would be harder to retreat should it not be fully successful. Only General Wade H. Haislip, in the Department of the Army, strongly opposed it.
Word soon spread via rumors within the 8th Army that desegregation had met with the approval of Van Fleet, and that many of the senior generals favored it. A few others opposed it, notably General Almond of X Corps. The wheels of complete desegregation turned very slowly, and it was not until 1 October 1951 that the 24th Infantry was inactivated.30
None of this information was known to the Buffalo Rangers in April 1951, when they received the mission of training for combat survival. Although the task came as a complete surprise to the Buffalo Rangers, they were glad to get fresh manpower from which they hoped to create additional Rangers after the Munsan-ni jump. Since the replacements had received only seven weeks of basic training on individual weapons and had no training on the bayonet (which was Captain Allen’s favorite Ranger weapon), the 2d Ranger Company’s first task was to get them in top physical condition. It was approaching springtime, so bare-chested road runs, speed marches, and bayonet training were the order of the day. Training stressed self-sufficiency of the lowest unit and drilled the concepts of movement to contact; fire and movement; support fire; assault with marching fire; capture of objective; reorganization; preparation for counter-attack; inspection of personnel and equipment; and signals/communication. The typical day began with a road march in the approach formation while carrying light packs, weapons, and ammunition to the training site. Replacements were mixed in with the regular troops. The men started with a squad in the attack and worked up to the company in the attack.
Queen was worried that 2d Ranger Company would be committed to a mission destined for failure. He knew it was rumored that these units had not passed their Army Training Test (ATT) and were incapable of providing close support combat fire to the infantry units without too many errors (short rounds). Failures of this sort would provide the opportunity for Corps to send in some white officers to get promotions and awards…at the expense of black Ranger fodder. Almost daily, from 6 to 24 April, a red-headed major driving an X Corps headquarters jeep observed the training exercises. He arrived about 0900 hours and parked on a hill overlooking the training area, observed what 2d Ranger Company was doing, and took a few notes. None of the men of 2d Ranger Company remember him introducing himself or visiting the company CP to explain his actions or purpose.
Without warning, on 24 April the Buffalo Rangers were relieved of their special “leg replacement” training mission.
Morning Report
[24 April 1951] RECORD OF EVENTS
VOCO relieved from training mission of 7th Inf Div and attached 31st RCT for employment unit departed Hangyee, Korea approx 1345 hrs via mtr march Arrived 7th Division Forward at 1500 arrived 31st RCT 1600 hrs distance traveled approx 20 miles rec’d mission to defend the high ground (Hill 613 in the vicinity of UT 265 070). Morale of troops excellent.
Not until 1994 would men from the 2d Ranger Company—including its officers—learn that Almond had gotten his racial policy endorsed and implemented by Ferenbaugh as follows:
Colored troops who arrive in this division, if they have the proper MOS’s, will be assigned to the 2d Ranger Company. Others who are assigned by error will be returned to Eighth Army Replacement Battalion. Personnel will not be mixed within units. If Ranger Company becomes greatly over strength, another company will be formed.
In other words, any black soldiers coming into the 7th Division with an infantry MOS (4745)—the most common MOS coming out of basic training and in the replacement pipeline—would be assigned to 2d Ranger Company with no consideration for their lack of Airborne or Ranger qualifications. More importantly, these replacements would not be volunteers—despite the pleas of Airborne and Ranger recruiters. This was the inauspicious beginning of the era of complete racial integration.
It was well known that troop commanders up to the rank of Brigadier General feared the immediate wrath of General Almond. He had relieved the commander of the 31st Infantry, Colonel Richard P. Overshine, after the Inchon landing. He shook up Major General David Barr, division commander, and put the skids under him after the Hungnan evacuation. Several other commanders had risked mission failure rather than face Almond’s verbal outbursts. It is a wonder that Ferenbaugh skirted Almond’s order by keeping all of his black troops stashed in the 2d Rangers, regardless of MOS (including quartermaster, ordnance, artillery, MP, and bandsmen), rather than sending them back to 8th Army. Perhaps Ferenbaugh guessed that the 7th Division soon would be moved from the control of X Corps, or that MacArthur, Almond’s benefactor, would soon be relieved by President Harry Truman.31 This shift of the 7th Division to the IX Corps, when it happened, was a blessing for the Buffalo Rangers. In retrospect, the fact that 2d Ranger Company remained attached to the 7th ID—a division to which black troops had never before been assigned—and under the benevolent command of Ferenbaugh was downright miraculous.
When the Army began integrating its personnel, men of all races had the opportunity to analyze and respond to myths fabricated by society and examine stereotypes firsthand. Predictions such as Van Houten’s “You people won’t fight when you get to Korea!” were disproved by valiant service in combat. On an individual basis, soldiers began relating to people of different races and began realizing that our main concerns, challenges, and problems usually were very similar. Families, the future of our children, and coming home safely were the top priorities of nearly every soldier—regardless of the color of his skin. Soldiers were beginning to construct their own opinions. As time passed, the Buffalo Rangers dealt with traditional, or alleged, stories that had been told of people of a different color. Direct knowledge and experience provided explanations for those things that previously could only be imagined. We lived and died together, formed friendships together, and established lifelong relationships—particularly with those men of our sister unit, 4th Ranger Company—that often knew no color.
On 1 July 1951, General Ridgway’s proposal to deactivate the 24th Infantry Division and begin integrating the U.S. Army in Korea was approved by the Department of the Army. In order to ensure across-the-board desegregation, the service established a goal that every Army unit in Korea should contain an equal percentage of African American personnel. Within a short time, however, the laudatory goal presented the Army in Korea with a problem: if a disproportionate number of black soldiers were sent to Korea, what should be done with the additional black personnel? The solution was obvious to proponents of desegregation: they should be distributed among and integrated into units throughout the Army worldwide.
Supporters and opponents of integration alike realized that merely desegregating the portion of the Army that was fighting in Korea was logistically impossible. If the military’s system of deployment, training, and personnel rotation was to remain operational, distinctions based on race would either have to be maintained everywhere or nowhere. Thus, barring the cessation of integration entirely, it was only a matter of time before desegregation occurred throughout the Army. Additionally, the success of desegregation in Korea made arguing that integration should not occur elsewhere impossible. With that in mind, the U.S. Army’s European Command in April 1952 began implementing a plan to integrate all of the troops under its jurisdiction, using the Army in Korea as a model. The desegregation of Army units around the world gradually followed. Ironically, as painstakingly slow as this process seemed, by the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled segregation unconstitutional in its landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision on 17 May 1954, the Armed Forces had already pioneered the road to integration.