The nuclear posture and strategic decisions of nuclear-armed nations have a significant, often immediate impact on the nuclear-acquisition decisions of other nations.1 A decision by a state to acquire nuclear weapons can trigger a similar decision in a rival state. Conversely, the commitment not to acquire or maintain nuclear weapons by one state or group of states can foster similar commitments regionally or globally.
This relationship is contested. Those who favor maintaining a large number of nuclear weapons argue that it is naïve, even arrogant, to believe that reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in the United States will have any impact on a decision by, say, Iran and North Korea on whether they will build their own weapons. They hold that U.S. (and Russian) nuclear policy is irrelevant to other nations, who will make decisions based on their own security calculations, not the postures of other nuclear-armed states.
For example, former senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) opposed the New START treaty in part by mocking the idea that U.S. actions influence others:
A central tenet of the Obama Administration’s security policy is that, if the U.S. ‘leads by example’ we can ‘reassert our moral leadership’ and influence other nations to do things. It is the way the President intends to advance his goal of working toward a world free of nuclear weapons and to deal with the stated twin top priorities of the Administration: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.2
There is, however, a solid, historical record showing that U.S. and Russian nuclear policies have a profound impact on other nations’ policy choices. This relationship was recognized in U.S. national intelligence assessments in the 1950s and 1960s and informed the U.S. decision to negotiate the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The new international norm established by the NPT and related agreements—that the world was moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons—helped prevent, and in some cases reverse, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states.
Even as the nuclear-armed nations increased and improved their nuclear weapons in the 1970s and early 1980s, the process of negotiation of new arms-control treaties maintained the deterrent effect of the NPT. Nations and publics saw the arms race as a violation of disarmament commitments and sought to bring the violating states back to the established norm. When the United States and Russia negotiated sharp reductions in nuclear arsenals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they reaffirmed this norm and substantially enhanced nonproliferation efforts, including the decisions by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear weapons—inherited from the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991—and the successful indefinite extension of the NPT at a crucial conference in 1995.
The United States briefly ended the negotiated reduction process in the early 2000s, and both the United States and Russia again emphasized the importance of modernizing and maintaining nuclear weapons and expanded their use to additional nonnuclear missions. As some nations concluded that the nuclear-weapon states had no intention of eliminating their nuclear weapons, and as India and Pakistan seemed to win acceptance as new nuclear nations, the antiproliferation impact of the NPT waned. When new states began to develop nuclear weapon technologies, the international cooperation needed to prevent this development became harder to muster.
Reestablishing the commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons by the United States and other nuclear-armed states coupled with practical steps toward that goal would be a powerful barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to other states. The interim report of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, chaired by William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, correctly notes: “If the U.S. by its actions indicates to other nations that we are moving seriously to decrease the importance and role of nuclear weapons, we increase our chance of getting the kind of cooperation we need to deal effectively with the dangers of proliferation.” As the commission found:
What we do in our own nuclear weapon program has a significant effect on (but does not guarantee) our ability to get that cooperation. In particular, this cooperation will be affected by what we do in our weapons laboratories, what we do in our deployed nuclear forces, what kind of nuclear policies we articulate, and what we do regarding arms control treaties (e.g., START and CTBT).3
The historical record strongly supports this conclusion.
HISTORIC LINKAGE BETWEEN U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE AND PROLIFERATION
Nonproliferation has been a declared part of U.S. national security strategy since 1945. President Harry Truman said in his message to Congress in October 1945, “The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation for the use and development of the atomic bomb.” From the beginning, officials recognized the linkage between the U.S. nuclear posture and proliferation. They detailed this linkage in successive official assessments. In 1958, when only three countries had nuclear weapons, a now declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the first exclusively devoted to proliferation, noted:
A U.S.-USSR agreement provisionally banning or limiting nuclear tests would have a restraining effect on independent production of nuclear weapons by fourth countries. However, the inhibiting effects of a test moratorium would be transitory unless further progress in disarmament—aimed at effective controls and reduction of stockpiles—were evident.
Specifically, the agencies concluded:
In the interest of encouraging progress in disarmament among the major powers, there is popular support throughout most of the world for a ban on tests. Hence, a U.S.-USSR agreement provisionally banning or limiting tests would bring into play strong public pressures against testing by fourth countries, even though such countries might not initially be parties to the agreement.
The test ban might not stop some countries, such as France, from testing, said the report. “Nevertheless, popular pressure, among other reasons, would probably force the Government to postpone further tests.” In the longer run, France would likely restrict its right to make weapons “only as part of an arrangement which required reduction of the stockpiles of the major nuclear powers.” Similarly, international agreements would help deter Japan from acquiring weapons, even if it were close to nuclear capability, as “not only the public but the government as well would welcome any agreement which promised to be effective… although they would be reluctant to accept restriction greater than those accepted by other fourth countries, notably Communist China.”4
International agreements have their limits, the NIE noted: “The Chinese Communists probably would not be deterred from nuclear weapons production by a limited disarmament agreement, except insofar as they might be prevented by Soviet adherence and Soviet withholding of assistance from China for development of a weapons program.”5
Subsequent NIEs reaffirmed this linkage. The first assessment done during John F. Kennedy’s presidency, in September 1961, reviewed the capabilities of fourteen countries believed capable of developing an operational nuclear weapon but noted that having the capability “does not answer the question whether they will actually do so.” The decision to go ahead with a program “will depend on a complex of considerations both domestic and international.”6
Domestic considerations other than technical capabilities include cost, security requirements, the desire to increase prestige, and domestic opposition to a program. International factors include the nature of relations with other states and the international security climate. Significantly, the estimate found:
The prospect of an agreement among the major powers for a nuclear test ban, for example, especially if it were viewed as a forerunner to broader disarmament steps, would undoubtedly strengthen force opposed to the spread of nuclear capabilities. Growing pessimism as to the likelihood of any realistic disarmament agreement could in some cases (e.g., Sweden, India) tend to undermine opposition to the acquisition of a national nuclear capability.7
These early NIEs were as concerned with the nuclear weapon decisions of U.S. friends and allies as they were with potential adversaries. They remind us that the proliferation problem has never been confined to hostile states. The considerations many U.S. allies had then mirror considerations these allies have today. The 1961 NIE examined each specific case, judged France and Israel as likely to develop weapons (France had tested in 1960; Israel would have a bomb by 1968), and found other likely cases were significantly dependent on international disarmament efforts. Specifically, Sweden would be technically capable of making a nuclear weapon by 1963.
If at that time the international climate appeared to be calm, especially if positive steps toward disarmament had been agreed upon by the major powers—or there were reasonable hopes that one would materialize—it is unlikely that the Swedes would decide to undertake a nuclear weapons program. In the absence of such reassuring factors and especially if other countries had already decided to produce nuclear weapons, the pressure to initiate a nuclear weapons program would probably grow sharply.8
India, the estimate said, would be under great pressure to develop a nuclear weapon if China exploded a nuclear device; “even so, we believe India would not decide to devote its nuclear facilities to a weapons program unless its leaders were firmly convinced that no broad disarmament agreements were possible.” Overall, the agencies judged the seven nations capable of developing nuclear weapons as unlikely to do so in the next few years but warned, “These attitudes and views could change in the coming years with changing circumstances, e.g., if it became increasingly clear that progress on international disarmament was unlikely.”9
GILPATRIC COMMITTEE CONCLUDES WEAPON STATES MUST LEAD BY EXAMPLE
In January 1965, a report from President Johnson’s Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, chaired by Roswell Gilpatric, concurred with the analysis of the earlier NIEs: “It is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race.”10 The first page of the report summarized:
The Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest.… [T]he United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds:
(a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements;
(b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and
(c) example by our own policies and actions.11
The committee detailed necessary steps, including tougher export controls, stricter safeguards on civilian nuclear programs, and increased budgets for the IAEA, and it acknowledged the importance of the participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. It warned: “Lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms-control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.”12 Its primary recommendation stressed the importance of multilateral agreements: “Measures to prevent particular countries from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are taken in support of a broad international prohibition applicable to many countries.”13 These agreements should include a global nonproliferation agreement (President Johnson concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and President Richard Nixon secured its ratification in 1970); nuclear-free zones, particularly in Latin America and Africa (both have such treaties in effect today); and a comprehensive test ban (concluded in 1996 but yet to enter into force).
After noting specific recommendations for policies toward individual nations and increased safeguards, the committee concluded: “If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments.”14
DISARMAMENT AS PART OF A WEB OF RESTRAINTS
While progress toward disarmament is important, no assessment ever found that it was the only factor in nonproliferation. NIEs usually included a web of issues influencing the decisions of individual nations on nuclear weapons programs. A December 1975 estimate summarized: “Threshold-crossers’ decisions will be strongly affected by what happens in the whole complex web of international relations—North-South disputes, East-West relations, economic, technological and military developments.”15 The main reasons that states acquire nuclear weapons are security, prestige, domestic politics, and, to a lesser degree, technology and economics. The reasons states do not develop nuclear weapons can be grouped into the same set of factors: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics.
Each driver for acquiring nuclear weapons has a matching barrier. That is, states decide not to build nuclear weapons—or, in some cases, give up weapons they have acquired or programs they have started—because they decide that the security benefits are greater without nuclear weapons or that prestige is enhanced by non-nuclear-weapon status, because domestic politics convince leaders not to pursue these programs, or because the technological and economic barriers are too significant to overcome.
An effective nonproliferation policy will minimize the drivers and maximize the barriers. A recent example of this approach is found in the 2007 NIE on Iran. The assessment concluded, “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.” It found that “some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways” might convince Tehran to halt its nuclear program.16
The United States on its own or through its alliances could influence some of these factors in the case of Iran or other states. But the global nonproliferation regime has proved a formidable barrier. Since the signing of the NPT, many more countries have given up nuclear weapon programs than have begun them. In the 1960s, twenty-three states had nuclear weapons, were conducting weapons-related research, or were actively discussing the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Today, only ten states have nuclear weapons or are believed to be seeking them.17 Before the NPT entered into force, only six nations abandoned indigenous nuclear weapon programs that were under way or under consideration: Egypt, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and West Germany. Since then, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia have all abandoned nuclear weapon programs or nuclear weapons (or both). Now North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are the only three states in the world that began acquiring nuclear capabilities after the NPT entered into force and have not ceased their efforts.
In other words, the reason that more states do not have nuclear weapons is because many nations, working together, have implemented polices to steadily reduce the role and numbers and desirability of nuclear weapons in the world. The reason that there are still nine nations with 17,000 weapons is that these policies have not gone further, faster. These policies are institutionalized in a global nonproliferation regime composed of treaties, security assurances, export restrictions, inspections and disarmament agreements. This regime will crumble if the consensus built on disarmament and nonproliferation commitments is not restored.
HISTORY’S VERDICT
History has borne out U.S. assessments of the essential connection between controlling existing arsenals and preventing new ones. These previous national estimates can assist today’s officials in efforts to apply the same logic to current threats. The Strategic Posture Commission’s interim report recognized this connection, noting, “The fact that other states possess nuclear weapons continues to affect decisions about the needed U.S. strategic posture.” The reverse is also true: The fact that the United States and other nations possess nuclear weapons continues to affect other states’ decisions about nuclear strategies. The interim report’s Finding 10, that “other nations are unlikely to eliminate their nuclear weapons just because the United States does so,” is true, but they are also unlikely to eliminate their weapons if the United States does not. A negotiated process of nuclear reductions and restraints has proven to be an essential element for convincing states to limit or eliminate their weapons and weapon programs.
The final report of the commission indicates the delicate balance that must be struck in these policies.
Programs to maintain the deterrent force are largely national programs, although their implementation involves a substantial international component with allies. In contrast, arms control and nonproliferation and associated activities are inherently international in character and their success requires the broadest possible international support.
This can become important when there are conflicts or trade-offs between the two. For example, a U.S. policy agenda that seems to stress unnecessarily our nuclear weapon posture could erode international cooperation to reduce nuclear dangers. Conversely, a policy agenda that emphasizes unilateral reductions could weaken the deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies. It is necessary to strike a balance in meeting these two imperatives.18
That is why the primary recommendation of the commission (for which I served as an expert advisor) was: “The United States should continue to pursue an approach to reducing nuclear dangers that balances deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation. Singular emphasis on one or another element would reduce the nuclear security of the United States and its allies.”19
Recognizing the enduring relationship between the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals and the prevention of new ones, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review found: “By demonstrating that we take seriously our NPT obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, we strengthen our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”20 These findings are correct, if regularly contested by supporters of the nuclear status quo. History provides ample evidence that a steady, determined commitment by the United States and other nuclear-armed nations to eliminate nuclear weapons and to take practical, immediate steps toward that goal will improve U.S. security and substantially enhance prospects for preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states and by terrorist groups.