Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late

3. The poll, conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks Poll, March 16–22, 2004, asked, “Based on what you know, do you think the U.S. should or should not participate in the following treaties and agreements? The treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapon test explosions worldwide.” See http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm.

4. The poll, conducted by GfK Roper Public Affairs & Media, November 3–8, 2010, asked, “Which statement comes closest to your view? No countries should be allowed to have nuclear weapons. (62 percent in favor) Only the United States and its allies should be allowed to have nuclear weapons. (16 percent in favor) Only countries that already have nuclear weapons should be allowed to have them. (15 percent in favor) Any country that is able to develop nuclear weapons (6 percent in favor) should be allowed to have them.” See http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm.

5. CBS News Poll, November 29–December 2, 2010, http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm.

6. The survey, which was statistically reliable to within 5 percent, not only asked Americans if they would cut the defense budget but to identify amounts for which areas they would cut. Given the choice of nuclear arms, ground forces, air power, or missile defense, the largest proportional cut chosen was nuclear weapons, at 27 percent. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Public Overwhelmingly Supports Large Defense Cuts,” Center for Public Integrity, May 10, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/05/10/8856/public-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts.

7. President John F. Kennedy, “Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations,” September 25, 1961, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx.

8. President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States–Soviet Relations,” January 16, 1984, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/11684a.htm.

9. See the National Security Advisory Group, William J. Perry, chair, “Worst Weapons in Worst Hands: U.S. Inaction on the Nuclear Terror Threat Since 9/11, and a Path of Action,” July, 2005), http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/nsag_worst_weapons_in_worst_hands_july2005.pdf, 1.

10. See Stephen I. Schwartz, “Barack Obama and John McCain on Nuclear Security Issues,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 6, 2008, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/080925_obamamacain.htm#_edn6.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham (1873), http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch07.html.

12. President Barack Obama, interview with Charlie Rose, CBS News, July 15, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3445_162-57472476/obama-not-enough-change-in-first-term/.

13. See, for example, Strobe Talbott, “An American President in the Age of Globalization,” Yale Global Online, November 19, 2012, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/american-president-age-globalization.

14. Conversations with author.

15. Joseph Cirincione, “Obama’s Turn on Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January/February 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137075/joseph-cirincione/obamas-turn-on-nuclear-weapons.

16. Talbott, “An American President in the Age of Globalization.”

17. “The Nuclear Agenda,” New York Times, February 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/the-nuclear-agenda.html.

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the research support of Benjamin Loehrke in the preparation of this chapter.

2. Edwin Chen and Hans Nichols, “Obama Condemns North Korea’s Launch of a Missile,” Bloomberg, April 5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=acFUssUbIDvc.

3. William J. Broad, “North Korean Missile Launch Was a Failure, Experts Say,” New York Times, April 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/world/asia/06korea.html.

1. This chapter is based on my “Strategic Collapse: The Failure of the Bush Nuclear Doctrine,” originally published by the Arms Control Association in the November 2008 edition of Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/cirincione

2. Glenn Kessler, “Rice: U.S. Has Aided in Nuclear Regulation,” Washington Post, September 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090702490.html; also see U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri at Press Conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,” September 7, 2008, available from http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Transcript/6300/transcript-us-secretary-of-state-condoleezza-rice-.

3. John Bolton, “A Legacy of Betrayal,” Washington Times, May 12, 1999, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/international-organizations/a-legacy-of-betrayal/.

4. Dafna Linzer, “The NSC’s Sesame Street Generation,” Washington Post, March 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/10/AR2006031002003.html.

5. Gary Schmitt, “Memorandum To: Opinion Leaders,” Project for a New American Century, August 2, 2005, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iran-20050802.htm.

6. Elliot Abrams, special assistant to the president and senior director on the National Security Council for Near East and North African affairs (2002–2005) and deputy national security adviser (2005–2008); John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security (2001–2005) and U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations (2005); Richard Perle, Defense Policy Board chairman (2001–2003); Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense (2001–2005) and State Department International Security Advisory Board chairman (2008).

7. Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55630/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest; Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy no. 111 (Summer 1998): 24–34, available from http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/a.kaplan.benevolentempire.fp.sum98.pdf.

8. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” Washington, D.C., June 1, 2002, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

9. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “President Bush Delivers ‘State of the Union,’” Washington DC, January 28, 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

10. Paul Wolfowitz, interview, on “Campaign Against Terror,” Frontline PBS, April 22, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html.

11. State Department, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002, 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf.

12. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” December 31, 2001.

13. David Sanger, “Bush Outlines Doctrine of Striking Foes First,” New York Times, September 20, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/international/20CND-STRA.html.

14. The Congressional Research Service calculates that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had cost $859 billion by mid-2008. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the wars would eventually cost $2.4 trillion. See Amy Belasco, “Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” CRS Report for Congress, July 14, 2008; Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs of U.S. Operation in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other Activities Related to the War on Terrorism Before the House Committee on the Budget, 110th Cong. (October 24, 2007) (statement of Peter Orszag, vice chairman of Global Banking at Citigroup); See also Travis Sharp and John Andrews, “Analysis of House-Senate Agreement on FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (S.3001),” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, September 24, 2008, http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/analysis_c110_s3001_conference/index.html.

15. See David Sanger, “Aftereffects: Nuclear Standoff,” New York Times, April 21, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/21/world/aftereffects-nuclear-standoff-administration-divided-over-north-korea.html.

16. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours,” March 17, 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html.

17. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), 3.

18. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Opposition to Iraq War Reaches New High,” Gallup Inc., April 24, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/106783/opposition-iraq-war-reaches-new-high.aspx.

19. Pew Research Center, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative: American Character Gets Mixed Reviews,” June 23, 2005.

20. DCI’s Global Intelligence Challenges: Briefing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Congress (February 16, 2005) (testimony of Porter Goss, director of the Central Intelligence Agency); see also, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (February 16, 2005) (testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency).

21. In 2002 the number of “significant” international terrorist incidents was 136; in 2003 it was 175; and in 2004, it was 651. See U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/; U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/. Also see National Counterterrorism Center, “A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004,” April 27, 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2004.pdf.

22. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2005), 30–32, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/securing-the-bomb-2005-fullreport.pdf?_=1322768203; also see National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), “Fact Sheet: NNSA Expands Nuclear Security Cooperation With Russia,” October 2005.

23. Brian Finlay, “Nuclear Terrorism: U.S. Policies to Reduce the Threat of Nuclear Terror,” Partnership for a Secure America, September 2008, http://www.psaonline.org/downloads/NUCLEAR%20report%208-28-08.pdf.

24. Lee Hamilton and Thomas Kean, “WMD Report Card: Evaluating U.S. Policies to Prevent Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Terrorism Since 2005,” Partnership for a Secure America, September 2008), 3, http://www.psaonline.org/downloads/ReportCard%208-25-08.pdf.

25. Nicholas Burns, “We Should Talk to Our Enemies,” Newsweek, October 25, 2008, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/10/24/we-should-talk-to-our-enemies.html. Former secretaries of state Madeleine Albright, James Baker, Warren Christopher, Henry Kissinger, and Colin Powell said they favored talking to Iran as part of a strategy to stop Tehran’s development of a nuclear weapons program during a forum hosted by The George Washington University on September 15, 2008. Former national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft also praised engagement at a July 2008 event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

26. Chuck Hagel and Peter Kaminsky, America: Our Next Chapter, Tough Questions, Straight Answers (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 93.

27. Alex Wagner, “Bush Puts N. Korea Negotiations on Hold, Stresses Verification,” Arms Control Today (April 2001), http://www.armscontrol.org/print/832.

29. Johnathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review (Summer 2003): 26, http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume1/august_2003/8_03_1.html.

30. Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” (April 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.

31. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” February 11, 2004, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.

32. Steve Kingstone, “Brazil Joins World’s Nuclear Club,” BBC News, May 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4981202.stm. See Leonor Tomero, “The Future of GNEP: The International Partners,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Reports, July 31, 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/reports/the-future-of-gnep/the-future-of-gnep-the-international-partners.

33. Sharon Squassoni, “Risks and Realities: The New Nuclear Energy Revival,” Arms Control Today (May 2007), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_05/squassoni.

34. Robert Norris, William Arkin, Hans Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 71–73, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/58/4/71.full.

35. Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin signed SORT in June 2002. Both sides were required to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. Under the proposed START III, negotiated by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1997, each side would have drawn down to similar numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2007, five years earlier than envisioned under SORT. START III would also have provided a framework for discussions on reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and dismantlement of warheads. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 204–5, 209–11. See Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no.1 (March/April 2008): 50–53, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/64/1/50.full.

36. Daryl G. Kimball and Miles A. Pomper, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: An Interview with Nuclear Threat Initiative Co-Chairman Sam Nunn,” Arms Control Today (March 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/Nunn.

37. Stephen Hadley, “Policy Consideration in Using Nuclear Weapons,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 8, no. 23 (Fall 1997): 23, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol8/iss1/4/.

38. Several of the participants were appointed to senior positions on nuclear policy in the Bush administration, including Linton Brooks, Stephen Cambone, and Robert Joseph. See Keith Payne et al., “Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy, January 2001, http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/volume%201%20complete.pdf.

39. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” Washington D.C., April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.

40. “Pakistan Demands U.S. Nuclear Deal,” BBC News, October 2, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7648435.stm.

41. Josh Loewenstein, “House Set to Approve Version of U.S.-India Deal With Added Oversight,” CongressNow, September 25, 2008.

42. Kofi Annan, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, United Nations, December 1, 2004, 3, http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

43. Ian Cobain and Ian Traynor, “Intelligence Report Claims Nuclear Market Thriving,” Guardian, January 4, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/04/iran.armstrade.

44. In April 2008, the former Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation Philip Coyle told the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs that the antimissile system being deployed in Europe “still has no demonstrated effectiveness to defend the U.S., let alone Europe, against enemy attack under realistic operational conditions.” Lisbeth Gronlund, a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, commented at the same hearing that “the United States is no closer today to being able to effectively defend against long-range ballistic missiles than it was 25 years ago.” See What Are the Prospects? What Are the Costs? Oversight of Missile Defense Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (April 2008) (statement of Phillip Coyle, former Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation).

45. Richard Haass “Regime Change and Its Limits,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60823/richard-n-haass/regime-change-and-its-limits.

46. Nicholas Burns, “We Should Talk to Our Enemies,” The Daily Beast, August 24, 2008, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/10/24/we-should-talk-to-our-enemies.html.

47. Wolfgang Panofky, “Nuclear Insecurity,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2007), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62832/wolfgang-k-h-panofsky/nuclear-insecurity.

48. Barack Obama, “A New Strategy for a New World,” speech, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008, available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/15/read-obamas-iraq-speech-a_n_112871.html.

49. John McCain, remarks by to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, March 26, 2008, available from http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2008/03/26/20858/embargoed-mccains-speech-to-the-los-angeles-world-affairs-council/.

50. “2008 Republican Platform,” Republican National Convention, Committee on Arrangements for the 2008 Republican National Convention, August 2008, 2.

51. “Renewing America’s Promise” 2008 Democratic Party Platform, Democratic National Convention Committee, August 25, 2008, 31–32.

52. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero: Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2008): 81.

1. This chapter is based on my “The Nuclear Pivot: Change and Continuity in American Nuclear Policy,” originally published in RUSI Journal 155, no. 3 (June 2010), http://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A4C21D6A2C1BC6/#.UTodN9FtXsI.

2. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

3. Barack Obama, remarks at UN Security Council Meeting, New York, September 24, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-un-security-council-summit-nuclear-non-proliferation-and-nuclear-.

4. Jim Hoagland, “President Obama’s Farsighted Nuclear Strategy,” Washington Post, April 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/16/AR2010041603992.html.

5. United States National Security Council, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” Washington, D.C., April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.

8. Elaine M. Grossman, “Gates Sees Stark Choice on Nuke Tests, Modernization,” Global Security Newswire, October 29, 2008, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/gates-sees-stark-choice-on-nuke-tests-modernization/.

9. George Shultz, “Debating Obama’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304222504575174200114028206.html.

10. James N. Miller, principal deputy undersecretary for policy at the Department of Defense, remarks to the Defense Writers Group, Washington, D.C., June 4, 2010.

12. Ben Armbruster, “Conservatives Falsely Claim New Obama Nuke Policy Prevents Nuclear Retaliation Against Chem/Bio Attack,” Think Progress, April 7, 2010, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/04/07/90545/conservatives-nuclear-posture-review/.

13. Charles Krauthammer, “Nuclear Posturing, Obama Style,” National Review Online, April 9, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229509/nuclear-posturing-obama-style/charles-krauthammer?pg=2.

14. “Nuclear Complex Upgrades Related to START Treaty to Cost $180 billion,” Walter Pincus, Washington Post, May 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/13/AR2010051305031.html.

15. Greg Mello, “The Obama Disarmament Paradox,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 4, 2010, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox.

16. David Alexander, “After Early Successes, Obama Struggles to Implement Disarmament Vision,” Reuters, August 31, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/us-usa-nuclear-arms-idUSBRE87U06B20120831.

17. Ambassador Linton Brooks, remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2010.

18. Tom Hunter, Michael Anastasio, and George Miller, “Tri-Lab Directors’ Statement on the Nuclear Posture Review,” Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico, April 9, 2010, http://www.lanl.gov/newsroom/news-releases/2010/April/04.09-nuclear-posture-review.php.

19. Statement by minister for foreign affairs of Japan on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, April 7, 2010; remarks by German federal foreign minister, Berlin, April 8, 2010; statements made by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs spokesperson, April 7, 2010; spokesperson’s commentary, South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of National Defense, April 7, 2010.

20. Richard Burt, “Debating Obama’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304222504575174200114028206.html.

21. James Schlesinger, “The Historical and Modern Context for U.S.-Russian Arms Control,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 2010.

22. James Baker, “The History and Lessons on START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty),” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 19, 2010.

23. William Perry, “The Historical and Modern Context for U.S.-Russian Arms Control,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 29, 2010.

24. Statement by David Miliband, foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, March 26, 2010.

25. Marty N. Natalegawa, statement at the NPT Conference, New York, May 3, 2010.

26. Hillary Clinton, statement at the NPT Conference, New York, May 3, 2010.

27. Marty M Natalegawa, statement on behalf of NAM States party to the NPT, May 3, 2010.

28. Daryl G. Kimball, “ACA Welcomes NPT Review Consensus,” Arms Control Association, May 28, 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/NPTReviewConference2010.

29. John Duncan, “The NPT Review Conference: Capturing Success,” The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Blog, June 3, 2010.

30. Eben Harell, “A Surprising Consensus on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Time, June 2, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993339,00.html.

31. Barack Obama, speech at United States Military Academy at West Point Commencement, New York, May 22, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-west-point-commencement.

1. This chapter is based on “The Continuing Threat of Nuclear War,” by Joseph Cirincione, chap. 18, pp. 381–401, from Global Catastrophic Risk, edited by N. Bostrom and M. M. Cirkovic (2008), free permission to use Author’s own material by permission of Oxford University Press, www.oup.com.

2. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3.

3. Calculations are based on the following deployed strategic warhead totals: 1992 combined total of 16,840 (U.S. 8,280, USSR 8,560); 2012 combined total of 4,380 (U.S. 1,950, USSR 2,430).

4. Adapted from Federation of American Scientists, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” December 18, 2012, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.

5. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 3 (March 2013): 84–91; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, forthcoming; Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and William M. Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time For Change (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001), 42, 73, 84.

6. Jeffrey Lewis, “Nightmare on Nuke Street,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/30/nightmare_on_nuke_street.

7. Bruce G. Blair, “Primed and Ready,” The Defense Monitor: The Newsletter of the Center for Defense Information 36, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 2–3.

11. Sam Nunn, speech to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/statement_nunnceip_062104.pdf?_=1316466791.

12. Federation of American Scientists, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”; Hans N. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences 68, no. 5 (September/October 2012): 96–104, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/5/96.full.pdf; Kristensen and Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2013.”

13. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, French Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 4 (September 2008): 52–54, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/64/4/52.full.

14. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 6 (November 2011): 81–87, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/6/81.full.

15. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, British Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 5 (September 2011): 89–97, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/57/6/78.full.

16. Shannon N. Kile, Phillip Schell, and Hans Kristensen, “Israeli Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nbc/nuclear. For the higher estimate, see Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 5 (September 2002): 73–75, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/58/5/73.full.

17. Kile, Schell, and Kristensen, “Israeli Nuclear Forces.”

18. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Indian Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 4 (July 2012): 96–101, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/4/96.full.

19. Hans Kristensen, “North Korea: FAS Says We Have Nukes!” FAS Strategic Security Blog, November 27, 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/11/dprk.php.

20. Scott Sagan, “A Call for Global Nuclear Disarmament,” Nature, July 5, 2012, 30, http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/a_call_for_global_nuclear_disarmament.

2. Bruce G. Blaire et al., “Accidental Nuclear War—a Post–Cold War Assessment,” The New England Journal of Medicine 338, no. 18 (April 1998): 1326–32.

3. Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).

4. Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington, D.C., 1979), 15, 35; Atomic Archive, “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” National Science Digital Library, 2001, http://www.atomicarchive.com/Effects/index.shtml.

5. Blaire et al., “Accidental Nuclear War,” 1326–32.

6. NRDC used computer software and unclassified databases to model a nuclear conflict and approximate the effects of the use of nuclear weapons based on an estimate of the U.S nuclear war plan. See Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and William M. Arkin, The U.S Nuclear War Plan: A Time For Change (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001), ix–xi, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/warplan_start.pdf.

7. McKinzie et al., The U.S Nuclear War Plan, 130.

8. Russian casualties are smaller that U.S. causalities because a higher percentage of Russians still live in rural areas and the lower-yield U.S. weapons produce less fallout. See Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War.

11. Robert T. Batcher, “The Consequences of an Indo-Pakistani Nuclear War,” International Studies Review 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 137.

12. R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan, “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions,” Science 222, no. 4630 (December 1983): 1290, http://www.atmos.washington.edu/~ackerman/Articles/Turco_Nuclear_Winter_83.pdf.

13. R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan, “Climate and Smoke: An Appraisal of Nuclear Winter,” Science 247, no. 4939, (January 1990): 166, http://www.atmos.washington.edu/~ackerman/Articles/Turco_Nuclear_Winter_90.pdf.

15. C. Sagan and R. P. Turco, “Nuclear Winter in the Post–Cold War Era,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 4 (November 1993): 369.

16. O. B. Toon, A. Robock, R. P. Turco, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. L. Stenchikov, “Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science 315, no. 5816 (March 2007): 1224–25, http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/SciencePolicyForumNW.pdf; A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B Toon, C. Bardeen, and R. P. Turco, “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions (April 2007): 11818.

17. Toon et al., “Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” 1224–25.

18. Robock et al., “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” 11823.

19. Ira Helfand, “Nuclear Famine: A Billion People at Risk: Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition,” Physicians for Social Responsibility, 2012, http://www.psr.org/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-famine-report.pdf.

20. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), 115.

21. Michael Krepon, “From Confrontation to Cooperation,” Henry L. Stimson Center, November 17, 2004, http://www.stimson.org/essays/from-confrontation-to-cooperation/.

22. P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NRRMChari.pdf.

23. George Perkovich, Jessica Mathew, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 24, 34, and 39, https://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/univ_comp_rpt07_final1.pdf.

1. This chapter is based on my “The Fiscal Logic of Zero,” originally published in the Brown Journal of World Affairs in 2011, http://bjwa.org/article.php?id=8ckn4rGp5fRKPQ9cpeFdT6DmLC6sJ4dY3QakmNyI. Benjamin Loehrke, Mary Kaszynski, and Leah Fae Cochran provided valuable research and assistance for the original article and its revision into this greatly expanded chapter.

2. Department of Defense, “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” January 2012, 2, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf.

3. “Consulting the American People on National Defense Spending,” Program for Public Consultation, Stimson Center, Center for Public Integrity, May 2012, 17, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/DefenseBudget_May12_rpt1.pdf.

7. Nickolas Roth, “NNSA and Its Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Week,” Nukes of Hazard, October 4, 2012, http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/10/4/18624/6553.

8. “Editorial: Axing NNSA Should Be Among Options,” The Albuquerque Journal, November 25, 2012, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/11/25/opinion/axing-nnsa-should-be-among-options.html.

9. Budget estimates from Russell Rumbaugh and Nathan Cohn, Resolving Ambiguities: Costing Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2012), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/RESOLVING_FP_4_no_crop_marks.pdf.

10. Ploughshares Fund, Working Paper: What Nuclear Weapons Cost Us (Washington, D.C.: Ploughshares Fund, 2012), 1, http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/What%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Cost%20Us%20Final%20(100212).pdf.

11. At the end of fiscal year 2011 (September 2011), China owned $1.27 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, about 8 percent of the U.S. national debt. See U.S. Treasury Department data, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt. For China’s defense budget, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure Database,” http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4.

12. Roger Altman and Richard Haass, “American Profligacy and American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66778/roger-c-altman-and-richard-n-haass/american-profligacy-and-american-power.

13. Robert Gates, “Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies,” the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527.

14. Baker Spring, “Obama’s Defense Budget Makes Protecting America Its Lowest Priority,” The Heritage Foundation, March 1, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority.

15. This figure includes $528 billion for the budget of the Department of Defense and $159 billion for the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Figures from White House Office of Management and Budget, Historical Table 5.1, “Budget Authority by Function and Subfunction: 1976–2017,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.

16. White House Office of Management and Budget, Historical Table 5.1; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “The Fifteen Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2011 (Table),” September 2011, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view.

17. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller/CFO), Overview of Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.

18. Eric Cantor, on Meet the Press, NBC, January 23, 2011.

19. Rick Maze, “House GOP Looks to Trim Defense, Vets Spending,” Military Times, February 7, 2011, http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2011/02/military-republicans-budget-020711w/.

20. Rand Paul, “Defense Cuts Are Essential for Deficit Reduction,” December 10, 2010, http://www.randpaul2016.com/2010/12/defense-cuts-are-essential-for-deficit-reduction/.

21. Congressional Budget Office, “Budget Infographic—Discretionary,” April 17, 2012, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43155.

22. National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, “The Moment of Truth,” December 2010, 20–23, http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.

23. “Solutions,” OweNo.com, see http://oweno.com/solutions/.

24. “Securing the National Defense,” OweNo.com, http://oweno.com/solutions/securing-the-national-defense/.

25. Todd Harrison, “Defense Funding in the Budget Control Act of 2011,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 2011, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2011/08/defense-funding-in-the-budget-control-act-of-2011/.

26. The president’s FY13 request for the Pentagon budget exceeded the BCA cap by $4 billion as did the Senate mark of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. The House NDAA mark exceeded the cap by $8 billion.

27. “Shields and Brooks on the Job Report, Sequestration, and Tea Party Primary Wins,” PBS Newshour, August 3, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec12/shieldsbrooks_08-03.html.

28. Aaron Mehta, “Dissent Among Republicans Over Defense Spending,” Center for Public Integrity, August 15, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/15/10695/dissent-among-republicans-over-defense-spending.

29. “Rep. Adam Smith on Defense Issues,” C-SPAN’s Newsmakers, July 22, 2012, http://www.c-span.org/Events/Rep-Adam-Smith-on-Defense-Issues/10737432483-1/.

30. House Armed Services Committee Democrats, “Ranking Member Adam Smith on National Security Aspects of State of the Union,” press release, U.S. House of Representatives, February 12, 2013, http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=af720d7e-8f21-48a4-83c8-9a4018d-9f009&ContentType_id=770e20a9-5d2a-40c5-a868-bcf7de9173a9&Group_id=fca18578-e10c-42e8-855a-020244bd590f&MonthDisplay=1&YearDisplay=2013.

31. Thom Shanker, “Senator Urges Bigger Cuts to Nuclear Arsenal,” New York Times, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/us/politics/senator-levin-urges-bigger-cuts-to-nuclear-arsenal.html.

32. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Senator Says Nuclear Arsenal Spending Is ‘Ripe for Cuts,’” Global Security Newswire, June 14, 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/powerful-senator-says-nuclear-stockpile-spending-ripe-cuts/.

33. Gen. James Cartwright (ret.), remarks by at Global Zero Summit, October 12, 2011.

34. John F. Kennedy, “Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations,” New York City, September 25, 1961, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx.

35. The United States produced an estimated 70,000 nuclear weapons since 1945. The stockpile peaked in 1967 with an estimated 31,255 warheads.

36. See notes 10–11.

37. Rumbaugh and Cohn, Resolving Ambiguities.

38. Ibid., 6. This includes an estimated $91.8 to $99.1 billion on programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (including funds for weapons activities, administrative costs, and naval reactors) and between $268.9 and $301.7 billion for the Department of Defense to sustain, operate, and modernize the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal over the next ten years.

39. Ploughshares Fund, Working Paper: What Nuclear Weapons Cost Us.

40. Benjamin Loehrke, “Estimated Missile Defense Spending, FY13–FY17,” Ploughshares Fund, August 2012, http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ploughshares%20Missile%20Defense%20Estimate%20Budget_0.pdf.

41. To derive these costs and the other costs for nuclear-threat reduction and nuclear-incident management, the study used data for FY08 from analysts Stephen Schwartz and Deepti Choubey then assumed those costs to grow with inflation through FY22. See Schwartz and Choubey, “Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities,” Carnegie Endowment, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2009/01/12/nuclear-security-spending-assessing-costs-examining-priorities/1vl5.

42. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

43. Jim DeMint, “Will START Treaty Weaken U.S. Missile Defense? Senator Kerry Seems to Hope So,” Jim’s Blog, May 18, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/05/18/guest-blogger-will-start-treaty-weaken-u-s-missile-defense-senator-kerry-seems-to-hope-so/.

44. Jon Kyl, “The New Start Treaty: Time for a Careful Look,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343360850107760.html.

45. Mark Thompson, “A New Nuclear Triad?” Time, February 13, 2011, http://nation.time.com/2011/02/13/a-new-nuclear-triad/.

46. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ohio Replacement SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2012, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf.

47. Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan,” July 2012, 16–17, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43468.

49. Thirty years ago, U.S. submarines carried 4,782 nuclear warheads. Today the navy deploys about 1,100. See Natural Resources Defense Council, “Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings,” http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp.

50. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, iii, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf.

51. Tom Collina, “Fact Sheet: Nuclear Modernization Programs,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization.

52. Stephen Daggett and Pat Towell, “FY2013 Defense Budget Request: Overview and Context,” Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2012, 10, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42489.pdf.

53. Daryl. G. Kimball, “Defuse the Exploding Cost of Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Association, November 29, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_12/Focus.

54. Dana J. Johnson, Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Hoffa, “Triad, Dyad, Monad: Shaping the U.S. Nuclear Force for the Future,” Air Force Association, Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, December 2009, http://www.afa.org/mitchell/reports/MP5_Triad_1209.pdf.

55. Jeffrey Lewis, “Minimum Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 3 (July/August 2008), http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/minimum_deterrence_7552.

56. Dwight Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace,” speech, 207th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, December 8, 1953, http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html.

57. “JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2003, http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/11/17/jfk-on-nuclear-weapons-and-non-proliferation/3zcu.

58. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 84, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64608/ivo-daalder-and-jan-lodal/the-logic-of-zero.

59. Valerie Plame Wilson and Queen Noor, interview with Savannah Guthrie, Today Show, MSNBC, November 16, 2012, http://video.today.msnbc.msn.com/today/49852931#49852931.

60. Daalder and Lodal, “The Logic of Zero,” 90.

61. Steven M. Kosiak, Spending on the US Strategic Nuclear Forces: Plans and Options for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2006), 50, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/2006.09.01-US-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Spending.pdf.

62. Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, “Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,” CATO Institute, September 23, 2010, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA667.pdf.

63. Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable,’” CATO Institute, May 2012, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-friendman-obis-spring-2012.pdf.

64. Daryl Kimball, “Nuclear and Missile Systems We Can’t Afford, Don’t Need,” Arms Control Association 3, no. 12 (July 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/Nuclear-and-Missile-Systems-We-Cant-Afford-Dont-Need%20.

66. Peter Fedewa, “Nuclear Weapons Spending Tops Five Major Cities,” Ploughshares Fund, July 2, 2012. http://www.ploughshares.org/blog/2012-07-02/nuclear-weapons-spending-tops-five.

67. Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring, “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the Twenty-First Century,” The Heritage Foundation, November 30, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century.

69. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 3 (2012): 84–91, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/3/84.full.pdf.

70. Kristensen and Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2012.”

71. Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Harrisonburg, Va.: R. R. Donnelley, 2012), 178, 188.

73. “Modernizing U.S. Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture,” Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, May 2012, http://www.ndr.de/info/programm/sendungen/streitkraefte_und_strategien/globalzeroreport101.pdf.

75. Sidney Drell and James Goodby, “What Are Nuclear Weapons For?” Arms Control Association, April 2005, 14–18, http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf.

76. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2010, http://icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf.

77. Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, 2009, 42–44, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/doctrine/targeting.pdf.

78. Friedman and Preble, “Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint,” 8.

79. James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 1 (2010): 82.

80. Keith Payne, “Zero Nuclear Sense: Is Reckless Disarmament the Plan for Second Obama Term?” Washington Times, May 29, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/29/zero-nuclear-sense/print/#ixzz2CnGDkxtw.

81. Keith Payne, “Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 7, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/summer/payne.pdf.

82. Senator Kelly Ayotte, “Ayotte Leads Freshman Senate Republicans in Calling on President to Fulfill Nuclear Modernization Commitment,” April 26, 2012, http://www.ayotte.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=564.

83. John R. Bolton, “What to Do About Syria?” National Review, June 11, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/302104/what-do-about-syria-john-r-bolton.

84. Senator Jim DeMint, “The New START Treaty Weakens U.S. National Security,” U.S. News & World Report, August 16, 2010, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/08/16/jim-demint-the-new-start-treaty-weakens-us-national-security.

85. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 11.

86. Jeffrey Lewis, “It’s Not You, It’s Me,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/07/its_not_you_its_me.

87. Barry Blechman and Alexander Bollfrass, eds., Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2010).

88. Frank Carlucci and William Perry, foreword to Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, ed. Barry Blechman and Alexander Bollfrass (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2010), ix, available from http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Preface_Foreword.pdf.

1. This chapter is based on my “Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons,” was originally published by the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation in June, 2011, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/strategic_turn.

2. New START counts each bomber as one weapon although bombers can carry six to sixteen bombs. Thus, the actual number of nuclear weapons allowed under the treaty is greater than 1,550.

3. Lynn Eden, “Underestimating the Consequences of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Condemned to Repeat the Past’s Errors?” Physics and Society 34, no. 1 (January 2005): 5–7, http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/underestimating_the_consequences_of_use_of_nuclear_weapons_condemned_to_repeat_the_pasts_errors.

4. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Nuclear Targeting Unaltered Since 2008,” Center for Public Integrity, August 2, 2012, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/02/10554/us-nuclear-targeting-unaltered-2008.

5. Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005), 243.

6. Mikhail Gorbachev, “Mikhail Gorbachev Calls for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons as Soon as Possible,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117021711101593402.html.

7. President George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons,” Washington, D.C., September 27, 1991, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20035.

8. Cited in Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992 (Washington, D.C: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, 2012), http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/CSWMD-CaseStudy/CSWMD_CaseStudy-5.pdf.

9. Johan Bergenas, Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” James C. Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 2009), 44, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf.

10. Private discussion with author, March 2010, Washington, D.C.

11. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, i, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.

12. George Shultz, “Debating Obama’s New Nuclear Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304222504575174200114028206.html.

13. Philip Taubman, The Partnership (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 325.

14. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace,” Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130806.htm.

15. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 12.

16. John Cornyn, “New START in Strategic Context,” Floor Statement, United States Senate, December 22, 2010, http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=d12fd78a-5244-4336-9760-a26b9377ccc9.

17. Jon Kyl, “Keynote Address at Nixon Policy Conference,” Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2010.

18. Baker Spring and Ariel Cohen, “Beware the Next U.S.-Russian Arms Control Treaty,” Heritage Foundation, May 27, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/beware-the-next-us-russian-arms-control-treaty.

19. Daryl G. Kimball, Oliver Meier, and Paul Ingram, “NATO on Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Missed and Next Steps Forward,” Arms Control Now: Blog of the Arms Control Association, May 21, 2012, http://armscontrolnow.org/2012/05/21/nato-on-nuclear-weapons-opportunities-missed-and-next-steps-forward/.

20. NATO Press Release 063, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” May 20, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-193D7980-4A881D9C/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.

21. “U.S. Announces Withdrawal from ABM Treaty, Outlines a ‘New Triad,’” Disarmament Diplomacy 62 (January–February 2002), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd62/62nr02.htm.

22. National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, full English translation from Rossiiskaya Gazeta, January 18, 2000. Approved by Presidential Decree No. 1300 of December 17, 1999.

23. Yury Fedorov, “New Wine in Old Bottles: The New Salience of Nuclear Weapons,” Institut français des relations internationles, Fall 2007, http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/New_Wine_Fedorov_2007.pdf.

24. Pavel Podvig, “Instrumental Influences: Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 47, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2011.549170.

25. Podvig, “Instrumental Influences,” 40.

26. Alexei Arbatov, “Ratification of the Prague Treaty Is Only a State on a Long Path: What Strategy Will Russia Choose?” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Moscow, February 11, 2011, emphasis added.

29. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 2 (March/April 2012): 91, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/03/russia2012.php.

30. Kevin Rothrock, “Mitt Romney: The American Vladimir Zhirinovsky?” A Good Treaty, July 14, 2010, http://www.agoodtreaty.com/2010/07/14/mitt-romney-the-american-zhirinovsky/.

31. Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119542524645797257.html.

32. Scott D. Sagan and Jane Vaynman, “Conclusions: Lessons Learned from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 239–40.

35. Joseph Biden, remarks at Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia, March 10, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/10/vice-president-bidens-remarks-moscow-state-university.

36. Steven Pifer, “The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START,” Arms Control Series, Paper 4, Brookings Institution, November 2010, 8, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2010/11/12-arms-control-pifer/12_arms_control_pifer.pdf.

37. Ibid. Alexei Arbatov provides a lower estimate of 1,000 to 1,100 warheads on 200 ICBMs, 44–60 SLBMs, and 40–50 heavy bombers. See Alexei Arbatov, “Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/gambit_endgame.pdf. Estimates are counted according to New START counting rules. Russia has not released official estimates of its force composition.

38. U.S. Department of State, “International Security Advisory Board Report on Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions,” November 27, 2012, Washington, D.C., http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/201191.htm.

39. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn’t Match the Urgency of the Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578325912939001772.html.

1. Leah Fae Cochran provided substantial research work for this chapter as did Rizwan Ladha earlier. Both worked as research assistants at Ploughshares Fund.

2. Valerie Plame, interview, The Daily Beast TV, June 21, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/videos/2012/06/21/valerie-plame-on-pakistan-s-nuclear-program.html.

3. Jay Branegan, “You Could Call It the Wonk Wing,” Time, May 7, 2000, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,44567,00.html.

4. Vipin Narang, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability,” Belfer Center, January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19889/pakistans_nuclear_posture.html. For a more detailed argument, see Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 38–78, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38.

5. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Pakistan: Maybe Not the Best Country in Which to Store Nuclear Weapons,” The Atlantic, August 16, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/pakistan-maybe-not-the-best-country-in-which-to-store-nuclear-weapons/261222/.

6. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 4 (July 2011): 91–99, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91.full.

8. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production,” 2011, 11, http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr11.pdf.

9. Ibid.; and David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Construction Progressing Rapidly on the Fourth Heavy Water Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 21, 2012, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/construction-progressing-rapidly-on-the-fourth-heavy-water-reactor-at-the-k/12.

10. Based on calculations of 12–18 kg of HEU or 4–6 kg of plutonium per warhead. See Kristensen and Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011,” for methodology.

11. Kristensen and Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces,” 96.

13. See press release “Naval Chief Inaugurates Naval Strategic Force Headquarters,” Inter Services Public Relations, Release no. PR122/2012-ISPR, May 19, 2012, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2067.

14. Bruno Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2012, 1, http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305e17790.pdf.

15. Shuja Nawaz, “Misfire on Attacks on Pakistani Nukes!” Foreign Policy, August 14, 2009, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/14/misfire_on_attacks_on_pakistani_nukes.

16. Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, “Beware Decline in Pakistani relations,” Politico, May 16, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55014.html.

17. Fareed Zakaria, “The Radicalization of Pakistan’s Military,” Washington Post, June 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-radicalization-of-pakistans-military/2011/06/22/AGbCBSgH_story.html; Pervez Hoodbhoy, “A State of Denial,” New York Times, January 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/opinion/16iht-edhood.1.9260885.html.

18. Benazir Bhutto, interview, “Pakistan in Crisis,” CNN, November 5, 2007, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0711/05/sitroom.02.html.

19. Mariana Baabar, “Pak N-Safety Plan,” The News International, November 10, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=25470&Cat=13&dt=11/10/2009.

20. Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” CTC Sentinel, June 1, 2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-tactics-in-pakistan-threaten-nuclear-weapons-safety.

21. Elaine Grossman, “Mullen: Pakistani Nuclear Controls Should Avert Any Insider Threat,” Global Security Newswire, July 8, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110708_3987.php.

22. Toby Dalton, Mark Hibbs, and George Perkovich, “A Criteria-Based Approach to Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 22, 2011, 12, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nsg_criteria.pdf.

23. Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes,” 15.

24. “Pakistani President Defends Nuclear Arsenal Security,” Global Security Newswire, April 27, 2009, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-president-defends-nuclear-arsenal-security/.

25. Hillary Clinton, interview, “Spiegel Interview with Secretary of State Clinton,” Der Spiegel, November 15, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-661188,00.html.

26. “State Dept. Says Pakistani Nukes Are Secure,” Global Security Newswire, June 22, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110622_2687.php.

27. Grossman, “Mullen: Pakistani Nuclear Controls Should Avert Any Insider Threat.”

28. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (RL34248) May 10, 2012, 18, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/169328.pdf.

30. Tom Hundley, “Race to the End,” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end.

31. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 18.

32. Paul R. Brass, “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: Means, Methods, And Purposes,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (2003): 71–101, http://faculty.washington.edu/brass/Partition.pdf.

33. For a discussion of how Pakistan’s identity affects security calculations, see Stephen P. Cohen, “The Nation and State of Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 109–22.

34. Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (New York: Harper, 2008), 165–166.

35. “The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,” in A Country Study: Pakistan (Washington: D.C.: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2011), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pktoc.html.

36. Office of the Historian, telegram, “Dissent from U.S. Policy Towards East Pakistan,” in Foreign Relations of the United States Series: South Asia Crisis, 1969–1972, Department of State, April 6, 1971, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d19.

37. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme and Imports,” in Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 16, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-programme-and-imports-/.

38. Although a U.S. Intelligence Estimate concluded as early as 1986 that Pakistan could assemble a weapon within two weeks if it choose to do so, the Reagan administration had been assuring Congress that there was not a Pakistani bomb program. This was because U.S. aid to the mujahedeen fighting the Russians in Afghanistan could only be dispersed per the Pressler amendment if a president could certify that Pakistan didn’t have a nuclear program. In 1987, in the heat of the Brasstacks crisis, A. Q. Khan told a journalist that Pakistan had the ability to build a weapon. Faced with this conundrum, Reagan choose to use the waiver for national security interest built into the Pressler amendment and continued aid to Pakistan despite the program. See Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 284–86.

39. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 195.

42. Walter C. Lagwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 158, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf.

45. The visiting group, the Landau Network–Centro Volta, is a group of international experts based in Italy who support global security, disarmament, and cooperation. See http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/.

46. Lagwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars,” 168. See also Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes,” 3.

47. Tom Hundley, “Race to the End,” Foreign Policy, September 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end.

48. “WikiLeaks: U.S. on Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine,” December 2, 2010, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/wikileaks-us-on-indian-army-s-cold-start-doctrine-69859?cp.

49. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme and Imports,” 33.

50. Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 91.

52. Tertrais, “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks,” 3, citing N. Salik, Minimum Deterrence and India Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan (Como: Landau Network-Centro Volta, 2006), 14, http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/01.%20Naeem%20Salik-Minimum%20deterrence%20and%20India%20Pakistan%20dialogie,%20PAKISTAN.%20Case%20Study%202006.pdf.

53. Johnsthon Marcus, “Will India’s Missile Test Trigger Arms Race with China?” BBC News, April 20, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17770586.

54. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “India’s Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2011 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011).

55. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s Nuclear Forces 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 3 (July 2012), http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/4/96.full.

56. “France Sells Nuclear-Capable Aircraft to India,” Global Security Newswire, February 7, 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/france-sells-nuclear-capable-aircraft-india/.

57. “India Test Launches Agni-V Long-Range Missile,” BBC News, April 19, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17765653.

58. “India to Achieve N-arm Triad in February,” Times of India, January 2, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-02/india/30580966_1_ins-arihant-first-indigenous-nuclear-submarine-akula-ii.

59. Norris and Kristensen, “India’s Nuclear Forces 2010,” 76.

60. Jamal Afrifi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070.

61. “West Worried by China-Pakistan atomic Ties—Sources,” Reuters, June 27, 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/nuclear-china-pakistan-idINL6E8HR8SL20120627.

62. James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “China and Pakistan: An Alliance Is Built,” Financial Times, June 30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/417a48c4-a34d-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NGlLavzb.

63. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, pbk. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 160.

64. Ismail Khan, “Prison Term for Helping CIA Find bin Laden,” New York Times, May 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/asia/doctor-who-helped-find-bin-laden-given-jail-term-official-says.html.

65. Bruce Riedel, “How to Repair the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship,” The Daily Beast, June 4, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/04/how-to-repair-the-u-s-pakistan-relationship.html.

66. Eric Schmidt “Pakistan Opens NATO Supply Line as Clinton Apologizes,” New York Times, July 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/asia/pakistan-opens-afghan-routes-to-nato-after-us-apology.html; Marcus Weisgerber, “Alternate Afghan Supply Route Tab: $2.1 Billion,” Military Times, June 30, 2012, http://militarytimes.com/news/2012/06/military-afghanistan-tab-alternate-supply-route-063012d/.

67. Vali Nasr, “No More Bullying Pakistan,” Bloomberg News, July 5, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-05/u-s-apology-ends-doomed-policy-of-bullying-pakistan-vali-nasr.html.

68. Mike Shuster, “Hard Questions Remain in U.S.-Pakistan Relations.” Morning Edition, NPR, July 11, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/156578951/hard-questions-remain-in-u-s-pakistan-relations.

69. For a detailed treatment of A. Q. Khans’ proliferation of nuclear weapons, see David Albright, Peddling Peril (New York: Free Press, 2010).

70. U.S. Department of State, “International Security Advisory Board Report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy,” October 9, 2012, Washington, D.C., http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/199411.htm.

73. Richard L. Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Independent Task Force Report no. 65 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010).

75. “Clever Steps at the Border,” The Economist, May 12, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21554526.

77. Haris Anwar and Augustine Anthony, “India, Pakistan Relax Visa Requirements as Part of Peace Process,” Bloomberg, September 9, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-09/india-pakistan-relax-visa-requirements-as-part-of-peace-process.html.

78. Moeed Yusuf, “The Silver Bullet: India-Pakistan Normalization,” U.S. Institute of Peace, May 23, 2011, http://www.usip.org/publications/the-silver-bullet-india-pakistan-normalization.

79. Daniel Markey, “How Cuts Affect U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 11, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/cuts-affect-us-pakistan-ties/p25453.

80. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 317.

81. Jayshree Bajoria, “Backgrounder: Pakistan’s Education System and Links to Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 7, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-education-system-links-extremism/p20364.

82. Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 111th Cong., S. 1707, GovTrack, October 2, 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1707.

83. “Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers: What the United States Spends in Pakistan,” Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/pakistan/numbers.

84. International Crisis Group, “Reforming Pakistan’s Electoral System,” Asia Report no. 203, March 30, 2011, 26, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/203%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Electoral%20System.ashx.

85. Robert D. Lamb and Sadika Hameed, “Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 16, 2011, 12, http://csis.org/files/publication/120610_Lamb_SubnatGovernPakistan_web.pdf.

86. Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, R41856, April 10, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf.

87. Armitage and Berger, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, 50.

88. Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 134; Shuja Nawaz, Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous U.S.-Pakistan Relationship (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2010), 18.

89. Yusuf, “The Silver Bullet.”

90. Armitage and Berger, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, 53.

91. Alex Rodriguez, “For Troops on the Siachen Glacier, the Elements Are the Enemy,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/20/world/la-fg-pakistan-glacier-soldiers-20120520.

92. “India, Pakistan Begin Siachen Talks,” AFP, June 11, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/391988/india-pakistan-begin-siachen-talks/.

93. Micheal Krepon, “Catch and Release,” Arms Control Wonk, September 10, 2012, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3531/catch-and-release#more-2770.

94. Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 128–29.

95. International Crisis Group, “Reforming Pakistan’s Electoral System,” 25–26.

96. Armitage and Berger, U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, 53.

97. Daniel Painter, “Why the U.S. Cannot Ignore Pakistan,” American Security Project, September 6, 2012, http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200081%20-%20Why%20the%20U.S.%20cannot%20ignore%20Pakistan.pdf.

98. Moeed Yusuf, “Stability in the Nuclear Context: Making South Asians Safe,” Jinnah Institute, 6, http://www.jinnah-institute.org/images/ji_policybrief_nuclear_security_jan-25-2011.pdf.

99. “Pakistan, India Agree to Set Up Hotline on Terror,” Pak Tribune, March 30, 2011, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?237715; Justin Huggler, “India and Pakistan to Have Nuclear Hotline,” The Independent, June 21, 2004; Yusuf, “Stability in the Nuclear Context,” 6.

100. Mohammed Badrul Alam, “CBMs in South and Northeast Asia: The Sum of Two Parts,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, July 16, 2004, http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/cbms-in-south-asia-and-northeast-asia-the-sum-of-1436.html.

101. Dalton, Hibbs, and Perkovich, “A Criteria-Based Approach,” 5.

102. A. H. Nayyar, M. V. Ramana and Zia Mian, “Fukushima lessons,” Dawn, March 27, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/2011/03/27/fukushima-lessons.html.

103. “Ottawa Dialogue Recommends Nuclear Agreements for India and Pakistan,” press release, University of Ottawa, July 13, 2011, http://www.uottawa.ca/media/media-release-2370.html.

104. Yusuf, “The Silver Bullet: India-Pakistan Normalization.”

105. Nawaz, Pakistan in the Danger Zone, 18.

106. Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 138.

107. Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 8.

108. Dalton, Hibbs, and Perkovich, “A Criteria-Based Approach,” 2–3.

109. Armitage and Berger, “U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” 52.

1. This chapter is based on my “The Impact of Nuclear Posture on Non-Proliferation,” in In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture, Selected Contributions by the Experts of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 193-200, http://www.usip.org/files/In%20the%20Eyes%20of%20the%20Experts%20full.pdf. I served as an expert advisor to the commission.

2. Cited by Jeffrey Lewis, “Diplomacy 101,” Arms Control Wonk, August 2, 2012, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5547/diplomacy-101.

3. “Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, December 15, 2008.

4. Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate: Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences,” no. 100-2-58, July 1, 1958, 2, 17.

6. Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate: Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the U.S. and UK,” No. 4-3-61, September 1961, 5.

10. The Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, “A Report to the President,” U.S. State Department (Gilpatric Report), January 21, 1965, 7.

15. Office of Political Research, “Eight Years Later: New ‘Threshold States’ Research Study, ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation’: The Politics of Limited Choice,” Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1975.

16. National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, 7.

17. The ten countries known to have nuclear weapons or believed to be seeking them are, in order of acquisition: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran.

18. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 15.

20. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, 12, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.

1. Colin H. Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next? (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2013), 10.

3. Phillip Yun, “Don’t Ignore North Korea,” The Hill, February 6, 2012, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/208999-dont-ignore-north-korea.

4. Mark Hibbs, “Assessing UN Trade Sanctions on North Korea,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 3, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/03/assessing-nuclear-trade-sanctions-on-north-korea/cj1h.

5. Paul Carroll, “The Mouse That Keeps Roaring: The United States, China, and Solving the North Korea Challenge,” Yale Journal of International Affairs (September 2012), http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/the-mouse-that-keeps-roaring-the-united-states-china-and-solving-the-north-korean-challenge/.

6. The range of estimates depends on how much plutonium North Korea may have produced and how much plutonium North Korea uses in its warheads. An estimate of 2 kg of plutonium per warhead yields a higher number of warheads; an estimate of 4 kg, fewer warheads. David Albright and Christina Walrond, “North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 16, 2012, 2, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_production_16Aug2012.pdf.

7. Siegfried S. Hecker, “What to Expect from a North Korean Nuclear Test,” ForeignPolicy.com, February 4, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/what_to_expect_from_a_north_korean_nuclear_test.

8. Michael Mazarr and James E. Goodby, “Redefining the Role of Deterrence,” in Deterrence: Its Past and Future, ed. George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby (Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2011), 63.

9. Siegfried S. Hecker, “What I Found in North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67023/siegfried-s-hecker/what-i-found-in-north-korea?page=2.

10. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Foreign Policy in the New Millennium: Results of the 2012 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, Dina Smeltz, project director (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2012), http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task%20Force%20Reports/2012_CCS_Report.pdf.

11. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011), 47.

13. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General of the IAEA, September 2, 2011, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-54.pdf.

14. Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge: Understanding Military Options Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 112th Cong. (June 20, 2012) (testimony of David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security).

16. Benjamin Netanyahu, speech to AIPAC, March 5, 2012. See transcript at http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahus-speech-at-aipac-full-text/.

17. Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2012): http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran.

18. Cited in Friends Committee on National Legislation, “U.S., Israeli Security Officials Warn Against Attacking Iran,” 2012, http://fcnl.org/issues/iran/us_israeli_security_officials_warn_against_war_with_iran/index.html.

19. Cited in Matt Duss, “The Neocons’ Big Iran Lie,” Salon.com, February 10, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/02/10/the_neocons_big_iran_lie/.

20. Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2012), 34, http://www.cnas.org/riskandrivalry.

21. Hillary Clinton, interview, The Charlie Rose Show, June 20, 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/06/21/504179/clinton-iran-hard-liners-attack-legitimize-regime/.

22. Yossi Melman, “Former Mossad chief: Israel air strike on Iran is the ‘stupidest thing I’ve ever heard’,” Haaretz, May 7, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/former-mossad-chief-israel-air-strike-on-iran-stupidest-thing-i-have-ever-heard-1.360367.

23. Bill Keller, “Nuclear Mullahs,” New York Times, September 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/opinion/keller-nuclear-mullahs.html.

24. Comments of Zbigniew Brzezinski, November 27, 2012, National Iranian American Council, http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8713.

25. General John Dempsey, CNN Global Public Square, February 17, 2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/17/watch-gps-martin-dempsey-on-syria-iran-and-china/.

26. Fareed Zakaria, “Iran is a ‘Rational Actor,” CNN Global Public Square Blog, March 8, 2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/08/zakaria-iran-is-a-rational-actor/.

27. Bill Keller, “Nuclear Mullahs, Continued,” New York Times, September 12, 2012, http://keller.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/nuclear-mullahs-continued.

28. I developed this analysis with my colleague Andrew Grotto while serving as vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress in the study, Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2007/02/28/2682/contain-and-engage-a-new-strategy-for-resolving-the-nuclear-crisis-with-iran/.

29. David Holloway, “Deterrence and Enforcement,” in Deterrence: Its Past and Future, ed. George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, and James E. Goodby (Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2011).

30. Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Mathews, Rose Gottemoeller, George Perkovich, and Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, 2007), 14.

32. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Romania, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and Yugoslavia.

33. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.

34. Cirincione et al., Universal Compliance, 24.

35. Barack Obama, remarks at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium, National War College, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium.

1. Kennette Benedict, “Democracy and the Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 15, 2012, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kennette-benedict/democracy-and-the-bomb.

2. This chapter is adapted from a paper, “Impact Philanthropy: How Strategic Grants Can Impact National Security Strategy,” prepared for the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, winter 2013.

3. Ford Foundation, Mission Statement, http://www.fordfoundation.org/about-us/mission.

4. MacArthur Foundation press release, “MacArthur Awards $13.4 Million to Study and Support Enhanced Nuclear Security,” March 22, 2012, http://www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/macarthur-awards-13-million-study-and-support-enhanced-nuclear-security/.

5. Robert Gallucci, “The Challenges of Philanthropic Leadership,” Conversations with History, University of California Television, July 23, 2012, http://uctv.tv/shows/The-Challenges-of-Philanthropic-Leadership-with-Robert-Gallucci-Conversations-with-History-24001.

6. Paul Brest and Hal Harvey, Money Well Spent: A Strategic Plan for Smart Philanthropy, (New York: Bloomberg Press, 2008), 28.

9. Josh Rogin, “Arms Control Leaders Convene Major Strategy Session,” The Cable, January 12, 2010, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/12/arms_control_leaders_convene_major_strategy_session.

10. Naila Bolus, “A Policy Victory Offers a Blueprint for Grant Makers and Advocacy,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 27, 2011, http://philanthropy.com/article/A-Policy-Victory-Offers-a/128008/.

11. The MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Foundation, Prospect Hill Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Winston Foundation also funded the campaign after it began. The campaign operated from December 1, 1993 until it disbanded on July 31, 1995, having achieved its goal.

12. Rogin, “Arms Control Leaders.”

13. Bolus, “A Policy Victory.”

14. From unpublished analysis, ReThink Media, “Post START Analysis—Print Outreach Revisited,” February 2011.

15. ReThink Media, “Post START Analysis.”

16. The Ploughshares Fund website is www.ploughshares.org.

17. Brest and Harvey, Money Well Spent, 6.

18. See Joseph Cirincione, “A Victory for Good Government,” Ploughshares Fund blog, September 23, 2012, http://www.ploughshares.org/blog/2012-09-23/victory-good-government.

19. For more on the strategic and budgetary analysis motivating the campaign, see Joseph Cirincione, “The Fiscal Logic of Zero,” Brown Journal of World Affairs (Spring/Summer 2011), http://bjwa.org/article.php?id=8ckn4rGp5fRKPQ9cpeFdT6DmLC6sJ4dY3QakmNyI.

20. Laura Secor, “Road Show,” The New Yorker, October 8, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2012/10/08/121008taco_talk_secor.

21. Data are derived from an unpublished report by Carah Ong of the Peace and Security Funders Group, “Nuclear Funding, 2008–2011.” The group is a collaboration of funders initiated by Ploughshares Fund, but the foundation had no influence over the study or its conclusions.

22. John Tirman, “Private Wealth and Public Power in the Search for Peace,” Dublin Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research, July 2000, 2, 3, http://www.johntirman.com/ISTR%20paper.pdf.

26. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “Whither the Role of Private Foundations in Support of International Security Policy?” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2002): 86, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91wall.pdf.