On the contrary, had Operation Hercules been allowed to proceed as intended, in July 1942, it probably would have succeeded, despite the Allies’ intelligence edge, because the British were still too low on men and equipment. The island’s 25,000 defenders would have nonetheless cost the Axis invaders dear, just as Hitler anticipated. Italian occupation of Malta at this time would have unquestionably prolonged the fighting in the Mediterranean and North African theaters, but not necessarily won them for Mussolini. The Americans were becoming adept at island-hopping, and could have just as surely taken Malta, as they did Pantelleria.

Even so, Italian forces could have seized Malta with ease if they invaded when it was deeply understrength during early summer 1940. Some Commando Supremo strategists had, in fact, insisted upon the island’s early capture as a precondition for Mediterranean victory. To be sure, Malta’s occupation before it was properly fortified would have guaranteed safe passage of Italian convoys, the life-blood of Axis forces in North Africa, throughout the desert campaign. The poor performance of Italian arms in France at this time, however, suggests an invasion of Malta would not have succeeded.

Before the decoding intercepts of ULTRA finally sealed Mussolini’s doom, the most decisive moment for Italian fortunes came in Libya during September 1940, when Graziani refused to maintain the momentum of his offensive. He may have been right to pause for resupply, but missed his best chance for success by waiting for the British to re-take the initiative. Had the Marshal resumed his attack in October, his men would have found General Wavell’s forces far more unready for battle than suspected. By year’s end, the Italians would have likely been in Alexandria, and driven their enemies from Egypt.

Commando Supremo could then have focused on Gibraltar in early 1941. Its capture or neutralization would have allowed Regia Marina surface ships access to the Atlantic Ocean, where the Royal Navy would have been hard-pressed between the Italian High Seas Fleet and the German Kriegsmarine. Great Britain could have been strangled into defeat before America’s official entry into the war after 7 December. With North Africa in Axis hands, the Regia Aeronautica and Esercito would have been free to devote the bulk of their forces to fighting the Soviets, who might have cracked under the added pressure of Italian planes and troops.

These speculations are by no means far-fetched. Although some are closer to the realm of probability than others, any one of them might have drastically altered the final outcome of Mussolini’s War. But winning it for him was not everything. He believed in a kind of parallel world, the flip-side of Earthly existence, where Fascism lived on undiminished by transitory military outcome.

“We have created our own myth,” he declared in 1935. “This myth is a faith, it is passion. It is not necessary that it shall be a reality. It is a reality by the fact that it is good, a hope, a faith, that it is courage.”²

Hope he never lost, and courage his soldiers never lacked.