The British were not slow to act after Italy’s declaration of war on 10 June. The next day, their armored cars raced across the Egyptian frontier into Libya, ambushing and destroying unarmed Italian trucks near Fort Capuzzo. After three days of fierce fighting, Capuzzo and another Italian fort (Maddalena) were captured. While units of the British Army and the RAF launched a series of relentless raids throughout the Italian-held territories, British engineers excavated a powerful defensive line at Mersa Matruh, 483 kilometers west of the Suez Canal. The conquest of North and East Africa was under way.
Responding to these incursions, Mussolini and his General Staff devised a strategy calling for a massed offensive of infantry, accompanied by anti-tank guns and field artillery screened by advancing units of tanks, and covered by fighters and bombers of the Regia Aeronautica. They had high hopes for the campaign, so long as the initiative was maintained. A prolonged struggle would only work to the advantage of the British, who were richer in war materials. Unlike the undersupplied divisions hastily thrown together for the invasion of France, Italian forces in Africa had had four years to organize and equip themselves since the capture of Ethiopia. They comprised fourteen divisions divided between the 10th Army in the east and the 5th Army in the west.
The Armata Azzurra, as the Italian Air Force was known in North Africa, was not, however, very substantial. Just 88 fighters–all of them Fiat CR.32 and CR.42 biplanes–accompanied 125 bombers. Britain’s Western Desert Air Force was only slightly larger and no less antiquated, with heavy reliance of its own biplane, the Gloster Gladiator. Combined British forces totaled 86,000 infantry against Italy’s 280,000 troops. Equipment disparity was yet more uneven. Against 1,500 Italian guns, the British had 150 of field artillery, and their 45 tanks faced 300 operated by the Italians.
Mussolini’s forces seemed overwhelmingly strong. But appearances were misleading. With few exceptions, like their Sahariana armored cars, virtually all their weapons were obsolete, poorly manufactured, and unreliable. Their machine-gun, the ‘knuckle-busting’ 8mm M1935 Fiat Revelli, was an updated version of an early World War One-vintage original, given to unexpectedly ‘cook off’ rounds chambered during lulls in operation. Italian armor was sub-standard. The M13 was supposed to be a medium tank, but was small enough to pass for a featherweight in most other armies.
British equipment was not much better, however. The Matilda, a strong, powerful tank, was nevertheless a ponderous, easy target, unable to keep up with the faster Cruiser Mk 6, itself dogged by mechanical breakdowns which often left it vulnerable. Worse for the Italians, 70% of their armies in Africa were made up of native troops. While known to generally fight well in close combat, they could be counted upon to panic under an artillery barrage or aerial assault. Moreover, they could hardly have been expected to serve with much enthusiasm or loyalty for their European conquerors. The British operated far fewer colonials in their ground forces, and possessed a decided technological advantage, at least in the air. Their Supermarine Spitfires outclassed anything flown by the Regia Aeronautica. Aware of these dire difficiencies, Mussolini dispatched an extra squadron of improved M-11 medium tanks to Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, commanding his armies in Libya.
Graziani began the invasion of Egypt on 13 September, intending to squeeze the enemy between both offensives. His five divisions with 200 tanks stormed across the border, taking Sollum, while the British Western Desert Force, consisting of the 7th Armored and 4th Indian Divisions, fell back. Just two days later, the Italians had penetrated sixty miles, overrunning Sidi Barrani. After four days on the march, Graziani halted the 10th Army eighty miles west of British defenses dug in at Mersa Matruh. He complained of the heat and anti-tank guns that awaited his armor, suggesting the offensive be renewed in October when his equipment replacements would be completed.
“That might be too late!” the Duce railed at him. He agreed that the struggle was difficult, and losses would probably be high. But the Italians must not lose their momentum now. “He who advances to the attack with decisiveness has victory already in his grasp!” The Italian 10th Army, seven divisions strong, must push on another 480 kilometers to capture the port of Alexandria, still under defended. With its seizure, the Campaign would be as good as won. 1940 was its best and perhaps only chance to succeed. “Time is working against us,” Mussolini urged Marshal Graziani. “The loss of Egypt will be the coup de gröce for Great Britain.”2 Still, Graziani hesitated, while Mussolini fumed helplessly and sent him more supplies.
The Duce’s impatience was not without cause. During late August, in the very midst of the Battle of Britain, when her every resource was pressed to the limit, Britain dispatched a large convoy carrying abundant munitions, artillery, aircraft, and 150 tanks to their beleaguered forces in North Africa. Since the Italian Navy still dominated the Mediterranean Sea, British freighters had to be routed the long, time-consuming way around the Cape of Good Hope. Mussolini knew that a fat convoy was on its way that would tip the scales against him. The moment to resume the attack was now or never.
Finally re-equipped with additional armor and Fiat CR-42 fighters, Marshal Graziani relit the offensive with initially good success, only to halt again after a few days, this time to build a series of fortified camps, allowing General Wavell, commanding British forces, opportunity to organize his own counter-attack. The Duce was furious, and demanded the advance be resumed at once. Incredibly, Graziani refused. Time, as Mussolini argued, was running out for the Italians in North Africa. On 24 September, more than a month after it set out, the heavy-laden convoy reached the British Western Desert Force. Wavell now had 31,000 troops, 120 guns, sixty armored cars, 150 aircraft, and 275 tanks, including fifty new Matildas and 100 Cruisers. Meanwhile, Graziani, still reluctant to resume the attack, worked at strengthening and expanding his fortified camps around Sidi Barrani.
Faced with an insubordinate commander and a re-supplied enemy, Mussolini was desperate to do something that would re-tilt the balance of the desert struggle in his favor. A lone alternative seemed to be a bold operation that must irk the only other major European power on Italy’s side, while risking yet another military humiliation. Yet, if it succeeded in its ulterior purpose, the effort would justify all sacrifices. Accordingly, he decided to invade Greece as a major diversionary strategy, hoping the British would draw away enough of their forces to make a critical difference in Africa. Italian reversals in Greece would even work on behalf of the diversion, making it yet more alluring to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, himself short of victories these days.