With steady deterioration of relations between Italy and the Western Allies after 1938’s Czech Crisis, Mussolini ordered the chiefs of his armed forces to consider their strategic options for a general European war. Among the criteria military analysts at the Regia Marina cited as essential for a prolonged confrontation with the French and British fleets was capture of Malta. Britain’s island-fortress lay at the very heart of any struggle for control of the Central Mediterranean, and was particularly dangerous to Italy, whose southern territories were within striking range of air attacks.
Malta was an indispensible stop-over for Allied planes flying from Britain, via Gibraltar, to the Near East. All Italian movements came under observation from the centrally located island, from which a wide range of interdiction could be launched against Italy itself. Most importantly, each attempt at supplying Italian holdings in Libya had to run the gauntlet of bombers and warships stationed at Malta. Consequently, its early seizure was of paramount importance, and naval planners in Rome submitted their proposals for invasion.
Their British Admiralty counterparts, however, were no less cognizant of the island’s pivotal significance in the event of a serious contest for domination of both North Africa and Southern Europe. During the years leading up to the Second World War, they bolstered its potential for both defensive and offensive operations aimed at the destruction of Italian sea power and assaults against the peninsula. Aware of Britain’s on-going preparations to render Malta impregnable, Commando Supremo strategists knew its occupation could not be undertaken by the Navy alone, but required strong support from air power.
Almost as soon as the invasion scheme was presented to Mussolini for his approval, he knew it would not work. His Air Force commanders told him that they could spare, at most, only 100 warplanes, all of obsolete types, for any Maltese conquest until 1942, when modern aircraft production was supposed to be in full swing. If war came sooner, he planned to throw the bulk of the entire Regia Aeronautica at Malta in a temporary, massive, concerted assault sufficient to soften it up for the Regia Marina to put troops ashore. As a more realistic alternative to staking all his hopes on such a risky, uncertain operation, he suggested that Malta could be avoided entirely by re-routing supply convoys to French Tunisia, a far less formidable conquest. Italian North African forces already in place would require no outside assistance and greatly outnumber the French defenders.
These contingencies were sound, even admirable in the context of the times when they were discussed. But 1940’s swift flow of events threw them all into a cocked hat. While the sudden fall of France reduced Italy’s enemies by half, Hitler had meanwhile crafted a delicate accord with the French aimed at eventually winning them over as allies in his war against the British Empire. Hence, the Führer refrained from occupying most of France, proffered an unexpectedly generous armistice at Compiegne, arranged for the eventual return of all French prisoners-of-war, and kept his hands off the French Fleet. To court its voluntary participation required the good will of its commanders, so he was anxious not to offend Gallic sensibilities whenever possible. The seizure of French West Africa by Mussolini, his closest ideological ally, would ruin all diplomatic efforts to curry favor with Germany’s traditional enemy.