CHAPTER ONE

The Sick Man

‘Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade – un homme gravement malade…’
[We have on our hands a sick man – a very sick man]

Czar Nicholas I referring to the Ottoman Empire during conversations (the ‘Seymour Conversations’) with Sir George Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador to St Petersburg on 9, 14 and 20 January 1853.1

‘We have cured the sick man.’

Enver Pasa, commenting on the CUP-driven overthrow of the Ottoman government, from Koprulu (Veles) in the Kosovo vilayet (now Macedonia) on 23 July 1908.²

IN 1911 Europe was divided, formally and informally and with some wriggle room as it would be termed today, into two Great Power blocs; the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, and the Triple Entente consisting of Britain, France and Russia. Three of these Great Powers, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, were basically intra-European Empires – though Germany had extensive territories in Africa and the Pacific - whilst the others had extra-European Empires. The largest of these was the British, closely followed by the French. Italy, the least of the Great Powers, had very little empire at all.

There was one other power that, if not included amongst those deemed Great, was nevertheless of vital importance in terms of the relationships between the two blocs; the Ottoman Empire, often, if strictly incorrectly, referred to as Turkey. This importance may perhaps be expressed in the term the ‘Eastern Question,’ which mainly concerned itself with the matter of what might, or should, happen to the Ottoman’s Balkan territories if and when the Empire disintegrated?³ That the Ottoman Empire was in a state of decay, and had been characterized from before the Crimean War as being akin to a ‘sick man’ in danger of imminent death, was a proposition accepted by the Great Powers.⁴ This decline had been gradual and had taken place against a high point probably reached during the 16th century. It has been argued that, between 1526 and 1596, there was no question of international politics with which it was not involved. In other words it was a world power at a period when those territories that bound the Mediterranean formed a significant portion of the world. During the early period of the reign of Sultan Suleiman I, who ruled from 1520-1566 and whose appellations included the ‘Magnificent’ and the ‘Lawgiver’, great advances in Ottoman power had been made. These included the conquest of Rhodes, the capture of Buda in 1529 (though the same year also saw defeat at Vienna) and the annexation of Hungary in 1541. These successes however were the high points of Ottoman expansion and despite the conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 – the last great military success – the years 1565 and 1566 marked the beginning of a halt in Ottoman advances, and thus the start of a decline, albeit a very slow one, in the fortunes of the Empire.

Ottoman expansion and conquest into the Balkan region had resulted in a complex mosaic of ethnic, national, and religious rivalries in that region. The dynamics of this might be exemplified by considering the history of the city of Belgrade, which is situated at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers and therefore in a position of immense strategic importance. Following the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmed II advanced northward, unsuccessfully besieging Belgrade in 1456. Some 65 years later, in 1521, an Ottoman force reckoned to be some 250,000 strong under Sultan Suleiman I marched on the city and this time succeeded in taking it before moving on into Central Europe. It was not until the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1688 that Belgrade again became a focus of battle, being conquered by the forces of the Holy League towards the end of that year. The Ottomans returned two years later, taking the city again on 14 October 1690 after a six-day siege. Prince Eugene of Savoy though, in a brilliant military action, retook it in 1717. However, by the Treaty (sometimes called the Peace) of Belgrade in 1739, Austria returned the fortress to the Ottomans and accepted the Danube-Sava River as delineating the common frontier. During the Austro-Turkish War of 1787–1791, Belgrade changed hands yet again, in 1789, but under the 1791 Treaty of Sistova which ended the conflict the Ottoman Empire once again took possession. Serbia won a degree of autonomy from the Ottoman Empire following the two uprisings comprising the Serbian Revolution (1804-1817) and Belgrade became its capital.

The slow Ottoman retreat from areas they once held had led to encroachments and competition from the empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia, and the rise of independent states. Of the latter, Greece fought its war of independence between 1821 and 1829, whilst Montenegro achieved de facto independence in 1858 after Great Power intervention to demarcate its borders with the Ottoman Empire.

Bulgaria declared itself an independent state in 1908 following the ‘Young Turk’ revolution, of which more later. As previously noted, the Great Powers were keenly interested in maintaining stability in the region and they attempted to set limits on the extent of the independent states. However the annexation of Bosnia, or more properly Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Austria-Hungary precipitating the Bosnian, or Annexation, Crisis,5 caused a strong reaction from Russia, which saw its influence in the region as being seriously weakened.

Bosnia was deemed legally, if not factually, to be a part of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman suzerainty had been affirmed in 1856 when Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, the Italian state of Piedmont-Sardinia and Russia, which was forced to terms by the outcome of the Crimean War, had signed the Treaty of Paris. Modifications to this treaty were however made in 1878 at the Berlin Conference. This had been convened following the uproar caused by the aftermath of the April Uprising of 1876, when a revolt took place in what is now the Pazardzhik Province of Bulgaria against the Ottomans. Perhaps because the insurrectionists were Christians, who reportedly indulged in massacres of Muslims, the insurrection was savagely repressed. Subsequent reports of horrendous retaliatory massacres of Christians by Muslim forces, including the much-feared irregular ‘bashibazouks,’ caused a furore in Western Europe. Though the Uprising was a failure – indeed a tragic failure for the Christian victims, of whom somewhere between 3,7006 and 15,000⁷ were barbarously murdered – publicity concerning the reprisals led to general European demands for reform of the Ottoman Empire. In perhaps more concrete terms, it also led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, which ended in Turkish defeat.

This upset of the ‘balance of power’ – Russia was thought to have gained unduly by the other Great Powers – caused the convening of the Congress of Berlin, which in turn resulted in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Under the terms of the treaty Romania, which had been formed from the regions of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1861, became independent, as did Serbia and Montenegro. Bulgaria became an autonomous region, and Austria-Hungary took over the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the latter portion of which had also risen in the Herzegovinian Rebellion of 1875, whilst much the same arrangement was imposed in terms of Cyprus and Britain. There were other complexities that need not detain us overmuch, but that the Ottoman Empire was greatly injured in several contexts is generally accepted by scholars.⁸

Neither was Balkan stability ensured. Indeed, despite agreeing to the transfer beforehand, the way the 1908 Bosnian Annexation was handled gave rise to Russian anxieties concerning Austro-Hungarian expansionism, and, because it was felt to have been humiliating to Russian diplomacy, hardened attitudes for the future. Despite then the matter being not much more than a legal or constitutional nicety, merely overturning as it did the rather ephemeral notion of Ottoman suzerainty, it nevertheless had the potential to lead to conflict between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Russia on the other. It was also a serious blow to Serbia, being perceived as a major impediment to territorial aspirations.⁹ This was a factor, but only one of several, that pushed Russia and Serbia together in opposition to Austria-Hungary. A further potential source of conflict came the same year with Bulgaria declaring independence. Though, again, the difference between autonomy and outright independence was perhaps more apparent than real, it again had the effect of increasing the likelihood of tension between Austria-Hungary and Russia. This in turn, because of the system of alliances and blocs, had the potential to instigate a general conflagration. Indeed, the great Otto von Bismarck had supposedly predicted such a scenario at the end of the previous century; ‘If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans.’¹⁰ On this occasion however diplomacy succeeded in resolving the effects of the Bosnian Crisis, though relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia were, and remained, somewhat damaged.

The nominal loss of Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina greatly diminished the European territory remaining in Ottoman possession. Indeed, following the actions of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary in 1908, the only Ottoman possessions left in mainland Europe were Eastern Thrace, a territory corresponding more or less to today’s Trakya, and the vilayet (province) of Salonika. There were also the vilayets of Manastir, skodra, Shkoder and Yanya (roughly corresponding to modern day Albania), as well as the vilayets of Kosovo (approximately corresponding to the modern-day entity) and Selanik. Portions of these territories were also known as Macedonia, though not by the Ottomans who strictly forbade use of the term.¹¹ To the Ottomans the European portions of their empire were dubbed Rumelia; ‘the land of the Romans’.

The Ottomans also retained provinces in North Africa, the pertinent one in the current context being the vilayet of Tripoli (Trablusgarp (Trablus-i Garb); Tripoli in the West to differentiate it from the vilayet of the same name (Trablus-ı am or Trablus-am; Tripoli near Damascus) in what is now Lebanon and Syria). Tripoli was not a single geographical unit, but was made up of several parts or regions, which differed in many important respects. Tripolitania, also often known as Tripoli, consisted of the coastal territory from the Tunisian frontier to the Gulf of Sidra. To the east of this was Cyrenaica, also known as Ben Ghazi or Barca, which is bounded to the south by the Libyan Desert. To the south of Tripolitania was Fezzan (Fazzan, Fezan), ‘the southern province of Tripoli – a collection of oases separated from the coast region by the stony desert, or Hamada-el-Homra.’12 Politically, Tripolitania and Fezzan on the one hand, and Cyrenaica on the other, had been divided into separate provinces and then reunited on a number of occasions since the 1830s. Between 1836 and 1863, Cyrenaica was a subcounty, or qaimmaqamiyya, linked to the province, or the iyala, of Tripoli, but in the period between 1863 and 1872, it became an independent county, or mutasarrifiyya, directly tied to the imperial capitol, Istanbul. Later, between 1872 and 1888, Cyrenaica became a fully independent province, or vilayat, like Tripoli. Finally, by 1888 and until 1911, it was reduced again to a county linked to Tripoli.¹³ Taking all areas together, the whole was estimated to form an area of some 42000 sq km in 1876.¹⁴ This is a good deal less than the area covered by modern Libya (1,759,540 sq km¹⁵); which may be accounted for by the fact that the borders, the greater extent of which exist only as lines on a map, had yet to be agreed internationally, or at least between the European colonial powers.¹⁶

Tripoli, and the other Ottoman territories in the region, had become semi-detached following the Ottoman defeat at the 1571 Battle of Lepanto. This was fought between a combined ‘Christian’ fleet, consisting of Spanish, Venetian, and Papal ships, augmented by the galleys of the Knights of St. John from Malta. Commanded by John of Austria, the fleet of the ‘Holy League’ numbered about 200 galleys, whilst the Ottoman fleet under Uluc Ali Pasa had some 208; they were thus evenly matched in terms of numbers. Despite this the battle ended with the virtual destruction of the Ottoman navy, a mere 40 galleys escaping destruction or capture. According to accounts of the conflict, approximately 15,000 Turks were slain or captured, some 10,000 Christian galley slaves were liberated, and much booty was taken. Lepanto was the first major maritime Ottoman defeat by the Christian powers, and it ended the myth of Ottoman naval invincibility. The battle was decisive in the sense that victory for the Ottomans would have made them supreme, whilst their defeat meant increasing difficulty in maintaining communications with territories in the west. This meant that naval forces in Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli no longer formed a regular part of the Ottoman fleet. Politically too, these territories were forced into de facto autonomy. This autonomy was exemplified and reinforced in 1711 when Ahmad Qaramanli, variously described as a Turkish-Arab cavalry officer or a local janissary officer, seized power in Tripoli. He and his descendants were to rule Tripoli, one of the three Barbary states that became notorious for their piracy, until the last of them, Yusuf Pasa Qaramanli was deposed in 1835. Yusuf Pasa was, according to the explorer Major Alexander Gordon Laing, who was at Tripoli between February and July 1825:

A cruel and unprincipled tyrant who never honoured his engagements unless it suited him […] he had soaring ambitions for his country which he pursued ruthlessly. He used his army to such effect against the ever lawless tribes of the hinterland that his influence was felt, and his name feared, nearly as far as Bornu.17

However, the age of the Barbary Corsairs was effectively over by the second decade of the nineteenth century; two wars conducted in 1801-5 and 1815 had largely destroyed their power.¹⁸ The end of organised piracy meant however the destruction of the main source of Tripoli’s income, and to compensate for this lost revenue attempts were made to bolster the trans-Saharan slave trade. This strategy failed, and economic hardship led to a diminution of Yusuf Pasa’s prestige and power. His abdication in 1832 in favour of one of his sons failed to guarantee the security of the Qaramanli dynasty; it merely caused his other sons to rebel and a multi-polar civil war began. The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II feared that this anarchic situation would cause foreign intervention – France had moved into Algeria on 1830 – and, at the same time, saw a chance to re-establish imperial authority. Consequently, a fleet and military force ostensibly sent to restore order in May 1835 went on to exile the Qaramanli family and re-establish direct rule.¹⁹ Halim Pasa, a cavalry officer of distinction, became C-in-C at Tripoli with the task of bringing the Bedouin under control and extending Ottoman rule into the interior of the province. By 1842 he had subdued most of the coastal areas, but the Fezzan however remained outside any form of central control, with the lawlessness having a harmful effect on the trans-Saharan trade routes.²⁰ Peace returned only following an accommodation with the Senussi, with which the Ottoman local government was forced to treat since they controlled the trade upon which the prosperity of Tripoli largely depended. The Senussi however refused to end their slaving activities even after the Ottoman Empire abolished the practice in 1857.²¹

This story however also concerns another of the Ottoman vilayets; that of the White Sea Islands (or Islands of the White Sea Djeza’ir-i bahr-I Sefid), also known as the Ottoman, or Turkish, Archipelago. The White Sea was the Ottoman name for what most Europeans termed the Aegean, and the islands in it that were Ottoman territory were often collectively known as the Sporades. The Sporades were, generally, the islands between Crete and the west coast of Asia Minor, though the terminology varied greatly and had done since ancient times.²² Following the Law of the Provinces promulgated in 1864, these territories were mostly organised as a single administrative unit, the vilayet, and sub divided into sanjaks as follows:

Sanjak of Bigha: Bozcaada (Tenedos), Limni (Lemnos), Semadirek (Samothrace), and Imroz (Imbros)

Sanjak of Midilli: Midilli (Mytilene, Lesbos)

Sanjak of Sakız: Sakız (Khios), Ipsaria (Psara)

Sanjak of Istankoi (Kos): Istankoi (Kos), Kelemez (Kalymnos), Patino (Patmos), Incirli (Nisyros), Nicaria (Icaria), leriye (Leros).

Sanjak of Rhodes: Rodos (Rhodes), Karpathos (Kerpe), Kharki (Calki), Kasos (Kasot).

There were, as with most things Ottoman, anomalies in the region. Beyond the above units the island of Tasoz (Thasos) had been gifted as a personal fiefdom to Muhammad Ali of Egypt following his intervention during the Greek War of Independence between 1821 and 1830, whilst the same struggle saw the island of Samos established as a semi-autonomous entity under Ottoman suzerainty. The status of Thasos changed in 1908 when it became a part of the vilayet of Salonika.²³

The most important of the Ottoman islands in the early years of the 20th century was undoubtedly Rhodes, which had fallen to the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. It had been under the rule of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem, also known as the Knights Hospitaller, since 5 September 1307, when Pope Clement V confirmed that Rhodes was to become their home. Situated only some 17 kilometres from the southern coast of Anatolia (Asia Minor), the island inevitably became vulnerable to the expansionist tendencies of the Ottoman Empire, particularly after their conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The main base of the Knights was Rhodes City, which they heavily fortified, making great efforts to update the Byzantine defences they had inherited. The expected Ottoman attack occurred in 1480, and the city endured a siege lasting from 23 May-17 August before the attackers gave up – temporarily. They were to return in June 1522 led by Suleiman the Magnificent, who employed a large corps of miners. These, utilising the long forgotten Hellenic culverts, tunnels, and cisterns over which the fortifications had been built, severely damaged the defences with mines and outflanked them from below. The Knights eventually capitulated in December, but were allowed to leave with their possessions. They occupied a new home in Malta in 1830, and were to successfully resist the Ottoman attempt to dislodge them from there in 1565.

Rhodes having fallen, the other main islands that came to constitute the Dodecanese, Agathonisi, Astipalea, Halki, Kalimnos, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kos, Leros, Nisyros, Patmos, Symi, and Tilos, were to swiftly follow into Ottoman rule. However, according to Ottoman customs and precepts only those that had resisted, principally Rhodes and Kos, were treated as conquered territory and governed directly. The others, because they had submitted voluntarily to the Sultan, were allowed privileges in return for paying an annual tax (maktou). In return they enjoyed administrative and judicial autonomy and they were permitted to practice their own religion, and retained their own language and culture.

Because of these factors the majority of the inhabitants maintained a sense of being Greek, and during the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) against the Ottoman Empire many sided with the insurgents. However, when an independent Greek state came into being following the London Protocol of 30 August 1832 the Dodecanese were excluded. The decline in Ottoman power during the 19th century meant however that Greece was able to satisfy some of its territorial ambitions, based roughly on the philosophy that Greece included any territory that had Greek history or where those that considered themselves Greek were present.24 The Ionian Islands, which had never been under Ottoman rule but had come under British control in 1815, became a part of Greece in 1864 and portions of modern Thessaly and Epirus were also incorporated in 1883; both being acquired diplomatically. Other than military weakness vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, the main obstacle to Greek territorial claims originated with the Great Powers, particularly the UK. British foreign policy was generally unsympathetic towards Greek expansionism, considering that it would hasten the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek government though remained less concerned with what might happen to the Ottoman Empire than it was with acquiring further unredeemed territory from it. In furtherance of this, principally to attain more of Thessaly and the island of Crete, Greece determined to move into Crete in 1897. Ottoman authority had broken down on the island and Greek troops were landed to support militias demanding union with their motherland. The situation threatened civil war and, the matter that concerned the Great Powers, an extension of the conflict to the Balkans. Though the Ottoman Empire declared war on 17 April 1897, a resolution to the conflict was largely enforced by the naval forces of the Great Powers, who despatched powerful fleets to the area and threatened a blockade of Greece unless they withdrew both their forces and their claims. This move was successful, a peace treaty was signed on 4 December 1897, and Greece was forced to back down and admit defeat, which led to diplomatic isolation and the stalling of Greek irredentism.

Greece had a small, but generally effective navy based around three small (4,885 tonnes) French constructed battleships of the Hydra Class – Hydra, Spetsai, and Psara – all laid down in 1885. That the Greek navy was to contribute virtually nothing to the conflict was however not due to the opposition of its Ottoman counterpart, but rather to the fact that the conflict broke out precipitately and it was caught totally unprepared.25 However unprepared the Greek navy was it was still greatly superior to its opposite number inasmuch as the Ottoman navy had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist in any meaningful form. This was a fairly recent occurrence; until the accession of Abdülhamid II as Sultan, following the deposition of his brother Murad on 31 August 1876, the Ottoman navy is generally credited with being powerful and efficient. Certainly in terms of size it was reckoned to be the third in Europe, and compared favourably with the second; that of France.²⁶ The Ottoman fleet was maintained at the Tersane-i Amire, the huge Imperial dockyard and arsenal sited on the Golden Horn. This scimitar-shaped estuary is a 1.8 kilometre wide natural inlet of the Bosphorus Strait, situated where it joins the Sea of Marmara, forming the natural harbour of Istanbul. The complex, which had been originally constructed by the Genoese, was greatly expanded under the reign of Selim I, who reigned 1512-20, and became the principal centre of Ottoman shipbuilding and repair. Indeed, in the late 15th and early 16th centuries this naval works, together with other military complexes, gave Istanbul what was probably the largest military-industrial concentration in early modern Europe, rivalled only by the Venetian Arsenal.²⁷ By 1876 the base was able to maintain a modern fleet partly thanks to over 200 British engineers, mainly from Clydeside and Tyneside, who worked there superintending shipbuilding and ship repair. British input also extended to the officer corps of the fleet, many of whom had been trained by the Royal Navy, and exercises were carried out regularly.

Abdülhamid did not however trust the navy. A number of explanations have been offered for this, including the part played by naval officers in deposing Murad, that these officers threatened mutiny if arrears of pay where not made good, and that he feared a coup instigated by them. Whatever the truth, it was certainly the case that from 1876 the navy was neglected and allowed to run down. The new Sultan would not sanction the fleet leaving the Golden Horn whilst, by 1880, the vast majority of the British engineers had been discharged and sent back to the UK. The officer corps was also dispersed, and by 1890 it no longer existed as a coherent force. Indeed, so anxious was Abdülhamid that he decreed that essential parts of the machinery and armament were removed from the vessels and stored onshore, whilst the ships themselves were allowed to disintegrate.

It naturally followed that when the threat of conflict with Greece broke out in 1897, the Ottoman navy was in no shape to intervene. The most it could manage was to send the central battery ship Mesudiye (1875) together with four other vintage vessels escorted by three torpedo boats to the Dardanelles. This flotilla left the Golden Horn on 19 March 1897, with the larger vessels having to tow the smaller, and berthed at Canakkale in the strait. Two Ottoman naval advisers, officers from Germany and Britain, arrived at Canakkale to inspect the vessels on 15 April 1897. The report from Vice-Admirals Kalau von Hofe and Sir Henry F Woods is devastating; many of the guns had been rendered useless by corrosion and damage, whilst some vessels had weapons, or vital parts of weapons, missing.28

Even Abdülhamid was forced to concede that the Ottoman fleet had degenerated to a state that was both an embarrassment and a source of great weakness for the Empire. Accordingly he had a naval commission set up to examine ways of restoring some degree of Ottoman naval power. There were however a growing group of influential figures within the Empire who had become dissatisfied in the extreme with the ramshackle and corrupt nature of the governing and administrative institutions. This eventually led to the formation of a movement that called itself the Committee of Union and Progress (ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) or CUP, also colloquially known as the ‘Young Turks.’ The origins of the CUP can be traced back to 1889, and it was basically an alliance of several discontented and otherwise fissiparous factions within the Empire. Most importantly was the joining, in 1907, of officers of the Ottoman 3^rd Army Corps based in the European vilayets. One of these, the comparatively junior Major Ahmed Niyazi inaugurated what became a revolution on 23 July 1908²⁹ when he led a revolt against the authorities at the town of Resna (Resen), now in the Republic of Macedonia. This rebellion rapidly spread throughout the empire, and the next day the reigning Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II conceded to its demands; the restoration of the 1876 constitution and the recall of parliament.

The CUP had then succeeded in establishing a government ostensibly committed to liberal and constitutional rule of the Ottoman Empire as part of their reform programme. Under the terms of the 1876 constitution elections were held throughout the Empire in November 1908, and on December 17 the Ottoman parliament was reopened. The deputies were elected according to a somewhat complex two-tier system. The first stage saw taxpaying male citizens over the age of 25 voting for a member on the basis of 500 voters per member. Those members so chosen then took part in a second stage, voting in turn for a deputy to represent them in Istanbul on the basis of one deputy per fifty-thousand voters.³⁰ Eight deputies were sent to the Ottoman capitol from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Sulyman al-Baruni and Farhat al-Zawi, who will appear later.³¹

The CUP programme was ambitious, even revolutionary, and dedicated to, as part of their name suggests, union of all the peoples of the empire on an equal footing. Though there is a great deal of scholarly debate about whether or not the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic State it had certainly discriminated against non-Muslims. Whilst Islam was the state religion, the population of the Empire comprised peoples of many different religious and national groupings, and most of these had a degree of communal autonomy. Within limits, these communities were allowed to order their own social and religious lives and apply their own laws to civil matters, such as marriage and inheritance. Only in respect of penal laws were they subject to Islamic regulation. These minority communities, or millets, elected or otherwise chose a high-ranking religious figure as their leader, who became their representative responsible to the Sultan. These leaders, who were accorded the status of state officials, had the authority to settle civil legal matters between members of their community and collected taxes. In other words, and put simplistically, the Ottoman Empire was not a strongly centralised polity.

The CUP sought to change this, and the government after 1908 introduced initiatives intended to promote the unity and modernisation of the Empire. These involved the removal of foreign influence in the internal affairs of the state, the construction of a strong central government, a process of industrialisation, and administrative reforms; the latter included secularisation of the legal system, subsidies for the education of women, and the modernisation of state-operated schools. The notion of a common Ottoman citizenship, and thus identity, had been introduced in the 19th century but met with resistance, not only from the Islamic majority but also from the leaders of the various communities who would see their status disappear. However the CUP proved ineffective at controlling the new government and was subjected to a reactionary counter-revolution the following April. This was in turn defeated by the raising of an ‘Action Army’ in the European vilayets commanded by Mahmud Sevket, with one Mustafa Kemal as chief-of-staff, which moved by train to occupy Istanbul. There was little or no fighting upon its arrival and the Sultan was forced to abdicate in favour of his brother, who became Sultan Mehmed V. Though the counter-revolution was unsuccessful, its defeat came at the price of elevating the army to the position of guarantor of political stability via martial law.32

Improvements in the naval position of the Empire were also sought as the complete lack of battleships was perceived as a great source of weakness. Accordingly, following the deposition of Abdülhamid the government initiated attempts to acquire one or two capital ships as well as modern armoured cruisers. Incredibly, the Germans initially appeared to be willing to sell the hybrid Blucher, a large armoured cruiser that was nearly a battlecruiser, or even Germany’s first pure battlecruiser Von der Tann or the newer Moltke. Such discussions as took place over the matter were seemingly conducted without the knowledge of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State Secretary at the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz, who was famously attempting to construct a battle-fleet to rival the British Royal Navy, stopped any further discussions over the matter in July 1910, but did indicate that some older ships were available. Eventually, two Brandenburg Class vessels, Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm and Weißenburg, were purchased and transferred to the Ottoman Navy on 1 September 1910 along with some smaller ships.³³ Renamed Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis respectively, this accretion of naval strength was of an order that may have been useful against the Hellenic Navy, the most likely main enemy, but it was to prove of no utility against the much more powerful Italian fleet.

However, despite corruption, bureaucratic bungling, and personal rivalries creating huge difficulties, some modernisation of the existing larger naval vessels was completed and new purchases of small warships made. Things did not however improve greatly. In 1904 the future British admiral, Captain Mark Kerr, had visited the Ottoman capital and opined that ‘it is no longer possible to talk about the Turkish Navy, as it is practically non-existent.’³⁴ That he had not exaggerated was made evident some four years later when Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble inspected the fleet in December 1908. Gamble found ‘vegetable gardens growing on the decks of the ageing warships (for Abdülhamid had considered that men-of-war in fighting trim might turn their guns on his palace).’³⁵ Gamble was not inspecting the remains of the Ottoman Navy out of idle curiosity. He had been appointed as head of the British Naval Mission to the Empire, which had the brief of supervising the reorganization of the fleet for the new government. During his tenure, between February 1909 and January 1910, he re-organized the fleet, reduced the number of officers and sent some young naval officers to Britain for training. Clearly he, and the British Naval Mission in general, had a formidable task, but a rationalization of the available resources was undertaken and a certain amount of progress was reported:

The obsolete vessels which had been lying at the Dardanelles and elsewhere have been collected at the Golden Horn and offered for sale by treaty. The latest ships, which possess a certain amount of fighting value, have had their crews completed and have undergone training, a certain amount of target practice having been carried out, and the ships sent on cruises.36

These cruises, the first of which took place in the Sea of Marmara on 27 May 1909 with another held in the Mediterranean in September, demonstrated that the Ottoman Navy needed a lot of work. As a 1910 British report put it: ‘At present the Turks have neither the officers to navigate and fight, nor the crews to man the ships which they have bought from the Germans, nor are they likely to for some time to come.’³⁷ They had also lost their leader early that year following the resignation of Gamble. The British admiral had clashed with the Ottoman Government over the organisation and finances of the fleet, considering that such decisions should be left in his hands. He was replaced in April 1910 by Vice-Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams, who also found himself at loggerheads with the government and resented his local ‘demotion’ to the rank of Rear-Admiral. Williams was to be at sea with the main body of the fleet, which was built around the two ex-German battleships, when war broke out with Italy.

The authority of the Empire was threatened by insurrections in the Kosovo vilayet in 1910 and Shkoder vilayet, near the border with Montenegro, the following year.³⁸ Clearly the stability of the Ottoman Empire had not been greatly enhanced by the accession of the ‘Young Turks.’ Indeed, despite Enver’s claim to have cured the ‘sick man,’ the CUP attempts to bring union and progress to the Ottoman Empire arguably resulted in less union and only marginal progress. Therefore the ‘Eastern Question,’ which at bottom revolved around managing Ottoman decline in such a way as to obviate potential conflicts between the Great Powers, was very much a live issue in 1911. It was a question that Italy was about to become deeply involved in, despite the possibility, or even probability, of shattering the status quo. Indeed, the administration of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti decided to undertake the conquest of the vilayet of Tripoli despite Italy’s rather gloomy history in terms of war and colonial adventures.