Deadlock
When Europe knows how few were the men who for months kept the great and splendidly equipped Italian army cooped up, so that it hardly dared to venture forth from the town of Tripoli, and is even now confined to a very few miles of coast-line, the standing of Italy as a military power must surely be forever lost.
Alan Ostler, The Arabs in Tripoli, 19121
EXPECTATIONS that Frugoni would prove an aggressive general seemed to have been confirmed with the advance on Ain Zara. The former Ottoman HQ was turned into ‘a miniature fortress; planks by hundreds were formed into rough parallel stockades and the space between filled with sand and rubble.’2 The garrison for this stronghold was powerful, consisting of the 1st Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Count Conte Pecori-Giraldi, and arrangements were made to construct a railway between it and Tripoli. It was first proposed that this be a ‘Decauville Railway’ – a 600 mm narrow gauge line made up of easily portable pre-assembled sections3 – but this was upgraded to a 950 mm gauge line before work started.
As originally conceived, the taking and fortification of Ain Zara was but a first step in a scheme for further advances. Caneva and Frugoni were planning a divisional-strength advance into the ‘Jaws of the Sahara’ in order to clear the enemy from the oases that lay on the Tripolitanian coastal plain (the Jefara plain), the southern boundary of which was marked by the Nafusa Mountains.4 One of the primary targets would be Al ‘Aziziyah (El Azizia, Azizia) some 55 kilometres south-west of Tripoli, a major waypoint on the route from the coast to the mountains and beyond to the Fezzan. Though the term desert implies a trackless expanse of sand and rock this was not quite the case. There were routes through it that had been used for centuries, perhaps millennia, by camel caravans. Such caravan routes, or masrabs as they were sometimes termed, were observed and studied by a New Zealander who had enlisted in the British Army and was stationed in Western Egypt in 1916, Captain Claud H Williams:
The masrabs consist of wavy camel tracks a few feet apart, running parallel to one another, and vary in number from 5 or 6 to 50 or 60 according to the importance of the route. In one case 120 distinct camel tracks were counted and the masrab was consequently over 100 yards in width. The masrabs appear to be of great antiquity, for the tracks are, in some places, deeply worn into solid rock; the constant traffic over a period of hundreds of years has rendered them much firmer and more solid than the surrounding unbeaten desert. A little study of the map will show the system in which they are laid out, and how connection can be made between almost any part of the coast and the important places in the interior […] they help define one’s position on the map in travelling across their course.5
The purpose of Williams’ study was in relation to the use of motor vehicles for penetrating the desert, using the ancient routes for travel and reference points. Prior to the advent of reliable vehicles, which were just coming into being in 1911, the only way to move through the desert was on foot or on the back of an animal. The desert inhabitants knew these routes and their waypoints intimately, whereas of course the invaders did not and the difficulty the Italians faced was based on getting their forces through, and maintaining them in, the desert over large distances. There were precedents for such operations, though study of them probably offered little in the way of practical advice for Caneva and Frugoni. Even the much vaunted Imperial German army had found itself stymied by the guerilla tactics employed, perforce, by the Nama people during the colonial war in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Namibia) between 1904 and 1909. Despite adopting a process of extermination towards the Herero and Nama, the German troops sent to the colony were unable to effectively penetrate the desert regions where the Nama survivors of the German genocide continued to fight. Jakobus (Jacob) Morenga, the Nama leader in the insurrection, was interviewed in the Cape Times and was asked if he knew that ‘Germany is one of the mightiest military powers in the world?’ Morenga replied ‘Yes, I am aware of it; but they cannot fight in our country. They do not know where to get water, and do not understand guerrilla warfare.’6
The most recent successful large-scale attempt had probably been the British reconquest of the Sudan in 1897-98, when an Anglo-Egyptian force some 25,000 strong had travelled to Omdurman under Major-General Herbert Kitchener and won the eponymous battle there on 2 September 1898. One of the officers that had taken part in the campaign was Charles à Court Repington, who had since been forced to resign his commission after being named in a divorce case. Repington, who had seen extensive wartime military service in India, Afghanistan, Egypt, the Sudan and South Africa, then became military correspondent for the London Times in 1902. He had applied his not inconsiderable intellect to the problems facing the Italians, and proffered advice, albeit in a rather negative tone, in one of his columns:
The crossing of the desert can be accomplished in one of three ways: by throwing a light railway into the interior – a very long and difficult undertaking – by establishing posts at intervals for the storage of water, or by forming a huge system of camel transport to accompany the army. The posts would have to be very strong, and the establishing of them would be a long and very considerable enterprise in itself. As for camel transport, the thousand camels said to be at General Caneva’a disposal would be utterly insufficient. Napoleon preferred deserts to mountains or rivers as the natural protection of a State, and he had good reason.7
Kitchener’s force had of course the benefit of the Nile to aid his communications, hence Churchill’s account of the campaign being called The River War. Nonetheless, because of the various cataracts and meanderings of this artery they also had to construct the 600-kilometre long Sudan Military Railway from Wadi Halfa to Atbara. More pertinently, the Sudanese forces chose to fight conventionally. Their error in so doing was revealed at Omdurman, where Winston Churchill observed that the technological superiority of the Anglo-Egyptian force ensured that destroying the enemy was merely a ‘matter of machinery.’8 The forces resisting the Italians would make no such error, but in attempting to penetrate the interior the Italian army seemed to be contemplating using a combination of all three of Repington’s stated methods. The beginning of the railway to Ain Zara, the wells of which could perhaps be considered as the first of the ‘posts,’ coincided with the beginning of a scheme to purchase and import some 2,000 camels from Tunisia and Somalia Italiana. There was an additional component, and one that had only recently became available; McClure noted the presence in one of the Tripoli markets of ‘Fifty motor wagons, each carrying between 1-1.5 tonne […] and it was reported that Italian firms were working night and day to treble the number.’9
Something of a consensus seems to have emerged amongst the foreign war correspondents with the Italians, to the effect that large-scale operations would commence around March 1912. The weather would be better then, and the facilities for operating the semi-rigid dirigible airships, P1 and P3, would have been repaired; the two hangars, one complete and one nearly so, at the aviation facility near the Jewish Cemetery had been destroyed on 16 December by a storm. Without the enhanced endurance and communication facilities of these craft, compared with aeroplanes, any advanced operations would be rendered more difficult.
If large-scale advances were seemingly on hold, then the same did not apply to more minor manoeuvres designed to disrupt Ottoman communications. The Italians had not occupied two villages on the coast to the west of Tripoli which lay just outside their lines. The nearest of these was Gargaresh (Gargaresch, Girgarish) at some 4 kilometres distance, whilst Zanzur (Janzur, Sansur) was around another 4 kilometres away. There was little that was remarkable about these places; the contemporary edition of Baedeker’s Mediterranean described a ‘monotonous sandy coast […] with the little port of Sansur, and the watch-tower of [Gargaresh] [being] scarcely visible till we are nearing Tripoli.’10 Zanzur though was one of the few decent anchorages between Tripoli and the Tunisian frontier, albeit only able to accommodate small vessels. According to Irace: ‘Here the roads meet that come from Tunis, and from it start good caravan routes for Azizia and Garian to the south. Through it naturally passes a double stream of contraband from the sea and from Tunis.’11
It is then difficult to understand why the Italians had not occupied the place, though both it and Gargaresh were highly vulnerable, inasmuch as they lay directly under the guns of the fleet with Gargaresh being within range of land-based artillery as well. There was also a telegraph station at Janzur that the Italians believed formed a link in the communication chain between Zuwarah (Zuara, Zuwara, Zwara, Zouara), a coastal town about 105 kilometres west of Tripoli, and the Ottoman forces at Gharian and Azizia. They therefore decided to mount an operation with the objective of destroying ‘telegraphic communication between Zuwarah and the Turkish headquarters.’ Zuwarah was also an important link in the trade route from Tunisia. In an attempt at interdicting this route an amphibious landing was attempted there on 16 December when four transports with naval support appeared offshore. The town and surrounding area was subjected to a heavy bombardment under cover of which advance parties of marines landed on the beach. Following their securing of a beachhead the intention was to land the 10th Brigade of infantry that had been transported from Italy for the purpose. A combination of bad weather and unexpectedly stiff resistance from the defenders, who forced the marines back to their boats carrying their dead and wounded, prevented the operation being carried out. According to Abbott:
The Arabs kept quiet until several boats had disembarked their passengers. Then the sheikh in command gave the order ‘Fire!’ The Arabs poured volley after volley down upon the hapless marines. […] They tried to repel the attack, and, supported by the big guns from the warships, they answered the Arab fire. But they had to fire from low and open ground at an enemy whom they could not see. After a time they gave up their futile fusillade and fled back to their boats, carrying off half a dozen dead with them, and leaving a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and other loot, to make glad the heart of the Arabs, who, having picked up these spoils, retired from the fray with only one wounded. The warships went on bombarding the sand dunes.12
Thwarted thus in their efforts to take the more distant target, the Italians determined on securing the closer. Consequently a land-based thrust against Janzur began on the morning of 17 December with the advance of the now experienced 50th Regiment, augmented by one battalion of the newly arrived 73rd Regiment. The infantry were supported by a regiment (five squadrons) of the 9th Regiment of Florence Lancers (Lancieri di Firenze) also newly arrived, and a battery each of mountain and field artillery. Covering the desert flank of this force was a smaller column, consisting of two battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of mountain-guns. This force moved south-west towards el-Togar, where there was a small party of Ottoman regulars about twenty strong. The force was described as ‘advancing gingerly to the south’ by eyewitnesses and it halted completely when fired on by the nineteen remaining troops; one had been sent to Suani Ben Adem to report the movement. Bennett, the former MP and fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, later reported:
I was in the Turkish lines at the time, and everybody, officers and men alike, was highly amused at the almost incredible timidity of the assailants. We were all longing to see them advance against [Suani Ben Adem]. No such luck! All we saw was fifteen shells rushing over the desert from the retiring mule battery and bursting 1,000 yards in front of the camp – a sheer waste of ammunition.13
There was an even smaller Ottoman force, consisting of four men according to some sources, at Janzur, which wisely retreated inland at the approach of the column. They were accompanied by many of the inhabitants, as the appearance of the Italians heralded a bombardment of the village from the sea. Possession of the village was thus undisputed; most of the male Arabs of military age had vanished. The remaining women, children, and old men offered no resistance as the invaders carried out a thorough search for weapons and suchlike and cut down the telegraph-line.
What then happened, as so often in the conflict, is subject to partisan dispute. According to the Italian version, which was reported in communiqués and reproduced in the international press, the column remained in Janzur throughout the rest of the day before retiring back to Tripoli in the evening with their work done. It was stated that ‘the importance of this advance lies in the fact that by it the smuggling of arms into Tripoli from the west has been rendered impossible for the future.’ The anti-Italian account argued that whilst engaged in Janzur the force was subject to an attack by tribesmen from the south, who eventually prevailed by driving them back to Tripoli at sunset. The Italian version is in general terms the most plausible, though the particular claim that it had made an impact on the movement of arms is risible.
There is though one point on which both narratives agree. When they withdrew the Italians took with them four senior tribesmen, variously described as notables or sheikhs. These either went willingly, because they had ‘submitted’ to Italian rule, or, as the counter argument has it, were captives and taken as prisoners. Both version agree in that whilst in Tripoli they paid formal homage to Italian power, though one version has it that they did this out of good sense, whilst the other maintains they dissimulated in order to get back to Zanzur. Whatever their motives, they were issued with paperwork so that they could fetch their families to Tripoli and returned to Zanzur.
Neither the notables nor their families travelled to Tripoli. However, it was reported by ‘spies’ to, and believed by, the Italians (and their supporters) that when Ottoman forces returned they did not find them at Zanzur either. According to this account, the Ottomans refused to accept the explanation that they had been made prisoners. They must then have gone to, and presumably stayed at, Tripoli willingly. Therefore they were traitors and, accordingly, their families were duly executed. This, according to McClure, demonstrated the folly of the Italians in ‘taking submission without giving protection’ as the results of ‘this untoward incident must have helped to rivet wavering Arabs to the Turkish cause.’ McClure admits that ‘the source of this story perhaps makes it suspect’ yet also argues that ‘it fits entirely with the probabilities.’14 According to Abbott, who was with the Ottoman forces at Azizia at the time, there was a very good reason the notables were not at Zanzur, or at Tripoli either for that matter. Instead of returning to Zanzur and taking themselves and their families to Tripoli, they instead ‘fetched their families away to the interior, and they themselves joined our camp, bringing the Italian permits with them.’15
The anti-Italian tale is undoubtedly the more convincing, and the story, whilst of little moment of itself, surely demonstrates the Italian’s continuing capacity for wishful thinking. It is though something of a mystery as to why they did not extend their occupation westwards the 8-10 kilometres necessary to enclose Zanzur and Gargaresh, given that the former was such an important hub in the Ottoman communication network. The excuse offered by Irace, ‘The fact that it is still in possession of the enemy merely means that we do not wish them to be relieved of the obligation of extending their forces from Azizia to the coast, a length of lines which is a continued source of weakness to them strategically’, seems flimsy. This is particularly so if one balances the Ottoman effort expended on defending it against the likely cost of having an important route closed down. The rationale behind the after-the-event Italian declaration that ‘the oasis of Zanzur has been occupied, and the population has submitted’ is also obscure. This is even more puzzling since the same communiqué also announced that the reason for withdrawal was because the operation had succeeded in its mission of destroying the telegraph.16 Even pro-Italian commentators were critical, McClure arguing that:
[…] on broad principles, the whole episode of the reconnaissance to Janzur must be regarded as an error. […] A mere raid, followed by withdrawal, was of doubtful value at the best; in view of the accompanying circumstances and the inevitable sequel, the step cannot escape condemnation. These Janzur sheikhs were the first, outside the occupied towns, to make submission to the Italians. The precedent set by their experience was not favourable to the prospect of further defections from the Turkish cause.17
The belief that there were pro-Italian elements within the Arab population requiring rescue from Ottoman influence was one of the factors that led to a near disaster two days after the action at Zanzur. Again, interpretations of the affair were much disputed, both at the time and later, ranging across a spectrum of opinion from ‘a successful fight,’ to an event that was merely a ‘repulse’ of Ottoman attempts to harass a reconnoitring party, through to a situation that ‘nearly attained the rank of a regrettable incident,’ and on to a ‘crushing’ Italian defeat.18
The origins of it appear to have been when news was conveyed to Ain Zara on 18 December to the effect that a body of Arabs, some 2-300 strong, had occupied a small oasis called Bir Tobras, about 15 kilometres to the south. This information was supposedly brought by five Arabs, who claimed that the usual inhabitants of the oasis were being mistreated by the occupiers and were appealing for protection from the Italians. When this news was conveyed to Conte Pecori-Giraldi he determined to send a column to force the occupiers to disperse and to rescue the inhabitants. The core of this force was to consist of two battalions of the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers. In support was a machine gun section of two guns, a squadron of light cavalry, and two mountain guns. The whole amounted to 1,500 men and it was put under the command of the ‘ambitious’ Colonel Gustavo Fara, hero of the defence at al-Hani on 23 October.19
Fara set out at 02:00 hours on the morning of 19 December with the object of arriving at Bir Tobras at 06:00 hours in order to attack at dawn. To guide him through the unfamiliar terrain, and in the dark, Fara took three of the five Arabs who had reported the enemy at Bir Tobras whilst the other two were kept at Ain Zara. Four hours would, under ideal circumstances, have been plenty of time to cover the required distance. The circumstances were very far from ideal however, and the column was distant from its objective at 06:00 hours, having become, perhaps predictably, disoriented in the difficult topography. With daylight the Arab guides were able to establish their position and successfully guided the force towards its objective. The delay occasioned meant that it was though another four hours before the Italians sighted the oasis and elements of the enemy contingent. These small groups were immediately brought under fire and they retreated towards Bir Tobras, followed by the column which was now itself under harassing fire from the flanks. The more they pressed forward however the more resistance they came up against and Fara realised that the enemy were in greater strength than had been calculated. Nevertheless he was confident that his command could still deal with them, though he took the precaution of sending a report of his progress and situation back to Ain Zara.
Mountain Artillery at Bir Tobras with, inset, Colonel Gustavo Fara. Bir Tobras is a small oasis about 15 kilometres to the south of Ain Zara. On 19 December 1911 two battalions of the 11th Bersaglieri reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers plus a machine gun section of two guns, a squadron of light cavalry, and two mountain guns amounting to some 1,500 men under the command of Colonel Gustavo Fara, set out to disperse an Ottoman detachment reported to be there. Upon engaging the enemy, however, it soon became apparent to Fara that they were far too strong and he sought to disengage. This proved impossible when the enemy pressed forward, flanking the Italian force on both sides so that it was in danger of being completely cut off. The retreat was in danger of turning into a rout as Fara attempted to manoeuvre his force through the dunes, with incipient panic becoming evident amongst the troops. Only by exercising decisive leadership did Fara rescue his command though they were forced to abandon much of their equipment. Fara was feted for his courage and coolness under fire and promoted to Major-General, but it was claimed that an ‘inclination to rashness’ and a ‘failure to see difficulties’ made him somewhat suspect. Any further such ventures were thereafter banned. (Author’s Collection).
By 12:00 hours, and still moving forward, Fara came to realise that his previous impression had been in error and that he was in fact up against a force that was far too large to engage with, and contained numbers of regular troops. Accordingly he ordered disengagement and withdrawal. The enemy though refused to allow him to disengage and pressed forward in turn, flanking the Italian force on both sides so that it was in danger of being completely cut off. The retreat was in danger of turning into a rout as Fara attempted to manoeuvre his force through the dunes, with incipient panic becoming evident amongst the troops.
Realising this, and with commendable coolness, he ordered the column to halt and entrench whilst he despatched further messengers back to Ain Zara for reinforcements. These were urgently required; his men were running short of ammunition and water and sand ingress had rendered his machine guns inoperable. Once the ammunition was gone then the column was finished. At least three concerted attacks were made by the enemy at 17:00, 20:00 and 23:00 hours, but while each was repulsed it was at the cost of depleting the ammunition. Indeed, it was fortunate in the extreme for the Italians that the enemy did not press home their attacks with more vigour, or move to completely surround their force. Given that his messengers had got through at all, which was by no means certain, Fara calculated that reinforcements should have arrived at midnight or so. However, with no sign, or even news, of them whatsoever he determined that he would have to evacuate his position before dawn on 20 December. If not he would then face certain destruction as the Ottomans were certain to renew their offensive, probably in greater strength, and his force would quickly run out of ammunition.
This withdrawal began at 03:00 hours and succeeded in moving silently through the dunes in a northward direction. They were completely unmolested and at about 07:00 hours they came across a camp containing a brigade strength contingent under Major-General Clemente Lequio that had entrenched for the night. This combined force then returned to Ain Zara, meeting on the way virtually the entire strength of the rest of the 1st Division under the personal command of Conte Pecori-Giraldi. The divisional commander was in search of his two subordinates and was undoubtedly mightily relieved to find them, and their forces, both largely intact; Fara’s casualties, announced at the time as six killed and 78 wounded, amounted to eleven dead and 91 wounded.20 The corresponding enemy casualties were according to Bennett, eleven killed and 40 wounded.21
There is no question that the Italians had been both foolhardy and extremely lucky. The sole creditable facet of the entire affair was the behaviour of Colonel Fara, who displayed a superlative presence of mind and quality of leadership without which the column would have been destroyed. Indeed, the decision to send the column seems of itself somewhat curious. The word of the five Arabs seems to have been taken at face value, at least by Pecori-Giraldi. That it was not a trap seems self-evident in retrospect inasmuch as the column escaped, whereas if the Ottomans had been waiting for it then they would have pre-deployed a much larger force and surrounded it properly. The bodies of the three who acted as guides were subsequently found riddled with bullets, and it seems practically certain that Fara, convinced of their treachery, had seen that they were shot. The two who remained at Ain Zara are believed to have been hanged.
According to Abbott, who was with the Ottoman forces and witnessed much of the fighting at Bir Tobras, the five Arabs were actually genuine. They were acting on behalf of a sheikh called Mukhtar, ‘a rich man who owned […] a large estate, consisting of a dozen palm-groves, with many mud dwellings and wells […]’ in the vicinity of Bir Tobras. At first he supported resistance to the Italian occupation, but suspected that the advance to Ain Zara presaged further movement:
When that came to pass, his property, owing to its position, would be the first to be seized, ravaged, and confiscated. He saw in fancy his noble palm-trees cut down, his mud dwellings demolished, his wives and his children, if not slain, driven to starvation and mendacity. He determined to avert this fate from himself, while there was yet time, by entering into secret negotiations with the enemy, and offering not only his submission, but also his assistance.22
Bennett, who was also there, admitted he did not know whether or not ‘these Arabs were mere Decoys’ or ‘were actually seeking the protection of the invaders.’23 He went on to make the point that ‘If the arrival of the five Arabs at Ain Zara was part of a carefully planned ruse, one can only say that no military trap ever caught a more gullible enemy.’24 On the other hand, and Pecori-Giraldi was to argue this when his decision to despatch the force came under criticism, the column was a powerful unit that was well able to take care of itself under foreseeable circumstances. It was not expected to operate at any great distance from its base and neither the troops nor their commander were inexperienced. The 11th Bersaglieri in particular had extensive recent experience of fighting the Saraceni, and they were supported by artillery and machine guns, albeit the latter were difficult to keep working in the sandy conditions. Against this the Ottomans were able to bring together a force, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, that was probably not greatly superior in numbers. The Italians estimated them as being 3,000 strong, whilst the Ottoman side reckoned there were only about five or six hundred. Undoubtedly both were inaccurate, but no reliable figure can be arrived at. The peril that the column found itself in was not then caused by weakness as such, but rather to the extreme difficulties of moving across the terrain combined with the lack of a reliable system of communications, and thus the ability to summon support. That it was not expected to have to do any serious fighting is evidenced by the limited supplies of ammunition, food, and water, it carried.
Despite its outcome, the Bir Tobras affair was condemned by the Italian high command in Tripoli, and Frugoni in particular. Indeed there was no aspect of the operation that Frugoni did not find fault with. He complained that he had not been consulted by his divisional commander and knew nothing of the despatch of Fara’s column, and he censured Pecori-Giraldi for initiating an operation, particularly as it escalated to embrace the entire 1st Division, without his knowledge and consent. Frugoni was also censorious of the tactics employed, especially with regard to night marches across the desert. The divisional commander was reminded that Frugoni had forbidden such manoeuvres during the advance on Ain Zara some two weeks previously, and that Pecori-Giraldi should therefore have known of, and respected, this decision. Damning criticism was directed at the planning and support of the operation, inasmuch as no provision had been made for keeping in communication with Fara’s column, and that no preparations had been made to have a reserve force ready to move in case of an emergency. Therefore when news reached Ain Zara at about 15:00 hours on 19 December, to the effect that the enemy were in greater strength than had been calculated, the divisional commander was unable to immediately initiate steps to get in touch with Fara. Astonishingly, neither did he bring his command to a state of readiness for going to his relief. The composition and strength of the column was also found wanting. Frugoni considered it too weak for independent operations and stated that it should have had at least a whole battery (six guns) of mountain artillery in support instead of just two guns.
Pecori-Giraldi defended himself against the majority of the charges, though he did acknowledge that the despatch of the column on the say-so of the five Arabs demonstrated a lack of prudence. He did, however, argue that the operation differed only slightly from the reconnaissance missions that had been carried out from Ain Zara on an almost daily basis since its capture. He also, as already explained, disputed Frugoni’s points about the strength of the unit, and claimed that if the enemy’s strength was greatly in excess of what he expected then the failure lay with army intelligence, upon whose information he had to rely, rather than him. The failure to maintain adequate communication he blamed on Fara, who, he claimed, had been assigned cavalry for just such a purpose. He also held Fara responsible for failing to make a surprise attack at dawn on the oasis, and held that he should have abandoned the attack after arriving at the oasis so late in the day. Carrying on with it was a major departure from the expected mission, and he should have sent word back to Ain Zara immediately he began the attack, instead of waiting two hours until he discovered the opposition was stronger than at first thought. Fara’s message to this effect, despatched at noon, did not arrive until after 15:00 hours, by which time, Pecori-Giraldi claimed, any relieving force would have to travel in the dark and would likely get lost in the desert. Further, he stated, Fara had informed him in the message that the column could take care of itself. When some hours later he was informed that the column was in trouble and had been forced to entrench, the two hour delay in sending Lequio and his brigade was explained by the need to try and prepare such a manoeuvre in the darkness. That General Lequio did get lost has already been noted, and because he could hear no firing from the south towards which to march he, perhaps wisely, decided to encamp and wait for daylight.25
There can be little doubt that Pecori-Giraldi’s arguments were as weak as his performance; nor can there be an excuse for his failure to at least ensure that reinforcements were on standby. This is particularly the case following the arrival of Fara’s morning message at around 15:00 hours stating that the enemy were in greater strength than anticipated. The outcome of this lack of preparation meant that when the message requesting urgent relief was received this had to be organised from scratch. As McClure was to state it: ‘General Pecori seems to have launched Fara’s column into the desert, and then ceased to have troubled himself about it any further.’26
The Bir Tobras affair was, of itself, of minor importance. One of the immediate outcomes was that the Ottomans claimed a victory and salvaged a great deal of booty from the battlefield. The most important of this was the two hundred rifles or so recovered. Abbott’s account offers an explanation for the large number of these:
[…] there were scores and scores of them, and as I could not believe that every rifle represented a dead enemy, I was obliged to accept the explanation which everybody gave - namely, that the Italians, knowing the Arabs’ unquenchable thirst for plunder, throw their rifles and cartridges away as they flee, so that they may escape while their pursuers waste time in picking them up.27
Gustavo Fara was feted for his courage and coolness under fire and promoted to Major-General, but it was claimed that an ‘inclination to rashness’ and a ‘failure to see difficulties’ made him somewhat suspect. If Fara came out of the affair with credit, the same cannot be said of Pecori-Giraldi. His position became untenable and early in January the inevitable ‘General Peccori-Giraldi has returned to Italy owing to ill health’ notice appeared. His replacement was the former commander of the 13th Division at Ancona, Count Vittorio Camerana. None of this was particularly significant in the grand scheme of things, but what was of great importance was the effect the whole business seems to have had on the minds of Caneva and Frugoni.
The plan for a powerful advance to the south in divisional strength, still very much in play in December, was quietly shelved. On 4 January 1912 the politicians and staff in Rome were told that any such offensive would be too costly and hazardous and would in any case be unlikely to bring about a decisive battle. Operational strategy defaulted to consolidation of territory already occupied, localised and small scale military operations, and to ‘ally ourselves with time.’28 The relationship between the Bir Tobras affair and the abandonment of what might be termed a forward strategy is impossible to determine with any certainty; it cannot be claimed that it was indisputably one of cause and effect. Nevertheless observers noted that progress on the railway to Ain Zara was not pursued with any great urgency. The specialised material and labour for the construction did not arrive at Tripoli until the middle of January 1912, suggesting that an advance early in 1912 was not a high priority. At some 14 kilometres in total length the line was of single track, with double track at six locations to provide passing places, and laid directly onto an excavated sand base with iron sleepers. The first train steamed into Ain Zara on 17 March 1912.
It was of course not perceived immediately that the lack of advance movement was a matter of policy rather than a matter imposed by military difficulties or ‘that tendency to wait upon events which must be held to have marked the Italian conduct of hostilities.’29 Repington noted towards the end of December that ‘the failure to turn the enemy out of Bir Tobras is one of the various symptoms that little progress is being made.’30 Retrospectively, McClure adjudged that ‘the most interesting points’ revealed by the events at Bir Tobras were ‘the obvious determination of the supreme command to avoid all the ordinary risks of war and, with that end in view, its conception of the proportionate military strength requisite for given operations.’ He perceived that this heralded the first indication of a policy that proscribed any action ‘involving the minimum of risk or more than the minimum of loss.’ The corollary of this required that ‘no operation should be undertaken without the assurance of a strong numerical superiority over the forces of the enemy.’ Despite being avowedly pro-Italian in outlook he was critical, arguing that: ‘The adoption of such principles of action gives ground for surprise; the enunciation of the second certainly seems to call for criticism.’31
This hesitant and risk-free philosophy was demonstrated in the Battle of Gargaresch, which took place on 18 January 1912. The decision to finally take the village seems to have been a reaction to the Ottoman forces operating openly in the area and, according to Italian sources, terrorizing the ‘loyal’ inhabitants. In any event on the morning of 18 January a powerful force was despatched westward from Tripoli consisting of the entire 57th Regiment of Infantry, reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers and supported by a battery of mountain artillery, a half-battery of field artillery, a force of engineers, and the 2nd and 4th squadrons of the 19th Cavalry (Guide) Regiment (Cavalleggeri Guide 19°) – about 3000 men in total under the regimental commander, Colonel Giuseppe Amari. This force, arrayed in column, reached the oasis surrounding Gargaresch at about 09:00 hours and encountered an enemy force estimated to be about 100 strong lurking amongst the foliage.
Being greatly outnumbered and under threat of being outflanked to the south, the defenders soon abandoned their positions and retreated to the west, allowing the column to occupy the village and its oasis. The construction of a series of strong entrenchments was immediately begun. By late morning the defenders to the south were deployed in deep trenches at a distance of around two kilometres from the outskirts of the oasis whilst the Grenadiers were similarly placed to the west. According to some sources there were three lines of trenches, but all accounts agree that there were two at least.
Around noon an Ottoman force, estimated by the Italians to be about 2,000 strong and comprising both men on foot and on horseback, became visible to the south and was watched as it moved towards the defensive perimeter. Those on horseback attempted to exploit a gap between the right-wing of the Grenadiers and the shore, but were thwarted when the defenders shortened their line somewhat and extended it to cover the weak point. Soon afterwards the whole Italian line was engaged in the battle supported by the artillery. The Ottomans advanced in open order, skilfully utilising the ground for cover, to approach the earthworks.
As is usual, the subsequent events were subject to partisan interpretation. Pol Tristan, a French war correspondent, was on the scene with the Ottoman forces and described what he saw:
[the attackers] were obliged to cross the zone that was swept by the Italian artillery which had taken up position in front of the oasis. They managed this without heavy loss, and so this kill zone did not prevent the Arabs making contact with the enemy, and they attempted, with a superb contempt of danger, to turn their left wing.
The Italian infantry, buried, as usual, to the shoulders in trenches [dug the previous day] seemed at first, in my view, to be well protected from the Turkish fire. I was then amazed to see them all of a sudden leap from these works, and retreat three hundred yards only to disappear again in a new trench; their first line of defence had become untenable. In this first trench, which was immediately occupied, wide and plentiful pools of blood abundantly proved the efficient shooting of the Turkish-Arab attackers. Moreover, several dead soldiers, who they had not had time to remove, still lay there.
This first retreat was to be followed a quarter of an hour later by a second, when the defenders withdrew another three hundred yards into the defences close around the oasis itself. The Italian troops were unsteady and I saw distinctly through my telescope, the officers attempting in vain to rally them under fire. Upon entering the second trench line twelve more dead bodies were found, as well as crates of ammunition, camping equipment and a considerable quantity of clothing.
Until the evening and even three quarters of an hour after sunset, the fire persisted without interruption on both sides. In the afternoon, we had seen arriving in a hurry along the road from Tripoli, several squadrons of cavalry and a number of Infantry battalions, supported by a battery of Artillery. These troops took up positions on the same front on the edge of the oasis, without attempting a forward movement or a march on the left, which would have undoubtedly given them fire superiority.32
The reinforcements were under the command of Major General Gustavo Fara, the hero of Bir Tobras, and with their arrival the Italian situation was stabilised. Tristan’s account is largely supported by those of other correspondents with the Ottoman forces, though their timings differ somewhat, but all agree that the attackers almost succeeded in breaking through the defences and that the Italians had suffered a severe shock.
Official Italian reports of the time stated only that the ‘enemy was attacked and defeated by our troops’ but accounts by pro-Italian correspondents such as McClure told a very different tale of how ‘by sunset the Turks and Arabs were in full retreat and the Italians were left in undisputed occupation of the position they had come to fortify.’ Tristan’s account concurs with the point about the Italians being left in occupation of the position, but he goes on to relate that during the night a reconnaissance was made of the Italian position, and this revealed that the entire force had withdrawn:
The oasis was completely abandoned! The disorder that had reigned in the Italian trenches, with abandoned equipment and eighteen corpses that had not been removed, allowed us to suppose that the fire of the Arabs had been very deadly for the second phase of the battle and that the Italian losses were considerable.33
An ‘Arab Joan of Arc’: Selima bent Mogos, or Salima bint Mughus, was a female warrior believed to have been from the nomadic Nuwayil tribe of western Tripolitania from an area close to the Tunisian border. She enjoyed the reputation of being a ferocious fighter who had ‘taken part in all the battles around Tripoli and had been wounded by a bullet in the chest.’
One somewhat remarkable facet of the battle of Gargaresch concern reports that the Ottoman attack was led by a woman. Alan Ostler of the Daily Express had his account of this ‘War Goddess in Tripoli’ syndicated by many papers. He wrote that as the attackers broke into the first line of trenches:
At their head was a figure, cloaked and hooded in russet brown, who carried no weapon but a staff of olive wood, and whose voice rang high and shrill above the shouts and rattling rifle fire. The face beneath the russet hood was of so deep a brown as to be almost black. […] The desert men swept up and over the earthworks, and their fearless leader, leaping into the trenches, stooped, plunged an arm elbow deep in blood, and then stood, with a dripping right hand flung upwards, a statue of the Goddess of African Battle. For it was a woman, a Soudanese she warrior […]34
His tale had been toned down a little when it came to be published in The Arabs in Tripoli, but the presence of this woman is confirmed by other witnesses. The Frenchman Georges Remond, correspondent of the Parisian L’Illustration, had crossed the Tunisian border on 17 January 1912 and was an observer of the attack on Gargaresch. He published an account of this in his 1913 book, and identifies the female warrior as ‘Selima bent Mogos, guerrière de la tribe des Naouaïl.’ He wrote that:
She had taken part in all the battles around Tripoli and had been wounded by a bullet in the chest. After fifteen days rest with her tribe she came back to take her place among the fighters. Pol Tristan gave her a sabre, which she branded fiercely while singing her war song.35
Remond also published a photograph of this ‘Arab Joan of Arc,’ as Ostler had called her, with the sword. She has been identified by Richard Pennell as Salima bint Mughus who, he argues, was not from the Sudan but was rather from the Nuwayil tribe. These were a nomadic clan whose territory was based in western Tripolitania around the Tunisian border, and were noted for their history of raiding and resistance.36
In terms of the battle, there is no definitive account of why the Italians withdrew from a position that they had just fought so hard to keep, other than it was ordered by Frugoni. The implications for morale amongst the Italian soldiery caused by such a withdrawal are not hard to fathom, and of course the opposite held true amongst the Ottoman forces. The decision is made all the more mysterious when it is considered that two days later, on 20 January, Gargaresch was reinvaded. This time the 1st Brigade – the 82nd and 84th Infantry Regiments complete with two batteries of artillery and an engineering battalion and supported by six squadrons of cavalry – traversed the few kilometres to the town and oasis under the command of Lieutenant General Felice de Chaurand. There was no opposition, and the engineers began constructing a defensive system of trenches and redoubts that would be too strong for any force the Ottomans might muster to take on.
The Italian’s Fabian-like strategy of making only tactical moves in irresistible force was also to be applied in the eastern theatre of the former vilayet, Cyrenaica. There had been no really notable battles or military manoeuvres in that portion of the war zone and, following the initial landings, the invaders did very little beyond consolidate themselves in the coastal enclaves. Nevertheless the principle of overwhelming strength was observed; Caneva’s request for reinforcements at the end of October 1911 saw the 4th Division under Lieutenant General Conte Vittorio Trombi, less the 50th Regiment of the 8th Brigade, despatched to Cyrenaica. Further reinforcements brought Italian numbers there to the 40,000 mark with the largest contingent being some 20,000 strong at Benghazi under Lieutenant General Ottavio Briccola. There were about 15,000 men under Trombi and Major-General Vittorio Zuppelli at Derna, where the former had been appointed governor, and 5,000 at Tobruk under Major-General Vittorio Signorile. (The western theatre got the lion’s share; 55,000 at Tripoli City and environs and 5,000 at Al Khums).
Derna and hinterland. The commander of Ottoman forces in Cyrenaica was the later infamous Enver Bey (Enver Pasha), who established his general headquarters at Ayn al-Mansur some 15 kilometres south-east of Derna. The fighting before Derna was centred around possession of the Wadi, and thus control of the water supply which depended upon an aqueduct extending some 3-5 kilometres south of the town. The Italian defences were sited to protect the aqueduct, and two large forts, Piemonte and Lombardia, were constructed. There was some fierce fighting and on occasion the garrison had to depend on water shipped from Italy, but, as elsewhere, the situation became essentially deadlocked with neither side able to prevail. Among the Ottoman officers was Mustafa Kemal, later the Empire’s greatest general and then Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Reassigned to Ayn al-Mansur on 30 December 1911 he was to command the forces before Derna and Tobruk while Enver oversaw the whole Cyrenaican theatre. (© Charles Blackwood).
The reinforcements were not confined to conventional forces. Three further aviation units were raised for the Cyrenaica theatre, the first to arrive being the 2nd Aeroplane Flotilla (2a Flottiglia aeroplani) at Benghazi with three aircraft; a Blériot, a Farman and an Italian-made Asteria. Five pilots were assigned to the unit, which left the Italian army somewhat short of qualified aviators. This situation was remedied via an intervention by the Italian sports magazine La Stampa Sportiva at the end of November. The magazine offered to pay for a group of civilian pilots to take part in the war. This unusual measure was approved by the army and eight civilians, together with eight army pilots, were deployed to Tobruk and Derna together with nine Blériot aeroplanes and one Farman. The four civilian pilots sent to Tobruk included the sportsman and politician, Carlo Montu, who was given the rank of captain. As has already been related, Captain Montu made aviation history on 31 January 1912 when he became the first casualty of anti-aircraft fire.
Meanwhile, the Ottoman forces in Cyrenaica became progressively better led, organised and equipped under the auspices of Enver Bey. According to his account dated 9 January 1912:
Despite all the unexpected difficulties that are revealed on every side, little by little the situation is stabilized. The organization begins to function. Supply columns of ten thousand camels ensure the provisioning of our forces. […] Each tribe is now commanded by officers. I hope soon to be able to set up a special company of picked Arabs, these will be trained as regular troops.37
Enver was impressed with the calibre of the tribesmen he encountered, stating they were contemptuous of the infidel soldiers. He became of a similar opinion himself, writing after the battle that took place on 27 December 1911 (see below) that the ‘Italian soldiers are cowards and unwilling or reluctant to fight [kampfunlustig], but I admire their officers who sacrifice themselves.’38 He had little money or equipment to kit out his ‘army’ but developed the technique of living off the enemy to some extent. After the battle referred to above, the booty obtained following the Italian retreat behind the defences at Derna amounted to: two machine guns, 600,000 cartridges, two mountain guns, twenty-five boxes of grenades and ten mules, which, Enver pointed out, ‘I can very well use to tow my guns.’39
The tribesmen were organised as units under their traditional chiefs, but the higher command devolved onto regular Ottoman officers. Enver was to be promoted to command of the whole of Cyrenaica40 and a general headquarters at Ayn al-Mansur (Ain al-Mansur, Ain Mansur), some 15 kilometres south-east of Derna was established by him.
My camp is on a high plateau […] In the east there is a deep gorge with almost vertical walls and down a narrow valley shaded by evergreen trees the water of Ain-el-Mansur spring flows to the sea. On the steep slopes on either side of the valley can be seen here and there, cave entrances, which serve as places of concealment for the local tribes. Another wadi, borders the plateau from the west. The plateau is about 300 metres above Derna and covered with huge boulders, between which wild thorny shrubs grow. […] In the middle of our campsite are the white tents of our soldiers, well-ordered in rows, whilst the dark or sand-coloured tents of the Arabs are scattered irregularly, often very cleverly hidden amongst the rocks and bushes. Further back, behind a hill, the tents of the Red Crescent are set up. I have my own tent, which actually consists of two Egyptian tents […] one I use as a bedroom, whilst the other is a reception room. Two rugs cover the ground and a white sheepskin form the seat - the furniture of the ‘salon.’ The bedroom is much more elegant: a portable bed, a small Turkish leather suitcase, and a stone slab that serves as a sink […].41
This is not quite the ‘great tent with carpets spread on the floor and hung with draperies’ that some have claimed.42 Nevertheless his was a sophisticated administration, and a factory to produce ammunition, a training camp for the tribesmen, and a school for their sons were also set up whilst a printing press produced a propagandist news sheet entitled Al-Jihad.43 Derna and its environs was a fertile area, and its topography had been described in 1864 by two British explorers, Captain R Murdoch Smith of the army and Commander E A Porcher of the navy. Their description gives an excellent indication of the likely course of any struggle for control of the area:
The town of Derna, with its gardens, covers a small triangular plain, formed by a projection of the seashore from the base of the range of hills […]. The shingly bed of a deep wady, which recedes several miles into the range, divides the small plain and the town into two distinct portions. On the eastern side are the two villages of Upper and Lower Bou Mansour; and on the western, a village on a spur of the hills called II Maghar, Derna proper lying immediately below, and a small detached village, called Gebeli, near the projecting headland. The whole assemblage of villages constitutes the town of Derna […] The beauty and fertility of the little plain of Derna are owing to the copious stream of fresh water which flows down the bed of the wady. Some two or three miles [3-5 kilometres] above the town the water is collected into an artificial aqueduct, by which it is led into the town, and thence distributed over the surrounding fields and gardens by means of small lateral branches. To insure the regular supply to every man’s property, a ‘Chief of the Water’ is appointed, whose duty it is to see that a supply is sent to every district in succession, and to prevent any one from diverting for his own use the stream that for the time belongs to his neighbour. Water-stealing is very properly considered a serious crime, and is punished accordingly.44
Once the Italians had occupied Derna then it was fairly obvious that any attempts to dislodge or discomfit them would begin with attempts at ‘water stealing.’ In order to prevent or mitigate this, the Italian defences were sited south of the town to protect the aqueduct and water flow, which followed the course of the Wadi Derna, the steep sides of which were filled with vegetation. To facilitate the defence two forts, christened Piemonte and Lombardia, were constructed on the plateau overlooking Derna, east and west of the watercourse respectively.
Until these forts and the other works were completed, and they were not finished until March-April 1912, the Italian defences were considered somewhat vulnerable and accordingly were subject to attacks by the Ottomans. Probing attacks were recorded on 17 November, and the Italians reckoned that efforts were made to raise a revolt amongst the inhabitants of Derna. These were unsuccessful, but the occupiers believed that the attackers were massing troops for a large scale operation.
In an attempt to gain further information, and possibly disrupt the attack, powerful reconnaissance units were despatched along the Wadi Derna. On 24 November one of these was advancing along the eastern side of the Wadi when it was ambushed by a large force. The difficulties of the terrain meant that disengagement and retreat was rendered difficult, but the despatch of a battalion of Alpini as reinforcements allowed the column to escape. In an engagement lasting some eight hours the Italians lost 15 killed and 37 wounded.
The next serious engagement took place on 27 December, when the Ottoman forces destroyed part of the aqueduct and cut off the water supply. Engineers were sent to effect repairs and to cover them three strong columns of infantry with mountain artillery were despatched; one on each side of the ravine of the Wadi Derna and one along the watercourse. This meant, of course, that each of the three columns was isolated from the other two, and when the right hand column on the west of the ravine was attacked there could be little cooperation from the centre or left. Despite its possession of mountain artillery, the right hand column came very close to being overrun by the Ottoman force and it was only with difficulty that reinforcements were able to reach it. Nevertheless, one battalion of Alpini were able to cross from the left column and strengthen the defenders, and this tipped the balance. The slackening of the Ottoman attack was not however the signal for an Italian forward movement, and the column began to retreat back towards Derna as part of a general withdrawal. Both left and right columns were fiercely attacked during this retreat, but managed to gain the safety of the main defences. The left column though was forced to abandon its machine guns and much other equipment as related above. This abandonment was also noted by foreign correspondents.45 The Italians unquestionably lost this encounter, and the cutting of the aqueduct forced them to rely on water shipped in from Italy. Captain Mahan would almost certainly have been impressed with this example of what ‘Command of the Sea’ could achieve. On the other hand, it is doubtful if he would have equally regarded the strategy that had got Italy into such a mess; reliance on imported water proved a very expensive and cumbersome business that caused serious inconvenience. An intense effort was made then to restore the water supply, and on 30 December a reinforced regiment advanced up the Wadi and managed to clear the area of the enemy. Repairs were made to the aqueduct, but without a large permanent force stationed in the vicinity it remained vulnerable to further attack.
Ottoman Artillery at Derna. Taken by Georges Remond, this photograph shows what appear to be mountain artillery in the Ottoman camp. Both the Italian and Ottoman armies were equipped with Krupp 75mm 1904 mountain guns, but it seems possible that these are captured weapons.
If the fighting around Derna was centred around possession of the Wadi, and hence control of the water supply, the terrain around Benghazi was rather less difficult, at least in terms of defence, with a fairly flat plain between the coast and the hills. Although frequent small-scale skirmishes occurred, there was no real attempt at an attack for weeks after the Italian occupation of the town, giving the occupiers time to construct strong earthworks and blockhouses. The Benghazi defences were sophisticated, and a ten-kilometre ‘Decauville Railway’ was constructed to provide communication between the various parts. An artificial airstrip was also built as, due to the soft nature of the ground around the chosen area of construction near the Wells of Sabri, it was necessary to lay down a wooden platform some 100 x 12 metres for the machines to take-off and land.
As at Tripoli City, the artillery had been reinforced with a number of heavy, 152 mm, guns by the middle of November. Provided that the Italians did not venture outside these defences then they were safe even though the Ottoman forces, estimated to number around 15,000, constantly attacked them, or pretended to. Following the movement of Ottoman officers into the vilayet the forces around Benghazi were under the command of Aziz Ali Bey El-Masri, an officer of Egyptian descent, of whom more later. According to the Italians, the tactics he often employed revolved around simulated nocturnal attacks, with the object of the exercise being twofold; the defenders would be unnerved and they would waste a great deal of ammunition in repelling these ‘attacks.’ Whether the first object was attained is difficult to judge, but the second was certainly achieved as these excursions usually resulted in a huge artillery barrage, from both land-based and, often, naval artillery. Tittoni describes such an action in what he calls a ‘general attack upon the city:’
This action involved only the artillery, as the Arab-Turks advanced cautiously and kept a great distance from the lines. The other arms, ready and on the watch, consequently participated neither in the action nor in the defense of the trenches nor in the counter-attacks.
The artillery opened up an efficacious and continuous fire at 3800 to 4000 metres […] using 29 pieces, each one firing on an average of 39 shots.
There were no appreciable losses; and when it is taken into consideration that the firing kept up all day, the expenditure of that amount of ammunition was justified. The batteries gave proof of their perfect fire-discipline, excellent technical and professional preparation, efficacy, and coordination of action.46
In November reconnaissance revealed that substantial elements of the Ottoman force were located to the north-east of Benghazi, principally at the oases of al Kuwayfiya (el-Coefia, al-Kwaifiya, Koefia, el Coef) and Sidi Khalifa (Sidi Chalifa, Sidi Califa); some 10 and 15 kilometres away respectively. Because these oases were close to the sea they were well within range of naval gunfire, therefore any advance on them would be well supported and thus less hazardous than an inland manoeuvre that went beyond the range of the warships. Accordingly, on 28 November Major General Raynaldo de’Amico led his 3rd Brigade, supported from offshore by the armoured cruiser San Marco and the destroyer Agordat, on a march along the coast towards the two oases.47 The brigade reached both objectives but came into conflict with a large Ottoman force. As usual, accounts of the fighting and its outcome differ greatly according to the proclivities of the author. Tittoni, quoting from the reports of the Italian General Staff, puts it thus: ‘[…] our troops, after ably overcoming the difficulty of the terrain, and giving proof of their vigor and ardor, surprised and dispersed a large force of Bedouins, who left on the field 21 dead […]. McClure, who admits he was not a witness of any of the events which took place in Cyrenaica, reported, from Italian sources, ‘a sharp but indecisive action’ whilst most non-Italian accounts describe a defeat, with twenty-two killed and fifty wounded, followed by retreat to Benghazi.
Minor combats of this nature, with no larger purpose other than to consolidate gains already made, were much in evidence at Tobruk, the third Cyrenaican port in Italian hands. Indeed the only notable feature of the conflict there, other than perhaps the airborne wounding of Carlo Montu, was the presence on the Ottoman side of Mustafa Kemal, who went on to become the Ottoman Empire’s greatest general and Atatürk (Father of the Turks), the founder of modern Turkey. Kemal had left Istanbul on 15 October and arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, on 29 October (the dates vary dependant on source).48 Travelling as either a journalist named Sherif (Serif) Bey, or a carpet salesman, or conceivably a mixture of the two, he was taken ill and delayed in the city. He eventually reached Benghazi on 8 December and was sent on to Tobruk, where the main Ottoman camp was situated at el-Mdàuar (Ras Mdauar, Mdawar) some 20 kilometres to the south.
The commander there was Edhem Pasa, who had requested the services of Kemal and quickly oversaw his promotion to the rank of major. Kemal, according to one of his biographers, stressed discipline and order to the men under his command, and divided them into small units.49 As soon as he arrived he personally reconnoitred the Italian positions and recommended a small-scale attack. This, his first engagement with the enemy, took place outside Tobruk on 22 December, and was deemed a victory.50 It was though, as elsewhere, impossible to do more than attempt to hold the Italians within their defences. As Tittoni related it: ‘the adversary was growing in numbers, and made a great many attacks against our works and skirmished with our troops on reconnaissance, but all the engagements were limited in importance.’51 On 30 December Kemal was reassigned to Ayn al-Mansur (Ain Mansur), where he was to command the forces before Derna and Tobruk while Enver commanded the whole Cyrenaican theatre from the same place. He was to write to a friend about how he had ‘crossed the Mediterranean Sea’ and ‘covered distant deserts to confront an enemy based on his Fleet, and how the Ottoman-led forces had ‘managed to keep the enemy at bay at certain points on the coast.’52 If his later account to his biographer, Hikmet Bayur, is to be believed, he realized from the start that doing anything more than containing the Italians in their enclaves ‘was hopeless.’ He had to stay and make the effort however in order ‘to keep my material and moral position in the army and amongst the officers who were my contemporaries.’53 It is often said that Kemal and Enver did not get on and this is borne out by the former’s 1926 reminiscence:
‘How his (Enver’s) designs were to be carried out was for him a matter of detail. He was generally ignorant in military matters, as he had not progressed step by step from the command of a battalion to that of a regiment, and so on.’54
At Al Khums in Tripolitania it became evident by the end of December 1911 that an advance, albeit one tactical in nature, was necessary. The port and town, complete with its 18-metre lighthouse, was surrounded on its landward side by an oasis, whilst some 6 kilometres to the east were the ancient ruins of Leptis Magna (Neapolis, Lebda). However the feature of most importance in the military context was Ra’s al Marqab (al-Markib, Markib, Colline del Mercheb, Mergheb), a steep-sided hill some 213 metres high and about 6 kilometres to the south-west. Dominating the town as it did, this was the key strategic feature of the landscape. Elements of the 8th Bersaglieri that had landed on 21 October under Colonel Giovanni Maggiotto to occupy Al Khums had penetrated as far as the hill, but without support could not take and hold it. Upon the withdrawal of the Bersaglieri, Ottoman forces had swiftly occupied the position, which was topped with a structure dating from antiquity, probably a blockhouse, that was then adapted for modern military purposes.55 According to Irace, this had ‘always been a well-known refuge of brigands, who, ensconced amongst the ruins of an old Roman castle, defied from this mountain eyrie the Turkish authority.’56
The modern adaptation might have been of only minor import had it not eventually included the emplacing of two artillery pieces; probably the Krupp 87 mm 1897 model though they might have been the more potent 75 mm 1906 model captured from the Italians. The usual inconclusive skirmishes and minor actions had taken place around the periphery of the defences ever since the occupiers had taken possession of Al Khums, and following the sending of large-scale reinforcements there were about 5,000 troops in the garrison under Major-General Ezio Reisoli. This garrison was apparently surprised when early in the New Year the Ottoman guns began a sporadic bombardment, firing several shells a day into Al Khums. This was little more than a nuisance, and was countered by the emplacing of a counter battery of 149 mm howitzers near the lighthouse that silenced the Ottoman guns on 12 January. It became clear to Reisoli though that to make the occupation secure Ra’s al Marqab would have to be taken and held. As well as mounting the two guns, it provided a secure base from which to mount harassing attacks.
Assaulting the position would be no easy task however, as the Ottomans had entrenched themselves around the prominence and were present in significant numbers. In order to weaken the defenders Reisoli devised and implemented a cunning and audacious plan. On 26 February 1912 two Italian vessels, a warship and a passenger steamer, appeared off the coast at Zliten (Sliten), some 40 kilometres east of Al Khums. Activity aboard these vessels indicated to those watching from shore that a landing was imminent. Accordingly, substantial reinforcements were hurried from the Ra’s al Marqab area to oppose the manoeuvre. It was however merely an Italian ruse, and during the early morning of 27 February almost the entire garrison of Al Khums left the defences and, divided into three columns, made towards the mountain in the pre-dawn darkness.
The centre column was composed of a battalion from the 89th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of Alpini, and a company of engineers, with a mountain battery in support. This was the assault column, tasked with making a frontal attack on Ra’s al Marqab in an attempt to take it by storm. The left and right columns, composed of battalions from the 8th Bersaglieri and two infantry battalions drawn from the 6th and 37th Regiments respectively, together with supporting elements, had the task of protecting the flanks and rear of the assaulting troops from any enemy interference. At daylight the artillery at Al Khums began a heavy bombardment of the Ottoman position and the troops of the centre column attacked the mountain. It was, according to reports issued from Rome the following day, ‘an all day battle’ but the Italians prevailed and by the evening of 27 February they held the summit of Ra’s al Marqab. Reisoli, through a combination of guile and daring, had won an important, if relatively minor, victory at the cost of 26 dead and 130 wounded; the Italian occupation of Al Khums was made secure.
Italian innovation was not restricted to tactical matters however. Mention has already been made of the collecting of motor wagons at the market at Tripoli City, and the use of lorries to carry and distribute supplies, and later infantry, became widespread. It had not at first been thought that such vehicles would prove useful due to the lack of proper roads in the theatre. A trial of two light FIAT lorries fitted with twin pneumatic tyres on the rear wheels was undertaken. Despite much of the terrain over which they operated consisting of rough, loose sand and gravel-type material strewn with rocks, interspersed with dunes that they could not negotiate, they quickly established their superiority over animal transport. Thirty more of the same type were then despatched followed by larger consignments. Sources differ as regards to numbers, but around 300 light ‘auto-trucks’ were sent to the theatre with around half being deployed in and around Tripoli City – heavier vehicles were excluded because they used solid rubber tyres, which would have been of no use given the ground.
The idea of using self-propelled vehicles in warfare was not novel and had been long encouraged by proponents of the devices. Indeed between the years 1873-1883 the Italian Army had conducted extensive experiments in using traction engines, or road locomotives (locomotive stradali) as they were termed, to haul artillery, but had concluded that they were too unwieldy and not reliable enough at that time.57 This was undoubtedly correct, but late nineteenth century technological evolution by no means discarded steam power. The Horseless Age, the first US automotive magazine, had carried an article in 1897 entitled ‘Motor Vehicles in Warfare’ which had identified deficiencies in internal combustion engine powered vehicles, and therefore argued that the future of such vehicles lay in steam power:
[…] since the petroleum motors at present are not satisfactory above ten horse power […] a motor vehicle for military service must be a carefully designed steam traction engine, planned to haul artillery and supply trains anywhere where horses can go; the questions of speed and personal comfort, so important in pleasure vehicles, need hardly be considered […] and it is not at all unlikely that motors in warfare may soon enter the field service as extensively as they have already entered other departments.58
They were indeed used in small number during the Second Boer War when the British despatched 24 of them to South Africa in 1899 followed by six armoured versions; the latter being equipped with four armoured trailers apiece.59 Used to tow heavy guns and their impedimenta the British named them ‘steam sappers,’ but the Italian experience was replicated according to Major General Sir John Headlam of the Royal Artillery who served with them. He concluded that they were ‘too cumbersome for general use on ordinary roads, and quite unsuited for taking guns into action.’60
Technological advances though led to much improved internal combustion engines, and by 1911 the objections to utilising vehicles powered by them had been largely overcome. Italy thus scored another military first by making large-scale use of motorised lorries to transport supplies. According to Renato Tittoni:
This new method of transportation resulted in the rapid clearing of the wharves and transmitting the stores to the troops, transporting construction materials, removal of camp equipage, and carrying ammunition and rations to the firing-line. We therefore had ample proof from this complex work – the long daily trips made over desert and variable ground – that inspired complete faith in this mode of transportation to follow the troops, under any circumstances and for long distances, with great saving of time and fatigue, besides the ordinary services required by the presence of many troops on a warlike mission.61
A Fabbrica Automobili Isotta Fraschini armour-plated car. By 1911 technological advances in internal combustion engines had led to their widespread adoption in vehicles. The Italian Army scored a military first by making large-scale use of motorised lorries to transport supplies, though the convoys thus formed of these thin-skinned vehicles were of necessity slow moving and thus somewhat vulnerable to small arms fire. In order to offer some protection, and to be able to retaliate against attack, armoured versions were constructed armed with machine guns. The first of these, designed by Giustino Cattaneo of the Milanese company Isotta Fraschini, was ready for deployment by the end of 1911. It was of an advanced design armed with two 6.5 mm Vickers-Maxim machine guns, one in a turret mounting that could swivel and one rear-firing. Plated with 4 mm steel for crew protection, the vehicle weighed some 3 tonnes and was fitted with steel extension rims for the wheels to prevent it sinking into the ground. It was a success, and several more of similar designs were ordered from various manufacturers. Though the concept was not entirely new, these were the first armoured fighting vehicles ever to be deployed in a combat situation. (Author’s Collection).
The convoys thus formed of these thin-skinned vehicles were of necessity slow moving and thus somewhat vulnerable to small arms fire. In a similar manner to their steam-powered ancestors, and in order to offer some protection and to be able to retaliate against attack, armoured versions equipped with machine guns were developed. Again this was not a totally new idea, and armoured cars powered by internal combustion engines had been both mooted and built previously; Austria-Hungary and France had constructed working, albeit experimental, models in 1900-6.62
Working quickly, and probably sensing a commercial opportunity, the Milanese company Fabbrica Automobili Isotta Fraschini had a model designed by its engineer Giustino Cattaneo ready for use by the end of 1911. It was of an advanced design armed with two 6.5mm Vickers-Maxim machine guns, one in a turret mounting that could swivel and one rear firing. Plated with 4mm steel for crew protection the vehicle weighed some 3 tonnes and was fitted with steel extension rims for the wheels to prevent it sinking into the ground. It can safely be concluded that the concept was considered successful, inasmuch as several more of similar design were ordered from various manufacturers.
The mobility conferred by the use of vehicular transport was first put to use in a military operation during another advance towards Zanzur (Janzur) that took place on 8 June 1912. This was undertaken by the heavily reinforced 1st Division comprising 13,494 infantry including troops from Eritrea (ascari), 8 squadrons of cavalry, 12 machine guns, and 50 artillery pieces now under the command of conteVittorio Camerana, which departed from the Italian lines near Gargaresh at 03:30 hours with its two core Brigades each in column.63 These two columns advanced in echelon, with Giardina’s 2nd Brigade (the 6th and 40th Regiments and two batteries of mountain artillery) on the right nearest the sea being slightly ahead of the 1st Brigade (the 82nd and 84th Regiments, with three batteries of field artillery) under Rainaldi.
Accompanying the advance were 54 motor lorries divided into four transport columns, the whole of this mechanical transport being under the command of Captain Corazzi. One of these columns, consisting of ten vehicles, formed an ambulance train under the command of a surgeon, whilst the other three (under the command of Lieutenants Milani, Bosio and Marocco) carried engineering equipment such as barbed wire, sand bags, and shovels together with a large quantity of dynamite. The ambulance column followed directly behind the advancing troops whilst the engineering supplies waited until called upon.
The objective was a small hill topped with a shrine or tomb (marabutto) marking the eastern extremity of the Zanzur Oasis. This high ground was considered to be the key to the whole position, and it was defended by a considerable Ottoman force that was well protected in narrow and deep trenches that sheltered them from rifle fire and all but direct hits from artillery. Against the nearly invisible enemy manning these defences the 2nd Brigade could not at first prevail, despite an outflanking move along the shore by a battalion of the 40th Regiment and heavy support from the mountain artillery and the 152 mm guns of the armoured cruiser Carlo Alberto stationed offshore. However the weight of fire eventually told and the infantry were able to advance over the open ground and into the trenches where some hand-to-hand fighting took place. Numbers prevailed and the clearance of the trenches meant that that the Ottoman forces as a whole were obliged to fall back into the Oasis of Zanzur and the position was taken. Having taken the hill the Italians now set out to fortify it against any counter-attack, and the 44 lorries conveyed the engineering equipment the circa 15 kilometres to the requisite positions. Having been unloaded the three columns returned to Gargaresh, where two of them were redeployed as ambulances whilst one was employed in conveying rations and equipment to the 6th and 40th Regiments atop their recently conquered position.
‘After the battle of Zanzur: General Frugoni with other senior officers visited the conquered enemy trenches filled with the dead.’ The small village of Zanzur lay about eight kilometres beyond the Italian occupied zone around Tripoli City and was remarkable only because it was one of the few decent anchorages between there and the Tunisian frontier. The Italians believed that it was a nodal point for the ‘contraband’ that succoured the Ottoman-led forces in the interior, but left it until 8 June 1912 before despatching an overwhelmingly strong force to occupy it. This ponderous manoeuvre was successful, though the great number of enemy dead depicted was more the result of artistic licence rather than an accurate rendition. From La Domenica del Corriere 23-30 June 1912. (Author’s Collection).
Frugoni’s report on the battle stated that out of the total manpower deployed the losses had amounted to one officer and 38 troops (including ten ascari) killed and 13 officers and 278 troops (including 75 ascari) wounded. Of these categories, 70 wounded Italian soldiers were carried to forward hospitals by the ambulances, whilst the dead were conveyed to the cemetery.64 In these matters, and in carrying the engineering materials to the object of the attack which would otherwise have had to be moved using horses or mules, the lorries had proven useful if not decisive. It was, though, a pointer of things to come, and the writer Horace Wyatt quoted an Italian newspaper in this regard:
The motor lorry was ubiquitous; it transported ammunition or succoured the wounded, fetched fodder for the horses and other animals, or money for the troops and for the Arabs; it brought new boots for the soldiers or delivered urgent messages, as well as being used for the transport of troops from the various bases right up to the first fighting line in battle. Only the advent of the autocar rendered possible many of the daring moves of this war, as it solved the difficulties of desert transport.65
This perhaps overstates the case somewhat, but nevertheless there can be no doubt that the Italians had at least begun the process of solving the difficulties of desert mobility by demonstrating that light lorries and similar vehicles could, in the main, handle the terrain and climatic conditions.
Mobility and the resultant ability to project power was assisted by the redeployment of airships to the theatre. This occurred at the end of February as, according to an eyewitness account, one of the dirigibles was test-flown about a week before first operational usage, the wind direction and speed at various heights being ascertained by sending up tethered kites. The observer was the British artist and experienced war correspondent, Henry Charles Seppings Wright, who recounted the sighting in his 1913 book:
One peaceful morning about eight o’clock a strange phenomenon presented itself in the sky. Over Tripoli was hovering what appeared to be an indistinct moon. The sky was heavy, and a purple haze obscured the horizon. We were not left long in doubt as to what this strange new object was, for gradually it turned and presented the long ovoid body of an airship, a new terror for frightening these unconquerable desert men. I had seen it before manoeuvring above the lagoons at Venice earlier in the year. We all watched its motions with intense interest; the Turks showed little concern, and the Arabs seemed to think that the Italians were providing a new target for them to practise at. Rifles were immediately discharged, in their usually excited and erratic manner, although the ship was a good fifteen miles away. This first ascent was evidently only a trial trip, or perhaps the kites had shown that the wind was set in a wrong direction, for she continued to hover over Tripoli. Probably, too, they were testing the engines.66
The airships P 2 and P 3 in their hangar at Tripoli. The P Type (modello piccolo) semi-rigid airship consisted of a gas-filled envelope 63 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4400 cubic metres of hydrogen. From the internal hinged keel was slung a boat-shaped car or gondola, with two 75 hp Fiat engines, one on either side, equipped with reversible propeller blades. The aircraft were fitted with dual controls and had a four or five man crew, which, despite the airships being army machines, consisted of both naval and military officers. The petrol for the engines was carried in the car as was the water ballast, whilst additional sand ballast was contained in bags and a number of bombs could also be carried. The first operational usage of the two airships occurred during the attack on Zanzur on 5 March 1912. Seppings Wright related how the two ‘ballons,’ as the Ottomans called them, ‘proceeded slowly and gracefully to Zanzur, manoeuvring like a couple of battleships.’ (Author’s Collection).
This vessel was either the P 2 or P 3. The P Type (modello piccolo) semi-rigid airship consisted of a gas filled envelope 63 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4400 cubic metres of hydrogen. From the internal hinged keel was slung a boat-shaped car or gondola, with two 75hp Fiat engines, one on either side, equipped with reversible propeller blades. The aircraft were fitted with dual controls and had a four or five man crew, which, despite the airships being army machines, consisted of both naval and military officers. The petrol for the engines was carried in the car as was the water ballast, whilst additional sand ballast was contained in bags and, although this was not apparent at the time, a number of bombs could also be carried.67 The aviators who manned these craft included several who went on to higher things. Perhaps most notable were Salvatore Denti di Piraino, who became an admiral and commander in chief of the Italian Navy and Giulio Valli, who as a rear admiral was to argue for the construction of Italian aircraft carriers to provide organic air power for the Italian fleet.
The first operational usage of the two airships (a third slightly smaller P Type – 60 metres in length and 11.6 metres in diameter containing 4200 cubic metres of hydrogen – P 1, was deployed at Benghazi from 11 May 1912) occurred in an attack on Zanzur on 5 March 1912. Seppings Wright related how the two ‘ballons,’ as the Ottomans called them, ‘proceeded slowly and gracefully to Zanzur, manoeuvring like a couple of battleships.’68 Though obviously useful for reconnaissance the dirigibles also had an embryonic strike capability. According to Abbott, who was in the vicinity, they aimed six bombs at ‘a hillock between Girgaresh and Zanzur, where a body of fifteen Arab horsemen were gathered at the time.’ Only one of these devices exploded whilst the rest embedded themselves in soft sand, allowing the Ottoman forces to recover them. Abbott described one he saw thus:
They consist of an outer iron cylinder, about nine inches long and four inches in diameter, and a narrower concentric cylinder inside. The latter is charged with dynamite, the former with about three hundred shrapnel bullets embedded in brittle resin. On the top of the cylinder is a wooden cap; through its centre passes a tube about two feet six inches long. The upper and longer portion of this tube serves to suspend and direct the bomb. The portion that goes through the bomb contains a detonator. From below projects a needle resting on a spring. When the lower end of the tube, which for equipoise is armed with a small linen parachute, has struck a hard substance, the needle gets loose, shoots upward, and hits the detonator, thus bringing about the explosion.69
According to reports issued from Rome shortly after the event these bombs had ‘terrific effect.’70 Later reports, having digested the operations in Tripoli as a whole, gave a different view; ‘The dropping of bombs, while they did no material damage, had a wonderful moral effect.’71
According to Italian sources, the dirigibles had an important effect on the advance towards Zanzur that took place on 8 June 1912. Drawn by the sounds of battle, Ottoman forces moved towards the Italian forces and hoped to surprise the 1st Brigade which was inland covering the flank of the main advance. This was spotted by the observers in the airships, who not only reported the movement but also bombed the advancing force. Though the bombing had little or no effect the warning was invaluable to Rainaldi’s brigade as it allowed it to deploy in good time and repulse the Ottoman attack.72
Another area of novel technology that the Italians utilised was in communications. Radio, or wireless, telegraphy (radiotelegrafici) was not new to the Italian forces, and they despatched a wireless detachment to Tripoli under the command of Lieutenant Luigi Sacco on 9 October. Nor was this was the first time wireless communication had been used in land warfare as the German forces in Deutsch-Südwestafrika had employed the technique during their campaign there in 1904-7. There it was discovered that it was possible to send Morse messages successfully at distances of over 150 kilometres using the portable Telespark apparatus. However, other than installation in permanent land-based stations, the apparatus was only really suitable for use on board ships because in that application the weight and size of the apparatus could easily be accommodated; such factors meant that developing portable apparatus for military use was problematical.
Sacco was joined at Tripoli City by none other than Guglielmo Marconi and they carried out a series of experiments on 16 December in the presence of Caneva and Frugoni at the airfield near the Jewish Cemetery. They established that with small-scale equipment using four 1.5-metre length antennae it was possible to communicate over a distance of 15-20 kilometres. The next day a further experiment was performed near the cavalry barracks. During the course of these tests Sacco and Marconi ‘accidentally made a discovery of the greatest importance.’ They discovered that they did not have to rig up an antenna on masts in order to send or receive a signal. Rather the insulating properties of the dry desert sand meant the running of a 200-metre cable on the ground allowed the apparatus to function ‘without interruption, exactly the same as if the usual system were employed.’
Messages sent from Tripoli were received at Coltano, near Pisa, in Italy, and as Sacco put it in his report it meant ‘a simple and safe communication with Italy although in only one direction.’ In terms of military applications he noted that the removal of the need for tall masts, which Marconi reckoned to be a grave danger as they could be seen by an enemy from a long distance, would allow greater flexibility in the field. He also noted that although it would be possible to intercept enemy wireless transmissions, the same applied in reverse and that therefore it would be necessary to encrypt all transmission by radiotelegrafici. Tactically, the Italians did manage to produce wireless sets that were small enough to be carried by animal transport and which were used by gunfire direction parties to communicate with ships close offshore. The use of these sets allowed close support naval gunfire to the army.73 The utilisation of these new technologies, though they were not without interest or import and reflected the Italian search for, and deployment of, technological solutions to the difficulties of terrain they faced, did not alter the fact that at the theatre or operational level the war was stalled. It was becoming impossible to disguise the fact that at the political and strategic level, the Italian government was in difficulties.