The Southern Sporades, the Dardanelles, and the Limits of Navalism
‘A cardinal factor [of British Mediterranean policy] has naturally been that no strong Naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour East of Malta.’
Rear-Admiral ECT Troubridge in a Memorandum of 29 June 19121
‘The water boiled around the torpedo boats from stem to stern, and jets of water flew high as shells fell with horrible thuds, as if volcanic eruptions were flashing inexhaustibly beneath the water […] The air was full of flashes, of flames, explosions, and splinters. Convulsive, foaming, full of glare and reflections, the sea seemed to become a huge fiery furnace. But at the zenith shone always the star of Italy.’
Giuseppe Bevione in La Stampa, 25 July 19122
AS originally conceived, the military component of the expedition to Rhodes was to be some 3,000 strong taken from the units around Tobruk, together with 350 horses and mules. This special detachment was to carry with it four weeks’ worth of rations and supplies, plus enough water to last two weeks, and 600 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Subsequently however it was greatly strengthened, which necessitated the use of units from Italy. The force thus created was to be termed the 6th Aegean Special Division (6° Divisione Speciale dell’Egeo) with Giovanni Ameglio, who had recently been promoted to Lieutenant General, in command. The concentration points for the division were Tobruk and Benghazi, where seven steamships (Sannio, Europa, Verona, Toscana, Bulgaria, Cavour and Valparaiso) to transport it were despatched. Protection for the convoy was provided by the heavy units of the 2nd Division of the 1st Squadron and torpedo boats, which would operate close by the troop carriers during the landing.3
The military contingent sent from Italy consisted of ten battalions of infantry, organised as the 34th and 57th Infantry Regiments, with two batteries of field artillery, eight machine gun sections, plus engineering and support troops. Also included were a group of Carabinieri and the 4th Regiment of Bersaglieri. The force drawn from the North African theatre consisted of the Fenestrelle Battalion of Alpini with its machine gun section and four-gun mountain battery, together with support. Also sent were two wireless telegraphy sections and two field hospitals. The 57th Infantry and 4th Bersaglieri were sent to Benghazi whilst the 34th Infantry concentrated at Tobruk. The total strength of the 6th Special Division amounted to between 8,494-9,282 officers and men, and 1,186-1,309 transport animals, dependent upon source. Also loaded aboard the ships were a number of civilians whose task would be to oversee civil administration.4
In order to maintain secrecy as to the destination of the expeditionary force, misinformation was disseminated to the effect that a landing was planned at Bomba, a village on the Gulf of Bomba some 60 kilometres from Derna. Secrecy was maintained to the extent that Ameglio forbade any reconnaissance of the target and strict censorship was imposed on all communications, particularly with respect to those of journalists. This led to the force being tagged as the Bomba detachment.
Rhodes. The Italian decision to expand and extend the campaign against the Ottoman Empire to the Southern Sporades (Dodecanese) was prompted by the wish to increase pressure on the Ottoman government. Opening another theatre of operations was fraught with diplomatic dangers, but the way was eventually cleared for a ‘temporary’ occupation of the islands of Rhodes, Karpathos and Stampalia. Once again utilising their command of the sea and expertise in amphibious warfare, the navy successfully landed a large force at the Bay of Kalithea (Baia di Catilla) on the east coast on 4 May 1912. This force advanced on Rhodes City and occupied it with little resistance, and after a short campaign of some twelve days the Ottomans throughout the island were forced to surrender. It had been a dramatic victory made possible by Italian naval supremacy, and it was followed by the occupation of the several other islands of the Southern Sporades. However, whilst an operational success the venture was a strategic failure as it did little or nothing to force the Ottoman government to terms. It also threatened a diplomatic rupture with Austria-Hungary as Italy occupied many more islands than the agreed three. (© Charles Blackwood).
The 1st Division of the 1st Squadron left Taranto on 30 April for Stampalia en route to Rhodes, whilst destroyers and torpedo-boats began to patrol the seas around the island and seize any Ottoman shipping found there. Ameglio, who it may be remembered had commanded the amphibious operation that seized Benghazi, had been granted complete tactical freedom by Pollio, though the Bay of Trianda, an area on the north-west coast near to the village of Trianda (Trianta, Ialyssos), which had a level shingle beach some two kilometres in length, had been suggested as the best area to land the troops. Furthermore it was also only around two or three kilometres from Rhodes City, the key objective of the invasion.
The Ottoman garrison on Rhodes was estimated to be somewhere between 2,000-5,000 strong and equipped with artillery. Should this force be in the right place at the right time then it could cause severe difficulties to the landing operation. Since the Trianda Bay area was obviously the most likely candidate for an amphibious attack Ameglio had decided to land elsewhere. Instead he chose to put his force ashore at the Bay of Kalithea (Baia di Catilla) on the east coast, which was about ten kilometres from Rhodes City and just north of the modern resort of Faliraki.5 On 1 May the cable between Rhodes City and the Anatolian mainland was dredged up and cut whilst the expeditionary force left the following day aboard the steamships. Escorted by the warships and accompanied by a hospital ship the Re d’Italia the fleet first steamed eastward at around ten knots. Even the crews were not aware of the true destination and only once it was out of sight of land was the course altered northwards.
This force was off Kalithea early on the morning of 4 May whilst diversionary tactics were employed by vessels off Trianda and several other places. The Italian navy had no specialist amphibious equipment, and the troops and their equipment had to be ferried to the landing beach aboard ships boats. After initial reconnaissance parties had landed and verified that there were no Ottoman forces in the vicinity the landing of the main force began at 04:00 hours. It was some ten hours later that Ameglio had his main body ashore, and so at 14:00 hours the north-eastern advance from the landing beach towards Rhodes City began, protected by the guns of the fleet.
There was to be very little opposition, and the only resistance encountered was from a small Ottoman detachment, estimated to be 400 strong, some five kilometres from the beachhead on high ground around the villages of Koskinou (Koskino) and Sgourou (Asguru, Arguru) The former village was deemed to be inhabited by ‘Greeks’ whilst the latter was ‘Turkish.’ This resistance only slowed the advance slightly, and by nightfall the main Italian body was about two kilometres from its objective where it camped for the night.
The advance resumed the next morning and Ameglio sent a deputation under his Chief of Staff, Major Ernesto Mombelli of the Alpini battalion, into Rhodes City to arrange terms of surrender with Ali Subhi (Subhy, Soubhy) Bey, the vali (governor) of the island. The terms were simple; capitulate immediately or the city would be bombarded. The navy was making similar demands. Captain Gustavo Nicastro took his destroyer Alpino into the harbour and also demanded that the governor surrender.
Subhi Bey had fled however, and his deputy prevaricated, arguing that he could not surrender the Ottoman military component as all the troops had left the city, leaving it undefended. Accordingly there was no resistance when both Italian army and navy detachments entered and took possession; at about 14:00 hours the Italian flag was raised above the old fortifications. Unnoticed by the invaders, the Ottoman vali escaped by boat and made his way along the coast. He was captured at Lindos whilst waiting to be transported to the Anatolian mainland on 28 May.
The Ottoman forces, the strength of which the Italians had greatly overestimated, had meanwhile concentrated around the village of Psinthos (Psithos, Psindos, Psitos) on a plateau some twenty kilometres south-west of Rhodes under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (bimbashi) Abdullah Bey. According to Italian sources they numbered 1,300 in total, whilst Ottoman records indicate about 950, though this figure may only include regular fighting troops. In any event, they were greatly outnumbered, had very little artillery, and no hope of escape.
Ameglio moved to deal with them on 15 May, dividing his force into three. Under his personal command the main body, Column A, consisting of the two infantry regiments with artillery support, would advance toward the enemy position overland. This advance would be supported by two amphibious operations in order to cut off any attempt at retreat. The Bersaglieri formed Column B and would embark on the Sannio landing on the beach at Kalavarda on the north-west of the island before moving southeast towards Kalopteri. Column C, the Alpini, would use the Bulgaria to land at Malona Bay on the south-east and then advance north-west. In order to preserve security rumours were spread to the effect that the two steamers were conveying troops to the other islands, and both left the harbour at Rhodes City at around 19:00 hours.
Both columns were safely ashore some two to three hours later, and guided by local people, they began to move towards their objectives along roads that were little better than mule tracks. At about 02:00 hours on 16 May the main body under Ameglio, which had advanced over half the distance between Rhodes City and Psinthos on the previous day, resumed its forward movement, arriving at Afandou to the east of the objective at 05:00 hours. The column then split, one of the regiments moving west to Archipoli whilst the other advanced directly towards Psinthos. By 09:00 hours the enemy were effectively surrounded and appeared to have been taken by surprise, though the barren and rocky terrain made any rapid movement difficult.
The defenders, once they observed the advancing Italians, began to fire upon them from around 09:30 hours, to which the Italian artillery replied. Under cover of the bombardment the infantry advanced towards the Ottoman positions, and the defenders began to slowly fall back. The broken nature of the ground made it difficult for the various attacking units to keep in proper contact with each other, but given the disparity in strength there could be little doubt of the outcome of the struggle. As the Italians gained ground they began to occupy the higher features of the terrain, and consequently were able to make the Ottoman positions increasingly untenable. Some of them began to withdraw north-east along the track to Maritsa, whilst attempts to suppress the Italian artillery with counter battery work was hopeless in the face of the much heavier rate of fire.
By 15:00 hours the Ottoman force had been largely driven from its positions and was attempting to retire in some disorder towards Maritsa along the only route not completely blocked by Italian units. A large number were able to shelter from the Italian fire in the broken ground, though could make little progress towards their goal because the Bersaglieri were positioned to interdict the track. Ameglio had already decided that he would deploy an entire regiment across this line of retreat the following day, which would have completely surrounded the Ottoman force. However, at 23:00 hours he despatched an officer under a flag of truce to call for surrender. Realising that his position was ultimately hopeless Abdullah sent a representative to Ameglio to negotiate terms. These were simple and straightforward; the entire Ottoman force would give itself and its weapons up at 08:00 hours the next morning, the only exceptions being the officers who would keep their swords as a mark of respect for them having fought bravely and with honour. This was accepted and the emissary returned.
Though Ameglio remained suspicious that some of the enemy would try to escape or even continue to fight, and so made his dispositions for resuming operations accordingly, the enemy did indeed lay down their arms as agreed. The Ottoman commander-in-chief, accompanied by the commander of the gendarmerie, called on Ameglio to observe the formalities and their forces accordingly handed over their arms. Also captured was a section of mountain artillery, together with an ammunition train complete with draft animals and much other equipment was also taken after being found abandoned. The total number of prisoners amounted to about 1,300 including 38 officers and they were sent to Rhodes City. The Italians estimated that around 200 of the enemy had been killed or wounded, whilst their own casualties amounted to one officer and seven soldiers killed, and 26 soldiers wounded. This casualty list demonstrates that although the fighting had been somewhat lengthy, it had certainly not been hard.
It had though, by any standards, been a dramatic military victory made possible, of course, by Italian naval supremacy, and it was this that allowed the occupation of several other islands of the Southern Sporades. On 12 May the islands of Karpathos (Scarpanto), Kasos (Caso), Tilos (Piscopi), Nisyros (Nisiro), Kalymnos (Calino), Leros (Lero), and Patmos (Patmo) were seized by landing parties from individual ships. There was no resistance and having left small garrisons the vessels departed. The island of Kos (Coo) was likewise taken on 21 May and the islands of Leipsoi (Lisso), Symi (Simi), and Halki (Calchi) soon followed.
This was, of course, going well beyond the occupation of Rhodes, Karpathos and Stampalia that had been reluctantly accepted by Austria-Hungary. That Berchtold was becoming somewhat exasperated by Italian actions in the Aegean, or at least by requests concerning them, is made plain in his communication with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, Kajetan von Merey, dated 23 May 1912.
The question of occupation of islands in the Aegean Sea has repeatedly been the subject of conversations between me and the Italian Ambassador in the last few days.
The Duke of Avarna resumed the discussion yesterday. He especially expressed the apprehension that the decision we had promised in respect of the occupation of several unimportant islands (he referred to Chios and the isles whence the Turkish officials had first been removed) might be such as to arouse profound ill-feeling in Italy.
He further observed that it impressed him strangely to see that of all Europe, including Germany, it was Austria-Hungary, Italy’s ally, who caused her the greatest difficulties in the attainment of her aim, which consisted in a speedy conclusion of the war.
I pointed out, that in this case we were in a peculiar situation in two respects: Firstly, because we had entered into bilateral agreements with Italy concerning the matter in question; secondly, because we were directly adjacent neighbours of Turkey, and consequently were the most closely concerned of all. Besides, I failed to understand his apprehension, inasmuch as there never had been a question of a ‘protest’ against the occupation of the islands referred to. Yet, we were compelled to specify our legitimate claim at this time in order to avoid possible future misunderstandings.
I finally specified our standpoint on this question as follows: We have been painfully impressed by the news of the occupation of additional islands by Italian troops. Because of the consequences to be feared from such operations, we are compelled to express our most serious misgivings. At the same time it is our duty to point out that in our opinion the occupations in question are contrary to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, and give us the right to demand compensation on our part.
True, for the time being we do not wish to make use of this right, out of a desire to avoid complicating Italy’s position. However, we must declare emphatically that if Italy perseveres in this policy the responsibility for it will rest with her, while we would be constrained to reserve the right to compensation which we are at liberty to use according to our own judgment.6
The ‘right to compensation’ as enshrined in Article VII of the Triple Alliance, was probably the motive force behind Austro-Hungarian concerns. Indeed, Austria-Hungary was the only Great Power to raise protests at Italian actions. As Giolitti recalled:
The occupation of the islands did not rise to any comments from the Powers, except Austria-Hungary. Berchtold renewed his complaints over our occupation, because it was not limited to those islands over which he had reluctantly expressed consent. […] He intended, however, that the occupations carried marked the final limit that he would accept.7
Austro-Hungarian forbearance was being prompted by the senior partner in the Triple-Alliance, who was accordingly grateful, as is revealed by messages passed between Austria-Hungary’s Ambassador to Berlin and Berchtold in Vienna. For example:
Von Kiderlen-Waechter assured me that he gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of Italian action in the Archipelago. He still entertained hopes that the occupation of several islands in the Aegean Sea by Italy would not provoke a dangerous reaction in the Balkans.8
Austro-Hungarian concerns were the only ones expressed directly, if in somewhat muted form, but the British Admiralty was certainly exercised by the Italian actions and their potential. Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge, the chief of the Admiralty War Staff, had the responsibility at the time for drawing up plans for naval strategy in the event of war. On 29 June 1912 he authored a memorandum entitled ‘Italian occupation of Aegean Islands and its effect on naval policy,’ which he circulated to the foreign office and other interested government departments. His analysis and conclusions were clear:
A cardinal factor of [of British policy] has naturally been that no strong Naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour East of Malta, if such harbour be capable of transformation into a fortified Naval base. […] None can foresee the developments of material in warfare, and the occupation of the apparently most useless island should be resisted equally with the occupation of the best. The geographical situation of these islands enables the Sovereign Power, if enjoying the possession of a Navy, to exercise a control over the Levant and Black Sea trade and to threaten our position in Egypt in an unprecedented degree. It may be confidently asserted that the possession by Italy of naval bases in the Aegean Sea would imperil our position in Egypt, would cause us to lose our control over our Black Sea and Levant trade at its source, and would in war expose our route to the East via the Suez Canal to the operations of Italy and her allies.9
A naval base in the area would be even more significant if, as the Admiralty suspected they might, the other members of the Triple Alliance were to have access to it. A combined Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleet would be ‘a much more formidable opponent than the feeble Italy’ and could have profound effects on British interests.10 Winston Churchill, the political head of the Royal Navy noted on 15 June that Britain’s rivals in the Mediterranean ‘may be said to be Italy and Austria, separately or together.’11 This was all the more so as many units of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean fleet were being withdrawn to counteract the increasing German threat in the North Sea. It is then no surprise that the Admiralty were disquieted, or that Sir Edward Grey made it his unstated policy to prevent Italy gaining a permanent hold on the islands. The policy was tacit at that time because of the repeated Italian assurances that the occupation was temporary. For example, Giolitti declared in Parliament on 5 December 1912 that the occupation was temporary and had been undertaken for ‘purely military purposes.’12 Nevertheless, just over a year later on 12 August 1913, after Italy proved somewhat reluctant to quit, Grey stated the policy, as agreed between the Great Powers, concerning the islands in an official statement to the UK Parliament:
The destiny of these Aegean Islands – all of them including those in the temporary occupation of Italy – is a matter which concerns all the Great Powers, and must be settled eventually by them and no Great Power is to retain one of these islands for itself.13
Italy was to have different ideas of course, but there is no evidence to suggest that Giolitti, San Giuliano, or indeed anyone else in a position of influence or power in Italy was being deliberately insincere in 1912 when they stated that the islands would be returned. There was however one complicating factor; the people of the occupied islands. In 1912 the population was around 143,000 of whom some 45,000 lived on Rhodes, whilst Halki, Astypalea, Tilos, Patmos and Kasos averaged under 3,000. It was not however a homogenous population. According to a study published in 1912 the population of Rhodes was mainly Greek (37,777) with a smaller number of Muslims (4,854), and the rest (2,445) categorised as Jews and ‘others.’ Over half of these lived in Rhodes City and its environs, whilst the rest were divided amongst 44 rural villages.14 This preponderance of Greeks, or rather those who thought of themselves as Greek, was more or less replicated amongst the other islands.
This population had been outraged when the Ottoman government had re-established the 1876 constitution, since, by establishing a common citizenship, it had removed their ‘privileges’ and made them liable for conscription into the army. According to Skevos Zervos, this had been proclaimed in a telegram dated 27 July 1909, which:
[…] revoked the whole of the privileges of the Dodecanese, demanded the payment of new taxes, insisted upon the use of the Turkish language in the courts of judicature, at once imposed the obligation to serve in the Turkish armies, and endeavoured, in fine, to assimilate the islands in all respects to the other Ottoman provinces.15
The response to this was to be found in political protest and, amongst men of military age in particular, large-scale migration to Greece. There was then little disappointment amongst the majority of the population when the Italians landed and made prisoners or fugitives of the Ottoman officials and soldiers. Indeed, the Italians were welcomed as liberators throughout the islands and there was no shortage of those happy and willing to assist them. Right from the first days of the occupation Ameglio had made clear that Italy would not greatly interfere with the way of life of any of the inhabitants, provided they did not resist. On 5 May, the day the Italian forces entered Rhodes City, he had issued a decree addressed to the inhabitants stating this:
Inhabitants of the island of Rhodes! Italy, tied to you by the glorious memories and affinity of civilization, is forced by the events of the war to occupy your island. On the order of H M the King I assume the chief civil and military powers, declaring that Italy is at war with the Ottoman government and army, but considers the unarmed and peaceful population of Rhodes friendly and will ensure the utmost respect to your religious beliefs, your customs, and your traditions.16
That their former rulers were not going to be back in the near future became plain once the Ottoman forces had surrendered, not just on Rhodes but throughout the islands that Italy had captured. Whilst this process was still ongoing Ameglio issued another decree on 20 May, basically restating the Italian position as previously enunciated:
The people of Rhodes can be confident in the feelings of justice and fairness that are characteristic of the Italian Government. Do not be afraid, for respect for your religion, your families, and for your properties will be meticulously observed. Italy welcomes you under her protection, which always was and always will be a symbol of civilization and progress.17
The Muslim population in general, and those who were supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress in particular, were hostile to the occupation, but they were very much in the minority. On the other hand the Orthodox, or Greek, majority were well pleased to be rid of their Ottoman masters, seeing the Italian invasion as a means to an end. That end however was not one the Italians would necessarily subscribe to. Dr Skevos George Zervos described the assistance given to Ameglio at the Battle of Psinthos, and the reason why it was offered:
In this engagement the Rhodians preceded and guided the Italians, for whom they performed invaluable service […] risking their lives in the fighting line with dauntless bravery and the conviction that when they had driven out the Turks they would at last be free and united with Mother Greece.18
Zervos, who had been born on Kalymnos, was an eminent medical practitioner and ardent patriot in the cause of the Dodecanese; this name, from the Greek dodeca (twelve) and nesos (island), being what the Greek population called the islands under Italian occupation from now on. This section of the population already had a functioning civic society, and their leaders wasted no time in setting out their desires and expectations. On 17 June 1912 a meeting was held at the Monastery of St John the Divine on Patmos with the leaders and representatives from all the islands attending. There they convened ‘a General Assembly of the Dodecanese’ and under its auspices issued a declaration:
We hereby make known the steadfast determination of the Dodecanesian people to undergo any sacrifice rather than again fall beneath the horrible despotism of the Turks. We further proclaim the age-long national yearning of the Dodecanesians for union with their Mother Country, Greece.19
They also proclaimed the ‘Autonomous state of the Dodecanese’ sometimes referred to as the ‘Autonomous state of the Aegean Sea,’ even approving a design for a flag according to some sources; a proposal ‘strongly discountenanced by Italy.’20 Indeed, a little later Ameglio was to ban any manifestation of Greek irredentism on the grounds that it could disturb public order, and removed from office Savvas Pavlides, the elected Mayor of Rhodes, for attempting to stir up a rebellion against the Italian occupation. The new, appointed, mayor was Attilio Brizi, an Italian.21
At this time, as has been pointed out, the Italian government had only a practical interest in occupying the islands, inasmuch as they could be used as leverage to force the Ottoman government to terms. Even if this was problematical in the extreme, the archipelago being, as Bosworth described it, ‘ethnically Greek and economically valueless,’ there was no purpose beyond this other than their usefulness in helping to interdict the seaborne passage of ‘contraband of war’ to Cyrenaica.22
Unfortunately for the Italians, and as Rocca Rey had argued, the occupation of the islands had no immediate apparent effect on what the Italian government considered to be Ottoman intransigence, leaving Italy in an awkward position. The accuracy of Albert Legrand’s observation in November 1911 that the war was ‘a cruel embarrassment’ to Italian politicians was becoming ever more apparent.23 The problems were not all Italian, as the Ottoman government had troubles aplenty. To quote Childs on the matter: ‘the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of 1912 was in a state of turmoil and disarray, its government in an ever more precarious position […] further complicated by the endemic unrest in northern Albania.’24 The problems in Albania, though they had deep roots, were exacerbated by the same factors that had alienated the population that cleaved to the notion of the ‘Autonomous state of the Dodecanese.’ This led, in May 1912 to what the Austro-Hungarians termed the Malissorenaufstand – a Christian Albanian uprising.
These ongoing, and increasing, Ottoman problems in Albania would appear to have been one of the motivating factors behind a document dated 29 June 1912 and sent by Pollio to his chief, Spingardi. This ‘Memorandum Regarding our Political and Military Situation’ (Promemoria sulla nostra situazione politico-militare) contains an analysis of the ‘internal crisis’ of the Ottoman Empire with particular reference to the recent events in Albania, which Pollio saw as having ‘enormously worsened the politico-military situation of the enemy.’25 Now, he argued, was an excellent time to strike them hard because their collapse was probable in any case, and Italy could profitably exploit the opportunity. Demonstrating the degree to which Giolitti and San Giuliano kept the military and naval leadership in the dark as regards the international political situation, he also admitted that he was unaware of the situation as regards the other members of the Triple Alliance, or indeed Britain and France, and did not know the reasons behind the paralysis of ‘our action in the eastern Mediterranean.’ He also reasoned that if the Empire did not collapse, ‘through foreign gold or the support of the Powers,’ then the prolongation of the war would cause Italy ‘great damage’ and require an even greater effort in the future.
The methodology by which Italy could finally shatter the Ottoman Empire he saw as twofold; a landing of an Italian expeditionary force at Smyrna (Izmir) and the support of the Christian insurgents in the Balkans. Pollio suggested that an army of 100,000 men be landed, though raising, equipping, transporting and maintaining a force of this size would have been unworkable given the amount of effort being expended in North Africa. In any event, the proposal was politically impossible and both at the time, and later in his memoirs, Giolitti was dismissive. He wrote that such an attack would be engaging an enemy where its strength was greatest, and that ‘unfortunately there are very few who can remain immune to the particular excitement that accompanies war.’26
The navy leadership, who might have baulked at having to mount an expedition such as proposed by Pollio, were however somewhat exercised at the incipient threat posed by the Ottoman ‘fleet in being’ sheltering in the Dardanelles. Rocca Rey had, it may be recalled, expressed his concerns before the operations to take the Dodecanese regarding the extra work Italian occupation would throw upon the Italian fleet. The need to maintain a force powerful enough to deal with any Ottoman sortie, unlikely as it was, and the necessity of escorting convoys in the area took their toll, not least in the admiral’s mind. He was to argue that, despite the ‘poor state’ of its ships and the similarly depressed morale of the crews, the Ottoman squadron ‘continued to pose a threat to our command of the sea.’ Furthermore it forced Italy ‘to keep defences on the islands and a vast number of ships at sea […] at large expense, putting great strain (forte logorio) on both personnel and material. We must put an end to this state of things.’27
There was only one way to achieve this and that was to sink or disable the offending ships, which had remained at anchor at Nagara Point (Nara Burnu, Abydos) some 30 kilometres north of the entrance and about 10 kilometres above the narrows at Çanakkale following the first attempt on them on 17-18 April. The Duke of Abruzzi’s command, the ‘Division of the Torpedo-Boat Inspector,’ would furnish the means, and his chief-of-staff, Captain Enrico Millo, would lead the enterprise. Millo was summoned to Rome to discuss the matter. The plan arrived at was relatively simple; five torpedo-boats were to enter the Dardanelles under cover of darkness and attempt to travel unseen over the distance to the Ottoman anchorage. Millo hand-picked the boats and their commanders; Spica, Perseus, Astore, Climene, and Centaur, commanded respectively by Umberto Bucci, Giuseppe Sirianni, Stanislao di Somma, Carlo Fenzi and Italo Moreno, all holding the rank of lieutenant (tenente di vascello). With Millo in tactical command aboard the Spica, the attack would not be closely supported and the boats would rely on going unnoticed. General support would be afforded by the Vettor Pisani and two destroyers, the Nembo and Borea, and the eight-vessel flotilla assembled at Stampalia before sailing on 14 July for Leros (Lero). Normally each boat was commanded by two officers but on this occasion each was given a third for the mission, and a pilot.
At Leros the torpedo-boats were prepared for the attack, with extraneous equipment being removed and camouflage paint applied, before sailing north to the Ottoman-ruled, but sparsely inhabited, island of Agios Efstratios (Saint Eustratius) near Lemnos on 17 July. From this position they were around 100 kilometres from the entrance to the strait, and on the afternoon of the next day Millo led his command, escorted by the three larger vessels, northwards towards the target. At 23:30 hours the flotilla split up, with the escort remaining out of sight whilst the torpedo-boats headed towards the strait.
According to Millo’s report of the action, ‘the weather was good and the sea calm, with only a light haze on the horizon.’ He also noted that the entrance to the Dardanelles was clearly identified by searchlights at Cape Helles and Kum Kale and that despite these the boats were able to enter unobserved a little after midnight. The flotilla was arranged in line ahead, with Spica leading them in the order Perseus, Astore, Climene, and lastly Centaur. They advanced at 12 knots at first, then increased to 15 as they passed through the entrance, keeping to the Asiatic side, in order to counteract the effects of the current. At around 00:40 hours the middle boat, Astore, was however fixed by one of the two searchlights at Cape Helles and followed for several minutes, during which time the alarm was raised and gunfire directed at the intruders. This fire was inaccurate, and despite being discovered Millo decided to continue the mission:
Since the defences appeared weak, I decided to continue the reconnaissance and advance further into the straits before deciding what to do depending on the circumstances. Speed was increased to 20 knots and the boats headed towards the European side to avoid the bombardment. Many other searchlights came into action, and from the illumination provided by that at Fort Suandare I was able to see that the squadron was in an orderly line ahead with the commanders bravely leading their units in precise formation despite the enemy fire.
Incredibly the boats managed to penetrate to within about ten kilometres of the anchorage without taking any serious hits before being forced to a halt off Çanakkale at the narrows, where the lead vessel fouled an underwater obstacle.
The Spica reached at great speed the promontory of Kilid-Bahr when it was suddenly halted. The abrupt manner of the stop, and the fouling of the two propellers, led us to believe that we had run into steel cables. The commander of the Spica immediately tried to manoeuvre us off the obstacle whilst the battery at Kilid-Bahr began a rapid fire.
Under such conditions, and after achieving the intended results of the reconnaissance, but with no chance to torpedo the enemy, and knowing that the torpedo boats under my command would be destroyed by enemy short-range fire […] I therefore considered any further advance an unnecessary sacrifice of men and torpedo boats. […] I then judged it my duty to stop the reconnaissance and retreat.
Lieutenant Bucci did manage to free his boat from the obstruction and the flotilla began the return journey at high speed. Remarkably, and despite being under fire the whole way, all the craft survived the journey more or less unscathed. Millo was to report that the total damage to his command was negligible with only Spica, Astore and Perseus suffering minor hits. The other two boats were not touched and there were no injuries whatsoever to any of the personnel that undertook the mission. It will be noted that Millo’s report referred to the mission as primarily a reconnaissance, and he had made clear to his superiors beforehand that if he adjudged the attack had no prospect of success then he would withdraw and call it just that. This was greeted with derision in certain quarters. For example, Captain Arthur Courtenay Stewart, the British Naval Attaché at Rome, was scathing, arguing that to claim the mission was a reconnaissance was ‘scarcely believable as everyone already knew precisely where the Turkish fleet was!’28
Whilst the enterprise was undoubtedly hazardous, and there can be little doubt that Millo made the correct decision to withdraw after becoming caught up on the defences, it was depicted in the Italian press, and government propaganda, as a stunning victory. Alfredo Frassati, the editor of the widely circulated Piedmontese daily La Stampa, published a piece in his paper on 21 July entitled ‘Five Italian torpedo-boats advance for 20 kilometres in the Dardanelles in strong Turkish crossfire.’ To Frassati the success of the mission restored the navy to glory and expunged the memories of the Battle of Lissa:
The recent fearful suspicions both moral and strategic of the value of our navy have disappeared: we breathe freely, free from all the care cultivated over the years of waiting defenceless […] Italy’s navy has entered into [parity with those of] the great powers: it can count its sailors among the best trained and the most fearless in the world.29
Captain Enrico Millo and the Dardanelles: a graphic that featured in L’illustrazione Italiana on 24 July 1912 following the mission by five torpedo-boats six days earlier. The story it illustrated was entitled ‘The Bold Action of our Torpedo-Boats in the Dardanelles’ and even though the mission to damage or sink the enemy ‘fleet in being’ was unsuccessful, it was nevertheless depicted in the Italian press, and in government propaganda, as a stunning victory. (Author’s Collection).
Giuseppe Bevione wrote a long account of the mission in the same paper four days later, entitling it ‘The Wonderful Adventure in the Dardanelles.’ He explained that because the Ottoman fleet refused to leave its base, the torpedo boats had set out to hunt them. These vessels, he told his readers, were almost without guns, were protected only with a ‘hint’ of steel armour, and for their protection relied on speed and audacity. His description of the escape is worth recounting:
The water boiled around the torpedo boats from stem to stern, and jets of water flew high as shells fell with horrible thuds, as if volcanic eruptions were flashing inexhaustibly beneath the water […] The air was full of flashes, of flames, explosions, and splinters. Convulsive, foaming, full of glare and reflections, the sea seemed to become a huge fiery furnace. But at the zenith shone always the star of Italy.30
Such overblown rhetoric may perhaps be forgiven, or at least is understandable, coming from the same press that had done so much to bring about the conflict, and was now desperate for victories to proclaim. The politicians were also keen to talk up the affair, and Millo and his fellow officers were promoted and bemedalled. Some ten years later Giolitti was still claiming the event as a naval triumph, stating that ‘steel nets’ made an attack impossible and that ‘the retreat was conducted in perfect order, without any harm, and ensuring that the enemy did not dare to chase, although our torpedo boats were not protected by any larger ships.’31
The Ottoman response was muted because the raid coincided with a political upheaval when Sait Pasa had resigned on 17 July following the collapse of his cabinet. Indeed, and according to the British chargé d’affaires at Constantinople Charles M Marling, it was popularly believed that the whole affair was a sham engineered by the CUP. In a message of 23 July he opined that the ‘Young Turks’ would not have been averse to ‘arranging a scenic display on the Dardanelles and attempting, by the expenditure of a little gunpowder, to draw off public attention from the very tight corner in which [they] found [themselves].’32 The fact that there was political instability perhaps explains why, although the Ottoman Government improved the defences in the Dardanelles by narrowing the channels through the barricades and mine fields, they did not close the straits.
With the occupation of the islands in the Southern Sporades and Millo’s ‘reconnaissance’ the limits of Italian navalism, and its ability to influence the outcome of the conflict with the Ottoman Empire, had been reached. There were to be no further notable actions, other than the occasional exchange of fire with Ottoman coastal defences, in the eastern Mediterranean or Aegean, but in the main theatre of the war the navy continued to assist in the occupation of key points. Perhaps chief amongst these was the operation to take Misrata (Misratah, Misurata), probably the most important commercial centre in the Tripoli vilayet after Tripoli City. It was a substantial town with a population estimated at about 10,000, surrounded by a large oasis with a population calculated to be some 35,000 strong.
The amphibious operation once again involved a feint by vessels of the Training Division. On the evening of 15 June and the next morning a demonstration was made at Zliten, about 60 kilometres west of Misrata by three auxiliary cruisers, the Duca di Genova, Citta di Messina and Citta di Siracusa, accompanied by three transports. The real landing however took place on the morning of 16 June at Qasr Ahmed (Bu-Sceifa, Misurata Marina), some 12 kilometres to the east of the target, under cover of the guns of the major units of Borea Ricci’s command. The military force, aboard nine transports, was made up of a composite division under Major-General Count Vittorio Camerana drawn from formations stationed in Italy, Tripoli, Derna and Benghazi. Three regiments of infantry formed the core of his command, the 35th, 50th, and 63rd, together with the Mondovi and Verona battalions of Alpini, a battalion of the 40th Infantry, a company of the 5th Eritrean, a squadron of Lucca cavalry, and artillery and engineer support. The whole force totalled about 10,000 men, and in command of the second of the two mixed brigades (II Brigata Mista) was Major-General Gustavo Fara, the hero of the actions at el-Hani on 23 October and Bir Tobras on 20 December.
The landing was accomplished without major incident, and by the evening of 16 June a secure bridgehead had been established ashore. Easily repulsed piecemeal attacks were made on the defensive perimeter during 17 June, but Camerana had decided on remaining on the defensive for the moment and so he made no attempt to exploit the lodgement. Indeed, the next week was spent by the Italians in consolidating their position on what was a barren stretch of coast, and building up supplies there for use as a base of operations. The cavalry squadron was used for reconnaissance towards the target and surrounding areas, and reported that there was no sign of the enemy in any force. This changed on 23 June when signs of Ottoman activity in the oasis of Misrata were detected and a concerted attack by a force reckoned to have been 5,000 strong was repulsed on 2 July.
At 04:00 hours on 9 July Camerana moved over to the offensive, advancing on Misrata in three columns supported by the Training Division steaming slowly offshore. The right and centre columns advanced directly towards the town whilst that on the left, commanded by Fara, swept around it to the south with his flank protected by the cavalry. According to official Italian reports, the column closest to the coast encountered stiff resistance from the start from enemy troops entrenched on the eastern edge of the Oasis of Misrata. The centre and left-hand columns bypassed much of this resistance, though the centre column also encountered enemy forces entrenched at the village of Az Zarrug on the eastern outskirts of the town, and Misrata itself was entered and taken by 18:00 hours that evening. It took until 20 July for the oasis to be completely cleared of enemy combatants, but the final Italian casualty list, 9 killed and 121 wounded (including 4 ascari) since landing, again suggests that the fighting had not been particularly hard. The figures for Ottoman casualties are impossible to compute, the Italians as always estimated several hundred, but a strong force remained congregated at the village of Al Ghiran (Gherem) southwest of Misrata. This village was attacked by Fara on 20 July and, relatively speaking, he suffered heavy casualties with 19 killed and 87 wounded and was almost overwhelmed; a manifestation of his supposed ‘inclination to rashness’ perhaps.
In any event, with the capture of Misrata the sole port on the entire coastline of the vilayet not in Italian hands was Zuwarah. The landing at El Faru and subsequent capture of Abu Kammash on 10 April had served notice that the usefulness of this coastal village as a node in the contraband route was threatened, but it had not completely negated it as there was an alternative, parallel, route some 15 kilometres inland. Ottoman forces still retained control of the village of Bi’r Sidi Sa’id (Sidi Said), situated some two kilometres along the coast from the base of the El Faru peninsula. Retention of this position gave the holders a flanking position in respect of any move on Riqdalin (Regdalin) which sat astride the inland road.
Accordingly, on 26 June 1912 Garioni had moved in two columns on Bi’r Sidi Sa’id from Abu Kammash and the peninsula and, after three days fighting, had taken possession. The next step was the taking of Zuwarah itself, and this was accomplished on 4 August via a two-pronged assault utilising control of the sea. Escorted by the battleships of the Training Division, together with two destroyers and six torpedo-boats, a brigade strength force, 5,000 men in 6 battalions with 2 artillery batteries, under Major-General Giulio Cesare Tassoni was conveyed in seven transports and landed at a small bay some 3.5 kilometres to the east of Zuwarah. Once ashore this force began to advance on the town hoping to time its arrival to coincide with an advance from the west by a brigade under Major-General Lequio. This force had set out during the night, but despite having to traverse rough terrain, covered the 18 kilometres in good time and arrived outside Zuwarah before Tassoni’s command at about 09:00 hours. Here they halted until 13:00 hours when Tassoni arrived, and the two brigades then entered the oasis and town; both were deserted.
The last significant port in the vilayet, albeit a very small and poor one, available to the Ottoman forces had fallen into Italian hands, cutting off any kind of meaningful marine trade. The road to the south was not to remain open much longer either; on 15 August Garioni directed both brigades southwards and they occupied and fortified high ground around Riqdalin. From here the road could be interdicted and so the trade had to be moved to the southern route where the Italians could not venture.
The amphibious warfare practised by Italy was sophisticated, and the various feints and ruses employed to ensure that the landing forces met with no opposition were an essential part of it. Perhaps the landing at Rhodes was the most prominent of these, achieved as it was with minimal cost. That operation, together with the occupation of the other islands, represented, according to General Ameglio, ‘the first major and successful combined operation between the army and the navy.’33 One may quibble at that statement, inasmuch as other landings such as the Benghazi operation of 21 October under Ameglio were similar, but he did identify a major point; that of the necessity of cooperation. This had the potential to be problematical, and historical examples abound of inter-service rivalry, but Italy seems to have had little trouble in 1911-12.
The other main problem was of course tactical. The only way of getting men from transport ships to the landing beach was by putting them in small boats, usually ships’ boats but almost anything that would float could be pressed into service. Before the First World War no army or navy possessed any specialised equipment to facilitate landing operations, the first such being the British ‘Beetle.’ These were armoured and each could carry about four hundred men; ‘They have a long gangway which lets down in front to enable troops to jump ashore across deep water, the gangway acting like a drawbridge.’34
The most hazardous parts of the operation from the point of view of the attackers was when they were still in the boats and completely powerless, or, having successfully made the journey from the ships, just after landing when they are weak and exposed. If Ottoman forces were present at or near the landing site in any significant number, then they would wreak havoc on the unprotected troops, and although the guns of the warships could lend support they were of little utility against nearly invisible defenders stationed in sand dunes and the like.
Unless they had the element of surprise, Italian amphibious operations were then hazardous and likely to fail. As the famous military theorist and historian, Basil Liddell Hart, was to put it in 1939 when considering the forthcoming war with Germany: ‘A landing on a foreign coast in face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.’35 The need for surprise is an enduring principle; the modern doctrine of the US Marine Corps, whose knowledge and abilities in the matter are unrivalled, emphasises this element.36
Mostly then, through cooperation between their army and navy, combined with good intelligence and thus their use of surprise, or ‘landing where the enemy wasn’t’ as it might be termed, the Italians were successful in most of their amphibious enterprises and scored some notable achievements. However, as has been noted, the Italians never admitted to suffering any setbacks and consequently their records show no indication of overt failure. In the amphibious context it is probably the case that two operations had to be aborted because of the presence of defenders, though because of the way the Italians conducted their operations casualties were slight. Italian practice devolved around landing parties of marines or sailors to reconnoitre and, if there were no resistance, secure the beach. These were then followed by the main body of the landing force. If resistance was met, then the initial landing parties would withdraw. This is what happened at Zuwarah on 16 December 1911, though the Italians blamed poor weather. Another hazard revolved around disinformation. This is what seems to have occurred on 1 June 1912 when landing parties were lured ashore under a false pretext, at least according to Enver Pasa. His diary entry for that day is as follows:
It was reported that the Italians had landed at Susa. That would be an excellent opportunity for us. They will run up against insurmountable difficulties in the terrain and fierce resistance from the Bedouin.37
Susah (Susa) is located some 70 kilometres to the west of Derna, on the Cyrenaican coast and was described in 1854 by ‘Mediterranean Smyth’ as ‘a mere boat cove, though once the port of the potent city of Cyrene.’38 A slightly fuller account of the event was given by Enver in his entry for the following day:
The landing of the Italians at Susa went as I had hoped. A native of Derna that served the Italians as a spy, was put ashore in order to ask the Bedouin around to a meeting with the Italians, where they would be persuaded by words and deeds of Italian generosity. The local Bedouin chief sent the spy back with a message agreeing to meet. Some Italians then left the ships and came to the beach in boats. After they had landed they were immediately put under a heavy fire and flew headlong back into their boats. In response to this friendly reception, the warship fired on the coast for the rest of the day.39
Nevertheless, the majority of Italian amphibious operations were successful, and the experienced gained made the Italian armed forces skilled in this form of warfare. Indeed, until the British and French operations at Gallipoli in 1915 were undertaken, amongst the European nations it was Italy that possessed the most knowledgeable and experienced forces in the technique. Skills in the military and naval spheres could not though resolve the conflict with the Ottoman Empire in Italy’s favour, and so it remained to be seen whether Italian politicians and diplomats could succeed where force had failed.