The WikiLeaks cables that were published in 2010 provide evidence of a consistent and aggressive effort by diplomats to promote US security and corporate interests in southern Africa. For decades, colonial and white-minority regimes were portrayed as natural allies of the United States because they were staunch anticommunists at a time when black African states were forging stronger ties with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. This policy agenda is evident in Republican and Democratic administrations, and cuts across ideological lines.
In fact, the policy dates back to the early years of the Cold War, when the Truman administration cast its lot with odious but useful allies in countries such as Iran, Chile, Portugal, Guatemala, and South Africa. The overarching goal was to promote US business and security interests; human rights concerns were lesser considerations in the making of foreign policy.
During the Eisenhower administration, Richard Nixon himself toured Africa and recommended that the US support pro-business nationalists in newly independent African countries. He also argued that the US corporations in South Africa should be allowed to set policies on discrimination and inequality without government intervention. A leaked National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 39) from the early Nixon years revealed the details of his policy toward southern Africa: publicly deplore apartheid while secretly facilitating corporate and security ties. White-minority regimes were considered natural allies in the Cold War.
The series of cables under review covers the ensuing media firestorm, and documents the State Department’s efforts to counter the international blowback. The cables feature State Department officials seeking direction on how to respond to questions about US foreign policy during the Kissinger years. An October 1974 cable, for instance, covers a State Department briefing about a Washington Post article tiled “Kissinger’s First Big Tilt.” The Jack Anderson article, published on October 11, 1974, argued that Kissinger had convinced President Nixon to adopt a “secret tilt” toward white supremacist nations in southern Africa. According to Anderson, “Henry Kissinger guided president Nixon, in January 1970, along a tightrope between black and white Africa, with a secret tilt toward the white supremacist nations” [1974STATE225811_b].
The August 1969 NSC report argued that US interests in the region were not vital, but pointed out the need to contain the growing influence of the Soviet Union and China in independent Africa. “Racial oppression by minority regimes and black African opposition to it” posed two problems for US interests in the area: first, US interests in the white states affected its credibility in Africa; and, second, the prospect of increased violence, “growing out of black insurgency,” could jeopardize US interests.
It listed five foreign-policy options for the United States, ranging from disengagement to an alliance with white-minority regimes. Kissinger advocated “option two” which suggested the United States “balance its economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states with the political interests dissociating the US from white regimes and their repressive racial policies.” The report concluded: “The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them.” The policy option suggested that the US relax sanctions against white regimes to “encourage some modification of their racial and colonial policies.”
During the October 12, 1974 briefing, officials acknowledged the existence of NSSM 39 but denied that the administration had adopted “Option Two” in a “secret tilt” toward the colonial and white-minority regimes.
Questions during the briefing focused on two main issues raised by anti-apartheid activists: relations with Rhodesia and arms shipments to Portuguese Africa. Reporters grilled US officials about the implementation of United Nations–imposed sanctions on Rhodesia after its white-minority regime, led by Ian Smith, had issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. The mandatory sanctions required member states to cut diplomatic, military, and business ties with the regime. US officials argued that the US cut diplomatic relations with the white-minority regime in accordance with UN sanctions, but were unable to explain why the consulate in Salisbury remained open between 1965 and 1970.
By 1970, it had become clear that the Nixon administration would maintain the status quo in southern Africa. In line with NSSM 39’s recommendations, Nixon relaxed sanctions against Rhodesia and approved legislation allowing the importation of Rhodesian chrome.1 This policy violated UN sanctions against the UDI regime and angered both African Americans and African states.2
Nixon also continued to provide military assistance to Portugal, despite African opposition. The Africans argued that US aid would release Portuguese resources for use against liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. They also argued that Portugal had used NATO airplanes to bombard civilians in southern Africa. The Africans argued that the US had sacrificed the principle of self-determination for the sake of maintaining its rights to the Azores base, which was no longer necessary for refueling airplanes.3
At the United Nations, the US shifted to openly supporting South Africa in Security Council deliberations. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, the US frequently abstained on votes about colonial issues. After 1969, however, the US often aligned itself with South Africa and Portugal in votes against decolonization. On November 22, 1969, for instance, the New York Times reported that the United States had voted against a resolution condemning apartheid “for the first time in years.” In a change of rhetoric and policy, the US suddenly insisted that South Africa was not a threat to international peace and did not warrant sanctions. In the 1972 General Assembly, the US voted negatively on seven out of eight resolutions on southern Africa. On October 30, 1974, the US, France, and Britain vetoed a Security Council resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations. A month later, the US cast the only vote against a more stringent arms embargo.
The South African regime was grateful for the support. A 1973 cable, for instance, quotes an interview with South African prime minister John Vorster praising the Nixon administration in striking Cold War language:
During interview with South African journalist March 8, PM Vorster said SAG had cordial relations with United States and Britain. He said that notwithstanding statements which were made about these countries’ use of their influence with SA, ambassadors concerned had not meddled in South African affairs. He expressed admiration for president Nixon who, he said, deserved cooperation of all non-communist nations. He said president Nixon “has a terrific job to do,” for he carries great responsibility “on behalf of all of us in the free world.” [1973CAPET00187_b]
THE CARTER YEARS
The Carter years brought a new emphasis on human rights in US foreign policy. Carter opposed the Nixon administration’s policy of overlooking human rights abuses in countries ruled by US allies. He rejected the Nixon administration’s policy of fighting fire with fire, equating it with adopting “the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs.” He argued that this was a failed policy, “with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty.”
Carter argued that his foreign policy was based on an historical vision of the US role in a changing world: “Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind.”
These policies were reflected in Carter’s Foreign Service appointments. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance practiced affirmative action, increasing the proportion of minorities from 6 to 11 percent and of women from 10 to 14 percent in the Foreign Service. Black ambassadors, a rarity during the Nixon years, were appointed to serve all over the world, not just in black states. By the end of his term, Carter had appointed a record fourteen black ambassadors.
These changes were epitomized by the appointment of civil rights leader Andrew Young as the country’s ambassador to the United Nations in 1977.4 Diplomats at the State Department seemed to take a particular interest in Ambassador Young’s stormy career. In January 1977, Kissinger himself forwarded a summary of then-Congressman Young’s interview on Meet the Press [1977STATE000828_c].
During the interview, Young signaled strong support for “majority rule” in Rhodesia and Namibia, and in South Africa itself. According to Young, this new policy favoring majority rule was a departure from the Nixon years that he hoped would lead to a new era of cooperation with African states at the United Nations. But he rejected African calls for sanctions against South Africa, claiming that they had “seldom worked.”5
During his tenure, he was criticized for meeting with leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, supporting Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and making undiplomatic comments about South Africa.6 Young was eventually forced to resign, in 1979, after he defied protocol and met with PLO officials despite US assurances to Israel.7
This new focus on human rights and majority rule was deeply resented in South Africa. Just six months into Carter’s tenure, South African prime minister Vorster wrote Carter a letter filled with threats, innuendo, and resentment: “Over the last six months we have become convinced that your administration is determined to impose upon South Africa prescriptions for the arrangement of her internal structure which you have found to be most appropriate for the United States” [1977PRETOR06374_c]. Vorster warned that pressure for majority rule from the United States would be counterproductive and increase violence in the region. The letter alluded repeatedly to the threat of destabilization from “outside the region.”
The cables from the Carter years include a series of accounts of the administration’s support for a corporate responsibility agenda. Diplomats went out of their way to provide support to voluntary efforts by US-based companies to reduce inequality in the workplace. UN ambassador Andrew Young captured the Carter doctrine early on when he signaled that corporations would play a major role in the campaign against apartheid. The cables highlight the Polaroid Experiment, one of the earliest attempts to implement the corporate responsibility agenda [1977JOHANN03086_c]. The diplomats followed the experiment closely through media and firsthand reports. Although the Polaroid Experiment failed to improve conditions for black workers, it became a model for corporate responsibility. In one of the cables, an official named Johnson criticizes his boss, Secretary of State Vance, for expressing his support for corporate responsibility in South Africa.
There is also a particular focus on the activities of corporate responsibility advocate and General Motors director Rev. Leon Sullivan [1977STATE045121_c]. Like the Carter administration, Sullivan was opposed to economic sanctions. Instead, he advocated a series of reforms that included higher pay and training for black workers. The cables indicate open State Department support for Sullivan, a civilian who was not associated with the diplomatic service. This reformist agenda enraged an increasingly radical anti-apartheid movement that refused to accept half-measures.8
“CONSTRUCTIVE” ENGAGEMENT
The 1980s were crucial years for the anti-apartheid movement, when South Africa was embroiled in an all-out civil war. July 1985 saw the introduction of broad government powers to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely without trial, censor media organizations, put civilians under surveillance, and move populations at will. The death rate from such incidents increased fivefold, from 100 in 1984 to 500 in 1985. In 1985, the State Security Council (SSC), the most powerful security body in the country, called on the troops to gun down leaders of demonstrations.9 The South African Defense Force also conducted frequent military incursions into neighboring states that it accused of harboring dissidents and “terrorists.”
By the 1980s, most countries at the United Nations had imposed political, economic, and military sanctions on the South African regime. The exceptions were the Western countries of Britain, France, and the United States, all of which argued that sanctions would hurt black Africans most. The Reagan administration reverted to Nixon’s “tilt” toward white-minority regimes in southern Africa. Reagan’s “constructive engagement” policy was very similar to Nixon’s policy of “communication” with the white-minority regimes in southern Africa. The policy provided incentives, such as foreign investment and diplomatic support, rather than sanctions. The cables document diplomats’ efforts to defend these policies. A January 1985 cable, for instance, defends the Reagan administration’s “constructive engagement” policy [1985GABORONE97_a]. It was written in response to reports in the African press that the US was supporting South Africa’s military incursions into neighboring states.
By the mid 1980s the system of apartheid was under siege. Internally, the country was becoming ungovernable, while international pressure was relentless. In the United States, a vigorous anti-apartheid movement demanded that cities, states, pension funds, banks, and universities divest themselves of shares in companies doing business in South Africa. In 1985, Citibank announced that it would no longer provide South Africa with loans.10 Later that year, Chase Manhattan refused to roll over short-term credit, demanding that South Africa repay its debts in full. Other banks followed suit. This was a major blow to the South African economy. The country’s business community, which bore the brunt of international sanctions, was also demanding reforms. By the mid 1980s, negotiations had become inevitable. The beginning of the end came in October 1986, when the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAA) over President Reagan’s veto.11
As the campaign for majority rule gained momentum, a confidential November 1987 cable praised the South African government for releasing Govan Mbeki, a former Communist Party leader, from prison, speculating that the freeing of political prisoners was designed to create space for dialogue with moderate black leaders, and partly also an attempt to avoid the deaths of aged ANC patriarchs in prison [1987PRETORIA17012_a].
The cable stressed that the South African government was aware that the “situation was stumbling head over heels toward some sort of catastrophe,” and that a gesture of some kind was needed to “break up the momentum.” The cable concludes that the prisoner release was designed to set the stage for dialogue with “credible black leaders” such as Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha, a Zulu nationalist organization.
A subsequent secret cable discussing a November 1989 meeting between the ANC’s International Department director, Thabo Mbeki, and Assistant Secretary Warren Clark highlights the differences between the US and the ANC [1989STATE368870_a]. In a contentious meeting, Mbeki made it clear that the ANC did not consider Buthelezi a “credible black leader,” partly because of his refusal to denounce attacks on ANC activists in Natal province. Mbeki also refused to give credit to the South African president at the time, F. W. de Klerk, for ongoing reforms including the release of political prisoners. Mbeki argued that de Klerk was responding to local and international pressure.
Clark made it clear that the US would not accept language that designated the ANC as the sole representative of the South African people. He also insisted that language referring to sanctions was “unacceptable,” despite the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that had become law in 1986. Mbeki appeared to acquiesce to both US demands.
By the early 1990s, internal unrest and international sanctions brought the apartheid regime to the brink of collapse. In response, the de Klerk regime was forced to release political prisoners and legalize opposition movements such as the African National Congress. The release in February 1990 of ANC leader Nelson Mandela epitomized this momentum toward majority rule. The growing unrest and clamor for change are reflected in a March 1990 cable, for instance, that transcribes a speech delivered in Durban by the US ambassador, which vividly reflects the contentious relations between the African nationalists led by Mandela and the Bush administration. The ambassador emphasized that the US continued to oppose apartheid but vowed that the US would reject any settlement that was not acceptable to all parties [90CAPETOWN623_a]. The ambassador noted that President Bush had invited both F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela to the White House. He took time to praise de Klerk for releasing political prisoners, and called on US allies in Europe to support the South African prime minister. The speech underscores the Bush administration’s tilt toward the white-minority regime. The ambassador clearly signaled the Bush administration’s ambivalence about the US sanctions mandated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and 1988. His boss, George Bush, had opposed both pieces of legislation as vice president in the Reagan administration.
The Clinton administration established a closer relationship with South Africa. This is reflected in the diplomats’ unusual interest in Thabo Mbeki, the presumed successor to Nelson Mandela. In March 1995, for example, in a confidential intelligence assessment, the INR posited that Thabo Mbeki would probably succeed Mandela as ANC leader and thus as the next South African president [1995STATE51417_a].
The report describes Mbeki as a “moderate” but warns that “growing rifts within the ANC will increasingly test Mbeki’s leadership.” One of these rifts is between moderates, led by Mbeki and Mandela, and “party militants.” The report attributes the rise of the militants to widespread frustration over the pace of reforms. Among the “populists” named are Winnie Mandela, Peter Makoba, Bantu Holomisa, and Rocky Malebane-Metsing, who argue for a radical redistribution of resources. This message reportedly appealed to the poorest South Africans, including squatters, peasants, the unemployed, and marginalized youth.
Another confidential assessment titled “Thabo Mbeki: The Man Who Would Be President,” took an in-depth look at Mbeki’s character [1995PRETORIA5893_a]. It argued that, though Mbeki’s image “appear[ed] a bit tarnished” by his handling of scandals involving Winnie Mandela and Allan Boesak, he nonetheless remained the most likely successor to Mandela. Mbeki is described as “self-assured, articulate and charismatic,” but inefficient and ill-advised. The generally positive evaluation of Mbeki’s administration reflects the close relations between South Africa and the United States during the Clinton years. Mbeki was considered a key asset in the implementation of US foreign policy in southern Africa.
The administration of George W. Bush had a less sanguine relationship with South Africa’s leadership. A 2001 cable referred to Mbeki as “thin skinned” and questioned his judgment on the HIV/AIDS issue [2001PRETORIA1173_a]. The cable also criticizes Mbeki for failing to “speak out on human rights and rule of law violations taking place in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.” The cable reflects a growing resentment toward Mbeki’s administration, questioning his loyalty to cabinet ministers—who are described variously as “AIDS denier,” “petulant,” and “truculent.” Mbeki himself is described as inclined to “shrillness” and “defensiveness,” despite his “widely acknowledged” intelligence. The cable nonetheless recommends that Washington accommodate this “brilliant, prickly leader of Africa’s most important state.”
The Mugabe issue was a particular sticking point. By 2000, Mugabe had become the bogeyman of the Western media establishment because he stood accused of encouraging former liberation fighters to invade white-owned farms. In 2008, at the behest of the United States, Thabo Mbeki was asked to mediate, but Mbeki proved a huge disappointment to the Bush administration. He supported the African Union’s position that Mugabe was the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe and refused to throw Mugabe under the bus. These tensions are evident in Mbeki’s recent statements accusing British prime minister Tony Blair of plotting an invasion of Zimbabwe.
Another confidential cable titled “The End of the ANC Intellectual?” blames Mbeki for killing intellectualism in the African National Congress [2008PRETORIA2715_a]. According to analysts contacted by the embassy, the ANC was no longer a standard-bearer for intellectualism: “The days of Sisulu, Tambo, Mandela, Mbeki, Slovo, and Hani are over, and they have been over for a long time,” the author noted. The cable argued that many intellectuals had left party politics because of Mbeki’s “top down leadership style”—an authoritarianism seen as a threat to the ANC’s history of intellectual excellence.
This portrait of a declining ANC includes a damning assessment of a new generation of leaders, such as Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema. In an assessment of Mbeki’s successor, for instance, analysts judged that Zuma’s poor judgment in his personal and professional life raised questions about his leadership skills and effectiveness in promoting South Africa’s future foreign policy agenda. The cables argued that the ascendancy of leaders such as Malema raised questions about the party’s reputation as a fount of ideas, depicting Malema as “uneducated” and “unpolished.” Several assessments of the newly elected President Zuma depicted him as a “country bumpkin,” whose appeal was the “dumbing down of the ANC’s intellectual traditions even more than what happened under Mbeki.” They identify the emergence of a “cult of personality” surrounding Zuma as a sure indicator of anti-intellectualism in the ANC. A second risk factor identified was the struggle over “who should have access to state patronage mechanisms.”
This concern with the democratization process has continued into the Obama era. A January 2010 cable, for instance, asked whether the ANC was as “democratic” as it claimed to be [2010DURBAN3_a]. The cable examines the ruling party’s forceful ejection of slum-dwellers, in a policy eerily reminiscent of the apartheid regime. In a cable designated “unclassified, for official use only,” analysts suggested that the ANC was using tactics deployed by the apartheid regime—though conceding that the realities of development would have forced the South African government to relocate the slum-dwellers to the “rural periphery.”
In the final analysis, the cables confirm suspicions of a consistent US policy in southern Africa that cuts across ideological lines. Both Democratic and Republican governments have emphasized security and corporate interests at the expense of human rights. Even the Carter and Clinton administrations continued to prioritize corporatism, despite their attention to human rights. So far, the same can be said of the Obama years.