In a speech at the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2013, US secretary of state John Kerry declared: “the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” A nearly 200-year-old hemispheric policy conceived in theory to protect Latin America from foreign intervention but in practice used to justify countless US military invasions and deep internal meddling was, according to Kerry, a thing of the past. “The relationship that we seek,” Kerry said, “and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s about all of our countries viewing one another as equals…”1
Much of the major English-language media coverage of the WikiLeaks cables on Latin America and the Caribbean support the thesis that the Monroe Doctrine has gone out of style, and that US diplomacy in the region is, nowadays, largely benign and non-interventionist. Many of the “revelations” highlighted in news outlets have focused on US foreign service officers’ colorful and potentially embarrassing descriptions of heads of state or senior government officials. As a DC analyst told the Washington Post, the cables show “a strange preoccupation with the personal and mental health of leaders, but [do not] fit the stereotype of America plotting coups and caring only about business interests and consorting with only the right wing.”2
As this chapter will demonstrate, even a limited examination of the WikiLeaks cables on Latin America confirms that US interference in Latin American countries’ internal political affairs remains, in fact, alive and well in the twenty-first century. The arch-enemy has changed—the Soviet Union has to some degree been replaced by the specter of Venezuelan Bolivarianism—but the goal remains the same: to use every means available to support Washington’s friends and subvert its (perceived) foes.
What has evolved since the Cold War era are the mechanisms of US intervention, as the cables attest. From the early 1950s, when the CIA organized a military coup in Guatemala, to the 1980s, when the Reagan administration supported repressive military regimes with security assistance and counter-insurgency training, an alleged communist threat served to justify direct support for brutal dictatorships and the unconstitutional ousting of left-leaning governments. Starting in the late 1980s, as William I. Robinson,3 Greg Grandin,4 and other scholars have shown, Central America—particularly Nicaragua—served as a testing ground for new, softer methods of political intervention that, by the 1990s, had become standard practice.5 As democratic regimes became the rule rather than the exception in the region, the US began organizing, funding, and training political organizations and networks of “civil society” entities generally aligned with US interests through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and para-governmental organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
WikiLeaks’ cables for Latin America and the Caribbean show how US diplomatic missions coordinate closely with USAID country offices to pursue a desired course of political change. In some cases, senior US diplomats even provide direct guidance to political allies on how to cultivate a network of US-funded NGOs that can help them consolidate “civil society” support. The cables also provide evidence of the manner in which US embassies try to leverage unilateral and multilateral development aid so as to affect electoral outcomes and pressure governments into adopting acceptable policy agendas.
The cables show how US diplomats, in violation of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, have worked to unify divided political groups opposed to governments the United States does not like, sought to mobilize campaign funding in favor of political allies, and even engaged in smear campaigns against candidates they oppose. As will be seen, the language used in these cables to characterize political figures and movements—for example, “democratic” and “anti-democratic,” “good” and “bad” economic policies, and so on—reveal much more about the ideological framework within which US diplomats operate than about the actual characteristics of the people and organizations described.
As is the case with other parts of the world, the leaked cables for the region are mostly from the period between 2004 and 2009—a moment of profound political change for many Latin American countries. While soft US methods of intervention helped maintain right-wing, Washington-friendly political parties in power during the period of democratization of the 1990s, beginning in 1998 a tide of left-leaning candidates began winning elections, from the southern tip of South America to El Salvador. By 2009, the vast majority of Latin Americans—who had experienced an unprecedented economic growth failure for more than two decades6 under governments that adhered to the neoliberal “Washington Consensus”—were living under governments that explicitly rejected many of these policies.
This chapter will examine the actions, recommendations, and observations of US diplomats in five countries, four of which saw left-wing political governments elected to power, and one of which experienced a US-backed coup that was followed by political violence and repression. The methods of intervention described above are all apparent in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, where US diplomatic missions sought to undermine left-leaning candidates and governments. In Haiti, the fifth country in our study, the strategies of intervention promoted and applied by the US embassy in Port-au-Prince appear to go far beyond what we see in other countries in the region.
This study is far from exhaustive. Though many of the cables cited here have not been previously referenced in the media, several were first noticed by researchers and journalists whom we acknowledge below.
Readers may ask why the two countries of the region that have had the most antagonistic relations with the US in recent years are absent from this survey. In Cuba, unlike other countries in the region, US policies of intervention and regime change, though opaque in their implementation, are a matter of lengthy public record. In the limited space reserved for Latin America and the Caribbean in this book, we focus here on countries for which the cables help reveal less overt and less publicized interventions.
Internal intervention in Venezuela—another country that experienced a US-backed coup in 2002—will be examined in detail in the following chapter, where we will also analyze cables that show how a policy of containment toward a supposed Venezuelan “threat” shaped US relations with other countries.
EL SALVADOR
From 1979 until 1992, El Salvador experienced a bloody civil war, pitting a repressive military regime against a broad-based insurrectionary movement called the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN, by its Spanish initials). The US government provided the Salvadoran army with training and hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance, despite abundant evidence of military involvement in death squads that murdered tens of thousands of unarmed civilians.
Cables from the US embassy in El Salvador show that in recent years US policy toward that country has focused on bolstering support for the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), a far-right party linked to the former military regime and death squads, and undermining the FMLN, which demobilized and became a political party after the war, eventually winning the presidency in 2009 and 2014.
In 2004, Antonio Saca, the fourth consecutive ARENA president, was elected. The Bush administration made no secret of its support for his candidacy and its intense opposition to FMLN candidate Schafik Handal. In a call with the Salvadoran press just days before the election, the assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, Otto Reich, could not have been clearer: “We are concerned about the impact that an FMLN victory would have on the commercial, economic and migration-related relations that the United States has with El Salvador.”7 Given the country’s enormous economic dependence on the US—with 50 percent of the country’s exports going to the US and remittances from Salvadoran emigrants reaching 18 percent of GDP—these statements were bound to have an impact on voters.
Saca’s government would go on to be a key regional ally of the US, even sending troops to Iraq (the only Latin American government to do so). As the embassy cables show, to maintain this relationship, and to try to prevent the FMLN from taking office, the US would leverage its influence using aid programs and other mechanisms to support ARENA’s candidates in the 2006 legislative elections.
Six months before the 2006 national legislative elections, Michael Butler, the US chargé d’affaires in San Salvador, laid out the embassy’s strategy for supporting ARENA in a cable. He first noted:
The close US-El Salvador bilateral relationship tends to further strengthen ARENA’s hand in next spring’s elections. Newspapers have frequently publicized USAID-funded projects in housing construction for 2001 earthquake victims, potable water supplies for poor rural communities, new clinics and schools, agricultural and rural-sector development finance through USDA, and other much-needed social investment, and US assistance is widely perceived to be a benefit of postwar ARENA governments’ close relationships with the US.
…
All of these projects and the close personal relationship between Presidents Saca and Bush provide the US with multiple opportunities to continue to showcase the benefits of the relationship, and to contrast El Salvador’s democratic parties with the FMLN’s radicalism. [05SANSALVADOR2507]
In the same cable, Butler states that everything indicates that the FMLN “has little money at this time to mount a robust national campaign, and clearly cannot match ARENA’s resources,” while “Saca and his ARENA team are impressive political operatives who know how to use the power and resources of the presidency to run an effective national campaign.” Nevertheless, Butler suggests that the US provide additional support to ARENA’s campaign by moving forward with a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, or aid grant: “Signing a compact with the MCC would also help legitimize ARENA’s economic program by showing it carries concrete benefits.” Two months after Butler wrote this cable, the US administration selected El Salvador as eligible for MCC assistance.8
In the years that followed, the Salvadoran economy performed badly, with poverty increasing from 34.6 percent to 40 percent between 2007 and 2008.9 In 2009, presidential elections were held in the midst of a sharp economic downturn resulting from El Salvador’s acute exposure to the US recession. Six months beforehand, the US embassy had outlined a plan to bolster the ailing incumbent government. The strategy again involved deploying banner projects from the development-assistance arsenal, and also deliberate, if discreet, proactive measures to support ARENA. In its initial assessment of ARENA’s beleaguered campaign, a cable from US ambassador Charles Glazer to the secretary of state noted, despite the recession and prior sluggish growth:
Simply playing on the fear of economic catastrophe in the event of an FMLN victory will not win the election for ARENA, which must play up its own positive record. The country has made remarkable economic progress and ARENA should be trumpeting those advances. ARENA needs to draw a direct link between the economic ideology of FMLN and the economic freefall in Venezuela, Nicaraua [sic], Bolivia, etc. and contrast that with concret [sic] examples of successful free market economies.
Under the title “Demonstrating the Benefits of a Good Relationship,” Glazer offered an eleven-point plan designed to mobilize US assistance and clout in favor of the ARENA campaign. The points included:
•Embassy believes a well-timed editorial by the Secretary published in regional, not just Salvadoran, media, extolling our views on core principles of open markets, liberalized trade, accountable and accessible government (including judicial systems) would have a positive impact in focusing voters’ minds.
•Washington could prepare a fact sheet comparing the relative performance of the economies of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia against that of Chile, Brazil, and others, in order to highlight the benefits of the core principles to be described in the above op-ed.
…•MCC: As part of a public dipomacy [sic] push, the Embassy will highlight the large pending infrastructure investment represented b [sic] the MCC compact, though ribbon-cutting ceremonie [sic] will not be possible until early 2009, perhaps ven [sic] after the first round of presidential elections March 15. [08SANSALVADOR1133] [Emphasis added.]
As in many other cables that touch on Latin America’s new left governments, the manner in which ideology trumps basic facts in the analysis of US diplomats is readily apparent. Glazer and many of his colleagues appear oblivious to the reality that the economies of Venezuela and Bolivia had actually performed at par with or better than the more moderate governments of Brazil and Chile over the previous three years.10
Ultimately, the FMLN candidate, Mauricio Funes, won the second round of the 2009 elections by a nearly three-point margin. Before the elections even took place, embassy cables made it clear that the US strategy would consist in trying to distance Funes, a popular journalist who had only recently become an FMLN member, from the left-wing leadership of the party. On March 11, two days before the first round of elections, the embassy sent an “action request” to Secretary of State Clinton regarding next steps in the event of a Funes victory:
A concerted effort by the USG, perhaps allied with the Brazilian government, could conceivably hold Funes to a responsible center-left approach to governing, giving him the strength necessary to push back against the radical elements of the FMLN. If high-level USG attention is required, we will not hesitate to request it, starting with a post-election congratulatory call from the President. [09SANSALVADOR206]
At Funes’s inauguration, the State Department decided to deploy its biggest gun in pursuit of this strategy. Rarely do US secretaries of state attend presidential inaugurations in small developing countries, but for the historic Salvadoran inauguration of 2009—marking the first time a left-wing party had occupied the country’s presidency—the Obama administration made an exception. The reasons for Hillary Clinton’s visit are abundantly clear in the “scene-setting” cable that the embassy sent her beforehand. The cable is permeated by the fear of a Chávez-and-Castro ideological takeover:
President-Elect Mauricio Funes, who ran as a US-friendly moderate, has stated his desire to make the US and Brazil his closest allies. But he is also being pulled towards radicalism by elements in the left-wing FMLN, the party he joined in 2008 to propel his presidential candidacy. While Funes has cultivated some FMLN members to take a pragmatic approach to governing, the party’s center of gravity is still radical left, and linked to Chavez and the Castro brothers. Your very presence at his inauguration, and your comments to the new president and to the public regarding the broad and deep commitment of the USG to support El Salvador will reinforce to him: (1) that his own instincts toward pragmatism are correct; and (2) that the USG is as good as its word when we say that we don’t judge a government on its ideology, but rather on its respect for democratic values. [09SANSALVADOR445]
Later cables discuss US diplomats’ efforts to “engage and support moderates in the GOES” at the expense of “hard-line” FMLN elements “seeking to carry out the Bolivarian, Chavista game-plan [10SANSALVADOR37]. Tensions between Funes and the FMLN leadership reached a head in late 2011 and early 2012, when the Salvadoran president removed FMLN leaders from key security posts and replaced them with military officers—a controversial and arguably unconstitutional move that a senior FMLN official attributed to US government pressure.11
Five years later, when longtime FMLN leader Salvador Sánchez Cerén won the 2014 presidential elections, the Obama administration displayed no optimism about its ability to co-opt the new president, and sent a particularly low-level delegation to Cerén’s inauguration led by Maria Contreras-Sweet, administrator of the US Small Business Administration.
NICARAGUA
The last century has seen near-continuous direct intervention in Nicaragua’s affairs on the part of the United States, notably including opposition to the Sandinista government that overthrew the decades-long US-backed dictatorship in 1979. This intervention included arming and training an insurrectionary force, the “Contras,” that became infamous for its atrocities but received continued US support even after a Sandinista government was democratically elected in 1984. Opposition to this intervention within the US led Congress to cut off aid to the Contras in 1985, leading to the Iran-Contra scandal when it was revealed that the White House had continued to fund the insurgency through extra-legal means.12
Fifteen years later, with Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) poised for a political comeback at the ballot box, how would the US react? Had US policy in Nicaragua truly changed? While the language may be more diplomatic, the cables reveal a US government still working against the Sandinistas.
In November 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell dined with Nicaraguan president Enrique Bolaños in Managua, telling the press that, while the “history between the United States and Nicaragua has been mixed over the years, and I was part of an earlier era,” it was now a “brighter era” full of democracy and the rule of law that would “allow Nicaragua to play an important role, its rightful role, in Central America and in the Americas.”13
Three years later, just days before the election that would return Ortega and the FSLN to the presidency, State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack told the press: “We do not … we are not trying to shade opinion or to try to take a position. This is a democratic election. If you look around the globe, we do not take positions. We do not try to influence these elections.”14
But, as the cables reveal, the US embassy in Nicaragua had long been working to prevent an FSLN victory by channeling funds to opposition parties, warning of the possible impact on US relations, and developing “rap sheets” on leading candidates whom the US did not want to see come to power. The election was a five-way race, and it is clear from the cables that the United States backed Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), and especially opposed former president Daniel Ortega of the FSLN and José Rizo of the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC).
In May 2006, six months ahead of the elections, US ambassador to Nicaragua Paul Trivelli sent a cable to the State Department with an update on the US government’s “democracy promotion strategy”:
The USG should encourage support of democratic candidates by encouraging funds to flow in the right direction; promoting defections of salvageable individuals from the PLC camp; granting Montealegre high-profile meetings in the United States; bringing internationally recognized speakers to discuss successful reform campaigns; and countering direct partisan support to the FSLN from external forces (notably Venezuela and Cuba). [06MANAGUA1105]
Trivelli continued by noting that the embassy had been a part of “numerous discreet meetings” with Nicaraguan financiers and others on the issue of directing election funds: “We should continue to encourage Pellas and other Nicaraguan and international financiers to ‘do the right thing’ by supporting Montealegre.”
Beyond these direct mechanisms for influencing the elections, the embassy sought to highlight past abuses allegedly perpetrated by FSLN members and Arnoldo Alemán, as evidenced by another May 2006 cable Trivelli sent to the CIA, the DIA, and relevant State Department bureaus:
In preparation for the November 2006 national elections in Nicaragua, post has developed three “rap sheets” on the records of Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista party (FSLN) and Arnoldo Aleman, highlighting their systematic crimes and abuses.
…
Post intends to use the information from these rap sheets in discussions with domestic and international interlocutors as a means of reminding Nicaraguan voters and others of the true character of Aleman, Ortega, and the Sandinistas. [06MANAGUA1002]
The embassy even went so far as to bring a State Department employee to Nicaragua to “work on several high-profile human rights issues that have considerable election year significance,” as Trivelli had explained in an earlier cable [06MANAGUA599].
As the elections approached, the embassy continued to signal its preference for a non-FSLN presidency. With Ortega leading in the polls, Trivelli wrote in late September 2006:
Ambassador and other senior USG officials have made clear statements to the Nicaraguan public that, while they are of course free to chose [sic] their political leaders, their choice will have a positive or negative impact on relations with the US. Specifically, we have been clear that an administration lead [sic] by FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega could damage Nicaragua’s economy if Ortega, as he has stated, attempts to manipulate the market economy, the system of remittances, and the DR-CAFTA framework. [06MANAGUA2116]
Trivelli’s statements made it into the Nicaraguan and international press,15 and in response the OAS issued a press release “lamenting the active intervention of authorities and representatives of other nations in the Nicaraguan electoral debate.”16
Despite the embassy’s efforts, Daniel Ortega went on to win the November 2006 election. With Ortega in office, the embassy prioritized strengthening the opposition through indirect funding and organizing.
The US acts to unite the opposition
In February 2007, the embassy’s deputy chief of mission, Peter Brennan, wrote:
The Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) is in debt from its campaign commitments and urgently needs funding to maintain its momentum, enable leader Eduardo Montealegre to emerge as the uncontested leader of the opposition, and prepare for the 2008 municipal elections. [07MANAGUA493]
In a meeting with Kitty Monterrey, the ALN planning coordinator, the embassy explained that the US did “not provide direct assistance to political parties,” but—as a means of bypassing this restriction—suggested that the ALN coordinate more closely with friendly NGOs that would be able to receive US funding. Monterrey, according to the cable, “offered to forward a comprehensive list of NGOs that indeed support ALN efforts.” Brennan concluded: “Monterrey will next meet with IRI [International Republican Institute] and NDI [National Democratic Institute for International Affairs] country directors. We will also follow up on capacity building for fundraisers and continue to engage the local private sector.”
Just one month later, in a cable to the secretary of state, intelligence agencies, and aid agencies, the ambassador bluntly stated: “We need to take decisive action and well-funded measures to bolster the elements of Nicaraguan society that can best stop him [Ortega] … Without our support, our democratic-minded friends may well falter” [07MANAGUA583)]. The cable requests “additional funds over the next four years to keep our place at the table and help Nicaraguans keep their country on a democratic path—approximately $65 million above our recent past base levels over the next four years.” This should continue “through the next Presidential elections to make this work.” Among the activities to be funded were the strengthening of political parties, “democratic” NGOs, and “rapid response” funds in order to “advance our interests, and counter those who rail against us.”
Beyond simply supporting opposition parties, the embassy actively engaged in organizing a united opposition. In March 2007, Trivelli, under a section titled “Embassy Jump Starts Liberal Unity Discussions,” reported: “After splintering under the weight of mutual suspicion and recriminations, DCM hosted a cocktail to bring together members of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) to reactivate discussions on the need to forge a unified opposition to confront President Ortega’s totalitarian ambitions” [07MANAGUA616].
The US embassy appears to have wanted the Nicaraguan opposition to learn from the defeats of their Venezuelan counterparts. At the end of the meeting, the US ambassador and his staff “set the meeting back on course” by relaying the claim that a fractured Venezuelan opposition had allowed Chávez “to gain absolute control.” When members of the Nicaraguan opposition asked for the embassy to help continue negotiations between the opposition parties, a USAID democracy and governance officer offered to “assist if/as needed.”
Despite US efforts to counter Ortega’s re-emergence and unify the opposition, Ortega went on to win the 2011 election with over 60 percent of the vote.
ECUADOR
In April 2005, President Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador resigned from the presidency under popular pressure, fleeing to Brazil to seek asylum; his departure was the latest event in a nine-year period of turmoil that saw six different presidents come and go. Though the US became more critical of Gutiérrez near the end of his presidency, Ambassador Kristie Kenney outlined the US view of Gutiérrez as an “ally” in a September 2004 cable: “Despite his political vulnerability (and perhaps contributing to it), Gutiérrez is a US ally on many key issues … His growing weakness make [sic] him increasingly ineffective implementing this shared agenda. But any scenario providing for his departure is unlikely to produce a more amenable ally or a noticeably stronger (lame duck) president” [04QUITO2497].
After Gutiérrez’s departure, the US embassy “established several working groups to review US policy toward and assistance to Ecuador.” In an October 2005 cable titled “Transforming Ecuador: Action Plan for Democracy,” new ambassador Linda Jewell outlined actions to encourage “desirable political and economic change in Ecuador.” The primary objective was to “[b]ring together Ecuadorians committed to change, [and to] motivate and activate them,” in order to “[d]evelop leaders for the future” [05QUITO2416].
But soon another, more pressing issue would emerge: the rising popularity of Rafael Correa—a popular former finance minister who opposed signing a “free trade” agreement with the US and called for the closure of a US military base in the west of Ecuador: the only permanent US military outpost in South America. As the country prepared for presidential elections in late 2006, the US embassy became more concerned about a possible Correa victory. In late August 2006, Ambassador Jewell sent a cable to the secretary of state and regional embassies, warning: “While none of the candidates will return the bilateral relationship to the halcyon days when then-president-elect Lucio Gutiérrez declared himself our ‘strongest ally in Latin America,’ none of the top contenders would affect USG interests as thoroughly as Rafael Correa.”
Jewell added, bluntly, that Correa’s election would “derail any hope for more harmonious commercial relations with the United States,” and that the embassy would expect Correa “to eagerly seek to join the Chávez-Morales-Kirchner group of nationalist-populist South American leaders.” While acknowledging that “overt attempts to influence voter decisions is [sic] fraught with risk,” Jewell added: “Privately, however, we have warned our political, economic, and media contacts of the threat Correa represents to Ecuador’s future, and have actively discouraged potential alliances which could balance Correa’s perceived radicalism” [06QUITO2150].
Without an alliance to temper Correa’s “radicalism,” the US believed his chances of success were severely limited. However, as had happened in other countries that saw historic shifts to the left in the last decade, the US vastly underestimated the appeal of Correa’s message. After finishing second in the first round, Correa easily won the run-off election, with nearly 57 percent of the vote.
Despite the embassy’s fears of a Correa presidency moving Ecuador closer to Venezuela, and the negative implications that would entail for their bilateral relationship, US officials’ public statements portray a drastically different picture.17 For example, Jewell sent the following “press guidance” to the State Department in the days before the second-round vote:
Q: Will the apparent win by Correa/Noboa hurt or help US-Ecuador relations?
A: The United States has traditionally enjoyed good relations with the government of Ecuador. We look forward to maintaining a positive, cooperative bilateral relationship with the next Ecuadorian government, consistent with our commitment to Ecuador’s democratic institutions and the peace and security of its people.
Q: (If Correa wins) Are you concerned about Correa’s ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez?
A: We respect the sovereign right of the government of Ecuador to build relations with any government it chooses.
[06QUITO2894]
Acting to limit progressive change
In December 2006, before Correa had even taken office, Jewell wrote:
We are under no illusions that USG efforts alone will shape the direction of the new government or Congress, but hope to maximize our influence by working in concert with other Ecuadorians and groups who share our views. Correa’s reform proposals and attitude toward Congress and traditional political parties, if unchecked, could extend the current period of political conflict and instability. [06QUITO2991]18
It is worth noting that the eight years since Correa was elected have been one of the most politically stable periods in Ecuador’s modern history, with Correa still enjoying very high approval ratings. Here, as elsewhere in many diplomatic cables, “political conflict and instability” are code for “a government that we do not want.”
In the same cable, Jewell identifies “redlines” that “if crossed, should trigger an appropriate USG response.” A primary concern was Correa’s proposed Constituent Assembly, which could dissolve congress as part of its mandate. To counteract this, the embassy decided to “offer limited technical assistance to boost the professionalism of the new Congress,” in order to increase its favorability ratings and decrease chances that Correa could move forward with the Constituent Assembly.
In early 2007, Jewell met with banker Guillermo Lasso, who “briefed [her] on a systematic effort he is coordinating to develop a cohesive private sector response to the Correa administration’s policy.” The embassy told their contacts that they needed to reach a consensus and offer a responsible alternative to Correa as “a necessary pre-condition before any international engagement can be truly effective.” Days later, in another meeting Jewell describes, the embassy’s economic counselor met with the president of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, María Gloria Alarcón, who outlined “how the business sector plans to address Correa’s call for a Constituent Assembly.” Alarcón stated that “whomever the business community decides to support will ‘have a lot of money’ to support their campaign.” This cable reveals that the embassy saw business support as a potential way to “balance” the “competing interests” behind the Constituent Assembly [07QUITO768].
Despite the efforts of the US embassy, voters approved the proposal for a Constituent Assembly with 80 percent of the vote, and gave Correa’s party a majority of the seats in the assembly. The new constitution—which contained numerous progressive initiatives, such as enshrining the rights of nature, treating drug abuse as a health issue, and food sovereignty—was approved with 64 percent of the vote.19 While the US ultimately proved unsuccessful in preventing Correa’s rise, the cables reveal the embassy’s clear intention to thwart the public’s will.
The concerns of the United States about Correa, and its activities against Ecuador’s progressive movement, did not end with the election of President Obama, however. In January 2009, Ambassador Heather Hodges wrote: “Over the past two months, Correa has taken an increasingly leftist, anti-American posture, apparently unconcerned that his actions would result in frayed ties with the United States.” Hodges discussed the leveraging of US aid funds in order to influence Correa:
[W]e are conveying the message in private that Correa’s actions will have consequences for his relationship with the new Obama Administration, while avoiding public comments that would be counterproductive. We do not recommend terminating any USG programs that serve our interests since that would only weaken the incentive for Correa to move back into a more pragmatic mode. [09QUITO15]
The Obama administration proved no more hesitant than its predecessor to intervene in Ecuador’s internal affairs when it decided that such intervention would advance their goals for Ecuador or the region. In March 2009, the Ecuadorian government expelled US official Mark Sullivan, accused by Correa and others of being the CIA station chief in Quito, following Sullivan’s alleged role in suspending US assistance to a special investigative police unit after rejecting the Ecuadorian government’s choice of chief for the unit. Correa also accused Sullivan and other embassy officials of seizing computers belonging to the unit that contained valuable national security information. Surprisingly, the State Department failed to carry out any retaliatory measures, a fact that—for many Ecuadorians—seemed to confirm that Sullivan was indeed a CIA agent. Embassy memos from this period registered frustration and dismay with the situation:
9. (C) The public relations dynamic in Ecuador is not working in our favor. Correa’s continued condemnation of US Embassy actions, combined with our lack of response since the Department statement on February 19, have led many Ecuadorians to conclude that US Embassy officials were caught doing wrong and deserved expulsion. [09QUITO176]
In late 2009, embassy staff met with local representatives of large US pharmaceutical companies to discuss Correa’s plans to enact compulsory licensing laws—which are legal and legitimate under the rules of the World Trade Organization—and encourage local production of pharmaceutical drugs [09QUITO998]. The companies worked in concert with the embassy and some dissident Ecuadorian ministers to thwart the plans. Hodges wrote: “Local representatives of US and other international R&D pharmaceutical companies have identified and been in contact with potentially sympathetic ministries … these ministers have tried to explain to Correa the potential negative implications for economic development and the health system of issuing wholesale compulsory licenses” [09QUITO893].
The cable notes that the health minister was even “looking into financial irregularities and business dealings of some of the local producers in an attempt to gain some leverage…” Despite the fact that Ecuador’s proposed changes were compliant with World Trade Organization rules, the US warned that trade preferences under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and the Generalized System of Preferences would be jeopardized if the government went ahead with its plans, and that the proposal represented “a serious problem” for bilateral relations.
In April of 2010, Ecuador granted its first compulsory license for an HIV/AIDS drug.20 By 2011, 54 percent of people with advanced HIV infection had received antiretroviral therapy coverage, up from just 30 percent in 2009, according to the World Bank.21
Relations between Ecuador and the US grew increasingly tense in the years that followed. In September 2010, an attempted coup took place when hundreds of national police kidnapped President Correa for ten hours, then shot repeatedly at the vehicle transporting him as he was being rescued by an elite military unit. An investigative commission created by the government asserted that “foreign actors” had played a role in the coup, and one of the three commissioners told the press that he believed the US Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency were involved.22
In April 2011, Correa expelled US ambassador Heather Hodges when the Ecuadorian press broke the story of a WikiLeaks cable signed by Hodges stating that Correa tolerated corruption in the national police force.
BOLIVIA
Cables show that, among South American leaders, Evo Morales—after Chávez—has probably been the most strongly opposed by the US government since his election in 2005. Morales’s electoral victory represented a seismic shift in Bolivia’s history—he is the country’s first indigenous president—and cables show that some foreign governments perceived him as “Bolivia’s Mandela.” His triumph at the ballot box by an unprecedented margin23 came after a string of unpopular predecessors (one, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, notoriously spoke Spanish with an American accent).
As embassy cables reveal, the US government was antagonistic toward Morales from the beginning, referring to him derisively in a State Department background note in 2005, for example, as an “illegal-coca agitator.”24 This attitude continued even after Morales took office.
On January 3, 2006, just two days after Morales’s inauguration as president, the US ambassador made clear that multilateral assistance to Bolivia would hinge on what the embassy would subsequently refer to as the “good behavior” of the Morales government:
[The ambassador] also showed the crucial importance of US contributions to key international financial [sic] on which Bolivia depended for assistance, such as the International Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. “When you think of the IDB, you should think of the US,” the Ambassador said. “This is not blackmail, it is simple reality.”
…
“I hope you as the next president of Bolivia understand the importance of this,” he said, “because a parting of the ways would not be good for the region, for Bolivia or for the United States.” [06LAPAZ6] [Emphasis added.]
Unfortunately for the US Department of State, the Morales government would quickly show that it was not interested in a new IMF agreement25—an unprecedented stance from a country that had been under IMF agreements for virtually all of the preceding twenty years, and a clear signal to Washington that this was a government determined to be more independent than its predecessors.
A few weeks later, Ambassador David Greenlee explicitly laid out a “carrots and sticks” approach to the Morales administration. Many of these related to Bolivia’s relationship with the IDB or to the existing preferential trade arrangement with the US, the ATPDEA:
4. (C) Dealing with the MAS-led government will require a careful application of carrots and sticks to encourage good, and to discourage bad, behavior and policy.
…
[I]t may be important to send clear signals early on, shots over the bow, that it will not be business as usual. A menu of options that could be used depending on circumstances and that would resonate clearly include:
•Use USG’s veto authority within the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations (from which Bolivia currently receives all its IDB funding) to withhold IDB funding for Bolivia, estimated by the IDB Resrep in Bolivia to total $200 million in 2006.
•Postpone decision on the forgiveness of IDB debt (approximately $800 million under the Fund for Special Operations and $800 million under the IDB’s regular program) pending clarification of the new GOB’s economic policies.
•Pursue a postponement of the World Bank’s vote on debt relief for Bolivia. Request a 6-month delay, pending a review of the GOB’s economic policies.
•Disinvite GOB participation as observers at future Andean FTA events, pending clarification of the new GOB’s interest in participating in the FTA.
•Discourage GOB interest in pursuing dialogue on a possible MCC compact.
•Deny GOB requests for logistical support by NAS aircraft and equipment, except in cases of humanitarian disasters.
•Stop material support (tear gas, anti-riot gear, and other assistance) for Bolivia’s security services.
•Announce USG intention to not extend the ATPDEA trade benefits beyond the December 31, 2006 expiry date.
[06LAPAZ93]
“Many USAID-administered economic programs run counter to the direction the GOB wishes to move the country,” the cable also noted.
Supporting a violent opposition
Cables and much other evidence reveal that the US government supported a violent opposition movement in Bolivia. The US sought to redefine power relations in Bolivia—to the advantage of regional governments and the detriment of the central government—and used USAID to further this goal: “US assistance via USAID continues at previous levels, but the focus of assistance has shifted from the central government to Bolivia’s prefects and other decentralized players”26 [06LAPAZ1952] [Emphasis added.]
Significant support was allocated to the opposition-based departments of the “Media Luna,” an eastern “crescent” comprised of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, where the majority of Bolivia’s important natural gas deposits lie.27 A cable from April 2007 describes “USAID’s larger effort to strengthen regional governments as a counter-balance to the central government” [07LAPAZ1167]. A USAID report from 2007 stated that “OTI has approved 101 grants for $4,066,131 to help departmental governments operate more strategically.”28 A year later, the Media Luna departments would feel sufficiently emboldened to hold referenda on autonomy—despite these having been ruled illegal by the national judiciary.
As this later cable shows, the US embassy in La Paz shared a common political strategy with opposition groups—some of which were pursuing an actual separatist goal—versus the Morales government:
In a March 27–28 outreach trip to Santa Cruz, A/DCM met briefly with the Prefect (Governor), new Civic Committee President, business leaders, leaders in the forestry sector, a media owner, and the Cardenal. While they understand there are limits to what the US can do to reverse antidemocratic trends in Bolivia, they are grateful for continued US engagement. [09LAPAZ501] [Emphasis added.]
Support for departmental governments became, whether intended or not, wrapped up with support for a violent, destructive campaign against the Morales government in the later months of 2008.29
When a full-blown political crisis emerged in August and September 2008, there was no public indication that the US government attempted to temper the opposition, and at no point did the US denounce the opposition violence as did, for example, the Union of South American Nations.30
Following weeks of violence (in the worst incident, over a dozen indigenous Morales supporters were killed in Porvenir, in Pando province, apparently by a far-right militant group), property destruction (including the ransacking of government offices and the sabotage of a gas pipeline), and road blockades, there was hope that dialogue between the Morales government and the opposition would resolve the crisis. But this cable from September 18, 2008, shows that the opposition preferred a hard line that they did not expect the Morales government to accept, and opposition prefects and the central democratic opposition coalition (CONALDE) “were in agreement” that the “next stage” would be “to blow up gas lines.” The cable does not describe US officials attempting to dissuade the opposition figures from this strategy:
7. (C) Opposition Strategist Javier Flores told Emboff the morning of September 17 that the dialogue will break down, “it’s only a question of when.” Flores and opposition civic leader Branko Marinkovic predict more violence after the dialogue fails. Some radicals in the Santa Cruz prefecture and Santa Cruz civic committee reportedly wanted to stop the process yesterday and begin blowing up gas lines, but Flores and Marinkovic advocated playing out the dialogue option first. Once dialogue breaks down, however, the opposition group CONALDE is generally in agreement that the next stage is to blow up gas lines. [08LAPAZ2004]
Similarly, a cable from September 9 shows that “both [Pando prefect Leopoldo Fernández] and also Tarija’s opposition Prefect, Mario Cossio see violence as a probability to force the government to admit to the divisions in the country and take seriously any dialog” [08LAPAZ1931]. Fernández was arrested a week later in connection with the Porvenir massacre two days after this cable, on September 11.31
Despite a lack of public commentary from US officials to this effect at the time, cables reveal that internally the State Department took seriously the possibility of Morales’s ouster or assassination in 2008. “Sources report that both sides are armed with personal weapons and ready to fight, with the opposition-aligned Santa Cruz Youth Union and university students reportedly preparing a trap for the government forces which could lead to a bloodbath,” noted a secret cable of September 24, 2008, describing how the Emergency Action Committee would “develop, with [US Southern Command Situational Assessment Team], a plan for immediate response in the event of a sudden emergency, i.e. a coup attempt or President Morales’ death” [08LAPAZ2083].32
Fed up with US support for people and groups working to violently overthrow it, the Morales government declared US ambassador Philip Goldberg persona non grata on September 10, 2008, and expelled him. USAID’s lack of transparency regarding whom it was funding in Bolivia had contributed to the breakdown in relations; Bolivian officials had repeatedly requested the information, to no avail. Cables from 2007 describe the anger of the minister of the presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, at the secretive nature of USAID’s programs [07LAPAZ2387]. US researchers also sought the release of USAID and related documents; by the time of the September 2008 events, three-and-a-half-year-old Freedom of Information Act requests remained unanswered. The US continued to send hundreds of millions of dollars to unnamed recipients in Bolivia via USAID after 2009.33 Ultimately, in 2013, Bolivia expelled USAID as well.
In 2004, the US flew democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide out of Haiti in what, for all practical purposes, was a rendition flight enacting a coup d’état. US marines were dispatched to Haiti for “peacekeeping” purposes, even though it was paramilitary death squads—some of them former CIA assets who had participated in the 1991 coup and subsequent murders—who were responsible for the great majority of the violence at the time.34 A “peacekeeping” force under the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would replace the marines a few months later.
Embassy cables shed light on how committed the US has been to opposing popular movements in Haiti and ensuring a strong military presence in the country to keep the populace in check.35 Although the interests of foreign investors may be part of this commitment,36 as shown by US opposition to minimum-wage increases, it appears that US intervention in Haiti is more driven by the aim of incorporating Haiti into its strategic plan for the hemisphere. Unlike in other countries, US efforts in Haiti have been aided in recent years by a “coalition of the willing” of other countries.
The cables illuminate the value that the US government sees in MINUSTAH, and why it has been a priority for US policy toward Haiti. In turn, they also offer insight into why UN “peacekeepers” remain in Haiti despite the lack of a civil war or other ongoing armed conflict. An October 2008 cable by then ambassador Janet Sanderson explains:
The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG policy interests in Haiti. Security vulnerabilities and fundamental institutional weaknesses mean that Haiti will require a continuing—albeit eventually shrinking—MINUSTAH presence for at least three and more likely five years.
…
MINUSTAH is a remarkable product and symbol of hemispheric cooperation in a country with little going for it. There is no feasible substitute for this UN presence. It is a financial and regional security bargain for the USG. USG civilian and military assistance under current domestic and international conditions, alone or in combination with our closest partners, could never fill the gap left by a premature MINUSTAH pullout.
[08PORTAUPRINCE1381] [Emphasis added.]
The cable goes on to emphasize the role MINUSTAH plays in the US “management” of Haiti, and in getting Latin American countries to participate:
In the current context of our military commitments elsewhere, the US alone could not replace this mission. This regionally-coordinated Latin American commitment to Haiti would not be possible without the UN umbrella. That same umbrella helps other major donors—led by Canada and followed up by the EU, France, Spain, Japan and others—justify their bilateral assistance domestically. Without a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping and stabilization force, we would be getting far less help from our hemispheric and European partners in managing Haiti. [Emphasis added.]
MINUSTAH, the cable reveals, also helps the US to address other Haiti priorities, such as preventing Haitian “boat people” from coming to the US, and holding back “populist” groups: “A premature departure of MINUSTAH would leave the Preval government or his successor vulnerable to resurgent kidnapping and international drug trafficking, revived gangs, greater political violence, an exodus of seaborne migrants, a sharp drop in foreign and domestic investment, and resurgent populist and anti-market economy political forces—reversing gains of the last two years” (emphasis added).37
Other cables provide a more chilling look at the role MINUSTAH troops have played at the urging of the US government and Haiti’s elite. As has been well documented,38 MINUSTAH assisted in targeting members of the Fanmi Lavalas political party (headed by Aristide) and its base of support in impoverished communities. Thousands of people were killed in the two years following the 2004 coup, many targeted for political reasons.39 One cable from January 2006 describes a business leaders’ meeting with then US chargé d’affaires Tim Carney, in which the business group requested additional ammunition for police (who were gunning down civilians at the time) and for MINUSTAH to “take back” the Cité Soleil neighborhood (a stronghold of Aristide support). Carney, according to the cable, acceded to these elites’ requests even though he recognized it would “inevitably cause unintended civilian casualties”—something human rights attorney Dan Kovalik says “would be a knowing and premeditated violation of the Geneva Conventions,” as well as a “war crime” and a “crime against humanity”:40
Leaders of the Haitian business community told Charge that they would call a general strike for Monday, January 9 to protest MINUSTAH,s [sic] ineffectiveness in countering the recent upswing of violence and kidnappings. Representatives will also meet with [special representative to the UN secretary general] Juan Gabriel Valdez to pressure him to take action against the criminal gangs. They also pleaded with the Charge for more ammunition for the police. Charge told the group to be ready to assist Cite Soleil immediately after a MINUSTAH operation, if it were to take place, and countered that the problem of the police was not [a] lack of ammunition, but a lack of skills and training. Clearly, the private sector is worried about the recent upsurge in violence.
5. … Representatives of the private sector will also meet one-on-one with UNSRSG Juan Gabriel Valdez to pressure him personally to take action against the criminal gangs in Cite Soleil. [President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Reginald] Boulos argued that MINUSTAH could take back the slum if it were to work systematically, section by section, in securing the area. Immediately after MINUSTAH secured Cite Soleil, Boulos said that he and other groups were prepared to go in immediately with social programs and social spending. NOTE: Boulos has been active in providing social programs in Cite Soleil for many years. END NOTE.
6. (SBU) The Charge cautioned that such an operation would inevitably cause unintended civilian casualties given the crowded conditions and flimsy construction of tightly packed housing in Cite Soleil. Therefore, the private sector associations must be willing to quickly assist in the aftermath of such an operation, including providing financial support to families of potential victims. Boulos agreed.
[06PORTAUPRINCE29]41 [Emphasis added.]
As journalist Kim Ives has noted, one cable from June 2005 about a meeting between US and Brazilian officials states that then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice had called “for firm Minustah action and the possibility that the US may be asked to send troops at some point.” Ives writes: “Less than a month after these meetings, on 5 July 2005, a browbeaten [MINUSTAH military commander Brazilian General Augusto] Heleno would lead Minustah’s first deadly assault on the armed groups resisting the coup and occupation in Cité Soleil.”42 A State Department cable (released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request) describes MINUSTAH firing 22,000 shots in just seven hours in this raid.43 Dozens of people, including several small children, were killed.44 Similar raids on Cité Soleil were carried out in the following months.45
Cables also reveal that MINUSTAH participated in other political activities, such as spying on student groups,46 and that it sought to keep Aristide from returning from his exile in South Africa. The US government did as well: “Ambassador and PolCouns also stressed continued USG insistence that all efforts must be made to keep Aristide from returning to Haiti or influencing the political process, and asked whether the GOB also remains firm on that point” [05BRASILIA1578] (emphasis added).
In the Nation, Ives and Herz have dissected a 2005 cable that describes US efforts to enlist other countries (in this case, France) in pressuring the South African government to block Aristide’s attempt to leave South Africa and return to Haiti.47 The Haiti policies of the Bush era have continued into the Obama era, with Obama calling South African president Jacob Zuma in a last-ditch attempt to stop Aristide’s return to Haiti,48 and MINUSTAH remaining in Haiti with US support, despite growing popular opposition to its presence.