Penkovsky arrived in Ankara in the summer of 1955 accompanied by his wife Vera.

As acting military attaché he was invited to numerous official receptions and made courtesy visits to senior defence personnel in other embassies. His pay and allowances were decent by Eastern European standards and he soon started to enjoy his new lifestyle. His engaging personality made it easy for him to establish an easy rapport with Western representatives.

He struck up a particularly warm relationship with Colonel Charles Peeke, the United States military attaché. He may also have had conversations with Anthony Parsons, First Secretary at the British Embassy, who was then on his first overseas posting as a diplomat, having previously spent fourteen years in the army, culminating in his tenure as military attaché at the British Embassy in Baghdad.†

Diplomatic niceties aside, Penkovsky worked diligently at his prime task of managing the small network of part-time agents and informants with access to intelligence on United States and NATO personnel and military establishments in Izmir and other parts of Turkey. He excelled at this work, building strong personal relationships with contacts he had inherited from his predecessor and winning over additional talent. His attention to detail in arranging dead-letter drops and other secret communications was of the highest professional standard. However, the more he learned about military transportation, weapons, deployment and plans for defence and attack, the more he grew to question the overall direction of the Cold War.

It could well have been about this time that the first thoughts of helping the West to understand the full dangers of Khrushchev’s hawkish attitude entered Penkovsky’s head. If he made any tentative approaches to Peeke, Parsons or anyone else they were not taken seriously enough to attract follow-up action, or they may have suspected him of being an agent provocateur.

Penkovsky contrived to have his photograph taken with Colonel Peeke at a social gathering and later used this photograph as evidence of his friendship with the West.

General Nicolai Petrovich Savchenko and Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolay Ionchenko arrived in Ankara together on 20 January 1956. The 63-year-old Savchenko used the pseudonym ‘Rubenko’. He was the new GRU chief in Ankara, with Penkovsky assuming the second-in-command position. Ionchenko was also GRU and ranked below Penkovsky.

It was natural that Penkovsky would be upset that his comfortable situation as the acting GRU Rezident in Ankara had come to an end, but Savchenko soon proved to be – at least in the eyes of Penkovsky – not up to the task, while Ionchenko, in turn, resented Penkovsky’s seniority. Savchenko and Ionchenko had become good friends in Moscow and en route to Ankara; so much so that Penkovsky felt they often conspired against him, trying to find fault in the way he toed the party line.

Despite the deteriorating office atmosphere, Penkovsky focused on executing his professional duties to the best of his ability. He was not a man to lower his standards or neglect his work.

As Penkovsky’s subordinate, Ionchenko was obliged to submit requests for operational funds and expenses to his office. As such, in April, Penkovsky realised that Ionchenko was buying military manuals and other confidential information from Turkish soldiers with a distinct lack of subtlety. This was, to say the least, an unprofessional means of collecting intelligence as Ionchenko could easily have been caught red-handed by the host counterintelligence agency. Penkovsky made this point to Savchenko, who promised it would not happen again.

This incident stirred Penkovsky to write to headquarters, requesting a transfer. Anywhere would do, as long as it freed him from Ankara and Savchenko. An unsympathetic official reply instructed him to remain in post and await a later transfer. Penkovsky would later confess that it was this incident that finally triggered his decision to offer his services to the Western powers.

The Shah of Persia and his wife were scheduled to make an official visit to Turkey during the second week in May 1956. As Turkish security would be on high alert the GRU headquarters sent instructions to Savchenko not to participate in any espionage-related activities during the visit.

On 10 May Penkovsky was in Savchenko’s office on routine business when an embassy official knocked on the door and came in. He reported that the Turkish police had called to say that Ionchenko was being held on a charge of buying a classified military manual from a Turkish soldier.

Savchenko shouted at Penkovsky, trying to blame him for the incident, and instructed him to arrange for Ionchenko’s release. Penkovsky argued that he had not advanced Ionchenko any money and denied all responsibility. In the end Savchenko had to acknowledge that he had, in fact, authorised Ionchenko’s operation. An almighty row erupted between the embarrassed Savchenko and Penkovsky, who had, after all, drawn his boss’s attention to the problem.

Penkovsky rescued Ionchenko from the clutches of the Turkish authorities, but they declared him persona non grata and he returned to Moscow. His Turkish accomplice, a lieutenant in the Turkish Army, was found guilty of selling state secrets to an enemy and executed.

Savchenko sent a report of the incident to Moscow. It claimed that Ionchenko had been the victim of a conspiracy hatched by US and Turkish intelligence. He was, Savchenko claimed, innocently buying some fruit in the market when he was pounced upon by the Turkish police and accused of spying. Savchenko also sent a telegram accusing Penkovsky of ‘gross insubordination’ over the matter.

Savchenko had full control over the content of all GRU signals sent from the embassy to Moscow, so Penkovsky could not report his side of the story directly to GRU headquarters. It was not in his character to accept this situation, so he took the drastic step of reporting his side through Colonel Yerzin, the KGB Rezident in the Soviet Embassy. In spite of the normal mistrust between the GRU and the KGB, Penkovsky and Yerzin had become good friends over the preceding six months.

In official parlance the GRU referred to the KGB as ‘our neighbours’ and the KGB referred to the GRU as ‘our military neighbours’. There were strong jealousies between the two, sometimes boiling over into hostility. It was virtually unheard of for one of them to send a report through the other.

Yerzin addressed the cable directly to Ivan Serov, the head of the KGB. Serov reported the incident to Khrushchev, since all cases of compromised intelligence officers were brought to the attention of the Politburo. Savchenko’s cable arrived about the same time. Khrushchev demanded an investigation to find out which of the two (Penkovsky or Savchenko) was telling the truth, or, at least, approximating it.

General Savchenko was given a severe reprimand by the Minister of Defence, Georgy Zhukov. Penkovsky received no such official chastisement. The two men tolerated each other, mostly in silence, for the next few months.

In October and November of that year the abortive anti-Soviet revolution in Hungary dominated headlines and news broadcasts around the world. Penkovsky was an avid fan of the BBC Overseas Service programmes beamed to Turkey through a powerful relay station on Cyprus. Through those chaotic weeks he also enjoyed access to the embassy’s mail, much of it made up of government telegrams explaining the official stance of the USSR regarding events in Hungary, a stance that shifted several times before an eventual military crackdown. The bullying tactics of the Soviet Union and the repression of the new Communist government it imposed on Hungary (still nominally a sovereign state) distressed him and further reinforced his intention to work for the West. He was sorry for the people of Hungary but pleased, in the interests of world peace, that the West’s denunciation of the Soviet Union’s aggressive action was muted.

A week before he left Ankara, Penkovsky tried to contact Colonel Peeke, only to be told that he had returned to America with his wife for the funeral of his mother-in-law and could not be contacted.

Penkovsky left on 6 November 1956. Savchenko was removed shortly afterwards and was later discharged from the service.

Penkovsky had an interview with General Smolikov, the GRU’s chief of personnel, on his return to Moscow. Smolikov told him he was right, in principle, to denounce Savchenko. In practice, he pointed out, the price of such principled action was high: Savchenko was a general and not many generals would be prepared to trust or work with him after such action.

Penkovsky was put on the reserve list and given temporary assignments at headquarters pending a suitable vacancy arising. He was disappointed at the outcome, but not surprised. He went to see Marshal Varentsov, told him about his recent differences with the GRU, and said he would like to return to a regimental command in the artillery. Varentsov claimed he would try to intercede on his behalf.

† Anthony Derrick Parsons, later Sir Anthony Parsons, was awarded the Military Cross as an artillery officer during WWII. His career as a diplomat, spent mostly in the Middle East, was equally successful. He became Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser after retiring from the Diplomatic Service.